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HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

REPORT
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ON
FOREIGN
RELATIONS
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HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

REPORT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

UNITED STATES SENATE,

WITH ACCOMPANYING TESTIMONY,

AND

EXECUTIVE DOCUMENTS

TRANSMITTED TO CONGRESS

FROM JANUARY 1, 1893, TO MARCH 10, 1894.

*U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on
foreign relations.*
SUBJECT INDEX.

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MESSAGE

FROM THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

IN RESPONSE

To Senate resolution of February 4, 1893, relative to the draft of an uncompleted treaty with Hawaii.

FEBRUARY 6, 1893.—Read, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and ordered to be printed.

To the Senate:

I transmit herewith, as desired by the resolution of the Senate of the 4th instant, a report from the Secretary of State of the 6th instant, with its accompanying correspondence, in relation to the draft of an uncompleted treaty with Hawaii, made in 1854.

BENJ. HARRISON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, February 6, 1893.

The PRESIDENT:

The Secretary of State, to whom was referred the resolution of the Senate of the 4th instant requesting the President, "if in his opinion it is not inconsistent with the public interests, to send to the Senate the draft of a treaty, negotiated in 1854, but not completed, between the plenipotentiaries of the United States and the Kingdom of Hawaii, with the correspondence between the two Governments relating to said negotiation," has the honor to transmit herewith a copy of the draft in question, together with copies of the correspondence referred to.

Respectfully submitted.

JOHN W. FOSTER.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 6, 1893.

[For accompanying papers see page 929.]

MESSAGE

FROM THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

TRANSMITTING

Correspondence respecting relations between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands from September, 1820, to January, 1893.

FEBRUARY 17, 1893.—Read, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and ordered to be printed.

To the Senate:

I transmit herewith a letter from the Secretary of State of the 15th instant, covering a report with accompanying correspondence respecting relations between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands from September, 1820, to January, 1893.

BENJ. HARRISON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, February 16, 1893.

The PRESIDENT:

In further relation to the subject, and as being of interest in conjunction with the papers submitting the treaty concluded and signed at Washington on the 14th of February, instant, and sent to the Senate with a message on the 15th instant, the undersigned, Secretary of State, has the honor to submit the accompanying report by Andrew H. Allen, chief of the Bureau of Rolls and Library of this Department, upon the relations between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands from 1820 to 1893, supplemented by an appendix and copies of considerable correspondence involved in the narrative.

This report shows that from an early day the policy of the United States has been consistently and constantly declared against any foreign aggression in the Kingdom of Hawaii inimical to the necessarily paramount rights and interests of the American people there, and the uniform contemplation of their annexation as a contingent necessity. But beyond that it is shown that annexation has been on more than one occasion avowed as a policy and attempted as a fact. Such a solution was admitted as early as 1850 by so far-sighted a statesman as Lord Palmerston when he recommended to a visiting Hawaiian commission the contingency of a protectorate under the United States or

of becoming an integral part of this nation in fulfillment of a destiny due to close neighborhood and commercial dependence upon the Pacific States.

Early in 1851 a contingent deed of cession of the kingdom was drawn and signed by the king and placed sealed in the hands of the commissioner of the United States, who was to open it and act upon its provisions at the first hostile shot fired by France in subversion of Hawaiian independence.

In 1854 Mr. Marcy advocated annexation and a draft of a treaty was actually agreed upon with the Hawaiian ministry, but its completion was delayed by the successful exercise of foreign influence upon the heir to the throne, and finally defeated by the death of the king, Kamehameha III.

In 1867, Mr. Seward, having become advised of a strong annexation sentiment in the islands, instructed our minister at Honolulu favorably to receive any native overtures for annexation. And on the 12th of September, 1867, he wrote to Mr. McCook, "that if the policy of annexation should conflict with the policy of reciprocity, annexation is in every case to be preferred."

President Johnson in his annual message of December 9, 1868, regarded reciprocity with Hawaii as desirable, "until the people of the islands shall of themselves, at no distant day, voluntarily apply for admission into the Union."

In 1871, on the 5th of April, President Grant in a special message significantly solicited some expression of the views of the Senate respecting the advisability of annexation.

In an instruction of March 25, 1873, Mr. Fish considered the necessity of annexing the islands in accordance with the wise foresight of those "who see a future that must extend the jurisdiction and the limits of this nation, and that will require a resting spot in midocean between the Pacific Coast and the vast domains of Asia, which are now opening to commerce and Christian civilization." And he directed our minister "not to discourage the feeling which may exist in favor of annexation to the United States," but to seek and even invite information touching the terms and conditions upon which that object might be effected.

Since the conclusion of the reciprocity treaty of 1875, it has been the obvious policy of the succeeding administrations to assert and defend against other powers the exclusive commercial rights of the United States and to fortify the maintenance of the existing Hawaiian Government through the direct support of the United States, so long as that Government shall prove able to protect our paramount rights and interests.

On December 1, 1881, Mr. Blaine, in an instruction to the American minister at Honolulu, wrote:

It [this Government] firmly believes that the position of the Hawaiian Islands, as the key to the dominion of the American Pacific, demands their benevolent neutrality, to which end it will earnestly coöperate with the native government. And if, through any cause, the maintenance of such a position of benevolent neutrality should be found by Hawaii to be impracticable, this Government would then unhesitatingly meet the altered situation by seeking an avowedly American solution for the grave issues presented.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
February 15, 1893.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
BUREAU OF ROLLS AND LIBRARY,
Washington, February 9, 1893.

SIR: In obedience to your direction of the 30th of January ultimo, I have the honor to submit the accompanying report on relations with the Hawaiian Islands.

Respectfully,

ANDREW H. ALLEN.

The SECRETARY OF STATE.

REPORT UPON THE OFFICIAL RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS FROM THE FIRST APPOINTMENT OF A CONSULAR OFFICER THERE BY THIS GOVERNMENT.

On September 19, 1820, Mr. John C. Jones was appointed to reside at the Sandwich Islands in the capacity of "Agent of the United States for commerce and seamen." To those functions there were added to the duties of the agent a general supervision of American interests in the islands concerning the status of which he advised the Department from time to time. Other official information touching these interests, and events then current there, was occasionally afforded by officers of the Navy, on visiting vessels, whose instructions permitted their friendly intervention in such affairs of the country as they might with propriety regard as of importance to this Government.

In consequence of instructions in May, 1825, to Commodore Hull, U. S. Navy, in command of the Pacific squadron, then at Callao, Thomas ap Catesby Jones, commanding the U. S. S. *Peacock*, was sent the following year to Honolulu on a visit of friendly inspection, to relieve the native authorities of the annoyance occasioned by deserters from American vessels in the islands, and to endeavor to adjust certain claims due American citizens there resident. The objects of this visit were successfully accomplished, and Capt. Jones negotiated a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with the King, which was signed December 23, 1826. This was the first treaty formally negotiated by the Hawaiians with any foreign power, and although it was never ratified by this Government, certain of its stipulations appear to have embodied friendly views and purposes of the United States which were considered morally binding by both parties. (A copy of the treaty will be found in Appendix —.

In 1829, Capt. Finch, commanding the U. S. S. *Vincennes*, visited the islands as the bearer of presents and a letter, dated January 20 of that year, from the Secretary of the Navy, on behalf of the President. In that letter Mr. Southard said:

The President anxiously hopes that peace and kindness and justice will prevail between your people and those citizens of the United States who visit your islands, and that the regulations of your government will be such as to enforce them upon all.

Our citizens who violate your laws or interfere with your regulations violate at the same time their duty to their own Government and country, and merit censure and punishment.

From time to time thereafter naval vessels of the United States visited Hawaii and intervened in a friendly way in their affairs. Among them the United States frigate *Potomac*, with Commodore Downs, touched at Honolulu soon after the deportation, in December, 1831, of the Roman Catholic priests who had been introduced into the country in 1827 by the French, and that officer interceded successfully in behalf of some of their converts, who were undergoing persecution at the hands of the native Government. These persecutions were not

finally arrested until 1839, in July of which year the French frigate *L'Artémise*, Laplace, commander, visited there. Laplace propounded several demands for the adoption of measures for the protection of the Catholics and offered a treaty of commerce, etc., threatening in the event of noncompliance with the demands and nonsignature of the treaty by the Hawaiian authorities to proceed forthwith to hostilities. The American consul was notified by Laplace at the same time that the American Protestant clergy would be treated as a part of the native population when hostilities should begin, he regarding them as the instigators of the alleged insults to France. The treaty, however, was signed by the premier, in the King's name, and violence was averted.

Under the provisions of article VI. of this treaty intoxicating liquors were introduced. (Appendix.)

At about the same time the British consul, Mr. Charlton, who had long been at odds with the native Government, left to present, en route to London, certain personal claims and complaints to the British naval force on the South Pacific station. Already his representations had secured the violent intervention of Lord Edward Russell, commanding H. B. M. S. *Acteon*, and that officer had "negotiated a treaty" under the guns of his ship, which was signed November 16, 1836. (Appendix.)

Charlton did not return, but the result of his errand was the visit in February, 1843, of Lord George Paulet, commanding H. B. M. S. *Carysfort*, who seized the islands in the Queen's name and forced from the King, Kamehameha III, a deed of cession, which was pathetically proclaimed by the unfortunate monarch on the 25th of that month. The Government was immediately put in commission by a proclamation of Lord George, he and (in the King's absence) the King's deputy, Mr. Judd, with others, being of the commission. On the 11th of May Mr. Judd resigned, after a protest against some of the acts of the commission, and thus withdrew the King from all further participation in their course. The remaining members of the commission continued to administer the Government and to perform various sovereign functions. Among others, they raised a native regiment, which they called "The Queen's Own," but which they armed and equipped at the expense of the Hawaiian treasury, and the officers of which they, of course, required to make oath of allegiance to the British Queen.

Commodore Kearney, U. S. Navy, on board the U. S. Frigate *Constellation*, arrived on the 11th of July, and promptly protested against the King's deed of cession, and also against the acts of the commission wherein the rights of American citizens had suffered in any degree. The King returned to Honolulu on the 25th of July, and on the 26th Rear-Admiral Thomas, R. N., entered the harbor on board H. B. M. S. *Dublin*, from Valparaiso. After friendly conferences between the King and the admiral, an agreement was signed, the Hawaiian flag was restored on July 31, 1843, and Lord George Paulet's act of seizure disavowed. (Appendix.)

In this relation Mr. Fox, in a note of June 25, 1843, to Mr. Upshur, used the following language:

I am directed by the Earl of Aberdeen to state to you, for the information of the Government of the United States, that the occupation of the Sandwich Islands was an act entirely unauthorized by Her Majesty's Government; and that with the least practicable delay due inquiry will be made into the proceedings which led to it. (Appendix.)

[In an ingenious (but not ingenuous) plea of defense against the claim of the King for compensation and reimbursement, the Earl of Aberdeen satisfied himself that no such claim could be entertained by Great Britain. He regarded the seizure by Lord George Paulet as not "forcible".—History Hawaiian Islands, Jarves.]

The indirect causes of this outrage were complicated, but of assisted and persistent growth. From the early days of foreign interests and immigration in Hawaii the American element had predominated. The contention of the two principal European nations sending ships into the North Pacific—England and France—for supremacy in the islands was hampered by this fact. The remedy adopted by the French was the introduction of a rival religion. It was the belief of the British consul that American influence might thus be broken, and the field left clear for a settlement of the question of ultimate sovereignty between the two powers, whose policy in that part of the world was one of conquest or colonization. The native sentiment turned toward that people by whom their independence had been first virtually acknowledged. The treaty negotiated by Capt. Jones had been the first actual recognition of their autonomy. For while that treaty had not been formally ratified, it had been observed as morally binding. The United States had manifested towards the Hawaiians a spirit of goodwill, and had maintained an attitude of neighborly respect in all official relations. The visits of their naval vessels had been generally helpful and encouraging; the purposes of their immigrants had been generally civilizing and progressive. By the policy of the French and English the Americans were thrust into a position of defense alongside of the native population, and threatened with a share of the punishment to be visited upon the government for the fancied insults and wrongs suffered by the people of those two nations.

But a short time before the event just recited, William Richards, a clergyman, and Timoteo Haalilio, of the King's suite, the first embassy from Hawaii, had left for the United States, thence to proceed to England and France, upon the errand of securing recognition of the independence of their government. Mr. Richards had been formerly sent to this country in 1836 by the King to secure, if possible, the service of some American eminent in public life as advisers to the chiefs; but his mission had been unsuccessful.

The embassy having arrived at Washington addressed a communication to Mr. Webster on the 14th of December, 1842, setting forth the situation of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, reciting the progress of the people in the paths of civilization; their aspirations, and the necessity that demanded the formulation by the King of some definite foreign policy, and the assumption by his government of diplomatic relations with other powers.

Mr. Webster answered them on the 19th, declaring in the name of the President recognition of the independence of the Hawaiian Government and the sense of the United States that no interference with the King by foreign powers should be countenanced. He pointed out the interest of the American people in the islands and the reasons for such interest, and added that in so obvious a case the President did not regard a formal treaty or the establishment of formal diplomatic relations as then necessary. He concluded with the assurance that not improbably the correspondence would be made the subject of a communication to Congress, and be thus officially made known to the Governments of the principal commercial nations of Europe. The President communicated the correspondence to Congress on the 30th of December, with a special message declarative of his policy. (Appendix.)

This recognition of Hawaiian independence was, as we shall see, afterwards confirmed by Mr. Calhoun.

Proceeding to England the Hawaiian ambassadors were finally suc-

cessful in London in securing, on the 28th of November, 1843, a convention between France and Great Britain, engaging them "reciprocally to consider the Sandwich Islands as an independent state, and never to take possession, either directly or under title of protectorate, or under any other form, of any part of the territory of which they are composed." (Appendix.)

This convention did not, however, guarantee the autonomy of the islands as against any third power, nor did it contain any expression of opinion on that point similar in spirit to Mr. Webster's declaration of the preceding December. Its intention seems to have been simply reciprocally to bind those two powers to do one thing—that is, "to consider the Sandwich Islands as an independent state"—and to refrain from doing another thing—that is, "never to take possession," under any pretext, "of any part of the territory of which they are composed."

In consequence of the recommendation contained in the message of President Tyler, of December 30, 1842, Congress made an appropriation for the compensation of a diplomatic officer from this Government to the Sandwich Islands, and on March 3, 1843, Mr. George Brown, of Massachusetts, was appointed commissioner. Mr. Brown arrived at Honolulu in October following, and, on the 30th of that month, presented his credentials, with an address to the King, in which he asked in behalf of the citizens of the United States favorable and impartial treatment, at the same time assuring the monarch that this Government had no wish to secure for itself or its citizens any exclusive privileges. The King, answering, said upon this point:

You may assure your Government that I shall always consider the citizens of the United States as entitled to equal privileges with those of the most favored nation. (Appendix.)

Unfortunately, soon after Mr. Brown's arrival—by the latter part of the following August—a cause of serious difference arose between him and the King's Government in the case of John Wiley, an American citizen, who had been arrested charged with the commission of a crime or misdemeanor, and to whom trial by jury had been denied by the local governor.

The treaty with France, above alluded to as secured by Capt. Laplace at the mouth of his guns, contained a stipulation (Article VI) that—

No Frenchman accused of any crime whatever shall be judged otherwise than by a jury composed of foreign residents, proposed by the consul of France and accepted by the Government of the Sandwich Islands.

On the 12th of February, 1844, a convention with Great Britain had been entered into by the King's Government which contained (Article III) the same provision in identical phrase, *mutatis mutandis*. This treaty had been secured very much after the fashion observed by Laplace. Within less than one year before its signature the islands had been seized by Great Britain and had been adequately advised of the power of England. The King's embassy was still absent, and the newly arrived British consul-general had communicated the fact that he was without discretion to alter terms. The treaty was itself, in still other respects, objectionable to the American commissioner by reason of apparent discrimination in favor of England and against the United States, and it had already been the subject of an earnest protest on his part. And now, there being no treaty with the United States, the King's promise made in his speech to that commissioner, as he understood it, had been ignored by advice of the attorney-general—an American citizen—a lawyer of New York, of the name of John Ricord, who had been invited to

accept the office and had gone to Hawaii and there become naturalized for the purpose. The dispute over the treaty and the Wiley case together created a situation of affairs that resulted in a request from the King for the recall of Mr. Brown (whose conduct was, however, approved by this Government) and the appointment of Mr. Ten Eyck. (Appendix.)

But in the meantime, on the 6th of July, 1844, the King's commissioners, having returned to this country from Europe, received a communication from Mr. Calhoun confirming the "full recognition on the part of the United States of the independence of the Hawaiian Government." They left for Honolulu in November.

On March 26, 1846, two general conventions were entered into—one by France, the other by Great Britain—identical in terms and equally to be substituted for all preëxisting agreements made by those Governments with the King. These conventions modified the jury clauses and Article VI of the Laplace treaty, governing the importation of intoxicating liquors. Juries were to be composed of native or foreign residents proposed by the consul (English or French) and accepted by the Hawaiian Government, and duties were allowed within the prohibitory limit upon ardent spirits. These conventions do not, however, seem to have recognized the complete independence of the King. (Appendix.)

On the 19th of the following October a treaty with Denmark was concluded at Honolulu, containing the favored-nation clause; and this compact appears to be the first of its kind conveying unrestricted and ample acknowledgment of Hawaiian independence. (Appendix.)

Mr. Ten Eyck's instructions had included a charge to negotiate a treaty upon the basis of that existing between the Government of the islands and Great Britain at the time of his appointment. The unacceptability of the jury clause in that instrument and the desire of the Hawaiian King to secure its modification rendered it unwise to insist upon a similar article in any new convention. The authority of Mr. Ten Eyck had not been limited to the negotiation of an identical agreement, and he seems therefore to have persisted unwisely in urging the inclusion of the objectionable provision. This error was pointed out to him by Mr. Buchanan in an instruction of June 18, 1847, but seemingly without result. Much correspondence occurred between the King's minister and the American commissioner, and several projects of treaties were ineffectually submitted by the latter. Pending these negotiations the disadvantageous position of the United States, in the absence of a treaty, was emphasized by each new agreement successfully negotiated by other governments. Meanwhile the commissioner became indiscreetly (with American claimants) involved in serious differences of opinion with the Government of Hawaii, respecting the rights of American residents, and his attitude became finally one of hostility. There was the repetition of the old story, told so many times in such quarters of the globe, personal and commercial difficulties involving consuls and diplomatic agents alike, conflicting interests among foreigners of two or three nationalities, rival factions, complicated quarrels, and, so far as practicable, general disregard of native rights by each and all. Mr. Ten Eyck was roundly rated by Mr. Buchanan in an interesting dispatch of considerable length and some tartness, dated August 28, 1848, from which there will be occasion to make several extracts. Mr. Ten Eyck resigned in September, 1848, and Mr. Charles Eames was appointed January 12, 1849. (Appendix.)

On the 8th of January, 1848, a treaty with Hamburg was concluded by the King's minister for foreign affairs, and later in the month an

agreement touching consular notices under the Danish and Hamburg treaties was reached. But it was not until October 22, 1849, that a treaty with this Government was finally signed at San Francisco by Mr. Eames and Mr. Judd. (Appendix.)

Mr. Eames, en route to Honolulu, had met Mr. Judd, the King's commissioner, en route to Washington, at San Francisco, and there together they had agreed upon an instrument of a general character. The treaty, in the English and Hawaiian languages, reached the Department of State on the 8th of December. But, in the meantime, the Hawaiian Government had appointed Mr. James Jackson Jarves, then in this country, a special commissioner to negotiate a treaty, and he met Mr. Clayton, appointed on behalf of the United States, at Washington in the same month. They agreed upon terms and signed a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation, and for extradition of criminals, December 20, 1849. Ratifications were exchanged at Honolulu the 24th of August, following, and the treaty was proclaimed—the first perfected treaty between the two powers—November 9, 1850.

This convention did not differ materially from the treaties negotiated by this Government with other nations for similar purposes. The treaty is still in force except so far as modified by later conventions. (Appendix.)

In 1849 disputes between the French consul and the native authorities respecting the convention of 1846 brought about another seizure of the islands by the armed forces of France, which became the occasion of the dispatch of very explicit instructions from the American Secretary of State. After a preliminary diplomatic skirmish between the French naval commander, Admiral de Tromelin, and the King's minister for foreign affairs, Mr. Wyllie, the admiral formulated his demands in an ultimatum, and upon its nonacceptance the naval force under his command, on the 25th of August, 1849, took military possession of the fort, the Government offices, and of the custom-house, and seized the King's royal yacht and several other vessels belonging to private persons. Official news of this proceeding reached the United States December 10, 1849, from Mr. Ten Eyck. (Appendix.)

The French continued in possession of the fort and public buildings until the 4th or 5th of September, dismantled the fort, and destroyed considerable public property, but did not haul down the Hawaiian flag. Upon the exercise of this restraint they depended for the argument that they had not acted in contravention of the agreement with England of 1843. (Appendix.)

Mr. Judd was appointed by the King as commissioner to England, France, and the United States, it appears, with pretty full powers to make some adjustment of this last difficulty. It was rumored that he was not limited even from cession of the kingdom either to England or the United States. His negotiations with the French minister for foreign affairs having proved fruitless he reached the United States on his way home in the spring of 1850, and in conjunction with Mr. Jarves solicited the good offices of this Government in the settlement of the dispute with France. They were promptly accorded by the President, through the Secretary of State, in a note of June 3, 1850, and instructions in conformity therewith were sent to Mr. Rives at Paris. Negotiations dragged and chances of settlement seemed to recede until on the 11th of March, 1851, Mr. Severance, the commissioner of the United States at Honolulu, reported the fact that a deed of cession of the kingdom to the United States had been drawn, submitted to him, sealed, and delivered to him on the afternoon of the same day by two of the

King's ministers. This instrument was the consequence of the King's apprehension excited by the hostile attitude of France. It bore the following inscription in the Hawaiian language:

The King requests the commissioner of the United States, in case the flag of the United States is raised above the Hawaiian, that he will open the inclosed and act accordingly.

The terms of this deed provided that the kingdom should be held by the United States until a satisfactory adjustment of the dispute with France, and, failing that end within a reasonable period, should be permanently transferred to them. (Appendix.)

Answering Mr. Severance's series of dispatches on this subject, Mr. Webster, on the 14th of July, 1851, said:

The Navy Department will receive instructions to place and to keep the naval armament of the United States in the Pacific Ocean in such a state of strength and preparation as shall be requisite for the preservation of the honor and dignity of the United States and the safety of the Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

In a confidential dispatch of the same date Mr. Severance was directed to return to the Hawaiian Government the deed of cession placed in his hands. (Appendix.)

The subject of annexation was not, however, abandoned in the correspondence by reason of Mr. Webster's dispatch. Mr. Marcy, writing to Mr. Gregg, then United States commissioner there, on the 4th of April, 1854, discussed the question fully, and authorized the negotiation of a treaty for the purpose, the terms of which he indicated. On the 11th November following, a draft of a treaty acceptable to the King was received with Mr. Gregg's dispatch No. 52 of September 15, 1854. (Appendix.)

Stipulations were drawn in this treaty for annuities aggregating three times the sum offered for that purpose by Mr. Marcy, and for the admission of the Kingdom as a State of the Union. These provisions were objected to by this Government, but before any conclusion was reached the King, Kamehameha III, died, and was succeeded in February, 1855, by a prince who held views unfavorable to the project, and so the treaty failed. (Appendix.)

In 1855, on the 20th of July, a treaty of reciprocity was concluded at Washington by Mr. Marcy and Judge Lee, the King's commissioner; but, although the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs appears to have been favorable to it, ratification failed, it is said, by reason of the pressure of more important and absorbing questions. (Appendix.)

Correspondence for several years following this incident is chiefly concerned with claims, complaints, and matters of routine. In 1863 the rank of the diplomatic officer of this Government was raised to that of minister resident, and James McBride, of Oregon, was appointed to that office. The conduct of the civil war so far diverted attention from Hawaiian affairs that consideration of the subject of a desired treaty of reciprocity was obliged, by Mr. Seward's engagements, to be deferred to a more tranquil period, and until the results of English and Southern influence there, exerted during the civil war in the United States against this Government, should be overcome. There are occasional references to annexation. (Appendix.)

In December, 1866, Queen Emma, queen dowager of Hawaii, visited the United States on her way from England to Honolulu.

On the 1st of February, 1867, Mr. McCook, our minister at Honolulu, was instructed that it was the desire to revive the subject of the reciprocity treaty of 1855, but upon terms more liberal to the United

States. Accordingly, on the 21st of May following, Mr. McCook, on behalf of the United States, and Mr. Harris, on the part of the Hawaiian Government, concluded a treaty of reciprocity at San Francisco, which received the approval of the President, but failed of ratification by the Senate. (Appendix.)

In a private note of June 7, 1867, Mr. McCook adverted to the subject of annexation, and asked leave of absence to visit the United States the following November, when the reciprocity treaty might be expected to become the subject of consideration in the Senate. This leave was granted by Mr. Seward, who thus instructed Mr. McCook:

You are at liberty to sound the proper authority on the large subject mentioned in your note, and ascertain probable conditions. You may confidentially receive overtures and communicate the same to me.

I will act upon your suggestion in that relation in regard to a party now here.

Mr. Seward's "large subject" was annexation, and Mr. Seward's "party now here" was the Hawaiian minister to this country, Mr. C. C. Harris. (Appendix.)

It is probable that a conference was held on the subject by Mr. Seward and Mr. Harris, but notes of it do not appear. On the 12th of September, however, Mr. Seward, writing confidentially to Mr. McCook, said:

Circumstances have transpired here which induce a belief that a strong interest, based upon a desire for annexation of the Sandwich Islands, will be active in opposing a ratification of the reciprocity treaty. It will be argued that the reciprocity will tend to hinder and defeat an early annexation, to which the people of the Sandwich Islands are supposed to be now strongly inclined.

He advised the minister to remain at Honolulu and abandon his earlier plan to visit Washington, and he added—

That if the policy of annexation should conflict with the policy of reciprocity, annexation is in every case to be preferred. (Appendix.)

During the spring and summer of 1867 some apprehension was created in the mind of the King by the presence in Hawaiian waters of the U. S. S. *Lackawanna*, Capt. Reynolds. This was based upon the fact that the commanding officer had been formerly a resident in Hawaii and was interfering, or had the purpose to interfere, in political affairs. It is not impossible that the King's minister for foreign affairs, de Varigny, was really responsible for the royal apprehensions. The presence of the ship delayed ratification of reciprocity, and it was not until after her departure that the King convened the legislature to consider the subject.

His Majesty stated to me [writes Mr. McCook] that he would like to discuss its [the treaty's] provisions with me, but did not deem it consistent with his dignity, etc., to enter into any such discussion while the *Lackawanna* remained here; I will do His Majesty the justice to say that I do not believe this idea was an original one, but was suggested to, and forced upon him by his ministers, they hoping that the *Lackawanna* could not, or would not leave, and that this might prove an insuperable obstacle to the ratification of the treaty. (Appendix.)

The treaty was ratified July 30, 1867. Our own Senate had received the treaty early the same month; it was reported in February, 1868, but was not finally acted upon until June 1st, 1870, when it was rejected. (Appendix.)

Very soon after his ratification of the reciprocity treaty the King sent a commissioner to Japan to negotiate a commercial treaty. This project the American minister at Honolulu earnestly antagonized, upon the ground that such a treaty would deflect trade from the United States and encourage English competition. (Appendix.)

A second time inviting the attention of the Senate to our own compact with Hawaii, President Johnson said, December 9, 1868:

It is known and felt by the Hawaiian Government and people that their Government and institutions are feeble and precarious; that the United States, being so near a neighbor, would be unwilling to see the islands pass under foreign control. Their prosperity is continually disturbed by expectations and alarms of unfriendly political proceedings, as well from the United States as from other foreign powers. A reciprocity treaty, while it could not materially diminish the revenues of the United States, would be a guaranty of the goodwill and forbearance of all nations until the people of the islands shall of themselves, at no distant day, voluntarily apply for admission into the Union. (Appendix.)

During the last mentioned year the subject of annexation continued to appear as an important feature of the correspondence from time to time, and on April 14 a letter to Mr. R. P. Spaulding, a member of Congress, from his son, Mr. Z. S. Spaulding, in charge of the United States legation, reported the projected organization of an active annexation party in Honolulu, and the prevalence of such a sentiment in the Kingdom. Mr. Seward was again obliged to defer immediate consideration of the subject by reason of the administration's absorption in domestic affairs relating to reconstruction. (Appendix.)

In 1868 a remonstrance was made by the United States representative at Honolulu on the subject of the importation of coolies into the islands, and a resolution of the Senate of the United States, describing the traffic in human beings, already substantially extirpated, as abhorrent to the spirit of modern international law and policy, and to the advanced sentiment of the great civilized powers, was brought to the attention of the Hawaiian Government. This intervention, however, was not effectual to stop or even moderate the business in the face of British and other influences, and the trade continued a threatening danger to the Kingdom. (Appendix.)

In February, 1871, Mr. Pierce, our minister at Honolulu, wrote recommending the subject of annexation to the attention of the President, and President Grant transmitted this most interesting dispatch to the Senate, confidentially, with a message soliciting the views of that body upon the matter. This message and dispatch are of so much interest and importance that it is deemed best to present the executive document *in toto* in this place.

[Confidential. Executive B. Forty-second Congress first session.]

MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, TRANSMITTING A COPY OF A DISPATCH RELATIVE TO THE ANNEXATION OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, ADDRESSED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BY HENRY A. PIERCE, MINISTER RESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AT HONOLULU.

APRIL 7, 1871.—Read and, with the dispatch referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, ordered to be printed in confidence for the use of the Senate.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit confidentially, for the information and consideration of the Senate, a copy of a dispatch of the 25th of February last, relative to the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, addressed to the Department of State by Henry A. Pierce, minister resident of the United States at Honolulu. Although I do not deem it advisable to express any opinion or to make any recommendation in regard to the subject at this juncture, the views of the Senate, if it should be deemed proper to express them, would be very acceptable with reference to any future course which there might be a disposition to adopt.

U. S. GRANT.

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1871.

Mr. Pierce to Mr. Fish.

No. 101.] Legation of United States at Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, February 25, 1871.

Mr. Henry A. Pierce to Secretary of State.

Subject: Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the territory of the United States.

Abstract: United States Government recommended to again consider the subject—Prevailing opinion thereon—The choice and will of Hawaiian people will be manifested on the death of their king, if approved of by the United States Government—Puritan and democratic tendencies of the Hawaiians—Fifteenth amendment, Constitution of the United States—Native population rapidly disappearing—Leaving their country to foreigners—Reasons given for the acquisition of these islands by United States—Lord Palmerston's opinions on the question—Sound and prophetic historical incidents in Hawaiian history.

No. 101.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Honolulu, February 25, 1871.

SIR: Impressed with the importance of the subject now presented for consideration, I beg leave to suggest the inquiry whether the period has not arrived making it proper, wise, and sagacious for the United States Government to again consider the project of annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the territory of the republic. That such is to be the political destiny of this archipelago seems a foregone conclusion in the opinion of all who have given attention to the subject in this country, the United States, England, France, and Germany.

A majority of the aborigines, creoles, and naturalized foreigners of this country, as I am credibly informed, are favorable, even anxious for the consummation of the measure named.

The event of the decease of the present sovereign of Hawaii, leaving no heirs or successor to the throne, and the consequent election to be made by the legislative assembly of a king, and new stirps for a royal family, will produce a crisis in political affairs, which, it is thought will be availed of as a propitious occasion to inaugurate measures for annexation of the islands to the United States, the same to be effected as the manifest will and choice of the majority of the Hawaiian people; and through means proper, peaceful, and honorable.

It is evident, however, no steps will be taken to accomplish the object named without the proper sanction or approbation of the United States Government in approval thereof.

The Hawaiian people for fifty years have been under 'educational' instruction of American missionaries, and the civilizing influences of New England people, commercial and maritime. Hence they are Puritan and democratic in their ideas and tendencies, modified by a tropical climate. Their favorite songs and airs are American. Sherman's "Marching Through Georgia" and "John Brown's Soul is Marching On," are daily heard in the streets and in their schoolrooms. The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States has made the project of annexation to our Union more popular than ever, both here and in the United States.

The native population is fast disappearing; the number existing is now estimated at 45,000, having decreased about 15,000 since the census of 1866. The number of foreigners in addition is between 5,000 and 6,000, two-thirds of whom are from the United States, and they own more than that proportion of foreign capital, as represented in the agriculture, commerce, navigation, and whale fisheries of the kingdom.

This country and sovereignty will soon be left to the possession of foreigners, "to unlineal hands, no sons of theirs succeeding." To what foreign nation shall these islands belong if not to the great Republic? At the present those of foreign nationalities hold all the important offices of Government and control legislation, the judiciary, etc. Well disposed as the Government now is toward the United States and its resident citizens here, in course of time it may be otherwise, as was the case during our civil war.

I now proceed to state some points of a more general character, which should influence the United States Government in their decision of the policy of acquiring possession of this archipelago, their geographical position occupying, as it does, an important central, strategical point, in the North Pacific Ocean, valuable, perhaps necessary, to the United States for a naval depot and coaling station, and to shelter and protect our commerce and navigation, which in this hemisphere is destined to increase enormously from our intercourse with the 500,000,000 population of China, Japan, and Australia. Humbolt predicted that the commerce on the Pacific would, in time, rival that on the Atlantic. A future generation, no doubt, will see the prophecy fulfilled.

The immense injury inflicted on American navigation and commerce by Great Britain in the war of 1812-1814, through her possessions of Bermuda and other West

India Islands, as also that suffered by the English from French privateers from the Isle of France, during the wars between those nations, are instances in proof of the necessity of anticipating and preventing, when we can, similar evils that may issue from these islands if held by other powers. Their proximity to the Pacific States of the Union, fine climate and soil, and tropical productions of sugar, coffee, rice, fruits, hides, goat-skins, salt, cotton, fine wool, etc., required by the West, in exchange for flour, grain, lumber, shooks, and manufactures of cotton, wool, iron, and other articles, are evidence of the commercial value of one to the other region.

Is it probable that any European power who may hereafter be at war with the United States will refrain from taking possession of this weak Kingdom, in view of the great injury that could be done to our commerce through their acquisition of them?

It is said that at a proper time the United States may have the sovereignty of these islands without money and without price, except, perhaps for purchase of the Crown and public lands, and moderate annuities to be given to the five or six high chiefs now living with uncertain claims as successors to the Crown.

His Hawaiian Majesty, although only in his forty-first year, is liable to a sudden decease, owing to frequent attacks of difficulty in breathing and danger of suffocation from congestion caused by obesity. His weight is 300 pounds. He is sole survivor of the royal race of Kamehameha; unmarried, no heir, natural or adopted; possessess the constitutional prerogative of naming his successor, but it is believed he will not exercise it, from a superstitious belief his own death would follow immediately the act.

Prince Alexander and Lott Kamehameha (the former subsequently became the fourth Hawaiian King and the latter the fifth) and Dr. G. P. Judd, my informant, visited England in 1850 as Hawaiian commissioners.

Lord Palmerston, at their interview with him, said, in substance, "that the British Government desired the Hawaiian people to maintain proper government and preserve national independence. If they were unable to do so, he recommended receiving a protectorate government under the United States or by becoming an integral part of that nation. Such," he thought, "was the destiny of the Hawaiian Islands arising from their proximity to the States of California and Oregon, and natural dependence on those markets for exports and imports, together with probable extinction of the Hawaiian aboriginal population and its substitution by immigration from the United States." That advice seems sound and prophetic.

The following historical events in relation to these islands are thought worthy of revival in recollection:

February 25, 1843.—Lord George Paulet, of Her Britannic Majesty's ship *Carysfort*, obtained, by forceful measures, cession of the Hawaiian Islands to the Government of Great Britain, July 31, 1843. They were restored to their original sovereignty by the British Admiral Thomas.

November 28, 1843.—Joint convention of the English and French Governments, which acknowledged the independence of this archipelago, and reciprocally promised never to take possession of any part of same. The United States Government was invited to be a party to the above, but declined.

August, 1849.—Admiral Tromelin, with a French naval force, after making demands on the Hawaiian Government impossible to be complied with, took unresisted possession of the fort and Government buildings in Honolulu, and blockaded the harbor. After a few weeks' occupation of the place, the French departed, leaving political affairs as they were previous to their arrival.

January, 1851.—A French naval force again appeared at Honolulu, and threatened bombardment and destruction of the town.

The King, Kamehameha III, with the government, fearing it would be carried into effect, and in mortal dread of being brought under French rule, similar to that placed by the latter over Tahiti, of the Society Islands, executed a deed of cession of all the Hawaiian Islands and their sovereignty forever in favor of the United States of America.

The document, in a sealed envelope, was placed in charge of Mr. Severance, United States commissioner here, with instructions to take formal official possession of the soil of these islands on occasion of the first hostile shot fired by the French. On learning the facts, the latter desisted further aggressive acts, and departed from the country.

Since that period the French authorities have pursued a conciliatory course in their relations with the Hawaiian Government, and fully of opinion, it is said, that a secret treaty exists between the United States Government and that of Hawaii, by which these islands pass into the possession of the former in case of aggressions made upon them thereafter by any hostile powers.

In 1854 the administration of President Pierce authorized the United States commissioner, Mr. Gregg, to negotiate a treaty with the Hawaiian authorities for the cession of the sovereignty of these islands to the United States; but Mr. Gregg suc-

ceded only in obtaining a protocol for a treaty, by which the United States were to extend a protectorate government over them. The matter in that form did not meet with the approval of Mr. Secretary Marcy, and further negotiations ceased.

I omitted to state in proper sequence that the deed of cession of 1851 was, by order of the Secretary of State, Mr. Webster, returned to the Hawaiian Government.

In conclusion, I herewith inclose "Annual Review of the Agriculture and Commerce of the Hawaiian Islands for the year 1870," published by the Pacific Commercial Advertiser, February 25, 1871. Additional copies will accompany my dispatch No. 102. Permit me to refer you to a lithographic map, published in 1867 by United States Bureau of Statistics, as showing in convenient form the relative position of these islands to the continents of America, Asia, etc.; also, steamship lines radiating therefrom.

With great respect, your obedient, humble servant,

HENRY A. PIERCE.

Hon. HAMILTON FISH,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

The failure from time to time to solve their difficulties by annexation served to continue a lively consideration of the subject of reciprocity as the second best solution; but the growing interests of the sugar States during nearly all of the first decade after the civil war were of sufficient influence to obstruct successfully any favorable consideration of such a treaty by this Government. The situation was frankly stated by Mr. Fish in an instruction of considerable length and importance on the 25th of March, 1873, in which, turning from reciprocity to annexation, always a question "full of interest," he said:

The position of the Sandwich Islands as an outpost fronting and commanding the whole of our possessions on the Pacific Ocean, gives to the future of those islands a peculiar interest to the Government and people of the United States. It is very clear that this Government can not be expected to assent to their transfer from their present control to that of any powerful maritime or commercial nation. Such transfer to a maritime power would threaten a military surveillance in the Pacific similar to that which Bermuda has afforded in the Atlantic—the latter has been submitted to from necessity, inasmuch as it was congenial with our Government—but we desire no additional similar outposts in the hands of those who may at some future time use them to our disadvantage.

The condition of the Government of Hawaii and its evident tendency to decay and dissolution force upon us the earnest consideration of its future—possibly its near future.

There seems to be a strong desire on the part of many persons in the islands, representing large interests and great wealth, to become annexed to the United States. And while there are, as I have already said, many and influential persons in this country who question the policy of any insular acquisitions, perhaps even of any extension of territorial limits, there are also those of influence and of wise foresight who see a future that must extend the jurisdiction and the limits of this nation, and that will require a resting spot in the midocean, between the Pacific coast and the vast domains of Asia, which are now opening to commerce and Christian civilization.

We are not in possession of information sufficiently accurate, and possibly not sufficiently extended, with respect to the population, trade, industry, resources, and debt, etc., of the Hawaiian Islands to decide the policy which must soon be considered with respect to the relations they are to maintain toward this Government.

You will, therefore, at the earliest date practicable, furnish me with full and accurate information upon the several questions above alluded to, and also as to the relative condition of the islands at this time, with respect to each question as compared with former periods.

If there be official documents or reports as to trade, population, debt, etc., you will obtain and transmit them.

Should occasion offer, you will, without committing the Government to any line of policy, not discourage the feeling which may exist in favor of annexation to the United States; and you will cautiously and prudently avail of any opportunity that may present of ascertaining the views of the Hawaiian authorities on this question, and if there be any idea entertained in that direction among those in official position, you will endeavor to sound them and ascertain their views as to the manner, and the terms and conditions on which such project could be carried into execution.

On the 3d of February, 1874, the King, Lunalilo, died without having named his successor, and the legislative assembly, called together by

the cabinet, proceeded to the election of a monarch. The excitement incident to this event, the threats of violence by the contending factions of the populace, and the danger of revolution or anarchy required the intervention of the naval forces of foreign powers in Hawaiian waters, the militia being unreliable in the circumstances. The British commissioner had invited the American minister to join him in effecting measures to preserve order, but this invitation was very properly declined by Mr. Pierce. On the 12th, in consequence of an assault by a mob of Queen Emma's adherents on the legislative committee attempting to announce to David Kalakaua his election to the throne, and an attack upon the Government buildings, the Hawaiian minister for foreign affairs appealed to Mr. Pierce to secure the landing of a sufficient force from the United States ships *Tuscarora* and *Portsmouth* to defend the authorities and suppress the rioters. The force was landed, at the request of the American representative, and placed in charge of the court-house.

Shortly after—within a few minutes—a force of sailors and marines from H. B. M. S. *Tenidos* went ashore under command of the executive officer of the vessel and the captain of the marines, without invitation from the Hawaiian authorities or orders from the commanding officers of their ship. They proceeded to disperse the lawless crowd about the residence of Queen Emma—the rival of Kalakaua for the throne—and thence marched to occupy the barracks, where they remained for eight days. This incident was afterwards accommodated by an antedated note, formally requesting their intervention. On the 20th these naval forces returned on board their respective vessels. (Appendix.)

In the autumn of 1874 King Kalakaua visited the United States on the U. S. S. *Benicia*, and, remaining several weeks, was during that time shown many friendly attentions by this Government. The U. S. S. *Pensacola* was placed at his disposal for the homeward voyage. One of the principal objects of this visit was the desire of the King to promote negotiations of reciprocity with the United States. It is noteworthy that this visit of the King was opposed by the English and French commissioners, as reported by Mr. Pierce October 12, 1874. (Appendix.)

The King before leaving Hawaii had appointed Mr. Allen and Mr. Carter commissioners to negotiate a reciprocity agreement, and, greatly to the delight of his people, the treaty was signed at Washington January 30, 1875. It contained a schedule which, to be made effective, required an act of Congress in ratification of the customs dues fixed thereby, and a proclamation of the fact. The treaty went into effect by this proclamation September 9, 1876. (Appendix.)

Some difficulty was encountered with Great Britain by reason of the "parity" or "favored nation" clause in the treaty of 1852 between that power and Hawaii; and Germany was also at first disposed to take a view similar to the English in that respect. But the German claim was successfully contested by Mr. Carter, appointed to arrange the matter with those two Governments, and the construction given that clause by the United States agreed to substantially. Much correspondence followed the expression of England's views on the subject, and a compromise was proposed fixing a duty of 10 per centum on British importations of the articles in the free schedule of our treaty. This proposition was not accepted by Mr. Carter, and was withdrawn; but in the discussion of the matter in the Hawaiian Legislature a majority of the committee on foreign relations reported not only in its favor, but

in favor of the original claim of the British Government to the enjoyment of privileges equal to those granted the United States. The controversy led to a change of ministry, and finally to an admission by the King's minister of the claim of this Government to exclusive privileges, and a pledge to hold the treaty, so interpreted, inviolate. This episode involved an "annexation scare" as against the United States, touching which Mr. Evarts thus instructed our minister, Mr. Comly, August 6, 1878:

You will endeavor to disabuse the minds of those who impute to the United States any idea of further projects beyond the present treaty. (Appendix.)

From time to time during the ensuing three years questions of interpretation of articles on the schedule and of the customs provisions of the treaty, and some involving attempted or apprehended frauds arose, several of them complicated by claims of Great Britain under the stipulations of the Anglo-Hawaiian treaty of 1852, and by the influence of British residents. All these questions were, however, satisfactorily determined without resort to any other mode of arrangement than the usual diplomatic method, by notes. A domestic scandal, involving almost the entire Government, followed, resulting in rapid changes of ministers and a hasty request for the recall of foreign representatives, including Mr. Comly. This request was, however, itself recalled promptly after the last change of cabinet on account of this particular crisis, and a more agreeable state of affairs brought about. The details of these incidents are, however, hardly worthy of any notice, as they serve chiefly to establish the disreputable character of certain of the King's advisers at the time, to verify charges of general corruption in the legislature, and point to influences at work against an extension of our reciprocity treaty.*

The same year the good offices of this Government were solicited by the Hawaiian Evangelical Association, in the suppression of the liquor traffic, by the enforcement of Chief Lebon's ordinance in the Ralik Islands. Mr. Evarts, on November 13, 1880, instructed Mr. Comly, and Mr. Dawson, the United States consul at Apia, also, to make efforts to secure some suitable person to act as consular agent of this Government in the Raliks. (Appendix.)

The good offices of this Government were enlisted also in the negotiation of a treaty between Hawaii and Japan, and its approval of such a convention sought by the king's minister for foreign affairs.

In June, 1881, Mr. Comly reported the persistent effort of Great Britain to derive benefit or advantage from the parity clause of the Anglo-Hawaiian treaty of 1852, through the reciprocity treaty with the United States, by way of pushing claims based upon that clause pending its termination by notification. He wrote:

I do not propose to trouble the Secretary of State with a repetition of my arguments intended to show the inadmissible character of this claim, and showing also that in 1855, when a reciprocal treaty with the United States was pending, the then British Commissioner here (Gen. Miller), acting under direct instructions from Lord Clarendon, literally "gave away" the whole case as to this present claim. He says: "Great Britain can not, as a matter of right, claim the same advantages for her trade, under the strict letter of the treaty of 1852." (Quoted more at length and in his own words in my dispatch No. 13.)

For the convenience of the Secretary of State I present a brief itinerary of the progress of this claim up to date, as I understand it:

1. Immediately after the reciprocity treaty went into effect, Maj. Wodehouse, the British Commissioner, peremptorily notified the Hawaiian Government that "Her Majesty's Government can not allow of" any discrimination against British products

* See Mr. Comly's 113, 121, and 122; and Mr. Evart's 76 and 78.

as in favor of American, and that British importers would claim under their treaty, for British products, equality with American products, under the American reciprocity treaty. A long diplomatic correspondence followed, in which I was frequently consulted in a friendly way by the Hawaiian minister, and was notified from time to time by Maj. Wodehouse of his proceedings. I have uniformly insisted that it would be a violation of the reciprocity treaty to allow the same privileges to British or any other products with those of the United States—privileges purchased by reciprocity advantages beyond the power of any other nation to concede. I have also insisted that it would amount to a violation of the sovereignty of this Kingdom for Great Britain to assume to dictate to the Hawaiian Government what differential rate of customs should be levied upon British goods as compared with those of other countries, taxation being an incident of sovereignty.

2. Finding that the British Government insisted upon its claim, the Hawaiian Government gave one year's notice (under the seventeenth article), terminating the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles of the Anglo-Hawaiian treaty of 1851-'52. (This would take effect July 3, 1878.)

3. This was resented by the British Government as "unfriendly" action.

4. Mr. Henry A. P. Carter was sent as Hawaiian envoy to England to settle the dispute. Major Wodehouse, alarmed by threats of annexation to the United States rather than submit to the demands of Great Britain, accompanied Mr. Carter to San Francisco, where he applied for and received telegraphic leave from Lord Derby to proceed to England with Mr. Carter.

5. In London Lord Derby proposed to Mr. Carter that England would drop the whole matter if the Hawaiian Government would withdraw its denunciation of the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles, and would attach the free schedule of the American treaty to an agreement that none of the articles in that schedule should be taxed more than 10 per cent if British product rejected. (My dispatch No. 43 is full on this and subsequent points.)

6. The notice of discontinuance was withdrawn as to all but first paragraph of fourth article.

7. In legislative assembly of 1878, a large and noisy party of British sympathizers attacked the Government severely and threatened the reciprocity treaty so seriously that I wrote a note of warning and protest to the minister of foreign affairs (appears as inclosure No. 4 with my dispatch No. 43) which was subsequently approved by Mr. Evarts Secretary of State.

8. The Hawaiian treaty was amended substantially as suggested by Lord Derby (10 per cent ad valorem horizontal). It was supposed that this would end the matter of the British Claims, but

9. About the beginning of the present year, Mr. Theo. H. Davies, acting British consul-general, a merchant doing large business here and one of the claimants, wrote (unofficially) to the minister of finance on behalf of the claimants, demanding a refund of duties paid under protest pending the termination of the first clause in the fourth article of the British treaty.

10. The minister of finance referred the claimants to the Hawaiian courts.

11. The British commissioner then made official demand for diplomatic (executive) settlement.

12. The Hawaiian minister informed Major Wodehouse that he would lay the matter before cabinet council.

The minister of foreign affairs informed Major Wodehouse that the action of the minister of finance was sustained by cabinet council, and that the claimants were remanded to the courts accordingly.

14. Major Wodehouse replied that he could not accept that form and would report to his Government for further instructions.

15. The Hawaiian minister wrote a brief note, simply acknowledging Major Wodehouse's note without comment.

16. Major Wodehouse wrote a severe reply, complaining that the Hawaiian minister had omitted to say that he would give due consideration to Major Wodehouse's note, or words to that effect.

17. I am informed by a member of the cabinet that the minister (Mr. Green) will make a brief and dignified protest against the tone of Major Wodehouse's note, and will say (substantially) that, Major W. having been already fully notified that the matter had been considered by His Majesty's Government and the claimants referred to the courts, and he himself having notified the Hawaiian Government that he had referred the matter to the British secretary, then, in that case, there was nothing further to consider at present, and Major Wodehouse's complaint was without foundation.

Here the matter rests.

This dispatch drew from Mr. Blaine, June 30, 1881, an explicit instruction setting forth the views of this Government as to the impossi-

bility of a grant by the Hawaiian Government of any of the privileges exclusively given the United States by the treaty of 1875 without a violation of that treaty. He said:

You will add that, if any other power should deem it proper to employ undue influence upon the Hawaiian Government to persuade or compel action in derogation of this treaty, the Government of the United States will not be unobservant of its rights and interests and will be neither unwilling nor unprepared to support the Hawaiian Government in the faithful discharge of its treaty obligations. (Appendix.)

The revival of the subject of coolie immigration from British India and an expression of the views of the British commissioner at Honolulu respecting the means by which such immigration should be promoted and such immigrants protected and controlled, together with a resuscitation, by Major Wodehouse, of the Lackawanna incident, and the adhesive character of the British claims arising from the reciprocity treaty, were together the moving cause of considerable correspondence designed to instruct the United States minister very fully respecting the established and continued policy of this Government. On December 1, 1881, Mr. Blaine said:

It [this Government] firmly believes that the position of the Hawaiian Islands as the key to the dominion of the American Pacific demands their benevolent neutrality, to which end it will earnestly coöperate with the native Government. And if, through any cause, the maintenance of such a position of benevolent neutrality should be found by Hawaii to be impracticable, this Government would then unhesitatingly meet the altered situation by seeking an avowedly American solution for the grave issues presented. (Appendix.)

In 1883 the Government of the United States was invited to concur in a protest by the Hawaiian Government against the extension of their respective territories by Great Britain and France in Polynesia, by annexation of the New Hebrides, the Solomon Islands, and adjacent groups. Mr. Frelinghuysen on December 6, 1883, declined to concur, because, as he wrote, "while we could not * * * view with complacency any movement tending to the extinction of the national life of the intimately connected commonwealths of the Northern Pacific, the attitude of this Government towards the distant outlying groups of Polynesia is necessarily different;" and he added that the President "does not regard the matter as one calling for the interposition of the United States, either to oppose or support the suggested measure." (Appendix.)

In the same year the reciprocity treaty between the United States and Hawaii reached the limit of its duration, subject to twelve months' notice from either power to the other of its desire to terminate the compact. Negotiations looking to the extension of this agreement were set on foot by the Hawaiian Government and the project was discussed in Congress and in the diplomatic correspondence with the ultimate result of a convention of renewal, etc., concluded December 6, 1884, at Washington, in three articles, of which Article I renewed the treaty for a period of seven years and Articles II and III provided, respectively:

ARTICLE II.

His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands grants to the Government of the United States the exclusive right to enter the harbor of Pearl River, in the Island of Oahu, and to establish and maintain there a coaling and repair station for the use of vessels of the United States, and to that end the United States may improve the entrance to said harbor and do all other things needful to the purpose aforesaid.

ARTICLE III.

The present convention shall be ratified and the ratifications exchanged at Washington as soon as possible.

The convention was not however ratified and proclaimed until November, 1887, owing to considerable opposition to the extension of the original compact by the sugar interests of this country and further discussion of the subject in Congress. The extension of the treaty and the Pearl River Harbor cession were also opposed by Great Britain as the general policy of that Government. (Appendix.)

In May, 1873, Gen. Schofield, under confidential instructions from the Secretary of War, made a full report upon the value of Pearl River Harbor as a coaling and repair station, recommending its acquisition, and later he appeared before a committee of the House of Representatives to urge the importance of some measure looking to the control of the Sandwich Islands by the United States. (Appendix.)

The question of connecting the islands by cable with Australia and the United States was presented to this Government by our minister in August, 1884, by his report of proposals of the Australasian Cable Syndicate in relation to the laying of an ocean cable from Brisbane to San Francisco, via Honolulu. This syndicate secured the introduction and passage of an act by the Hawaiian legislature providing a subsidy of not more than \$20,000 for a period limited to fifteen years. Owing to the failure to secure landing privileges at San Francisco before 1886 this act was then amended so as to provide for the landing of the cable at any other port or place on the North American continent, presumably in the interest of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company's telegraphic system. While the sentiment in the islands favored a terminus in the United States, the project of Mr. Coote, a British subject, was a terminus in British Columbia. Further legislation on the subject drew from the British commissioner a protest against the granting of exclusive privileges to any persons for the landing of a cable from any British territory on any of the Hawaiian Islands and the assertion on the part of the King's Government of their right to control the matter as they believed best. In 1891-'92 a cable survey was made by the U. S. S. *Albatross*, of the Fish Commission, and lines of sounding were run from the Californian coast, Salinas Landing, Monterey Bay, to Honolulu.

In 1886 a bill was passed by the legislature and approved by the King to negotiate a loan of \$2,000,000 and pledge the revenues of the Kingdom for its repayment. An English syndicate had the matter in charge. Its objects were the liquidation of certain outstanding bonds and the prosecution of domestic improvements. The loan under such conditions was successfully opposed by this Government under the exclusive privileges granted the United States by the reciprocity treaty. (Appendix.)

Early in 1887 the subject of a proposed treaty of political alliance or confederation between the Hawaiian and Samoan Kings was brought to the attention of this Government with a view to its advice and its approval of the project; but Mr. Bayard pointed out the inexpediency of such a compact and withheld approval. (Appendix.)

On the 23d of December, 1887, the minister of Great Britain at Washington handed the following memorandum to Mr. Bayard:

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1887.

England and France by the convention of November 28, 1843, are bound to consider the Sandwich Islands as an independent state and never to take possession, either directly or under the title of a protectorate or any other form, of any part of the territory of which they are composed.

The best way to secure this object would, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, be that the powers chiefly interested in the trade of the Pacific should join in making a formal declaration similar to that of 1843 above alluded to, and that the

United States Government should, with England and Germany, guarantee the neutrality and equal accessibility of the islands and their harbors to the ships of all nations without preference.

To this communication Mr. Bayard replied:

PERSONAL.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 15, 1888.

DEAR SIR LIONEL: After reading the memorandum of Lord Salisbury in relation to the Sandwich Islands, it does not occur to me that I can add anything to what I stated to you orally in our interview on the 23d of December last, when you first sent it to me.

I was glad to find that you quite understood and had conveyed to your Government the only significance and meaning of the Pearl Harbor concession by the Hawaiian Government, as provided in the late treaty of that Government with the United States, and that it contained nothing to impair the political sovereignty of Hawaii.

The existing treaties of the United States and Hawaii create, as you are aware, special and important reciprocities, to which the present material prosperity of Hawaii may be said to owe its existence, and by one of the articles the cession of any part of the Hawaiian territory to any other government without the consent of the United States is inhibited.

In view of such existing arrangements it does not seem needful for the United States to join with other governments in their guaranties to secure the neutrality of Hawaiian territory, nor to provide for that equal accessibility of all nations to those ports which now exists.

I am, etc.,

T. F. BAYARD.

The direct and immediate motive of Great Britain in this correspondence is not evident; but it is obviously to be discovered in certain closely anterior events, sufficiently well known at the time. But a little while before an understanding had been reached between England and Germany relative to a division of a great area of the Pacific Ocean; the attitude then lately assumed by this Government respecting Samoan affairs had perhaps been the cause of some surprise and, it may be, a little apprehension in this direction on the part of Her Majesty's Government, and the frankness with which we shall see the British consul-general in Hawaii cautioning the King's Government against any exclusive concession of a naval station to any foreign power is no less useful a key to the action of Sir Lionel West. The causes, then, of this step were complicated; jealousy of the United States led to the inclusion of this Government in a project for an agreement prompted by jealousy of Germany, and France was relegated to the convention of 1843 by force of more pressing circumstances.

While Mr. Bayard, in February, 1888, was writing his answer to Sir Lionel, the British commissioner at Honolulu, formally protested against the grant to the United States of the exclusive use of Pearl River Harbor as a coaling and repair station, by Article II of the supplementary convention extending our reciprocity treaty, and argued that the Hawaiian Government was estopped from this action by the provisions of Article II of the King's treaty with Great Britain, granting to vessels of war liberty of entry to all harbors to which such ships of other nations "are or may be permitted to come." And he said:

Under instructions from Her Majesty's Government I have already pointed out to the Government of His Hawaiian Majesty that the acquisition by a foreign power of a harbor, or preferential concession in the Hawaiian Islands, would infallibly lead to the loss of the independence of the islands; but this consideration has not prevented His Hawaiian Majesty's Government from proceeding to the ratification of the supplementary convention with the United States, and although Her Majesty's Government are informed that by an exchange of notes between the Hawaiian minister at Washington and Mr. Bayard it is declared that the article in question

(No. 11) does not subtract from Hawaiian jurisdiction; that it gives no right of property in the harbor or cession of territory; that no exclusive right is conferred commercially, and that it terminates with the original treaty of 1875, whenever notice of such a termination is given. (Appendix.)

The question was ably treated by the Hawaiian minister for foreign affairs, and the privileges granted this Government clearly defined. (Appendix.)

On the 30th of July, 1889, an insurrection was set on foot by Robert W. Wilcox and Robert Boyd, two half-caste Hawaiians, who, on the afternoon of the same day, together with their adherents, about 100 in number, were defeated. The ringleader, with about 60 of his followers, was imprisoned. About 70 sailors and marines from the U. S. S. *Adams*, then in the harbor, were landed by permission with a machine gun to protect life and property at the legation and in the city, and their appearance on the streets had a favorable effect on the populace. Remaining over night, quartered at the armory, they returned on board the next morning when tranquility was restored. (Appendix.)

A dispute between the King and the cabinet, of a constitutional scope, was decided by the supreme court, against the King, just after the attempt at revolution; and it was determined that his signature was subject to the direction of the cabinet whenever required on public documents, and that the Government in all its departments must be conducted by that council. This controversy received the attentive consideration of all the foreign representatives, and its termination, as recited, appears to have been accepted with general satisfaction.

On the 20th of March, 1890, Mr. Blaine wrote inviting the King of the Hawaiian Islands to participate in the International American Conference, then in session at Washington. This invitation was extended in pursuance of a resolution of Congress adopted upon the President's recommendation. In consequence of the adjournment of the Conference *sine die* before Mr. Carter, the delegate from Hawaii, could present his credentials, he did not participate in its deliberations. Upon Mr. Blaine's invitation, however, Mr. Carter, on the 28th of April, after the adjournment, announced his appointment as delegate and expressed his regret at its arrival too late to permit his attendance on the Conference; but at the same time signified the probable accession of his Government to its conclusions.

In December, 1890, Kalakaua, the King, arrived in the United States on a friendly visit, and died at San Francisco, January 20, 1891. His body was returned to Honolulu on board the U. S. S. *Charleston*, the flagship of Rear-Admiral Brown, which arrived in that harbor January 29; whereupon the Princess Liliuokalani, regent during the King's absence, was proclaimed Queen. (Appendix.)

Considerable doubt and fear seem to have prevailed with the better element of the people in regard to the course of the new Queen, as the matter is reported by Mr. Stevens. On the 22d of February, 1891, he wrote:

The present ministry has been but a few months in office and the best men of the islands, including nearly all the principal business men, wish the present ministry to remain, who, by the present constitution, are chiefly independent of the Crown, and can not be removed except by impeachment or by the votes of the legislature. Under her extreme notions of sovereignty and the influence of her bad advisers, the Queen is trying to force the resignation of the ministers and to get a cabinet composed of her tools. So far the ministers have refused to resign, and the best public opinion increases in their support. Should the supreme court sustain the right of the ministers, which is very clearly and strongly intrenched in the constitution, the ministers will be supported by such a united determination of the business men and other better citizens of the islands as will force the

Queen to yield. If she should still persist and attempt to form a ministry of her own, without the consent of the legislature, she will surely imperil her throne. She is well known to be much more stubborn in character than her brother, the late King, but my present belief is that she will finally yield to the legal and other legitimate forces operative against her present course and place herself in the hands of the conservative and respectable men of the country as the only way to retain her throne.

Early in the spring of 1891 the supreme court decided that the Cabinet of the late King ceased to have legal existence at his death. A new Cabinet was appointed which seemed to give general satisfaction and somewhat to allay earlier apprehensions touching the probable course of the Queen. Mr. Stevens, however, expressed some lack of faith in the minister of finance.

In September, 1891, Mr. Stevens wrote that the prince consort, husband of Queen Liliuokalani, a native of New York and strongly American in his sympathies, had died August 27, 1891.

At the same time the minister reported a project for a revision of the reciprocity treaty between this Government and Hawaii, prompted by the removal of the tariff on sugar, which materially, if not vitally, affected the principal interests of the islands. Late in 1891, Mr. Mott Smith was appointed a special envoy to the United States to negotiate such an agreement, and a legislature favorable to the treaty was elected in February, 1892.

In a confidential communication of March 8, 1892, Mr. Stevens reports revolutionary plans to be held in check solely by the presence of an United States naval vessel, and describes a very general sentiment of hostility to the succession of the "half English" heir to the throne—at the time being educated in England—and a growing inclination among all classes towards annexation to the United States. (Appendix.)

Mr. Stevens's dispatches continue to be of the same tenor. The subjection of the queen to the influences of a half-caste Tahitian of the name of Wilson, and marshal of the Kingdom, since soon after her accession, continued to excite considerable dissatisfaction, and revolutionary schemes were rife throughout the year. The attitude of the Queen and her immediate entourage was one of arrogance. Late in August or early in September the cabinet was voted out, and a deadlock followed between the Queen and the legislature. The new cabinet was objectionable to the better elements, but a vote of want of confidence sufficiently decisive to bring on the crisis was not secured until the 17th October. The minister said in his dispatch of October 19, 1892, on the situation—

My present impression is, that the Queen and her faction will have to yield. Otherwise the entire overthrow of the monarchy could not be long delayed.

In his No. 74, of November 20, Mr. Stevens gave a full statement of the financial, agricultural, social, and political condition of the islands, and said:

One of two courses seems to me absolutely necessary to be followed: Either bold and vigorous measures for annexation or a "customs union," an ocean cable from the Californian coast to Honolulu, Pearl Harbor perpetually ceded to the United States, with an implied but not necessarily stipulated American protectorate over the islands.

Reports to the Secretary of the Navy—especially those beginning with one from Rear-Admiral Brown, dated September 6, 1892—corroborated the American minister's accounts and forecasts of events in Hawaii until, on the 28th of January, telegraphic news was received from both sources of the accomplishment of a peaceful revolution at Honolulu and the dethronement of the Queen. (Appendix.)

The correspondence examined in the preparation of this report indicates the general policy of this Government towards the Hawaiian Islands to have been, from 1820 to 1893, one of close friendship and protection, prompted by a desire for the welfare and autonomy of the islands and a careful preservation of American rights and territory on this continent. The active intervention of foreign powers in the affairs of Hawaii is shown to have been uniformly regarded with distrust, and a determined attitude against it seems to have been frankly assumed whenever occasion called for an expression of purpose upon the subject from the United States. This view of the common interests of the two countries several times contemplated annexation as a necessity under apprehended foreign encroachment at Honolulu, and once, if not more than once, as the positive policy of this Government—notably in the administration of President Pierce.

Respectfully submitted.

ANDREW H. ALLEN,
Chief, Bureau of Rolls and Library.

[The narrative of events from the 17th of January, 1893, is continued in the report accompanying the President's message of February 15, 1893, sending to the Senate the treaty concluded and signed at Washington, February 14, 1893, by the Secretary of State of the United States and the representatives of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.]

APPENDIX.

The time and assistance available in the preparation of the foregoing report and this appendix have not been sufficient to render a full presentation of the correspondence involved practicable here. The purpose of this supplement therefore is to give a general view of the progress of events and to submit copies of all papers of ascertained importance to a clear understanding and reinforcement of the narrative, except those published in the volumes of Foreign Relations of the United States and other volumes, to which reference is noted in a bibliographical paragraph.

It has been deemed neither necessary nor advisable to touch upon the subject of private claims of the citizens or subjects of either country against the government of the other, as none of the claims adverted to in the consular or diplomatic correspondence appears to have become at any time matter of special or separate negotiation or to have reached a position of adequate moment to demand any further action than the exercise of good offices by the diplomatic representative of the Government of the claimant.

Three unperfected treaties described in the correspondence are deposited in this Bureau, those of 1849, 1855, and 1867, respectively.

A considerable volume of correspondence upon Hawaiian relations will be found in the archives of the Navy Department, should it be regarded as desirable to examine letters of naval officers of the United States in support or elaboration of the consular and diplomatic letters given or referred to in the list of papers.

The present report and appendix bring the narrative down to the revolution of January 17, 1893, from which point it is continued in the report accompanying the President's message of February 15, 1893, sending to the Senate the treaty concluded and signed at Washington, February 14, 1893, by the Secretary of State of the United States and the representatives of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

A list of papers, chronologically arranged, follows, and is, in its turn, followed by a brief subject index for more convenient reference.

A. H. A.

BUREAU OF ROLLS AND LIBRARY, *February 14, 1893.*

LIST OF PAPERS.

[The arrangement is chronological.]

- Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States and the Sandwich Islands, signed at Honolulu, December 23, 1826.
 Letter to the Secretary of the Navy from Thomas ap Catesby Jones, December 25, 1826. Extract.
 Extract of letter to William Bolton Finch, U. S. S. *Vincennes*, January 20, 1829.
 Treaty between Great Britain and Hawaii of November 16, 1836, signed at Honolulu.
 Treaty between France and Hawaii, signed at Honolulu, July 12, 1839.
 Treaty between France and Hawaii, signed at Honolulu, July 17, 1839.
 Message of the President of December 31, 1842. (H. R. Ex. Doc. No. 35, Twenty-seventh Congress, third session.)
 Commercial Agent William Hooper's, No. 22, March 7, 1843.
 Commercial Agent William Hooper's, No. 23, March 11, 1843.
 Commercial Agent William Hooper's, No. 28, August 15, 1843.
 Mr. Webster to Mr. Brown, No. 7, March 15, 1843.
 Commercial Agent Hooper's No. 28, August 15, 1843.
 Mr. Brown to Mr. Webster, No. 5, October 26, 1843.
 Mr. Brown to Mr. Webster, No. 6, November 4, 1843.
 Declaration of Great Britain and France relating to independence of islands, London, November 28, 1843.
 Mr. Calhoun to Mr. Brown, No. 4, January 20, 1845.
 Treaty of peace, amity, and commerce between France and Hawaii, signed at Honolulu, March 26, 1846.
 Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Ten Eyck, August 28, 1848.
 Article 6, treaty with France of July 17, 1849.
 Mr. Ten Eyck to Mr. Buchanan, No. 55, September 3, 1849.
 Mr. Turrill to Mr. Clayton, No. 30, September 4, 1849.
 Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States and Hawaiian Islands, concluded at Washington 20th December, 1849.
 Messrs. Judd and Jarves to Mr. Clayton, May 30, 1850.
 Mr. Clayton to Messrs. Judd and Jarves, June 3, 1850.
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 Joint resolution of the nobles and representatives of June 21, 1851.
 Mr. Rives to Mr. Webster, No. 95, July 8, 1851.
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 Confidential, Mr. Webster to Mr. Severance, July 14, 1851.
 Mr. Rives to Mr. Webster, No. 97, July 22, 1851.
 Mr. Rives to Mr. Seward, No. 109, October 30, 1851.
 Mr. Marcy to Mr. Mason, No. 3, December 16, 1853.
 Message of the President of March 3, 1854.
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(Bureau of Rolls and Library, Department of State.)

- Mr. McBride to Mr. Seward, No. 9, October 9, 1863.
 Mr. Seward to Mr. McBride, No. 10, January 14, 1864.
 Message of the President, February 5, 1864.
 Mr. McBride to Mr. Seward, No. 37, September 16, 1864.
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 Mr. McCook to Mr. Seward, private, June 7, 1867.
 Mr. Seward to Mr. McCook, No. 33, July 13, 1867.
 Mr. McCook to Mr. Seward, No. 31, August 5, 1867.
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 Mr. Seward to Mr. McCook, No. 36, October 5, 1867.
 Mr. Seward to Mr. Spalding, No. 42, July 5, 1868.
 Mr. McCook to Mr. Seward, No. 54, August 14, 1868, with inclosure.
 Message of President Johnson, December 9, 1868.
 Mr. Z. S. Spalding to Mr. ——— Spalding, April 14, 1869.
 Mr. McCook and Mr. De Varigny, notes of conversations, September 14, 1869, and Mr. McCook and the King.
 Mr. Pierce to Mr. Fish, No. 189, February 7, 1873.
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 Mr. Pierce to Mr. Fish, No. 191, February 17, 1873.

- Gen. Schofield to Gen. Belknap, May 8, 1873.
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 Mr. Pierce to Mr. Fish, No. 243, February 17, 1874.
 Mr. Pierce to Mr. Fish, No. 245, February 20, 1874.
 Mr. Pierce to Mr. Fish, No. 291, October 12, 1874.
 Treaty between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands, Commercial Reciprocity, January 30, 1875.
 Treaty: Protocol of Conference, September 9, 1876. (Ratification of Commercial Reciprocity.)
 Mr. Evarts to Mr. Comly, No. 28, August 6, 1878. (See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1878.)
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 Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Daggett, No. 42, December 6, 1883. (See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1883.)
 Treaty: Hawaiian Islands Supplementary Convention, December 6, 1884. Reciprocity and Pearl River Harbor Cession.
 Mr. Merrill to Mr. Bayard, No. 78, September 2, 1886.
 Mr. Merrill to Mr. Bayard, No. 85, October 19, 1886.
 Mr. Hastings to Mr. Bayard, No. 89, October 28, 1886.
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 Mr. Merrill to Mr. Bayard, No. 173, February 24, 1888. (See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1888.)
 Treaty: Parcels Post Convention between the United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom, December 19, 1888.
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- Treaty of amity, commerce, and unavigation, unperfected, 1849. (Bureau of Rolls and Library, Department of State.)
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 Mr. Marcy to Mr. Mason, No. 3, December 16, 1853.
 Mr. McCook to Mr. Seward, No. 6, September 3, 1866.
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Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster, No. 74, November 20, 1892.

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See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1881.

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See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1873, 1880, 1881, 1882, 1885, 1888, 1889.

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Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster, No. 74, November 20, 1892.

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Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Ten Eyck, August 28, 1848.

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Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine, No. 46, February 8, 1892, revision.

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- Commercial Agent Wm. Hooper's No. 22, March 7, 1843.
- Commercial Agent Wm. Hooper's No. 23, March 11, 1843.
- Commercial Agent Wm. Hooper's No. 28, August 15, 1843.
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Treaty between France and Hawaii, signed at Honolulu July 12, 1839.

Treaty between France and Hawaii, signed at Honolulu July 17, 1839.

Treaty of peace, amity, and commerce between France and Hawaii, signed at Honolulu March, 26, 1846.

Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States and Hawaiian Islands, concluded at Washington, December 20, 1849.

Treaty of reciprocity, unperfected, 1855. (Bureau of Rolls and Library, Department of State.)

Treaty, unperfected treaty of reciprocity, 1867. (Bureau of Rolls and Library, Department of State.)

Treaty between United States and the Hawaiian Islands, Commercial Reciprocity, January 30, 1875.

Treaty: Protocol of Conference, September 9, 1876. Ratification of Commercial Reciprocity.

Treaty, Hawaiian Islands. Supplementary Convention, December 6, 1884. Reciprocity and Pearl River Harbor Cession.

Treaty, Parcels Post Convention between the United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom, December 19, 1888.

Visit of King Kalakaua:

- Mr. Pierce to Mr. Fish, No. 291, October 12, 1874.

Wiley case:

- Proceedings on appeal from judgment of the inferior court. Mr. Calhoun to Mr. Brown, No. 4, January 20, 1845.

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Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, between The United States and the Sandwich Islands, signed at Honolulu, December 23, 1826.

Articles of agreement made and concluded at Oahu, between Thomas ap Catesby Jones, appointed by the United States, of the one part, and Kauikeaouli, King of the Sandwich Islands and his guardians, on the other part.

ARTICLE I. The peace and friendship subsisting between the United States and their Majesties, the Queen Regent and Kauikeaouli, King of the Sandwich Islands, and their subjects and people, are hereby confirmed and declared to be perpetual.

II. The ships and vessels of the United States (as well as their consuls and all other citizens), within the territorial jurisdiction of the Sandwich Islands, together with all their property, shall be inviolably protected against all enemies of the United States in time of war.

III. The contracting parties, being desirous to avail themselves of the bounties of Divine Providence, by promoting the commercial intercourse and friendship subsisting between the respective nations; for the better security of these desirable objects, their Majesties bind themselves to receive into their ports and harbours, all ships and vessels of the United States, and to protect to the utmost of their capacity all such ships and vessels, their cargoes, officers, and crews, so long as they shall behave themselves peacefully, and not infringe the established laws of the land; the citizens of the United States being permitted to trade freely with the people of the Sandwich Islands.

IV. Their Majesties do further agree to extend the fullest protection within their control to all ships and vessels of the United States which may be wrecked on their shores, and to render every assistance in their power to save the wreck and her apparel and cargo; and, as a reward for the assistance and protection which the people of the Sandwich Islands shall afford to all such distressed vessels of the United States, they shall be entitled to a salvage or a portion of the property so saved; but such salvage shall in no case exceed one-third of the vessel saved, which valuation is to be fixed by a commission of disinterested persons, who shall be chosen equally by the parties.

V. Citizens of the United States, whether resident or transit, engaged in commerce or trading to the Sandwich Islands, shall be inviolably protected in their lawful pursuits, and shall be allowed to sue for and recover by judgment all claims against the subjects of His Majesty the King according to strict principles of equity and the acknowledged practice of civilized nations.

VI. Their Majesties do further agree and bind themselves to discountenance and use all practicable means to prevent desertion from all American ships which visit the Sandwich Islands; and to that end it shall be made the duty of all governors, magistrates, chiefs of districts, and all others in authority, to apprehend all deserters and to deliver them over to the master of the vessel from which they have

deserted; and for the apprehension of every such deserter who shall be delivered over as aforesaid, the master, owner, or agent shall pay to the person or persons apprehending such deserter the sum of 6 dollars, if taken on the side of the island near which the vessel is anchored; but if taken on the opposite side of the island the sum shall be 12 dollars, and if taken on any other island the reward shall be 24 dollars, and shall be a just charge against the wages of every such deserter.

VII. No tounage dues or impost shall be exacted of any citizen of the United States which is not paid by the citizens or subjects of the nation most favored in commerce with the Sandwich Islands; and the citizens or subjects of the Sandwich Islands shall be allowed to trade with the United States and her territories upon principles of equal advantage with the most favored nation.

Done in council at Honolulu, Island of Oahu, this 23rd day of December, in the year of our Lord 1826.

THOS. AP CATESBY JONES.
ELISABETA KAAHUMANU.
KARAIMOKU.
BOKI.
HOAPILI.
LIDIA NAMAHANA.

[From Jones, December 25, 1826, dated Honolulu.]

Says that the state of affairs in regard to foreigners being protected is in a bad condition and that his services are really required at the islands to protect the seamen.

"On the 23d instant I concluded some arrangements with the Government of these islands calculated to secure our interest in this quarter and suppress the evils which have hitherto existed. I have also secured satisfactory pledges for the speedy payment of the large claims held by American citizens against the islanders. In short, I hope it will be proved that the *Peacock's* visit to the Sandwich and Society Islands has in some degree accomplished the main object of the cruise."

[To Wm. Bolton Finch, U. S. S. *Vincennes*, January 20, 1829.]

"Chaplain Stewart has in his care and will deliver to you a letter to King Kamelameha, a few presents from our Government to the principal chiefs of the Sandwich Islands. You will deliver them to the persons for whom they are intended.

"Remain from two to three weeks, or as long as shall be thought expedient for careful to cultivate the most friendly relations and to procure from our consular and commercial agent or from other sources every information respecting our commercial and other interests which may be practicable."

Instructions to reclaim deserting sailors, and to make inquiries into the state of our commerce, etc.

[No mention made of the treaty of December 23, 1826.]

(2) *English treaty of Lord Edward Russell, November 16, 1836.*

Articles made and agreed on at Honolulu, island of Oahu, the 16th of November, 1836.

ARTICLE I. English subjects shall be permitted to come with their vessels, and property of whatever kind, to the Sandwich Islands; they shall also be permitted to reside therein, as long as they conform to the laws of these islands, and to build houses, and warehouses for their merchandise, with the consent of the King; and good friendship shall continue between the subjects of both countries, Great Britain and the Sandwich Islands.

ARTICLE II. English subjects, resident at the Sandwich Islands, are at liberty to go to their own country, or elsewhere, either in their own or any other vessel; they may dispose of their effects, enclosures, houses, &c., with the previous knowledge of the King, and take the value with them, without any impediment whatever. The land on which houses are built is the property of the King, but the King shall have no authority to destroy the houses, or in any way injure the property of any British subject.

ARTICLE III. When an English subject dies on the Sandwich Islands, his effects shall not be searched or touched by any of the governors or chiefs, but shall be delivered into the hands of his executors or heirs, if present; but if no heir or executor appear, the consul or his agent shall be executor for the same; if any debts were owing to the deceased, the governor of the place shall assist and do all in his power to compel the debtors to pay their debts to the heirs or executor, or the consul, in case no heir or executor appears, and the consul is to inform the King of the death of every British subject leaving property upon the Sandwich Islands.

KAMEHAMEHA III.

EDWARD RUSSEL,

Captain of H. B. M. S. Acteon.

[Translation.]

Treaty concluded July 12, 1839, between the King of the Sandwich Islands and Capt. Laplace, commanding the French frigate Artemise, acting in the name of the King of the French.

ARTICLE 1. The Catholic worship is declared free in all the islands subject to the King of the Sandwich (Islands); the members of that communion will enjoy there all the privileges granted to Protestants.

ART. 2. A piece of ground for a Catholic church will be granted by the Government at Hohorourou, a port frequented by the French, and that Church will be served by priests of their nation.

ART. 3. All the Catholics imprisoned on account of their religion since the last persecutions exercised against the French missionaries will be immediately set at liberty.

ART. 4. The King of the Sandwich (Islands) will deposit in the hands of the captain of the *Artemise* the sum of twenty thousand dollars as a guarantee of his future conduct towards France, the Government of which will restore him this sum when it shall deem that the clauses of

this treaty and those of the convention concluded with Captain Dupetit-Thouars in July, 1837, have been faithfully executed.

ART. 5. The treaty, together with the sum mentioned above, will be brought on board the frigate *Artemise* by one of the principal chiefs of the country, and, at the same time, the batteries of Honorourou will salute the French flag with twenty-one guns, which will be returned by the frigate.

Made and signed between the contracting parties July 12, 1839.

KAMEHAMEHA III.

C. LAPLACE,

Commanding the Artemise.

[Translation.]

Convention concluded July 17, 1839, between the King of the Sandwich Islands, Kamehameha III, and Captain Laplace, commanding the French frigate Artemise, representing his Government.

ARTICLE 1. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the King of the French and the King of the Sandwich Islands.

ART. 2. Frenchmen shall be protected in an efficient manner, in their persons and property, by the King of the Sandwich Islands, who will also grant them the necessary permission to prosecute those of his subjects against whom they may have just claims.

ART. 3. Such protection shall extend to French vessels, their crews and their officers. In case of shipwreck, the chiefs and inhabitants of the various parts of the archipelago must lend them assistance and protect them from pillage. The salvage dues will be settled, in case of difficulty, by umpires appointed by both parties.

ART. 4. No Frenchman accused of any crime can be tried otherwise than by a jury composed of foreign residents, proposed by the consul of France and accepted by the Government of the Sandwich Islands.

ART. 5. The desertion of sailors employed on board the French vessels will be severely repressed by the local authorities, who must employ every means at their command to have the deserters arrested; and the expenses of capture will be paid by the captains or owners of the said vessels, in accordance with the tariff adopted by the nations.

ART. 6. French goods, or those recognized as being of French origin, and especially wines and brandies, can not be prohibited, nor pay an import duty of more than five per cent ad valorem.

ART. 7. No tonnage or import duties can be required of French merchants, unless they are paid by the subjects of the most favored nation in its commerce with the Sandwich Islands.

ART. 8. The subjects of King Kamehameha III shall be entitled, in the French Possessions, to all the advantages enjoyed by the French in the Sandwich Islands, and they shall be considered, moreover, as belonging to the most favored nation, as regards its commercial relations with France.

Made and signed between the contracting parties, July 17, 1839.

KAMEHAMEHA III.

C. LAPLACE,

Captain, Commanding the Artemise.

[House Ex. No. 35, Twenty-seventh Congress, third session.]

SANDWICH ISLANDS AND CHINA.

Message from the President of the United States, respecting the trade and commerce of the United States with the Sandwich Islands and with diplomatic intercourse with their Government; also in relation to the new position of affairs in China, growing out of the late war between Great Britain and China, and recommending provision for a diplomatic agent.

DECEMBER 31, 1842.—Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

I communicate herewith to Congress copies of a correspondence which has recently taken place between certain agents of the Government of the Hawaiian or Sandwich Islands and the Secretary of State.

The condition of those islands has excited a good deal of interest, which is increasing by every successive proof that their inhabitants are making progress in civilization, and becoming more and more competent to maintain regular and orderly civil government. They lie in the Pacific Ocean, much nearer to this continent than the other, and have become an important place for the refitment and provisioning of American and European vessels.

Owing to their locality and to the course of the winds which prevail in this quarter of the world, the Sandwich Islands are the stopping-place for almost all vessels passing from continent to continent, across the Pacific Ocean. They are especially resorted to by a great number of vessels of the United States, which are engaged in the whale fishery in those seas. The number of vessels of all sorts, and the amount of property owned by citizens of the United States, which are found in those islands in the course of a year, are stated, probably with sufficient accuracy in the letter of the agents.

Just emerging from a state of barbarism, the Government of the islands is as yet feeble; but its dispositions appear to be just and pacific, and it seems anxious to improve the condition of its people, by the introduction of knowledge, of religious and moral institutions; means of education, and the arts of civilized life.

It can not but be in conformity with the interest and wishes of the Government and the people of the United States that this community thus existing in the midst of a vast expanse of ocean should be respected, and all its rights strictly and conscientiously regarded. And this must also be the true interest of all other commercial states. Far remote from the dominions of European Powers, its growth and prosperity as an independent state may yet be in a high degree useful to all whose trade is extended to those regions, while its near approach to this continent, and the intercourse which American vessels have with it—such vessels constituting five-sixths of all which annually visit it—could not but create dissatisfaction on the part of the United States at any attempt by another power, should such attempt be threatened or feared, to take possession of the islands, colonize them, and subvert the native Government. Considering, therefore, that the United States possesses so very large a share of the intercourse with those islands, it is deemed not unfit to make the declaration that their Government seeks nevertheless no peculiar advantages, no exclusive control over the Hawaiian Government, but is content with its independent existence, and anxiously wishes for its security and prosperity. Its forbear-

ance in this respect, under the circumstances of the very large intercourse of their citizens with the islands, would justify the Government, should events hereafter arise, to require it, in making a decided remonstrance against the adoption of an opposite policy by any other power. Under the circumstances, I recommend to Congress to provide for a moderate allowance to be made out of the Treasury to the consul residing there, that in a Government so new and a country so remote American citizens may have respectable authority to which to apply for redress, in case of injury to their person and property, and to whom the Government of the country may also make known any acts committed by American citizens of which it may think it has a right to complain.

Events of considerable importance have recently transpired in China. The military operations carried on against the Empire by the English Government have been terminated by a treaty according to the terms of which four important ports hitherto shut against foreign commerce are to be open to British merchants, viz, Amoy, Foo-Choo-Foo, Ningpo, and Chinghai. It can not but be interesting to the mercantile interest of the United States, whose intercourse with China at the single port of Canton has already become so considerable, to ascertain whether these other ports now open to British commerce are to remain shut, nevertheless, against the commerce of the United States. The treaty between the Chinese Government and the British commissioner provides neither for the admission nor the exclusion of the ships of other nations. It would seem, therefore, that it remains with every other nation having commercial intercourse with China to seek to make proper arrangements for itself with the Government of that Empire in this respect.

The importations into the United States from China are known to be large, having amounted in some years, as will be seen by the annexed tables, to \$9,000,000. The exports, too, from the United States to China, constitute an interesting and growing part of the commerce of the country. It appears that in the year 1841, in the direct trade between the two countries, the value of the exports from the United States amounted to \$715,000 in domestic products and \$485,000 in foreign merchandise. But the whole amount of American produce which finally reached China and is there consumed is not comprised in these tables, which show only the direct trade. Many vessels with American products on board sail with a primary destination to other countries, but ultimately dispose of more or less of their cargoes in the port of Canton.

The peculiarities of the Chinese Government and the Chinese character are well known. An Empire supposed to contain 300,000,000 of subjects, fertile in various rich products of the earth, not without the knowledge of letters and of many arts, and with large and expensive accommodations for internal intercourse and traffic, has for ages sought to exclude the visits of strangers and foreigners from its dominions, and has assumed for itself a superiority over all other nations. Events appear likely to break down and soften this spirit of nonintercourse, and to bring China ere long into the relations which usually subsist between civilized States. She has agreed, in the treaty with England, that correspondence between the agents of the two Governments shall be on equal terms—a concession which it is hardly probable will hereafter be withheld from other nations.

It is true that the cheapness of labor among the Chinese, their ingenuity in its application, and the fixed character of their habits and

pursuits may discourage the hope of the opening of any great and sudden demand for the fabrics of other countries; but experience proves that the productions of Western nations find a market, to some extent, among the Chinese; that that market, so far as respects the productions of the United States, although it has considerably varied in successive seasons, has on the whole more than doubled within the last ten years; and it can hardly be doubted that the opening of several new and important ports, connected with parts of the Empire heretofore seldom visited by Europeans or Americans, would exercise a favorable influence upon the demand for such products.

It is not understood that the immediate establishment of correspondent embassies and missions, or the permanent residence of diplomatic functionaries, with full powers, of each country, at the court of the other, is contemplated between England and China, although, as has been already observed, it has been stipulated that intercourse between the two countries shall hereafter be on equal terms. An ambassador or envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary can only be accredited, according to the usages of western nations, to the head or sovereign of the state. And it may be doubtful whether the court of Pekin is yet prepared to conform to these usages so far as to receive a minister plenipotentiary to reside near it.

Being of opinion, however, that the commercial interests of the United States, connected with China, require at the present moment a degree of attention and vigilance such as there is no agent of this Government on the spot to bestow, I recommend to Congress to make appropriation for the compensation of a commissioner to reside in China, to exercise a watchful care over the concerns of American citizens and for the protection of their persons and property; empowered to hold intercourse with the local authorities, and ready, under instructions from his Government, should such instructions become necessary and proper hereafter, to address himself to the high functionaries of the Empire, or through them to the Emperor himself.

It will not escape the observation of Congress that, in order to secure the important objects of any such measure, a citizen of much intelligence and weight of character should be employed on such agency; and that, to secure the services of such an individual, a compensation should be made corresponding with the magnitude and importance of the mission.

JOHN TYLER.

WASHINGTON, *December 30, 1842.*

Messrs. Richards and Haalilio to the Secretary of State.

WASHINGTON, *December 14, 1842.*

SIR: The undersigned having been duly commissioned by His Majesty Kamehameha III, King of all the Hawaiian Islands, to represent his Government and promote its interests in the United States, wish to call the attention of your Government to the existing relations between the two countries.

In the year 1826 articles of agreement, in the form of a treaty, were entered into between His Majesty's Government and Thomas ap Catesby Jones, commanding the United States sloop of war *Peacock*. His Majesty has never received any notice of that treaty's being ratified,

nor intimation that it was approved by the Government of the United States. His Majesty has, nevertheless, during the last sixteen years, governed himself by the regulations of that treaty in all his intercourse with citizens of the United States.

Subsequently to the above similar forms of agreement have been entered into between His Majesty and officers commanding vessels of war of different nations of Europe; but, so far as is known to the undersigned, those agreements have never received the sanction of their several Governments.

These facts, viewed in connection with their attendant circumstances, have led His Majesty to feel considerable embarrassment in managing his foreign relations, and have awakened the very strong desire that his Kingdom shall be *formally* acknowledged by the civilized nations of the world as a sovereign and independent State.

His Majesty considers that this acknowledgment has already been tacitly but virtually made, both in the United States and Europe, by the appointment of consuls and commercial agents to reside in his dominions and by the formal manner in which the commanders of national vessels have transacted business with him, many of whom have professedly acted under the express instructions of their several Governments. But he is nevertheless of opinion that the time has now arrived when both the interests and the honor of his Kingdom demand a more formal acknowledgment than has hitherto been made by any foreign government. It is His Majesty's request that the Government of the United States will take into consideration the nature, extent, and the rapidity of those changes which have taken place in his dominions during the last few years—changes which he has the happiness to believe are honorable both to his Government and to the people over whom it rules.

Twenty-three years ago the nation had no written language and no character in which to write it. The language had never been systematized nor reduced to any kind of form. The people had no acquaintance with Christianity nor with the valuable institutions or usages of civilized life. The nation had no fixed form or regulations of government, except as they were dictated by those who were in authority or might by any means acquire power. The right of property was not acknowledged, and was therefore but partially enjoyed; there were no courts of justice and the will of the chieftains was absolute. The property of foreigners had no protection except in the kind disposition of individuals. But under the fostering influence, patronage, and care of His Majesty and of his predecessors the language has been reduced to visible and systematized form and is now written by a large and respectable proportion of the people. Schools have been established throughout his dominions and are supported principally by the Government, and there are but few among the younger people who are unable to read. They have now, in their own language, a library, embracing a considerable variety of books on a variety of subjects, including the Holy Scriptures, works on natural history, civil history, church history, geography, political economy, mathematics, and statute law, besides a number of elementary books. A regular monarchical Government has been organized, of a limited and representative character, a translation of the constitution of which we herewith transmit. A code of laws, both civil and criminal, has been enacted and published.

The legislature holds an annual meeting, for the purpose of adding to and amending this code. Courts of justice have been established and regular trials by jury required in all important cases. Foreigners

of different nations have testified their confidence in these courts by bringing suits in cases where many thousands of dollars' worth of property was involved, and that, too, in cases when, with but very short delay, they could have been carried before the courts of other countries.

It has, moreover, been the uniform practice of consuls and commercial agents, resident in His Majesty's dominions, and also of all commanders of national vessels visiting those dominions, to demand all that protection, both of persons and property, which is demanded of sovereign and independent States, and this His Majesty believes has been duly and efficiently extended. While, therefore, all is demanded of his Government, and all is rendered by it which is demanded of or rendered by the governments of sovereign and independent states, he feels that he has a right to expect his state to be acknowledged as such, and thus be formally received into the general compact of sovereign nations. In the request which His Majesty hereby makes to the Government of the United States, he has of course for his direct object the promotion of the interest of his own Kingdom, but he is also very fully convinced that the important interests of all the great commercial nations will also be materially subserved by his dominions remaining, as they have hitherto been, independent.

Their position is such that they constitute the great center of the whale fishery for most of the world. They are on the principal line of communication between the western continent of America and the eastern continent of Asia; and such are the prevailing winds on that ocean that all vessels requiring repairs or supplies, either of provisions or of water, naturally touch at those islands, whether the vessels sail from Columbia River on the north, or from the far distant ports of Mexico, Central America, or Peru, upon the south; and it should be further added, that there is no other place in all that part of the Pacific Ocean where repairs of vessels can be made to so good an advantage, or supplies be obtained in such abundance, and on so favorable terms.

His Majesty wishes also to remind the Government of the United States that the amount of property belonging to their citizens, which is either landed at or enters the various harbors or roadsteads of his dominions, and is consequently more or less dependent on the protection of his Government, can not be less than from five to seven millions of dollars annually. This property lies in some 90 or 100 whaling ships and their cargoes, and in some 12 or 15 merchant vessels, besides also a considerable amount of other property belonging to American citizens on shore. At some seasons there have been not less than three or four millions of dollars worth of American property, and some 1,400 American citizens at the same time, at the various ports of the islands, requiring constantly, in some degree, the protection of His Majesty; and he has the happiness of believing that efficient and satisfactory aid has always been extended to those who have required it. In evidence corroborative of many of the facts herein stated, the undersigned do not hesitate to refer to documentary evidence, which they believe must be among the papers in your Department of State, recently furnished by masters of national vessels, but more especially by the United States commercial agent at Honolulu.

His Majesty is also desirous that there should be a definite arrangement for the settlement of any future difficulties which may unhappily arise and which, between sovereign and independent nations, would ordinarily be the subject of diplomatic correspondence. To carry into effect these desirable objects the undersigned are authorized by His

Majesty Kamehameha III to enter into negotiation with the authorities of the United States, by convention, treaty, or otherwise, whenever the latter shall acknowledge the sovereignty of the former; and as evidence that the undersigned are thus authorized, they are prepared to present official papers from His Majesty whenever the way is open for them to be received.

The undersigned will further state that they are directed to proceed from the United States to Europe for the purpose of obtaining from some of the principal governments there the same acknowledgments which it is the object of this letter to obtain from the Government of the United States.

Accept, sir, the assurances of the high consideration with which the undersigned have the honor to be your obedient servants,

TIMOTEO HAALILIO.
WILLIAM RICHARDS.

HON. DANIEL WEBSTER,
Secretary of State.

The Secretary of State to the agents of the Sandwich Islands.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 19, 1842.

GENTLEMEN: I have received the letter which you did me the honor to address to me, under date of the 14th instant, stating that you had been commissioned to represent in the United States the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, inviting the attention of this Government to the relations between the two countries, and intimating a desire for a recognition of the Hawaiian Government by that of the United States.

Your communication has been laid before the President, and by him considered.

The advantages of your country to the navigators in the Pacific, and in particular to the numerous vessels and vast tonnage of the United States frequenting that sea, are fully estimated; and just acknowledgments are due to the Government and inhabitants of the islands for their numerous acts of hospitality to the citizens of the United States.

The United States have regarded the existing authorities in the Sandwich Islands as a Government suited to the condition of the people, and resting on their own choice; and the President is of opinion that the interests of all the commercial nations require that that Government should not be interfered with by foreign powers. Of the vessels which visit the islands, it is known that a great majority belong to the United States. The United States, therefore, are more interested in the fate of the islands, and of their Government, than any other nation can be; and this consideration induces the President to be quite willing to declare, as the sense of the Government of the United States, that the Government of the Sandwich Islands ought to be respected; that no power ought either to take possession of the islands as a conquest, or for the purpose of colonization, and that no power ought to seek for any undue control over the existing Government, or any exclusive privileges or preferences in matters of commerce.

Entertaining these sentiments, the President does not see any present necessity for the negotiation of a formal treaty, or the appointment or reception of diplomatic characters. A consul or agent from this

Government will continue to reside in the islands. He will receive particular instructions to pay just and careful attention to any claims or complaints which may be brought against the Government or people of the islands by citizens of the United States, and he will also be instructed to receive any complaint which may be made by that Government for acts of individuals (citizens of the United States) on account of which the interference of this Government may be requested, and to transmit such complaint to this Department.

It is not improbable that this correspondence may be made the subject of a communication to Congress, and it will be officially made known to the governments of the principal commercial powers of Europe.

I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

DANIEL WEBSTER.

Messrs. TIMOTEO HAALILIO and WILLIAM RICHARDS,
Washington.

No. 22.

U. S. COMMERCIAL AGENCY,
Oahu, Sandwich Islands, March 7, 1843.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you of the arrival at these islands of the British frigate *Carysfort*, Capt. Lord Geo. Paulet, on the 11th ultimo, dispatched from San Blas by Admiral Thomas to inquire into certain charges alleged against this Government by Mr. Charlton, late English consul for these islands. Copies of the correspondence which took place between Capt. Paulet and His Majesty the King are herewith inclosed.

The nature of the demands made by Capt. Paulet were such as rendered it utterly impossible for the King to comply with them without completely subverting the established laws of the land and sacrificing the interests of many citizens of the United States, resident here, by setting aside decisions of juries in cases in which they were interested. In this dilemma he chose the only alternative proffered by Capt. Paulet, which was to cede the islands to Great Britain; accordingly a provisional cession was made, a copy of which I have the honor to inclose to you.

I would, observe in regard to the first of the demands made by Capt. Paulet, that the attachment on the property of Mr. Charlton was made by virtue of a judgment rendered against him in the regular established courts of these islands. The Government, however, fearing that the result of an immediate prosecution of the judgment might be construed into an infringement on the privileges claimed by ministers, simply caused the sheriff to issue public notice that the property could not be transferred, by which measure the full occupation and enjoyment of the property was secured to Mr. Charlton. Not the shadow of a loss, therefore, was sustained by him in consequence of the proceedings.

By the second demand it will be perceived that Capt. Paulet denies the right which this Government claims, in common with other nations, of receiving or rejecting consuls or their agents, even when good and sufficient cause for rejection can be adduced.

The punishment of foreigners who have committed crimes by putting them in irons has only occasionally been resorted to, to prevent offend-

ers from leaving the port; indeed so slack has the Government become in awarding punishment to merited offenders (foreigners) that I have formally declared to the governor of this island that, unless some reform should take place in that particular, I should feel it my duty to represent it to Com. Jones of the Pacific squadron.

The promise made by the King to Capt. Jones, referred to in the fourth demand, has been most religiously complied with, and the parties interested in the matter having voluntarily left their case with Sir George Simpson as arbitrator, the business has been fully and definitely settled, and is now only brought forward among other equally frivolous charges in order to swell the amount of "grievances" of British subjects.

In an interview between Mr. Simpson and the King, after he had formally acceded to the demands made by Capt. Paulet, he, Mr. Simpson, demanded that new trials should be granted in every instance in which decisions had been made affecting British subjects, since Mr. Charlton, the late consul, left, and this he contended was granted him by the King in acceding to the two last demands made by Capt. Paulet. The King, overwhelmed with this and similar unjust and exorbitant demands, gave up in despair. The final result of the business terminated in the provisional cession of the islands, before referred to.

I have thus briefly reviewed the character of the "demands" made on this Government by Capt. Paulet under the direction of Mr. Simpson; of the injustice of them no one conversant with the facts for a moment doubts.

I would observe in passing that Lord Paulet is a young man of whose intellectual capacities very little can be said, and could the Government of Great Britain be induced to send out a commission for the purpose of instituting an inquiry into the causes which led him to pursue the course he has, the result would by no means be creditable to him. Such a commission the King most devoutly wishes might be sent, and it is intended, I learn, to solicit the Governments of France and the United States to use their influence in bringing it about.

The geographical situation of the islands is such as to render it highly desirable that they should be neutral and their ports accessible at all times, in peace or war, by vessels of every nation.

Of their value to American interests the Department must be fully aware from repeated communications and returns from this agency.

A census of American citizens resident at these islands taken under my direction gives the number of 404, a large proportion of which are more or less interested in landed property, and they are not a little solicitous as to the national character they shall have to assume in order to retain their estates, should the islands become British territory. So, also, in regard to the titles of their estates, a majority of which are held simply by the right of gift from some chief, now deceased, to some person, also deceased, and from whom the estate has passed without that formality which an English court of law would deem requisite in order to establish a valid title.

It will be perceived on referring to the King's letter of February 18, (No. 7) to Capt. Paulet, that he complies with his demands only under protest; this was undoubtedly done with the hope of exciting the sympathies of foreign governments, but are there not other considerations which should induce the Government of the United States to exert its influence to secure the recognition of the independence of these islands by the European powers.

The subject is, indeed, one which deserves the profound consideration of the Government.

The British commissioners have assessed an additional duty of 1 per cent on all merchandise imported after this date.

I have the honor to be, etc.,

WM. HOOPER,
Acting U. S. Commercial Agent.

To the Hon. DANIEL WEBSTER,
Secretary of State, Washington City.

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S SHIP CARYSFORT,
Woahoo, February 11, 1843.

SIR: Having arrived at this port, in her Britannic Majesty's ship *Carysfort*, under my command, for the purpose of affording protection to British subjects, as likewise to support the position of Her Britannic Majesty's representative here, who has received repeated insults from the Government authorities at these islands, respecting which it is my intention to communicate only with the King in person.

I require to have immediate information by return of the officer conveying this dispatch whether or not the King (in consequence of my arrival) has been notified that his presence will be required here, and the earliest day on which he may be expected, as otherwise I shall be compelled to proceed to his residence, in the ship under my command, for the purpose of communicating with him.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

GEORGE PAULET,
Captain.

To KEKUANO, A,
Governor of Woahoo, etc.

[Translated by G. P. Judd, translator to the Government.]

HONOLULU, OAHY, *February 11, 1843.*

Salutations to you, Lord George Paulet, captain of Her Britannic Majesty's ship *Carysfort*.

I have received your letter by the hand of the officer, and, with respect, inform you that we have not as yet sent for the King, as we were not informed of the business, but, having learned from your communication that you wish him sent for, I will search for a vessel and send.

He is at Wailuku, on the eastern side of Maui. In case the wind is favorable he may be expected in six days.

Yours, with respect,

M. KEKUANO, A.

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S SHIP CARYSFORT,
Honolulu Harbor, February 16, 1843.

SIR: I have the honor to acquaint your Majesty of the arrival in this port of Her Britannic Majesty's ship, under my command, and, accord-

ing to my instructions, I am desired to demand a private interview with you, to which I shall proceed with a proper and competent interpreter. I therefore request to be informed at what hour to-morrow it will be convenient for your Majesty to grant me that interview.

I have the honor to remain your Majesty's

Most obedient and humble servant,

GEO. PAULET,

Captain.

To His Majesty KAMEHAMEHA III.

HONOLULU, *February 17, 1843.*

Salutations to you, Lord George Paulet, Captain of Her Britannic Majesty's ship Carysfort.

SIR: We have received your communication of yesterday's date, and must decline having any private interview, particularly under the circumstances which you propose. We shall be ready to receive any written communication from you to-morrow, and will give it due consideration.

In case you have business of a private nature, we will appoint Dr. Judd our confidential agent to confer with you, who, being a person of integrity and fidelity to our Government, and perfectly acquainted with all our affairs, will receive your communications, give you all the information you require (in confidence), and report the same to us.

With respect,

KAMEHAMEHA III.

KEKAULOUHI.

I hereby certify the above to be a faithful translation,

G. P. JUDD,

Translator and Interpreter for the Government.

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S SHIP CARYSFORT,

Woahoo, February 17, 1843.

SIR: In answer to your letter of this day's date (which I have too good an opinion of your majesty to allow me to believe ever emanated from yourself, but from your ill-advisers) I have to state that I shall hold no communication whatever with Dr. G. P. Judd, who, it has been satisfactorily proved to me, has been the punic mover in the unlawful proceedings of your Government against British subjects.

As you have refused me a personal interview, I inclose you the demands which I consider it my duty to make upon your Government, with which I demand a compliance at or before 4 o'clock p. m. to-morrow (Saturday); otherwise I shall be obliged to take immediate coercive steps to obtain these measures for my countrymen.

I have the honor to be your majesty's most obedient, humble servant,

GEO. PAULET,

Captain.

His Majesty KAMEHAMEHA III.

Demand made by the Right Honorable Lord George Paulet, captain, R. N., commanding Her Britannic M. Ship Carysfort, upon the King of the Sandwich Islands.

First. The immediate removal by public advertisement, written in the native and English languages and signed by the governor of this island and F. W. Thompson, of the attachment placed upon Mr. Charlton's property, the restoration of the land taken by the Government for its own use and really appertaining to Mr. Charlton, and reparation for the heavy loss to which Mr. Charlton's representatives have been exposed by the oppressive and unjust proceedings of the Sandwich Island Government.

Second. The immediate acknowledgment of the right of Mr. Simpson to perform the functions delegated to him by Mr. Charlton, namely, those of Her Britannic Majesty's acting consul until Her Britannic Majesty's pleasure be known upon the reasonableness of your objections to him, the acknowledgment of that right, and the reparation for the insult offered to Her Majesty through her acting representative, to be made by a public reception of his commission and the saluting the British flag with twenty-one guns, which number will be returned by Her Britannic Majesty's ship under my command.

Third. A guarantee that no British subject shall in future be subjected to imprisonment in fetters, unless he is accused of a crime which by the laws of England would be considered a felony.

Fourth. The compliance with a written promise given by King Kamehameha to Capt. Jones, of Her Britannic Majesty's ship *Curaçoa*, that a new and a fair trial would be granted in a case brought by Henry Skinner, which promise has been evaded.

Fifth. The immediate adoption of firm steps to arrange the matters in dispute between British subjects and natives of the country or others residing here, by referring these cases to juries, one-half of whom shall be British subjects, approved of by the consul, and all of whom shall declare on oath their freedom from prejudgment upon or interest in the case brought before them.

Sixth. I direct communication between His Majesty Kamehameha and her Britannic Majesty's acting consul for the immediate settlement of all cases of grievance and complaint on the part of British subjects against the Sandwich Island Government.

Dated on board her Britannic Majesty's ship at Woahoo this 17th day of February.

GEORGE PAULET,
Captain.

Salutations to Right Honorable Lord George Paulet, captain of Her Britannic Majesty's ship *Carysfort*.

We have received your letter and the demands which accompanied, and in reply would inform your lordship that we have commissioned Sir George Simpson and William Richards as our ministers plenipotentiary and envoys extraordinary to the court of Great Britain, with full powers to settle the difficulties which you have presented before us; to assure Her Majesty the Queen of our uninterrupted affection and confer with her ministers as to the best means of cementing the harmony between us.

Some of the demands which you have laid before us, are of a nature calculated seriously to embarrass our feeble Government, by contraven-

ing the laws established for the benefit of all. But we shall comply with your demands as it has never been our intention to insult Her Majesty the Queen or injure any of her estimable subjects; but we must do so under protest, and shall embrace the earliest opportunity of representing our case more fully to her Britannic Majesty's Government through our ministry.

Trusting in the magnanimity of the sovereign of a great nation whom we have been taught to respect and love, that we shall there be justified.

Waiting your further order with sentiments of respect,
KAMEHAMEHA.
KEKAULUOHI.

I hereby certify the above to be a faithful translation.

G. P. JUDD,
Translator for the Government.

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S SHIP CARYSPORT,
Woahoa, February 18, 1843.

SIR: I have had the honor to acknowledge Your Majesty's letter of this day's date, wherein you intimate your intention of complying with my demands, which I have considered my duty to make on Your Majesty's Government, I appoint the hour of 2 o'clock this afternoon for the interchange of salutes, and I shall expect that you will inform me at what hour on Monday you will be prepared to receive myself and Her Britannic Majesty's Representative.

I have the honor to be Your Majesty's most obedient humble servant,
GEORGE PAULET, *Captain.*

His Majesty TAMEHAMEHA III.

HONOLULU, OAHU, *February 18, 1843.*

Salutations to Lord George Paulet, captain of Her Britannic Majesty's ship *Carysfort*.

I have received your communication and make known to you that I will receive yourself and Her Britannic Majesty's representative, on Monday, the 20th of February, at 11 o'clock a. m.

Yours respectfully,

KAMEHAMEHA III.

I hereby certify the above to be a faithful translation.

G. P. JUDD,
Translator for the Government.

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S SHIP CARYSFORT,
Woahoo, February 17, 1843.

SIR: I have the honor to notify you that Her Britannic Majesty's ship *Carysfort*, under my command, will be prepared to make an immediate attack upon this town at 4 p. m. to-morrow (Saturday) in the event of the demands now forwarded by me to the King of these islands not being complied with by this time.

I have the honor to be, etc.,

GEORGE PAULET,
Captain.

CAPTAIN LONG,

Commanding U. S. S. Boston, Honolulu:

Where are you, chiefs, people and commons from my ancestor, and people from foreign lands!

Hear ye! I make known to you that I am in perplexity by reason of difficulties into which I have been brought without cause; therefore, I have given away the life of our land, hear ye! But my rule over you, my people, and your privileges will continue, for I have hope that the life of the land will be restored when my conduct is justified.

Done at Honolulu, Oahu, this twenty-fifth day of February, 1843.

KAMEHAMEHA III
KEKAULUOHI.

Witness,

JOHN D. PAALUA.

I hereby certify the above to be a faithful translation.

G. P. JUDD,
Recorder and Translator for Government.

In consequence of the difficulties in which we find ourselves involved, and our opinion of the impossibility of complying with the demands in the manner in which they are made by Her Britannic Majesty's representative upon us, in reference to the claims of British subjects, we do hereby cede the group of islands known as the Hawaiian (or Sandwich) Islands, unto the Right Honorable Lord George Paulet, captain of her Britannic Majesty's ship of war *Carysfort*, representing Her Majesty, Victoria, Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, from this date, and for the time being: the said cession being made with the reservation that it is subject to any arrangements that may have been entered into by the representatives appointed by us to treat with the Government of Her Britannic Majesty; and in the event that no agreement has been executed previous to the date hereof subject to the decision of Her Britannic Majesty's Government on conference with the said representatives appointed by us; or in the event of our representatives not being accessible, or not having been acknowledged, subject to the decision which Her Britannic Majesty may pronounce on the receipt of full information from us, and from the Right Honorable Lord George Paulet.

In confirmation of the above we hereby affix our names and seals this twenty-fifth day of February, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and forty-three, at Honolulu, Oahu, Sandwich Islands.

KAMEHAMEHA III.
KEKAULUOHI.

Signed in the presence of—

G. P. JUDD,
Recorder and Translator for the Government.

A provisional cession of the Hawaiian or Sandwich Islands having been made this day by Kamehameha III, King, and Kekauluohi, premier thereof, unto me, the Right Honorable Lord George Paulet, commanding Her Britannic Majesty's ship *Carysfort*, on the part of Her Britannic Majesty, Victoria, Queen of Great Britain and Ireland; subject to arrangements which may have been made or shall be made in Great Britain with the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, I do hereby proclaim,

First. That the British flag shall be hoisted on all the islands of the group, and the natives thereof shall enjoy the protection and privileges of British subjects.

Second. That the government thereof shall be executed, until the receipt of communications from Great Britain, in the following manner, namely: By the native King and chiefs and the officers employed by them, so far as regards the native population, and by a commission consisting of King Kamehameha III, or a deputy appointed by him, the Right Honorable Lord George Paulet; Duncan Forbes Mackay, esquire, and Lieut. Frere, R. N., in all that concerns relations with other powers (save and except the negotiations with the British Government), and the arrangements among foreigners (others than natives of the Archipelago) resident on these islands.

Third. That the laws at present existing or which may be made at the ensuing council of the king and chiefs (after being communicated to the commission) shall be in full force so far as natives are concerned; and shall form the basis of the administration of justice by the commission in matters between foreigners resident on these islands.

Fourth. In all that relates to the collection of the revenue, the present officers shall be continued at the pleasure of the native King and chiefs, their salaries for the current year being also determined by them, and the archives of Government remaining in their hands; the accounts are, however, subject to inspection by the commission heretofore named. The Government vessels shall be in like manner subject, however, to their employment if required for Her Britannic Majesty's service.

Fifth. That no sales, leases, or transfers of land shall take place by the action of the commission appointed as aforesaid, nor from natives to foreigners, during the period intervening between the 24th of this month and the receipt of notification from Great Britain of the arrangements made there; they shall not be valid, nor shall they receive the signatures of the King and premier.

Sixth. All the existing and bona fide engagements of the native King and premier shall be executed and performed as if this cession had never been made.

Given under my hand this 25th day of February, in the year of our Lord 1843 at Honolulu, Oahu, Sandwich Islands.

GEORGE PAULET,
Captain of H. B. M. S. Carysfort.

Signed in the presence of

G. P. JUDD,

Recorder and Interpreter to the Government.

ALEXR. SIMPSON,

H. B. M. Acting Consul.

No. 23.

U. S. COMMERCIAL AGENCY,
Oahu, Sandwich Islands, March 11, 1843.

SIR: The document herewith inclosed has been received at this office from His Majesty the King of these islands, with a request that it be forwarded to the President of the United States by the earliest opportunity.

I have the honor to remain, sir, etc.,

WM. HOOPER,
Acting U. S. Commercial Agent.

HON. DANIEL WEBSTER,
Secretary of State, Washington City.

[Inclosure in No. 23.—Translation.]

Kamehameha III, native King of the Sandwich Islands, to His Excellency John Tyler, the President of the United States of America.

GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND: In trouble and difficulty we present for consideration to the President the unfortunate situation in which we and our Government are placed.

Demands upon us unsustained by the acknowledged laws of nations and unfounded in justice were for the first time presented by Lord George Paulet, captain of Her British Majesty's ship *Carysfort*, then lying in the harbor of Honolulu, with a threat of coercive measures in case of noncompliance within nineteen hours. Our proposals for discussion and negotiation through our principal adviser were declined with rudeness, and we were compelled without a hearing to yield to demands which we believed to be arbitrary and unjust as regards ourselves, oppressive and illegal as regards foreign residents.

We have been compelled to acknowledge an acting consul of Her Britannic Majesty against whom there were positive objections susceptible of explicit proof, without the grounds of our refusal being heard or considered. The acknowledged consul of Her Britannic Majesty had suddenly and secretly withdrawn from these islands without soliciting an interview or giving us any sort of notice of his intentions previous to his departure. After his departure, we received notice that he had delegated his consular functions to Alexander Simpson, who was a known and declared enemy of our Government, who had openly insulted the chief magistrate of this island and other high officers of our appointment, who had publicly threatened to involve us in difficulties, and whose recognition as consular agent was protested against by two British subjects who represented the chief commercial interests in these islands.

Compliance has been compelled with demands, violating the obligations of contracts and contravening laws for the collection of debts, which have been established for the general benefit in accordance with the statutes of civilized nations, by compelling us to annul the decision of juries after the cases had been dismissed, and to grant new trials contrary to law, and by compelling us to remove attachments levied by one British resident on the property of another in due course of law and under the usual formalities.

Precluded from negotiation and unable to repel by force, we yielded to these requisitions, under protest, of embracing the earliest opportunity of representing them more fully to Her Britannic Majesty.

Compliance having been thus procured to the foregoing demands, others were preferred by Her Britannic Majesty's acting consul (now acknowledged) more unjust, exorbitant and arbitrary; claims for heavy indemnities where no damage was proven, and only alleged on frivolous pretexts, and demands for damages in a case still pending under the previous protest to Her Britannic Majesty. We were called upon to violate every principle of equity, by setting aside the decision of juries in several cases without any just cause being pretended why new trials should be granted; these demands were enforced at private interviews between ourselves, his lordship and Her Britannic Majesty's acting consul. The subject was only verbally canvassed, written negotiations were positively refused, and even written statements and proof and copies of the claims preferred were denied. The only alternative offered us were immediate resolve to violate the laws by acts illegal and oppressive, immediate admission and payment of claims to indemnity so loosely supported, or immediate hostilities.

Without force to resist hostilities, without resources to meet the payment of the heavy indemnities demanded, and firmly resolved to support law and justice, we adopted the only peaceful alternative left, to throw ourselves upon the generosity of the British nation by a conditional cession of these islands to Her Britannic Majesty. To have awaited hostilities would have been to expose to destruction the property and jeopardize the lives of a large number of foreign residents who are American citizens; to have complied with the demands urged would have been to sanction oppressive and illegal acts affecting the rights and prospects of American citizens also, and an open violation of the stipulations with the United States in 1826.

Placed in difficulties from which we could not extricate ourselves with honor and justice, compelled to immediate decision, and threatened with immediate hostilities we have, with the advice and consent of our chiefs, signed with a heavy hand and many tears the deed of provisional cession and have permitted the British flag to be planted in all our islands, but under the guns of a frigate and at the point of the bayonet.

Relying on the magnanimity and firmness of the United States, we appeal to the President to interpose the high influence of the United States with the court of England to grant us an impartial hearing and procure us justice, to induce Her British Majesty to withdraw from the sovereignty of these islands and leave us as we have been—an *independent government supported in our right*.

We have labored to civilize and improve our islands; we have adopted the laws of the United States and of Britain; we have appointed upright and capable American citizens and British subjects to offices of trust and responsibility, in order that their functions might be exercised with energy and fidelity; we have adopted all suggestions which would tend to put the commercial intercourse of American citizens with us upon the best footing; we have been gratified with the large and increasing number of American residents. We confidently appeal to the Americans on these islands engaged in mercantile and commercial pursuits to testify to the honesty of our intentions and our capabilities for self-government, and we acknowledge them to have been the most consistent and efficient supporters of our Government.

We look to the United States with peculiar feelings of respect and gratitude. To the benevolence and enterprise of that great people we owe the introduction of the Christian religion, of civilization and laws

of commerce and agriculture, and the large and respectable number of our foreign residents.

We ask of you to secure and preserve the great interests common to us and you, and arrest the course of events so prejudicial to both; and we shall never cease to be grateful for your aid.

And we pray to the Almighty God to have your excellency, our great and good friend, in his most holy keeping.

Written at Honolulu, Island of Oahu, Hawaiian (Sandwich) Islands, this 10th day of March, anno Domini one thousand eight hundred and forty three.

By your good friend,

KAMEHAMEHA III. [SEAL.]
Premier KEKAULUOHII. [SEAL.]

No. 28.]

U. S. COMMERCIAL AGENCY,
Sandwich Islands, August 15, 1843.

SIR: I have the honor to announce to you the arrival at this port, on the 26th ultimo, of H. B. M. Frigate *Dublin*, from Valpao, and of the restoration of the sovereignty of this group of islands to His Majesty the King thereof by Rear Admiral Thomas.

It appears that the acts of Capt. Paulet were entirely unauthorized by the British Government, or the commander of the British naval force in the Pacific.

The U. S. Ship *Constellation* arrived at these islands some time prior to the restoration of the Hawaiian flag by Admiral Thomas, and Com. Kearny receiving official information from me of the transaction of Capt. Paulet issued a protest, a copy of which is herewith inclosed.

The protest of the King against Loré Paulet, A, and the declaration of Admiral Thomas, Doc. C, are herewith inclosed for the information of the State Department.

The restoration of the Government of these islands to the native chiefs is as gratifying to the American residents here as it must be to the Government of the United States.

With sentiments of the highest consideration, etc.

WM. HOOPER,
Acting U. S. Commercial Agent.

HON. DANIEL WEBSTER,
Secretary of State, Washington.

Know all men that, according to private instructions given to our deputy, he on the 10th of May, issued a protest on our behalf in the following words:

"Whereas the undersigned was, by commission dated February 27, 1843, appointed deputy for His Majesty Kamehameha III to the British Commission for the Government of the Sandwich Islands, under the provisional cession thereof unto Her Most Gracious Majesty Victoria, Queen of the United Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland;

"And whereas in the prosecution of business by the commissioners many acts have been passed and consummated affecting the interests of foreigners residing on the islands, and by acts which virtually abrogate the bona fide obligations of the Government existing at the period of

the provisional session, to which acts the said Kamehameha III did refuse through me, his deputy;

"And whereas, by an order issued April 27, 1843, to the acting governor of Oahu, and by subsequent orders dated May 8, 1843, issued to all the governors of these Sandwich Islands, the commissioners, to wit, the Rt. Hon. Lord George Paulet, captain of H. B. M. ship *Carysfort*, and Lieut. John Frere, R. N., did virtually abrogate one of the existing laws of these islands by forbidding the imprisonment of persons found guilty of fornication, except in certain cases not specified in the laws, as will appear more fully upon reference to said orders, violating thereby the solemn compact entered into under the provisional session;

"Now, therefore, be it known to all men that I, the said deputy for the said King Kamehameha III, do by these presents enter this my most solemn protest against the acts, especially those above recited, of the said commissioners, which have not the signature and approbation of me, the said deputy, as will appear more fully upon reference to the records of said commission.

"And I do hereby most solemnly protest against the said Rt. Hon. Lord George Paulet and Lieut. Frere, commissioners aforesaid, and all others whom it may concern, holding them responsible for their violation of the solemn compact or treaty entered into on the 25th day of February, 1843.

"G. P. JUDD,
"for the King.

"HONOLULU, OAHU, SANDWICH ISLANDS, *May 10, 1843.*"

On the next day our deputy withdrew from the British commission by the following document, acting in our place and stead:

"Whereas the undersigned deputy for the King Kamehameha III did, on the 10th day of May, instant, enter his protest against certain acts of the British commission for the Government of the Sandwich Islands;

"And whereas the undersigned has been verbally informed this day by the Rt. Hon. Lord George Paulet and Lieut. Frere that one of the laws as made at the recent Council of the King and Chiefs, viz, 'A law for the licensing of public auctioneers,' shall not go into operation;

"And whereas it now appearing evident to the undersigned that the terms of the compact or treaty entered into on the 25th February, 1843, will not in future be respected by the British commission;

"Therefore be it known to all men that I, the said deputy, do by these presents resign my seat in the said commission, thereby withdrawing the said King Kamehameha III from all future responsibilities in the acts of the said commission.

"Done at Oahu Sandwich Islands, at the office of the British commission for the Government of the Sandwich Islands, this 11th day of May, A. D 1843.

"G. P. JUDD,
"Deputy for the King."

We therefore publicly make known that we, Kamehameha III, the King, fully approve and acknowledge the protest and withdrawal of our deputy as our own, and declare that we will no more sit with the British commissioners, or be responsible for any act of theirs which may encroach on the rights of foreigners.

The Rt. Hon. Lord George Paulet and his Lieutenant, John Frere, having enlisted soldiers under the title of "the Queen's Regiment", maintaining them as a standing army out of funds appropriated by us for the payment of our just debts, which expense we consider quite uncalled for and useless; they having enforced their demand for the payment of the money by a threat of deposing from his trust an officer of the treasury, although contrary to the orders of the King and premier to him, made known to the British Commissioners;

By these oppressions, by the trial of natives for alleged offenses against the native Government, cases which come not properly under their cognizance, and by their violating the laws which, by the treaty, were to have been held sacred until we hear from England; we are oppressed and injured, and feel confident that all good men will sympathize with us in our present state of distress; and now we protest in the face of all men against all such proceedings both towards ourselves and foreigners, subjects of other governments, on the part of the Rt. Hon. Lord George Paulet, captain of H. B. ship *Carysfort*, and his lieutenant, John Frere, R. N., and take the world to witness that they have broken faith with us.

LAHAINA MAUI, SANDWICH ISLANDS, *June 24, 1843.*

By me, (Signed) KAMEHAMEHA III.

By me, (Signed) KEKAULUOHI,

Premier.

His Majesty KAMEHAMEHA III,

King of the Sandwich Islands:

In the name and on behalf of the people of the United States of America and their Government, which the undersigned has the honor to represent, and in order to explain clearly for the information of all concerned is issued a protest.

Whereas a provisional cession of the Hawaiian or Sandwich Islands was made by His Majesty Kamehameha III and Kekauluohi, premier thereof, unto the Hon. George Paulet, commanding Her Britannic Majesty's ship *Carysfort* (to wit) on the 25th day of February, 1843, and whereas, the United States' interests and those of their citizens resident on the aforesaid Hawaiian Islands are deeply involved in a seizure of His Majesty's Government under the circumstances; as well as in the act of the aforesaid King and premier acceding thereto under protest or otherwise, to affect the interests before cited: Now, therefore, be it known that I solemnly protest against every act and measure in the premises; and do declare that from and after the day of said cession until the termination of the pending negotiations between His Majesty's envoys and the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, I hold His Majesty Kamehameha III and Capt. Lord George Paulet answerable for any and every act, by which a citizen of the United States resident as aforesaid shall be restrained in his just and undisputed rights and privileges, or who may suffer inconvenience or losses, or be forced to submit to any additional charges on imports or other revenue matters, or exactions in regard to the administration of any municipal laws whatever enacted by the "Commission" consisting of His Majesty King Kamehameha III, or his deputy of the aforesaid islands and the

Right Hon. Lord George Paulet, Duncan Forbes Mackay, esq., and Lieut. John Frere, R. N.

Given under my hand on board the U. S. Ship *Constellation*, at anchor off Honolulu, Oahu, this 11th day of July, 1843.

LAWRENCE KEARNEY,
Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Naval force in the East Indies.

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S SHIP DUBLIN,
Off Honolulu, July 26, 1843.

SIR: It being my desire to obtain the honor of a personal interview with His Majesty King Kamehameha III, for the purpose of conferring with His Majesty on the subject of the provisional cession of his dominions, I have to request that you will be pleased to intimate my wishes to His Majesty in order that he may appoint the time and place where such interview may be held.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

RICHARD THOMAS,
*Rear Admiral and Commander-in-Chief of H. B. M.
Ships and Vessels in the Pacific.*

To KEKUANA'OA,
Governor of Oahu.

[With Mr. Hooper's No. 28.]

DECLARATION.

Of Rear-Admiral Thomas, Commander in Chief of Her Britannic Majesty's ship and vessels in the Pacific, in relation to the events which transpired at the Sandwich Islands, and consequent upon the visit of Her Britannic Majesty's Ship Carysfort in February, 1843.

TO KING KAMEHAMEHA III AND THE PRINCIPAL CHIEFS OF THE SANDWICH ISLANDS: Immediately that the commander in chief was made acquainted in Valparaiso in June, 1843, of the provisional cession of the Hawaiian Islands unto the Right Honorable Lord George Paulet, as the then and there representative of Her Majesty, Queen Victoria, he hastened to the spot to make himself fully acquainted with all the circumstances and, if possible, the motives which led to such an unlooked for event.

His first duty on arrival was to seek a personal interview with His Majesty Kamehameha III, and to ascertain whether these difficulties in which he found himself involved, and the opinion which His Majesty appeared to entertain of the impossibility of complying with certain requisitions which had been made, were so utterly insurmountable as to call upon him to renounce the sovereignty of these islands for the time being, likewise whether the cession was a free unbiased and unsolicited act of sovereign power.

The rear-admiral having ascertained that the difficulties to which allusion is made in the deed of cession might be surmounted, having convinced His Majesty that he had not properly understood the principles of justice and good faith which invariably guide the councils of Her Majesty, the Queen of Great Britain, in all their deliberations, partic-

ularly respecting their relations with foreign powers, and that whenever it becomes necessary to vindicate the rights of British subjects or redress their wrongs the government scrupulously respects those rights which are vested in all nations in an equal degree, whether they be powerful or weak, making it, therefore, a rule not to resort to force until every expedient for an amicable adjustment has failed, having, moreover, learned that His Majesty entertained the hope that his conduct was capable of justification, and that such justification he thought would restore to him the authority he had ceded under supposed difficulties, and having, moreover, assured His Majesty that whilst it is the earnest desire of the Government of Great Britain to cultivate by every means a good understanding with every independent nation, and to prevent any of its subjects from injuring those of other sovereigns, either in person or property, wherever they may be located, and that when it can be avoided rather than urge compliance with demands which are likely to embarrass a feeble Government, its object is to foster and even *assist* by kind advice or good offices such as may be disposed to seek its friendly interposition, requiring in return only equal privileges for such British residents as may have been granted to the subjects of the most favored nation. Lastly, His Majesty has given his assent to new proposals submitted to him for the amicable adjustment of the pending differences which led to the temporary cession of his authority. The commander-in-chief of Her Britannic Majesty's ships and vessels in the Pacific, for the reasons herein stated and as the highest local representative of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, hereby declares and makes manifest that he does not accept of the provisional cession of the Hawaiian Islands, made on the 25th day of February, 1843, but that he considers His Majesty Kamehameha III the legitimate King of those islands, and he assures His Majesty that the sentiments of his Sovereign towards him are those of unvarying friendship and esteem, that Her Majesty sincerely desires King Kamehameha to be treated as an independent sovereign, leaving the administration of justice in his own hands, the faithful discharge of which will promote his happiness and the prosperity of his dominions.

Although it is the duty of every sovereign and his ministers and counselors to do all in their power to prevent any of their subjects from injuring those of any other nation residing among them; nay more, that he ought not to permit foreigners to settle in his territory unless he engages to protect them as his own subjects, and to afford them perfect security as far as regards himself; yet Great Britain will not consider the public character of the legitimate sovereign of a state but recently emerged from barbarism, under the fostering care of civilized nations, as at all implicated by the aggression of some of his subjects, provided the Government does not directly or indirectly sanction any acts of partiality or injustice, either by conniving at whilst they are planning or being executed or by allowing the perpetrators to remain unpunished.

If, unfortunately, a case should occur in which there is an evasion or denial of justice on the part of the Government towards British subjects, the course to be pursued is clear, and it would then be the duty of the commander-in-chief, in such case of real grievance which shall remain unredressed, to obtain that which bad faith and injustice have denied.

The commander-in-chief confidently hopes that this act of restora-

tion to the free exercise of his sovereign authority will be received by the King of the Sandwich Islands as a most powerful and convincing proof, not only of the responsibility he is under to render immediate reparation for real wrongs committed upon British subjects or their property, but also of the importance which attaches to the maintenance of those friendly and reciprocally advantageous relations which have for so many years subsisted between the two nations; and he further hopes that neither His Majesty nor his successors will ever forget that to the illustrious circumnavigator Capt. Cook, as the first discoverer, the inhabitants of the Sandwich Islands owe their admission into the great family of civilized man, and from the lips of Vancouver (another Englishman) Kamehameha I heard mention for the first time of the true God, which ultimately led to the abrogation of a false worship, idolatry, and human sacrifices, and by the well-directed energies, the ceaseless perseverance of the American missionaries to the establishment of a religion pure and undefiled, accompanied by the advantages of instruction and civilization, the which combined and duly cultivated bring in their train security of life and property, social order, mental and moral improvement, internal prosperity, and the respect as well as good will of other nations more advanced in the knowledge of the true faith and the science of good government.

Blessings and advantages of this nature the government of Great Britain is desirous of increasing and promoting among the inhabitants of the Sandwich Islands by every honorable and praiseworthy means in its power, and thus to enlist the sympathies of the sovereign and his ministers on the side of justice, which is the basis of all society and the surest bond of all commerce.

Given on board Her Britannic Majesty's ship *Dublin*, at Honolulu, island of Oahu, this thirty-first day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-three.

RICHARD THOMAS.

No. 1.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, 15th March, 1843.

SIR: The accompanying message of the President to Congress of the 30th of the December last, transmitting a correspondence between this Department and certain agents of the Sandwich Islands then in this city, will acquaint you with the view which he entertains of the relations between the United States and those islands, and with the objects and motives of this Government for cultivating and strengthening those relations. Congress having complied with his suggestions by providing for a Commissioner to reside at the islands, you have been chosen for that purpose. A commission appointing you to the office will be found among the papers which you will receive herewith, and a letter from this Department addressed to that minister of the King of the islands who may be charged with their foreign relations, accrediting you in your official character. The title selected for your mission has reference in part to its purposes. It is not deemed expedient at this juncture fully to recognize the independence of the islands or the right of their Government to that equality of treatment and consideration which is due and usually allowed to those Governments to which we send and from which we receive diplomatic agents of the ordinary ranks. By this, however, it is not meant to intimate that the islands,

so far as regards all other powers, are not entirely independent; on the contrary, this is a fact respecting which no doubt is felt, and the hope that through the agency of the Commissioner that independence might be preserved, has probably, in a great degree, led to the compliance by Congress with the recommendation of the President.

It is obvious, from circumstances connected with their position, that the interests of the United States require that no other power should possess or colonize the Sandwich Islands, or exercise over their Government an influence which would lead to partial or exclusive favors in matters of navigation or trade. One of your principal duties therefore, will be to watch the movements of such agents of other Governments as may visit the islands. You will endeavor to obtain the earliest intelligence respecting the objects of those visits, and if you should think that, if accomplished, they would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, you will make such representations to the authorities of the islands as in your judgment would be most likely to further them. You will also endeavor to impress upon those authorities the necessity of abstaining from giving just cause of complaint to the Governments of those powers whose policy is to increase their possessions and multiply their colonies abroad. This duty can best be performed by the prompt and impartial administration of justice according to the laws and customs of the islands, in such cases of difference as may occur between their officers and citizens and the officers, citizens, or subjects of other Governments.

You will give the Government of the Sandwich Islands distinctly to understand that the Government of the United States in all its proceedings, and in setting on foot your mission, has not in any degree been actuated by a desire or intention to secure to itself exclusive privileges in matters of navigation or trade, or to prevent any or all other commercial nations from an equal participation with ourselves in the benefits of an intercourse with those islands. We seek no control over their Government, nor any undue influence whatever. Our only wish is that the integrity and independence of the Hawaiian territory may be scrupulously maintained and that its Government should be entirely impartial towards foreigners of every nation. In making resolute and stern resistance, therefore, to any claim of favor or exclusive privilege by other powers, you will at all times frankly disavow any desire that favors or exclusive privileges should be granted to the United States, their ships, commerce, or citizens.

You will transmit to the Department full and exact information respecting the trade of the United States and of other nations with the islands. Any suggestions which may occur to you having in view any improvement of the commerce of the United States with the islands will be acceptable. Your attention is particularly requested to the nature of the fiscal regulations in force there, to their effects upon foreign commerce generally, and to the policy of the Government in regard to this subject. If those regulations should be frequently changed, or if there should be cause to apprehend the imposition of discriminating duties upon our navigation and trade, the expediency of negotiating a treaty with that Government which would determine for a series of years the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties in regard to those subjects will be taken into consideration.

After you shall have resided long enough at the Sandwich Islands to have made yourself familiar with the state of public affairs there, and shall have communicated to the Department the results of your observations, you may make a visit to the Society Islands for the purpose of

examining and reporting upon their condition and prospects. It is advisable, however, that your absence from your post should not be prolonged beyond the period absolutely necessary for that purpose.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

DANIEL WEBSTER.

GEORGE BROWN, Esq.,

*Appointed Commissioner of the United States
for the Sandwich Islands.*

[From Mr. Brown's dispatch, No. 5, of October 26, 1843.]

SIR: I arrived here on the 16th instant, and found here Commodore Dallas, who arrived in the *Erie* a few days before me, also the *Cyane*, Commander Stribling. Admiral Thomas, commanding the English naval forces in the Pacific, was also here, having, as you must have learned ere receiving this, restored the flag to the King of Hawaii.

Commodore Dallas having offered me the *Cyane* to carry me to Lahaina, Maui, the residence of the King, for the purpose of presenting my credentials to the Government, I visited her yesterday and was received with a salute of thirteen guns. This morning, on arriving on board, was informed that the admiral intended to dispatch the corvette *Hazard* for Mazatlan on Saturday, and, as we are under way, have no time to write as I could wish, being obliged to send this back by the pilot. Everything, however, appears to be going on as we could wish. The admiral appears to have done everything that could have been required to satisfy the King. He appears to be a very fine man, and the conduct of Lord George Paulet is a sore subject to him. The most charitable construction I have heard put upon the conduct of Lord George is that he was partially deranged.

Mr. Hooper, United States commercial agent, informs me that he has sent to the State Department a full account of all that has happened previous to my arrival. The meagerness of this dispatch I hope therefore will be excused. The English corvette *Champion* arrived yesterday from Valparaiso, which is the occasion of the *Hazard* being ordered to Mazatlan so soon, thereby giving me so little time to write. On my return from Mani will write you fully of all my proceedings. It affords me much pleasure to know that the President has availed himself of your talents and services in the State Department.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your very obedient servant,

GEO. BROWN.

HON. ABEL P. UPSHUR,

Secretary of State, Washington.

[From Mr. Brown's dispatch No. 6, of November 4, 1843.]

HONOLULU, *November 4, 1843.*

SIR: I last had the honor of addressing you on the 26th ultimo from on board the U. S. S. *Cyane*, on my passage from this place to Lahaina. Not being informed until after the ship was under way that the English admiral was about dispatching a vessel for Mexico, I had only time to

inform you of my arrival here, and of my being on my way to present my credentials to the premier who was residing at Lahaina, Mani.

I arrived here from Tahiti in the brig *Catharine* on the 16th ultimo, after a passage of 28 days, and found, much to my gratification, that the English admiral, Thomas, had restored the flag to the King, and placed the islands again under its native government. It will be unnecessary for me to give you a history of the doings of Lord George Paulet previous to the arrival of the admiral, or of the proceedings of the latter, as I am informed by Mr. Hooper, our acting commercial agent here, that he has written you fully on the subject, giving you every information requisite. I will therefore only say that, from what I have so far learned, both the Government here and the American residents are perfectly satisfied with what the admiral has done. There are some questions and cases arising out of the usurpation of Lord George which are not yet settled, but will have to wait for the arrival of the British commissioner or for the action of the British Government, but there appears no doubt that everything will be amicably and properly arranged.

Learning on my arrival that the King was absent from his usual residence at Lahaina, on a visit to the island of Hawaii, and that he would not return until the 27th, I remained here until the 26th, when I took passage on board the *Cyane*, which ship had been placed at my disposal by Commodore Dallas, for Lahaina. I arrived there on the 30th at 8 a. m., accompanied by Dr. Judd, the Government interpreter, and wrote a note to the premier, informing her (him?) of my arrival, and requesting to know at what time it would be convenient for her to receive me. I received an answer that she would be ready at half past twelve.

On leaving the ship I was saluted with thirteen guns, and on landing was received by a number of the high chiefs and conducted to the house of Kekaumohi, the premier, whom, on introduction by Mr. Judd, I addressed as follows:

I have the honor to present to your excellency my credentials as commissioner from the Government of the United States to the King of Hawaii, and I beg to assure your excellency that it will afford me much pleasure in carrying out the instructions of my Government to cultivate the friendship of the Hawaiian Government and to deserve it by all the good offices in my power.

After the credentials were read the premier replied in the following terms as interpreted to me:

I am happy to see you here as the representative of a nation to whom we owe so much and whose friendship and good will we so highly value and that we shall always endeavor to retain. Your credentials are highly satisfactory.

I was then asked whether I wished to be introduced to the King, and on replying in the affirmative, the premier handed me a letter of introduction, observing that on account of lameness she could not accompany me. I was attended, as heretofore, by a number of the high officers of Government, and on arriving at the house of the King found him waiting for me dressed in regimentals and attended by the governor of Mani and his aides. On entering he came forward and took me by the hand, requesting me to be seated. I handed him the premier's letter, which he read. I then rose and addressed him as follows, which was translated by Mr. Judd:

SIR: Having been appointed by the President of the United States of America a commissioner to reside in the dominions of Your Majesty, I have taken the earliest opportunity to pay you my respects. While my Government expects no exclusive privileges, and has no desire or intention to prevent any or all other commercial na-

tions from an equal participation in the benefits to be derived from an intercourse with your islands, and seeks no control or undue influence whatever, it has a right to expect that no partial or exclusive favors be granted to other nations. The wish of my Government is that the independence of the Hawaiian territory may be scrupulously maintained, and that its Government should be impartial towards foreigners of every nation.

Allow me to congratulate Your Majesty upon the interest taken in you and your people by one of the most powerful and free nations of the earth, as evinced by the unanimous vote of its representatives that a diplomatic intercourse should be opened with you. It must be a matter of great satisfaction to Your Majesty to think that while not a quarter of a century has elapsed since your country was in a state of heathenism, such progress has been made in civilization and Christianity that you are about to be admitted into the communion of nations who for ages have had advantages which have made them powerful and happy.

Next to the gratitude due from you to the Almighty Disposer of Events, you owe under Him, to those who, for the welfare of your people, left their friends and country to teach them (you) the blessings of Christianity and the arts of civilization, a debt which can only be paid by the knowledge that their efforts have not been in vain.

I assure Your Majesty that it will afford me great pleasure to be the means of uniting more closely the relations heretofore of the most friendly kind between the Government of the Hawaiian Archipelago and my own, and to further by everything in my power a reciprocal feeling of friendship and good will.

To which His Majesty replied as follows, which was also translated by Mr. Judd:

I am much gratified at being informed by the premier of your arrival, and am happy to receive you as a representative of the United States of America whose Government is much respected by me, and whose people have made great efforts to promote civilization and Christianity among my people.

I thank you for the kind sentiments you have expressed, and trust there will never be any alienation between my Government and yours. You may assure your Government that I shall always consider the citizens of the United States as entitled to equal privileges with those of the most favored nations.

* * * * *

Declaration of Great Britain and France relative to the independence of the Sandwich Islands, London, November 28, 1843.

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the King of the French, taking into consideration the existence in the Sandwich Islands of a government capable of providing for the regularity of its relations with foreign nations, have thought it right to engage, reciprocally, to consider the Sandwich Islands as an independent state, and never to take possession, either directly or under the title of protectorate, or under any other form, of any part of the territory of which they are composed.

The undersigned, Her Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs and the ambassador extraordinary of His Majesty the King of the French, at the court of London, being furnished with the necessary powers, hereby declare in consequence that their said majesties take reciprocally that engagement.

In witness whereof the undersigned have signed the present declaration, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done in duplicate at London, the 28th day of November, in the year of our Lord, 1843.

[L. S.]
[L. S.]

ABERDEEN.
ST. AULAIRE.

Convention of commerce, navigation, etc., between Great Britain and the Sandwich Islands. Signed at Lahaina, February 12, 1844.†*

The differences which existed between the governments of Great Britain and of the Sandwich Islands having been happily settled, the following articles of agreement have been mutually entered into between the King of the Sandwich Islands, on the one part, and William Miller, esq., Her Britannic Majesty's consul-general for the Sandwich and other islands in the Pacific, in the name and on the behalf of Her Britannic Majesty, on the other part, for the preservation of harmony, and the prevention of future misunderstanding between the two parties.

ARTICLE I. There shall be perpetual peace and amity between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the King of the Sandwich Islands, their heirs and successors.

II. The subjects of Her Britannic Majesty shall be protected in an efficient manner in their persons and properties by the King of the Sandwich Islands, who shall cause them to enjoy impartially, in all cases in which their interests are concerned, the same rights and privileges as natives, or as are enjoyed by any other foreigners.

III. No British subject accused of any crime whatever shall be judged otherwise than by a jury composed of foreign residents, proposed by the British consul and accepted by the Government of the Sandwich Islands.

IV. The protection of the King of the Sandwich Islands shall be extended to all British vessels, their officers, and crews. In case of shipwreck, the chiefs and inhabitants of the different parts of the Sandwich Islands shall succour them and secure them from plunder.

The salvage dues shall be regulated, in case of difficulties, by arbitrators freely chosen by both parties.

V. The desertion of seamen embarked on board of British vessels shall be severely repressed by the local authorities, who shall employ all the means at their disposal to arrest deserters; and all reasonable expenses of capture shall be defrayed by the captains or owners of the said vessels.

VI. British merchandise, or goods recognized as coming from the British dominions, shall not be prohibited, nor shall they be subject to an import duty higher than 5 per cent *ad valorem*.

VII. No tonnage, import, or other duties shall be levied on British vessels or goods, or on goods imported in British vessels, beyond what are levied on the vessels or goods of the most favored nation.

VIII. The subjects of the King of the Sandwich Islands shall, in their commercial and other relations with Great Britain, be treated on the footing of the most favored nation.

Done at Lahaina, the 12th day of February, 1844.

[L. S.]	WM. MILLER.
[L. S.]	KAMEHAMEHA III.
[L. S.]	KEKAULUOHI.

Signed in the presence of:

G. P. JUDD,

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

ROBERT C. WYLLIE,

Secretary to Consul-General Miller.

* Signed in English, and in the language of the Sandwich Islands.

† Annulled by Convention of March 26, 1846, Vol. XXXIV, p. 22

ADDITIONAL ARTICLE.

His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands being anxious to suppress intemperance within his dominions, and with that view having taken measures to obtain the consent of the French Government to the abrogation of Article VI of the treaty of July 17, 1839,* which admits the introduction of spirits and wine, on payment of a duty of 5 per cent; it is hereby further agreed, that if His Majesty the King of the French should consent to the abrogation or to any alteration of the said article, Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain will likewise consent so to alter Article VI of the foregoing treaty as that it may have precisely the same effect in what relates to intoxicating liquors; and that this additional article shall be referred to the British Government for approval, to be afterward appended to the convention at present agreed to.

[L. S.]	WM. MILLER.
[L. S.]	KAMEHAMEHA III.
[L. S.]	KEKAULUOHL

CASE OF JOHN WILEY.

[Before the governor of Oahu, assisted by Hon. G. P. Judd and J. Ricord, esq., H. M. attorney-general, at the Fort, September 4, 1844.]

John Wiley, plaintiff on appeal, vs. The Hawaiian Government.

This was an appeal from the judgment of the inferior judges of Honolulu. The present plaintiff in error had been charged before the court below with the commission of a rape upon the body of ———, an Hawaiian girl, a subject of His Majesty; and proof having been adduced to the satisfaction of the inferior judges, they condemned the present plaintiff in error to pay the statute fine of \$50. This fine the plaintiff having paid, he appealed to the governor, and demanded a jury under the Hawaiian statute law, complying therewith by depositing the sum of \$25, required by the statute to entitle him to a jury. The governor having given the usual notice of drawing the jury of appeal, he proceeded on the day appointed to draw a mixed jury of half Hawaiian subjects and half foreigners, required in such cases by the printed statute law. In the interval William Hooper, esq., claimed for his Government the right of selecting and proposing to the governor an entire panel of foreign jurors, to try the accused for the crime charged against him, which the governor declined on the ground that he was governed in his administration of justice by the printed law of the land and that there was no treaty extant between His Hawaiian Majesty and the United States of America which authorized him to deviate from the statute.

On the day of trial above named the plaintiff Wiley appeared by his attorney, Richard Ford, and in person, and expressed his readiness to proceed to trial, but before the jury were actually impaneled William Hooper, esq., United States commercial agent, appeared before

*VI. Les marchandises françaises, où reconnues être de provenance française, notamment les vins et les eaux-de-vie, ne pourront être prohibées ni payer un droit d'entrée plus élevé que 5 pour cent *ad valorem*.

the court and made out and desired to have entered on its minutes the following protest:

Before the court proceeds to the trial of Mr. Wiley, I beg to state that by a treaty entered into between this Government and that of Great Britain, on the 12th February last, the subjects of the latter were secured in the privilege of being tried, when charged with crime against the laws of this country, by a jury appointed by their consul, that I claim, in virtue of the assurance given to Mr. Brown, the United States commissioner, by His Majesty the King in October last, which secured to citizens of the United States equal privileges with those of the most favored nation, that Mr. Wiley, the defendant, is entitled to a jury appointed by me, as acting United States consul.

The court, as at present constituted, I protest against, and request that it may be entered on the records of the court.

WM. HOOPER,
Acting United States Consular Agent.

HONOLULU, *September 4, 1844.*

Upon which protest the court decided as follows:

The decision of this court upon the protest of William Hooper, esq., vice-commercial agent of the United States, now entered on the minutes, is, that there is a law in the statute books of this Government, which the accused is charged with having violated, and that at the time of violating that statute there was and still is, also in the statute book, a law regulating the drawing of juries in the Hawaiian Islands, which is obligatory upon this court. This court knows of no treaty extant with the United States that authorizes it, under the oaths of the judges, to depart from the law concerning juries, and it can not conscientiously take cognizance of any diplomatic correspondence between the Secretary of State for foreign affairs and the resident ministers of other powers; nor is this court authorized to look into treaties with other powers for the purpose of according analogous privileges to a nation not actually in treaty with His Hawaiian Majesty, especially when according them would infract a statute law by which this court is clearly bound.

The plaintiff, John Wiley, is under the protection of this court, who are bound to give him the chances of the jury box, and not suffer a foreign consul to pick a jury who might be selected to convict him.

Hereupon, before the jury were actually sworn, the United States vice-commercial agent advised the plaintiff to withdraw his appeal, which he accordingly did, and the court thereupon nonsuited the plaintiff and decided that his withdrawal was, in law, tantamount to an affirmance of the judgment of the inferior judges, which had been already satisfied, and they further adjudged the plaintiff to have forfeited the \$25 deposited for drawing the jury of appeal. The court intimated that William Hooper, esq., was liable to the plaintiff in error for having misguided him in a manner prejudicial to his private rights, and left him to his remedy.

Mr. Calhoun to Mr. Brown.

No. 4.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 20, 1845.

SIR: Your dispatches to No. 16, inclusive, have been received. It is to be regretted that a case like that of Mr. John Wiley, to which the last principally relates, should have occurred so soon after the recognition of the Hawaiian Government by that of the United States. Your course in regard to it is approved by the President, who concurs in the views which you express. Notwithstanding the United States have no treaty stipulation with the Government of the islands, they can not, under the circumstances, consent that the privilege of being tried by a jury of foreigners shall be withheld from our citizens while it is accorded

to the subjects of Great Britain and France. We have every reason to expect our citizens shall have, in the dominions of that Government, the same privileges as the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation. You will accordingly communicate these views to the minister for foreign affairs and repeat, in the name of the Government of the United States, your firm protest against the proceedings of the Hawaiian authorities in regard to Mr. Wiley, assuring him in the strongest terms that the United States will not submit to discrimination so unjust in their nature and so unfriendly in spirit as respects their citizens, and that the Government of the islands will be held responsible for all damages which may have been sustained in this case, or which may hereafter be sustained by citizens of the United States under similar circumstances.

The United States, if it be desired by the Hawaiian Government, are willing to enter into treaty stipulations on the basis of those now existing between it and Great Britain, and I herewith transmit to you full powers to conclude such a convention. But it is to be understood that the treaty is not to bar the claim for damages in the case of Mr. Wiley (if any have been sustained), nor of any citizen or citizens of the United States for injuries accruing prior to its adoption, should it be made. I have further to say that if Great Britain or France should hereafter consent, in cases involving the rights of their respective citizens, to a trial by jury *de mediatate lingua*, the United States would be willing to make the same concession. But, whether there be or be not treaty stipulations between us and the Islands, the United States can never consent that their citizens should be put on any other footing than those of the most favored nations.

I have the honor to be, with highest respect, sir, your obedient servant,

J. C. CALHOUN.

[Translation.]

Treaty of peace, amity, and commerce between France and the Sandwich Islands, signed at Honolulu, March 26, 1846.

Time having shown the expediency of substituting a general treaty for the various conventions mutually concluded heretofore by France and the Sandwich Islands, the French and Hawaiian Governments have mutually agreed upon the following articles, and have signed them, after acknowledging and decreeing that all other treaties and conventions now existing between the contracting parties, shall be hereafter considered as void and of no effect.

ARTICLE 1. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between His Majesty the King of the French and the King of the Sandwich Islands, and between their heirs and successors.

ART. 2. The subjects of His Majesty the King of the French, residing in the possessions of the King of the Sandwich Islands, shall enjoy, as to civil rights, and as regards their persons and their property, the same protection as if they were native subjects, and the King of the Sandwich Islands engages to grant them the same rights and privileges as those now granted, or which may be granted hereafter, to the subjects of the most favored nation.

ART. 3. Any Frenchman accused of any crime or offense shall be

tried only by a jury composed of native residents, or of foreigners proposed by the consul of France, and accepted by the Government of the Sandwich Islands.

ART. 4. The King of the Sandwich Islands will extend his protection to French vessels, their officers and crews. In case of shipwreck, the chiefs and inhabitants of the various parts of the Sandwich Islands must lend them assistance and protect them from all pillage.

The salvage dues will be settled, in case of difficulty, by umpires appointed by both parties.

ART. 5. Desertion of sailors employed on board French vessels, will be severely repressed by the local authorities, who must use every means at their command to arrest the deserters. All expenses, within just limits, incurred in their recapture, will be refunded by the captain or owners of the said vessels.

ART. 6. French goods, or those recognized as coming from French possessions, can not be prohibited nor subjected to a higher import duty than five per cent ad valorem. Wines, brandies, and other spirituous liquors are excepted, and may be subjected to any just duties which the Government of the Sandwich Islands may think proper to impose upon them, but on condition that such duty shall never be high enough to become an absolute obstacle to the importation of the said articles.

ART. 7. Tonnage and import duties and all other duties imposed upon French vessels, or upon merchandise imported in French vessels, must not exceed the duties imposed upon the vessels or merchandise of the most favored nation.

ART. 8. The subjects of the King of the Sandwich Islands will be treated upon the footing of the most favored nation in their commercial or other relations with France.

Made at Honolulu, March 26, 1846.

[L. S.]

EM. PERRIN,
Consul of France,
Charged with a special mission to the Sandwich Islands.

[L. S.]

R. C. WYLLIE,
His Hawaiian Majesty's Minister of Foreign Relations.

Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Ten Eyck, August 28, 1848.

[Extracts.]

Mr. Calhoun, in a note addressed to Messrs. Richards and Haalilio, the Hawaiian commissioners, dated on the 6th July, 1844, informed them that "the President regarded his message to Congress of the 31st December, 1842, the proceedings of the House of Representatives thereon, and the appropriation made for the compensation of a commissioner of the United States, who was subsequently appointed to reside in the islands, as a full recognition on the part of the United States of the independence of the Hawaiian Government." Besides, the letter of President Polk to the King which you bore with you, dated on the 10th September, 1845, treated him as an independent sovereign.

This Government, having thus pledged itself to accord to that of the Hawaiian Islands the rights and privileges of a sovereign state, can not in honor or justice demand from it anything which, under like circumstances, it would not demand from the most powerful nations. I

can discover nothing which would justify this Government in objecting to the decisions of the Hawaiian courts in ordinary cases arising under the municipal laws of the country or in dictating the policy which that Government should pursue upon any domestic subject, and especially that of the tenure of real estate by resident foreigners.

* * * * *

For these reasons it is my conviction that if, in a conciliatory spirit, you would devote your efforts to acquire a just and honorable influence over the Hawaiian authorities, you might accomplish the object. Such a result would be highly advantageous to both countries. You might thus by your counsel and advice render the Hawaiian Government as well as the citizens of your own country important services. We ardently desire that the Hawaiian Islands may maintain their independence. It would be highly injurious to our interests if, tempted by their weakness, they should be seized by Great Britain or France; more especially so since our recent acquisitions from Mexico on the Pacific Ocean.

* * * * *

Having been the first to welcome the Hawaiian Islands into the community of nations, it is our true policy, weak and feeble as they are, to treat them with as much kindness and forbearance as may be consistent with the maintenance of our own just rights. Such is the opinion of the President.

* * * * *

Mr. Ten Eyck to Mr. Buchanan.

No. 55.]

OFFICE UNITED STATES COMMISSION,
Honolulu, September 3, 1849.

SIR:

* * * * *

Having waited until the 1st of August last, and the *Savannah* not yet arriving, and a good opportunity offering to return, I left San Francisco at that time and reached this place on Saturday, the 25th ultimo, in time to witness the landing of an armed force from the French men-of-war in and off the harbor, who took possession of the fort and other public buildings and property belonging to the Sandwich Islands Government in consequence of the Government having refused compliance with certain demands made upon it by the French admiral and the resident French consul. I have in my letter to Commander Jones, of the 31st ultimo (copy of which is hereto annexed), given a brief history of the proceedings of the French.

Mr. Turrill, our consul (with whom this Government has held official correspondence since its resolutions of December last, suspending official intercourse with the U. S. Commissioner), has neglected to furnish me with any documents or correspondence received by him in relation to the difficulties between the French and the islands' Government, although I have made a written request upon him therefor, "in order," as I stated to him, "that I might be enabled to determine whether the dignity and honor of the Government I serve, her rights, or the rights

and interests of her citizens required any, and if any what, official action at my hands, and also that I might be enabled understandingly to advise the State Department fully upon the matter." In consequence I am unable to state to you the demands made by the French, the grounds upon which they are based, the reasons for noncompliance on the part of the islands' authorities, or to give any opinion upon the merits of the controversy between the parties.

I am advised by Mr. Turrill that an expose of the whole difficulty will be published in a few days by the authorities here, in pamphlet form, when I will forward a copy. Mr. Turrill advises me, also, that he intends forwarding manuscript copies of all the correspondence to your Department.

I am waiting very anxiously the arrival of my successor, that I may be relieved and get finally away from all connection with this Government. If ever a foreign representative has been neglected and abused by the administration at Washington then have I been by Mr. Polk's, and all simply because Mr. Buchanan had the manliness to sacrifice me by censuring my official conduct (in laboring to follow out his instructions) in the vain hope of advancing his own political interests with the American Board of Foreign Missions, and of securing himself from the just charge of neglect and inattention to his public duties in connection with this legation.

I hope, most certainly, to see Mr. Eames here in all this month. If he does not reach here by the 1st October I shall feel that I am under no obligation to remain longer, and shall leave the archives of the legation in the hands of some trusty American resident, to be delivered to my successor on his arrival.

During my absence from here nothing of any public interest had occurred up to the time of the arrival of the French admiral. Three or four of our whale fleet have returned here from their hunting grounds near the Japan and Northwest Coast. Those now here are bound home, having met with good success. Within the next six weeks 100 or 200 whaleships will have arrived at the different ports of these islands for recruits. The native population continues to disappear very rapidly. It is estimated that 16,000 or 18,000 have died within the last ten or eleven months, out of a population not exceeding 70,000.

I have the honor, etc.,

A. TEN EYCK.

SEPTEMBER 4, 1849.

P. S.—I was just on the point of closing this dispatch when I received a note from the French consul (copy of which is hereto annexed). Mr. Turrill not having condescended to furnish me with a copy of his correspondence with the French admiral, to which allusion is made in the French consul's note, I can do no more than simply acknowledge the receipt of the French consul's note, with the assurance that a copy will be forwarded to the proper department of the Government of the United States.

A. T. E.

Mr. Ten Eyck to Commodore Jones.

[Inclosure in No. 55.]

OFFICE UNITED STATES COMMISSION,
Honolulu, August 31, 1849.

SIR: On Saturday last, the 25th inst., I reached this place on my return from California, just in time to witness the landing of a body of armed men from the French frigate the *Poursuivant* and the French steamer *Gassendi*.

It seems that the Admiral de Tromedin had arrived here about the 18th instant from Callao, and the day after the steamer arrived from Tahiti. Under the advice of M. Dillon, the resident French consul, the admiral requested an audience of the King for the purpose of discussing certain differences existing between the French consul and the King's Government. This request the King, by the advice of his ministers, refused. The admiral then, as I understand it, made ten formal demands in writing upon the King's Government and gave them three days to consider and accede to them, advising the King that if they were not complied with within that time he should land a force and take possession of the fort and other Government property. The Government refused compliance with the admiral's demands, and accordingly, on Saturday last, at 3 p. m., he landed a force and took possession of the fort, the custom-house, and the Honolulu House (where the ministers have their offices). He also took possession of the Government schooner, the *Kamehameha*, and all the small craft in port under the Sandwich Islands flag. All this was done without the slightest opposition being offered by the authorities, the Government, in fact, having ordered that no resistance should be made to any proceedings instituted or conducted by the French forces.

Thus matters continued until Wednesday last, when the French guards were withdrawn from the custom-house and the Honolulu House, and all the vessels seized, except the Government schooner, were released. During this day the marines in possession of the fort amused themselves by destroying the powder, the large and small firearms, and whatever property they could find, and towards evening finally marched out and returned on board their vessels. While the French forces were on shore a deputation from the Government visited the admiral on board the steamer, but without any favorable result.

M. Dillon had only on Saturday placed his family on board the steamer, and at 3 p. m. hauled down the flag of the consulate, and himself went on board the same vessel. This was the signal for the landing of the French forces.

The demands made by the admiral, the response of the Government, and all the correspondence is, I understand, in process of publication; as soon as I can procure a copy I will forward it. I understand from Mr. Turrill, our consul, that this Government have furnished him manuscript copies, which, with a protest sent by him to the admiral, against his proceedings, he will forward you and the Secretary of State.

M. Dillon and family leave for France in the admiral's ship early next week, via San Francisco. I forward this by him. What the result of this proceeding on the part of the French forces may be, or what effect it may have upon the future political interests and independence of this Government, is a matter of uncertainty.

I fear it will tend to hasten the consummation of the intrigues of Mr. Wyllie, the King's minister of foreign relations, and General Miller,

the English consul-general, by inducing the King, ere long, to place himself under the protection of the English. Dr. Judd and the American missionaries will, I believe, counsel this course rather than permit the King to submit to any exactions conflicting with his and their views and policy. During all this proceeding, and while negotiations were being attempted, the English consul-general was constantly consulted and his advice generally followed by the Islands authorities.

Mr. Turrill having failed to put me in possession of the papers received by him from this Government, or of copies of his correspondence relating to these difficulties, although I had requested them from him, I am unable to express any opinion upon the merits of the controversy between the French and the Sandwich Islands Government.

So far as the conduct of the French in destroying the Government property in the fort is concerned, I do not hesitate to condemn it.

The *Preble* is still here. Capt. Glynn will, of course, report to you the condition of his crew. It must be anything but encouraging, judging from what I have seen and hear of their sickness. The French steamer will leave for Tahiti, taking the King's schooner in company, at the same time that the frigate sails for San Francisco.

I have the honor, etc.,

A. TEN EYCK.

SEPTEMBER 4, 1849.

P. S.—I have opened this to say that the United States revenue brig *C. W. Lawrence*, Capt. Fraser, has just arrived, forty-five days from Valparaiso.

A. T. E.

No. 30.]

CONSULATE OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
Honolulu, September 4, 1849.

SIR: Rear-Admiral Tromelin arrived here on the 13th August, in the frigate *La Poursuivante*. The French steamer *Gassendi* entered this port on the day following.

The admiral, on his first arrival, evinced a most friendly disposition, and it was for a while confidently believed that, notwithstanding the embittered feelings of the consul of France, no hostile demonstrations would be made. It was soon apparent, however, that the admiral had placed himself under the control of the consul and would be merely an instrument in his hands.

On the 22d of last month demands were made upon this Government jointly by the admiral and the consul. On the 25th this Government sent answers to these demands, declining to comply with the same. On the afternoon of that day troops were landed, the fort taken possession of, and a guard stationed around two public buildings. No opposition whatever was made to the troops. The French held the fort until the 30th, when they abandoned it, destroying everything connected therewith, and doing much damage to the governor's house and the furniture in it.

During the time the fort was thus occupied by the French unavailing efforts were made, through the medium of commissioners, to effect an amicable settlement of existing difficulties.

I herewith inclose a copy of the correspondence between Admiral Tromelin and myself, also a copy of the proceedings between this Gov-

ernment and the admiral and consul, so far as they have been printed. I also send a copy of a letter addressed to me by the minister of foreign affairs, in relation to the mediation of the President of the United States, and my answer to the same.

H. B. M. consul-general protested in strong terms against the proceedings of the admiral, and three consuls of the smaller powers also remonstrated against the same. The course taken by the consuls no doubt had a very beneficial effect. Supposing that you may receive a communication upon that subject, I send herewith a copy of the correspondence between Mr. Ten Eyck and myself.

It has ever been the desire and aim of this Government, I beleive, to observe faithfully all the provisions of the treaty with France, and they have undoubtedly done so. Why, then, have these demands been made? To one residing here, who has noticed passing events attentively for a year or two past, this question is by no means difficult of solution. Soon after his arrival in Honolulu, the consul of France set on foot certain political intrigues, the object of which was to eject from office one of the King's ministers, for the purpose, as is confidently believed, of providing a place for himself. Failing in these efforts he became embittered against the King's advisers, and seemed determined to gratify his feelings at the expense of this nation.

The assault made by the admiral upon this weak, this Christian nation, was unprovoked, and admits of no excuse. There is not one paliating circumstance attending it. When the facts and circumstances connected therewith shall be fully known, the whole civilized world will place upon it the mark of condemnation.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. TURRILL.

Hon. JOHN M. CLAYTON,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

[Translation.]

ADMIRAL'S FRIGATE OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
LA POURSUIVANTE,
*Naval Station of the French Republic in the Pacific Ocean,
Honolulu, August 23, 1849.*

MR. THE CONSUL: The Hawaiian Government, especially in latter times, violated the treaty concluded between France and the Sandwich Islands in a manner which requires a prompt and complete reparation, which divers acts of which some French citizens have been the victims render still indispensable.

I have taken, in concert with Mr. the consul of the French Republic in the Sandwich Islands, all the measures compatible with the dignity of France to obtain an amicable arrangement, but the obstinacy of the Hawaiian Government appeared to wish to force me to make use of the means at my disposal to oblige it to understand the voice of reason and justice.

In this circumstance and agreeably to the conclusions of the ultimatum sent by me, in concert with Mr. the Consul Dillon, I have the honor of advising you that the delay for the Hawaiian Government to make its answer known will expire on August 25, instant, Saturday, at 3 p. m., after which delay, if the Government of His Majesty Kamehameha

III does not give me a complete satisfaction, it will only remain for me to reclaim by force what I have demanded at first through the pacific way of correspondence, and which I have not been able to obtain by means of a conference, which has been refused to me.

In informing you of their disposition, Mr. the Consul, I ought to give you here the assurance that the French Republic neither looks to an occupation or a protectorate of the Hawaiian archipelago, but to a complete reparation. I shall give the necessary orders that, in the case of hostilities taking place, the commerce of American proprietors shall be respected as ought to be that of a friendly nation.

I have the honor to invite you to make these dispositions known to your fellow citizens, in order that they may take from this day the necessary measures, on their part, to put themselves out of the risk of all hazards that may result from the operations which I may have to order against Honolulu.

I pray you to acknowledge the receipt of this notification.

Mr. the Admiral, commander-in-chief of the naval station of the French Republic in the Pacific ocean.

LEGOARANT DE TROMELIN.

To Mr. the Consul of the United States of America in the Sandwich Islands, at Honolulu.

UNITED STATES CONSULATE FOR THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
Honolulu, August 24, 1849.

SIR: I did myself the honor this morning of acknowledging the receipt of yours of yesterday and in doing so I took occasion to remark that I would reply to your communication as soon as I could procure a correct translation of the same.

As far as I have been able to do so, I have communicated the contents of your letter to my countrymen, but I can not well advise them what to do, as I am not made acquainted with the nature of the hostile measures, if any, that are to be used. If the town is to be bombarded, it will be necessary for them to remove their families and valuable effects, to places of safety; but I do not wish to have them put to the great expense and inconvenience of doing so unless the course you may ultimately take shall render that necessary.

Since the receipt of your letter, I have examined with much care the several demands which, in connection with the consul of France, you have thought proper to make upon the Hawaiian Government, and I have heretofore read attentively the voluminous correspondence of France and this Government in relation to the claims upon which those demands rest.

By that correspondence I am informed that as early as last April a large proportion of those claims, and I believe all that had then been agitated, were, by a resolution of the King in council, referred for final adjustment "direct to the minister of foreign affairs of France," and, although the fact be not material to perfect the case, I will add that it appears from the same correspondence that the consul of France assented to that reference.

I am also advised from a source entitled to full credit that some months ago—the exact time I do not recollect—the King appointed a special commissioner to proceed to France for the express purpose of effecting an amicable adjustment of those claims. This reference, beyond all question, removed the claims direct to France for settlement,

and placed them entirely beyond the jurisdiction of the consul or of any other subordinate agent of the French Republic.

But, viewing the case as disconnected with the reference, I beg leave to remark that I have searched through the whole of that correspondence in vain to discover a single instance in which either the letter or the spirit of the existing treaty has been violated by the Hawaiian Government. If there be such an instance, the consul of France has failed to point it out.

The demands which have been thus made upon this Government are, in my judgement, in direct opposition to the plain provisions of the treaty, and the enforcing them in the manner indicated would be a palpable violation of the law of nations.

As the course you have advised me that circumstances may induce you to pursue must of necessity seriously affect the great American interests connected with these islands, it becomes my imperative duty as a representative of the United States to interpose my solemn protest against it, which I now do, and I shall lose no time in communicating to the President of the United States the facts and circumstances attending this case.

With the ardent hope that the pending difficulties may yet be amicably disposed of,

I have the honor to remain, sir, etc.,

J. TURRILL,
United States Consul.

LEGOARANT DE TROMELIN,
*Rear-Admiral and Commander-in-Chief
of the Naval Forces of the Republic of France
in the Pacific Ocean.*

[Translation.]

ADMIRAL'S FRIGATE OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
THE POURSUIVANTE,
*Naval Station of the French Republic in the
Pacific Ocean, off Honolulu, the 25th August, 1849.*

MR. THE CONSUL: In acknowledging receipt of your letter of yesterday's date, I have the honor of testifying to you the surprise which its perusal has occasioned to me. I had not only not given you any communication of my demands on the Hawaiian Government, but further, the policy of the American Government made it your duty to not interfere officially in our affairs with the administration of His Majesty Kamehameha III, for you know as well as I that the United States of America has made it to themselves a law of not mixing ever in the affairs of other nations, and especially those of France, their ancient and their most faithful ally.

I ought to advise you that I believe it to be my duty to communicate your precited dispatch to the Government of the French Republic.

I renew to you, Mr. the Consul, the assurance of my very distinguished consideration.

The rear admiral, commander-in-chief of the naval forces of the French Republic in the Pacific Ocean,

LEGORANT DE TROMELIN.

To Mr. the Consul of the United States of America in the Sandwich Islands, Honolulu.

UNITED STATES CONSULATE,
FOR THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
Honolulu, August 27, 1849.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of yours of the 25th instant, a translation of which was not obtained in time to give it an answer on Saturday, the day it bears date.

You are right in supposing it not to be the policy of the United States to mix in the affairs of other nations. But when a case like the one under consideration occurs, and I clearly see that the course military power is to take against this weak nation must greatly injure my countrymen and seriously embarrass the extensive American commerce connected with these islands, it becomes my duty so far to interfere officially as to interpose my protest; and in doing so I doubt not my course will meet the entire approbation of the President of the United States.

I have the honor to remain, sir, etc.,

J. TURRILL.

LEGORANT DE TROMELIN,
*Rear-Admiral and Commander in Chief
of the Naval Forces of the French Republic
in the Pacific Ocean.*

SEPARATE AND URGENT.]

FOREIGN OFFICE,
August 25, 1849.

SIR: The King, my master, commands me to convey to you, for your information, and that of your Government, the inclosed copies of the peremptory demands made on the 22d instant by the admiral and the consul of France, and of the replies to the same, which I have sent by His Majesty's command.

It is not believed that any consequences can justly ensue endangering the lives and properties of American citizens, which His Majesty will protect, so long as His Sovereign authority and the empire of his laws are respected. When that period ceases, His Majesty's power to protect will cease also, and it will be for you, as consul of the United States, representing that Government, to act as you may consider to be necessary.

It may be of importance for you to know that by command of the King I addressed, on the 22d instant, by the *James Monroe* a request in His Majesty's name, through his special commissioner, James Jackson Jarves, esquire, for the friendly mediation of his excellency the President of the United States with the Government of France, in regard to all demands made or that may be made upon the Government by the consul and admiral of the French Republic, and to obtain this favor the King commands me to request your good offices.

With the highest respect, etc.,

R. C. WYLLIE.

JOEL TURRILL, Esq.,
United States Consul, etc.

P. S.—In case His Excellency the President of the United States should be objected to as a mediator, or decline to act as such, a similar note, with a similar intent, is now passed to H. B. M. consul-general. The King engages to ratify and abide by the award of His Excellency

the President of the United States, or of the British Government, acting either solely or jointly upon all points that may not be agreed upon between the French Government and the King's special commissioner, James Jackson Jarves, esq.

R. C. W.

UNITED STATES CONSULATE,
Honolulu, August 25, 1849.

SIR: I have the honor of acknowledging the receipt of your despatch bearing even date herewith, inclosing copies "of the peremptory demands made on the 22d instant by the admiral and the consul of France, and of the replies to the same," and informing me that you had by command of the King, on the 22d of this month, addressed a request in His Majesty's name, through his special commissioner, James Jackson Jarves, esq., for the friendly mediation of His Excellency the President of the United States with the Government of France, in regard to all demands made or that may be made upon this Government by the consul and admiral of the French Republic, and to obtain this favor the King commands you to request my "good offices." You also inform me that a similar note has been addressed by you to H. B. M. consul-general, soliciting the mediation of England, stating that the King engages to ratify and abide by the award of the President of the United States or of the British Government, acting either solely or jointly on all points that may not be agreed upon between the French Government and the King's special commissioner. You may assure His Majesty the King, that I will cheerfully do anything in my power to aid in bringing about an amicable adjustment of existing difficulties, and for that purpose shall lose no time in sending to the President of the United States a copy of your despatch, accompanied with such remarks as I may deem necessary.

I received a letter from Rear-Admiral Legoarrant de Tromelin on the 24th instant, bearing date the 23d, in which he states that "the Hawaiian Government, especially in latter times, violated the treaty conducted between France and the Sandwich Islands in a manner which requires a prompt and complete reparation, which divers acts, of which some French citizens have been the victims, render still indispensable."

And the admiral advised me, among other things, that unless the Hawaiian Government should comply with the ultimatum sent by him in concert with the consul of France, by 3 o'clock p. m. this day, that force would be used.

Believing that the admiral had been misinformed in relation to the violation of the treaty, and knowing that the use of force for the purpose and in the manner indicated by him would greatly injure American commerce in the Pacific Ocean, I expressed in decided terms in my answer to the admiral's letter, which bears date of the 24th instant, the opinion that neither the letter nor spirit of the treaty had been violated by the Hawaiian Government, and I protested against the enforcing of the demands in the manner indicated by the admiral.

I shall lose no time in making the President of the United States fully acquainted with the course I have taken in relation to the proceedings of the admiral and the consul of France.

I have the honor to be, etc.,

J. TURRILL.

His Excellency R. C. WYLLIE,
Minister of Foreign Relations, etc., Honolulu.

A treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation, between the United States of America and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands. concluded at Washington, 20th December, 1849—Ratified 4th February, 1850—Exchanged 24th August, 1850—Proclaimed 1th November, 1850.

Whereas a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation, between the United States of America and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, was concluded and signed at Washington on the twentieth day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-nine, the original of which treaty is, word for word, as follows:

The United States of America and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, equally animated with the desire of maintaining the relations of good understanding which have hitherto so happily subsisted between their respective states, and consolidating the commercial intercourse between them, have agreed to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation, for which purpose they have appointed plenipotentiaries, that is to say: The President of the United States of America, John M. Clayton, Secretary of State of the United States, and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, James Jackson Jarves, accredited as his special commissioner to the Government of the United States, who, after having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have concluded and signed the following articles.

ARTICLE I.

There shall be perpetual peace and amity between the United States and the King of the Hawaiian Islands, his heirs and his successors.

ARTICLE II.

There shall be reciprocal liberty of commerce and navigation between the United States of America and the Hawaiian Islands. No duty of customs or other impost shall be charged upon any goods the produce or manufacture of one country, upon importation from such country into the other, other or higher than the duty or impost charged upon goods of the same kind the produce or manufacture of or imported from any other country; and the United States of America and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands do hereby engage that the subjects or citizens of any other state shall not enjoy any favor, privilege, or immunity whatever, in matters of commerce and navigation, which shall not also at the same time be extended to the subjects or citizens of the other contracting party, gratuitously, if the concession in favor of that other state shall have been gratuitous, and in return for a compensation, as nearly as possible of proportionate value and effect, to be adjusted by mutual agreement, if the concession shall have been conditional.

ARTICLE III.

All articles the produce or manufacture of either country, which can legally be imported into either country from the other, in ships of that other country, and thence coming, shall, when so imported, be subject to the same duties and enjoy the same privileges, whether imported in ships of the one country or in ships of the other; and, in like manner,

all goods which can legally be exported or reëxported from either country to the other, in ships of that other country, shall, when so exported or reëxported, be subject to the same duties and be entitled to the same privileges, drawbacks, bounties, and allowances, whether exported in ships of the one country or in ships of the other; and all goods and articles, of whatever description, not being of the produce or manufacture of the United States, which can be legally imported into the Sandwich Islands, shall, when so imported in vessels of the United States, pay no other or higher duties, imposts, or charges than shall be payable upon the like goods and articles when imported in the vessels of the most favored nation, other than the nation of which the said goods and articles are the produce or manufacture.

ARTICLE IV.

No duties of tonnage, harbor, light-houses, pilotage, quarantine, or other similar duties, of whatever nature, or under whatever denomination, shall be imposed in either country upon the vessels of the other, in respect of voyages between the United States of America and the Hawaiian Islands, if laden, or in respect of any voyage, if in ballast, which shall not be equally imposed in the like cases on national vessels.

ARTICLE V.

It is hereby declared that the stipulations of the present treaty are not to be understood as applying to the navigation and carrying trade between one port and another situated in the States of either contracting party, such navigation and trade being reserved exclusively to national vessels.

ARTICLE VI.

Steam vessels of the United States, which may be employed by the Government of the said States in the carrying of their public mails across the Pacific Ocean, or from one port in that ocean to another, shall have free access to the ports of the Sandwich Islands, with the privilege of stopping therein to refit, to refresh, to land passengers and their baggage, and for the transaction of any business pertaining to the public mail service of the United States, and shall be subject, in such ports, to no duties of tonnage, harbor, light-houses, quarantine, or other similar duties, of whatever nature or under whatever denomination.

ARTICLE VII.

The whale ships of the United States shall have access to the ports of Hilo, Kealakekua, and Hanalei, in the Sandwich Islands, for the purposes of refitment and refreshment, as well as to the ports of Honolulu and Lahaina, which only are ports of entry for all merchant vessels; and in all the above-named ports they shall be permitted to trade or barter their supplies of goods, excepting spirituous liquors, to the amount of two hundred dollars *ad valorem* for each vessel, without paying any charge for tonnage or harbor dues of any description, or any duties or imposts whatever upon the goods or articles so traded or bartered. They shall also be permitted, with the like exemption from all charges for tonnage and harbor dues, further to trade or barter, with the same exception as to spirituous liquors, to the additional amount of

one thousand dollars *ad valorem* for each vessel, paying upon the additional goods and articles so traded and bartered no other or higher duties than are payable on like goods and articles when imported in the vessels and by the citizens or subjects of the most favored foreign nation. They shall also be permitted to pass from port to port of the Sandwich Islands for the purpose of procuring refreshments; but they shall not discharge their seamen or land their passengers in the said islands, except at Lahaina and Honolulu; and in all the ports named in this article the whale ships of the United States shall enjoy, in all respects whatsoever, all the rights, privileges, and immunities which are enjoyed by, or shall be granted to, the whale ships of the most favored foreign nation. The like privilege of frequenting the three ports of the Sandwich Islands above named in this article, not being ports of entry for merchant vessels, is also guaranteed to all the public armed vessels of the United States. But nothing in this article shall be construed as authorizing any vessel of the United States having on board any disease usually regarded as requiring quarantine to enter, during the continuance of such disease on board, any port of the Sandwich Islands other than Lahaina or Honolulu.

ARTICLE VIII.

The contracting parties engage, in regard to the personal privileges, that the citizens of the United States of America shall enjoy in the dominions of His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, and the subjects of his said Majesty in the United States of America, that they shall have free and undoubted right to travel and to reside in the states of the two high contracting parties, subject to the same precautions of police which are practiced towards the subjects or citizens of the most favored nations. They shall be entitled to occupy dwellings and warehouses, and to dispose of their personal property of every kind and description, by sale, gift, exchange, will, or in any other way whatever, without the smallest hindrance or obstacle; and their heirs or representatives, being subjects or citizens of the other contracting party, shall succeed in their personal goods, whether by testament or *ab intestato*; and may take possession thereof, either by themselves or by others acting for them, and dispose of the same at will, paying to the profit of the respective Governments such dues only as the inhabitants of the country wherein the said goods are shall be subject to pay in like cases. And, in case of the absence of the heir and representative, such care shall be taken of the said goods as would be taken of the goods of a native of the same country in like case, until the lawful owner may take measures for receiving them. And if a question should arise among several claimants as to which of them said goods belong, the same shall be decided finally by the laws and judges of the land wherein the said goods are. Where, on the decease of any person holding real estate within the territories of one party, such real estate would, by the laws of the land, descend on a citizen or subject of the other, were he not disqualified by alienage, such citizen or subject shall be allowed a reasonable time to sell the same, and to withdraw the proceeds without molestation, and exempt from all duties of detraction on the part of the Government of the respective states. The citizens or subjects of the contracting parties shall not be obliged to pay, under any pretence whatever, any taxes or impositions other or greater than those which are paid, or may hereafter be paid, by the subjects or citizens of the most favored nations, in the respective

states of the high contracting parties. They shall be exempt from all military service, whether by land or by sea; from forced loans; and from every extraordinary contribution not general and by law established. Their dwellings, warehouses, and all premises appertaining thereto, destined for the purposes of commerce or residence, shall be respected. No arbitrary search of or visit to their houses, and no arbitrary examination or inspection whatever of the books, papers; or accounts of their trade, shall be made; but such measures shall be executed only in conformity with the legal sentence of a competent tribunal; and each of the two contracting parties engages that the citizens or subjects of the other residing in their respective states shall enjoy their property and personal security in as full and ample manner as their own citizens or subjects, or the subjects or citizens of the most favored nation, but subject always to the laws and statutes of the two countries, respectively.

ARTICLE IX.

The citizens and subjects of each of the two contracting parties shall be free in the States of the other to manage their own affairs themselves, or to commit those affairs to the management of any persons whom they may appoint as their broker, factor, or agent; nor shall the citizens and subjects of the two contracting parties be restrained in their choice of persons to act in such capacities; nor shall they be called upon to pay any salary or remuneration to any person whom they shall not choose to employ.

Absolute freedom shall be given in all cases to the buyer and seller to bargain together and to fix the price of any goods or merchandise imported into, or to be exported from, the States and dominions of the two contracting parties, save and except generally such cases wherein the laws and usages of the country may require the intervention of any special agents in the States and dominions of the contracting parties. But nothing contained in this or any other article of the present treaty shall be construed to authorize the sale of spirituous liquors to the natives of the Sandwich Islands, further than such sale may be allowed by the Hawaiian laws.

ARTICLE X.

Each of the two contracting parties may have, in the ports of the other, consuls, vice-consuls, and commercial agents of their own appointment, who shall enjoy the same privileges and powers with those of the most favored nations; but if any such consuls shall exercise commerce, they shall be subject to the same laws and usage to which the private individuals of their nation are subject in the same place. The said consuls, vice-consuls, and commercial agents are authorized to require the assistance of the local authorities for the search, arrest, detention, and imprisonment of the deserters from the ships of war and merchant vessels of their country. For this purpose they shall apply to the competent tribunals, judges, and officers, and shall, in writing, demand the said deserters, proving, by the exhibition of the registers of the vessels, the rolls of the crews, or by other official documents, that such individuals formed part of the crews; and this reclamation being thus substantiated, the surrender shall not be refused. Such deserters, when arrested, shall be placed at the disposal of the said consuls, vice-consuls, or commercial agents, and may be confined in the public

prisons, at the request and cost of those who shall claim them, in order to be detained until the time when they shall be restored to the vessel to which they belonged, or sent back to their own country by a vessel of the same nation, or any other vessel whatsoever. The agents, owners, or masters of vessels on account of whom the deserters have been apprehended, upon requisition of the local authorities, shall be required to take or send away such deserters from the States and dominions of the contracting parties, or give such security for their good conduct as the law may require. But if not sent back nor reclaimed within six months from the day of their arrest, or if all the expenses of such imprisonment are not defrayed by the party causing such arrest and imprisonment, they shall be set at liberty, and shall not be again arrested for the same cause. However, if the deserters should be found to have committed any crime or offence, their surrender may be delayed until the tribunal before which their case shall be depending shall have pronounced its sentence, and such sentence shall have been carried into effect.

ARTICLE XI.

It is agreed that perfect and entire liberty of conscience shall be enjoyed by the citizens and subjects of both the contracting parties, in the countries of the one and the other, without their being liable to be disturbed or molested on account of their religious belief. But nothing contained in this article shall be construed to interfere with the exclusive right of the Hawaiian Government to regulate for itself the schools which it may establish or support within its jurisdiction.

ARTICLE XII.

If any ships of war or other vessels be wrecked on the coasts of the States or Territories of either of the contracting parties, such ships or vessels, or any parts thereof, and all furniture and appurtenances belonging thereunto, and all goods and merchandise which shall be saved therefrom, or the produce thereof, if sold, shall be faithfully restored with the least possible delay to the proprietors, upon being claimed by them or by their duly authorized factors; and, if there are no such proprietors or factors on the spot, then the said goods and merchandise, or the proceeds thereof, as well as all the papers found on board such wrecked ships or vessels, shall be delivered to the American or Hawaiian consul or vice-consul in whose district the wreck may have taken place; and such consul, vice-consul, proprietors, or factors, shall pay only the expenses incurred in the preservation of the property, together with the rate of salvage and expenses of quarantine which would have been payable in the like case of a wreck of a national vessel; and the goods and merchandise saved from the wreck shall not be subject to duties unless entered for consumption, it being understood that in case of any legal claim upon such wreck, goods, or merchandise, the same shall be referred for decision to the competent tribunals of the country.

ARTICLE XIII.

The vessels of either of the two contracting parties which may be forced by stress of weather or other cause into one of the ports of the other shall be exempt from all duties of port or navigation paid for the

benefit of the State, if the motives which led to their seeking refuge be real and evident, and if no cargo be discharged or taken on board, save such as may relate to the subsistence of the crew, or be necessary for the repair of the vessels, and if they do not stay in port beyond the time necessary, keeping in view the cause which led to their seeking refuge.

ARTICLE XIV.

The contracting parties mutually agree to surrender, upon official requisition, to the authorities of each, all persons who, being charged with the crimes of murder, piracy, arson, robbery, forgery, or the utterance of forged paper, committed within the jurisdiction of either, shall be found within the territories of the other, provided that this shall only be done upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial if the crime had there been committed; and the respective judges and other magistrates of the two Governments shall have authority, upon complaint made under oath, to issue a warrant for the apprehension of the person so charged, that he may be brought before such judges or other magistrates, respectively, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered; and if, on such hearing, the evidence be deemed sufficient to sustain the charge, it shall be the duty of the examining judge or magistrate to certify the same to the proper executive authority, that a warrant may issue for the surrender of such fugitive. The expense of such apprehension and delivery shall be borne and defrayed by the party who makes the requisition and receives the fugitive.

ARTICLE XV.

So soon as steam or other mail packets under the flag of either of the contracting parties shall have commenced running between their respective ports of entry, the contracting parties agree to receive at the post-offices of those ports all mailable matter, and to forward it as directed, the destination being to some regular post-office of either country, charging thereupon the regular postal rates as established by law in the territories of either party receiving said mailable matter, in addition to the original postage of the office whence the mail was sent. Mails for the United States shall be made up at regular intervals at the Hawaiian post-office, and dispatched to ports of the United States, the postmasters at which ports shall open the same, and forward the inclosed matter as directed, crediting the Hawaiian Government with their postage as established by law, and stamped upon each manuscript or printed sheet.

All mailable matter destined for the Hawaiian Islands shall be received at the several post-offices in the United States and forwarded to San Francisco, or other ports on the Pacific coast of the United States, whence the postmasters shall dispatch it by the regular mail packets to Honolulu, the Hawaiian Government agreeing on their part to receive and collect for and credit the Post-Office Department of the United States with the United States' rates charged thereupon. It shall be optional to prepay the postage on letters in either country, but postage on printed sheets and newspapers shall, in all cases, be prepaid. The respective Post-Office Departments of the contracting

parties shall in their accounts, which are to be adjusted annually, be credited with all dead letters returned.

ARTICLE XVI.

The present treaty shall be in force from the date of the exchange of the ratifications, for the term of ten years, and further, until the end of twelve months after either of the contracting parties shall have given notice to the other of its intention to terminate the same, each of the said contracting parties reserving to itself the right of giving such notice at the end of the said term of ten years or at any subsequent term.

Any citizen or subject of either party infringing the articles of this treaty shall be held responsible for the same, and the harmony and good correspondence between the two Governments shall not be interrupted thereby, each party engaging in no way to protect the offender or sanction such violation.

ARTICLE XVII.

The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States of America, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the said States, and by His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, by and with the advice of his privy council of state, and the ratification shall be exchanged at Honolulu within eighteen months from the date of its signature, or sooner, if possible.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the same in triplicate and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Washington, in the English language, the twentieth day of December, in the year one thousand eight hundred and forty-nine.

JOHN M. CLAYTON, [SEAL.]
JAMES JACKSON JARVES. [SEAL.]

And whereas the said treaty has been duly ratified on both parts and the respective ratifications of the same were exchanged at Honolulu on the 24th day of August last, by Charles Bunker, consul of the United States at Lahaina, and R. C. Wyllie, minister of foreign relations of His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, on the part of their respective governments:

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Millard Fillmore, President of the United States, have caused the said treaty to be made public, to the end that the same, and every article and clause thereof, may be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States and the citizens thereof.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this 9th day of November, in the year of our Lord 1850, and of the Independence of the United States the seventy-fifth.

[L. S.]

MILLARD FILLMORE.

By the President:

W. S. DERRICK,

Acting Secretary of State.

Mr. G. P. Judd and Mr. James J. Jarves to Mr. Clayton.

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1850.

SIR: We have the honor to inclose for your perusal copies of certain documents relative to the late difficulties which have arisen between the Governments of France and the Hawaiian Islands.

Nos. 17, 18, and 19 relate to an application to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty in order to obtain their good offices in the adjustment of the points at issue. Nos. 20 and 21 relate to a new treaty with France.

From these you will perceive that the British Government have consented to use their good offices in favor of our Government. We are instructed to request the friendly interposition of the United States towards a satisfactory settlement of the difficulties with France, and we invite the coöperation of your excellency, particularly with reference to the adoption by both England and France of treaties similar to that negotiated by the United States. It is the earnest desire of His Hawaiian Majesty that the United States become party to an arrangement with those two powers to secure his neutrality in all wars and provide for the settlement of any future difficulty which may arise between the Hawaiian Islands and either of the three powers by a reference to the other two.

Trusting that our communication may meet with a favorable consideration, we subscribe ourselves,

Your excellency's most obedient servants,

G. P. JUDD,
JAMES J. JARVES.

[Inclosures not found with note.]

Mr. Clayton to Mr. Judd and Mr. Jarves.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 3, 1850.

To Messrs. G. P. JUDD and JAMES J. JARVES,

Washington:

GENTLEMEN: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 30th ultimo, with the accompanying documents, relative to the difference between His Hawaiian Majesty's Government and the Government of France, growing out of certain proceedings of the late consul-general of France and of the naval commander of that Republic at the Hawaiian Islands. Your note has been submitted to the President, who has directed me to state, in reply, that as the United States have strong motives both of sympathy and interest for desiring that His Hawaiian Majesty's Government should be upon the most friendly terms with all others and especially with those of powerful commercial States, he ardently hopes that the misunderstanding adverted to may be adjusted to the mutual satisfaction of the parties, and will cheerfully do anything in his power, compatible with the cardinal policy of this Government, to bring about that desirable result. An instruction will accordingly be addressed to Mr. Rives, the United States minister at Paris, directing him to employ his good offices, either separately or in conjunction with the British minister, for the purpose of accommo-

lating the dispute between His Hawaiian Majesty's Government and that of France.

The desire which you express in behalf of His Hawaiian Majesty that the United States should become a party to an arrangement with Great Britain and France to secure His Majesty's neutrality in all wars and provide for the settlement of any future difficulty which may arise between the Hawaiian Islands and either of the three powers, by a reference to the other two, shall be taken into respectful consideration.

I avail myself of the occasion, gentlemen, to offer to you the assurance of my very high regard.

JOHN M. CLAYTON.

Mr. Clayton to Mr. Rives.

No. 15.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 5, 1850.

TO WILLIAM C. RIVES, Esq., etc.:

SIR: I transmit a copy of a note and of the accompanying papers addressed to this Department, under date the 30th of May last, by Messrs. G. P. Judd and James Jackson Jarves, accredited to this Government as special commissioners of His Hawaiian Majesty, requesting the friendly interposition of the United States towards a satisfactory settlement of the differences between the Hawaiian Government and that of France. A copy of my answer to the application is also inclosed.

It certainly is very desirable that the relations between France and the Hawaiian Islands should be of an amicable character. We desire that those islands should maintain their independence. We believe that their existing government is competent to discharge the duties of a sovereign state, and that if any of its acts or omissions with reference to other governments, or to the citizens or subjects owing them allegiance, have been of questionable propriety, this should be imputed to the inexperience of the Hawaiian functionaries, and to the difficulties arising from the peculiarities of their position.

It undoubtedly behooves the governments of older and more powerful states who hold official intercourse with the Hawaiian Government to view with indulgence any delinquencies which they may commit clearly resulting from the causes just indicated. The occasion is not considered to call for an expression of an opinion by this Department in regard to the merits of the controversy between the French and the Hawaiian authorities. The Department, however, will not hesitate to express its belief that whatever may have been the convictions of the French officers as to the justice of their cause, the measures adopted to obtain redress were unnecessarily harsh. It is hoped that this will ultimately be the conclusion of the French Government itself; and that, in that event, it will make such amends to the Hawaiian Government as a great and magnanimous nation can not fail to consider as due in such case to a feeble and injured state.

The Department will be slow to believe that the French have any intention to adopt, with reference to the Sandwich Islands, the same policy which they have pursued in regard to Tahiti. If, however, in your judgment it should be warranted by circumstances, you may take a proper opportunity to intimate to the minister for foreign affairs of

France that the situation of the Sandwich Islands, in respect to our possessions on the Pacific and the bonds commercial and of other descriptions between them and the United States, are such that we could never with indifference allow them to pass under the dominion or exclusive control of any other power. We do not ourselves covet sovereignty over them. We would be content that they should remain under their present rulers, who, we believe, are disposed to be just and impartial in their dealings with all nations.

The President is not prepared to comply with the request of Messrs. Judd and Jarves, that the United States should become a party to an arrangement with England and France to secure the neutrality of the Hawaiian Government in all wars, and to provide for the adjustment of any future misunderstanding between that Government and either of the three by a reference to the other two. But although a formal treaty for these purposes would be too little in consonance with our usual policy to be entered into without great deliberation, our interests involved in the independence of the Sandwich Islands are of sufficient importance to require and warrant us in adopting other measures for the purpose of restoring and preserving harmony between their Government and that of either England or France. The President consequently hopes for the best results from your zealous, yet prudent, endeavors toward a satisfactory accommodation of the dispute which is the immediate occasion of this dispatch.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN M. CLAYTON.

Mr. W. C. Rives to Mr. Webster.

No. 49.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris, September 12, 1850.

SIR: I omitted in my last dispatch to acknowledge the receipt of dispatch No. 15 from the State Department, addressed to me by the late Secretary of State, and which was not received here until I had left Paris on my recent excursion. I shall in the exercise of the discretion it commits to me profit of the first occasion which may seem suitable and proper to bring the views and considerations it suggests to the aid of an amicable adjustment of the difficulties between the Sandwich Islands and this Government, without intruding officiously or offensively in the controversy between the parties. The minister of foreign affairs left here ten or twelve days ago to accompany the President in his visit to Cherbourg and some of the neighboring departments, and is not expected back for several days yet to come. I have therefore had no opportunity of personal communication with him since my return to Paris.

* * * * *

I have the honor, etc.,

W. C. RIVES.

We, Kamehameha III, by the grace of God of the Hawaiian Islands, King: By and with the advice of our kuhina nui and counsellors of native chiefs, finding our relations with France so oppressive to my Kingdom, so inconsistent with its rights as an independent State, and

so obstructive of all our endeavors to administer the government of our islands with equal justice with all nations and equal independence of all foreign control, and despairing of equity and justice from France, hereby proclaim as our royal will and pleasure that all our islands and all our rights as sovereign over them are from the date hereof placed under the protection and safeguard of the United States of America until some arrangements can be made to place our said relations with France upon a footing compatible with my rights as an independent sovereign under the laws of nations and compatible with my treaty engagements with other foreign nations; or, if such arrangements be found impracticable, then is our wish and pleasure that the protection aforesaid under the United States of America be perpetual.

And we further proclaim as aforesaid that from the date of publication hereof the flag of the United States of America shall be hoisted above the national ensign on all our forts and places and vessels navigating with Hawaiian registers.

Done at our palace at Honolulu this 10th day of March, A. D. 1851, and in the twenty-sixth year of our reign.

[L. S.]

KAMEHAMEHA.
KEONI ANA.

Mr. Severance to Mr. Webster.

UNITED STATES COMMISSION,
Honolulu, March 11, 1851.

No. 6.]

SIR: I wrote you yesterday and sent the letter by mail in a vessel which sails on Wednesday, in relation to the negotiations with M. Perrin, the French consul-general, and that there was little probability of an amicable conclusion. What will follow we can not tell, but in case of another hostile attack from the French, the King, with the approbation of his chiefs, and I believe nearly all the principal officers of the Government, have it in contemplation to take down the Hawaiian flag and run up that of the United States. They contemplate annexation to our Republic, and have already consulted me about it. They would prefer a guaranty of protection from England and the United States, and have consulted with Gen. Miller, the British consul-general here. He gives them no satisfaction, having written to his Government on the same topic before and received no reply. He is bound by the joint declaration of 1843, that Great Britain shall *not* take possession, either as a protectorate or otherwise.

There is considerable British interest here. Formerly the King and chiefs put great reliance on the protection of England, which was promised verbally to Liholiho, the immediate predecessor of the present King, when he visited England with several of his chiefs. William IV was then on the British throne, I believe; but since then they have had a great deal of difficulty with Mr. Charlton, the British consul, and some with Gen. Miller, the present consul. So they have also with my predecessors, Brown and Ten Eyck; yet the American interest, missionary, mercantile, and otherwise, is altogether paramount.

The popular representative body recently elected by native votes is for the most part composed of natives of the United States, and so is the executive part of the Government, as well as the judiciary, at least in the high courts. The other branch of the legislature is composed of

a council of native chiefs, retaining so far their ancient privileges. During the last year or two there has been a considerable immigration from Sidney, but not an influential or desirable population. Three-fourths, at least, of the business done here is by Americans, and they already own much of the real estate. The sugar-planters are nearly all Americans, and have a strong interest in annexation to the United States, as in that event they will supply our Pacific coast with sugar at an advantage of 30 per cent over all other sugars from the East Indies or elsewhere. The subject of annexation is here often hinted at, and sometimes freely discussed in private; but it is known only to a very few that the King and his Government have the matter under consideration. If the action of the French should precipitate a movement here, I shall be called on, perhaps, to protect the American flag. I was indeed requested to go and see the King on Monday night, and in the presence of the council to give him assurance of protection should he raise the American flag instead of his own; but I preferred to keep away, so as to avoid all appearance of intrigue to bring about a result which, however desirable, and as many believe ultimately inevitable, must still be attended with difficulties and embarrassments. It was a week before this that I was applied to by the King to prevent the sailing of the *Vandalia*, as was contemplated by Capt. Gardner. It was his wish to go on Saturday last. The letters of the premier, minister of the interior, and vice-regent will be found on sheet annexed, marked A.

To the letter of the regent I replied as on sheet marked B. I then addressed a letter to Capt. Gardiner, after first having a free conference with him and with Mr. Allen, the American consul. The letter is marked C. To this Capt. Gardiner replied as marked D.

Capt. Cosnier, commander of the *Serieuse*, appears to be a very worthy man and takes no part in the controversy, as far as known. He can not speak English. I can not yet believe Mr. Perrin will require him to commence war or reprisals, or even blockade. I am, however, in the highest degree anxious to have your instructions how far I may go in protecting the American flag if it shall be raised here. There will be no lack of volunteers to defend it on shore, and a host will soon rush here from California to uphold the stars and stripes. But then if the French should fire upon the town from the corvette, might not Capt. Gardiner interpose to protect American property which is to be found on both sides of every street in town, and all along the wharves? Under the circumstances I am strongly inclined to this opinion, but it requires very serious reflection. I hope no outbreak may change the present state of things till I can hear from you and know how far I can be justified in calling upon a volunteer force or any of our vessels of war to defend the American flag should it be raised here by the consent or desire of the existing Government.

The *Serieuse* may now go away without committing any act of hostility, but the difficulties are not settled. The French may return with a larger force. They have more ships of war in the Pacific—one frigate and a brig, I believe. The natives look upon them as enemies, and if they come again on a like errand we shall be again appealed to for protection and the subject of annexation will come up again with added force.

I hope the exigency will not arrive till after I have heard from you, as I greatly fear my inclination may lead me to transcend my authority. Meantime I shall endeavor to retain the confidence of the King, the chiefs, and the cabinet. Of the latter, John Young, minister of the in-

terior, is the son of an Englishman by a native woman. Mr. Wylie, minister of foreign relations, is a Scotchman, liberal and learned. Dr. Judd, minister of finance, is from New York; so is the chief justice, W. L. Lee; and so is Mr. Bishop, the collector-general, who boards at the same table with me. Mr. Bates, the attorney-general, is from Michigan. Mr. Armstrong, minister of public instruction, is from Pennsylvania; Judge Andrews is from Ohio. These Americans are now Hawaiian subjects, but they retain their affection for their native land.

WEDNESDAY, *March 12.*

The King, his chiefs, and ministers, had a consultation at the palace on Monday night, and again on Tuesday night. It was the desire of the chiefs to appeal to Gen. Miller for British protection. This was promised them verbally by William IV, when they were in England. They have never forgotten it; but the general gave them no promises. At the same time he cautioned them against transferring their authority to any other power, evidently meaning the United States. I find he is beginning to be a little jealous of us. They say he complains of the partiality of the Government to Americans. He breakfasted with M. Perrin a few days ago, and though he declares the French demands preposterous, he still seems little disposed to do much to oppose them. Perrin will doubtless inflame his jealousy of us as much as possible. Already I hear through a French channel that Perrin has no fear of England in this business. They both see that the natural tendency of events will be to thoroughly Americanize the islands, a process which will go on more rapidly when we get a steam communication with San Francisco.

The tone of the California newspapers just received, too, will quicken these jealousies and apprehensions, if they are felt. But what is most important for you to know is that a paper has actually been drawn up and executed transferring the sovereign authority of the Islands to the United States with the design of having the flag of the United States above the Hawaiian. This is only to be used in case of hostilities by the French; otherwise to be a dead letter. I am not committed to this proceeding by any writing, nor have I been present, but have my information from one who was present. The most I have said in private conversation is, that if the King cedes the islands to the United States and puts up the American flag, I will do what I can to protect it for the time being, until the pleasure of my Government shall be known. Leaning upon us as they do, and sympathizing with them under aggravated wrongs and repeated insults, I could not tell them we should reject their proffered allegiance, and stand passive while they, with the American flag in their hands, should be trampled under foot by the French. If in this I have said too much, I am willing to be sacrificed if I can be the means of bringing about ultimate favorable results.

The *Falmouth* is expected here shortly, and I am in hopes that when the news of difficulties here reaches Com. McAuley he will come here with the *Raritan*. There ought to be an American ship-of-war here most of the time; its presence will have a salutary effect in preventing mischief. The English have had none here for some time. The fear of disturbances here operates injuriously upon our commerce, checks emigration hither, and retards the purchase of lands here by Americans.

You will get a pretty accurate view of these islands, their resources, and their politics, from Mr. Jarves' History, latest edition. Com. Wilkes, and Com. Jones too, understood the matter very well.

When Capt. La Place was here, in 1839, the French consul was Jules Dudoit; he has remained here, and is now a resident of the Island of Kani. I am told on good authority that he says it was the intention of La Place to seize and retain the islands, and that in demanding the sum of \$20,000, in default of which he would take possession, he had no idea the King could raise the money, and was much disappointed when he did so by borrowing it of the foreign residents. M. Dudoit has now large interests here and entirely disapproves the present conduct of the French.

The Government here has long been harassed by the continued interference of foreign consuls. The English consuls have been as dictatorial as the French in some things, especially in the matter of land claims. If an English subject had any sort of claim to a piece of land, he was pretty sure to get through the interference of the consul, who paid little respect to native courts. Property of great value in this town was given to Mr. Charlton by a decision of the law advisers of the British crown in London on a case made up by the consul. In fact, the independence of the Islands has not been practically acknowledged. The Government has been compelled to yield to every capricious demand which a British or French foreign resident chose to make, if he could get his consul by any means to take up his case. He had only to point to the guns of a ship of war, and the trembling Government, conscious of its weakness, was forced to yield. The Government has sought guarantees of protection but has not obtained them. Mutual jealousy of each other, coöperating with more generous motives, dictated the joint declaration of 1843 by England and France; but this does not secure the Islands from continued annoyance by the latter, and hence the people here want a flag over them which will protect them.

WEDNESDAY (2 o'clock p. m.).

John Young, minister of the interior, and Dr. Gerret P. Judd, minister of finance, have just called on me at my office, and delivered to me a paper, which, after allowing me to read, they sealed in my presence and delivered to me to be kept among the archives of the legation. It contains this indorsement upon the envelope in the native language, which Dr. Judd translated to me as follows:

The King requests the Commissioner of the United States in case the flag of the United States is raised above the Hawaiian, that he will open the inclosed and act accordingly.

The paper thus sealed is a cession of the sovereignty of the Islands to the United States by proclamation of the King, to be held until some arrangement satisfactory to all parties can be made consistent with the treaty obligations already existing; and in case none such can be made, then the transfer of sovereignty to be perpetual.

This, of course, requires the consent of the United States, which I have not the authority to pledge, but I shall keep the paper and be governed by circumstances. The most I can do is to accept the transfer provisionally and wait for the decision of my Government thereupon. The proclamation also authorizes vessels with Hawaiian registers to carry the flag of the United States.

Dr. Judd, in the presence of Mr. Young, assured me that the King and his chosen and constitutional advisers were unanimous in agreeing to the course they had taken.

MARCH 16.

I understand from Mr. Wyllie this morning, that M. Perrin has returned to him the copy of my letter setting forth the claim of Ladd & Co. for violation of the La Place treaty, deeming it to contain an offensive imputation on La Place, and also the correspondence between Mr. Bates and myself in relation to the treaty of 1846. You will have herewith copies of the correspondence so returned, and judge whether I have transgressed the rules of diplomatic decorum.

In relation to the La Place treaty I have stated the literal truth. It was extorted at the mouth of cannon, and the world ought to know it, if it does not already. The official correspondence at the time demonstrates this, and M. Perrin can not deny it. Perhaps he takes this course to evade a demand which he can not meet by argument, for he has himself admitted that the La Place treaty was in force from 1839 to 1846.

I learned last night from undoubted authority (an American resident who has long been opposed to the Government here) that the few French and English residents here are trying to get up another opposition paper in place of one recently stopped for want of support. The proposed editor is an Englishman; the prospectus which has been privately circulated denounces the missionaries and the Government. Funds will probably be raised and the paper started. You are aware that many Americans who hate the missionaries for reasons you no doubt understand and hate the Government for the same and other reasons have heretofore fallen into the opposition, but they have no intention of playing into the hands of the British or French leaders, and when the flag of the United States shall be raised every man of them will rally under it. The restraining moral and religious influence of the missionaries is odious to many here, and this is inflamed by foreigners who see that these missionaries are all Americans, and conversing as they do in the native language and mingling with the natives have a powerful influence over them. The same remark applies to the officers of the Government. They are now all with us, and we must keep them so. It has been otherwise.

I refer to the nature of the American opposition to the Government here to let you see clearly what elements British or French influences have to work upon. But these will be swept away in a moment when the question lies between an American and some other foreign flag. It must be remarked, too, that the number opposed to the laws for the suppression of licentiousness and drunkenness is being constantly diminished comparatively by the arrival of merchants, agriculturists, and others with their families, giving a constantly improved tone to society, which is now very good in Honolulu.

MONDAY, *March 17.*

This is the King's birthday. Flags are displayed in all directions. The King has a levee to-night.

The importers of foreign goods here may not like to substitute the American tariff for the Hawaiian, but then there will be ample compensation in having free trade with our part of the continent, and 30 per cent protection on sugar. Even now there is a greater amount of goods imported from the United States than from all the world beside. The 5 per cent will be saved on this. The natural markets of these islands are along the Pacific American coast, while the imports will come from all parts of the world, but being chiefly from the United States will pay no duties.

It is believed to be a part of the design of the new paper to attempt to

control the elections to the legislative body. At the last election Dr. Rooke, one of the successful candidates, an Englishman and not a Catholic, received every Catholic vote, the tickets for him being marked with a cross. If there should be an attempt to unite the European and Catholic interests in the elections, it will bring all the Americans to act together and they will carry all the chiefs and nine-tenths of the native votes with them. We look to the legislative body to sanction and confirm the action of the King and the chiefs. I hold it to be pretty certain the native Government can not last long. The King's health is precarious; he is not so temperate as he ought to be, and the prince, heir apparent, is unfortunately getting into the same way. They are now under good restraining influences, but they are often tempted by wine and flattery to discard their Puritanical advisers and maintain their royal prerogatives. It is almost a marvel that they have resisted these seductions so well as they have; but they have some chiefs in their council who are very wise and cautious men.

As to the importance of these islands to our commerce I need say nothing to you. This town must be a great depot for coal for the steamers to China and of supplies for the whaling fleet. But besides this the islands have great agricultural capacities. I have before me the first volume of the translations of the Hawaiian Agricultural Society, of which I have become a member. Among the papers is an address of H. M. Whitney, who has long been a resident of the islands. He estimates that there are 224,000 acres of sugar lands, and twice that number of acres of tillable lands. Calculating sugar at 6 cents per pound, he says the annual produce of the lands would be no less than \$27,000,000. He puts down the probable exports thus:

From the produce of soil.....	\$20, 250, 000
From hides, tallow, and beef.....	1, 875, 000
Butter and cheese.....	1, 000, 000
Total.....	23, 125, 000

This may be an extravagant estimate, but it is no longer doubtful that the islands can produce a vast amount of sugar, coffee, and a great variety of tropical fruits, precisely such as are wanted on our Pacific coast, while an acre of swampy *taso* land will supply half a dozen families of natives with food.

I am happy to say that the Hawaiian Government has no public debt, but has public lands, though perhaps the King and chiefs own the greater part of the vacant lands in their individual rights. The public funds have been very carefully managed, much better probably than they would have been had the opposition prevailed upon the King to discharge his ministers.

In the report of the minister of finance of 1850 I find the following passage:

In reporting the state of the department of finance it is with extreme pleasure that it can be said in brief to be out of debt, and that the revenue received has been sufficient to meet the current exigencies of the Government and to admit the expending of a considerable sum in permanent improvements for the general good.

Entire receipts.....	\$301, 576. 61
Disbursements.....	179, 034. 54

Balance in favor of treasury	122, 542. 07
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The whole balance of assets in favor of the treasury is \$170,981.40, but deducting the amount not deemed available the balance is \$64,539.39. Not many independent governments stand so well as this.

There are some claims against the Government, but the greater amount of them, if good against the Government, are good against France, being damages for nonexecution of the Laplace treaty by France, as set forth in my No. 7, March 3, to the Hawaiian minister of foreign relations.

While thus out of debt and with money in the treasury, there is also Government property to the value of several hundred thousand dollars, which ought, I think, to be left to the territory when formed, as the tariff of the United States would here produce more revenue than the government of the islands would cost the United States. Leaving the lands also to the island territorial or state Government would still be a vast deal better bargain than we made with Texas in a financial point of view.

MARCH 18.

A good deal of powder was burned yesterday in celebrating the King's birthday. There were flags of all sorts, and in the evening the palace was crowded by the representatives of all nations, except the "Palani" (French). So many white faces (and especially ladies) were never seen there before. The number is rapidly increasing every year.

After the company departed the King's band came to my lodgings and played "Hail Columbia." I know not if there was a special design in it. The band is composed of Germans and natives.

The white population of the islands is increasing; the native is diminishing. The commerce with British possessions in New Zealand and New Holland is increasing, as also with China and the East Indies, and emigrants come from both quarters. We want the steam communication with San Francisco as quick as possible. Mr. Kingsbury, of New York, is here trying to make arrangements to put two steamers on the line from here to the coast and also to go from one island to another. With these steamers and a telegraph from San Francisco to Washington we can communicate with you in about a week; so I hope you will not object to a political connection on account of distance. Nor are we so far from the centripetal force of our republic as to be in danger of being thrown off in a tangent. We must not take the islands in virtue of the "manifest destiny" principle, but can we not accept their voluntary offer? Who has a right to forbid the banns?

I ought, perhaps, to have stated before, though it may be known to you, that there is no land tax. Foreigners are not taxed on their property. There is a poll tax or labor tax, but the revenues are mostly derived from customs, tonnage duties, licenses, harbor dues, stamps, etc. But roads are much wanted, and the making of most of them will be expensive, from the mountainous nature of the country.

THURSDAY, *March 20.*

From present appearances the plan of getting up an opposition paper here in the British interest will fail. So many Americans belonging to the old opposition have joined in the project they will be sure to control it. They have been put on their guard and will insist on having an American editor. We can not yet let the American opposition into our secret, lest it should get out. These Americans are in favor of annexation, but they have no idea the cabinet they are opposing are equally so, and they, in their hatred of the missionaries, have apparently not considered how powerful the latter may be in any question between American and other foreign influence with the natives. The Protestant missionaries are all Americans—all republicans. The Cath.

olic missionaries have all their instructions from Rome and are all Frenchmen—Jesuits, in part, if not wholly.

With an American editor for the opposition paper, we can prevent him from doing any serious mischief. I have confided our secret to Dr. Robert W. Wood, one of this old American opposition to the Government, but a very discreet and influential man, with whom I have daily intercourse. He has two extensive sugar plantations and ardently desires annexation. He now goes into the support of the new paper for the purpose of keeping it in American hands. If the British interest insist on controlling it, the Americans will all drop it, and then it will be powerless.

FRIDAY, *March 21.*

I hear to-day from members of the cabinet that the difficulties with M. Perrin are in part settled, or waived, and in part referred to the French Government at home, and that the *Sérieuse* will soon go away, leaving M. Perrin here. A few days ago he increased his demands. Mr. Wyllie told him they were wholly inadmissible. He then intimated that he should be compelled to enforce them. Mr. Wyllie told him in a very significant manner that if he did so the King's independence would be at an end. Mr. Dudoit had told him before that if he pushed his demands too far, the islands would go into the possession of the United States. Probably he had the same intimation from other quarters. Mr. Wyllie's remark and manner confirmed these intimations, and it is probably in consequence that he has since lowered his tone and evinced a disposition to recede as fast as his dignity and French honor will permit.

The duty on distilled spirits, in accordance with the recommendation of the Hawaiian Chamber of Commerce (composed of merchants, chiefly Americans), will be reduced to \$2.50; but there will be no treaty stipulation about it. It satisfies M. Perrin for the present, though the effect will be to diminish the importation of French brandy and increase the importation of rum, gin, and whisky.

The question of indemnity to the Hawaiian Government for property destroyed, the King's yacht carried off, and damages under the Laplace treaty, is to be referred to the French Government. I do not see that M. Perrin gains anything whatever by his mission. When the *Sérieuse* goes away the *Vandalia* will go also, but I hope another American ship-of-war will soon be here. The natives look to us now as their friends and protectors, and they do not regard the matter as finally settled, as indeed it is not. New demands may be made at any time and perhaps a larger armament be sent to enforce them.

Now the question may arise, What shall I do with the King's cession to the United States? Ought I to retain it if he asks for it? I think I shall not give it up till I hear from you. We have a great interest in the islands, and may as well hold the paper as security against a cession to any other power. We should not enforce it against the will of the King and his chiefs, but his health is precarious, and such are the habits of his appointed successor there is no knowing whom he may choose for his constitutional advisers. He may be weary of the moral restraints imposed upon him now and throw himself into the arms of some interest altogether hostile to us. In that event the paper I hold may have its use. I want your instructions before any new difficulties arise.

Capt. Gardiner, of the *Vandalia*, will take this letter and forward it to you by some trusty hand.

I dine with Gen. Miller, the British consul-general for the Pacific islands, this afternoon, and may be able to pick up some information.

I now close this letter, but shall write further by the same conveyance. I have written this as altogether confidential.

With great respect, I have the honor, etc.,

LUTHER SEVERANCE.

Mr. Webster to Mr. Rives.

No. 28.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, June 19, 1851.

WILLIAM C. RIVES, Esq., etc.:

SIR: In the dispatch from this Department (No. 15) of the 5th of July last, you were instructed with reference to the application of Messrs. G. P. Judd and James Jackson Jarves, special commissioners of the Hawaiian Government, for the mediation of the Government of the United States for the purpose of adjusting the differences between that Government and the Government of France. In your dispatch (No. 49) of the 12th of September, you stated that you would avail yourself of the first suitable occasion towards bringing about an amicable adjustment of the controversy. It is believed, however, that you have not since mentioned the subject.

It appears from the accompanying letters addressed to the Department and to the Rev. Rufus Anderson by Mr. Judd, from Panama, that the French Government declined to accept the mediation of the Government of Great Britain, and dispatched an agent to the Sandwich Islands, whom Mr. Judd met at Panama, waiting for the arrival of an armed force from Callao, with which he intended to proceed to the islands for hostile purposes. The public journals have since announced that he had reached his destination and had entered upon a correspondence with the Hawaiian Government. This intelligence has given the President much pain. It has also alarmed the American Board of Missions, whose corresponding secretary visited this city last autumn, brought with him the letter from Mr. Judd to the Rev. Mr. Anderson above referred to, and made application for vessels of war of the United States to be sent to the islands for the protection of the persons and property of the missionaries there.

Under these circumstances, if you should not already have made the French Government acquainted with the interest we feel in the independence of the islands, you will lose no time in taking that course.

The proceedings of M. Dillon and the French admiral there in 1849, so far as we are informed respecting them, seem, both in their origin and in their nature, to have been incompatible with any just regard for the Hawaiian Government as an independent state. They can not, according to our impressions, be accounted for upon any other hypothesis than a determination on the part of those officers to humble and annihilate that Government for refusing to accede to demands which, if granted, must have been at the expense of all self-respect and substantial sovereignty. The further enforcement of those demands which, it appears, is the object of Mr. Perrin's mission, would be tantamount to a subjugation of the islands to the dominion of France. A step like this could not fail to be viewed by the Government and people of the United States with a dissatisfaction which would tend seriously to

disturb our existing friendly relations with the French Government. This is a result to be deplored. If, therefore, it should not be too late, it is hoped that you will make such representations upon the subject to the minister of foreign affairs of France as will induce that Government to desist from measures incompatible with the sovereignty and independence of the Hawaiian Islands, and to make amends for the acts which the French agents have already committed there in contravention of the law of nations and of the treaty between the Hawaiian Government and France.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

DANL. WEBSTER.

JOINT RESOLUTION.

Be it resolved by the nobles and representatives of the Hawaiian Islands in legislative council assembled, That, in the sense of this house, the demands of France are so clearly unjust and contrary to the laws of nations and to treaty, and the course pursued by her so incompatible with the existence of a regular independent government in these islands; if France should persist in such a course it will be the duty of the King to shield himself and his kingdom from insult and oppression by placing this kingdom under the protection of some friendly state; and that should such emergency be so urgent as not to admit of the legislative council being convened, it shall be left to His Majesty by and with the advice of his privy council, under such emergency, to consult the honor and safety of his kingdom, according to His Majesty's best judgment; and that whatever he may do will be binding upon the nation.

Passed both houses of the legislature June 21, 1851.

WM. L. LEE,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
KEONI ANA,
President of the House of Nobles.

Approved by the King, August 4, 1851.

KAMEHAMEHA.
KEONI ANA.

Mr. Rives to Mr. Webster.

No. 95.]

VICHY, July 8, 1851.

SIR: I received here three days ago your dispatch No. 28.

While Gen. de la Hitte was minister of foreign affairs I had several conversations with him respecting the unhappy differences which had arisen between France and the Hawaiian Government. I availed myself of those occasions to represent to him the deep interest which the people and Government of the United States feel in the welfare and independence of the Hawaiian Islands, and their earnest desire to see the controversy then pending brought to an amicable conclusion, which should be consistent alike with the magnanimity of France and the claims of justice on both sides. Gen. de la Hitte always testified the best dispositions on the subject, and I had reason to think that he was

far from approving in all things the conduct of the French agent in 1849. Since his retirement from the ministry there have been such frequent changes in the department of foreign affairs that I have had no suitable opportunity of recurring to the subject in the brief periods of official intercourse with the successive ministers who have temporarily occupied the department; nor indeed did I suppose from all that has come to my knowledge that there was any serious danger of measures being pursued which might compromise the independence or overawe the freedom of action of the Hawaiian Government in regard to the matters in dispute.

Since the receipt of your dispatch, I have felt it my duty to address a communication to the minister of foreign affairs, setting forth plainly and frankly, but in a tone not calculated to wound the pride or dignity of the French Government, the views of the Government of the United States as embodied in your dispatch, the deep interest it feels in the independence of the Sandwich Islands, and the danger that would consequently arise of an interruption of the good understanding now happily existing between France and the United States, if measures should be pursued by her authority incompatible with a just respect of that independence. To give the full effect you desire to these representations, it seemed to me indispensable that they should be made in writing, for, besides the consideration that mere verbal communications never have the weight and importance that are attached to written ones, a strong additional reason is furnished by the changes of ministry which so frequently occur here for placing the views of the Government of the United States on *record*, where they will pass under the eyes of whatever ministers may successively be called to conduct the department of foreign affairs. A copy of the communication addressed to me by the minister of foreign affairs is herewith inclosed. I shall return to Paris in a few days, and if anything of importance should occur in my interview with the minister I will embrace the earliest opportunity to communicate it to you.

I have the honor to be, etc.,

W. C. RIVES.

Mr. Webster to Mr. Severance.

No. 4.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 14, 1851.

LUTHER SEVERANCE, Esq.:

SIR: Your confidential communications, Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, have been duly received, submitted to the President, and by him considered.

They relate to a subject of great importance, not only to the Hawaiian Government and its citizens, but also to the United States.

The Government of the United States was the first to acknowledge the national existence of the Hawaiian Government, and to treat with it as an independent state. Its example was soon followed by several of the Governments of Europe; and the United States, true to its treaty obligations, has in no case interfered with the Hawaiian Government for the purpose of opposing the course of its own independent conduct, or of dictating to it any particular line of policy. In acknowledging the independence of the islands, and of the Government established over

them, it was not seeking to promote any peculiar object of its own. What it did, and all that it did, was done openly in the face of day, in entire good faith, and known to all nations. It declared its real purpose to be to favor the establishment of a government at a very important point in the Pacific Ocean, which should be able to maintain such relations with the rest of the world, as are maintained between civilized states.

From this purpose it has never swerved for a single moment, nor is it inclined, without the pressure of some necessity, to depart from it now, when events have occurred giving to the islands and to their intercourse with the United States a new aspect and increased importance.

This Government still desires to see the nationality of the Hawaiian Government maintained, its independent administration of public affairs respected, and its prosperity and reputation increased.

But while thus indisposed to exercise any sinister influence itself over the counsels of Hawaii, or to overawe the proceedings of its Government by the menace or the actual application of superior military force, it expects to see other powerful nations act in the same spirit. It is, therefore, with unfeigned regret that the President has read the correspondence and become acquainted with the circumstances occurring between the Hawaiian Government and M. Perrin, the commissioner of France at Honolulu.

It is too plain to be denied or doubted that demands were made upon the Hawaiian Government by the French commissioner wholly inconsistent with its character as an independent state, demands which if submitted to in this case would be sure to be followed by other demands equally derogatory, not only from the same quarter, but probably also from other states, and this could only end in rendering the islands and their Government a prey to the stronger commercial nations of the world.

It can not be expected that the Government of the United States could look on a course of things leading to such a result with indifference.

The Hawaiian Islands are ten times nearer to the United States than to any of the powers of Europe. Five-sixths of all their commercial intercourse is with the United States, and these considerations, together with others of a more general character, have fixed the course which the Government of the United States will pursue in regard to them. The annunciation of this policy will not surprise the governments of Europe, nor be thought to be unreasonable by the nations of the civilized world, and that policy is that while the Government of the United States, itself faithful to its original assurance, scrupulously regards the independence of the Hawaiian Islands, it can never consent to see those islands taken possession of by either of the great commercial powers of Europe, nor can it consent that demands, manifestly unjust and derogatory and inconsistent with a bona fide independence, shall be enforced against that Government.

The substance of what is here said has already been intimated with sufficient explicitness to the Government of France, and we have the assurance of his excellency, M. Sartiges, minister of the Republic of France near the United States, that that Government has no purpose whatever of taking possession of the islands or of acting towards them in any hostile or aggressive spirit.

A copy of this letter will be placed in the hands of the French minister here; another copy will be transmitted to Paris; and another copy

you will please to communicate to M. Perrin, the French commissioner, upon the appearance of any disposition on his part or on the part of any French naval commander in the Pacific Ocean to proceed to hostilities against the Government of Hawaii for the purpose of enforcing the demands which have been made upon it on the part of France.

The Navy Department will receive instructions to place, and to keep, the naval armament of the United States in the Pacific Ocean in such a state of strength and preparation as shall be requisite for the preservation of the honor and dignity of the United States and the safety of the Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

I have, etc.,

DANIEL WEBSTER.

[Unnumbered.]

Mr. Webster to Mr. Severance.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, July 14, 1851.

SIR: I have written you a regular official dispatch, setting forth the principles of policy which will be pursued by the administration here in whatever respects the Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

I now write you a letter of private instructions, made necessary by suggestions contained in your communications by Lieut. Johnson.

In the first place, I have to say that the war-making power in this Government rests entirely with Congress, and that the President can authorize belligerent operations only in the cases expressly provided for by the Constitution and the laws. By these no power is given to the Executive to oppose an attack by one independent nation on the possessions of another. We are bound to regard both France and Hawaii as independent states, and equally independent; and though the general policy of the Government might lead it to take part with either in a controversy with the other, still, if this interference be an act of hostile force, it is not within the constitutional power of the President, and still less is it within the power of any subordinate agent of Government, civil or military. If the *Serieuse* had attacked Honolulu, and thereupon the *Vandalia* had fired upon the *Serieuse*, this last act would have been an act of violence against France not to be justified, and, in fact, if not disavowed at Washington it would have been an act of war. In these cases, where the power of Congress can not be exercised beforehand, all must be left to the redress which that body may subsequently authorize. This you will constantly bear in mind. But, at the same time, it is not necessary that you should enter into these explanations with the French commissioner or the French naval commander.

In my official letter of this date I have spoken of what the United States would do in certain contingencies. But in thus speaking of the Government of the United States I do not mean the executive power, but the Government in its general aggregate, and especially that branch of the Government which possesses the war-making power. This distinction you will carefully observe, and you will neither direct, request,

or encourage any naval officer of the United States in committing hostilities on French vessels of war.

Another leading topic in your communication is the proposed contingent surrender by the Government of the islands of their sovereignty to the United States or their annexation to this country.

This is a very important question, and one which you will readily see rises above any functions with which you are charged. It may, indeed, be very proper for you in this case, as well as in all others, to communicate to your Government whatever the Government to which you are accredited desire to have so communicated; but it is very important that on a question involving such deep interests, both domestic and foreign, you should yourself altogether forbear expressing any opinion whatever to the Hawaiian Government. You will see by my official letter, which you are at liberty to communicate to that Government, the disposition of the United States to maintain its independence; beyond that you will not proceed. The act of contingent or conditional surrender, which you mention in your letter as having been placed in your hands, you will please to return to the Hawaiian Government. In this case the Government of the United States acts upon principles of general policy; it will protect its own rights. It feels a deep interest in the preservation of Hawaiian independence, and all questions beyond this, should they arise, must be considered and settled here by the competent authorities.

You inform us that many American citizens have gone to settle in the islands; if so, they have ceased to be American citizens. The Government of the United States must, of course, feel an interest in them not extended to foreigners, but by the law of nations they have no right further to demand the protection of this Government. Whatever aid or protection might under any circumstances be given them must be given, not as a matter of right on their part, but in consistency with the general policy and duty of the Government and its relations with friendly powers.

You will therefore not encourage in them, nor indeed in any others, any idea or expectation that the islands will become annexed to the United States. All this, I repeat, will be judged of hereafter, as circumstances and events may require, by the Government at Washington.

I do not suppose there is any immediate danger of any new menaces from France; still less of any actual attack on the islands by her naval armament. Nevertheless you will keep us constantly and accurately informed of whatever transpires.

Your account of the prosperity of the islands and the fiscal condition of its Government is interesting, and you can be hardly too full and particular in such statements.

Mr. Allen is at present quite unwell at Boston. As soon as he is able he will return to his post. Lieut. Johnson will take this dispatch to Panama. If Mr. Allen's illness should continue for any length of time, which we hope may not be the case, Lieut. Johnson will be directed to return without him.

I have the honor, etc.,

DANIEL WEBSTER.

Mr. Rives to Mr. Webster.

No. 97.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris, July 22, 1851.

SIR: I inclose herewith the copy of a letter I received a few days ago at Vichy, from the minister of foreign affairs in answer to the one I addressed to him on the 8th instant, in relation to the Sandwich islands. You will observe that after expressing the painful surprise my communication had caused him, he states that the information which had been received in the United States respecting the pending measures and intentions of the French Government towards those islands, and on which your despatch No. 28 was founded, is erroneous; which he has instructed Monsieur de Sartiges to rectify in his communications with you at Washington, while he awaits my return to Paris to give me *viva voce* the same *eclaircissements* here.

I waited upon the minister of foreign affairs as soon as I returned, and after some moments of conversation on general topics he entered upon the subject of our recent correspondence. He said that he had been surprised and even pained at the apparent facility with which the Government of the United States had given credence to the rumors which had reached it respecting the supposed designs of France toward the Sandwich Islands; that there was in truth no real foundation for those rumors; that the French Government had ordered no hostile demonstrations whatever to sustain M. Perrin's mission to coerce the submission of the islands to its demands; that not having the advantage which both England and the United States possessed in the presence and controlling influence of natives of each of those countries in the Hawaiian councils, it might sometimes find it necessary to employ a more energetic tone of negotiation than either of those powers to obtain an equal treatment with them, but that the Government of the United States might be assured that France would always respect the independence of these islands, which she had a common interest with other commercial nations in maintaining; and that nothing was more remote from her wishes or intentions in any event than to subject them to her dominion or to acquire territorial sovereignty over them.

I told Monsieur Baroche that I should have great pleasure in communicating to you these explicit and honorable declarations on the part of the French Government; and having already presented to him in writing the views of the Government of the United States, as expressed in your dispatch of the 19th ultimo, I did not think it necessary to add anything further than to say that the rumors which he seemed to think had met with too easy a credence at Washington, had come through a semiofficial channel which it would have been difficult wholly to disregard.

I will take this occasion to remark that there seems to have been an entire misconception on the part of Mr. Judd as to the nature of the instructions received from the Department of State, in June, 1850, respecting the controversy between France and the Hawaiian Government. In both of his letters, which accompanied your dispatch No. 28, he speaks of my being authorized to propose to the French Government the good offices of the United States for the adjustment of the controversy. It will be seen, however, on reference to the instructions addressed to me, that, without any proposal of the good offices of the United States for settling the matters in dispute, I was to take a "proper opportunity" in my intercourse with the minister of foreign affairs, "if circumstances, in my judgment, should warrant it," to

intimate to him the deep interest which the United States have in maintaining the independence of the Sandwich Islands, and to employ the other topics of persuasive consideration suggested in those instructions "toward a satisfactory accommodation of the dispute;" all of which was to be done with "prudence," and without entering into the merits of the controversy between the French and Hawaiian authorities, on which the Department of State did not consider "the occasion as calling for the expression of an opinion."

My understanding of these instructions at the time was manifested by my dispatch No. 49, acknowledging their receipt, to which you refer, and in which I say:

I shall, in the exercise of the discretion they commit to me, profit of the first occasion which may seem suitable and proper to bring the views and considerations they suggest to the aid of an amicable adjustment of the difficulties between the Sandwich Islands and this Government without intruding officially or offensively in the controversy between the parties.

These instructions were accordingly fulfilled in my conversations with Gen. de La Hitte, while he was minister of foreign affairs, as stated in my dispatch No. 95, being persuaded that if anything further were deemed necessary, I should receive instructions to that effect as soon as the occasion arose to call for them. I was the more convinced of the propriety of not going beyond the line of my original instructions, until it should plainly become my duty to do so, because I saw evidences of an undue anxiety on the part of the British Government, as represented here, to put us forward in an invidious and delicate office which might compromise our friendly relations with France, when that Government itself was particularly required and called upon by the joint engagement entered into by France and England on the 28th November, 1843, for the mutual respect of the independence of the Sandwich Islands, to take the initiative on the occasion, and also because I had every reason to believe from the declarations of Gen. de La Hitte that there was no design on the part of the French Government to menace or endanger their independence.

I have the honor, etc.,

W. C. RIVES.

Mr. Rives to Mr. Webster.

No. 109.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris, October 30, 1851.

SIR: After disposing of the particular object of my call, Monsieur Viel-Castel took occasion to remark to me in a friendly, but at the same time very earnest, tone that the Government of the Republic had been very much annoyed by the consequences, as it had been sensibly wounded by the manner of the intervention of the Government of the United States in their difficulties with the Sandwich Islands.

He said that since the communication you had addressed to the commissioner of the United States in the islands had been known there, the Hawaiian authorities had refused absolutely to listen to any of the demands of the French Government, and made no other reply to the French consul than that if those demands were pressed they would immediately put themselves under the protectorate of the United States. He further observed that all they asked or wished of the Ha-

waiian Government was a fair and substantially equal treatment of their commerce, navigation, and the religion of their citizens, relatively to that which the same interests of England and the United States enjoyed; that the French Government had never had the slightest intention of pursuing any measures toward the Sandwich Islands inconsistent with a just respect of their independence; that after the receipt of the letter I had addressed to the minister of foreign affairs in July last, Monsieur de Sartiges had been instructed to give you the fullest and most formal assurances to that effect; but if they had known at the time, or could have anticipated, the course which was pursued by the Government of the United States in the matter, the dignity of the French Government would not have permitted them, in such circumstances, to give the frank and unreserved explanations which had been authorized.

He spoke of the manner in which the interposition of the United States had taken place as being unusual and wounding (*blessante*) to the dignity of the French Government, referring, as I understood him, to the circumstance of a communication on the subject being first addressed to the commissioner of the United States, and immediately afterwards made known by a circular to all the members of the diplomatic corps at Washington. He said it so happened that the first information of the proceeding reached them through the English legation here, which was very prompt to communicate it. He alluded, also, to the circumstance that the United States had been invited to become a party to the convention concluded between France and England in 1843 for mutually respecting the independence of the Sandwich Islands, but the invitation had been declined, a circumstance which, he thought, should protect France from the suspicion of having improper designs upon the independence of the islands.

Mr. Viel-Castel concluded by saying that in the position in which they were now placed by the proceedings of the Government of the United States it was not possible they could ask of us our good offices in bringing about an arrangement of their difficulties with the Sandwich Islands, but he trusted the United States itself would be prompted by its own sense of justice and a feeling of common friendship for both parties to use its influence with the Hawaiian Government to extend an equal treatment in the spirit of its treaty obligations to French interests with those of other nations.

I report to you without comment these observations of M. Viel-Castel, with as near a conforming to his own language as I have been able to attain. You will best appreciate their bearing and importance on the points which seemed most to touch the susceptibility of the French Government. I made such observations to him in reply as, without departing from the position taken by the Government of the United States, seemed best calculated to exhibit it in a friendly and conciliatory aspect. In this spirit (considering the preservation of the ancient friendly relations between the two countries as a matter of the highest importance to both, and, indeed, to all mankind) I have hitherto endeavored to conduct my official intercourse with this Government, and I am happy to say that I have always found it reciprocated in the fullest measure by the public authorities here.

I have the honor, etc.,

W. C. RIVES.

Mr. Marcy to Mr. Mason.

No. 3.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 16, 1853.

JOHN MASON, Esq., etc.:

SIR: Recent accounts from the Sandwich Islands represent that the political affairs of the Hawaiian Government were in an unsettled state and some changes of high official men had been made. The political agitations were in a great measure composed at the date of the last dispatches from our commissioner, but while they existed the question of transferring the sovereignty of these islands to the United States was much discussed. As it was to be expected, the representatives of Great Britain and France at Honolulu were disturbed by the agitation of this question and used all their influence to repress the rising sentiment of annexation to this country.

I have good reason for believing that both Great Britain and France feel much solicitude in relation to the future destiny of the Sandwich Islands and are very unwilling to see them become a territory of the United States. Their respective ministers near this Government have had several conferences with me on that subject in which they appeared to be desirous of getting assurances that this Government would take no measures to acquire the sovereignty of these islands or accept it if voluntarily offered to the United States. Their language to me leaves it doubtful in my mind how far Great Britain and France intend to go in preventing such a transference of them to this country. I am satisfied that these powers will do what they can short of a resort to actual force to defeat that object. Their ministers, particularly the minister of France, labored to impress me with the belief that such a transfer would be forcibly resisted; but I do not believe that these Governments would go to that extreme length unless there should be something in the manner of acquiring the islands which would afford a plausible pretense for such an interference.

The object in addressing you at present is to request you to look into this matter and ascertain, if possible, without making it a matter of direct discussion, what would probably be the course of France in case of an attempt on the part of the United States to add these islands to our territorial possessions by negotiation or other peaceable means.

I do not think the present Hawaiian Government can long remain in the hands of the present rulers or under the control of the native inhabitants of these islands, and both England and France are apprised of our determination not to allow them to be owned by or to fall under the protection of either of these powers or of any other European nation.

It seems to be inevitable that they must come under the control of this Government, and it would be but reasonable and fair that these powers should acquiesce in such a disposition of them, provided the transference was effected by fair means.

It has been intimated that Russia takes an interest in the destiny of the Sandwich Islands, and even has an eye on them for herself. I do not doubt that she would prefer that they should remain as they are rather than see them under the control or in the possession of either Great Britain, France, or the United States, but it is scarcely probable that she would actively interfere in the matter. As to England and France, a different conclusion may be adopted. The views of the French Government, and the part it would take in case the United

States should accept or acquire fairly the sovereignty of these islands I hope you will be able to ascertain, and will apprise your Government thereof.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. L. MARCY.

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

I transmit to the Senate a report from the Secretary of State, with accompanying papers, in answer to their resolution of the 2d instant.

FRANKLIN PIERCE.

WASHINGTON, *March 3, 1854.*

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

The Secretary of State, to whom was referred the resolution of the Senate of the 2d instant, requesting the President to communicate to that body, if not incompatible with the public interest, "copies of all correspondence between the Governments of the United States and Great Britain in regard to the Sandwich Islands, including copies of all communications between the Secretary of State and Mr. Fox, the British minister, during the years 1843 and 1844, in regard to the independence of those islands, and especially of the letters of Mr. Fox to Mr. Upshur of the 25th of June, 1843, and of Mr. Upshur to Mr. Fox of the 5th of July, 1843; also a copy of any protest or other communication from the King of the Sandwich Islands to this Government in regard to the seizure of those islands by Lord George Paulet, commander of Her Britannic Majesty's ship *Carysfort*, and of any reply of this Government thereto," has the honor to lay before the President the papers mentioned in the subjoined list.

Respectfully submitted.

W. L. MARCY.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, February 15, 1854.

LIST OF ACCOMPANYING PAPERS.

Mr. Everett to Mr. Webster, July 1, 1842, extract.
 King Kamehameha III to the President, March 10, 1843, copy.
 Mr. Webster to Mr. Everett, March 23, 1843, copy.
 Mr. Everett to Mr. Webster, March 28, 1843, extract.
 Mr. Everett to Mr. Legare, June 1, 1843, extract.
 Mr. Everett to Mr. Legare, June 3, 1843, copy.
 Mr. Legare to Mr. Everett, June 13, 1843, extract.
 Mr. Everett to Mr. Legare, June 14, 1843, extract.
 Mr. Fox to Mr. Upshur, June 25, 1843, copy.
 Mr. Everett to Mr. Legare, July 1, 1843, extract.
 Mr. Upshur to Mr. Fox, July 5, 1843, copy.
 Mr. Everett to Mr. Upshur, August 15, 1843, extract.
 Mr. Everett to Mr. Upshur, September 28, 1843, extract.
 Mr. Everett to Mr. Nelson (with inclosure), April 24, 1844, copy.

Mr. Everett to Mr. Webster.

[Extract.]

No. 16.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

London, July 1, 1842.

DANIEL WEBSTER, Esq.,

Secretary of State:

SIR:

* * * * *

Mr. Brinsmade, the commercial agent of the United States to the Sandwich Islands, lately arrived here. He is intrusted with letters from the King of those islands to the sovereigns of Great Britain and France, of purport similar to that of which he was the bearer to the President. I introduced him to Mr. Addington, under secretary of state, who appeared to take an interest in his errand.

* * * * *

I am, sir, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

EDWARD EVERETT.

Kamehameha III to the President.

Kamehameha III, native King of the Sandwich Islands, to his excellency John Tyler, the President of the United States of America:

GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND: In trouble and difficulty we present for consideration to the President the unfortunate situation in which we and our Government are placed.

Demands upon us unsustained by the acknowledged laws of nations and unfounded in justice were for the first time presented by Lord George Paulet, captain of H. B. M. ship *Carysfort*, then lying in the harbor of Honolulu, with a threat of coercive measures in case of non-compliance within nineteen hours. Our proposals for discussion and negotiation through our principal adviser were declined with rudeness and we were compelled without a hearing to yield to demands which we believed to be arbitrary and unjust as regards ourselves, oppressive and illegal as regards foreign residents.

We have been compelled to acknowledge an acting consul of Her British Majesty against whom there were positive objections, susceptible of explicit proof, without the grounds of our refusal being heard or considered. The acknowledged consul of Her British Majesty had suddenly and secretly withdrawn from these islands without soliciting an interview or giving us any sort of notice of his intentions previous to his departure. After his departure we received notice that he had delegated his consular functions to Alexander Simpson, who was a known and declared enemy of our Government, who had openly insulted the chief magistrate of this island and other high officers of our appointment, who had publicly threatened to involve us in difficulties, and whose recognition as consular agent was protested against by two British subjects who represented the chief commercial interests of Great Britain in these islands.

Compliance has been compelled with demands violating the obligations of contracts and contravening laws for the collection of debts which have been established for the general benefit in accordance with the statutes of civilized nations, by compelling us to annul the decisions of juries after the cases had been dismissed, and to grant new trials contrary to law, and by compelling us to remove attachments levied by one British resident upon the property of another in due course of law and under the usual formalities.

Precluded from negotiation and unable to repel by force, we yielded to these requisitions under protest of embracing the earliest opportunity of representing them more fully to Her Britannic Majesty.

Compliance having been thus procured to the foregoing demands, others were successively preferred by Her Britannic Majesty's acting consul (now acknowledged), more unjust, exorbitant, and arbitrary; claims for heavy indemnities where no damage was proven and only alleged on frivolous pretexts and demands for damages in a case still pending under the previous protest to Her Britannic Majesty. We were called upon to violate every principle of equity by setting aside the decision of juries in several cases without any just cause being pretended why new trials should be granted. These demands were enforced at private interviews between ourselves, his lordship, and Her Britannic Majesty's acting consul. The subject was only verbally canvassed, written negotiations were positively refused, and even written statements and proof and copies of the claims preferred were denied. The only alternatives offered us were immediate resolve to violate the laws by acts illegal and oppressive, immediate admission and payment of claims to indemnity so loosely supported, or immediate hostilities. Without force to resist hostilities, without resources to meet the payment of the heavy indemnities demanded, and firmly resolved to support law and justice, we adopted the only peaceful alternative left, to throw ourselves upon the generosity of the British nation by a conditional cession of these islands to Her Britannic Majesty. To have awaited hostilities would have been to expose to destruction the property and jeopardize the lives of a large number of foreign residents who are American citizens; to have complied with the demands urged would have been to sanction oppressive and illegal acts affecting the rights and prospects of American citizens also and an open violation of the stipulations with the United States in 1826.

Placed in difficulties from which we could not extricate ourselves with honor and justice, compelled to immediate decision, and threatened with immediate hostilities, we have, with the advice and consent of our chiefs, signed with a heavy heart and many tears the deed of provisional cession and have permitted the British flag to be planted in all our islands, but under the guns of a frigate and at the point of the bayonet.

Relying on the magnanimity and firmness of the United States, we appeal to the President to interpose the high influence of the United States with the Court of England to grant us an impartial hearing and procure us justice, to induce Her Britannic Majesty to withdraw from the sovereignty of these islands and leave us as we have been, an independent Government supported in our right.

We have labored to civilize and improve our islands, we have adopted the laws of the United States and of Britain, we have appointed upright and capable American citizens and British subjects to offices of trust and responsibility, in order that their functions might be exer-

cised with energy and fidelity, we have adopted all suggestions which would tend to put the commercial intercourse of American citizens with us upon the best footing. We have been gratified with the large and increasing number of American residents. We confidently appeal to the Americans on these islands engaged in mercantile and commercial pursuits to testify to the honesty of our intentions and our capabilities for self-government, and we acknowledge them to have been the most consistent and efficient supporters of our Government.

We look to the United States with peculiar feelings of respect and gratitude. To the benevolence and enterprise of that great people we owe the introduction of the Christian religion, of civilization and laws, of commerce and agriculture, and the large and respectable number of our foreign residents.

We ask of you to secure and preserve the great interests common to us and you, and arrest the course of events so prejudicial to both, and we shall never cease to be grateful for your aid.

And we pray the Almighty God to have your excellency, our great and good friend, in His most holy keeping.

Written at Honolulu, Island of Oahu, Hawaiian (Sandwich) Islands, this tenth day of March, anno Domini one thousand eight hundred and forty-three.

By your good friend,

[L. S.]

KAMEKAMEHA.

KEKAULURKI,

Premier.

Mr. Webster to Mr. Everett.

No. 34]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, March 23, 1843.

EDWARD EVERETT, Esq., etc:

SIR: The course adopted by this Government in regard to the Sandwich Islands has for its sole object the preservation of the independence of those islands and the maintenance by their Government of an entire impartiality in their intercourse with foreign states. The United States desire to exercise no undue influence or control over the Government of the islands, nor to obtain from it any grant of exclusive privileges whatever. This was solemnly declared in the President's message to Congress, and it is declared also in the instructions given to Mr. Brown, of which you will receive herewith a copy.

The President would exceedingly regret that suspicion of a sinister purpose of any kind on the part of the United States should prevent England and France from adopting the same pacific, just, and conservative course towards the Government and people of this remote, but interesting group of islands.

I am, sir, etc.,

DANL. WEBSTER.

[Extract.]

Mr. Everett to Mr. Webster.

No. 34.]

LONDON, March 28, 1843.

DANIEL WEBSTER, Esq.,
Secretary of State.

SIR:

* * * * *

Lord Aberdeen told me the other day that he had signified to the French ambassador that England could not agree to any encroachment on the Sandwich Islands, and the Count de Ste. Aulaire replied that none was contemplated. Lord Aberdeen added that this Government would distinctly recognize the independence of these islands and presumed France would do the same. He hoped our missionaries would abstain from all attempt to exercise political influence.

* * * * *

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

EDWARD EVERETT.

Mr. Everett to Mr. Legare.

[Extract.]

No. 40.]

LONDON, June 1, 1843.

H. S. LEGARE, Esq.,
Secretary of State:

SIR:

* * * * *

The immediate object of my interview with Lord Aberdeen was to make inquiry relative to a report contained in the papers of the week, that the sovereignty of the Sandwich Islands had been ceded to the Queen of Great Britain, and possession taken by Lord George Paulet, of the ship of war *Carysfort*, the British officer commanding in those seas. This report will no doubt have attracted your notice; and following so closely after the official recognition of the independence of these islands by the United States and Great Britain herself is well calculated to produce uneasiness and surprise, and in this light I spoke of it to Lord Aberdeen.

He said they were entirely without information on the subject beyond what the newspapers contained and had no other reason to believe in the fact of the occupation. He could only say, at present, that if any such thing had taken place it was entirely without authority or instructions, as I could easily infer from the recent official recognition of the independence of the islands by Great Britain, which was made known to me at the time. I observed to Lord Aberdeen that, of course, if the islands had been thus without authority taken possession of, the act would be immediately disavowed by Her Majesty's Government. He said it might not be proper for him, in the absence of all information, under an entire ignorance of what had been done, to pledge the Government to any course; but he was quite willing to say that the intelli-

gence had produced no change in the opinions and feelings which led him to advise the recognition, and that he still remained without the least wish for any addition to their colonial possessions. He told me they had several times declined to accept the sovereignty of different groups of islands in the Pacific which had been offered to them. If the report was founded in truth, he thought the cession might have proceeded from apprehensions on the part of the government of the Sandwich Islands that the French were meditating also the occupation of that group and that aversion to the French might have led them, in the absence of Mr. Richards, to wish to place themselves under British protection. I told Lord Aberdeen that I had understood from a private source of information that the Hawaiian Commissioners at Washington had offered to place the islands under the protection of the United States; that I could not vouch for the truth of the report, but that if the offer were made it was certainly, as he was aware, declined.

In reference to the reserve with which he had spoken of giving up the islands, if possession as reported had been taken of them, Lord Aberdeen said this reserve was only *in majorem cautelam*, in consideration of his total ignorance of the circumstances of the case, and not because his opinions and feelings as to the expediency of the measure were at all varied by the rumored fact of the occupation. On my remarking that in one version of the newspaper report the cession was said to have been accepted by Lord George Paulet in full satisfaction for demands of compensation for injuries sustained by British subjects from the Government of the Sandwich Islands, he said he was not acquainted with any such demands and should be doubly unwilling to sanction a cession made on that basis. Upon the whole, when I reflect how distinctly and how recently this Government is pledged to the United States, to France, and to the Sandwich Islands themselves to recognize their independence I can not doubt that the act of the commander of the *Carysfort* will be readily disavowed.

* * * * *

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDWARD EVERETT.

Mr. Everett to Mr. Legare.

No. 41.]

LONDON, June 3, 1843.

H. S. LEGARE, Esq.,

Secretary of State:

SIR: At a late hour last evening I received a note from the Earl of Aberdeen requesting an interview at noon this day, at which he informed me that since he saw me last he had received a dispatch from Mr. Doyle, the British chargé d'Affaires at Mexico, dated April 24, transmitting a printed and evidently authentic paper, in which the particulars of the "provisional cession" of the Sandwich Islands to Great Britain are set forth. Lord Aberdeen allowed me to read Mr. Doyle's dispatch and the printed paper, and also read to me the dispatch which he had himself prepared to Mr. Fox on the subject, and the papers accompanying it. As these documents will be communicated to you, I do not know that there is anything left for me to say, Lord Aberdeen's oral communication being but a repetition and amplification of the contents of his dispatch to Mr. Fox and his letter of last October

to the commissioners of the Sandwich Islands. He said the account in the printed paper was a confused and not very intelligible affair, and his only reason for any reserve in expressing himself on the subject arose from the fact that Lord George Paulet was one of the most discreet and judicious officers of their navy, and could not, he thought, have acted without better grounds than might be inferred from the printed accounts.

It will perhaps be in my power, by the next steamer, to give you further information on the subject.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDWARD EVERETT.

Mr. Legaré to Mr. Everett.

[Extract.]

No. 46.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 13, 1843.

EDWARD EVERETT, Esq., etc.:

SIR:

* * * * *

It is well known that our settled policy is the strictest nonintervention in what does not immediately concern us that we accept governments *de facto* as governments *de jure*, and that above all we have no wish to plant or to acquire colonies abroad. Yet there is something so entirely peculiar in the relations between this little commonwealth and ourselves that we might even feel justified, consistently with our own principles, in interfering by force to prevent its falling into the hands of one of the great powers of Europe. These relations spring out of the local situation, the history, and the character and institutions of the Hawaiian Islands, as well as out of the declarations formally made by this Government during the course of the last session of Congress, to which I beg leave to call your particular attention.

If the attempts now making by ourselves, as well as by other Christian powers to open the markets of China to a more general commerce be successful, there can be no doubt but that a great part of that commerce will find its way over the Isthmus. In that event it will be impossible to overrate the importance of the Hawaiian group as a stage in the long voyage between Asia and America. But without anticipating events which, however, seem inevitable, and even approaching the actual demands of an immense navigation, make the free use of those roadsteads and ports indispensable to us. I need not remind you, who are in so peculiar manner related to that most important interest, commercial and political, that our great nursery of seamen, the whale fishery, has for years past made this cluster of islands its rendezvous and resting place. It seems doubtful whether even the undisputed possession of the Oregon Territory and the use of the Columbia River, or indeed anything short of the acquisition of California (if that were possible), would be sufficient indemnity to us for the loss of these harbors.

Independently, however, of these paramount considerations, it is impossible that any enlightened American acquainted with what his countrymen have done to make this people worthy of their mission, which ought to be hospitality to the flags of all nations navigating that

ocean, can regard without lively sympathy their present unfortunate situation. All accounts seem to concur in representing this tribe, especially its chiefs, as having been within the last twenty-five years raised from a brutally savage state to a condition which may be fairly called civilized. This is the work of Christianity, and it seems to me a touching instance of the beneficent influence of the common religion of all the Great Powers that it had thus prepared an asylum for them all amidst the dangers of that vast ocean and concentrated it by its own peaceful spirit to a perpetual neutrality. It was with this view that we heartily concurred, so far as our good offices went, in promoting the objects of the mission sent to us last winter, one of the results of which was the message of the President already referred to.

You are, therefore, requested to use your best endeavors to prevent the consummation of any purpose of conquest that England may possibly have conceived. France is interested in coöperating with us to the same end. Unfortunately there are embarrassments in the way of her doing so, at least of her doing so with all the effect that would otherwise attend the intervention of so conspicuous a power in favor of so great an interest of the whole Christian world. Still, her ministers may be moved to do something. You may, at least, if occasion serve, sound their ambassador in London. Russia has also a special interest in it, if she looks with any solicitude to her settlements on the northwest coast. Might you not enlist her Government in the same cause?

On the whole, however, the better opinion seems to be that what Lord George Paulet has done will be disavowed.

* * * * *

I have the honor to be, with sincere respect, sir, your obedient humble servant,

H. S. LEGARÉ.

Mr. Everett to Mr. Legaré.

[Extract.]

No. 43.]

LONDON, *June 14, 1843.*

SIR:

* * * * *

June 19.—In the Times of the 15th there was an editorial article of considerable significance on the recent provisional cession of the Sandwich Islands to the British Crown. It wore the appearance at the time of being semiofficial, and from its having remained for two or three days uncontradicted in any quarter I am inclined to think that it was at least founded on good information. Should this be the case it may be considered as certain that the Government here have made up their minds to disavow the cession, and to adhere to the recognition of the independence of the islands.

* * * * *

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDWARD EVERETT.

H. S. LEGARÉ, Esq.,
Secretary of State.

Mr. Fox to Mr. Upshur.

WASHINGTON, *June 25, 1843.*

SIR: Her Majesty's Government, previously to the departure from England to the last steam packet, had already received information, though not officially, of the provisional occupation of the Sandwich Islands, in the name of Great Britain, by the officer commanding Her Majesty's ship *Carysfort*.

I am directed by the Earl of Aberdeen to state to you, for the information of the Government of the United States, that the occupation of the Sandwich Islands was an act entirely unauthorized by Her Majesty's Government, and that with the least practicable delay due inquiry will be made into the proceedings which led to it.

The British Government had already announced to certain commissioners, who arrived in Great Britain in March last on the part of the King of the Sandwich Islands, that Her Majesty had determined to recognize the independence of those islands under their present chief.

To that determination Her Majesty's Government intend to adhere. At the same time, however, it is right that it should be understood that the British Government equally intend to engage, and, if necessary, to compel the chief of the Sandwich Islands to redress whatever acts of injustice may have been committed against British subjects by that chief or his ministers or agents, either arbitrarily or under the false color of lawful proceedings.

Instructions which during the past year were addressed by Her Majesty's Government to the British consul residing in the Sandwich Islands and to the naval officers employed on the Pacific station, enjoined those officers to treat upon all occasions the native rulers of the Sandwich Islands with forbearance and courtesy; and, while affording due and efficient protection to aggrieved British subjects, to avoid interfering harshly or unnecessarily with the laws and customs of the native Government.

It has been the desire of the British Government, in regulating the intercourse of its public servants with the native authorities of the Sandwich Islands, rather to strengthen those authorities, and to give them a sense of their own independence by leaving the administration of justice in their own hands, than to make them feel their dependence upon foreign powers by the exercise of unnecessary interference. It has not been the purpose of Her Majesty's Government to seek to establish a paramount influence in those islands for Great Britain at the expense of that enjoyed by other powers. All that has appeared requisite to Her Majesty's Government has been that other powers should not exercise there a greater influence than that possessed by Great Britain.

I avail myself of this occasion to renew to you the assurance of my distinguished consideration.

H. S. Fox.

Mr. Everett to Mr. Legare.

[Extract.]

No. 44.]

LONDON, July 1, 1843.

H. S. LEGARE, Esq.,
Secretary of State:

SIR:

* * * * *

With respect to the occupation of the Sandwich Islands, I have reason to think that the conduct of Lord George Paulet in coercing their provisional cession to this Government has been formally disavowed. I am to see Lord Aberdeen this afternoon and hope to ascertain positively whether this is the case. If I find that the cession is not and is not likely to be disavowed, I shall address a pointed remonstrance to this Government against the occupation and spare no pains to enlist in the same course the representatives of the other maritime powers. Mr. Marshall of Charlestown (Massachusetts) arrived here yesterday, with authority from the King of the Sandwich Islands, as a joint commissioner with Mr. Richards. He is the bearer of dispatches from the Government of the islands to that of Great Britain. He has been preceded by Mr. Simpson, the deputy consul left in the islands by the late British consul, Mr. Charlton. * * * Mr. Simpson came to London, a few days since, as bearer of Lord George Paulet's dispatches to the admiralty.

* * * * *

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDWARD EVERETT.

Mr. Upshur to Mr. Fox.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
 Washington, July 5, 1843

HENRY S. FOX, Esq., etc.:

SIR: I have received the letter which you did me the honor to address to me on the 25th ultimo, explanatory of the views of the British Government respecting the Sandwich Islands, and stating, by direction of Her Majesty's secretary of state for foreign affairs, for the information of this Government, that the recent occupation of those islands in the name of Great Britain by the officer commanding Her Majesty's ship *Carysfort* was an act entirely unauthorized by Her Majesty's Government, and that with the least practicable delay due inquiry will be made into the proceedings which led to it.

I have lost no time in submitting your letter to the consideration of the President of the United States, by whom I am directed to express to you the satisfaction which this prompt disavowal by Her Majesty's Government of the act in question has afforded him.

The United States take a deep interest in the condition of those islands—so important from their geographical position to American citizens engaged in the fisheries and other lawful pursuits in the North Pacific Ocean; and hence the President awaited with lively concern the course which Her Majesty's Government should adopt with respect

to the occurrences referred to. He entertained a confident expectation, strengthened by his knowledge of the reception which had been given in England to the commissioners of the King of the Sandwich Islands, and of the fact that Her Majesty's Government had determined to recognize the independence of those islands, that no undue advantage would be taken by Great Britain of their peculiar political condition, and he sees with a corresponding gratification that this expectation is now realized.

Seeking to establish no undue advantages in the Sandwich Islands for citizens of the United States at the expense of other powers, the President receives with much pleasure the assurance contained in Mr. Fox's note that none such are sought for Great Britain. He can not doubt that the recognition of the independence and sovereignty of those islands will be found altogether compatible with every just claim of Great Britain, while it will best conduce to the interests of the islands themselves and of all nations having intercourse with them.

I have the honor to renew to you, sir, on this occasion the assurance of my distinguished consideration and respect.

A. P. UPSHUR.

Mr. Everett to Mr. Upshur.

[Extract.]

No. 50.]

LONDON, August 15, 1843.

A. P. UPSHUR, Esq.,
Secretary of State:

SIR:

* * * * *

I then took occasion to advert to the affairs of the Sandwich Islands. The commissioners of the King of those Islands are here, Messrs. Haalileo, Richards, and Marshall, and have presented a written statement of considerable length (as they inform me) to Lord Aberdeen, containing the requisite explanations of the matters alleged against them by way of complaint by the late British consul and others. Lord Aberdeen told me there was a good deal worthy of consideration in their statements, and that he did not apprehend much difficulty in coming to a satisfactory settlement.

With respect to the acknowledgment of the independence of the islands, the following seems to be the precise state of the case: The English Government, following our example, acquainted Messrs. Haalileo and Richards in April last that they were prepared to acknowledge their independence. Meantime Lord George Paulet, acting without instructions, had taken provisional possession of the islands by a treaty extorted from weakness of the native Government. Great Britain feels herself pledged to adhere to the recognition of their independence and has invited France to follow her example. France has agreed to do so as soon as Great Britain withdraws her occupation.

Great Britain, before giving up the occupation, means to do two things; one, to obtain satisfaction to the matters of complaint above alluded to, which I am inclined to think will not be attended with difficulty; the other, to come to some arrangement with France which will prevent that power, at some subsequent period, from taking possession of those islands, as they have lately done of the Marquesas.

In fact, the series of events which, however menacing for the moment, bids fair to result in the establishment of the independence of the islands on a firm basis, is one of the most fortunate, on the whole, which could be imagined, and I can not but regard the recognition of the United States as having determined the character of all the succeeding occurrences. As soon as I received, last winter, the instructions of the Department on the subject, I lost no opportunity of bringing it to the consideration of Lord Aberdeen, and the occupation of the Marquesas by the French no doubt united with our recognition in hastening the decision of this Government. There is now reason to think that the occupation of the islands by Lord George Paulet was a fortunate event, inasmuch as it prevented them from being taken possession of by a French squadron, which (it is said) was on its way for that purpose. Had France got possession of the islands she would certainly have retained them. Had intelligence been received here of Lord George Paulet's occupation of them before her promise was given to recognize them, England, I think, would not have given them up. As it is, an understanding between the great European powers, amounting in effect, if not in form, to a guaranty of their independence, is likely to take place. This is the only state of things with which the United States could be content. As it will be brought about without involving us in any compacts with other powers, and as I have already said, mainly, as it seems to me, under the impulse of our example, it will, I think, be regarded by the President as an eminently satisfactory result.

* * * * *

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDWARD EVERETT.

Mr. Everett to Mr. Upshur.

[Extract.]

No. 56.]

LONDON, *September 28, 1843.*

A. P. UPSHUR, Esq.,

Secretary of State:

SIR:

* * * * *

I had a conversation last evening of a satisfactory character with Mr. Richards, the commissioner of the Government of the Sandwich Islands. He has nearly brought his business with this Government to a close, and in a manner with which he appears to be content. You are aware that various claims on the Government of the Sandwich Islands on the part of the British subjects, and principally Mr. Charlton, the late consul, had long been pending, and that it was professedly to enforce satisfaction for these claims that possession was taken of the islands by Lord George Paulet. I fear that most of the claims were such as are too apt to be set up by the strong against the weak. The Government at home (as I intimated in a former dispatch the opinion they would do), though disclaiming the act of Lord George Paulet as without instructions, determined to retain possession of the islands till satisfaction was given in reference to the claims, and some kind of an assurance procured from France that she would respect the independence of the islands.

A question arose how the claims were to be adjudicated. I advised Mr. Richards to offer to submit them to the decision of Lord Aberdeen himself. I thought this course would preclude delay, which there was some reason to fear might be desired here, and which would be very dangerous in the extremely anomalous condition of things. I doubted if the claims could be got before any tribunal independent of the influence of this Government; and I felt confident, that more could be obtained from the liberality of Lord Aberdeen when thus appealed to than if the British Government were made to assume the position of an opposing party. Mr. Richards fully concurred in this view, and the result, on the whole, seems to have justified it. On five out of seven points the decision is wholly in favor of the Government of the islands; on the sixth substantially so; on the seventh much is left dependent on the discernment and good faith of Gen. Miller, the new consul-general; but Mr. Richards considers this point to be also settled in their favor, and he has promptly accepted the whole decision. He informs me that he has been uniformly treated at the foreign office with courtesy and respect.

He has conferred freely with Mr. Addington, the under secretary of state, on the delicate point of restoring possession of the islands to the native Government, and has been promised that it shall be done as soon as a satisfactory assurance is given by France; and he thinks—justly, in my opinion—that it is for the interest of the islands that Great Britain should retain her possession till this assurance is given. There is no fear that it will be long withheld.

I have the honor to be, with great respect,

Your obedient servant,

EDWARD EVERETT.

Mr. Everett to Mr. Nelson.

No. 114.]

LONDON, April 24, 1844.

JOHN NELSON, Esq.,

Secretary of State ad interim:

SIR: In the course of the past year I had frequent occasion to make mention of the affairs of the Sandwich Islands and of the agency of Messrs. Richards and Haalilio, who had been sent to the United States and Europe as the representatives of the native Government. I have now the satisfaction to communicate authentic information of the conclusion of a convention between the governments of Great Britain and France, by which the independence of the Sandwich Islands is recognized, and the two powers stipulate that they will not take possession of them, either directly or under the name of a protectorate. Messrs. Richards and Haalilio have promised to give me a copy of this convention, which I hope they will do in season to be transmitted with this dispatch, but as it has not been published by either Government, and is of course communicated unofficially to me, I would suggest the propriety of receiving it for the present in confidence.

In their negotiations with this Government relative to the demands and complaints of British subjects against the native Government which led to the provisional occupation of the islands by Lord George Paulet, and with the French Government in reference to the modification of the treaty imposed by France on the islanders, of which treaty France exacts the benefits for herself while she refuses to grant them to the

other party, Messrs. Richards and Haalilio have been partially successful. But I fear that in both cases the measure of justice done by these powerful governments to this defenseless and feeble State is such and such only, as the strong are too apt to render to the weak.

The step taken by the French Government in disavowing the act of Admiral Dupetit-Thonars, who had without instructions converted the protectorate established at Taiti into an assertion of absolute sovereignty, continues to be vehemently assailed by the opposition in France. A large mass of papers on this subject was laid upon the table of the Chamber of Deputies a few days since by Mr. Guizot, and will be found in the *Journal des Debats* of the 20th instant. I do not find that they place the conduct of the French admiral in a new light.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDWARD EVERETT.

Declaration.

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the King of the French, taking into consideration the existence in the Sandwich Islands of a government capable of providing for the regularity of its relations with foreign nations have thought it right to engage reciprocally to consider the Sandwich Islands as an independent State and never to take possession, either directly or under the title of protectorate, or under any other form, of any part of the territory of which they are composed.

The undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, and the ambassador extraordinary of His Majesty the King of the French, at the court of London, being furnished with the necessary powers, hereby declare in consequence that their said majesties take reciprocally that engagement.

In witness whereof the undersigned have signed the present declaration, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done in duplicate at London, the 28th day of November, in the year of our Lord 1843.

ABERDEEN. [L. S.]
ST. AULAIRE. [L. S.]

[Senate Ex. Doc. No. 45. Fifty-second Congress, second session.]

Message from the President of the United States, in response to Senate resolution of February 4, 1893, relative to the draft of an uncompleted treaty with Hawaii.

FEBRUARY 6, 1893.—Read, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and ordered to be printed.

To the Senate:

I transmit herewith, as desired by the resolution of the Senate of the 4th instant, a report from the Secretary of State of the 6th instant, with its accompanying correspondence, in relation to the draft of an uncompleted treaty with Hawaii, made in 1854.

BENJ. HARRISON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, February 6, 1893.

The PRESIDENT:

The Secretary of State, to whom was referred the resolution of the Senate of the 4th instant requesting the President, "if in his opinion it is not inconsistent with the public interests, to send to the Senate the draft of a treaty, negotiated in 1854, but not completed, between the plenipotentiaries of the United States and the Kingdom of Hawaii, with the correspondence between the two Governments relating to said negotiation," has the honor to transmit herewith a copy of the draft in question, together with copies of the correspondence referred to.

Respectfully submitted.

JOHN W. FOSTER.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 6, 1893.

List of accompanying papers.

1. Mr. Marcy to Mr. Gregg, April 4, 1854, No. 6.
 2. Mr. Gregg to Mr. Marcy, July 26, 1854, No. 48.
 3. Mr. Gregg to Mr. Marcy, August 7, 1854, No. 51.
 4. Mr. Gregg to Mr. Marcy, September 15, 1854, No. 52.
 - (Copy of the treaty draft accompanies Mr. Gregg's dispatch No. 52, of September 15, 1854, included here.)
 5. Mr. Gregg to Mr. Marcy, October 2, 1854, No. 54.
 6. Mr. Gregg to Mr. Marcy, December 19, 1854, No. 61.
 7. Mr. Gregg to Mr. Marcy, December 29, 1854, No. 64.
 8. Mr. Marcy to Mr. Gregg, January 31, 1855, No. 12.
-

Mr. Marcy to Mr. Gregg.

No. 6.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, April 4, 1854.

SIR: In your general instructions you were furnished with the views of this Government in regard to any change in the political affairs of the Sandwich Islands. The President was aware, when those instructions were prepared, that the question of transferring the sovereignty of those islands to the United States had been raised, and favorably received by many influential individuals residing therein. It was foreseen that at some period, not far distant, such a change would take place, and that the Hawaiian Islands would come under the protectorate of or be transferred to some foreign power. You were informed that it was not the policy of the United States to accelerate such a change; but if, in the course of events, it became unavoidable, this Government would much prefer to acquire the sovereignty of these islands for the United States, rather than to see it transferred to any other power. If any foreign connection is to be formed, the geographical position of these islands indicates that it should be with us. Our commerce with them far exceeds that of all other countries; our citizens are embarked in the most important business concerns of that country, and some of them hold important public positions. In view of the large American interests there established and the intimate commercial relations existing at this time it might well be regarded as the duty of this Government to prevent these islands from becoming the appendage of any other foreign power.

It appears by your dispatches lately received at this Department that the ruling authorities of the Hawaiian Government have become convinced of their inability to sustain themselves any longer as an independent State, and are prepared to throw themselves upon our protection or to seek incorporation into our political system. Fears are entertained by those who favor such a measure that if the United States should manifest a disinclination to receive the proffered sovereignty of this country, the people would seek elsewhere a less desirable connection or be given over to anarchy.

The information contained in your last dispatch, No. 10, dated the 7th of February, renders it highly probable that the ruling powers of that Government will have presented to you, as our diplomatic agent, an offer of the sovereignty of their country to the United States. The President has deemed it proper that you should be furnished with instructions for the guidance of your conduct in such an emergency. With this dispatch you will be furnished with a full power to treat with the present authorities of the Hawaiian Government for the transfer of the Sandwich Islands to the United States. This can only be done by a convention or treaty, which will not be valid until it is ratified by the Senate of the United States.

No intimation has ever been given to this Government as to the terms or conditions which will be likely to be annexed to the tender of the sovereignty. It is presumed, however, that something more than a mere protectorate is contemplated. A protectorate tendered to and accepted by the United States would not change the sovereignty of the country. In that case this Government would take upon itself heavy and responsible duties for which it could hardly expect compensating advantages.

I understand that the measure proposed by the people, and that in which the present rulers are disposed to concur, is "annexation" as distinguished from protection; and that it is their intention that these islands shall become a part of our Territories and be under the control of this Government as fully as any other of its territorial possessions. In any convention you may make it is expected that the rights to be acquired by the United States should be clearly defined.

Should the sovereignty of these islands be transferred to the United States, the present Government would, as a matter of course, be superseded, or, at least, be subjected to the Federal authority of this country.

It is reasonable to anticipate that the present rulers and chiefs would expect that some provision would be made as compensation to them for the surrender of their political position. This provision could not be, as I conceive, any other than a pecuniary allowance. In this respect the United States would manifest toward them a liberal spirit. Annuities to the amount of \$100,000 to be distributed in such manner as they would prefer might be secured to them in the treaty.

In the convention you may make you are authorized to provide in the amplest manner for the security of individual property as held at the time of the transfer of the sovereignty, but the reservation of political rights or privileges in behalf of individuals would be inconsistent with the political power which it is proposed to vest in the United States.

If you should succeed in making a treaty transferring the islands to the United States, it is advisable that it should receive the ratification of the Hawaiian Government before it is sent here for the consideration of the President and the Senate. You are directed to induce that Government to send on one or more persons at the same time the treaty is

forwarded, clothed with full powers to assent to any modifications of it which may here be made. In view of the great uncertainty as to the terms by which the cession of the sovereignty of the islands may be encumbered the carrying out of this suggestion is deemed to be of great importance.

I have good reason to believe that some of the leading powers of Europe would be very unwilling to see the Sandwich Islands become a part of the United States, and, if an opportunity occurred, would endeavor to defeat any negotiation for that purpose. This consideration and others, make it important that you should bring it to a close as expeditiously as possible. The treaty should be here in time to be submitted to the Senate at its present session.

I am, etc.,

W. L. MARCY.

Mr. Gregg to Mr. Marcy.

No. 48.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, July 26, 1854.

SIR: The Hawaiian cabinet has determined at length that it will not do to allow much longer delay in bringing to a close arrangements for annexation. On the 17th a meeting was held, at which Prince Alexander was present, when it was agreed that the minister of foreign relations should immediately proceed, if possible, to arrange and sign a treaty to be submitted to the King for ratification. Mr. Wyllie called on me the next day, and we have since had several conferences, but without as yet arriving at any definite result. The difficulty, I apprehend, is that more will be demanded, in the way of consideration, etc., than ought to be yielded. It is probable that by the next mail it will be in my power to communicate something more definite than I am now able to do. I have the assurance of Mr. Wyllie that, so far as he is concerned, there shall be no occasion to complain of further procrastination, and I can not doubt that he is in earnest. Prince Alexander is responsible for all past delay, and he will not hesitate to incur the responsibility of still more, unless his mind is brought to the conviction which everyone else entertains, that it is impossible for him ever to wear a crown. He evidently sees that the existing Government is in danger, and wishes to be in a condition to escape it when the crisis comes, but *hopes* strongly that it may be averted. If a treaty is once signed he will not oppose its ratification directly and openly, but strive to postpone it to the last moment compatible with safety.

I am convinced that a revolution will soon take place if a treaty of annexation is not concluded. The foreign residents, especially Americans, are becoming impatient under the present state of things, and will not be disposed to endure much longer the feebleness and inefficiency of the Government. They have power enough in their hands, if they act in concert, to do anything they wish, and in a single week could subvert the throne and establish a republic upon its ruins.

A combined British and French squadron of seven vessels—three English and four French—arrived here on the 17th from Callao, having made the passage from Nukuhiva in fourteen days. Its appearance created quite an excitement among all classes of people. On Saturday the English frigate *Pique* joined the fleet, making eight vessels in all,

as follows: The frigates *President* and *Pique*, the sloop *Amphitrite*, and the steamer *Virago* (British), under the command of Rear-Admiral David Price; the frigates *La Forte* and *L'Euridice*, the corvette *L'Artemise*, and the brig *L'Obligado* (French), commanded by Rear-Admiral Febvrier des Pointes. On Tuesday they all sailed in a northwesterly direction. I could not learn satisfactorily who was the commanding officer of the entire squadron, as the English and French accounts differed materially on that point, though I presume it can not be doubted that Admiral Price is the official senior of Admiral des Pointes. It is evident that no great harmony of feeling exists between the different portions of the fleet, and I learn from pretty good authority that a separation will soon be deemed expedient.

On Friday the two admirals and their officers had an audience at the palace which was marked by a circumstance that ought to be mentioned. After the usual courtesies, addresses, etc., were over, the French admiral, on the suggestion of Mons. Perrin, said to the King, through an interpreter, that he hoped there was no thought of alienating the sovereignty of the Kingdom, as such a thing would lead to difficulty and perhaps war with England and France, which it would be for the interest of His Majesty to avoid. The King made no reply whatever.

* * * * *

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID L. GREGG.

Mr. Gregg to Mr. Marcy.

No. 51.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, August 7, 1854.

SIR: I am only able to write briefly by the mail which goes this afternoon, being much debilitated by an attack of sickness from which I am just convalescent.

* * * * *

The Government here rests on a volcano. Its subversion is within the power of the foreign residents, and I am prepared to witness an outbreak at any moment. The dissatisfaction with the present state of things is daily increasing, and a crisis of some sort is inevitable.

On Tuesday evening last there was an intense alarm among the native population on account of the supposed presence of "filibusters." The troops were called out and remained under arms all night. The apprehension seems to have been excited by the discovery of a box of pistols among some goods landed at the custom-house.

I have succeeded in arranging the terms of a treaty of annexation with the minister of foreign relations, which meets the approval of the Crown Prince and cabinet. But it is not yet signed, and I am unable to give you any assurance that it will be immediately completed. The pretense of delay is the supposed necessity of consulting the King, which for sometime has been impossible on account of His Majesty's illness.

The great difficulty I had to encounter was the inveterate prejudice of the Hawaiian authorities against a territorial form of government, which could not be overcome. Finding it impossible to provide otherwise, I finally consented to agree to the admission of the islands as a

State, as soon as it could be done in conformity with the principles and requirements of the Federal Constitution, leaving the existing laws, so far as they are republican and consistent with such Constitution, in full force and effect in the meantime.

There was also much controversy as to the extent of consideration. The Government absolutely refused to listen to anything short of annuities to the extent of \$300,000, and I finally listened to the *sine qua non* which they presented, with the understanding that it was solely *ad referendum*.

I had intended to send you a copy of the treaty as agreed on, for information, but I have been altogether unequal to the task of making it in time for the present mail.

I have notified the minister of foreign relations that there must be a speedy *diplomatical* conclusion of our negotiations, and expressed the view that any further delay will be inconsistent with the position of the Government of the United States in the transaction. He assents to the propriety of my representations, and promises to spare no efforts to bring about the signature of the treaty.

I may therefore express the hope that a final result will soon be attained. But I fear the occurrence of a state of things which will place me in some embarrassment. There is reason to believe that upon the ratification of the treaty there will be a desire and *a necessity* of an immediate transfer of the sovereignty of the islands to the United States in order to guard against pressing danger. If such a crisis occurs I shall deem myself justified in accepting a provisional transfer, subject to the provisions of the treaty, or such arrangements as may be finally made by the two parties. This, I have no doubt, would be decisive as to the influences hereafter to prevail in the archipelago, whatever might be the view of our Government as to the cession. A flood of emigration would pour in from California the moment our flag was raised, sufficient to put a check upon all future British and French pretensions.

Yesterday I had an audience at the palace for the officers of the *St. Mary*. The King was unable to be present, owing to his illness, but he was represented by the Kuhina Nui, who always stands in his place when he can not perform his functions.

The British consul-general has demanded a personal audience of the King, to communicate to him certain views of his Government, which will take place as soon as His Majesty is recovered.

I have, etc.,

DAVID L. GREGG.

Mr. Gregg to Mr. Marcy.

No. 52]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, September 15, 1854.

* * * * *

The negotiations for annexation are in the same condition as when my dispatch (No. 51) of the 7th instant was written. On Saturday last the cabinet had an audience of the King and laid before him a copy of the treaty in the Hawaiian language, and through Mr. Armstrong, as interpreter, explained it in all its particulars. He expressed himself satisfied, as I am advised, but stated that he wished to consult

particularly with a few of his chiefs before final action was taken. Unfortunately he has since been in such a state of infirmity as to be able to consult with no one, and it is difficult to predict when his present fit of illness will terminate.

I have insisted upon the immediate signature of the treaty, and Mr. Wyllie admits that, according to diplomatic usage, there should be no further delay. In my last dispatch I stated that I had notified him that the negotiations must be at once concluded. I have since addressed him a letter to the same effect, setting forth strongly the reasons which induced me to take this course. A copy of it is herewith inclosed for your information. Its representations I considered would have an important bearing in bringing matters to an issue, and I still think this will be the effect. I hope I did not go further than the President will be willing to approve. The peculiar circumstances which exist seemed to demand a strong expression on my part, with all the incidental references and suggestions which are employed. I acted with regard to what I supposed to be the peculiar exigencies of the times, and it has been intimated to me that my course will probably contribute to hasten matters to a conclusion.

I forward also a copy of the treaty, the terms of which were finally settled between Mr. Wyllie and myself on the 19th ultimo. I have already informed you of the utter impossibility of such provisions as I desired in the second and eighth articles. As they stand they will be regarded as *ad referendum* so far as the United States are concerned. This, of course, was the only ground upon which I could place my assent to them, especially the last. From the protocols, which are not yet all in a condition to be copied for transmission, the true character of the negotiation and its embarrassing circumstances will more fully appear. I shall probably be able to send them by the next mail.

The provisions of the separate article were made a matter of positive demand by the Hawaiian cabinet. I refused to incorporate them into the body of the treaty, because they contemplate an object which, if effected at all, must be brought about before any final ratification can take place. The ratification of the treaty by this Government would undoubtedly quell any disturbances that might arise from American sources, but a conditional cession, as contemplated by such article, would forever practically settle all questions as to future influence and jurisdiction. The moment our flag was raised a flood of immigration from California would pour in, sufficient, at least, to make the islands thoroughly American and to secure an equitable and fair arrangement if the terms of the present treaty are deemed unsatisfactory.

The return of Judge Lee from the island of Maui is expected in a few days.. It was through his persuasions that the King made advances for annexation, and his influence with the chiefs and native population generally is greater than that of any man on the islands. I learn that he objects to the second article of the treaty on the ground that he does not think it provides explicitly enough for a State government. In this respect I have gone to the utmost limit of what, in my judgment, the Constitution allows, and if his advice leads this Government to exact impracticable conditions I shall, of course, be fully prepared to reject them.

The British consul-general has advised this Government that he will not, for the present, seek the audience which he formerly demanded, as I advised you in my last dispatch.

The effect of the publications in the New York Daily Tribune of July 20 has been unfortunate here in giving to the British consul-general

weapons to fight against the United States. I regret very much that any opportunity should have occurred at this juncture to confirm, in the minds of the Hawaiians, the false impressions which are constantly sought to be created in regard to our purposes and policy. If the present negotiations fall through I shall attribute it almost entirely to the effect of such publications as that of the Tribune and other papers of like character.

I have, etc.,

DAVID L. GREGG.

Treaty of annexation concluded between His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands and the United States of America

His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, being convinced that plans have been, and still are, on foot hostile to his sovereignty and to the peace of his Kingdom, which His Majesty is without power to resist, and against which it is his imperative duty to provide, in order to prevent the evils of anarchy and to secure the rights and prosperity of his subjects, and having in conscientious regard thereto, as well as to the general interests of his Kingdom, present and future, sought to incorporate his Kingdom into the Union of the United States, as the means best calculated to attain these ends and perpetuate the blessings of freedom and equal rights to himself, his chiefs, and his people; and the Government of the United States, being actuated solely by the desire to add to their security and prosperity and to meet the wishes of His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, and of his Government, have determined to accomplish by treaty objects so important to their mutual and permanent welfare.

For that purpose His Majesty Kamehameha III, King of the Hawaiian Islands has granted full powers and instructions to Robert Crichton Wyllie, esquire, his minister of foreign relations, his secretary at war and of the navy, member of his privy council of state, member of the house of nobles, and chairman of the commissioners of his privy purse; and the President of the United States has invested with like powers David Lawrence Gregg, esquire, commissioner of said States to the said Kingdom; and the said plenipotentiaries, after exchanging their full powers, have agreed to and concluded the following articles:

ARTICLE I.

His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, acting in conformity with the power vested in him by the constitution of his Kingdom, and with the wishes of his chiefs and people, and of the heads of every department of his Government, cedes to the United States his Kingdom, with all its territories, to be held by them in full sovereignty, subject only to the same constitutional provisions as the other States of the American Union. This cession includes all public lots and squares, Government lands, mines and minerals, salt lakes and springs, fish ponds, public edifices, fortifications, barracks, forts, ports and harbors, reefs, docks, and magazines, arms, armaments and accouterments, public archives, and funds, claims, debts, taxes and dues existing, available, and unpaid at the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty.

ARTICLE II.

The Kingdom of the Hawaiian Islands shall be incorporated into the American Union as a State, enjoying the same degree of sovereignty as other States, and admitted as such as soon as it can be done in consistency with the principles and requirements of the Federal Constitution, to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of a State as aforesaid, on a perfect equality with the other States of the Union.

ARTICLE III.

His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, his chiefs and subjects of every class, shall continue in the enjoyment of all their existing personal and private rights—civil, political, and religious—to the utmost extent that is possible under the Federal Constitution, and shall possess and forever enjoy all the rights and privileges of citizens of the United States, on terms of perfect equality, in all respects, with other American citizens.

ARTICLE IV.

The decisions of the board of land commissioners made and not appealed from, at the date of the final ratification of this treaty, shall be and remain forever valid and undisturbed, and all titles to real estate which are now, or shall have then been declared valid under the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom, shall be held to be equally valid by the United States, and measures shall be adopted by the United States for the speedy and final adjudication of all unsettled claims to land in conformity with the laws and usages under which they may have originated.

ARTICLE V.

All engagements of whatever kind, affecting the rights of corporations or individuals, validly contracted, and lawfully incumbent upon the King's Government or the Hawaiian nation to pay and discharge, shall be respected and fulfilled in as prompt, full, and complete a manner as they would have been respected and fulfilled had no change of sovereignty taken place.

ARTICLE VI.

The public lands hereby ceded shall be subject to the laws regulating the public lands in other parts of the United States, liable, however, to such alterations and changes as Congress may from time to time enact. The grants of land for the promotion of education heretofore made by the Government of the King of the Hawaiian Islands shall be confirmed by the United States, which in addition thereto, shall grant and set apart for the purposes of common schools, seminaries of learning, and universities so much of the public lands and of the proceeds thereof as may be equal proportionally to the grants for such purposes in any of the States of the Union.

ARTICLE VII.

The laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom, so far as they are compatible with republican institutions and conformable to the Constitution of the United States, shall be and remain in full force and effect until modified, changed, or repealed by the legislative authority of the State contemplated by this treaty.

ARTICLE VIII.

In consideration of the cession made by this treaty, and in compensation to all who may suffer or incur loss consequent thereon, the United States shall pay the aggregate sum of three hundred thousand dollars (\$300,000) as annuities to the King, the Queen, the crown prince, those standing next in succession to the throne, the chiefs, and all other persons whom the King may wish to compensate or reward, to be apportioned as may be determined by His Majesty the King, and his privy council of state, which amounts to be apportioned as aforesaid, shall be paid ratably without deduction or offset on any ground or in any shape whatever, to the parties severally named in such apportionment, at Honolulu, on the first day of July of each successive year so long as they may live. It is, however, expressly agreed upon that on the demise of His present Majesty the annuity of the immediate heir to the throne shall then be increased to the same amount before allowed and paid to the King himself.

As a further consideration for the cession herein made, and in order to place within the reach of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands the means of education, present and future, so as to enable them the more perfectly to enjoy and discharge the rights and duties consequent upon a change from monarchical to republican institutions, the United States agree to set apart and pay over for the term of ten years the sum of seventy-five thousand dollars per annum, one-third of which shall be applied to constitute the principal of a fund for the benefit of a college or university, or colleges or universities, as the case may be, and the balance for the support of common schools, to be invested, secured, or applied as may be determined by the legislative authority of the Hawaiian Islands, when admitted as a State into the Union, as aforesaid.

ARTICLE IX.

Immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty the President of the United States shall appoint a commissioner, who shall receive in due form, in the name of the United States, the transfer of the sovereignty and territories of the Hawaiian Islands; also all public property, archives, and other things hereinbefore stipulated to be conveyed, and who shall exercise all executive authority in said islands necessary to the preservation of peace and order, and to the proper execution

of the laws, until the State contemplated in this treaty can be duly organized and admitted as such State; and until the arrival of such commissioner, all departments of His Majesty's Government shall continue as now constituted.

ARTICLE X.

This treaty shall be ratified by the respective high contracting parties, and the ratifications exchanged at the city of Honolulu within eight months from the date hereof, or sooner, if possible, but it is agreed that this period may be extended by mutual consent of the two parties.

In witness whereof, we, the undersigned, plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands and of the United States of America, have signed three originals of this treaty of annexation in Hawaiian and three in English, and have thereunto affixed our respective official seals.

Done at Honolulu this — day of —, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-four.

SEPARATE AND SECRET ARTICLE.

Whereas it is desirable to guard against the exigencies declared in the preamble to the foregoing treaty, and to secure the King of the Hawaiian Islands, his chiefs and all who reside under his jurisdiction from the dangers therein referred to and expressed, it is hereby provided and expressly agreed that at any time before the final exchange of the ratifications of said treaty, if the same shall be duly ratified on the part of His Majesty the King and satisfactory notice thereof given to the commissioner of the United States, it shall be competent for His Majesty, by proclamation, to declare his islands annexed to the American Union, subject to the provisions of such treaty as negotiated; and the commissioner of the United States, for the time being, shall receive and accept the transfer of the jurisdiction of the said islands, in the name of the United States, and protect and defend them by the armed forces of the United States, as a part of the American Union, holding the same for and in behalf of his Government and exercising the jurisdiction provided for in said treaty, with the understanding, however, that in case the said treaty is not finally ratified, or other arrangement made by the free consent and to the mutual satisfaction of the contracting parties, the sovereignty of the islands shall immediately revert, without prejudice, to His Majesty, or his immediate heir, in the same conditions as before the transfer thereof; and it is further understood and agreed that this article shall be as binding for all the ends and purposes herein expressed as if it formed a part of the foregoing treaty.

Mr. Gregg to Mr. Marcy.

No. 54.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, October 2, 1854.

SIR: In my dispatch of the 7th ultimo (No. 41) I mentioned that the British consul-general had demanded an audience of the King for the purpose of communicating to him certain views of his Government. It was first appointed for the 6th ultimo, the same day as that fixed for the audience to the officers of the *St. Mary*, but the King being unable on account of illness to attend it was then postponed. Subsequently, however, although Gen. Miller at first declined, an arrangement was made to receive him on the 18th, when he made an extemporaneous speech of an hour and a quarter against annexation to the United States and in dispraise of our country, her Government, and people.

The substance of his remarks has been stated to me by those who heard them. He deprecated annexation to the United States and represented it to be one of the worst evils which could befall the Hawaiian race, denouncing our institutions as corrupting in their tendency and wholly unequal to protect in security the enjoyment of life and property. As an illustration, he referred to California and described numerous disorders, which he alleged had prevailed there, in the strongest

terms, predicting that the introduction of American rule in these islands would be the signal for the commencement of a similar state of things, in which the rights of the natives would be altogether lost sight of and sacrificed. He read at length the articles in the New York Tribune of July 20 and the Herald of a previous date, on the subject of annexation, to show that the designs of our Government were hostile to Hawaiian interests and ought to be regarded in no friendly light. These papers, he insisted, were fair and honest, rising above the corrupting tendency of republican institutions, and entitled to great weight in forming an opinion of the policy of the American nation. He complained of the course of the minister of foreign relations, charging him with a want of openness and candor and stating that he was too much disposed to publish matters which ought to be kept secret. As an instance, he referred to the joint protest of himself and Mons. Perrin, last year, which, he said, had been unnecessarily communicated to Mr. Severance, who had made a long rigamarole of a reply, and that his rejoinder to that reply had been suppressed.

I have the best reason in the world for believing that in this respect Gen. Miller's memory was at fault, as he never made any rejoinder whatever. He also entered into an argument to refute what I took occasion to say on the 4th of July relative to the merits of colonial government and the law of primogeniture, praising the latter as a beneficent institution which gave England a class of gentlemen and statesmen not to be surpassed in the world. When he had concluded the King replied as follows:

I have heard what you have said to me in the name of your Government. I am not sure that I have clearly understood it all, but I shall consider it so far as I may be able to recollect it. I would prefer that in all matters which relate to my sovereignty, in which my chiefs and people have a deep interest, communications should be made in writing so as to prevent misunderstandings and mistakes either by me or them.

The speech of Gen. Miller as I have heard accounts of it from authentic sources, was an outrage upon all propriety and insulting to the United States. An accurate statement of what transpired at the audience was drawn up, as I have reason to believe, by the minister of foreign relations and submitted to Gen. Miller for revision. He promised to write out the substance of his remarks, but as yet has not done so. I have assurances that a copy will be communicated to me at the earliest practicable moment. Had not the audience been what is termed private I should have requested officially an account of what took place, and shall yet find some just reason for doing so if it is not received as I anticipate through the dictates of a just and proper courtesy, which the minister of foreign relations has on every occasion heretofore been willing to extend.

On Thursday last (September 28) the officers of the *Portsmouth* and *St. Mary* had a royal audience by special invitation from the King. The invitation was conveyed to me on the preceding day through the minister of foreign relations. The whole affair may be regarded as exceedingly complimentary. Such a thing as an invitation for an occasion of this kind was never before known here. Capt. Dornin is a great favorite among all classes of the Hawaiian people, commanding universal respect and confidence. It is perhaps to this fact, as much as to anything else, that the extraordinary courtesy of the occasion may be attributed. But it may be said undoubtedly in addition that the Hawaiian authorities are especially desirous of cultivating friendly relations with the United States, and look forward to the time when

their country may constitute an integral portion of the great North American Republic.

Since my dispatch of the 15th ultimo there has been no progress in regard to the treaty of annexation. The crown prince is absent on the island of Hawaii, but he has been sent for and his return is daily expected. This step resulted from my letter to the minister of foreign relations of the date of September 12, a copy of which I have already transmitted for your information. I inclose herewith an acknowledgment of its receipt, from which you will perceive the cause of any recent delay that has occurred.

I now feel some confidence that immediately upon the arrival of the prince the treaty will be signed and ratified. The King is unwilling to have any action taken in his absence, but at the same time anxious to bring matters to a speedy conclusion. Liholiho has already given his formal assent to the negotiations so far, by countersigning with the ministers the protocols and also the draft of the treaty, a copy of which I have sent you. Present appearances indicate that the period of procrastination is nearly at an end, and I indulge the expectation of being able to send home a treaty of annexation in time for the commencement of the next session of Congress.

I have, etc.,

DAVID L. GREGG.

Mr. Gregg to Mr. Marcy.

No. 61.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, December 19, 1854.

SIR: The King of the Hawaiian Islands, Kamehameha III, died on Friday last, the 15th instant, after an illness of about two weeks. He was born on the 17th of March, 1813, being in his forty-second year. By his subjects he was universally beloved, and among them the manifestations of grief are universal and striking. With scarcely an exception the resident foreigners respected him and confided in his justice and generosity. His partiality to Americans has always been strong, and it will be universally conceded that by his decease they have lost a faithful and honorable friend.

As soon as his death was known, minute guns were fired from the fort on shore and by all the vessels of war in the harbor.

On the same day the accession of the Prince Royal Alexander Liholiho to the throne, under the style of Kamehameha IV, was proclaimed and received universal acquiescence. The young monarch will be 21 years of age on the 9th of February next. By the Hawaiian laws the age of majority for males is fixed at twenty, so that he becomes at once ruler *de facto* of the Kingdom.

But few young men of his years have more ability or intelligence. His general education is good and for sometime past he has been accustomed to take part in the management of public affairs. A few years since, with his older brother, he visited the United States and Europe, and evidently derived much profit from the opportunity thus placed within his reach. His manners and habits are plain and simple, in consistency with the American education he has received.

The cabinet ministers and members of the privy council placed their offices at the disposal of the new sovereign yesterday, but he desired them to remain for the present in the discharge of their several functions.

The King's confidential and most influential adviser is the Hon. William L. Lee, chief justice of the supreme court, a thorough American and a man of undoubted integrity. On the 2d instant he resigned his office on account of ill health, but his resignation was not then accepted, and the present King absolutely refuses to allow him to quit his position, promising to have such an arrangement made as will relieve him of his most burdensome duties.

* * * * *

The salute at sunrise on the 16th, referred to in my letter to the minister of the 18th, was participated in by the *St. Mary*, but not by the English and French ships in port, probably for the reason that they were not prepared to follow the Hawaiian and American salutes. "The royal salute of etiquette" appears to have been arranged for the purpose of giving them an opportunity of making up for the omission of the morning.

I have, etc.,

DAVID L. GREGG.

Mr. Gregg to Mr. Marcy.

No. 64.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, December 29, 1854.

SIR: * * * From information which has recently come to my knowledge, I am inclined to entertain the opinion that the present head of the government will be disposed to preserve, if possible, the separate independence of the Hawaiian Islands. I anticipate, therefore, a notification, as soon as affairs are somewhat settled, to the effect that the negotiations for annexation to the United States are no longer to be entertained. This is rather a matter of inference than of positive certainty; but my own mind is convinced that the anticipations I entertained will prove to be well founded.

I think it also probable that efforts will be made to secure the protection of the existing sovereignty by the United States, France, and Great Britain. That foreign protection of some kind will be sought, I regard as almost a certainty. I should be glad to receive instructions to guide my conduct in the event of any such question being brought up for consideration.

The ministers who will doubtless be reappointed are men of honesty and integrity, but my observation leads me to conclude that in their estimation the retention of office is a paramount consideration. Their great fault is weakness and not perversity of purpose. Besides their views are all against the present administration of the United States, and it is not at all unlikely that they conceive it to be fair and just to pursue every legitimate course to play advisedly into the hands of those who desire political changes. These remarks are especially to be applied to the American elements of the Hawaiian Government.

I have, etc.,

DAVID L. GREGG.

Mr. Marcy to Mr. Gregg.

No. 12.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 31, 1855.

SIR: The policy of the United States in relation to the future of the Sandwich Islands is presented in the instructions heretofore given to you. That policy is not to accelerate or urge on any important change in the government of that country, but if it has or should become so far enfeebled that it can not be continued, and the sovereignty of the islands must be transferred to another power, then a state of things will exist in which it will be proper for the United States to have a regard to the future condition of that country.

If the Hawaiian Government and people become convinced of the necessity of such a change, it is probable that they will, if left to their free choice, look to the United States as the country to which they would wish to be united. To a proper arrangement of this kind this Government certainly has no objection.

My dispatch of the 4th of April last has reference to such a contingency which it was then supposed was about to happen. In case a transfer of the islands was proffered to the United States, you were directed to enter into negotiations as to the terms of it and conclude a treaty on that subject. The outlines of such a treaty were contained in that dispatch.

You have apprised the Department that as soon as negotiations were opened you perceived that stipulations different from those indicated in your instructions were insisted on, and you very properly notified the Hawaiian authorities that you could only entertain them as matters to be referred to your Government for its approval or rejection.

The draft of a treaty you have forwarded to the Department has been considered by the President, and he directs me to say that he can not approve of some of the articles. If ratified in its present shape at Honolulu and sent hither, he would not probably submit it to the Senate. There are in his mind strong objections to the immediate incorporation of the islands in their present condition into the Union as an independent State. It was expected that the Hawaiian Government would be willing to offer the islands to the United States as a territory, and to leave the question in relation to their becoming a State to the determination of this Government, unembarrassed by stipulations on that point. The interests of both parties would seem to indicate this as the wisest course. A treaty which would embarrass the United States in their action on this question would therefore be objectionable.

There are other objections to the draft which you have sent to the Department, though less formidable than that which the second article presents. The amount to be paid as annuities, etc., according to the draft, is much larger than was contemplated.

I think it would be proper that you should inform the Hawaiian Government that the United States would not be likely to approve of a treaty differing in important particulars from the terms contained in the dispatch of the 4th of April.

This Government will receive the transfer of the sovereignty of the Sandwich Islands with all proper provisions relative to the existing rights and interests of the people thereof, such as are usual and appropriate to territorial sovereignty. It will be the object of the United States, if clothed with the sovereignty of that country, to promote its growth and prosperity. This consideration alone ought to be a suffi-

cient assurance to the people that their rights and interests will be duly respected and cherished by this Government.

In presenting objections to the draft of the treaty which you have sent to this Department, the President desires me to assure you that he takes no exception whatever to your course in this difficult and embarrassing negotiation, but, on the contrary, it is highly approved. Your efforts have been properly directed and your ability is appreciated and commended. It gives me pleasure to concur in and communicate the President's approbation of your conduct.

I am, etc.,

W. L. MARCY.

Mr. McBride to Mr. Seward.

No. 9.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, October 9, 1863.

SIR: Notwithstanding the subject is a delicate one, yet regarding it as a duty to my Government to transmit information concerning the policy and views of that to which I am accredited, I ask your undivided attention to a few facts in reference to this Government, and some things connected with it.

First. The King is strongly predisposed in favor of the British in preference to Americans, or those of any other nationality. English policy, English etiquette, and English grandeur seem to captivate and control him. His familiar associates are Englishmen, and where an office becomes vacated by death, resignation, or otherwise, it is filled by the appointment of an Englishman. In a word, English diplomacy here has been so adroit and sagacious as to win the esteem and confidence of His Majesty and the royal family, while American diplomacy has been a complete failure in this respect.

It is plainly to be seen that the British Government places a high estimate on the future value of these islands, believing, no doubt, that the Pacific and other railroads will be built, and that these islands will become very important as a "half-way house" between Europe and America on one side and China and Japan on the other, and also in their capacity for growing the sugar cane, coffee, rice, and cotton, which, no doubt, will be very great when fairly and fully developed. The salubrity and peculiar pleasantness of the climate must also add much to the intrinsic worth and importance of this country.

Secondly. The King's health is poor, being afflicted with asthma and other chronic affections, and therefore it is not at all probable that he will live many years, and, like other valetudinarians, his death would not surprise his acquaintances at any time. The English influences which are thrown around the King in the persons of English school teachers recently imported, and a number of English clergymen sent here by Her Britannic Majesty at the request of the King, and he not a pious man, and the filling of vacant offices by Englishmen, on the whole, being considered, is shrewdly suspected of being a political affair under the garb of religion and intended at least to supersede Americans holding office under His Majesty's Government, American school teachers, and American clergymen, many of whom have already been turned out; in other words, an endeavor to thoroughly Anglicize this place and prepare it for a British regency.

Thirdly. The native population is decreasing so rapidly as to produce the general, if not the universal, belief that within a short period, say from twenty to forty years, there will not be enough of them remaining to perpetuate this Government. This being the case, these islands must, of necessity, pass into other hands and their destiny be controlled by other people. The question then is, to what nation shall they belong, and to whom ought they belong, the English or the Americans? They are the only competitors.

Fourthly. An Englishman a little over a year ago loaned this Government \$90,000 for ten years at 10 per cent per annum, interest to be paid annually. This Government, in all probability, will not be able to pay more than the interest, if that, and will be more likely to hypothecate lands to Englishmen or to the English Government for more money. Such an event would be a sufficient excuse for Great Britain (Napoleon-like) to take and hold these islands as an indemnity, and everybody knows what the result would be. The payment of this debt by the United States, and, if need be, the loan of half a million more, together with presents both ornamental and useful to their majesties and to the heir apparent, cautiously and wisely bestowed, might be the means of giving Americans the vantage ground in point of court influence and other interests which may come up in the future.

I beg leave to further say that American interests greatly predominate here over all others combined, and not less than four-fifths of the commerce connected with these islands is American. The merchants, traders, dealers of all kinds, and planters are principally Americans. The English have no commerce here worthy of the name and but one or two retail stores; the Germans about the same amount of business as the English. Many American merchants here are doing quite a large business, and would extend their business still more but for the danger of British rule over this group, which, if it should become the dominant or governing power, American interests would be crushed out with eagerness and dispatch. Such is the universal belief of all American citizens with whom I have conversed, and such is my own opinion. It would be a flagrant injustice to American citizens, after they have labored for the good of these islands for the last forty years, after they have brought these people out of barbarism and taught them civilization, science, and religion; in a word made them an intelligent and Christian nation, and have done all that has been done in the development of the resources of the country, and given it a world-wide popularity, to be either driven out or so treated and harassed as to make it necessary for their interests to sacrifice their property and leave, which is believed would be the case provided the English obtain greater influence with the King than they now have; which influence it is the desire of Americans here and for the interests of the American Government to avert. Some merchants and planters are contracting their business, so that they may not suffer so heavy a loss in the event of the change which seems probable at no very distant day.

I am also informed that the British Government since the commencement of the rebellion in the United States sent a deputation to examine and report on the cotton-growing capacity of this group, and the report is said to be remarkably favorable. This may aid in explaining the lively interest which Her British Majesty's Government takes in this Government and the final disposition of these islands so far as conduct is a faithful index to design. The cotton-growing capacity of these islands has been sufficiently tested to demonstrate it as a fact

that it is not at all inferior to Alabama, Georgia, or Mississippi, either as to quality or quantity per acre. There is some cotton now growing in the suburbs of this city as rich and luxuriant a growth as I ever saw in the Southern States. The capacity of these islands for growing sugar cane is of world-wide celebrity and is known to be not inferior to that of any other country. All the sugar plantations of any note on these islands, with the exception of two or three, belong to Americans. Coffee grows here well and it is believed that with proper care and skill it might become equal to those more celebrated coffee-growing countries. A great deal is now raised here, although for the last few years there has been in some localities what is here called the blight on the tree. This soil grows rice of an excellent quality in great abundance.

Indian corn grows well here and yields from 20 to 40 bushels per acre. Garden vegetables also grow well here.

This group of islands under the control of our Government, in my judgment would be far more valuable than the ownership of both Cuba and the Bahama Islands. All of which is respectfully submitted.

I have the honor, etc.,

JAMES MCBRIDE.

Message of the President of the United States, communicating, in answer to a resolution of the Senate of the 4th instant, a report of the Secretary of State, relative to a proposed reciprocity treaty between the United States and Sandwich Islands.

FEBRUARY 8, 1864.—Read, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and ordered to be printed.

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of yesterday on the subject of a reciprocity treaty with the Sandwich Islands, I transmit a report from the Secretary of State, to whom the resolution was referred.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1864.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, February 5, 1864.

The Secretary of State, to whom has been referred the Senate's resolution of yesterday, requesting the President, "if not incompatible with the public interests, to communicate to the Senate any recent correspondence at the Department of State relative to a proposed reciprocity treaty between the United States and the Sandwich Islands," has the honor to report that application has been made for a revival of a similar treaty which was negotiated here during the administration of President Pierce, but which was not approved by the Senate. After due consideration, however, especially in connection with the probable effect of such a measure on the public revenue at this juncture, it has not been deemed advisable further to entertain the subject. It is not deemed expedient at present to communicate the correspondence called for by the resolution.

Respectfully submitted.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

The PRESIDENT.

Mr. Seward to Mr. McBride.

No. 10.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 14, 1864.

JAMES MCBRIDE, Esq., etc.:

SIR: Your dispatch No. 9, of October 9, 1863, has been received. The subject of which it treats, viz, the policy of Great Britain in the Sandwich Islands—the efforts made by its officials there to shape and control the future destinies of these islands—and the measures which you indicate, with the view of counteracting these influences, are all deemed of much importance and they will receive the consideration to which they are justly entitled.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. McBride to Mr. Seward.

No. 37.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, September 16, 1864.

SIR: As the United States Government is now paying rent for a piece of ground for a naval depot, and as a permanent depot here will be vastly more important to our Government in the future than it has been in time past, from the increased necessity for naval defense, owing to the States and Territories on the Pacific Slope, the number of American whale ships floating in various parts of the Pacific, the increased and increasing commerce with these islands, and last, though not least, the immense commerce which we have the right to anticipate between the United States, China, and Japan, I hope it will be considered proper in me to suggest that, if a reciprocity treaty should at any time be made with this Government, a fee simple to a piece of land at this port, sufficient for a wharf and buildings for a naval depot and also for a dry dock, should be made one of the conditions of said treaty, as the principal advantage accruing from such a treaty will be to this Government, as shown in my dispatch of yesterday.

I have the honor to be, etc.,

JAMES MCBRIDE.

Mr. McCook to Mr. Seward.

No. 6.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, September 3, 1866.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch No. 3, inclosing the opinion of the Attorney-General in the matter of the American ships *Josephine* and *Blue Jacket*.

I regard it as a cause for congratulation that the Government has arrived at the conclusion indicated by the opinions of the Attorney-General, for the Hawaiian courts have in the past certainly shown a disposition to unnecessarily annoy American shipmasters, and the Hawaiian Government has invariably refused to redress their grievances.

In examining the correspondence of my predecessors I observe that

each one has seen proper to communicate to the State Department his views in relation to the Government and people of these islands. Although I suppose you are already thoroughly informed, yet I desire to call your attention to some points upon which I very materially differ from the ideas expressed by my predecessors.

Before my arrival here I was led to believe that this Government displayed a marked hostility towards the Government and citizens of the United States. The State Department has probably been led into the same error. I am perfectly satisfied that no such feeling does exist. Many of the American residents have rendered themselves obnoxious to the King and his cabinet by personal abuse of the ministers and unwarranted interference in the political affairs of the Kingdom. The natural result of this has been dislike, freely expressed, on both sides. As the feeling is apparently of an entirely personal character, I can see no reason why it should affect my relations or the relations of my Government with His Majesty and his ministers. Another class of Americans, the missionaries, have controlled the political affairs of the country since 1820. They are dissatisfied because within the last few years they have lost their hold upon the Government and its offices. The first class of Americans are generally disappointed adventurers, the second class are religionists, who, having once exercised supreme power in church and state, feel all the bitterness of disappointment at seeing their political power pass into other hands, and knowing that the native population is beginning to listen to a religion preached from other pulpits than their own. The American missionaries have undoubtedly labored faithfully; but it is their own fault if, after forty years' experience as keepers of the conscience to the natives and their princes, they permit themselves to be driven from the field by an adroit English priest, whose church is a mere political machine, and who possesses apparently neither the intelligence nor the virtue of his more experienced and Puritanical brother missionaries.

So far as I can see, the influence of the American Government is all that it has ever been. The influence of American individuals has been lost through their own want of tact and harmony.

There is still another class—the planters of the country. They are nearly all Americans, both in nationality and in sympathy; they are the better class of the residents of the islands, possess its substantial wealth, control its resources, and annually ship 20,000,000 pounds of sugar to the Pacific coast of the United States. Their pecuniary interests, their political sympathies, their business relations, and their personal attachments are all with the United States and its citizens.

The health of the present King is most precarious. When he dies the race of Hawaiian kings dies with him, and I feel confident that he will not name a successor. His Majesty is superstitious and to a great degree under the influence of a native sorceress, who has predicted that he will die as soon as he names a successor. He has faith in her prophecy and acts accordingly. I mention this fact in order that you may more properly appreciate the enlightened influences which sometimes control His Majesty's important political measures.

The fact as I state it is undoubted, and in the event that no successor to the throne is appointed the Government of the United States may be called upon to arbitrate the future of this country. For this reason I have felt it my duty to remind you of the condition of affairs here and to call your attention to the value of American interests which do now, and always must, center in these islands.

They are the resting place, supply depot, and reshipping point of all our American whaling fleet.

They are the sources from which the Pacific States receive all the sugars they consume.

The greater part of the agricultural, commercial, and moneyed interests of the islands are in the hands of American citizens.

All vessels bound from our Pacific coast to China pass close to these shores.

Geographically these islands occupy the same important relative position towards the Pacific that the Bermudas do towards the Atlantic coast of the United States, a position which makes them important to the English, convenient to the French, and, in the event of war with either of those powers, absolutely necessary to the United States. Destitute of both army and navy, the Hawaiian Government is without the power to resist aggression, to compel belligerents to respect the neutrality of her ports. Equally destitute of financial resources, they are without the means of indemnifying those who may suffer through their weakness.

The spirit of this whole people is heartily republican and thoroughly American. The King, his half dozen half-civilized nobles, as many cabinet ministers, and the Lord Bishop of Honolulu (Staley) constitute the entire aristocratic element of the country, either in fact or in feeling. And when this dynasty ends, as end it will probably within the next year, I am sure that if the American Government indicates the slightest desire to test in these islands the last Napoleonic conception in the way of territorial extension you will find the people here with great unanimity "demanding by votes, freely expressed, annexation to" the United States.

I have the honor, etc.,

EDWARD MCCOOK,
United States Minister Resident.

[Private.—For the Secretary alone.]

SAN FRANCISCO, *June 7, 1867.*

Hon. W. H. SEWARD,

Washington, D. C. :

SIR: I sail to-morrow for Honolulu and desire before leaving to ask you to order me to report in Washington about the time the Hawaiian treaty comes before the Senate for ratification or grant me a leave of absence for that purpose. I will then have in my possession every fact which might influence the favorable consideration of Congress; and it is unnecessary for me to say how deep an interest I feel in the successful conclusion of the matter with which you intrusted me.

Should the treaty be ratified, I will feel that I have possibly accomplished all I can accomplish in my present position, and will probably wish to return to my home in Colorado, unless you should favor the absolute acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands, in which event I would like to conduct the negotiations. I think their sovereignty could be purchased from the present King, and feel sure that the people of the United States would receive such a purchase with universal acclamation. Will you permit me to suggest that you sound Mr. Harris on the subject?

I hope you will send me the leave of absence or orders I have asked for; I know it seems like taxing your indulgence too far to ask this favor so soon after receiving a similar one at your hands; but I certainly have no wish to make the long winter voyage from Honolulu to New York as a pleasure trip, and my only reason for wishing to visit the United States this winter is that I believe it will materially advance the interests of the public service, and I feel sure you will be perfectly satisfied with the result should you permit me to come.

I have, etc.,

EDWARD M. MCCOOK.

Mr. Seward to Mr. McCook.

[Confidential.]

No. 33.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 13, 1867.

Mr. McCook,
Honolulu:

SIR: Your private note written on the 27th of June, on the eve of your departure from San Francisco for Honolulu, has just been received.

You have leave to come to this place at the next meeting of Congress, which will probably take place in November.

You are at liberty to sound the proper authority on the large subject mentioned in your note and ascertain probable conditions. You may confidentially receive overtures and communicate the same to me.

I will act upon your suggestion in that relation in regard to a party now here.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. McCook to Mr. Seward.

No. 31.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, August 5, 1867.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.:

SIR: Since my dispatch No. 30 I have had several interviews with His Majesty the King, in one of which I called his attention to the remark made by his minister of foreign affairs relative to His Majesty leaving his capital because of the presence of the U. S. S. *Lackawanna* here (Mr. De Varigny, the minister of foreign affairs, was present), and the King disavowed any such motive and informed me that he had left this island simply to superintend the labor on some one of his plantations. The whole subject was dismissed by my calling His Majesty's attention to the fact that there had been nothing in the past acts or present attitude of my Government toward this Kingdom which should make the presence of an American man-of-war in these waters the source of suspicion, and that I regarded it as peculiarly unfortunate that these suspicions should be expressed at this particular time, when the Government of the United States was endeavoring, by the negotia-

tion of a reciprocity treaty and by every other assurance in their power, to show their friendship for the King and people of these islands.

On the 25th of July His Majesty again sent for me to meet him in council. Telegrams from Washington, published in the California papers, had reached here, disclosing the fact that a treaty of reciprocity had been concluded between the two countries and made public in the United States. His Majesty stated to me that he would like to discuss its provisions with me, but did not deem it consistent with his dignity, etc., to enter into any such discussion while the *Lackawanna* remained here. I will do His Majesty the justice to say that I do not believe this idea was an original one, but was suggested to and forced upon him by his ministers, they hoping that the *Lackawanna* could not or would not leave, and that this might prove an insuperable obstacle to the ratification of the treaty. I requested that this determination of his might be conveyed to me in writing, and on the same day I received a communication from the minister of foreign affairs, a copy of which I inclose.

The *Lackawanna* sailed from these waters on the 30th of July, in compliance with orders from the Navy Department, to take formal possession of and survey Middlebrook Island, and this obstacle being removed His Majesty again sent for me, approved the treaty in council, and issued a proclamation convoking an extraordinary session of the legislative assembly on the 2d of September, "for the purpose of considering such legislation as may be rendered necessary by the proposed convention of reciprocity with the Government of the United States." A copy of this proclamation is herewith transmitted.

I think that the King heartily and earnestly favors this treaty, and I think that some, probably the majority, of his ministers just as heartily and earnestly oppose it; because they know it will prove destructive to all other foreign influence and make American influence dominant on these islands. I was present by invitation of His Majesty at four of his cabinet meetings and on each occasion he seemed disposed to act promptly and favorably, while his councilors yielded, I thought, a reluctant and sullen assent to a measure which they alone, of all this little Kingdom, look upon with disfavor. I have heard some of the most intelligent and influential men of the islands express the opinion that should this treaty be ratified by the United States and go into effect, abrogation would be revolution; and after its benefits are once felt this people will always demand reciprocity or annexation.

I have the honor to be, sir, your very obedient servant,
EDWARD M. MCCOOK.

[Inclosure in No. 31.]

Mr. De Varigny to Mr. McCook.

HONOLULU, July 25, 186-.

Sir: Pursuant to the request expressed by your excellency during your interview of to-day with His Majesty, I have the honor to transmit to you the desire expressed by the King.

Before entering into the consideration of the treaty of reciprocity, His Majesty and his Government desire your excellency to use your influence in securing the departure from this Kingdom of the *Lackawanna* for the reasons explained to you during the aforesaid interview.

Hoping for a favorable result of this request, I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurances of the high respect and distinguished consideration with which I remain,

Your excellency's very obedient humble servant,

C. DE VARIGNY.

Mr. McCook to Mr. Seward.

No. 32.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, August 5, 1867.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose you the copy of a communication addressed by me to Gen. Van Valkenburgh, United States minister resident at Yedo, Japan.

The note explains itself; and as I deemed it essential to the interests of the public service that it should be written and forwarded promptly, I hope its contents will meet with your entire approval.

I have the honor to be, etc.,

EDWARD M. MCCOOK.

[Inclosure in No. 32.]

*Mr. McCook to Gen. Van Valkenburgh.*UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, August 3, 1867.

DEAR SIR: An envoy of the Hawaiian Government sails for Japan to-day for the purpose of endeavoring to negotiate a treaty with Japan which will admit the sugars and other products of that kingdom on an equality with the products of the United States, England, etc. I should think it would be your policy to oppose the consummation of such a treaty by every means in your power. The Pacific States of the United States are almost entirely dependent upon these Hawaiian Islands for their supply of sugars, and the planters here depend on the Pacific States just as entirely for a market. This circumstance has been instrumental in maintaining American influence here, although all the sympathies of the Government are probably English; and so soon as they can find another market which will render them independent of the United States, our political and commercial influence on the islands will be lost.

You have been here and understand how important in every respect these islands are to our country; and the fact that a treaty of reciprocity has just been concluded with them shows conclusively that the President and Secretary of State fully realize this importance, and are anxious by securing all their trade to make American influence paramount. Should they secure this treaty with Japan, and thus find another and possibly better market for their sugars, etc., it will in effect defeat the objects of the treaty just concluded, by diverting the trade we wish to secure into another channel, and enable the planters and merchants of these islands to sell their sugars to Japan, and with the proceeds buy their goods, as they now do, in an English market, instead of an American one, as they would naturally if their trade were exclusively with the United States.

At any rate I believe that after so largely subsidizing a line of steamers to secure the trade of China and Japan, we ought to secure *all of it* if we can; and if the Japanese want sugars raised in this part of the Pacific let them buy them through the merchants of San Francisco, or some of our other Pacific ports. This seems like a small affair, but I think our new trade growing up with China and Japan should be jealously watched and fostered, and all other countries hindered if possible from injuriously interfering with it in any way.

I hope you will concur with me in the view I have taken of this matter, and throw every obstacle you can in the way of the success of Capt. Waterman, the Hawaiian envoy, and request Gen. Stahl and our other consuls to do the same.

I have forwarded a copy of this letter to the honorable Secretary of State, hoping that he will approve my opinions and communicate with you at once.

I have the honor to be, etc.,

EDWARD M. MCCOOK,
Minister Resident.

Mr. Seward to Mr. McCook.

[Confidential.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 12, 1867.

EDWARD M. MCCOOK, Esq., etc. :

SIR: Circumstances have transpired here which induce a belief that a strong interest, based upon a desire for annexation of the Sandwich Islands, will be active in opposing a ratification of the reciprocity treaty. It will be argued that the reciprocity will tend to hinder and defeat an early annexation, to which the people of the Sandwich Islands are supposed to be now strongly inclined. Under these circumstances, I have, first, to advise that you remain at Honolulu instead of coming to the United States, as you have before proposed.

Second. You will be governed in all your proceedings by a proper respect and courtesy to the Government and people of the Sandwich Islands; but it is proper that you should know, for your own information, that a lawful and peaceful annexation of the islands to the United States, with the consent of the people of the Sandwich Islands, is deemed desirable by this Government; and that if the policy of annexation should really conflict with the policy of reciprocity, annexation is in every case to be preferred.

The bearer of this communication will remain for the present at Honolulu, and will conform himself in his proceedings there to your advice, coöperating with you confidentially; and you will exercise your own discretion how far it may be necessary and when to instruct him in any of the matters contained in this dispatch.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Seward to Mr. McCook.

No. 36.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, October 5, 1867.

Mr. MCCOOK, etc.:

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of the 5th of August, No. 31. The President is gratified with the information that His Majesty the King of the Sandwich Islands approves of the reciprocity treaty, and that he took measures to call an extra-

ordinary session of the legislature for the purpose of a formal ratification. Since the receipt of your dispatch we have received a report by the telegraph from San Francisco that the treaty has been finally and fully ratified by the Hawaiian Government.

I refrain altogether from treating upon the subject of the irritation which has been manifested at Honolulu in connection with the visit of the *Lackawanna* at that port. No conceivable good could result from engaging in diplomatic debate upon that subject.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Spalding.

[Confidential.]

No. 42.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 5, 1868.

Z. S. SPALDING, Esq., etc.:

SIR: Your letter of the 14th of April has been received and carefully read. The information which you give of the excitement which is prevailing in Honolulu in regard to the annexation of the Sandwich Islands is very interesting. You suggest a system of proceeding here with reference to that object which could not possibly, at the present time, obtain the sanction of any department of this Government.

Without going into an explanation of the causes for the condition of national sentiment which temporarily exists, it is enough to say that the public attention sensibly continues to be fastened upon the domestic questions which have grown out of the late civil war. The public mind refuses to dismiss these questions even so far as to entertain the higher but more remote questions of national extension and aggrandizement. The periodical Presidential and Congressional elections are approaching. Each of the political parties seems to suppose that economy and retrenchment will be prevailing considerations in that election and the leaders of each party therefore seem to shrink from every suggestion which may involve any new national enterprise, and especially any foreign one. How long sentiments of this sort may control the proceedings of the Government is uncertain, but, in the meantime, it will be well for you not to allow extravagant expectations of sympathy between the United States and the friends of annexation in the islands to influence your own conduct. You will continue, however, to write me upon the subject freely as you have hitherto done.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

No. 54.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
At Honolulu, August 14, 1868.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.:

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith a copy of a communication addressed by me to the Hawaiian minister of foreign affairs on the

29th ultimo. At the same time I inclosed him a copy of the resolution of the Congress of the United States which accompanied your circular of January 17, 1867, relative to the coolie trade.

I deemed this action called for on my part from the fact that during my absence a cargo of Japanese coolies arrived at this port on the British ship *Scioto*, and were distributed among the planters and other parties on the islands under a system of contracts holding them to labor for the term of three years. I know nothing of the circumstances under which these people left Japan, but supposed you are fully advised in the premises through Mr. Vanvalkenburg.

I have been informed that it is in contemplation to send an expedition to the South Sea Islands under the auspices of the Hawaiian Government, or the Hawaiian board of immigration, for the purpose of procuring laborers (coolies) from there. Should this really have been the design, I hope the communication I have already addressed to His Majesty's Government may lead them to abandon their purpose. If any such attempt is persisted in I will deem it my duty to protest most emphatically against it, unless otherwise directed by you.

As these South Sea Islanders are without an organized government and unable to protect themselves, any attempt to take them by force or fraud from their own country and reduce them to a state of temporary servitude here would, it seems to me, justify such active interference on the part of the Government of the United States as might be necessary to prevent the inauguration of a traffic more odious than the coolie trade of China.

I have the honor to be, your very obedient servant,

EDWARD M. MCCOOK.

No. 41.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

Honolulu, July 29, 1868.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose you a copy of a resolution on the subject of the coolie trade, which has unanimously passed both Houses of the Congress of the United States.

It is believed that in this matter the resolution referred to correctly indicates the moral sentiment of the country I have the honor to represent; consequently I transmit the inclosed copy for the information of your Government, believing that His Majesty, actuated by those sentiments of humanity for which he has always been so eminently distinguished, will cordially coöperate with the Government of the United States in its endeavor to discountenance and discourage a traffic so repulsive that it meets with the reprobation of the civilized world.

With sentiments of the highest consideration and regard, I have the honor to be,

Your very obedient servant,

EDWARD M. MCCOOK.

His Excellency STEPHEN H. PHILLIPS,

H. H. M. Minister of Foreign Affairs, etc.

[From the annual message of President Johnson to the Fortieth Congress, December 9, 1868.]

I am aware that upon the question of further extending our possessions it is apprehended by some that our political system can not successfully be applied to an area more extended than our continent; but the conviction is rapidly gaining ground in the American mind that, with the increased facilities for intercommunication between all portions of the earth, the principles of free government, as embraced in our Constitution, if faithfully maintained and carried out, would prove of sufficient strength and breadth to comprehend within their sphere and influence the civilized nations of the world.

The attention of the Senate and of Congress is again respectfully invited to the treaty for the establishment of commercial reciprocity with the Hawaiian Kingdom, entered into last year, and already ratified by that Government. The attitude of the United States towards these islands is not very different from that in which they stand towards the West Indies. It is known and felt by the Hawaiian Government and people that their Government and institutions are feeble and precarious; that the United States, being so near a neighbor, would be unwilling to see the islands pass under foreign control. Their prosperity is continually disturbed by expectations and alarms of unfriendly political proceedings, as well from the United States as from other foreign powers. A reciprocity treaty, while it could not materially diminish the revenues of the United States, would be a guaranty of the good will and forbearance of all nations until the people of the islands shall of themselves, at no distant day, voluntarily apply for admission into the Union.

HONOLULU, *April 14, 1869.*

DEAR FATHER: The bark *Comet* sails to-day for San Francisco, and even though I have little to make a letter interesting, I will venture a few lines.

Our latest advices, by the *Idaho*, seemed to convey the idea that the reciprocity treaty was beyond hope, and the effect is beginning to be generally felt and seen. Men who have kept silent for months, guarding their words and actions, have openly expressed themselves of late as being in favor of annexation, and begun to talk of forming an organization or party with that end in view.

What they want is to know that they will be backed up by the United States and its representatives here in all proper measures taken by them to secure a change in the political sentiment of the islands and their annexation at the earliest possible period.

This means not necessarily a war on the part of the United States, but a feeling that they are supported by our Government and its officials, even to the continued presence of a man-of-war, if necessary, and intervention should this Government attempt to stop free speech and a free press or put down an American simply because he is an American and expresses himself favorably towards the United States.

Americans whose opinions are entitled to respect claim that they have never had from the Government of the United States that countenance and support that England and France have always extended to their subjects here. They say (and I am disposed to think with some justice) that while an Englishman or Frenchman, even though holding an office under this Government, never forgets his country, Americans have been brought up and become more thoroughly Hawaiian than the

natives themselves. I know this to be true in regard to some Americans at present holding office under this Government, and from the records of some of our ministers, as well as their subsequent careers, I am satisfied there has been ground for complaint. No doubt the American party has committed mistakes. They had the power, and ought to have fought rather than lose it. But coming from the missionary stock, it was contrary to their principles and feelings to resort to blows. Besides, some of their best material was drawn off by means of royal favor and the honors and emoluments of office. The "dollar" is as powerful here as in more enlightened countries, and Americans as apt to forget all else in the accumulation of riches.

I told you I had no hope for annexation while there was a chance for "reciprocity." Events do not change my opinion. On the contrary, I feel that the desire for annexation is stronger to-day than it has been at any time since my arrival on the islands, simply because the prospects for the treaty are felt to be almost hopeless, and the planters must have relief by annexation.

I have already given you my opinion as to what the missionary or American party would do if left to themselves—absolutely nothing. In a short time they would be bound hand and foot and powerless to resist the machination of the English and French. They are like raw troops. Unless they can feel that they are supported by the "veteran hand" of the United States they will run at the first flash of powder or sight of blood. But shove them into the front rank and let them feel that they are safe and they will make as much noise as anybody.

It is time to decide upon the plan of action. If we want these islands immediately, I have no doubt the *Lackawanna* embroglio will furnish the pretext for taking them a la England or France. If no other good has been accomplished by the *Lackawanna*, she has served to "draw out" the ministers into strong expressions against her and our Government, and by her presence has kept up the fire of opposition in the hearts of Americans and left it easy for our Government to shape its future policy. If the United States should take possession to-morrow, on the ground that this Government has failed to respect American interests and shown its inability to maintain its position as an independent government, I think it would hardly raise a single remonstrance, either here or abroad. The feeling of foreigners seems generally to be that of astonishment to see the United States "put up" with so much from this little Kingdom.

But if the Government is in no particular hurry about the acquisition of the islands, and desires to accomplish its ends with as little display of force or expenditure of money as possible, it might be well to give the annexation party a chance to see what they can do. Two years will accomplish the change if it can be done at all. To my mind there is a better chance for an annexation party right now than there has been since the idea of reciprocity was first started. The "Hawaiian Club," of Boston, write that the treaty is undoubtedly dead, and that although they never favored annexation heretofore, they do so now. They also say that the failure of the treaty is owing to the action of the ministers of this Government, Dr. Hutchinson and M. de Varigny, news which has raised a great deal of ill-feeling toward this Government and increased the desire for connection with the United States. I take good care not to contradict the opinion. The truth is that so long as there was a chance for receiving the benefits of free trade with the United States and escaping taxation men who had capital invested here were generally opposed to annexation.

The missionaries, I think, always opposed it, on the ground that the nations would suffer by the change. But just now all classes, except office-holders, are down on this Government, and reciprocity having failed them, are ready for anything that will give them a change. But here let me reiterate my opinion that our Government must be prepared to uphold such a party with more favor and stronger aid than has ever been given before, and be ready, in case of necessity, to assume the whole work and finish it with one stroke. That is to say, we should show to this Government that Americans and their interest *must be respected* and the United States regarded equally with the "most favored nations," and let our friends see that we will indorse them in all lawful actions and receive them under the Stars and Stripes whenever application is made in the proper manner.

I still hold that little or nothing can be accomplished at the present time by "voluntary" action on the part of the natives or foreigners, in the way of changing the political status of the islands or overthrowing the present Government. What may be done in time, by educating the people up to the issue, especially where the greater part of the capital of the islands is at stake, is another question. There are many good men who will come out boldly for annexation and strain every nerve for its success if they can be satisfied that the United States will help them through. But they are not willing to throw away the good they have for the uncertainty of something better. The present King has already shown, by his abrogation of the old constitution and forcing upon the people an instrument of his own creation, that he will stop at nothing within his power. Foreign intervention in favor of annexation must of course come from the United States. Will it come? If so, the party can be organized.

The present attitude of this Government towards the United States and the patience with which we have borne its slights is "a thorn in our sides." Englishmen ridicule us, while they secretly "chuckle" over what they consider our loss of influence. I am as willing to "stoop to conquer" as anyone, and am willing to wait for our laugh until we shall have won. But, with every American on these islands, I hope our Government will either give up all idea of ever coming into possession of this country or else take measures to secure it. That we have been outgeneraled in the past is very clear. The reciprocity treaty just as completely tied Minister McCook's hands as did the Hawaiian minister of foreign relations bind our commissioner, Mr. Gregg, by getting him in his debt. The ministers of this Government never wanted "reciprocity" or any other connection with the United States, but they entertained the subject to quiet the demand for annexation, intending to kill it in the end. They have either bamboozled or bought up our representatives before Gen. McCook, and he they allowed to run wild on reciprocity.

If Gen. McCook comes back here with definite instructions from Washington to inaugurate and carry out any set policy, he will undoubtedly fulfill his instructions. But if he returns with no other orders but to "cultivate friendly relations," and is allowed to do that after his own fashion, you need not look for annexation. The American party here is composed of men mostly from the New England States. That they are generally "radical" follows as a matter of course. No representative of the United States, not even Gen. McCook, has ever been in communication with them enough to lead them. What Gen. McCook's interest in reciprocity was, I need not say; but everything

else had to give way to that one idea, and Americans who did not favor it were "d——d Republican Yankees."

My present position is far from enviable. I keep as clear of diplomatic questions as possible, and, of course, while the present state of affairs remains unchanged I keep my lips closed, and while hearing all sides give approval to none. I have been particularly careful not to commit myself. Whenever the future policy of our Government in relation to these islands is decided upon, if I am kept here in any position enabling me to take part I can do so without undoing a single act.

I send you a newspaper, by this mail, giving account, as far as heard from, of the late earthquakes and volcanic eruptions on the island of Hawaii. All accounts agree that the present has been the most serious convulsion ever experienced.

His Majesty, accompanied by his commissioner and others, left yesterday on the steamer *Kilauea* to visit the scene. I was invited to accompany them, but on account of the absence of Gen. McCook, and having several vessels in port, was obliged to decline the invitation. It is reported that His Majesty goes to Hawaii to make an offering to Pele (the goddess of volcanoes) to appease her wrath! He is certainly superstitious enough to do so, and the fact that his native sorceress bore him company would seem to confirm the story. The natives say that some high chief is about to die, and that that is the cause of the present volcanic convulsions. It is further said that the King fears he is the condemned chief, and hence his visit to Hawaii to make his offering to the enraged goddess.

The *Lackawanna* is still in port, Capt. Reynolds thinking the action of this Government, in refusing to allow his men to have liberty on shore at Hilo, sufficient reason for not returning there. He knows his presence here is an eyesore to them, and as they and he are at swords points he proposes to remain in their sight as long as he can. I have been assured by one of His Majesty's ministers that this Government has no fault to find with the United States or any man-of-war, but that they object to Capt. Reynolds personally. I give you this information for what it is worth. My own opinion is that both parties are in the wrong.

The legislature opens on Saturday next, notwithstanding the absence of the King. The King's father will deliver the opening speech in native, and the chief justice, Judge Allen, will deliver the same in English. There may be some interesting matters before the legislature during the session, but the main point will be to see how far the present ministry can control it. There will be an effort made to separate the two houses, which, if successful, will be one point for the opposition.

I look for Gen. McCook on the *Idaho*, due May 4, and will write fully by her return.

With much love, your affectionate son,

Z. S. SPAULDING.

Notes of conversations, Saturday, September 14, 1869.

Called on Mr. DeVarigny, the minister of foreign relations, about 9:30 a. m., and after some conversation concerning the reciprocity treaty, Mr. DeV. asked me when I expected the *Lackawanna* to return. I replied that I had no definite idea as to the time.

Mr. DEV. I do not wish to see the *Lackawanna* back here. I hope when she does return she will have orders to leave immediately.

McC. For what reason?

DEV. The commander of the *Lackawanna*, Capt. Reynolds, is personally obnoxious to this Government.

McC. Why?

DEV. Because when a resident of these islands his political sentiments were displeasing to His Majesty and his ministry.

McC. What were those political sentiments?

DEV. I can not tell; they were very obnoxious.

McC. Do you wish to establish the principle that, before any American man-of-war can touch these islands, you have the right to designate who shall command her, and what his political principles shall be?

Mr. DEV. We have the same rights with regard to a man-of-war which we would have in relation to a diplomatic agent—the principle is precisely the same, and we have the right to refuse to receive the one or permit the other to remain in our ports; and if the *Lackawanna* returns to stop here, we will order her peremptorily to leave; we will send her away for the reasons I have mentioned about Capt. Reynolds, and for other and more serious reasons—this is our right and we are determined to exercise it.

McC. I decline discussing this matter any further at present. Your mind appears to be made up, and you saw proper to refer the whole matter directly to the Secretary of State of the United States, without making your communication through the legation, and Mr. Seward will no doubt take such action as will be just and proper and I hope satisfactory to you. I would suggest, however, at this time, if your Government really desires the ratification of the reciprocity treaty, it would probably be highly impolitic and imprudent to order away from your waters any man-of-war belonging to the United States, just at the time when my Government is endeavoring by the most substantial proof in their power to show their friendship for the Hawaiian Government.

About 10:30 a. m. I called on His Majesty and stated that I desired to talk with him unofficially. I repeated the conversation between Mr. De Varigny and myself and suggested that, as I intended going to Washington sometime during this fall or winter, it would probably be better to take no action in the premises, even should the *Lackawanna* remain, until he heard from me. On my arrival in Washington I would lay the whole matter before the Secretary of State and call his attention to the objections of the Hawaiian Government to the presence of the *Lackawanna* here. His Majesty replied that this had better be understood before I left. I called his attention to the dispatch of the Secretary of State, No. 31, containing renewed assurances of the desire of the United States to maintain just and amicable relations with the King of the Hawaiian Islands, and also to all my past assurances that the *Lackawanna* was here on a friendly mission and for no unusual purpose. I thought that after all these assurances of friendship from all the representatives of my Government he ought to be satisfied as to their feelings. The past conduct of the United States toward the Government of these islands should be the best assurance that his sovereignty would always be respected in the future as it had been in the past.

His Majesty spoke of newspaper articles in the press of the United States, advocating the annexation or acquisition of those islands. I said that the newspapers of a country did not always represent the

sentiments of the government. Editors in the United States were in the habit of publishing pretty much what they pleased, without consulting the wishes of any person. The articles His Majesty referred to had, undoubtedly, originated here in Honolulu. They displayed a local knowledge of persons and things which no resident of the United States would possess. As for acquisition, the United States had never yet acquired a foot of territory by conquest. The additions to her boundaries had all been made like that of Russian America, by purchase, and, although I did not speak by authority, yet I had no doubt but that my Government would pay a liberal compensation for the cession of any of these islands or all of them. The growing trade of the United States on the Pacific made it almost necessary that we should have some good naval depot between the Pacific coast and China.

His Majesty answered that he did not believe that his people would ever permit him to cede any of the four larger islands of the group. I said that money was a great power, particularly with a needy population, and with a very small portion of the amount he might receive for such a cession he would probably be able to direct the sentiments of his people in any channel he desired. He replied that Honolulu and Hilo were the only two good ports on the islands; that Hilo might be made an excellent harbor by spending some money for a breakwater, but it was on one of the largest islands, and he did not see, on the whole, how he could sell part of an island or the best port in it; he also said that it would not be their policy to part with any of the larger islands. It might not be objectionable to part with one of the smaller ones, but one of them could be of no value to the United States, because they had no harbors at all.

I thanked His Majesty for the interview, and requested that he would not mention the subject of our conversation to his ministry or any person else, as it would only produce unnecessary and undesirable comment. He replied that it would not be mentioned by him to any person.

From the manner of the King during the whole interview, I was led to believe that the subject of our conversation was not an unfamiliar one.

No. 189.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Honolulu, February 7, 1873.

Hon. HAMILTON FISH,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.:

SIR: The new Government here seems well established and in working order, appointments to fill its offices having given general satisfaction to our resident countrymen.

The English and German portion of the community, however, complain that their respective nationalities have not been duly considered in the composition of this "cosmopolitan government."

A strong movement is afoot to induce King Lunalilo to visit Washington and endeavor to form a reciprocity treaty with the United States, failing to obtain which it is hoped the occasion will be availed of for entering into negotiations for the annexation of these islands to the United States.

I respectfully suggest that proper instructions and arrangements be

made by United States Government for the conveyance of and treatment of His Majesty as the guest of the nation.

It is proper that I inform you of a remark made to me within a few days past by Capt. Cator, of H. B. M. S. *Scout*, to the effect that, in view of recent events here, his opinion was that England, France, and the United States should take possession of these islands under joint occupancy. I replied that I thought the United States Government would not consent to be a party to any such project.

I am, sir, etc.,

HENRY A. PEIRCE.

P. S.—I inclose three copies of the Hawaiian custom-house statistics for the year 1872.

No. 190.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, February 10, 1873.

Hon. HAMILTON FISH,

Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. :

SIR: The subject now uppermost in the thoughts of Hawaiian officials, planters, and merchants relates to the measures needed to be taken to stop the decline of the Kingdom in its population, revenue, agricultural productions, and commerce. The panacea for the cure of these evils, in their opinion, is to be had by effecting a reciprocity treaty with the United States. This notwithstanding repeated failures heretofore in similar attempts to obtain one. Success therein is now hoped for by offering to the United States a *quid pro quo*, the cession of the sovereignty and proprietorship of the spacious, land-locked, easily defended harbor or estuary known as Ewa or Pearl River, in this island, 10 miles distant from Honolulu, and also to include the territory surrounding it, say 10 miles square in all.

There is a bar at the entrance of the harbor having on it 12 feet of water at low tide, but the depth can be increased to any reasonable extent without great expense.

The harbor is sufficiently spacious for several hundred ships to ride in safety. Inclosed herewith is extract from the P. Commercial Advertiser, newspaper, of date 8th inst., entitled "Reciprocity," that develops the views of those urging this project.

My opinion in regard to probable success of the measure named having been solicited by several persons high in authority, but in an unofficial manner, I have said in reply that in my judgment the United States Government would object to acquiring sovereignty over a part only of this island. That the consideration offered by the Hawaiian Government for a reciprocity treaty with the United States is certainly a very generous one, inasmuch as my Government now derives in imports from these islands, in customs revenue, only about \$370,000 per annum. Nevertheless, as the proposed measure or treaty would allow the Hawaiian Government to continue to maintain its sovereignty over the other portion of the island of Oahu not occupied by the United States, therefore the latter would not, probably, seriously entertain the proposition in the shape presented. Since this conversation occurred I have consulted on the subject-matter with Rear-Admiral Pennack, who is of the opinion that the United States Government should accept the proposition of the harbor of Pearl River, even

under the terms and conditions as foreshadowed by the Hawaiian Government officials.

I am expecting to receive ere long some definite proposals in regard to the subject-matter.

The native newspaper, "Kuokoa," opposes the suggestion mooted here in regard to King Lunaleho visiting Washington for the purpose of effecting a treaty, and some of the cabinet also oppose it, on account of the King's want of self-restraint in the use of intoxicating liquors.

I am, etc.,

HENRY A. PEIRCE.

P. S.—Mail steamer *Nevada*, left on the 27th ultimo for San Francisco, returned on the 6th instant to recoal—sailed on 7th instant; vessel leaked badly, with machinery and boilers in bad condition. Delay in receipt by you of my dispatches (No. 179 to 189) by that vessel is to be regretted.

Yours, etc.,

HENRY A. PEIRCE.

No. 191.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Honolulu, February 17, 1873.

Hon. HAMILTON FISH,

Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.:

SIR: Annexation of these islands to the United States and a reciprocity treaty between the two countries are the two important topics of conversation and warm discussion among Government officials and foreign residents.

A large majority of the latter favor the first-named project, while the former advocate reciprocity. All are convinced, however, that some measure should be taken by the Hawaiian Government to effectually stay the decline in the prosperity of the country, evidenced in decreasing exports, revenue, population, whale fishery, and an increasing public debt.

Annexation of the islands to the United States will never, in my opinion, be adopted or presented as a Government measure, however much the people as a whole may desire it. The glitter of the crown, love of power, and emoluments of office have too many attractions to prevent it. Should the great interests of the country, however, demand that "annexation" shall be attempted, the planters, merchants, and foreigners generally will induce the people to overthrow the Government, establish a republic, and then ask the United States for admittance into its Union. My opinion has recently been frequently asked in regard to probable success of the two measures proposed. I have said that if annexation or a reciprocity treaty is proposed on the part of Hawaii to the United States, that the subject will, in either case, be profoundly considered and decided upon. But in view of former non-success in attempts to secure reciprocity with the United States, and the complications that might inure to both nations if cession of the harbor of Pearl River were to be accepted by the United States as proposed in the present instance, I thought the proffer of the cession pure and simple of the whole archipelago would have the better chance for success as compared with reciprocity under the conditions now suggested.

Those favoring the former measure think it can be carried if the King's consent thereto is first obtained (and endeavors will be made to that end), provided the United States will, for and in consideration of said cession, pension off His Majesty and all the chiefs of royal blood with the aggregate sum per annum of \$125,000, and pay off the Hawaiian national debt, now amounting to about \$250,000, and bestow upon the cause and for the benefit of education, public schools, and the nation's hospitals (three of latter in number) the proprietorship and revenues of the crown and public lands. The value of said lands is at present estimated at about \$1,000,000. It includes, however, the public buildings, waterworks, wharf property, fish ponds, etc. The income of the crown lands, now inuring to the sovereign, amounts to about \$25,000 per annum. The public, or Government, waterworks, give about \$15,000 per annum, wharf property about the same, notwithstanding the free use of them granted to steamship lines.

Many persons are lukewarm on the subject of annexation to the United States solely for the reason that they fear repulse by the United States Government. I think the latter should declare its policy and objects in regard to this important subject. This nation is bewildered and suffering to some degree, not knowing how to shape its own policy in connection with its hopes and expectations in regard to the United States.

I inclose herewith an extract from the Commercial Advertiser of the 15th inst., headed "Annexation," considered here as intended to be a feeler on the subject.

With great, etc.,

HENRY A. PEIRCE.

P. S.—Your dispatches Nos. 78 and 79 are received. Should the King Lunalilo conclude to visit Washington, his departure will not take place before October next.

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., May 8, 1873.

Hon. WM. W. BELKNAP,

Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

SIR: In compliance with your confidential instructions of the 24th June, 1872, we have the honor to state that we have visited the Sandwich Islands and ascertained the defensive capabilities of their different ports, examined into their commercial facilities, and collected all the information in our power on other subjects in reference to which we ought to be informed in the event of a war with a powerful maritime nation, and we have now the honor to submit the following

REPORT:

We left this city on the 30th of December, 1872, on board the U. S. S. *California*, the flagship of Rear-Admiral Pennock, U. S. Navy, and arrived at Honolulu January 15, 1873. Admiral Pennock had received instructions from our Government to proceed to the Sandwich Islands in his flagship and bring to the United States the late King Kamehameha VI.

A few days before sailing, however, the news of the death of the king was received in San Francisco.

When we arrived at Honolulu we found a new King, Lunalilo, had been elected by an almost unanimous vote of the people. He had been inaugurated, and his Government was established in an orderly manner. At an audience with the King and his ministers, Admiral Pen-nock made known his instructions from the Secretary of the Navy, to offer a passage to the late King to the United States.

We were present at this interview and the announcement of the generous intentions of the Government of the United States toward the late King appeared to establish, at once, the best relations between the new King and Admiral Pen-nock, as also between the members of his Government and ourselves.

This was fortunate, as it gave us all desirable facilities for accomplishing the objects of our visit; enabled us to converse frankly with the King and his ministers upon the subject and to ascertain their feelings and wishes concerning it, as well as their general policy toward the United States. We ascertained from the officers of the U. S. Navy, from maps, and from seafaring men that Honolulu is the only good commercial harbor in the whole group of the Sandwich Islands.

There are many other so-called harbors, or places for anchorage, but they are mostly open roadsteads affording shelter only from certain winds, and they are all entirely incapable of being defended by shore batteries. Even the harbor of Honolulu itself can not be defended from the shore. It is a small harbor lying seaward from the land and only protected from the sea by outlying coral reefs.

An enemy could take up his position outside of the entrance to the harbor and command the entire anchorage, as well as the town of Honolulu itself. This harbor would therefore be of no use to us as a harbor of refuge in a war with a powerful maritime nation.

With one exception there is no harbor on the islands that can be made to satisfy all the conditions necessary for a harbor of refuge in time of war. This is the harbor of Ewa or Pearl River situated on the Island of Oahu, about 7 miles west of Honolulu.

Pearl River is a fine sheet of deep water extending inland about 6 miles from its mouth, where it could be completely defended by shore batteries. The depth of water after passing the bar is ample for any vessel.

Pearl River is not a true river; it partakes more of the character of an estuary. It is divided into three portions called "locks"—the east lock, the middle lock, and the west lock, the three together affording some 30 miles of water front, with deep water in the channels. Of these locks the east lock is the best, having the most room, the deepest water, and presenting the greatest facilities for shore improvements. In the middle of this lock there is an island called "Rabbit Island," having deep water close to its shores and fine anchorage all around it. This island is a level coral island, rising only a few feet above high-water level. It is destitute of fresh water, but there is a great abundance of good water on the adjacent shores, which could be carried to the island at small expense.

From our examinations we are of the opinion that this island and the adjacent shore to the north and west of it afford the most advantageous location for a naval depot of supplies and equipment in all these waters. But there is not sufficient water at present for heavy vessels to enter this Pearl River harbor. At the entrance to the harbor is a coral reef some 250 to 300 yards in width, with a depth of water of only 2 to 3 fathoms on the reef at low water. This reef appears to extend around the island, being broken only at the entrance to Honolulu Harbor, and

in fact we are informed that a platform of coral reefs fringe most of the shores of all the islands of the Hawaiian group, broken only in few places. This coral found at the entrance to Pearl River is "dead;" that is, it is not growing, and the reef is therefore not increasing in size. This ridge of coral forms a barrier or bar across the entrance to this harbor about 300 yards wide, measuring perpendicularly to the shore. It is comparatively level on the top, from 2 to 3 fathoms of water over it at low tide. Its sides are vertical, or nearly so, the depth of water increasing in a few feet to 4 or 5 fathoms. The outer, or sea side, then is found to be steeper than the inner, or shore side. At the distance of half a mile outside of the reef there is a depth of 15 fathoms, while at the same distance inside the reef the depth is only 8 fathoms.

If this coral barrier were removed Pearl River Harbor would seem to have all or nearly all the necessary properties to enable it to be converted into a good harbor of refuge. It could be completely defended by inexpensive batteries on either or both shores, firing across a narrow channel of entrance. Its waters are deep enough for the largest vessels of war, and its "locks," particularly around Rabbit Island, are spacious enough for a large number of vessels to ride at anchor in perfect security against all storms. Its shores are suitable for building proper establishments for sheltering the necessary supplies for a naval establishment, such as magazines of ammunition, provisions, coral, spars, rigging, etc., while the island of Oahu, upon which it is situated, could furnish fresh provisions, meats, fruits, and vegetables in large quantities.

Such being the properties of this harbor, and it being the only one on these islands possessing all the requisites, except depth of water on the bar, the question arises, can the coral reef at its entrance be removed? If so, at what cost? And again, if it be removed would the channel fill up, or would it remain open under the influence of natural causes?

A correct answer to these questions in detail can not be given without a survey of the entrance to this harbor. Under the supposition that full information on this subject would become necessary, in case negotiations were entered upon looking to the cession of Pearl River Harbor to the United States, we informally requested Admiral Pennock to include a detailed survey of the entrance to this harbor in his examinations and surveys of the harbors of these islands. The Admiral promised to have such surveys made; when it is received, a detailed estimate of the cost of removing the coral barrier can be made. We will state however that Lieut. Col. Alexander crossed this bar several times while we were at Honolulu. He did not undertake a survey, but he took soundings on and around the reef, and examined its character and outline. He found the reef composed mostly of coral in situ, covered over in small patches for a few inches in depth with coral sand, being fragments of coral and coral rock thrown upon the reef and ground to pieces under the action of the waves and tidal currents. It is his opinion that an entrance could easily be cut through this coral reef by surface blasting and that the fine débris would be washed seaward under the influence of the currents, while the larger masses could be removed by dredging or by divers, the islands furnishing many men skilled in such business.

He further gives it as his opinion, founded on the examinations he was able to make, that the amount of coral to be removed to open a channel 200 yards in width, with a depth of 26 feet of water at low tide, would be about 250,000 cubic yards, and that it could be removed for

\$1 per cubic yard, or for a sum of about \$250,000. It should be observed, however, that this is only an approximate estimate of the cost of this work. Detailed estimates could only be made after accurate surveys and thorough investigation made for this special purpose.

As the entrance to Honolulu harbor shows no tendency to fill up, and as the entrance to Pearl River, if opened, will be almost exactly like that of Honolulu, we see no reason at present to fear a filling up on the bar after a passage through the coral reef at its mouth shall have been secured. Upon this point, however, it will be safe to withhold opinions until the character of the bottom just outside the coral reef is accurately ascertained.

If the survey and examination should show a large quantity of coral sand there, and if the resulting currents of the ebb tide do not remove it, it is possible that some of this sand might accumulate in the channel of entrance during storms from seaward.

In case it should become the policy of the Government of the United States to obtain the possession of this harbor for naval purposes, jurisdiction over all the waters of Pearl River with the adjacent shores to the distance of 4 miles from any anchorage should be ceded to the United States by the Hawaiian Government.

This would be necessary in order to enable the Government to defend its depots and anchorages in time of war by works located on its own territory. Such a cession of jurisdiction would embrace a parallelogram of about 10 by 12 miles.

It would not be necessary, however, for the Government of the United States to own all this land. On the contrary, Rabbit Island and a few thousand acres of the shore to the northward and westward of it, the limits of which could be determined after careful survey, with sufficient land on either side of the entrance of the harbor for fortification purposes, equal in area to about 1 square mile on either side, would be all the land which it would be necessary for the Government to own. All the rest of the land which might be embraced in any cession of jurisdiction could remain in the hands of the present owners.

We remark that the Hawaiian Government is now having a survey made of Pearl River and the vicinity. This survey will show the nature of the country and the ownership of all abutting lands. When it is completed it will enable us to define distinctly the boundaries of the district over which jurisdiction should be ceded, in case our Government wishes to acquire possession of that harbor. We can then also designate what land the Government would require for naval purposes and for fortifications at the entrance of the harbor.

From what we could learn of the feelings of the Hawaiian Government on this subject, we believe it would be possible for the United States to obtain such a cession of jurisdiction and of land as we have indicated should it become the policy of the Government to establish a naval depot in these islands.

The cession of Pearl River and of so much of the surrounding district as might be necessary for its defense, and the title to all the positions which would be occupied by the Government either for naval or military purposes, would probably be freely given by the Government of these islands as a *quid pro quo* for a reciprocity treaty.

We remark in this connection that sugar is the principal product of these islands, and that it is mostly exported to the Pacific coast of the United States.

The great object of the Hawaiian Government in seeking a reciprocity treaty with the United States has been, and will probably continue to

be, to relieve its sugar-planters from the operation of our tariff on that article.

The cession of Pearl River could probably be obtained by the United States in consideration of the repeal of the duty on Sandwich Island sugar. Indeed, the sugar-planter sare so anxious for a reciprocity treaty, or so anxious rather for free trade in sugar with the United States, that many of them openly proclaim themselves in favor of annexation of these islands to the United States.

The members of the present Government of the Hawaiian Islands seem fully alive to the necessity of relieving their principal industry from the heavy burden under which it now suffers, and no other mode of relief seems possible but annexation or reciprocity.

Neither the Government nor the native people of the islands are, it is believed, prepared to consider the question of annexation at the present time, even if the United States desired to propose it, but the cession of Pearl River harbor as an equivalent for free trade is freely discussed and favorably considered by the Government and people.

It is to be observed that if the United States are ever to have a harbor of refuge and naval station in the Hawaiian Islands in the event of war, the harbor must be prepared in advance by the removal of the Pearl River bar.

When war has begun it will be too late to make this harbor available, and there is no other suitable harbor on these islands.

We have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. M. SCHOFIELD,

Major-General U. S. Army.

B. S. ALEXANDER,

Lieutenant-Colonel Engineers, Brevet Brigadier-General U. S. Army.

No. 241.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Honolulu, February 11, 1874.

Hon. HAMILTON FISH,

Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.:

SIR: A telegram addressed to you by this legation, under date of February 7th instant, informed you of the decease of King Lunalilo on the 3d instant, and that in consequence of his not having nominated a successor for the throne, the legislative assembly was called to convene on the 12th instant for the purpose of choosing a new sovereign. Inclosed herewith is a portion of the Hawaiian Gazette of this date, which gives the official correspondence between this Government and the representatives of foreign countries in regard to Lunalilo's death. It also contains an obituary notice, entitled "Our Late King," and some other interesting matter pertaining to the same general subject. I also forward herewith some specimens of the political placards and broadsides with which the town has been inundated during the past few days; and which have tended to excite the popular mind to fever heat in regard to the succession to the throne.

Thinking it to be a prudent measure to be prepared against any violation of the public peace that may take place to-morrow—on the occasion of the election of a new sovereign—I have verbally requested Commander Belknap, commanding the U. S. S. *Tuscarora* and senior naval officer present, the U. S. S. *Portsmouth*, Commandér Skerritt, being also in this port, to be prepared to land an armed force, in case it

were required for the preservation of the peace and protection of life and property. I also addressed to him a note suggested by the Hawaiian minister of foreign affairs, recommending that the crews of the two vessels should be kept on board on the day of the national election, and for the reasons therein named. Copy of said note, together with Commander Belknap's reply, is herewith inclosed, marked No. 3.

Mr. Wodehouse, British commander, just now called at the legation, and proposed that in case it became necessary to land an armed force from the vessels of war in port, that those belonging to H. B. M. ship *Tendos* and the United States vessels should be required to act in concert and unitedly for the preservation of good order and protection of life and property while occupying the town of Honolulu.

In reply I informed Mr. Wodehouse that in the contingency named the American forces, if landed, would act by request of the Hawaiian authorities, and for the sole purposes he named; that I felt unwilling to trammel myself with pledges and understandings, as events might possibly arise requiring of me independent action and no time given me to consult with him. Therefore I felt compelled to decline his proposition.

To all this Mr. Wodehouse said, "very well."

I am, etc.,

HENRY A. PIERCE.

No. 243.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Honolulu, February 17, 1874.

Hon. HAMILTON FISH,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.:

SIR: I have now the honor to make report of what has transpired here on and since the 12th instant. On that day the legislative assembly elected the high chief, Hon. David Kalakaua, King of these islands; 39 votes were cast for him and 6 for Queen Emma, relict of Kamehameha IV. On the 13th instant he was installed as sovereign, under the name of "Kalakaua" (the word signifying "the day of battle") in presence of all the officers of Government, the members of the diplomatic and consular corps, naval officers, and many other spectators.

On the announcement by the president of the assembly from the balcony of the court-house at 3 p. m. of 12th instant that Kalakaua was elected King, the populace received it with jeers and contempt.

The members of a committee that had been appointed by the assembly to wait upon Kalakaua and inform him of his election, as soon as they emerged from the building, were set upon and beaten by a mob. The majority of the committee were compelled to return to it, in a wounded and sad condition. The rioters thereupon assaulted the court-house, broke its windows and sashes, forced in the rear doors, and effected an entrance to the rooms. The offices of the attorney-general, of Judge Hartwell and others, were sacked and gutted, and all their books and valuable papers thrown into the street and destroyed. They visited the room of the assembly, broke and destroyed the furniture, and assaulted such of the obnoxious members as they found within the building, viz, 10 or 12 persons in all. Some of these, severely injured and senseless, were carried off by friends, the others escaped. The crowd outside continued to increase, and became more threatening

and menacing. Cries were heard to "fire the town." About 40 policemen, selected for the purpose, were on duty during the day; but when required to make arrests of rioters, took off their badges of office and disappeared among the crowd. The volunteer companies of the militia were not called out to assist in maintaining order, for the reason as I was told, that they could not be depended upon, being divided in political opinions.

It was at this condition or aspect of affairs that I received requests from the King elect and Minister Bishop and Governor Dominis to cause an armed force to be landed from the United States vessels of war *Tuscarora* and *Portsmouth*, then in port. To Commander Belknap, of the *Tuscarora*, as being the senior United States naval officer present and eyewitness with myself of all the events of the day, I immediately made the request, in conformity with the solicitations of the authorities above named. Within the space of ten minutes' time 150 men and officers, under the respective commands of Commander Belknap and Commander Skerrett, were landed from their vessels, and arrived at the court-house and took possession of the building and square of ground surrounding the same. The greater part of the mob instantly dispersed. Some few of the ringleaders who remained were arrested on the spot by deputy sheriffs, assisted by our officers and men.

The armed force of 70 men that were landed from the British corvette *Tenedos* did not reach the court-house grounds until sometime after our forces had taken possession of the place. I am confident in belief that no request was originally made by the native authorities for the assistance of the English armed force. The executive officer and captain of marines of the *Tenedos*, in the absence of Capt. Ray, took the responsibility of landing them without orders; and they received the censure of Capt. Ray for same.

The matter has, however, been accepted and sanctioned by the Hawaiian authorities, and a letter, antedated, sent to the British commissioner making a request for assistance.

The United States forces have, since the 12th instant p. m., guarded the court-house, armory, treasury, prison, and station-house. The British force, after dispersing the crowd of natives that were assembled on the grounds of Queen Emma, and on making there a few arrests of ringleaders, then marched to occupy the barracks and to guard the palace and its grounds. There they have remained since the 12th instant.

On the night of the 12th instant some two or three shots were discharged upon the American guard at the court-house and returned by the latter. No one received damage therefrom. The town has been in a condition of peace and good order ever since then. Fifty-three rioters are in prison awaiting trial. Inclosed herewith are the following papers.

Extracts from the I. Commercial Advertiser of February 14, 1874, giving accounts of the doings of the assembly on the 12th instant, the particulars of the riot, with other interesting articles contained therein.

Copy of resolutions unanimously passed by the assembly on the 14th instant, tendering their thanks to the representatives of foreign powers and to the officers and crews of the war vessels in port for generous assistance given in preserving the peace and order of the Kingdom on the 12th day of February, 1874.

Printed copy of resolutions adopted by the foreign consular corps appointing the consuls for the German Empire and for France a committee to call upon the representatives of the United States and Great

Britain, and to convey to them the sincere thanks of the foreign consuls for the promptness and impartiality with which the ships of war in port assisted the local authorities in putting an end to the disturbance on the 12th instant, and praising the conduct of officers and men.

Copy of a circular of date February 13, 1874, addressed to the legation from the Hawaiian department for foreign affairs, informing of the election of David Kalakaua, King of the Hawaiian Islands. Same to the same, of date February 14, 1874, informing that His Majesty the King had appointed, by the consent of the nobles, under the twenty-second article of the constitution, his brother, his royal highness Prince William Litt Leleiohoku, to be his successor to the throne after His Majesty's decease.

Photographic likeness of King Kalakaua, and a biographical notice of him. Born November 16, 1836; educated at royal school then in charge of American missionaries; married December 19, 1863. Has wife and several children living, neither of whom are in the line of the succession to the throne.

Copies addressed by the legation to Commander Belknap, senior officer present, commanding the U. S. S. *Tuscarora* off Honolulu. One dated February 10, 1874, recommending the retention on board on the 12th instant (the day of election for King) the crews of the *Tuscarora* and *Portsmouth*. Another dated February 16, 1874, conveying my grateful acknowledgments and thanks to him and Commander Skerrett for valuable, discreet, and efficient services performed by the United States forces on the occasion of the riot in this town on the 12th instant, and for their subsequent services. In this connection, I beg leave further to say that the legation and all American citizens here are under deep obligations to Commanders Belknap and Skerrett, their officers and enlisted men and marines, composing the forces that were landed on the 12th instant, for suppressing the riot of that day and for services rendered since in guarding the public buildings and preserving order.

The disposition and handling of the force were admirable, and I observe that officers and men were disposed to use no more violence while suppressing the disturbance than was absolutely necessary to effect the object, and their conduct is deserving of commendation for that as well as in other respects.

At midnight of the 12th instant I received a note signed by King Kalakaua, requesting my presence at the palace at 7 o'clock the ensuing morning. On arrival there I found present His Majesty, Mr. Bishop, minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Wodehouse, British commissioner, and Mr. Ballieu, French commissioner.

Mr. Bishop stated that the object of the meeting was to ascertain whether the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and France then present, respectively, recognized Kalakaua as sovereign of the Hawaiian Kingdom. Each of said representatives replied in the affirmative.

Mr. Bishop then informed us that the King would be sworn into office and inaugurated on that day at 11 o'clock a. m., and he desired our presence on the occasion. The ceremony being hastened as to time, on account of the critical condition of affairs, the installation took place as arranged.

At the request of Mr. Bishop, Mr. Wodehouse, and Mr. Ballieu, I called the same morning on Queen Emma, and by authority of my colleagues and in my own capacity as minister resident of the United States, as well as her friend, said to her that each member of the diplomatic corps had acknowledged David Kalakaua as the King of the

Hawaiian Islands and should hereafter recognize him as such, and we advised her to do the same, for the interests of herself and people and for the preservation of the peace of the Kingdom; that any further opposition to the declared will of the assembly, in regard to the succession to the throne, might result in serious difficulty to her and her supporters; that we recommended her to accept the fact of the legality of Kalakaua's election as King, and to urge her people to likewise do the same, and not to commit any more acts of violence or disorder. Queen Emma listened to my remarks and advice with great attention and respect.

The same day, in the afternoon, she publicly addressed her people and gave them the counsel I had indicated, and also sent a message to the King that she acknowledged him as sovereign of the realm and that her people would do the same. The following morning the King called in person on her, was favorably received, and amicable relations now exist between them and the peace of the kingdom seems restored.

There is a lamentable want of physical strength in the Government to protect itself and foreign residents. The late riot was a natural outgrowth of the mutiny at the barracks last August and the impunity with which the offenders were let off. The weakness of the Government will probably increase, as the military and police force can not be relied on to support the law or to arrest its violation.

Were it not for the serious condition of things emanating from the above-named facts one would be amusingly reminded by the Hawaiian court and Government, their parade paraphernalia, etiquette, and diminutiveness of the nation and absence of strength, of the court and government of Offenbach's Grand Duchess of Germalstine.

Hereafter a United States vessel of war should always be stationed at these islands under a system of reliefs. A time may arrive when the United States Government will find it necessary for the interests of our nation and its resident citizens here to take possession of this country by military occupation.

I am, sir, etc.,

HENRY A. PIERCE.

No. 245.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Honolulu, February 20, 1874.

Hon. HAMILTON FISH,
Secretary of State:

SIR: Herewith inclosed is copy of the correspondence relating to the withdrawal of the United States armed force from this city. The event took place this morning at 6 o'clock, after a stay on shore of nearly eight days. The conduct of the officers and men during the whole period has been of a character entirely unexceptionable and deserving of commendation.

The British force landed from the *Tenedos*, about 70 men and officers, return on board this forenoon.

Since order was restored the King has daily invited two or three of the officers in charge of our force to dine with him; and all, both officers and men, express satisfaction with their treatment while on shore.

Very respectfully,

HENRY A. PIERCE.

Mr. Green to Mr. Pierce.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, February 21, 1874.

SIR: I am commanded by His Majesty the King to thank you in his name and in that of His Majesty's Government, and through you Commander Belknap and Commander Skerrett, of the U. S. S. *Tuscarora* and *Portsmouth*, for the prompt and efficient aid rendered to the local authorities in suppressing the riot in this city on the 12th instant.

The events of that day, unfortunate as they may have been, served to exhibit the feelings of friendship which exist between the two countries and the certainty with which this Government may rely in cases of emergency upon the cordial and disinterested coöperation of the representatives and ships of the United States, as well as those of Her Britannic Majesty.

I have the honor to be, with great respect and high consideration, your excellency's, etc.,

W. L. GREEN.

His Excellency HENRY A. PIERCE,
Minister Resident of the United States.

Mr. Pierce to Mr. Fish.

[Extract.]

No. 291.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, October 12, 1874.

Hon. HAMILTON FISH,

Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.:

SIR:

* * * * *

The English and French commissioners here inform me that they are opposed to the act of King Kalakaua's departure out of his Kingdom, on account of its present political condition. I am, however, of the belief that they are not actuated therein by a real regard for the welfare of this nation, but by a desire to throw obstacles in the way of and prevent if possible closer relations taking place between Hawaii and the United States.

It is not thought probable that the King will extend his tour from the United States to England and France. It is reported that his finances are in a low condition.

Inclosed herewith are two articles, extracted from the *Friend* newspaper, on the subject of reciprocity with the United States and advocating the same.

In view of the best interests of the United States in their relations with these islands, I take the liberty to express the hope that a liberal commercial treaty may soon be inaugurated by the two countries, feeling confident that such act would result to the equal benefit of both nations in a pecuniary sense, and moreover be the means of binding this archipelago to the United States by the chains of self-interest, never to be severed.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

HENRY A. PIERCE.

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS—COMMERCIAL RECIPROCITY.

Convention between the United States of America and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands.

COMMERCIAL RECIPROCITY.

Concluded January 30, 1875.

Ratification advised by Senate March 18, 1875.

Ratified by President May 31, 1875.

Ratified by King April 17, 1875.

Ratifications exchanged at Washington June 3, 1875.

Proclaimed June 3, 1875.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas a convention between the United States of America and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, on the subject of commercial reciprocity, was concluded and signed by their respective plenipotentiaries, at the city of Washington, on the thirtieth day of January, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five, which convention, as amended by the contracting parties, is word for word as follows:

The United States of America and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, equally animated by the desire to strengthen and perpetuate the friendly relations which have heretofore uniformly existed between them, and to consolidate their commercial intercourse, have resolved to enter into a convention for commercial reciprocity. For this purpose the President of the United States has conferred full powers on Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State; and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands has conferred like powers on Honorable Elisha H. Allen, chief justice of the supreme court, chancellor of the Kingdom, member of the privy council of state, His Majesty's envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the United States of America, and Honorable Henry A. P. Carter, member of the privy council of state, His Majesty's special commissioner to the United States of America.

And the said plenipotentiaries, after having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in due form, have agreed to the following articles:

ARTICLE I.

For and in consideration of the rights and privileges granted by His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands in the next succeeding article of this convention, and as an equivalent therefor, the United States of America hereby agree to admit all the articles named in the following schedule, the same being the growth and manufacture or produce of the Hawaiian Islands, into all the ports of the United States free of duty.

SCHEDULE.

Arrowroot; castor oil; bananas, nuts, vegetables, dried and undried, preserved and unpreserved; hides and skins undressed; rice; pulu; seeds, plants, shrubs or trees; muscovado, brown, and all other unre-

fin^d sugar, meaning hereby the grades of sugar heretofore commonly imported from the Hawaiian Islands and now known in the markets of San Francisco and Portland as "Sandwich Island sugar;" syrups of sugar-cane, melado, and molasses; tallow.

ARTICLE II.

For and in consideration of the rights and privileges granted by the United States of America in the preceding article of this convention, and as an equivalent therefor, His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands hereby agrees to admit all the articles named in the following schedule, the same being the growth, manufacture, or produce of the United States of America, into all the ports of the Hawaiian Islands free of duty.

SCHEDULE.

Agricultural implements; animals; beef, bacon, pork, ham, and all fresh, smoked, or preserved meats; boots and shoes; grain, flour, meal, and bran, bread and breadstuffs, of all kinds; bricks, lime, and cement; butter, cheese, lard, tallow; bullion; coal; cordage, naval stores, including tar, pitch, resin, turpentine, raw and rectified; copper and composition sheathing; nails and bolts; cotton and manufactures of cotton, bleached and unbleached, and whether or not colored, stained, painted, or printed; eggs; fish and oysters, and all other creatures living in the water, and the products thereof; fruits, nuts, and vegetables, green, dried or undried, preserved or unpreserved; hardware; hides, furs, skins and pelts, dressed or undressed; hoop iron and rivets, nails, spikes and bolts, tacks, brads or sprigs; ice; iron and steel, and manufactures thereof; leather; lumber and timber of all kinds, round, hewed, sawed, and unmanufactured, in whole or in part; doors, sashes, and blinds; machinery of all kinds, engines and parts thereof; oats and hay; paper, stationery, and books, and all manufactures of paper or of paper and wood; petroleum and all oils for lubricating or illuminating purposes; plants, shrubs, trees, and seeds; rice; sugar, refined or unrefined; salt; soap; shooks, staves, and headings; wool and manufactures of wool, other than ready-made clothing; wagons and carts for the purposes of agriculture or of drayage; wood and manufactures of wood, or of wood and metal, except furniture, either upholstered or carved, and carriages; textile manufactures, made of a combination of wool, cotton, silk, or linen, or of any two or more of them, other than when ready-made clothing; harness and all manufactures of leather; starch; and tobacco, whether in leaf or manufactured.

ARTICLE III.

The evidence that articles proposed to be admitted into the ports of the United States of America, or the ports of the Hawaiian Islands, free of duty, under the first and second articles of this convention, are the growth, manufacture, or produce of the United States of America or of the Hawaiian Islands, respectively, shall be established under such rules and regulations and conditions for the protection of the revenue as the two Governments may from time to time respectively prescribe.

ARTICLE IV.

No export duty or charges shall be imposed in the Hawaiian Islands, or in the United States, upon any of the articles proposed to be admitted into the ports of the United States or the ports of the Hawaiian Islands free of duty under the first and second articles of this convention. It is agreed, on the part of His Hawaiian Majesty, that, so long as this treaty shall remain in force, he will not lease or otherwise dispose of or create any lien upon any port, harbor, or other territory in his dominions, or grant any special privilege or rights of use therein, to any other power, state, or government, nor make any treaty by which any other nation shall obtain the same privileges, relative to the admission of any articles free of duty, hereby secured to the United States.

ARTICLE V.

The present convention shall take effect as soon as it shall have been approved and proclaimed by His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, and shall have been ratified and duly proclaimed on the part of the Government of the United States, but not until a law to carry it into operation shall have been passed by the Congress of the United States of America. Such assent having been given, and the ratifications of the convention having been exchanged as provided in Article VI, the convention shall remain in force for seven years from the date at which it may come into operation; and further, until the expiration of twelve months after either of the high contracting parties shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same, each of the high contracting parties being at liberty to give such notice to the other at the end of the said term of seven years, or at any time thereafter.

ARTICLE VI.

The present convention shall be duly ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at Washington City, within eighteen months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible.

In faith whereof the respective plenipotentiaries of the high contracting parties have signed this present convention, and have affixed thereto their respective seals.

Done in duplicate, at Washington, the thirtieth day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five.

[SEAL.]
[SEAL.]
[SEAL.]

HAMILTON FISH.
ELISHA H. ALLEN.
HENRY A. P. CARTER.

And whereas the said convention, as amended, has been duly ratified on both parts, and the respective ratifications were exchanged in this city on this day:

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Ulysses S. Grant, President of the United States of America, have caused the said convention to be made public, to the end that the same, and every clause and article thereof, may be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States and the citizens thereof.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this third day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five, [SEAL.] and of the Independence of the United States the ninety-ninth.

U. S. GRANT.

By the President:

HAMILTON FISH,
Secretary of State.

1876.

Protocol of a conference between the Acting Secretary of State of the United States and the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, held at Washington on the ninth day of September, 1876.

Whereas it is provided by Article v of the convention between the United States of America and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands concerning commercial reciprocity, signed at Washington on the 30th day of January, 1875, as follows:

“Article V. The present convention shall take effect as soon as it shall have been approved and proclaimed by His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, and shall have been ratified and duly proclaimed on the part of the Government of the United States, but not until the law to carry it into operation shall have been passed by the Congress of the United States of America, such assent having been given, and the ratifications of the convention having been exchanged as provided in Article VI, the convention shall remain in force for seven years from the date at which it may come into operation; and further, until the expiration of twelve months after either of the high contracting parties shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same, each of the high contracting parties being at liberty to give such notice to the other at the end of the said term of seven years, or at any time thereafter.”

And whereas the said convention has been approved and proclaimed by His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands and has been ratified and duly proclaimed on the part of the Government of the United States;

And whereas an act was passed by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled entitled “An act to carry into effect a convention between the United States of America and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, signed on the thirtieth day of January, eighteen hundred and seventy-five,” which was approved on the 15th day of August in the year, 1876;

And whereas an act was passed by the Legislative Assembly of the Hawaiian Islands entitled “An act to carry into effect a Convention between His Majesty the King and the United States of America, signed at Washington on the 30th day of January, 1875,” which was duly approved on the 18th day of July, in the year 1876;

And whereas the ratifications of the said Convention have been exchanged as provided in Article VI.

The undersigned, William Hunter, Acting Secretary of State of the United States of America, and the Honorable Elisha H. Allen, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Chancellor of the Kingdom, Member of the Privy Council of State, and His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and

Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States of America, duly authorized for this purpose by their respective Governments, have met together at Washington, and having found the said convention has been approved and proclaimed by His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands and has been ratified and duly proclaimed on the part of the Government of the United States, and that the laws required to carry the said Treaty into operation have been passed by the Congress of the United States of America on the one part and by the Legislative Assembly of the Hawaiian Islands on the other, hereby declare that the Convention aforesaid concluded between the United States of America and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands on the 30th day of January, 1875, will take effect on the date hereof.

In witness whereof the undersigned have signed this protocol and have hereunto affixed their seals.

Done in duplicate, at Washington, this ninth day of September, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six.

[SEAL.]
[SEAL.]

W. HUNTER.
ELISHA H. ALLEN.

Mr. Evarts to Mr. Comly.

No. 81.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 13, 1880.

SIR: Your No. 117 of the 5th of July last, in reference to the appeal of the Hawaiian Evangelical Association for the moral influence of this Government to support the enforcement of the prohibitory liquor ordinance of Chief Lebon of the Ralik Islands, has had favorable consideration. The wise enactment of that chief requires no argument to justify the earnest support of all governments having intercourse with the islands, and this Government in particular is desirous of seeing its complete and impartial enforcement, inasmuch as one of the reported offenders is unfortunately said to be an American citizen. In view of the absence of a national representative in the Ralik group, and considering also the alleged coparceny of the German consular officer in the traffic which it is so properly sought to restrain, it has been thought that a double result might be reached by informing the German Government of our adhesion to Chief Lebon's edict, and requesting its good offices, through the agency at Jaluit and the superior consulate at Apia, to aid in the impartial and complete enforcement of the law.

While considerations of trade would hardly serve alone to warrant the establishment of a consular station of the United States in the Raliks, it is thought that the moral benefit which would flow from our proper representation in that quarter would justify the steps, if a proper person could be found to accept the position of consular agent under the consulate at Apia. It is regarded as best that the office should pertain to the Samoan scheme for more harmonious correlation with the British and German systems of consular supervision in the Pacific.

Your own good offices in the direction of making such an appointment are desired, to the extent of inquiring of the Rev. Mr. Bingham, who addressed you on the Ralik question, whether he knows of any capable American citizen in the Raliks who would accept the post without salary. Possibly the Mr. J. L. Young who wrote to Mr. Bingham from Jaluit, would be a suitable person, and if he should prove to

be a resident missionary at that place, no better recommendation would be desired.

Mr. Dawson, the consul at Apia, has been instructed in the sense of this dispatch.

I am, etc.,

WM. M. EVARTS.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Comly.

[Confidential.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 1, 1881.

JAMES M. COMLY, Esq., *Honolulu:*

SIR: In my formal instruction of this date I have reviewed the general question of the relationship between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands, and the position of the latter, both as an integral part of the American system and as the key to the commerce of the North Pacific. As that instruction was written for communication to the Hawaiian secretary of state, I touched but lightly on the essential question of the gradual and seemingly inevitable decadence and extinction of the native race and its replacement by another, to which the powers of Government would necessarily descend.

A single glance at the census returns of Hawaii for half a generation past exhibits this alarming diminution of the indigenous element, amounting to $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent per annum of the population. Meanwhile the industrial and productive development of Hawaii is on the increase, and the native classes, never sufficiently numerous to develop the full resources of the islands, have been supplemented by an adventitious labor element, from China mainly, until the rice and sugar fields are largely tilled by aliens. The worst of this state of things is that it must inevitably keep on in increasing ratio, the native classes growing smaller, the insular production larger, and the immigration to supply the want of labor greater every year.

I have shown in a previous instruction how entirely Hawaii is a part of the productive and commercial system of the American States. So far as the staple growths and imports of the islands go, the reciprocity treaty makes them practically members of an American zollverein, an outlying district of the State of California. So far as political structure and independence of action are concerned, Hawaii is as remote from our control as China. This contradiction is only explicable by assuming what is the fact, that thirty years ago, having the choice between material annexation and commercial assimilation of the islands, the United States chose the less responsible alternative. The soundness of the choice, however, entirely depends on the perpetuity of the rule of the native race as an independent government, and that imperiled, the whole framework of our relations to Hawaii is changed, if not destroyed.

The decline of the native Hawaiian element in the presence of newer and sturdier growths must be accepted as an inevitable fact, in view of the teachings of ethnological history. And as retrogression in the development of the Islands can not be admitted without serious detriment to American interests in the North Pacific, the problem of a replenishment of the vital forces of Hawaii presents itself for intelligent solution in an American sense—not in an Asiatic or a British sense.

There is little doubt that were the Hawaiian Islands, by annexation

or district protection, a part of the territory of the Union, their fertile resources for the growth of rice and sugar would not only be controlled by American capital, but so profitable a field of labor would attract intelligent workers thither from the United States.

A purely American form of colonization in such a case would meet all the phases of the problem. Within our borders could be found the capital, the intelligence, the activity, and the necessary labor trained in the rice swamps and cane fields of the Southern States, and it may be well to consider how, even in the chosen alternative of maintaining Hawaiian independence, these prosperous elements could be induced to go from our shores to the islands, not like the coolies, practically enslaved, not as human machines, but as thinking, intelligent, working factors in the advancement of the material interests of the islands.

I desire, therefore, that you will give this subject due attention. An examination and report will be valuable if showing the proportion of occupied rice and sugar lands to the unoccupied and undeveloped territory, the capacities of production, the peculiarities of climate, the wages of labor, and the cost of living. It will also be well for you in conversation with the leading men of Hawaii to turn their thoughts discreetly in the direction of inviting American colonization there. A Hawaiian homestead act for the benefit of actual American settlers, with remission of taxation during the time necessary to establish new plantations on a paying basis, might be in turn supplemented in the United States by voluntarily organized emigration schemes and co-operative aid to bona fide settlers. Throughout the continent, north and south, wherever a foothold is found for American enterprise, it is quickly occupied, and this spirit of adventure, which seeks its outlet in the mines of South America and the railroads of Mexico, would not be slow to avail itself of openings for assured and profitable enterprise even in mid-ocean.

Commending this aspect of the subject to your earnest and immediate attention,

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

Supplementary convention between the United States of America and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, to limit the duration of the convention respecting commercial reciprocity concluded January 30, 1875.

Concluded December 6, 1884; ratification advised by Senate January 20, 1887; ratified by President November 7, 1887; ratified by King October 20, 1887; ratifications exchanged at Washington November 9, 1887; proclaimed November 9, 1887.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas a convention between the United States of America and the Kingdom of the Hawaiian Islands, for the purpose of definitely limiting the duration of the convention concerning commercial reciprocity concluded between the same high contracting parties on the

thirtieth day of January, 1875, was concluded and signed by their respective plenipotentiaries at the city of Washington, on the sixth day of December, in the year of our Lord 1884, which convention, as amended by the Senate of the United States and being in the English language, is word for word as follows:

Supplementary convention to limit the duration of the convention respecting commercial reciprocity between the United States of America and the Hawaiian Kingdom, concluded January 30, 1875.

Whereas a convention was concluded between the United States of America and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, on the thirtieth day of January, 1875, concerning commercial reciprocity, which by the fifth article thereof was to continue in force for seven years from the date after it was to come into operation, and further, until the expiration of twelve months after either of the high contracting parties should give notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same; and

Whereas the high contracting parties consider that the increase and consolidation of their mutual commercial interests would be better promoted by the definite limitation of the duration of the said convention:

Therefore, the President of the United States of America and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands have appointed:

The President of the United States of America, Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, Secretary of State; and

His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, Henry A. P. Carter, accredited to the Government of the United States, as His Majesty's envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary;

Who, having exchanged their respective powers, which were found sufficient and in due form, have agreed upon the following articles:

ARTICLE I.

The high contracting parties agree, that the time fixed for the duration of the said convention, shall be definitely extended for a term of seven years from the date of the exchange of ratifications hereof, and further, until the expiration of twelve months after either of the high contracting parties shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same, each of the high contracting parties being at liberty to give such notice to the other at the end of the said term of seven years or at any time thereafter.

ARTICLE II.

His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands grants to the Government of the United States the exclusive right to enter the harbor of Pearl River, in the island of Oahu, and to establish and maintain there a coaling and repair station for the use of vessels of the United States, and to that end the United States may improve the entrance to said harbor and do all other things needful to the purpose aforesaid.

ARTICLE III.

The present convention shall be ratified and the ratifications exchanged at Washington as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the

present convention in duplicate, and have hereunto affixed their respective seals.

Done at the city of Washington the 6th day of December, in the year of our Lord 1884.

FREDK. T. FRELINGHUYSEN. [L. S.]
HENRY A. P. CARTER. [L. S.]

And whereas the said convention, as amended, has been duly ratified on both parts, and the respective ratifications of the same have been exchanged.

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Grover Cleveland, President of the United States of America, have caused the said convention to be made public to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof, as amended, may be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States and the citizens thereof.

In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this ninth day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-seven, and of the Independence of the United States the one hundred and [SEAL.] twelfth.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

By the President:

T. F. BAYARD,
Secretary of State.

Parcels Post Convention between the United States of America and the Hawaiian Kingdom.

For the purpose of making better postal arrangements between the United States of America and the Hawaiian Kingdom, the undersigned, Don M. Dickinson, Postmaster-General of the United States of America, and H. A. P. Carter, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the Hawaiian Kingdom at Washington, by virtue of authority vested in them by law, have agreed upon the following articles for the establishment of a parcels post system of exchanges between the two countries.

ARTICLE I.

The provisions of this convention relate only to parcels of mail matter to be exchanged by the system herein provided for, and do not affect the arrangements now existing under the Universal Postal Union Convention, which will continue as heretofore; and all the agreements hereinafter contained apply exclusively to mails exchanged under these articles, *directly* between the office of San Francisco, in the State of California, and such other offices within the United States as may be hereafter designated by the Postmaster-General of the United States, and the office of Honolulu, in the island of Oahu, and such other offices within the Hawaiian Islands as may be hereafter designated by the postmaster-general of the Hawaiian Kingdom; such matter to be admitted to the mails under these articles as shall be sent through such exchange offices from any place in either country to any place in the other.

ARTICLE II.

1. There shall be admitted to the mails exchanged under this convention, articles of merchandise and mail matter, except letters, post cards, and written matter, of all kinds, that are admitted under any conditions to the domestic mails of the country of origin, except that no packet must exceed 5 kilograms or 11 pounds in weight, nor the following dimensions: Greatest length, three feet six inches; greatest length and girth combined, six feet; and must be so wrapped or inclosed as to permit their contents to be easily examined by postmasters and customs officers; and except that the following articles are prohibited:

Publications which violate the copyright laws of the country of destination; poisons, and explosive or inflammable substances; fatty substances, liquids, and those which easily liquefy, confections and pastes; live or dead animals, except dead insects and reptiles when thoroughly dried; fruits and vegetables, and substances which exhale a bad odor; lottery tickets, lottery advertisements, or lottery circulars; all obscene or immoral articles; articles which may in any way damage or destroy the mails, or injure the persons handling them; also opium.

2. All admissible articles of merchandise mailed in one country for the other, or received in one country from the other, shall be free from any detention or inspection whatever, except such as is required for collection of customs duties, and shall be forwarded by the most speedy means to their destination, being subject in their transmission to the laws and regulations of each country respectively.

ARTICLE III.

1. A letter or communication of the nature of personal correspondence must not accompany, be written on, or enclosed with any parcel.

2. If such be found, the letter will be placed in the mails if separable, and if inseparably attached, the whole package will be rejected. If, however, any such should inadvertently be forwarded, the country of destination will collect double rates of postage according to the Universal Postal Union Convention.

3. No parcel may contain parcels intended for delivery at an address other than the one borne by the parcel itself. If such enclosed parcels be detected, they must be sent forward singly, charged with new and distinct parcel post rates.

ARTICLE IV.

1. The following rates of postage shall in all cases be required to be fully prepaid with postage stamps of the country of origin, viz:

2. For a parcel not exceeding four hundred and sixty grams or one pound in weight, twelve cents; and for each additional four hundred and sixty grams or one pound, or fraction thereof, twelve cents.

3. The packages shall be promptly delivered to addresses at the post-offices of address in the country of destination, free of charge for postage; but the country of destination may at its option, levy and collect from the addressee for interior service and delivery a charge not exceeding five cents on each single parcel of whatever weight; and if the weight exceeds four hundred and sixty grams or one pound, a charge equal to one cent for each one hundred and fifteen grams or four ounces, of weight, or fraction thereof.

ARTICLE V.

1. The sender will, at the time of mailing the package, receive a receipt of mailing from the post-office where the package is mailed on a form like Model I annexed hereto.

2. The sender of a package may have the same registered by paying the registration fee required for registered articles in the country of origin.

3. An acknowledgment of the delivery of a registered article shall be returned to the sender when requested, but either country may require of the sender prepayment of a fee therefor not exceeding five cents.

4. The addressees of registered articles shall be advised of the arrival of a package addressed to them, by a notice from the post office of destination.

ARTICLE VI.

1. The sender of each package shall make a customs declaration, pasted upon or attached to the package, upon a special form provided for the purpose (see Model 2 annexed hereto) giving a general description of the parcel, an accurate statement of the contents and value, date of mailing, and the sender's signature and place of residence, and place of address.

2. The packages in question shall be subject in the country of destination to all customs duties and all customs regulations in force in that country for the protection of its customs revenues; and the customs duties properly chargeable thereon shall be collected on delivery, in accordance with the customs regulations of the country of destination.

ARTICLE VII.

Each country shall retain to its own use the whole of the postages, registration, and delivery fees it collects on said packages; consequently, this convention will give rise to no separate accounts between the two countries.

ARTICLE VIII.

1. The packages shall be considered as a component part of the mails exchanged direct between the United States of America and the Hawaiian Kingdom, to be despatched by the country of origin to the other at its cost and by such means as it provides, in boxes prepared expressly for the purpose, or ordinary mail sacks, to be marked "Parcels post," and to be securely sealed with wax or otherwise, as may be mutually provided by regulations hereunder.

2. Each country shall return to the despatching office by next mail all bags, boxes, or sacks used in the exchange of parcels.

3. Although articles admitted under this convention will be transmitted as aforesaid between the exchange offices, they should be so carefully packed as to be safely transmitted in the open mails of either country, both in going to the exchange office in the country of origin and to the office of address in the country of destination.

4. Each despatch of a parcel post mail must be accompanied by a descriptive list in duplicate of all the packages sent, showing distinctly the list number of each parcel, the name of the sender, the

name of the addressee, with address of destination, and must be enclosed in one of the boxes or sacks of such despatch under the form of Model 3, annexed hereto.

ARTICLE IX.

Exchanges of mails under this convention from any place in either country to any place in the other shall be effected through the post-offices of both countries already designated as exchange post-offices, or through such others as may be hereafter agreed upon, under such regulations relative to the details of the exchanges, as may be mutually determined to be essential to the security and expedition of the mails and the protection of the customs revenues.

ARTICLE X.

1. As soon as the mail shall have reached the exchange office of destination that office shall check the contents of the mails.

2. In the event of the parcel bill not having been received a substitute should at once be prepared.

3. Any errors in the entries on the parcel bill which may be discovered shall, after verification by a second officer, be corrected and noted for report to the despatching office on a form, "verification certificate," which shall be sent in the special envelope.

4. If a parcel advised on the bill be not received, after the non-receipt has been verified by a second officer, the entry on the bill should be canceled and the fact reported at once.

5. Should a parcel be received in a damaged or imperfect condition full particulars shall be reported on the same form.

6. If no verification certificate or note of error be received a parcel mail shall be considered as duly delivered, having been found on examination correct in all respects.

ARTICLE XI.

If a package can not be delivered as addressed, or is refused, the sender will be communicated with through the central administration of the office of destination as to the manner in which he desires the package to be disposed of, and if no reply is received from him within a period of three months from the date of the notice, the package may be sold for the benefit of whom it may concern.

An order for redirection or reforwarding must be accompanied by the amount due for postage necessary for the return of the article to the office of origin, at the ordinary parcel rates.

When the contents of a parcel which can not be delivered are liable to deterioration or corruption, they may be destroyed at once, if necessary, or if expedient, sold, without previous notice or judicial formality, for the benefit of the right person, the particulars of each sale being noticed by one post-office to the other.

ARTICLE XII.

The Post-Office Department of either of the contracting countries will not be responsible for the loss or damage of any package, and no indemnity can consequently be claimed by the sender or addressee in either country.

ARTICLE XIII.

The Postmaster-General of the United States of America and the postmaster-general of the Hawaiian Kingdom shall have authority to jointly make such further regulations of order and detail as may be found necessary to carry out the present convention from time to time; and may by agreement prescribe conditions for the admission to the mails of any of the articles prohibited by Article II of this convention

ARTICLE XIV.

This Convention shall be ratified by the contracting countries in accordance with their respective laws, and its ratifications shall be exchanged at the City of Washington as early as possible. Once ratified, and its ratifications exchanged, it shall take effect, and operations thereunder shall begin on the 1st day of March, 1889, and shall continue in force until terminated by mutual agreement, but may be annulled at the desire of either Department upon six months previous notice given to the other.

Done in duplicate, and signed at Washington the 19th day of December, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-eight.

[SEAL.]

DON M. DICKINSON,

Postmaster-General of the United States of America.

[SEAL.]

H. A. P. CARTER,

*Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
of the Hawaiian Kingdom.*

The foregoing Parcels Post Convention between the United States of America and the Hawaiian Kingdom has been negotiated and concluded with my advice and consent, and is hereby approved and ratified.

In testimony whereof I have caused the Great Seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed.

[SEAL.]

GROVER CLEVELAND.

By the President:

T. F. BAYARD,

Secretary of State.

WASHINGTON, D. C., January 29, 1889.

The foregoing Parcels Post Convention between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States of America has been negotiated and concluded with my advice and consent, and is hereby approved and ratified.

In testimony whereof I have caused the Great Seal of the Hawaiian Kingdom to be hereunto affixed.

[SEAL.]

KALAKAUA, REX.

By the King:

JONA. AUSTIN,

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

HONOLULU, January 10, 1889.

FORM No. 3.

Date stamp of the United States post- office.	<i>Parcels from the United States for Hawaii.</i>	Date stamp of the Hawaiian post-office.
	Parcel Bill No....., dated..... 18..; by "S. S....."	
* Sheet No.....		

Entry No.	Origin of parcel.	Name of addressee.	Address of parcel.	Remarks.

When more than one sheet is required for the entry of the parcels sent by the mail, it will be sufficient if the undermentioned particulars are entered on the last sheet of the parcel bill.

lbs.

* Total number of parcels sent by the mail to Hawaii	* Total weight of mail
* Number of boxes or other receptacles forming the mail.....	* Deduct weight of receptacles.....

Signature of dispatching officer at the United States post-office.....	Net weight of parcels.....
---	----------------------------

Signature of receiving officer at Hawaiian post-office.

Mr. Merrill to Mr. Blaine.

No. 255.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, August 1, 1889.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose a very full account, from the "Bulletin" of Honolulu, of an attempt made on the 30th ultimo, by about 100 half-castes and natives, under the leadership of Robert W. Wilcox and Robert Boyd, two half-caste Hawaiians, to overthrow the present Government of Hawaii and depose the King.

This is supposed to be their purpose, although their exact intention is not yet fully known.

About 6 o'clock a. m. a message from the King informed me that an armed party, led by Mr. Wilcox, was in possession of the palace

grounds, and soon thereafter it was learned that insurgents were in charge of the building containing the Government offices.

As soon as possible I had communication with Commander Woodward of the U. S. S. *Adams*, and at once all necessary preparations were made to land a force, if found necessary for protection of the people and property interests.

Soon thereafter I met His Majesty's minister of foreign affairs, who informed me that a cabinet council would be held forthwith.

Soon after the news of the affair became generally known, the British, Portuguese, and French commissioners called at the legation, and while comparing information regarding the situation, Mr. Damon, the newly appointed minister of finance, arrived and stated that it was the desire of His Majesty's ministers to meet the foreign representatives at once. It was deemed advisable to comply with this request without delay. On meeting the ministers they stated that they desired to fully inform us of their contemplated action in the present emergency, and that they had determined to occupy the tops of the buildings commanding a view of the palace grounds, with sharpshooters, for the purpose of preventing the use of the cannon which were known to be in the possession of the insurgents inside the walls inclosing the palace grounds, gradually surround and finally dislodge them with other forces.

After learning the intention of the Government to operate at once with an armed force, I suggested the propriety of Mr. Damon, one of the members of the cabinet who speaks the native language, endeavoring to communicate with Mr. Wilcox, the leader of the insurgents, and ascertain, if possible, the cause of his action and what his demands were, if any; then if Mr. Damon failed, that the representatives of foreign powers endeavor to obtain an interview with Wilcox, and by their good offices effect a peaceful settlement if possible.

This was cordially agreed to by all and the representatives withdrew with the understanding that Mr. Damon would inform us of the result of his mission. In about one-half hour Mr. Damon reported to me at the legation that Mr. Wilcox refused to receive any communication from him whatever, and that while he was seeking to communicate with him firing commenced; he deemed it not only imprudent, but suicidal for anyone to attempt to approach the palace grounds on a peace mission.

At this juncture, as the report of small arms and cannon came from the palace grounds and immediate vicinity quite rapidly, and as many with alarm were coming to the legation, I at once requested Commander Woodward to send to the legation a body of marines, which request he promptly complied with.

The appearance of the marines on the streets and at the legation had a very favorable effect on the populace. Soon the report of the large guns ceased by reason of the inability of the insurgents to operate them in the presence of the fire of the sharpshooters on the tops of the surrounding buildings.

The "bungalow" mentioned in the newspaper account and into which the insurgents retreated is a frame building situated in the corner of the palace grounds sometimes used by the King as a dwelling and for offices.

The palace square comprises about 4 acres, situate two blocks from the central business part of the city, and is entirely inclosed by a concrete wall about 8 feet high, while the King's palace is situated in the center of the square.

In the afternoon, and as soon as I ascertained from one of the cabinet ministers that an attempt would be made to dislodge the insurgents from the "bungalow" before dark by the use of dynamite, and as there were large crowds of people congregated on the streets, I deemed it advisable to ask for the landing of the remainder of the forces from the *Adams* before dark as a precautionary measure in the event any assistance to preserve order might be required, and to be immediately available in the event a conflagration should start. In this matter Commander Woodward fully agreed, and by permission of the minister of foreign affairs the forces landed about 5 o'clock p. m. Early the following morning all the men belonging to the *Adams* returned to the ship.

The members of the cabinet and many prominent residents expressed much commendation of the prompt landing of the men, and remarked upon the very salutary effect their presence seemed to have among the people on the streets.

The U. S. S. *Adams* was the only naval vessel in port. The British ship *Espiegle* recently left under sealed orders on a cruise south.

This disturbance at this time was wholly unexpected by the Government officials as well as nearly every permanent resident.

Although for several weeks it was known that Wilcox was endeavoring to draw around him as many disappointed native political aspirants as possible, yet it was recently ascertained on what seemed very reliable authority that no overt acts would be committed prior to the next general election in February, when it was thought the present ministers would be defeated at the polls.

However, the success of the Government in subduing the insurgents, it is thought, will draw some to its support, and the general feeling is that the Government will be strengthened by the result of the conflict.

Immediately after the surrender of the insurgents the city was quiet and still remains so, while business is being transacted as usual. As to the exact number of the insurgents it is difficult now to determine, as some deserted in the early morning. About 80 prisoners were secured. No serious casualties occurred except to the insurgents.

In order that you may be promptly informed of the principal facts a week in advance of the regular mail, I will forward by the steamer leaving here to-morrow a telegram, to be wired from San Francisco, of which the following is a copy:

On July 30 unsuccessful attempt by about one hundred half-castes and natives to overthrow Government and depose King. Insurrection suppressed by Hawaiian Government without foreign aid. Six insurgents killed, 12 wounded. Order restored same day. Men from U. S. S. *Adams* landed by permission, to protect lives and property if found necessary; afterwards returned to ship.

Before sealing this dispatch I shall inclose clippings from newspapers giving latest intelligence, but will be unable to properly paste and arrange them.

Trusting my action may merit the approval of the Department,
I have the honor, etc.,

GEO. W. MERRILL.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 46.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 8, 1892.

SIR: The semiannual election of members of the Hawaiian legislature took place February 3, after several weeks of exciting canvass. The principal issue on the part of the business men and more conservative and responsible citizens was in respect of treaty relations with the United States. These supporters of the proposed new treaty which they believe has been negotiated at Washington had the approval of the principal Government officials, though the cabinet is far from being vigorous and influential. The opposition, or Liberals, as they term themselves, composed mostly of the irresponsible white voters, half-castes, and of a large majority of the native Hawaiians, pushed their canvass on three lines—a new constitution, opposition to the present cabinet, and hostility to the proposed treaty, though it finally hedged and disclaimed more or less in regard to the last.

These so-called Liberals were led by Wilcox, the half-caste who was at the head of the revolutionary outbreak in July, 1887, and by C. W. Ashford, the Canadian member of the cabinet, who betrayed and deserted his associates when Minister Carter was trying to negotiate a new treaty in 1889. This Ashford has some ability, any amount of audacity, and is utterly without scruples, and has done his utmost to influence the prejudices and passions of the native Hawaiians. Both he and Wilcox secured their election as representatives from this island. The legislature is composed of 48 members, one-half being nobles elected by property holding or income voters. The Conservatives and friends of the treaty have secured most all of the nobles and enough of the representatives to give them a decisive majority, sufficient, it is thought, to secure the approval of the treaty, even with the Pearl Harbor grant in perpetuity. Not improbably there may be a change of cabinet when the legislature assembles in May.

There are increasing indications that the annexation sentiment is growing among the business men as well as with the less responsible of the foreign and native population of the islands. The present political situation is feverish, and I see no prospect of its being permanently otherwise until these islands become a part of the American Union or a possession of Great Britain. The intelligent and responsible men here, unaided by outside support, are too few in numbers to control in political affairs and to secure good government. There are indications that even the "Liberals," just beaten at the election, though composed of a majority of the popular vote, are about to declare for annexation, at least their leaders, their chief newspaper having already published editorials to this effect. At a future time, after the proposed treaty shall have been ratified, I shall deem it my official duty to give a more elaborate statement of facts and reasons why a "new departure" by the United States as to Hawaii is rapidly becoming a necessity, that a "protectorate" is impracticable, and that annexation must be the future remedy, or else Great Britain will be furnished with circumstances and opportunity to get a hold on these islands which will cause future serious embarrassment to the United States.

At this time there seems to be no immediate prospect of its being safe to have the harbor of Honolulu left without an American vessel of war. Last week a British gunboat arrived here, and it is said will remain here for an indefinite period.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Sterens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 48.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, March 8, 1892.

SIR: In view of possible contingencies in these islands, I ask for the instructions of the Department of State on the following, viz:

If the Government here should be surprised and overturned by an orderly and peaceful revolutionary movement, largely of native Hawaiians and a provisional or republican government organized and proclaimed, would the United States minister and naval commander here be justified in responding affirmatively to the call of the members of the removed Government to restore them to power or replace them in possession of the Government buildings? Or should the United States minister and naval commander confine themselves exclusively to the preservation of American property, the protection of American citizens, and the prevention of anarchy? Should a revolutionary attempt of the character indicated be made, there are strong reasons to presume that it would begin with the seizure of the police station, with its arms and ammunition, and this accomplished, the Royal Palace and the Government building, containing the cabinet offices and archives, would very soon be captured, the latter building being situated about one-third of a mile from the police station. In such contingencies would it be justifiable to use the United States forces here to restore the Government buildings to the possession of the displaced officials? Ordinarily in like circumstances the rule seems to be to limit the landing and movement of the United States force in foreign waters and dominion exclusively to the protection of the United States legation, and of the lives and property of American citizens. But as the relations of the United States to Hawaii are exceptional, and in former years the United States officials here took somewhat exceptional action in circumstances of disorder, I desire to know how far the present minister and naval commander may deviate from established international rules and precedents in the contingencies indicated in the first part of this dispatch.

I have information which I deem reliable that there is an organized revolutionary party on the islands, composed largely of native Hawaiians and a considerable number of whites and half whites, led chiefly by individuals of the latter two classes. This party is hostile to the Queen and to her chief confidants, especially opposed to the coming to the throne of the half-English heir apparent, now being educated in England, and means to gain its object either by forcing the Queen to select her cabinet from its own members, or else to overthrow the monarchy and establish a republic with the ultimate view of annexation to the United States of the whole islands. A portion of this party mean only the former, and the other portion intend the latter. Failing to accomplish the former, the most of the party would seek the latter alternative. I have little doubt the revolutionary attempt would have been made ere this but for the presence here of the United States ship-of-war. I still incline to the opinion that the revolutionary attempt will not be made so long as there is a United States force in the harbor of Honolulu, but it would be rash to assume or assert this positively. Therefore I deem it my official duty to ask for instructions in view of possible contingencies.

I may add that the annexation sentiment is increasing, quite as much among the white residents and native Hawaiians, and other workingmen who own no sugar stock, as with the sugar planters.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN S. STEVENS.

Admiral Brown to the Secretary of the Navy.

Copy No. 275.] UNITED STATES CRUISER SAN FRANCISCO,
FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
San Francisco, Cal., September 6, 1892.

HON. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C. :

SIR: At the time this ship sailed from Honolulu, on the 27th ultimo, everything was extremely quiet.

There is a strong sentiment existing in Hawaii, among the native Hawaiians as well as among the Americans and Germans, in favor of a change in the form of government, looking toward the ultimate annexation of the islands to the United States.

This subject of annexation has been freely discussed by individuals for a long time, but until very recently there has been no combined concert of action. There now exists in Honolulu an organization comprising the most prominent annexationists, which has for its object the formulation of some plan by which a change of government can be affected quietly, and with the consent and coöperation of the Queen and the members of her cabinet and staff.

It is thought that the Queen will consent to abdicate in favor of a republican form of government if she can be assured that a suitable provision will be made for her in the way of a permanent pecuniary settlement.

The organization I refer to will not countenance anything of a revolutionary character in the way of force, but expects to be aided by the majority of the Hawaiians who now favor annexation without having any ideas of how such an event can be reached.

A change in the present cabinet will certainly be made before the present legislature adjourns. There is trouble in obtaining a new cabinet, because the reform parties can not agree on the men to go into the different positions. The liberal party is in the majority, and will not be allowed to have any voice in the question of the new ministry.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. BROWN,
*Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.*

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

[Confidential.]

No. 65.] UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, September 14, 1892.

SIR: In my dispatch, No. 64, of September 9, I expressed the hope that I would be able to send the information by this mail that a new Hawaiian cabinet had been formed to take the place of the one so emphatically voted out by the legislature, but the deadlock between the Queen and the legislature continues. She has announced a new cabinet, but it is so unsatisfactory to the legislative majority and the business men of the islands that it will undoubtedly be rejected to-day; but the vote will not be taken in time to send the information of the fact by this mail, which closes at 11 a. m. The Tahitian half-caste fa-

vorite of the Queen, the marshal of the little kingdom, and his band of adventurers, still dominate the palace and defy the responsible men of the legislature and the islands. An associate of the half-caste favorite is an American renegade by the name of Whaley, a disgraced and expelled San Francisco custom-house official, now at the head of the "opium ring," and one of the supposed owners of the *Halcyon*, the notorious smuggling schooner which flits between these islands and British Columbia. This man Whaley has more brain than the Tahitian favorite.

The better portion of the English residents are in substantial accord with the principal Americans in support of the legislature, and the chief German commercial houses and influential German residents are in full agreement with the Americans; but more or less of the English are so jealous of the strong American sentiment in the legislature that they support the Queen and the Tahitian favorite openly or covertly. The native Hawaiians, composing half of the legislature, are about equally divided. The unscrupulous adventurers of different nationalities—Americans, English, and Germans, without character, and most of them without property—are with the half-caste Tahitian favorite and the Queen. A majority of the legislature and the best citizens of the islands are exercising remarkable forbearance and self-control.

It is proper for me to say that just at this time Mr. Mott Smith, the present minister at Washington, is likely to be misinformed as to the real condition of things, for the rejected minister of foreign affairs, a native Hawaiian, of the Queen's supporters, still occupies the foreign office, and the American deputy would hardly dare to send any advices to Minister Smith not indorsed by the acting head of the department.

The U. S. S. *Boston* is in the harbor, and Capt. Wiltse will cooperate with me in exercising careful circumspection. In about twelve days from this I can send another dispatch.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Capt. Wiltse to the Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. S. BOSTON (SECOND RATE),
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, October 12, 1892.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.:

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 14th of September the introduction in the Hawaiian legislature of a want of confidence resolution in the new ministry resulted in a vote of 24 to 21 in favor of the resolution.

The opposition claimed that the resolution had passed, but the ministry declared it required a vote of 25 to pass, and the chair sustained them. As the question hinged on an interpretation of the constitution, the matter was referred to the supreme court, which decided in favor of the ministry.

On October 4 an election was held to fill the vacant seats of two members. The ministerial party raised the cry of anti-annexation and were ardently supported by the British and other foreigners. Unwarranted attacks were made (in my opinion for political purposes) up

on the United States representatives by anonymous writers in the official organ of the Government. The election resulted in a victory for the ministry.

The British representatives manifest the most unusual interest, publicly, in all political proceedings. The action of the ministry, with possibly one exception, and of the English element, is plainly in opposition to the United States.

There is a large and growing sentiment, particularly among the planters, in favor of annexation to the United States, but I am informed that the leaders do not think an opportune moment will arrive for some time to come. However, everything seems to point toward an eventual request for annexation.

The political situation at present is more quiet and will probably remain so until another resolution of want of confidence is passed, which is not likely in the immediate future.

The financial question is the most important question to be met by the ministry.

Very respectfully,

G. C. WILTSE,
Captain, Commanding.

Capt. Wiltse to the Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. S. BOSTON (SECOND RATE),
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, October 20, 1892.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.:

SIR: I have the honor to report that, since my last letter, on Monday, October 17, a want of confidence resolution was unexpectedly introduced and passed by a vote of 31 to 15, forcing the ministry to resign.

The political situation is still unsettled.

It is thought that the names of the new cabinet will be sent to the legislature by Monday next, October 24. If the new ministry is acceptable to the majority, legislation will be resumed and affairs become more settled. If, however, the Queen persists in consulting only her own inclination, regardless of the wishes of the opposition, which is a large majority, it is difficult to predict what will be the outcome.

I inclose a paper giving an account of the proceedings, etc., when the want of confidence resolution was introduced.

Very respectfully,

G. C. WILTSE,
Captain, Commanding.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

[Confidential.]

No. 72.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, October 31, 1892.

SIR: In dispatch 71 of October 19 I gave account of the rejection of the new cabinet appointed by the Queen in defiance of a previously expressed majority of the legislature. The deadlock continues. Though two weeks have elapsed since the decisive action of the legis-

lature no ministers have been designated to fill the vacancies. The Tahitian favorite and the Queen still refuse to take the legislative majority and the leading business men of the islands into their confidence. The palace is still thronged and surrounded by the worst elements, and the responsible citizens feel that they are not welcomed as advisors. The Queen and the Tahitian have made several new ministerial slates with one responsible man and three of the other kind; but no responsible man, so far, can be found who will go into the cabinet with the three whom only a minority of the legislature will accept.

Thus there is here, on a small scale, the old historic issue between autocracy and parliamentary responsibility. The foreign adventurers and renegades stand by the Tahitian favorite because he is the instrument which they can use, and he adheres to them because he needs their support. In the meantime the legislature is unable to do business and has been in session only a few hours for several weeks. If that body holds firm, the Queen will have to yield, and a responsible minority would probably be the result. The ultra-English influence is strongly with the half-English Tahitian favorite and the Queen, for the one reason only, that the success of the legislative majority would be the appointment of a cabinet strongly American in sympathy and purpose. There are strong reasons for the belief that were it not for the presence of the American naval force in the harbor the Tahitian marshal and his gang would induce the Queen to attempt a coup d'etat by proclaiming a new constitution, taking from the legislature the power to reject ministerial appointments.

The recent arrival here from England of T. H. Davies, the head of a strong English house in Honolulu, formerly a resident here for many years, has served to intensify the ultra-English feeling and to strengthen the American sentiment. This T. H. Davies having made himself rich under the sugar provisions of the reciprocity treaty, now resides in England and has a kind of supervisory care of the half-white Hawaiian crown princess, for several years and still at school in England. When a resident here at the time the Pearl Harbor provision was pending, Davies strongly opposed that provision. He comes now with revived zeal against the Pearl Harbor concession. It is not thought that he has any encouragement to this course from the home Government of England, but that his course is his own, and that his zeal is increased by the Canadian Pacific Railroad managers, of whom Davies is the agent. The desperate efforts of that road to save itself embrace the scheme of a cable, and Pacific steamer lines to Australia and China, including the design of antagonizing the interests of the United States in these islands. This involves the plan of controlling the Hawaiian monarchy through the present Queen and her favorite, and especially by the having in hand the crown princess, the general belief being that the present Queen will not live many years. Davies, who has this supervising care of the crown princess in England, is a tory. Of course these facts, so apparent to intelligent observers here, are telling on all friends of the United States.

The other of the two principal English commercial houses here, older and nearly as wealthy as those of Davies & Co., is thoroughly Americanized and stands firmly against the efforts of T. H. Davies, and is for the United States on every issue. This house owns several hundreds of thousands (of dollars worth?) of property in Iowa and California, its head being father-in-law of Gen. Dimond, the head of the United States mint in San Francisco.

Perhaps it is well to state that it is the rumor here that the last rejected cabinet, only holding their places until others are appointed, have sent a dispatch to Washington asking the recall of Consul-General Severance. I do not credit this rumor. But influential parties have called at this legation who say that if any such step has been taken by this rejected cabinet, the American merchants and business men, as well as other leading citizens, will send a strong memorial to the Department of State against any such action of a dead ministry. I have not encouraged any such action in our behalf, believing it to be unnecessary. So far I am supported here by all the responsible Americans and others to a degree more than I had the right to expect. This so much the more impresses on me the necessity of prudence as well as of firmness. To keep the Department of State well informed as to affairs here, I deem it well to give these particulars.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[Later.]

NOVEMBER 1, 1892.

Names of the new cabinet sent to the legislature this morning. Resolution of "want of confidence" passed in one house, and thirty minutes after the names of the new ministry were read, and only 13 votes out of 48 members of whom the legislature is composed were in their favor. The strongest objections are to the minister of foreign affairs and to the minister of finance—Joseph Mamohi and William H. Cornwell—both of them unqualified and very unacceptable to the more responsible men of all nationalities. As they will assume to hold their places until their successors shall have been appointed, they may attempt to do some strange things. As Cornwell, for some reason, is hostile to the American minister and to the consul-general, would not be surprised should he induce his associates to ask for our recall. Possibly they may hold their places one week, as the legislature has adjourned for six days to allow the Queen time to select their successors.

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Capt. Wiltse to the Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. S. BOSTON (SECOND RATE),
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 1, 1892.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.:

SIR: Respecting the state of political affairs in the Hawaiian Kingdom, I have the honor to report that, after much delay, a cabinet was sent to the legislature to-day and was immediately voted out by a vote of 26 to 13.

The legislature then adjourned until November 7, having yesterday refused to pass appropriation bills for the running expenses of the Government. Meanwhile the salaries of all officials are overdue and must

remain unpaid until the legislature appropriates the money according to law.

The Queen persists in refusing to appoint a cabinet in conformity with the wishes of the majority, and it is possible that her obstinacy may precipitate a crisis.

Very respectfully,

G. C. WILTSE,
Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S. Boston.

Capt. Wiltse to the Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. S. BOSTON (SECOND RATE),
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 9, 1892.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.:

SIR: I have the honor to report that the danger of a political crisis in the Hawaiian Kingdom seems to have passed.

The Queen has appointed a cabinet, after much pressure had been brought to bear, that is strong financially and favorable to American interests. The new ministry will probably be supported by the legislature, although much opposition has been aroused among the native members because they are not represented. It is doubtful, however, if the natives can secure enough votes to vote the cabinet out, though they would do so if possible.

I am informed, from reliable sources, that the Queen had been strongly advised to dissolve the legislature and order a new election, which would have been unconstitutional, and which would probably have caused a revolution; but she was deterred by the presence of United States vessels of war.

I inclose paper containing editorials on the situation.

Very respectfully,

G. C. WILTSE,
Captain, Commanding U. S. S. Boston.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

[Confidential.]

No. 74.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, November 20, 1892.

SIR: Fidelity to the trust imposed on me by the President, the Department of State, and the Senate, requires that I should make a careful and full statement of the financial, agricultural, social, and political condition of these islands. An intelligent and impartial examination of the facts can hardly fail to lead to the conclusion that the relations and policy of the United States toward Hawaii will soon demand some change, if not the adoption of decisive measures, with the aim to secure American interests and future supremacy by encouraging Hawaiian development and aiding to promote responsible government in these islands. It is unnecessary for me to allude to the deep interest and the settled policy of the United States Government in re-

spect of these islands, from the official days of John Quincy Adams and of Daniel Webster to the present time. In all that period, we have avowed the superiority of our interests to those of all other nations, and have always refused to embarrass our freedom of action by any alliance or arrangement with other powers as to the ultimate possession and government of the islands. Before stating the present political condition of the little kingdom, it is well to review the substantial data as to its area, its resources, its financial and business condition, its capabilities of material development, its population, the status of its landed property, its government, revenues, and expenditures, etc.

PHYSICAL DIMENSIONS.

The total area of the kingdom is about 6,000 square miles. Not including several small islands of little importance, the chief value of the land area is in the six islands of Oahu, Kauai, Maui, Molokai, Lanai, and Hawaii, the last named being nearly the size of all the rest of the group. The plains, valleys, and lowlands are fertile, while the highlands are adapted to the raising of extensive herds of cattle, horses, and sheep. The arable lands are adapted to the production of sugar, coffee, rice, bananas, oranges, lemons, pineapples, grapes and maize. Of the arable lands only such as are fitted for the production of sugar and rice have been much brought into use. The coffee raised is of superior quality, and finds ready market for home consumption and in San Francisco. There is no doubt that this product can be greatly extended. This opinion is sustained by the examination of experts and has been verified by successful results in coffee-raising, to which there is now being given special attention.

The banana culture can be greatly extended, and the opportunities for the production of oranges are large and promising. Ripening at a time in the year different from those of southern California, the Hawaiian oranges can find a ready market in San Francisco, and especially in the cities of Oregon and Washington, where the islands procure most of their lumber for buildings and fences, and from which they procure coal, the consumption of which will necessarily increase for use in the sugar mills and the supply of steamers. For a quarter of a century the profits of sugar-raising have tended to divert capital and enterprise almost exclusively to the cane culture, to the neglect of the other industries and interests of the islands. Good government and the building of necessary roads and bridges, the Government assumption of the "crown lands," and the conversion of them into small homesteads for raising the crops already specified, would speedily stimulate general prosperity and increase the American and European families and freeholders, and aid to constitute a large number of responsible voters, thus giving stability to legislation and government.

There are nearly 900,000 acres of "crown lands," and these, in the main, are among the most valuable of the islands. The rent paid for them goes to the Sovereign, and the amount of the income received is no doubt much less than it would be if these lands were owned and managed by private individuals. There have long been more or less abuses in the leasing of these lands, and it is well understood that the leases have been prolific sources of political favoritism and corruption. Well handled and sold at fitting opportunities, the proceeds of the crown lands would pay the national debt, provide adequate pensions for the two or three royalties, in case monarchy should

be abolished, and yet leave a balance of considerable amount for a permanent school fund.

COMMERCIAL AND NAVAL IMPORTANCE OF THE ISLANDS.

The value of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States for commercial and naval purposes has been well understood by American statesmen for more than half a century. The examination of the Hawaiian harbors and a careful consideration of their capabilities of defense, twenty years since, by Gen. Scofield and naval officers, whose opinions are on record in the Washington departments, plainly indicate how important these islands and harbors are to the future American commerce of the Pacific. Even to a nonexpert the great value and the easy defensibility of the harbors of Pearl City and of Honolulu are unmistakably obvious. Only six miles from each other, with narrow entrances backed by a continuous wall of mountains, each terminus of this natural barrier reaching to the sea, at relatively small expense these harbors can be impreguably fortified against all attack by sea and land. The harbor of Honolulu can now be entered by ships drawing 30 feet of water. But Pearl Harbor is larger and much preferable for naval purposes. It is only necessary to deepen the entrance by removing the bar of coral formation. This coral obstruction can be removed with comparative ease, and the expense would not be large. Opinions of practical men here, who have had to do with these coral formations, as well as my personal observation, go to show how readily it can be removed by modern explosives and the improved mechanical agencies.

With a large island between it and the sea, a capacious, safe, and beautiful harbor is secured for American commercial and military marine just where the future greatness and the necessities of the United States imperatively require. Only those who have carefully examined the vast resources of the American Pacific States, and considered that nearly two-fifths of the immense area of the United States, through the transcontinental railways and by rivers and sounds, outlet on the Pacific, and have studied the data surely pointing to the vast future commerce of this western world, can adequately appreciate the importance of these harbors to the American nation, and the necessity of securing them against foreign rivals. If we neglect them the present occupants must suffer, and their necessities will force them in directions unfriendly to American interests. Circumstances are pressing, and no time should be lost in looking at the facts as they really exist. The strong inclination of several European powers to gain possession of all the islands in the Pacific, except such as are expressly protected by the United States, is plainly shown by what has taken place in recent years.

The seizure of Gilbert, Johnson, and other islands, in the past few months, and what recently transpired in regard to Samoa, emphatically show that England certainly has not moderated her policy in the indicated regard, to which course the Canadian Government is undoubtedly the inspiring cause. The enormous cost of the Canadian Pacific Railway impels its managers to make the most desperate efforts to secure freight and passengers, and hence its aggressive plans to secure Pacific commerce and to gain political and commercial influence in these islands. The scheme of a British cable from Vancouver via Honolulu, as well as to Japan and China, and of establishing commercial and mail lines of steamers on the same routes, is not an idle dream. Powerful agencies are already working to these ends, and to effectively safeguard American interests on the Pacific and in these islands there is no time for

hesitation and delay. If the United States Government does not very promptly provide for laying a cable from San Francisco or San Diego to Honolulu or Hilo, it may be regarded as certain that a cable will be laid by British capital and be controlled by British managers. Pearl Harbor for a coaling station and an American cable between California and Hawaii are of immediate importance to American commercial and naval interests and to the maintenance of American influence on these islands.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLANDS.

A question of vital importance to Hawaii and of American interest in and care for its future is that of its government. There has been in the last twenty years a great change in the political status of things here. Formerly the facts and circumstances appertaining to government on these islands were essentially different from what they are to-day. Then the population was chiefly native Hawaiian. The natives had long lived under a kind of feudal system, with rigid laws and customs, which gave to the numerous chiefs and the King absolute despotic power. The wisdom and the religious zeal of the Christian missionaries enabled them to acquire and exercise a strong influence for good over the chiefs and King as well. Thus a system of government and laws were established which were a great improvement on the former condition of things. The general good character of the men who effectively aided the Hawaiian monarch to carry on the Government for years secured fairly successful administration of law and the maintenance of public order at limited cost, the public revenues being small. But the numerous Hawaiian chiefs are in their graves. Their families are extinct. The original native Hawaiians are now so decimated as to number less than two-fifths of the population of the islands.

The coming to the throne of the late King Kalakaua in 1873 was by legislative election, and but for the presence in the harbor and on shore of American marines and sailors, of the United States vessels of war, he would have failed to secure his crown against a determined mob in the interest of another aspirant. The great prosperity of the islands under the reciprocity treaty, stimulating the production of sugar, leading to a large American, European, and Asiatic immigration, caused a large increase of the Government revenues. This prosperous state of things also soon resulted in a large increase of the Government expenditures, in the addition of new offices, a large augmentation of salaries, thus stimulating the desire for official places and patronage, exciting the greed of adventurous and too often unworthy political partisans. Easy going, unused to and incapable of safe and economical administration, the King, Kalakaua, too often, in his seventeen years of reign, fell into the hands of unscrupulous associates and advisers. The Government expenditures soon reached figures much above what the area and population of the little kingdom justified. But so long as the great profits of sugar-raising under the American tariff flowed into the islands, the excessive Government expenses could be paid without the principal taxpayers very sensibly realizing the burden.

The adoption of a new constitution in 1887, taking from the King much of his former power and establishing legislative and ministerial responsibility, effected a beneficial change. But the great reduction of the profits of sugar-raising, rendering some of the plantations nearly worthless, and greatly lessening the income and market value of the others, has brought a condition of affairs which compels all the reflect-

ing and responsible citizens to see that the present expenses of the Government are much beyond what the islands can pay and much higher than wise legislation and proper economic administration require. But the difficulty of getting out of the old grooves, of scaling down salaries, and abolishing useless offices is hard to overcome. Nearly one-half of the population of the country have no voice in political affairs, unless exerted through corruption and bribery. The voting population is made up of several nationalities—Hawaiian, Portuguese, American, English, German, and others, the more intelligent and responsible of these generally acting together sufficiently to exercise a beneficial influence on legislation and administration. But the palace patronage and influence are still considerable, costing the country more than it is able to pay and returning to the country no positive advantages.

Directly and indirectly, the palace probably costs the little kingdom \$150,000 per year. A governor, at \$5,000 a year, acting in harmony with the responsible men of the legislature, would be far better for the islands than the present monarchical Government. In truth, the monarchy here is an absurd anachronism. It has nothing on which it logically or legitimately stands. The feudal basis on which it once stood no longer existing, the monarchy now is only an impedient to good government—an obstruction to the prosperity and progress of the islands. Incapable of comprehending the principles of constitutional government, more likely to take the advice of unworthy counsel than of the more competent, the reigning Sovereign insists in dealing with what properly belongs to the legislature and to the ministers. Thus the palace is constantly open to superficial and irresponsible courtiers and to unprincipled adventurers of different nationalities. Instead of exercising a salutary influence on public affairs it is the center of maladministration and of the most vicious kind of politics. It is now, and it has been for the last twenty years, and is always likely to be, a fruitful source of public demoralization.

It may be asked why do not the people of the islands at once reform this state of things? There is a considerable number of intelligent, energetic, and excellent citizens, of the different nationalities, in possession of the elective franchise. They are largely Americanized in their opinions and manners. They are sympathetic with American institutions. This is so of the Portuguese, the Germans, more or less of the English, and of the native Hawaiians and half-whites, as well as of the most of those of American parentage. But these unaided and alone can not well make the necessary changes in the existing condition of things. As a crown colony of Great Britain, or a Territory of the United States, the government modifications could be made readily, and good administration of the laws secured. Destiny and the vast future interests of the United States in the Pacific clearly indicate who, at no distant day, must be responsible for the government of these islands. Under a territorial government they could be as easily governed as any of the existing Territories of the United States.

The men qualified are here to carry on good government, provided they have the support of the Government of the United States. Why not postpone American possession? Would it not be just as well for the United States to take the islands twenty-five years hence? Facts and obvious probabilities will answer both of these interrogations. Hawaii has reached the parting of the ways. She must now take the road which leads to Asia, or the other, which outlets her in America, gives her an American civilization and binds her to the care of American

destiny. The nonaction of the American Government here in thirty years will make of Hawaii a Singapore, or a Hongkong, which could be governed as a British colony, but would be unfit to be an American Territory or an American State under our constitutional system. If the American flag floats here at no distant day, the Asiatic tendencies can be arrested and controlled without retarding the material development of the islands, but surely advancing their prosperity by diversifying and expanding the industries, building roads and bridges, opening the public lands to small farmers from Europe and the United States, thus increasing the responsible voting population, and constituting a solid basis for American methods of government.

Two-fifths of the people now here are Chinese and Japanese. If the present state of things is allowed to go on the Asiatics will soon largely preponderate, for the native Hawaiians are now decreasing at the rate of nearly one thousand per year. At the present prices of sugar, and at the prices likely to hold in the future, sugar-raising on these islands can be continued only by the cheapest possible labor—that of the Japanese, the Chinese, and the Indian coolies. Americanize the islands, assume control of the “crown lands,” dispose of them in small lots for actual settlers and freeholders for the raising of coffee, oranges, lemons, bananas, pineapples, and grapes, and the result soon will be to give permanent preponderance to a population and a civilization which will make the islands like southern California, and at no distant period convert them into gardens and sanitariums, as well as supply stations for American commerce, thus bringing everything here into harmony with American life and prosperity. To postpone American action many years is only to add to present unfavorable tendencies and to make future possession more difficult.

It is proper to consider the following facts: The present Sovereign is not expected to live many years. The princess heir apparent has always been, and is likely always to be, under English influence. Her father is British in blood and prejudices, firmly intrenched here as collector of customs, an important and influential office. She has been for some years and still is in England; her patron there who has a kind of guardianship of her, T. H. Davies, is a Tory Englishman, who lived here many years, who still owns large property in the islands, and is a resolute and persistent opponent of American predominance, bitterly denouncing even the American acquisition of Pearl Harbor. Mr. Wodehouse, the English minister, has long resided here; his eldest son is married to a half-caste sister of the Crown Princess, another son is in the Honolulu post-office, and a daughter also is married to a resident of one of the islands. The death of the present Queen, therefore, would virtually place an English princess on the Hawaiian throne, and put in the hands of the ultra-English the patronage and influence of the palace.

In the existing state of things, with non-American intervention, these palace influences, skillfully handled, are nearly equal, frequently superior, to the power of the legislature. Add to this palace power, in British hands, the influence of an adventurous, impecunious, and irresponsible mob of “hoodlums” and there results a state of things which would put it in the power of Canadian and ultra-British schemers, with a subsidy fund of \$50,000, to secure control of the legislature, and by prompt and vigorous action secure Canadian and British franchises, privileges, and rights entirely legal, to get rid of which would cause embarrassment and expense to the United States and her allies here. As is well known to the Department of State, Secretary Marcy,

with the approval of President Pierce and Cabinet, authorized the negotiation of a treaty for making these islands a Territory of the United States. Commissioner Gregg was authorized to facilitate the negotiation by the promise to pay \$100,000 for pensions to the King, chiefs, and other official persons, on condition that the sovereignty and property of the islands should be transferred to the United States.

Commissioner Gregg exceeded his instructions by stipulating to pay, in all, three times the sum which Secretary Marcy named in his instructions. These terms were deemed onerous and unacceptable by the Washington Department of State, and consequently the treaty was dropped, after all negotiations had been completed, the King finally being induced by his Scotch minister of foreign affairs not to sign it, though the King and cabinet had previously given their support to the spirit and terms of the negotiations and the conclusions reached. The embarrassments and objections that then existed as to the number of the royal princes and chiefs, the small number of the American population, the want of ready communication with the United States, and distance from Washington, now no longer stand in the way of making Hawaii a well governed and prosperous United States Territory. The reasons for annexation in 1854 were certainly much less adequate and pressing than they are now.

THE EXISTING BUSINESS STATUS.

It is well to consider the existing state of things here resulting from the change in the United States sugar tariff. Only personal observation and a careful investigation of the facts can give an adequate idea of the severe blow sugar raised here has received. The production of sugar being the main business of the islands, the great reduction of the market price has effected powerfully the entire affairs and condition of the islands. I think it underestimating the truth to express the opinion that the loss to the owners of the sugar plantations and mills, etc., and the consequent depreciation of other property by the passage of the McKinley bill, wise and beneficial as that measure is proving to be for the vast interests of the United States, has not been less than \$12,000,000, a large portion of this loss falling on Americans residing here and in California. Unless some positive measures of relief be granted, the depreciation of sugar property here will continue to go on. Wise, bold action of the United States will rescue the property holders from great loss, give the islands a government which will put an end to a worse than useless expenditure of a large proportion of the revenues of the country, using them for the building of roads and bridges, thus helping to develop the natural resources of the islands, aiding to diversify the industries, and to increase the number of the responsible citizens.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

One of two courses seem to me absolutely necessary to be followed, either bold and vigorous measures for annexation or a "customs union," an ocean cable from the Californian coast to Honolulu, Pearl Harbor perpetually ceded to the United States, with an implied but not necessarily stipulated American protectorate over the islands. I believe the former to be the better, that which will prove much the more advantageous to the islands, and the cheapest and least embarrassing in the end for the United States. If it was wise for the United

States, through Secretary Marcy, thirty-eight years ago, to offer to expend \$100,000 to secure a treaty of annexation, it certainly can not be chimerical or unwise to expend \$100,000 to secure annexation in the near future. To-day the United States has five times the wealth she possessed in 1854, and the reasons now existing for annexation are much stronger than they were then. I can not refrain from expressing the opinion with emphasis that the golden hour is near at hand. A perpetual customs union and the acquisition of Pearl Harbor, with an implied protectorate, must be regarded as the only allowable alternative. This would require the continual presence in the harbor of Honolulu of a United States vessel of war and the constant watchfulness of the United States minister while the present bungling, unsettled, and expensive political rule would go on, retarding the development of the islands, leaving at the end of twenty-five years more embarrassment to annexation than exists to-day, the property far less valuable, and the population less American than they would be if annexation were soon realized.

It may be said that annexation would involve the obligation of paying to the Hawaiian sugar-producers the same rate of bounties now paid to American producers, thus imposing too heavy a demand on the United States Treasury. It is a sufficient answer to this question to say that it could be specifically provided in the terms of annexation that the United States Government should pay 6 mills per pound—\$12 per ton—to the Hawaiian sugar-raisers, and this only so long as the present sugar-bounty system of the United States shall be maintained. Careful inquiry and investigation bring me to the conclusion that this small bounty would tide the Hawaiian sugar-planters over their present alarming condition and save the islands from general business depletion and financial disaster. Could justice to American interests in the islands and care for their future welfare do less than this?

To give Hawaii a highly favorable treaty while she remains outside the American Union would necessarily give the same advantages to hostile foreigners, those who would continue to antagonize our commercial and political interests here, as well as those of American blood and sympathies. It is a well authenticated fact that the American sentiment here in 1890, the last year of the great prosperity under the sugar provisions of the reciprocity treaty, was much less manifest than before the treaty had gone into effect, and less pronounced than when Secretary Marcy authorized the negotiation of the annexation treaty in 1854. It is equally true that the desire here at this time for annexation is much stronger than in 1889. Besides, so long as the islands retain their own independent government there remains the possibility that England or the Canadian Dominion might secure one of the Hawaiian harbors for a coaling station. Annexation excludes all dangers of this kind.

Which of the two lines of policy and action shall be adopted our statesmen and our Government must decide. Certain it is that the interests of the United States and the welfare of these islands will not permit the continuance of the existing state and tendency of things. Having for so many years extended a helping hand to the islands and encouraging the American residents and their friends at home to the extent we have, we can not refrain now from aiding them with vigorous measures, without injury to ourselves and those of our "kith and kin," and without neglecting American opportunities that never seemed so obvious and pressing as they do now. I have no doubt that

the more thoroughly the bed rock and controlling facts touching the Hawaiian problem are understood by our Government and by the American public, the more readily they will be inclined to approve the views I have expressed so inadequately in this communication.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Hon. JOHN W. FOSTER,
Secretary of State.

MESSAGE

FROM THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

TRANSMITTING

A treaty of annexation concluded on the 14th day of February, 1893, between the United States and the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

FEBRUARY 15, 1893.—Read; treaty read the first time, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and, together with the message and accompanying papers, ordered to be printed in confidence for the use of the Senate.

FEBRUARY 17, 1893.—Injunction of secrecy removed and ordered to be printed.

To the Senate :

I transmit herewith, with a view to its ratification, a treaty of annexation concluded on the 14th day of February, 1893, between Hon. John W. Foster, Secretary of State, who was duly empowered to act in that behalf on the part of the United States, and Lorrin A. Thurston, W. R. Castle, W. C. Wilder, C. L. Carter, and Joseph Marsden, the commissioners on the part of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

The treaty, it will be observed, does not attempt to deal in detail with the questions that grow out of the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States. The commissioners representing the Hawaiian Government have consented to leave to the future and to the just and benevolent purposes of the United States the adjustment of all such questions.

I do not deem it necessary to discuss at any length the conditions which have resulted in this decisive action.

It has been the policy of the administration not only to respect, but to encourage the continuance of an independent government in the Hawaiian Islands so long as it afforded suitable guarantees for the protection of life and property and maintained a stability and strength that gave adequate security against the domination of any other power. The moral support of this Government has continually manifested itself in the most friendly diplomatic relations, and in many acts of courtesy to the Hawaiian rulers.

The overthrow of the monarchy was not in any way promoted by this Government, but had its origin in what seems to have been a reactionary and revolutionary policy on the part of Queen Liliuokalani, which put in serious peril not only the large and preponderating interests of

the United States in the islands, but all foreign interests, and indeed the decent administration of civil affairs and the peace of the islands.

It is quite evident that the monarchy had become effete and the Queen's government so weak and inadequate as to be the prey of designing and unscrupulous persons. The restoration of Queen Liliuokalani to her throne is undesirable, if not impossible, and unless actively supported by the United States would be accompanied by serious disaster and the disorganization of all business interests. The influence and interest of the United States in the islands must be increased and not diminished.

Only two courses are now open; one the establishment of a protectorate by the United States, and the other, annexation full and complete. I think the latter course, which has been adopted in the treaty, will be highly promotive of the best interests of the Hawaiian people, and is the only one that will adequately secure the interests of the United States. These interests are not wholly selfish. It is essential that none of the other great powers shall secure these islands. Such a possession would not consist with our safety and with the peace of the world.

This view of the situation is so apparent and conclusive that no protest has been heard from any government against proceedings looking to annexation. Every foreign representative at Honolulu promptly acknowledged the provisional government, and I think there is a general concurrence in the opinion that the deposed queen ought not to be restored. Prompt action upon this treaty is very desirable.

If it meets the approval of the Senate peace and good order will be secured in the islands under existing laws until such time as Congress can provide by legislation a permanent form of government for the islands. This legislation should be, and I do not doubt will be, not only just to the natives and all other residents and citizens of the islands, but should be characterized by great liberality and a high regard to the rights of all the people and of all foreigners domiciled there.

The correspondence which accompanies the treaty will put the Senate in possession of all the facts known to the Executive.

BENJ. HARRISON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

February 15, 1893.

The PRESIDENT:

The undersigned, Secretary of State, has the honor to lay before the President, with a view to obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate thereto, should such a course be in the judgment of the President for the public interest, a treaty, signed at Washington on the 14th day of February, instant, by the undersigned and the accredited commissioners of the existing provisional government of the Hawaiian Islands, in representation of their respective Governments, for the full and absolute cession of the said islands and all their dependencies to the United States forever, with provision for the temporary government of those islands, under the sovereign authority of the United States, until Congress shall otherwise enact.

With this treaty the undersigned submits to the President copies of the correspondence recently exchanged, showing the course of events in the Hawaiian Islands as respects the overthrow of the late monarch.

ical form of government, the creation of a provisional government thereof in the name of the Hawaiian people, the recognition of the same by the representatives there of the United States and of all other powers, the dispatch of a commission to this capital to negotiate for a union of the Government of the Hawaiian Islands with the Government of the United States, and the outcome of those negotiations in the treaty herewith submitted.

The change of government in the Hawaiian Islands, thus chronicled, was entirely unexpected so far as this Government was concerned. It is true that for some months past the Hawaiian press and the advices received from the diplomatic and consular representatives at Honolulu indicated political uncertainty, party intrigues, and legislative opposition, but not more so than at many times in the past history of the islands, and certainly not suggestive of an overthrow of the monarchy through popular resistance to the unconstitutional acts of the late sovereign. At no time had Mr. Stevens been instructed with regard to his course in the event of a revolutionary uprising. The well-established policy of this Government, maintained on many occasions from its earliest establishment, to hold relations with any *de facto* government in possession of the effective power of the State and having the acquiescence of the governed, being ample to meet unforeseen contingencies, no instructions in this specific sense were indeed necessary; and the minister, without explicit instructions, was expected and constrained to use his best judgment, in accordance with fundamental precedent, as the emergency should arise.

The change was in fact abrupt and unlooked-for by the United States minister or the naval commander. At a moment of apparent tranquillity, when the political excitement and controversy of the immediately preceding three months had been to all appearances definitely allayed, and when, as appears from dispatches from the minister and from the commanding officer of the *Boston*, a settlement of differences seemed to have been reached, Minister Stevens quitted the capital for a brief excursion of ten days to a neighboring island, on the *Boston*, the only naval vessel of the United States at the islands. On returning to Honolulu on January 14 the crisis was found to be in full vigor and to have already reached proportions which made inevitable either the success of Queen Liliuokalani's attempt to subvert the constitution by force or the downfall of the monarchy.

On Saturday, the 14th of January, the capital was wholly controlled by the royal troops, including a large additional force of over 500 armed men not authorized by Hawaiian law. On the same day the first call to arms in opposition to the Queen was issued, and the citizens' committee of safety was developed. During the 14th, 15th, and most of the 16th, the two parties confronted each other in angry hostility, with every indication of an armed conflict at any moment. It was not until late in the afternoon of Monday, the 16th, after request for protection had been made by many citizens of the United States residing in Honolulu, that a force of marines was landed from the *Boston*, by direction of the minister, and in conformity with the standing instructions which for many years have authorized the naval forces of the United States to coöperate with the minister for the protection of the lives and property of American citizens in case of imminent disorder. The marines, when landed, took no part whatever toward influencing the course of events. Their presence was wholly precautionary, and only such disposition was made of them as was calculated to subserve the particular end in view. They were distributed that night between

the legation and the consulate, where they occupied inner courts and a private hall rented for their accommodation. Beyond a sentry at the door of each post, and the occasional appearance of an officer passing from one post to another, no demonstration whatever was made by the landed forces, nor was the uniform of the United States visible upon the streets. They thus remained, isolated and inconspicuous, until after the success of the Provisional Government and the organization of an adequate protective force thereunder.

At the time the Provisional Government took possession of the Government buildings, no troops or officers of the United States were present or took any part whatever in the proceedings. No public recognition was accorded to the Provisional Government by the United States minister until after the Queen's abdication and when they were in effective possession of the Government buildings, the archives, the treasury, the barracks, the police station, and all the potential machinery of the Government.

Then, and not until then, when the Provisional Government had obtained full *de facto* control, was the new order of things recognized by the United States minister, whose formal letter of recognition was promptly followed by like action on the part of the representatives of all foreign governments resident on the Hawaiian Islands. There is not the slightest indication at any time prior to such formal recognition in full accord with the long-established rule and invariable precedents of this Government, did the United States minister take any part in promoting the change, either by intimidating the Queen or by giving assurance of support to the organizers of the Provisional Government.

The immediate cause of the change is clearly seen to have been the unconstitutional and intemperate acts of the Queen herself, in attempting to coerce her responsible ministers and to annul the existing constitution and replace it arbitrarily by another of her own choice.

The Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands is, by all usual and proper tests, in the sole and supreme possession of power and in control of all the resources of the Hawaiian nation, not only through the Queen's formal submission, but through its possession of all the armed forces, arms and ammunitions, public offices, and administration of law, unopposed by any adherents of the late Government.

On the first instant, subsequently to the departure of the Hawaiian special commissioners, the United States minister at Honolulu, at the request of the Provisional Government, placed the Hawaiian Government under the protection of the United States to insure the security of life and property during the pending negotiations at Washington and without interfering with the administration of public affairs by the said Government. An instruction has been sent to the minister, commending his action in so far as it lay within the purview of standing instructions to the legation and to the naval commanders of the United States in Hawaiian waters, and tended to cooperate with the administration of affairs by the Provisional Government, but disavowing any steps in excess of such instructions whereby the authority and power of the United States might appear to have been asserted to the impairment of the independent sovereignty of the Hawaiian Government by the assumption of a formal protectorate.

In this condition of things, the five commissioners named by the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands reached Washington on the 3d instant, bearing authentic letters from the Hawaiian Government accrediting them to the President, and conferring upon them full

powers to negotiate for the union of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States.

On the 4th instant the commissioners were accorded an interview with the undersigned, at the request of the regularly accredited Hawaiian minister, Mr. J. Mott Smith, and submitted their credentials, accompanied by a statement of events leading up to and connected with the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of the Provisional Government. At a second conference on the same day the commissioners submitted to the undersigned the proposition of the Provisional Government, containing the terms upon which that Government desired the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States. A copy of this proposition is inclosed. Frequent conferences have since been held at the Department of State, and all questions connected with the subject have been carefully examined and discussed, until a concurrence of views on the part of the negotiating parties was reached on the 14th instant.

In drafting and agreeing upon the treaty now transmitted, the undersigned has sought, under your direction, to effect thereby the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States with as few conditions as possible and with a full reservation to Congress of its legislative prerogatives. An examination of the provisions of this treaty will show that to Congress is reserved the determination of all questions affecting the form of government of the annexed territory, the citizenship and elective franchise of its inhabitants, the manner and terms under which the revenue and navigation laws of the United States are to be extended thereto, and all other questions relating to the economic and political status of the islands. As there is no provision in the existing legislation of Congress whereby the Executive power can provide an organized form of government for new territory annexed to the Union, or extend over it the laws of the United States and cause the same to be executed, it was deemed necessary to continue the existing government and laws of the Hawaiian Islands until Congress should have an opportunity to legislate on the subject; but a provision has been inserted in the treaty for the exercise by the Executive of the United States of a veto power upon the acts of that government during the interregnum. The temporary maintenance of the existing political institutions of the islands seems the more appropriate in view of the fact that the Hawaiian constitution, of which a copy is inclosed herewith, and the Hawaiian laws are based upon principles similar to those contained in our own organic law and the principles of the common law.

It is to be noted that, according to a recognized principle of international law, the obligations of treaties, even when some of their stipulations are in terms perpetual, expire in case either of the contracting parties loses its existence as an independent state. The foreign treaties of the Hawaiian Islands therefore terminate, upon annexation, with the competence of the government thereof to hold diplomatic relations. An examination of these treaties shows, however, that they contain no stipulations which would embarrass either the Hawaiian Islands or the United States by their termination.

Accompanying the treaty are tables giving full details as to the area of the territory annexed, the public debt, the public lands, the annual allowances to and revenue of the late royal household, and statistics as to the population, revenues, commerce, and other economic matters relating to the islands.

It is gratifying to be able to state that pending the negotiations leading up to the treaty herewith submitted the undersigned has received

Respectfully submitted.

JOHN W. FOSTER.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 15, 1893.

2 The Government of the Hawaiian Islands hereby cedes, from the
3 date of the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, absolutely

4 and without reserve to the United States forever all rights of sov-
5 ereignty of whatsoever kind in and over the Hawaiian Islands and
6 their dependencies, renouncing in favor of the United States every
7 sovereign right of which as an independent nation it is now pos-
8 sessed; and henceforth said Hawaiian Islands and every island
9 and key thereunto appertaining and each and every portion thereof
10 shall become and be an integral part of the territory of the United
11 States.

1 ARTICLE II.

2 The Government of the Hawaiian Islands also cedes and transfers
3 to the United States the absolute fee and ownership of all public,
4 government or crown lands, public buildings or edifices, ports,
5 harbors, fortifications, military or naval equipments and all other
6 public property of every kind and description belonging to the
7 Government of the Hawaiian Islands, together with every right
8 and appurtenance thereunto appertaining. The existing laws of
9 the United States relative to public lands shall not apply to such
10 lands in the Hawaiian Islands, but the Congress of the United
11 States shall enact special laws for their management and disposi-
12 tion: Provided, that all revenue from or proceeds of the same, ex-
13 cept as regards such part thereof as may be used or occupied for
14 the civil, military or naval purposes of the United States or may
15 be assigned to the use of the local Government, shall be used solely
16 for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands for
17 educational and other public purposes.

1 ARTICLE III.

2 Until Congress shall otherwise provide, the existing Govern-
3 ment and laws of the Hawaiian Islands are hereby continued, sub-
4 ject to the paramount authority of the United States. The Presi-
5 dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall ap-
6 point a Commissioner to reside in said Islands who shall have the
7 power to veto any act of said Government, and an act disapproved
8 by him shall thereupon be void and of no effect unless approved
9 by the President.

10 Congress shall, within one year from the exchange of the rati-
11 fications of this Treaty, enact the necessary legislation to extend
12 to the Hawaiian Islands the laws of the United States respecting
13 duties upon imports, the internal revenue, commerce and naviga-

tion; but until Congress shall otherwise provide, the existing commercial relations of the Hawaiian Islands both with the United States and foreign countries shall continue as regards the commerce of said Islands with the rest of the United States and with foreign countries, but this shall not be construed as giving to said Islands the power to enter into any new stipulation or agreement whatsoever or to have diplomatic intercourse with any foreign Government. The Consular representatives of foreign powers now resident in the Hawaiian Islands shall be permitted to continue in the exercise of their consular functions until they can receive their exequaturs from the Government of the United States.

1 ARTICLE IV.

2 The further immigration of Chinese laborers into the Hawaiian
3 Islands is hereby prohibited until Congress shall otherwise pro-
4 vide. Furthermore, Chinese persons of the classes now or here-
5 after excluded by law from entering the United States will not be
6 permitted to come from the Hawaiian Islands to other parts of the
7 United States, and if so coming shall be subject to the same pen-
8 alties as if entering from a foreign country.

1 ARTICLE V.

2 The public debt of the Hawaiian Islands, lawfully existing at the
3 date of the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, including
4 the amounts due to depositors in the Hawaiian Postal Savings
5 Banks, is hereby assumed by the Government of the United
6 States; but the liability of the United States in this regard shall
7 in no case exceed three and one quarter millions of dollars. So
8 long, however, as the existing Government and the present com-
9 mercial relations of the Hawaiian Islands are continued, as here-
10 in before provided, said Government shall continue to pay the
11 interest on said debt.

1 ARTICLE VI.

2 The Government of the United States agrees to pay to Liliuo-
3 kalani, the late Queen, within one year from the date of the ex-
4 change of the ratifications of this Treaty the sum of twenty thousand
5 dollars, and annually thereafter a like sum of twenty thousand
6 dollars during the term of her natural life, provided she in good

7 faith submits to the authority of the Government of the United
8 States and the local Government of the Islands.

9 And the Government of the United States further agrees to
10 pay to the Princess Kaiulani within one year from the date of the
11 exchange of the ratifications of this treaty the gross sum of one
12 hundred and fifty thousand dollars, provided she in good faith
13 submits to the authority of the Government of the United States
14 and the local Government of the Islands.

1 ARTICLE VII.

2 The present Treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United
3 States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, on the
4 one part, and by the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian
5 Islands on the other, and the ratifications thereof shall be ex-
6 changed at Honolulu as soon as possible. Such exchange shall be
7 made on the part of the United States by the Commissioner here-
8 inbefore provided for, and it shall operate as a complete and final
9 conveyance to the United States of all the rights of sovereignty
10 and property herein ceded to them. Within one month after such
11 exchange of ratifications the Provisional Government shall furnish
12 said Commissioner with a full and complete schedule of all the
13 public property herein ceded and transferred.

14 In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed
15 the above articles and have hereunto affixed their seals.

16 Done in duplicate at the city of Washington this fourteenth day
17 of February, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-three.

18 JOHN W. FOSTER, [SEAL]

19 LORRIN A. THURSTON, [SEAL]

20 WILLIAM R. CASTLE, [SEAL]

21 WILLIAM C. WILDER, [SEAL]

22 CHARLES L. CARTER, [SEAL]

23 JOSEPH MARSDEN. [SEAL]

List of accompanying documents.

- No. 1. Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster (telegram), January 18, 1893.
- No. 2. Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster, January 18, 1893.
- No. 3. Mr. Dole to Mr. Foster, January 18, 1893.
- No. 4. Ex-Queen Liliuokalani to the President, January 18, 1893.
- No. 5. Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster, January 19, 1893.
- No. 6. Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens (telegram), January 28, 1893.
- No. 7. Mr. Tracy to Mr. Foster, January 28, 1893.
- No. 8. Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster (telegram), February 1, 1893.
- No. 9. Mr. Smith to Mr. Foster, February 3, 1893.
- No. 10. Mr. Tracy to Mr. Foster, February 3, 1893.
- No. 11. The Hawaiian special commissioners to Mr. Foster, February 3, 1893.
- No. 12. Credential letters of the Hawaiian special commissioners, exhibited February 4, 1893.
- No. 13. Commissions of the Hawaiian special commissioners, exhibited February 4, 1893.
- No. 14. The Hawaiian special commissioners to Mr. Foster, February 4, 1893.
- No. 15. The Hawaiian special commissioners to Mr. Foster, February 11, 1893.
- No. 16. Mr. Carter to Mr. Foster, February 11, 1893.
- No. 17. Mr. Tracy to Mr. Foster, February 11, 1893.
- No. 18. Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens, February 11, 1893.
- No. 19. Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster, February 1, received February 14, 1893.
- No. 20. Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster, February 1, received February 14, 1893.
- No. 21. Constitution of the Hawaiian Islands.
- No. 22. Statistical tabulated statements pertaining to the Hawaiian Islands.
 - A. Population in 1878, 1884, and 1890; voters in 1890.
 - B. Property, real and personal.
 - C. Schools: Number, attendance, and nationality of teachers.
 - D. Public debt, as of March 31, 1892.
 - E. Sugar plantations, value, area, ownership, wages.
 - F. Taxation, internal, proceeds of, and per capita in 1882, 1884, 1886, 1888, 1890, and 1891.
 - G. Revenues and expenditures, biennial periods from 1878-'80 to 1890-'92.
 - H. Receipts, expenditures, cash balances, and public debt in 1880, 1882, 1884, 1886, 1888, and 1892.
 - I. Imports, detailed statement of, from 1883 to 1892; values.
 - J. Exports, detailed statement of, from 1882 to 1891; quantities and values.
 - K. Imports and exports, by countries, from 1884 to 1891.
 - L. Imports and exports, and customs receipts, annual value of, from 1882 to 1891.
 - M. Navigation, nationality of vessels engaged in the foreign trade with the Hawaiian Islands from 1882 to 1891.

No. 1.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

[Telegram.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

Honolulu, H. I., January 18, 1893.

Via San Francisco, January 28. (Received January 28.)

Events in Hawaii in the past few days have moved rapidly. An entire overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy and the establishment of a Provisional Government in the interest of the whole people of the islands without the sacrifice of a single life. The new government is in full possession of the islands and was promptly recognized by all the diplomatic representatives. The four men of whom it is composed are of high character, one of whom resigned his position as one of the supreme judges to assume the place. Full dispatches by the mail leaving Honolulu to-day by special steamer.

STEVENS,
United States Minister.

No. 2.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 79.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 18, 1893. (Received February 3.)

SIR: In my 73 of November 8 I gave full information of the surrender of the Queen to the wishes of the legislature by the formation of a ministry composed of men of intelligence and wealth possessing the entire confidence of the business men and the more responsible citizens of the country. But this surrender of the Queen and of those surrounding her was only seeming. As soon as the principal appropriations had been voted and the legislative work was nearly concluded, several of the best members having already left for their homes, a remarkable conspiracy was revealed.

The undersigned, for the first time since he has been at the head of this legation, January 4 took passage for Hilo and the volcano on the U. S. S. *Boston* for the benefit of the health of himself and of his daughter, it being also desirable that the town of the second importance in the islands should have this attention at the time the *Boston* was making a visit to Hawaii, the chief island in the group. Beyond all doubt, immediately after the *Boston* and myself had left Honolulu the unscrupulous adventurers around the Queen improved the opportunity to push through the legislature an astounding lottery franchise with the obvious intent to sell it out to the Louisiana lottery men. This was worked by some of the same parties supposed to be of the powerful opium ring whose four points of operation are Vancouver, San Francisco, Honolulu, and Hongkong. They distributed the lottery stock among the native members of the legislature in large figures.

Notwithstanding the strong opposition of all the best people of the islands, including whites and natives, and the emphatic opposition of the chamber of commerce, the Queen and her palace favorite gave their warmest support to the lottery bill and signed it at once. She was to be immediately compensated by being allowed to proclaim a new constitution, restoring to the Crown the old despotic prerogatives in direct violation of the existing constitution, which provides for the only mode of change, which is by the action of successive legislatures.

Returning on the *Boston* from our Hilo trip on the 14th instant, we found the legislature was to be prorogued at 12 a. m., one-half hour after my arrival at the legation. The prorogation completed, members of the legislature, diplomatic corps, judges of the supreme court, and other officials went to the palace by invitation. In the meantime it began to be known in public circles the Queen's intention to proclaim the revolutionary constitution. This resulted in raising an excitement which alarmed her confidants and caused some of them to draw back. This consumed time, so that she could not secure the signatures of her new cabinet as she had expected. In the meantime the diplomatic corps grew weary and left the palace, realizing that the invitation to be present was a trick.

As I had just returned, weary from my voyage, I had not received the invitation, the chamberlain knowing I was absent when he invited the English, Portuguese, French, and Japanese diplomatic representatives the day before. In the short meanwhile I had suspicioned the trick. Finally, the Queen appeared in the throne room, before the supreme judges and other officials, in an extreme passion of anger, and avowed her purpose to postpone her revolutionary constitution for a

brief period, and then went upon the balcony and spoke with great passion in the same strain to those around the palace, principally her retainers and the royal guard, her determination to proclaim her constitution at another time. What I have described as to the lottery legislation, the forcing out of the responsible cabinet of November 8 and appointing the lottery cabinet, two of whom had been voted out of the ministry during the legislative session by a two-thirds vote for the best of reasons. It was the lottery bribe and the autocratic design of the Queen that quickly precipitated events.

A mass meeting of the citizens was called to meet on Monday, the 16th, at 2 p. m., which assembled in the largest hall in the city. Short as was the notice, over 1,300 of the principal citizens of Honolulu and from other islands, who happened to be in the city, were in attendance. This meeting included merchants, bankers, professional men, the principal business men, and the mechanics, the chief German and some of the leading English merchants and other nationalities, as well as American residents. It is said such an assemblage was never before equaled in Honolulu. Intelligent American visitors here say that such a public meeting would do credit to a meeting of a similar class of citizens in our best American cities.

The assemblage was a unit in feeling and purpose. The speeches and resolutions are on the printed slips I herewith inclose. This remarkable uprising of the best citizens, including nearly all of the chief property holders, the Tahitian marshal and palace favorite did not dare attempt to suppress. A committee of public safety was at once created to meet the emergency and to prevent anarchy and riot. It was fortunate that the *Boston* was in the harbor. The committee on public safety called on me for aid. I promptly addressed to the commander of the *Boston*, Capt. G. S. Wiltse, the following note:

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 16, 1893.

SIR: In view of the existing critical circumstances in Honolulu, including an inadequate legal force, I request you to land marines and sailors from the ship under your command for the protection of the United States legation and United States consulate, and to secure the safety of American life and property.

Very truly, yours,

JOHN L. STEVENS,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

Capt. G. C. WILTSE,
Commander U. S. S. Boston.

A copy of the call of the committee of public safety for aid is inclosed.

Promptly the men from the *Boston* were landed. Detachments were placed around the legation and the consulate, the principal members having marched to a central hall for shelter and headquarters; the night being at hand, the public anxiety being especially strong as to what might be done by irresponsible persons in the night, the landing of the men of the *Boston* so promptly gave immediate relief to the public anxiety.

As soon as practicable a Provisional Government was constituted, composed of four highly respectable men, with Judge Dole at the head, he having resigned his place on the supreme bench to assume this responsibility. He was born in Honolulu, of American parentage, educated here and in the United States, and is of the highest reputation among all citizens, both natives and whites. P. C. Jones is a native of Boston, Mass., wealthy, possessing property interests in the islands.

and a resident here for many years. The other two members are of the highest respectability. The committee of public safety forthwith took possession of the Government buildings, archives, and treasury, and installed the Provisional Government at the heads of the respective departments. This being an accomplished fact, I promptly recognized the Provisional Government as the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands. The English minister, the Portuguese chargé d'affaires, the French and the Japanese commissioners promptly did the same; these, with myself, being the only members of the diplomatic corps residing here.

All is quiet here now. Without the sacrifice of a single life this change of government has been accomplished. Language can hardly express the enthusiasm and the profound feeling of relief at this peaceful and salutary change of government. The underlying cause of this profound feeling among the citizens is the hope that the United States Government will allow these islands to pass to American control and become American soil. A commission of citizens, duly accredited, will go by the steamer that takes this dispatch to Washington, to state the wishes of the Provisional Government and of the responsible people of the islands, and to give a complete account of the existing state of things here.

It is proper that I should add, that the presence of the *Boston* here has been of the highest importance, and the behavior of officers and men has been admirable. Capt. Wiltse has exercised prudence and great firmness, while he and the undersigned have recognized only accomplished facts and have not allowed the use of the United States force for any but the most conservative reasons

I am, sir,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Written copy by future mail.

S.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 79.]

PROCLAMATION.

In its earlier history Hawaii possessed a constitutional government honestly and economically administered in the public interest.

The Crown called to its assistance as advisers able, honest, and conservative men, whose integrity was unquestioned even by their political opponents.

The stability of the Government was assured, armed resistance and revolution unthought of, popular rights were respected, and the privileges of the subject from time to time increased and the prerogatives of the sovereign diminished by the voluntary acts of the successive Kings.

With very few exceptions this state of affairs continued until the expiration of the first few years of the reign of His late Majesty Kalakaua. At this time a change was discernible in the spirit animating the Chief Executive and in the influences surrounding the throne. A steadily increasing disposition was manifested on the part of the King to extend the royal prerogatives; to favor adventurers and persons of no character or standing in the community; to encroach upon the rights and privileges of the people by steadily increasing corruption of electors, and by means of the power and influence of officeholders and other corrupt means to illegitimately influence the elections, resulting in the final absolute control of not only the executive and legislative, but to a certain extent the judicial departments of the Government in the interests of absolutism.

This finally resulted in the revulsion of feeling and popular uprising of 1887, which wrested from the King a large portion of his ill-gotten powers.

The leaders of this movement were not seeking personal aggrandizement, political power, or the suppression of the native Government. If this had been their object it could easily have been accomplished, for they had the absolute control of the situation.

Their object was to secure responsible Government through a representative cabinet, supported by and responsible to the people's elected representatives. A clause to this effect was inserted in the constitution, and subsequently enacted by law by the legislature, specifically covering the ground that in all matters concerning the state the sovereign was to act by and with the advice of the cabinet, and only by and with such advice.

The King willingly agreed to such proposition, expressed regret for the past, and volunteered promises for the future.

Almost from the date of such agreement and promises up to the time of his death, the history of the Government has been a continual struggle between the King on the one hand and the cabinet and legislature on the other, the former constantly endeavoring by every available form of influence and evasion to ignore his promises and agreements and regain his lost powers.

This conflict upon several occasions came to a crisis, followed each time by submission on the part of His Majesty, by renewed expressions of regret and promises to abide by the constitutional and legal restrictions in the future. In each instance such promise was kept until a further opportunity presented itself, when the conflict was renewed in defiance and regardless of all previous pledges.

Upon the accession of Her Majesty Liliuokalani, for a brief period the hope prevailed that new policy would be adopted. This hope was soon blasted by her immediately entering into conflict with the existing cabinet, who held office with the approval of a large majority of the legislature, resulting in the triumph of the Queen and the removal of the cabinet. The appointment of a new cabinet subservient to her wishes and their continuance in office until a recent date gave no opportunity for further indication of the policy which would be pursued by Her Majesty until the opening of the legislature in May of 1892.

The recent history of that session has shown a stubborn determination on the part of Her Majesty to follow the tactics of her late brother and in all possible ways to secure an extension of the royal prerogatives and an abridgment of popular rights.

During the latter part of the session the legislature was replete with corruption; bribery and other illegitimate influences were openly utilized to secure the desired end, resulting in the final complete overthrow of all opposition and the inauguration of a cabinet arbitrarily selected by Her Majesty in complete defiance of constitutional principles and popular representation.

Notwithstanding such result the defeated party peacefully submitted to the situation.

Not content with her victory Her Majesty proceeded on the last day of the session to arbitrarily arrogate to herself the right to promulgate a new constitution, which proposed, among other things, to disfranchise over one-fourth of the voters and the owners of nine-tenths of the private property of the Kingdom, to abolish the elected upper house of the legislature and to substitute in place thereof an appointive one, to be appointed by the Sovereign.

The detailed history of this attempt and the succeeding events in connection therewith is given in the report of the committee of public safety to the citizens of Honolulu and the resolution adopted at the mass meeting held on the 16th instant, the correctness of which report and the propriety of which resolution is hereby specifically affirmed.

The constitutional evolution indicated has slowly and steadily, though reluctantly and regretfully, convinced an overwhelming majority of the conservative and responsible members of the community that independent, constitutional, representative, and responsible government, able to protect itself from revolutionary uprisings and royal aggression, is no longer possible in Hawaii under the existing system of government.

Five uprisings or conspiracies against the Government have occurred within five years and seven months. It is firmly believed that the culminating revolutionary attempt of last Saturday will, unless radical measures are taken, wreck our already damaged credit abroad and precipitate to final ruin our already overstrained financial condition; and the guaranties of protection to life, liberty, and property will steadily decrease and the political situation rapidly grow worse.

In this belief, and also in the firm belief that the action hereby taken is and will be for the best personal, political, and property interests of every citizen of the land—

We, citizens and residents of the Hawaiian Islands, organized and acting for the public safety and the common good, hereby proclaim as follows:

- (1) The Hawaiian monarchical system of Government is hereby abrogated.
- (2) A provisional government for the control and management of public affairs and the protection of the public peace is hereby established, to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon.
- (3) Such provisional government shall consist of an executive council of four members, who are hereby declared to be Sanford B. Dole, James A. King, Peter C.

Jones, William O. Smith, who shall administer the executive departments of the Government, the first named acting as president and chairman of such council and administering the department of foreign affairs, and the others severally administering the departments of interior, finance, and attorney-general, respectively, in the order in which they are above enumerated, according to existing Hawaiian law as far as may be consistent with this proclamation; and also of an advisory council, which shall consist of fourteen members, who are hereby declared to be S. M. Damon, L. A. Thurston, J. Emmeluth, J. H. McCandless, F. W. McChesney, W. R. Castle, W. C. Wilder, A. Brown, J. F. Morgan, H. Waterhouse, E. D. Tenney, F. Wilhelm, W. G. Ashley, C. Bolte. Such advisory council shall also have general legislative authority.

Such executive and advisory council shall, acting jointly, have power to remove any member of either council and to fill such or any other vacancy.

(4) All officers under the existing Government are hereby requested to continue to exercise their functions and perform the duties of their respective offices, with the exception of the following-named persons: Queen Liliuokalani; Charles B. Wilson, marshal; Samuel Parker, minister of foreign affairs; W. H. Cornwell, minister of finance; John F. Colburn, minister of the interior; Arthur P. Peterson, attorney-general; who are hereby removed from office.

(5) All Hawaiian laws and constitutional principles not inconsistent herewith shall continue in force until further order of the executive and advisory councils.

HENRY E. COOPER.
ANDREW BROWN.
J. A. MCCANDLESS.
THEODORE F. LANSING.
JOHN EMMELUTH.
C. BOLTE.
ED. SUHR.
HENRY WATERHOUSE.
W. C. WILDER.
F. W. MCCHESENEY.
WILLIAM O. SMITH.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 79.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *January 17, 1893.*

SIR: The undersigned, members of the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government this day established in Hawaii, hereby state to you that for the reasons set forth in the proclamation this day issued, a copy of which is herewith inclosed for your consideration, the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and a Provisional Government established in accordance with the said above-mentioned proclamation.

Such Provisional Government has been proclaimed, is now in possession of the Government departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and is in control of the city. We hereby request that you will, on behalf of the United States of America, recognize it as the existing *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands, and afford to it the moral support of your Government, and, if necessary, the support of American troops to assist in preserving the public peace.

We have the honor to remain your obedient servants,

SANFORD B. DOLE.
J. A. KING.
P. C. JONES.
WILLIAM O. SMITH.
S. M. DAWSON.
JOHN EMMELUTH.
F. W. MCCHESENEY.
W. C. WILDER.
J. A. MCCANDLESS.
ANDREW BROWN.
JAS. F. MORGAN.
HENRY WATERHOUSE.
E. D. TENNEY.
F. J. WILHELM.
W. G. ASHLEY.
C. BOLTE.

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
United States Minister Resident.

[Inclosure 3 in No. 79.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *January 17, 1893.*

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

[Order No. 1.]

All persons favorable to the *Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands* are hereby requested to forthwith report to the Government at the Government buildings and to furnish to the Government such arms and ammunition as they may have in their possession or control as soon as possible, in order that efficient and complete protection of life and property and the public peace may immediately and efficiently be put in operation.

SANFORD B. DOLE,
J. A. KING,
P. C. JONES,
WILLIAM O. SMITH,
Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

JOHN EMMELUTH,
ANDREW BROWN,
C. BOLTE,
JAMES F. MORGAN,
HENRY WATERHOUSE,
S. M. DAMON,
W. G. ASHLEY,
E. D. TENNY,
F. W. MCCHESENEY,
W. C. WILDER,

Advisory Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

[Inclosure 4 in No. 79.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *January 17, 1893.* (Issued 6 p. m.)

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

[Order No. 2.]

It is hereby ordered and decreed that until further ordered, the right of the writ of habeas corpus is hereby suspended and martial law is hereby declared to exist throughout the island of Oahu.

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
J. A. KING,
Minister of the Interior,
P. C. JONES,
Minister of Finance,
WILLIAM O. SMITH,
Attorney-General,
Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

[Inclosure 5 in No. 79.]

[Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser, January 17, 1893.]

MASS MEETING—CITIZENS DETERMINED TO RESIST AGGRESSION—AN ENTHUSIASTIC GATHERING AT THE RIFLES' ARMORY PROTESTS AGAINST THE REVOLUTIONARY ATTITUDE OF THE QUEEN—RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED AND THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY AUTHORIZED TO TAKE FURTHER STEPS.

At 2 p. m. yesterday the Honolulu Rifles' armory was the scene of one of the largest and most enthusiastic mass meetings ever held in Honolulu. It was called by the committee of public safety for the purpose of protesting against the revolutionary aggressions of the Queen. At 1:30 citizens began to assemble, and before 2 o'clock

the large building was crowded to its utmost capacity, 1,260 being present, by actual count, while many others came later. Every class in the community was fully represented, mechanics, merchants, professional men, and artisans of every kind being present in full force. The meeting was intensely enthusiastic, being animated by a common purpose and feeling, and most of the speakers were applauded to the echo. Hon. W. C. Wilder, of the committee of safety, was the chairman.

Mr. WILDER said: Fellow citizens, I have been requested to act as chairman of the meeting. Were it a common occurrence, I should consider it an honor, but to-day, we are not here to do honor to anybody. I accept the chairmanship of this meeting as a duty. [Applause.] We meet here to-day as men—not as any party, faction, or creed, but as men who are bound to see good government. It is well known to you all what took place at the palace last Saturday. I need not tell you the object of this meeting, and no such meeting has been held since 1887. There is the same reason now as then. An impromptu meeting of citizens was called Saturday to take measures for the public safety. The report of the committee will be read to you. We do not meet as revolutionists, but as peaceful citizens who have the right to meet and state their grievances. [Loud applause.] We will maintain our rights and have courage to maintain them. [Universal cheers.]

Noble Thurston being introduced by the chairman read the report of the committee of safety.

“REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF SAFETY.

“To the citizens of Honolulu:

“On the morning of last Saturday, the 14th instant, the city was startled by the information that Her Majesty Queen Liliuokalani had announced her intention to arbitrarily promulgate a new constitution, and that three of the newly appointed cabinet ministers had, or were about to, resign in consequence thereof.

“Immediately after the prorogation of the legislature at noon the Queen, accompanied, by her orders, by the cabinet, retired to the palace; the entire military force of the Government was drawn up in line in front of the building, and remained there until dark, and a crowd of several hundred native sympathizers with the new-constitution project gathered in the throne room and about the palace. The Queen then retired with the cabinet, informed them that she had a new constitution ready, that she intended to promulgate it and proposed to do so then and there, and demanded that they countersign her signature.

“She turned a deaf ear to their statements and protests that the proposed action would inevitably cause the streets of Honolulu to run red with blood, and threatened that unless they complied with her demand she would herself immediately go out upon the steps of the palace and announce to the assembled crowd that the reason she did not give them the new constitution was because the ministers would not let her. Three of the ministers, fearing mob violence, immediately withdrew and returned to the Government building. They were immediately summoned back to the palace, but refused to go on the ground that there was no guaranty of their personal safety.

“The only forces under the control of the Government are the household guards and the police. The former are nominally under the control of the minister of foreign affairs and actually under the control of their immediate commander, Maj. Nowlein, a personal adherent of the Queen.

“The police are under the control of Marshal Wilson, the open and avowed royal favorite. Although the marshal is nominally under the control of the attorney-general, Her Majesty recently announced in a public speech that she would not allow him to be removed. Although the marshal now states that he is opposed to the Queen's proposition, he also states that if the final issue arises between the Queen and the cabinet and people he will support the Queen.

“The cabinet was absolutely powerless and appealed to citizens for support.

“Later they reluctantly returned to the palace, by request of the Queen, and for nearly two hours she again endeavored to force them to acquiesce in her desire, and upon their final refusal announced in a public speech in the throne room and again from the upper gallery of the palace that she desired to issue the constitution, but was prevented from doing so by her ministers and would issue it in a few days.

“The citizens responded to the appeal of the cabinet to resist the revolutionary attempt of the Queen, by gathering at the office of William O. Smith.

“Late in the afternoon it was felt that bloodshed and riot were imminent; that the community could expect no protection from the legal authorities; that, on the contrary, they would undoubtedly be made the instruments of royal aggression. An impromptu meeting of citizens was held, which was attended by the attorney-general, and which was addressed, among others, by the minister of the interior, J. F. Colburn, who stated to the meeting substantially the foregoing facts.

“The meeting unanimously passed a resolution that the public welfare required

the appointment of a committee of public safety of thirteen, to consider the situation and devise ways and means for the maintenance of the public peace and the protection of life and property.

"Such a committee was forthwith appointed and has followed its instructions.

"The first step which the committee consider necessary is to secure openly, publicly, and peaceably, through the medium of a mass meeting of citizens, a condemnation of the proceedings of the party of revolution and disorder and a confirmation from such larger meeting of the authority now vested in the committee.

"For such purpose the committee hereby recommends the adoption of the following resolution:

"RESOLUTION.

"1. Whereas Her Majesty Liliuokalani, acting in conjunction with certain other persons, has illegally and unconstitutionally and against the advice and consent of the lawful executive officers of the Government, attempted to abrogate the existing constitution and proclaim a new one in subversion of the rights of the people;

"2. And whereas such attempt has been accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed and a display of armed force, and such attempt and acts and threats are revolutionary and treasonable in character;

"3. And whereas Her Majesty's cabinet have informed her that such contemplated action was unlawful and would lead to bloodshed and riot and have implored and demanded of her to desist from and renounce such proposed action;

"4. And whereas such advice has been in vain, and Her Majesty has in a public speech announced that she was desirous and ready to promulgate such constitution, the same being now ready for such purpose, and that the only reason why it was not now promulgated was because she had met with unexpected obstacles and that a fitting opportunity in the future must be awaited for the consummation of such object, which would be within a few days;

"5. And whereas at a public meeting of citizens held in Honolulu on the 14th day of January instant a committee of thirteen to be known as the 'committee of public safety' was appointed to consider the situation and to devise ways and means for the maintenance of the public peace and safety and the preservation of life and property;

"6. And whereas such committee has recommended the calling of this mass meeting of citizens to protest against and condemn such action and has this day presented a report to such meeting denouncing the action of the Queen and her supporters as being unlawful, unwarranted, in derogation of the rights of the people, endangering the peace of the community, and tending to excite riot and cause the loss of life and destruction of property:

"Now, therefore, we, the citizens of Honolulu of all nationalities and regardless of political party affiliations, do hereby condemn and denounce the action of the Queen and her supporters;

"And we do hereby ratify the appointment and indorse the action taken and report made by the said committee of safety; and we do hereby further empower such committee to further consider the situation and further devise such ways and means as may be necessary to secure the permanent maintenance of law and order and the protection of life, liberty, and property in Hawaii."

Mr. THURSTON said: Mr. Chairman: Hawaii is a wonderful country. We are divided into parties and nationalities and factions, but there are moments when we are united and move shoulder to shoulder, moved by one common desire for the public good. Three times during the past twelve years this has happened—in 1880, 1887 and to-day. They say it is ended, it is done, there is nothing to consider. Is it so? [Calls of no! no!] I say, gentlemen, that now and here is the time to act. [Loud cheers.] The Queen says she won't do it again. [Cries of humbug.] Fellow-citizens, have you any memories? Hasn't she once before promised—sworn solemnly before Almighty God to maintain this constitution? What is her word worth? [Calls of nothing! nothing!] It is an old saying that a royal promise is made to be broken. Fellow-citizens, remember it. We have not sought this situation. Last Saturday the sun rose on a peaceful and smiling city; to-day it is otherwise.

Whose fault is it? Queen Liliuokalani's. It is not her fault that the streets have not run red with blood. She has printed a proclamation and at the same time, perhaps sent out by the same carriers, her organ prints an extra with her speech with bitterer language than in the Advertiser. She wants us to sleep on a slumbering volcano which will one morning spew out blood and destroy us all. The Constitution gives us the right to assemble peacefully and express our grievances. We are here doing that to-day without arms. The man who has not the spirit to rise after the menaces to our liberties has no right to keep them. Has the tropic sun cooled and thinned our blood, or have we flowing in our veins the warm, rich blood which loves liberty and dies for it? I move the adoption of the resolution.

[Tumultuous applause.]

Mr. H. F. GLADE. The Queen has done an unlawful thing in ignoring the constitution which she had sworn to uphold. We most decidedly protest against such revolutionary proceeding, and we should do all we possibly can to prevent her from repeating actions which result in disorder and riot. We now have a promise from the Queen that proceedings as we experienced on Saturday shall not occur again; but we should have such assurances and guaranties for this promise that will really satisfy us and convince us of the faith and earnestness of the promise given, of which we now have no assurance. What such guaranties and assurances ought to be I can not at this moment say or recommend. This should be referred to the committee of safety for their careful consideration. I second the motion.

Mr. Young, in addressing the meeting, spoke as follows:

Mr. Chairman and fellow-citizens: In June, 1887, I stood on this same platform and addressed an audience almost as large as the one now before me. At that time we had met to consider a resolution that looked toward a new constitution, which proposed constitution was considered the most effectual method of removing some flagrant abuses in governmental affairs, practiced by the King and his cabinets. The constitution was promulgated. To-day we have met to consider the action of Her Majesty in attempting to set aside the constitution we all worked so hard to have promulgated, in the lost interests of the sovereign and the people at large, as well as for the redemption of the credit of the Kingdom abroad. It has long been reported that at some favorable opportunity the Queen would spring a new constitution upon the people and place matters even more in the hands of the sovereign than they were before the revolution of 1887. Some did not believe the rumors, but the actions of the Queen in the last few days have convinced the most skeptical that the rumors were well founded and that she had been pregnant with this unborn constitution for a long time; but it could not be born till under the propitious star.

In trying to promulgate this long-promised constitution the Queen has therefore premeditatedly committed a breach of faith with one portion of her subjects in order to satisfy the clamors of a faction of natives urged by the influence of a mischievous element of foreigners who mean no good to the Queen or the people, but simply for the purpose of providing avenues for carrying out more perfectly the smuggling of opium and diverting the contents of the treasury into their own pockets. A by-authority circular has now been handed around setting forth that the Queen and her cabinet had decided not to press the promulgation of a new constitution; but can we depend on this promise of Her Majesty? Is this promise any more binding upon her than the oath she took before Almighty God to support and maintain the present constitution? Has not the Queen resorted to very questionable methods in an underhanded way to remove what, to the people, was one of the most acceptable cabinets ever commissioned by any sovereign in this Kingdom, in order that four other ministers might be appointed that would carry out her behest, treasonable or otherwise, as might be most conveniently within their scope?

I say, have we any reasonable assurance that the Queen and her ministers have abandoned finally the new constitution promulgation scheme? [Roars of "No" from the audience.] My fellow citizens, while the Queen and her cabinet continue to trifle with and play fast and loose with the affairs of state there can be no feeling of security for foreign families residing within these domains. There can be no business prosperity here at home, and our credit abroad must be of the flimsiest and most uncertain nature. And you, business men, who are toiling honestly for your bread and butter, will have to put up with thin bread and much thinner butter if this farcical work is continued. In order that matters may be set to rights again, and that honest, stable, and honorable government may be maintained in Hawaii, I support the resolution and trust that it will be passed unanimously by this meeting.

Mr. C. BOLTE. Since the resolution which was read here has been written things have changed. On Saturday the Queen promised the native people that she would give them a new constitution under all circumstances; she did not say exactly when, but as soon as possible. This morning a proclamation was issued, in which she says that her attempt to promulgate a new constitution last Saturday was made under stress of her native subjects, but that she will not do it again. An attempt to change the fundamental law of the land is a very serious matter, a matter that requires a good deal of consideration, and I am well convinced that this matter has been weighed and considered for more than a day by the Queen, and that there was no acting on the spur of the moment under the stress of her native subjects about it. It was her well premeditated conclusion that she would change the constitution so as to suit herself, on the day of prorogation of the legislature. Many people knew this several days ago, but there have been so many rumors about all sorts of things that not very much attention was paid to it; it was expected that she might change her mind before that day would come. But she did not change her mind as soon as that; she told the native people that she was ready to give them a new constitution right then and there, but that she could not do it because her ministers would not

let her. Now she has changed her mind; she makes a sort of excuse for what she did, and says she will never do it again.

It seems to me that the question that your committee has to ask now, and which is for you gentlemen here in the meeting to decide is this: Are you satisfied with the assurance given in to-day's proclamation signed by the Queen and the four ministers, and will you consider this matter ended, or do you desire greater and stronger guarantees for the safety and preservation of your life and liberty and property? I am one of the citizens' committee of public safety; my views on the situation are expressed in the resolutions which have just been read, and I trust you will show that you are of the same mind as the committee by adopting these resolutions.

Hon. H. P. BALDWIN. I feel, with the rest of you, that the actions of the Queen have put the country in a very critical situation. Before this revolutionary act of Her Majesty we were getting along. A ministry had been appointed which would probably have been able to pull us through. The McKinley bill had put the whole country into a critical situation. We were working up new industries. Mr. Dillingham was trying to build a railroad around this island. The Queen seems to have blinded herself to all these things. She has followed a whim of her own—a whim of an irresponsible body of Hawaiians—and tried to establish a new constitution. We must stop this; but we must not go beyond constitutional means. I favor this resolution, but think the committee should act within the constitution. There is no question that the Queen has done a revolutionary act; there is no doubt about that. The Queen's proclamation has not inspired confidence; but shall we not teach her to act within the constitution? [Loud calls of "No."] Well, gentlemen, I am ready to act when the time comes.

J. EMMELUTH wished to say a few words on the situation. He had heard the Queen's speech at the palace, and noted the expression of her face. It was fiendish. When the petitioners filed out he reflected on the fact that thirty men could paralyze the business of the community for twenty-four hours. It was not they that did it, but the schemers behind them, and perhaps a woman, too. It was not the Hawaiians that wanted the new constitution; not those who worked. This was the third time that he had shut his doors, let his men go, and came up to this building. It would be the last time. If we let this time go by we would deserve all we would get. An opportunity came once in every lifetime. It had come to us, and if we finished as we should, a repetition of last Saturday would never occur in this country again. [Applause.] We must stand shoulder to shoulder. There was but one course to pursue, and we would all see it. The manifesto of this morning was bosh. "I won't do it any more; but give me a chance and I'll do it again." If the Queen had succeeded last Saturday, myself and you would have been robbed of the privileges without which no white man can live in this community. "Fear not, be not afraid," was written in my Bible by my mother twenty-five years ago. Gentlemen, I have done. As far as the Hawaiians are concerned, all have an aloha for them, and we wish to have laws enabling us to live peaceably together.

R. J. GREENE. Fellow citizens, among the many things I never could do was to make an impromptu speech. I have tried it over and over again and never succeeded but once, and that was after five weeks' preparation. Our patience has been exhausted. We all agree about the case. The question is, the remedy. John Greene, of Rhode Island, entered the war of the Revolution and served throughout. His son, my father, served through the war of 1812, until that little matter was settled. In 1862 John Greene, my father, stood before a meeting like this, and said he had four sons in the war, of whom I was the youngest, and would serve himself if he was not too old. This experience has biased my judgment as to some matters of civil government. It is too late to throw obstacles across the path of its progress here. I have adopted this flag and am loyal to it, but I am not willing to go one step back in the matter of civil liberty, and I will give the last drop of Rhode Island blood in my veins to go forward, and not back. [Cheers.]

Chairman Wilder read the latter part of the resolution.

It was passed by a unanimous standing vote, without a dissenting voice, and amid tremendous cheers, after which the meeting broke up.

[Inclosure 6 in No. 79.]

[Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser, January 18, 1893.]

THE NEW ERA—THE REVOLUTION TERMINATED BY THE ESTABLISHING OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT—CITIZENS RISE AND SEIZE THE GOVERNMENT BUILDING—THE MONARCHY ABROGATED—ENTHUSIASTIC VOLUNTEERS RALLY ROUND THE NEW GOVERNMENT—THE LATE QUEEN AND CABINET YIELD AND LEAVE THE TOWN UNDER THE QUIET PROTECTION OF ITS OWN CITIZENS—FULL TEXT OF THE PROCLAMATION AND ORDERS.

All day yesterday the community were in a state of expectancy, looking to the committee of public safety to do something to end the state of tension, and to secure the rights of all citizens against encroachment once and for all. The committee in the meantime was not idle, but was incessantly occupied completing its organization and perfecting the final arrangements necessary to the proclamation of the Provisional Government and its protection by an armed force. At about 2:30 o'clock an attempt was made by three native policemen to arrest the progress of a wagon which was being driven up Fort street, by Mr. Benner and Mr. Good. Those in charge of the wagon resisted the attempt of the officers to arrest its course. One of the officers making a motion to draw a revolver, Mr. Good drew his own, and calling attention to the fact that he was justified in shooting, he fired, seeking, however, to avoid the infliction of a dangerous wound. The wagon pursued its way, followed by a policeman in a hack. This episode precipitated the movement. Citizens hurried to the Beretania street armory, where they were formed into companies and marched to the Government building.

In the meantime the committee of public safety, accompanied by members of the government about to be formed, proceeded to the Government building. They were entirely unarmed. Arrived at the Government building the committee inquired for the cabinet, but the ministers were not to be found. They then demanded and received of Mr. Hassinger the possession of the building. The party now proceeded to the front steps and, in the presence of a rapidly increasing crowd, the following proclamation was read:

Before the reading of the proclamation was completed the volunteers from the Rifles' armory began to assemble in force. The grounds of Aliiolani Hale were cleared and a guard set at all the gates.

The following orders were then promptly issued by the Provisional Government:

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
January 17, 1893.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

[Order No. 1.]

All persons favorable to the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands are hereby requested to forthwith report to the Government at the Government building and to furnish the Government such arms and ammunition as they may have in their possession or control as soon as possible, in order that efficient and complete protection of life and property and the public peace may be immediately and efficiently put into operation.

SANFORD B. DOLE,
J. A. KING,
P. C. JONES,
WILLIAM O. SMITH,
Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

JOHN EMMELUTH,
ANDREW BROWN,
C. BOLTE,
JAMES F. MORGAN,
HENRY WATERHOUSE,
S. M. DAMON,
W. G. ASHLEY,
E. D. TENNY,
F. W. MCCHESENEY,
W. C. WILDER,
J. A. MCCANDLESS,
W. R. CASTLE,
LORRINA A. THURSTON,
F. J. WILHELM,

Advisory Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *January 17, 1893.*

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

[Order No. 2.]

It is hereby ordered and decreed that until further ordered the right of the writ of habeas corpus is hereby suspended, and marshal law is hereby declared to exist throughout the island of Oahu.

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
 J. A. KING,
Minister of the Interior,
 P. C. JONES,
Minister of Finance,
 WILLIAM O. SMITH,
Attorney-General,

Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

The Provisional Government sent for the late ministers, who were at the police station. Two of them came, and finally all four repaired to the headquarters of the new government, where formal demand was made upon them for the possession of the police station. The exministers asked for time to deliberate upon this demand. They went to the palace in company with Hon. Samuel M. Damon, and held a consultation with Liliuokalani. The result was a compromise proposition, which was rejected by the Provisional Government. After further consultation the following protest was noted:

I, Liliuokalani, by the grace of God and under the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against any and all acts done against myself and the Constitutional Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming to have established a Provisional Government of and for this Kingdom.

That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America, whose minister plenipotentiary, his excellency John L. Stevens, has caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the said Provisional Government.

Now, to avoid any collision of armed forces and perhaps the loss of life, I do, under this protest, and impelled by said force, yield my authority until such time as the Government of the United States shall, upon the facts being presented to it, undo the action of its representative and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as the constitutional Sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

Done at Honolulu this 17th day of January, A. D. 1893.

LILIUOKALANI, R.
 SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
 WM. H. CORNWALL,
Minister of Finance.
 JNO. F. COLBURN,
Minister of the Interior.
 A. P. PETERSON,
Attorney-General.

S. B. DOLE, Esq., and others,

Composing the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

(Indorsed:) Received by the hands of the late cabinet this 17th day of January, A. D. 1893. (Signed) Sanford B. Dole, chairman of the executive council of Provisional Government.

The late Queen and cabinet accordingly yielded unconditionally, and the police station was turned over to Commander Soper and Capt. Ziegler with forty men from Company A. Mr. Wilson made a short address to the police force assembled in the station, telling them that resistance was no longer feasible.

The Provisional Government sent notifications of the situation to the representatives of foreign powers. The following answer to the request for recognition was received from his excellency John L. Stevens:

"A Provisional Government having been duly constituted in the place of the recent Government of Queen Liliuokalani, and said Provisional Government being in full possession of the Government building, the archives, and the treasury, and in control of the capital of the Hawaiian Islands, I hereby recognize said Provisional Government as the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

"JOHN L. STEVENS,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

At latest advices the Provisional Government was in complete possession of the city, and the only Government possessing, exercising, or claiming any authority or power whatsoever.

No. 3.

Mr. Dole to Mr. Foster.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 18, 1893.

(Received February 3.)

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that, as president of the executive and advisory council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, I have this day commissioned and appointed the following gentlemen as special commissioners from this Government to that of the United States of America, viz, Hon. L. A. Thurston, W. R. Castle, esq., Hon. W. C. Wilder, Charles L. Carter, esq., Hon. Joseph Marsden, accrediting them to his excellency the President of the United States.

A copy of their credentials will be found inclosed.

Expressing the hope that these gentlemen will prove acceptable to the United States as the representatives of this Government, and that you will extend them all proper assistance in furtherance of their mission,

With sentiments of the highest esteem and respect,

I have, etc.,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Inclosures:) Copies of the credential letters of the five commissioners. For text see Credentials of Mr. Lorrin A. Thurston, printed as paper No. 13, *post*.

No. 4.

Ex-Queen Liliuokalani to the President.

(Received February 3, 1893.)

His Excellency BENJAMIN HARRISON,
President of the United States:

MY GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND: It is with deep regret that I address you on this occasion. Some of my subjects, aided by aliens, have renounced their loyalty and revolted against the constitutional government of my Kingdom. They have attempted to depose me and to establish a provisional government, in direct conflict with the organic law of this Kingdom. Upon receiving incontestable proof that his excellency the minister plenipotentiary of the United States, aided and abetted their unlawful movements and caused United States troops to be landed for that purpose, I submitted to force, believing that he would not have acted in that manner unless by the authority of the Government which he represents.

This action on my part was prompted by three reasons: The futility of a conflict with the United States; the desire to avoid violence, bloodshed, and the destruction of life and property, and the certainty which I feel that you and your Government will right whatever wrongs may have been inflicted upon us in the premises.

In due time a statement of the true facts relating this matter will be laid before you, and I live in the hope that you will judge uprightly and justly between myself and my enemies.

This appeal is not made for myself personally, but for my people who have hitherto always enjoyed the friendship and protection of the United States.

My opponents have taken the only vessel which could be obtained here for the purpose, and hearing of their intention to send a delegation of their number to present their side of this conflict before you, I requested the favor of sending by the same vessel an envoy to you, to lay before you my statement, as the facts appear to myself and my loyal subjects.

This request has been refused and I now ask you that in justice to myself and to my people that no steps be taken by the Government of the United States until my cause can be heard by you.

I shall be able to dispatch an envoy about the 2d day of February, as that will be the first available opportunity hence, and he will reach you with every possible haste that there may be no delay in the settlement of this matter.

I pray you, therefore, my good friend, that you will not allow any conclusions to be reached by you until my envoy arrives.

I beg to assure you of the continuance of my highest consideration.

LILIUOKALANI, R.

HONOLULU, *January 18, 1893.*

No. 5.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 80.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,

Honolulu, January 19, 1893. (Received February 3.)

SIR: The Provisional Government of Hawaii, by special steamer, send a commission to Washington with full powers to negotiate with the Government of the United States. It is composed of six representative men of the highest respectability. Hon. William C. Wilder is the president and chief manager of the Interisland Steamship Company, running steamers among the islands, and he has large property interests in Honolulu. Hon. C. M. [surname omitted] is a leading lumber merchant, doing business with Puget Sound and Oregon, born here of the best American stock. Hon. L. A. Thurston is one of the most, if not *the* most talented and influential man on the islands, and is of the highest respectability. He and his father were born on the islands, of Connecticut parentage. Though a young man, he was the leading member of the reform cabinet from July, 1887, to 1890.

Hon. William H. Castle is a lawyer of eminence, born on the islands, of western New York parentage, his father still living here at the age of 84, having resided in Honolulu nearly half a century, and for many years exercised a large influence here. Mr. Charles P. Carter is the son of the recent Hawaiian minister at Washington, Hon. H. P. Carter, and is an accomplished and most reliable gentleman, American to the core, and has a Michigan wife. Hon. Mr. Marsden is of English birth, is a prominent business man and a noble in the legislature.

These six commissioners represent a large preponderating proportion of the property holders and commercial interests of these islands. They are backed by the influences which will enable them to fully carry out their agreements with the United States Government.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

No. 6.

[Telegram.]

*Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.*DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 28, 1893.

Your dispatch, telegraphed from San Francisco, announcing revolution and establishment of a Provisional Government was received to-day. Your course in recognizing an unopposed *de facto* government appears to have been discreet and in accordance with the facts. The rule of this Government has uniformly been to recognize and enter into relation with any actual government in full possession of effective power with the assent of the people. You will continue to recognize the new Government under such conditions. It is trusted that the change, besides conducing to the tranquillity and welfare of the Hawaiian Islands, will tend to draw closer the intimate ties of amity and common interests which so conspicuously and necessarily link them to the United States. You will keep in constant communication with the commander of the United States naval force at Honolulu, with a view to acting if need be for the protection of the interests and property of American citizens and aiding in the preservation of good order under the changed condition reported.

JOHN W. FOSTER.

No. 7.

*Mr. Tracy to Mr. Foster.*NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, January 28, 1893. (Received January 28.)

SIR: I have the honor to inclose for your information a copy of a dispatch received this date from Capt. G. C. Wiltse, commanding officer U. S. S. *Boston*.

I have, etc.,

B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy.

[Inclosure.]

*Capt. Wiltse to Mr. Tracy.*HONOLULU, *January 18, 1893. (Via San Francisco, January 28.)*

The cabinet was voted out on January 12; another was appointed on January 14, on which date the Queen prorogued the legislature and attempted to proclaim new constitution. At 2 p. m. on January 16 the citizens met and organized a committee of safety. At 4:30 p. m. landed force in accordance with the request of the United States minister plenipotentiary.

Tuesday (17th) afternoon the Provisional Government was established; the Queen dethroned. The revolution was accomplished without loss of life. Everything is quiet. Commission appointed so as to negotiate terms of annexation to the United States Government.

WILTSE.

No. 8.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

[Telegram.]

HONOLULU, *February 1, 1893.*

(Via San Francisco, Feb. 9, 1893. Received Feb. 9, 4:30 p. m.)

Provisional Government of Hawaii gaining power and respect. Everything is quiet. Annexation sentiment is increasing. Dead monarchy and opposition to annexation is supported chiefly by lottery and opium ring. Today at 9 a. m., in accordance with the request of Provisional Government of Hawaii, I have placed Government of Hawaii under the United States protection during negotiations, not interfering with the execution of public affairs. Have mailed important dispatches. Have sent duplicate copies of dispatches. It is advisable that Commodore Skerrett proceed at once to Honolulu, Sandwich Islands, with one or more United States ships as precautionary measures.

STEVENS.

No. 9.

Mr. Smith to Mr. Foster.

HAWAIIAN LEGATION,

Washington, February 3, 1893. (Received February 3.)

SIR: I beg to submit to you (copy of) official dispatch of the Provisional Government of Hawaii, received by me yesterday.

It announces the sending of five commissioners, Hon. L. A. Thurston, W. R. Castle, esq., Hon. W. C. Wilder, C. L. Carter, esq., Hon. Joseph Marsden, to treat with the Government of the United States.

These gentlemen will arrive in Washington this day, and with your consent, I shall be glad to present them to you to-morrow, at the State Department.

Renewing assurance of my highest consideration,

J. MOTT SMITH.

[Inclosure 1.]

Mr. Dole to Mr. Smith.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 18, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to inform your excellency that by public proclamation made on the 17th instant, from the Government building, in all formal style, the Hawaiian monarchy was abrogated and a Provisional Government over the Hawaiian Islands established, as is duly set forth in the copy of the proclamation handed to your excellency herewith.

It having been found necessary to dispatch a commission of five gentlemen to Washington for the purpose of carrying out the provisions expressed in such proclamation, I have this day, by and with the advice and consent of the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government, appointed and commissioned the following-named gentlemen as such commissioners: Hon. L. A. Thurston, W. R. Castle, esq., Hon. W. C. Wilder, C. L. Carter, esq., Hon. Joseph Marsden, who have been presented with the proper credentials to the President of the United States and the Secretary of State.

I would therefore request your excellency to render all possible aid and assistance in your power to the furthering of their mission, the success of which the Provisional Government earnestly desires to consummate.

With the highest respect and consideration,
I have the honor, etc.,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

[Inclosure 2.]

[Proclamation of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, January 17, 1893, printed *ante* as inclosure with Mr. Stevens's No. 79 of January 18, 1893.]

No. 10.

Mr. Tracy to Mr. Foster.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, February 3, 1893. (Received February 3.)

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a communication received this day from Capt. G. C. Wiltse, U. S. Navy, commanding the U. S. S. *Boston*, relating to Hawaiian affairs.

I have the honor, etc.,

B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy.

[Inclosure.]

Capt. Wiltse to Mr. Tracy.

U. S. S. BOSTON, SECOND RATE,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 18, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report concerning the condition of political affairs in the Hawaiian Islands:

As stated in my communication of January 4, 1893, the *Boston* sailed from this port for Hilo, Hawaii, with the United States minister on board.

During the absence of the ship from this port, on January 12, the cabinet was voted out of office by a vote of 25 to 16. Another cabinet was appointed on January 14.

On the morning of January 14 the *Boston* arrived in this port from Lahina, Maui, and came to anchor. At noon on the same day the legislature was prorogued by the Queen, and it was rumored that the Queen intended proclaiming a new constitution. This, however, was not done. On Monday, January 16, there was a large and enthusiastic mass meeting, composed of the representative men of Honolulu, held in the largest hall in the city, at 2 p. m. On the same day I received from the United States minister a request to land the sailors and marines of the *Boston* to protect the United States legation, consulate, and the lives and property of American citizens.

At 4:30 p. m., January 16, I landed the ship's battalion under command of Lieut. Commander William T. Swinburne.

One detachment of marines was placed at the legation and one at the consulate, while the main body of men, with two pieces of artillery, were quartered in a hall of central location near the Government building.

On Tuesday, January 17, a provisional government was established and the Queen dethroned.

The Provisional Government took possession of the Government buildings, the archives, and the treasury, the Queen acquiescing under protest. The Provisional Government was recognized as the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands by the United States minister.

The revolution has been accomplished without the loss of a single life, and to-day, January 18, the Provisional Government has possession and control of the city, which is under martial law.

I am informed that commissioners will leave to-morrow for Washington fully accredited for purposes of negotiation to permit these islands to come under the control of the United States.

Very respectfully,

G. C. WILTSE,
Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S. Boston.

No. 11.

The Hawaiian special commissioners to Mr. Foster.

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1893.

SIR: We have the honor to hereby inform you that by order of his excellency Sanford B. Dole, president and minister of foreign affairs of the executive council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands and of the executive council of such Government, Messrs. L. A. Thurston, W. C. Wilder, W. R. Castle, J. Marsden, and C. L. Carter have been constituted and appointed special commissioners to the President of the United States, with instructions to proceed forthwith to Washington and there to represent to the President and Government of the United States of America the facts leading up to and concerning the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, and to request from such Government of the United States of America that the acknowledgment and recognition of such Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands heretofore given to such Provisional Government by his excellency John L. Stevens, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States of America at Hawaii, may be confirmed by the President and Government of the United States of America.

And also the said commissioners are instructed and fully authorized and empowered by the said Provisional Government to negotiate a treaty between the said Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands and the Government of the United States of America, by the terms of which full and complete political union may be secured between the United States of America and the Hawaiian Islands.

In accordance with such instructions we hereby present for your consideration a brief statement of the principal facts leading up to and concerning the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, as follows:

On Saturday, the 14th of January, ultimo, Her Majesty Liliuokalani, Queen of the Hawaiian Kingdom, attempted with force to abrogate the existing constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom and promulgate a new constitution. Such attempt was resisted by her cabinet, whom she threatened with violence. She finally desisted from her attempt to immediately promulgate the proposed constitution, announcing in two public speeches, however, that she had not abandoned such project, but would carry the same into effect "within a few days."

All of the military and police forces of the Kingdom being directly under the control of the personal adherents of the Queen, the cabinet appealed to citizens for protection and support against the proposed aggression. The citizens rallied in opposition to the project of the Queen, and at a public meeting appointed a committee of public safety,

of thirteen members, to consider the situation and devise ways and means for the maintenance of the public peace and the protection of life and property.

After considering the situation, such committee called a public meeting of citizens on Monday, the 16th of said January. Such meeting was duly held, to the number of about fifteen hundred of the leading citizens. A report by such committee was submitted to such meeting, recommending the adoption of certain resolutions. Such resolutions were unanimously adopted. A copy of such report and resolutions, marked Inclosure A, is herewith submitted.

A few hours before such meeting a proclamation was issued by the Queen and cabinet, a copy of which is inclosed herewith and marked Inclosure B.

On the afternoon of the same day, the Queen then having about four hundred men under arms and the people being in open preparation for dethroning her, with every indication of a conflict, the United States troops landed and a guard was stationed at the American consulate and legation and the remainder were quartered in a public hall hired for that purpose.

They neither then nor at any time since have taken any part either for or against the Queen or the Provisional Government.

After full consideration by the said committee and consultation with leading citizens of all nationalities, it was the unanimous opinion of such committee and citizens that the statements of fact in such proclamation did not detract from the necessity for action, and the undertaking therein contained was deemed unreliable; and for the reasons briefly set forth in such above-mentioned report of the committee of safety and resolutions, and also in the proclamation hereunder referred to, there was no longer any possibility of efficiently and permanently maintaining the public peace and the protection of life, liberty, and property in Hawaii under the existing system of government, and that the only method of maintaining such permanent peace and security was by securing the assistance and support of the Government of the United States, or some other foreign power possessed of sufficient force to prevent the future possibility of revolution or despotic assumption of power in derogation of the rights of the people.

In accordance with such conclusion, such committee, representing almost the entire property and intelligence of the Hawaiian Islands, on the 17th day of said January issued a proclamation abrogating the monarchy, deposing Queen Liliuokalani, and establishing a Provisional Government, "to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon," a copy of which proclamation, marked Inclosure C, is submitted herewith.

Immediately after such proclamation such Provisional Government took possession of the city of Honolulu, including the Government buildings, the archives and the treasury, and within a few hours thereafter received surrender of all the military and police forces, thereby coming into full possession of the Kingdom.

Immediately after such possession had been obtained notification thereof was given to the representatives of all foreign countries represented at Honolulu, accompanied by the request that such representatives extend to said Provisional Government their recognition.

In reply to such request the representative of the United States of America accorded such recognition upon the same day that it was requested, to wit, the 17th of said January, and on the following day recognition of such Provisional Government was made by the repre-

sentatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Russia, Spain, Norway and Sweden, The Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Mexico, Chile, Peru, and China; and on the following day, to wit, the 19th of said January, recognition of such Provisional Government was extended by the representatives of France and Portugal. Copies of the acknowledgments of the said representatives of foreign Governments, with the exception of those of the representatives of Portugal and France, which were received too late to obtain copies thereof, are inclosed herewith, marked Inclosure D.

In further pursuance of such instructions we hereby request that the acknowledgment and recognition of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands by the representative of the United States of America at Hawaii may be confirmed by the Government of the United States of America.

And also in further pursuance of such instructions we herewith present a communication from the said executive council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands to Benjamin Harrison, President of the United States of America, informing him of the appointment of the above-named L. A. Thurston, W. C. Wilder, W. R. Castle, J. Marsden, and C. L. Carter as special commissioners with full power and authority to negotiate and agree upon the terms of a union of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands and the Government of the United States of America, the original of which is inclosed herewith and marked Inclosure E.

The commissions of the said above-named gentlemen, as such special commissioners for the purpose aforesaid, are also inclosed herewith for inspection, and marked Inclosure F.

In further pursuance of such instructions, we also hereby request that a treaty may be concluded between the Government of the United States of America and the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, by the terms of which full and complete political union may be secured between the United States of America and the Hawaiian Islands, and for that purpose we hereby request that negotiations may be opened between the representatives of the Government of the United States of America and the said special commissioners on behalf of the Provisional Government.

In further pursuance of such instructions, we also herewith submit a copy of a protest made by her ex-majesty Queen Liliuokalani against the action of the said Provisional Government, which is marked Inclosure G.

We have the honor, etc.,

L. A. THURSTON,
W. C. WILDER,
WM. R. CASTLE,
J. MARSDEN,
CHARLES L. CARTER,

*Special Commissioners of the Provisional Government
of the Hawaiian Islands.*

[Inclosure A.]

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF SAFETY.

To the citizens of Honolulu:

On the morning of last Saturday, the 14th instant, the city was startled by the information that Her Majesty, Queen Liliuokalani, had announced her intention to ar-

bitrarily promulgate a new constitution, and that three of the newly appointed cabinet ministers had, or were about to, resign in consequence thereof.

Immediately after the prorogation of the legislature, at noon, the Queen, accompanied by her orders by the cabinet retired to the palace; the entire military force of the Government was drawn up in line in front of the building, and remained there until dark, and a crowd of several hundred natives, sympathizers with the constitution project, gathered in the throne room and about the palace. The Queen then retired with the cabinet; informed them that she had a new constitution ready; that she intended to promulgate it and proposed to do so then and there, and demanded that they countersign her signature.

She turned a deaf ear to their statements and protests, that the proposed action would inevitably cause the streets of Honolulu to run red with blood, and threatened that unless they complied with her demand she would herself immediately go out upon the steps of the palace and announce to the assembled crowd that the reason she did not give them the new constitution was because the ministers would not let her. Three of the ministers, fearing mob violence, immediately withdrew and returned to the Government building. They were immediately summoned back to the palace but refused to go, on the ground that there was no guaranty of their personal safety.

The only forces under the control of the Government are the household guards and the police. The former are nominally under the control of the minister of foreign affairs, and actually under their immediate commander, Maj. Nowlein, a personal adherent of the Queen.

The police are under the control of Marshal Wilson, the open and avowed royal favorite. Although the marshal is nominally under the control of the attorney-general, Her Majesty recently announced in a public speech that she would not allow him to be removed. Although the marshal now states that he is opposed to the Queen's proposition, he also states that if the final issue arises between the Queen and the cabinet and the people he will support the Queen.

The cabinet was absolutely powerless and appealed to citizens for support.

Later they reluctantly returned to the palace, by request of the Queen, and for nearly two hours she endeavored to force them to acquiesce in her desire, and upon their final refusal announced in a public speech in the throne room and again from the upper gallery of the palace that she desired to issue the constitution but was prevented from doing so by her ministers and would issue it in a few days.

The citizens responded to the appeal of the cabinet to resist the revolutionary attempt of the Queen by gathering at the office of William O. Smith.

Later in the afternoon it was felt that bloodshed and riot were imminent; that the community could expect no protection from the legal authorities; that on the contrary they would undoubtedly be made the instruments of royal aggression. An impromptu meeting of citizens was held, which was attended by the attorney-general, and which was addressed, among others, by the minister of the interior, J. F. Calburn, who stated to the meeting substantially the foregoing facts.

The meeting unanimously passed a resolution that the public welfare required the appointment of a committee of public safety of thirteen, to consider the situation and devise ways and means for the maintenance of the public peace and the protection of life and property.

Such committee was forthwith appointed and has followed its instructions.

The first step which the committee consider necessary is to secure openly, publicly, and peaceably through the medium of a mass meeting of citizens a condemnation of the proceeding of the party of revolution and disorder and a confirmation from such larger meeting of the authority now vested in the committee.

For such purpose the committee hereby recommends the adoption of the following resolution:

RESOLUTION.

(1) Whereas Her Majesty Liliuokalani, acting in conjunction with certain other persons, has illegally and unconstitutionally, and against the advice and consent of the lawful executive officers of the Government, attempted to abrogate the existing constitution and proclaim a new one in subversion of the rights of the people;

(2) And whereas such attempt has been accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed and a display of armed force; and such attempt and acts and threats are revolutionary and treasonable in character;

(3) And whereas Her Majesty's cabinet have informed her that such contemplated action was unlawful and would lead to bloodshed and riot, and have implored and demanded of her to desist from and renounce such proposed action;

(4) And whereas such advice has been in vain, and Her Majesty has in a public speech announced that she was desirous and ready to promulgate such constitution, the same being now ready for such purpose, and that the only reason why it was not

promulgated was because she had met with unexpected obstacles, and that a fitting opportunity in the future must be awaited for the consummation of such object, which would be within a few days;

(5) And whereas at a public meeting of citizens held in Honolulu on the 14th day of January instant a committee of thirteen to be known as the "Committee of Public Safety" was appointed to consider the situation and devise ways and means to consider the situation of the public peace and safety and the preservation of life and property;

(6) And whereas such committee has recommended the calling of this mass meeting of citizens to protest against and condemn such action, and has this day presented a report to such meeting denouncing the action of the Queen and her supporters as being unlawful, unwarranted, in derogation of the rights of the people, endangering the peace of the community, and tending to excite riot, and cause the loss of life and destruction of property.

Now, therefore, we, the citizens of Honolulu, of all nationalities, and regardless of political party affiliations, do hereby condemn and denounce the action of the Queen and her supporters.

And we do hereby ratify the appointment and indorse the action and report made by the said committee of safety, and we do hereby further empower such committee to further consider the situation, and further devise such ways and means as may be necessary to secure the permanent maintenance of law and order and the protection of life, liberty, and property in Hawaii.

[Inclosure B.]

BY AUTHORITY.

Her Majesty's ministers desire to express their appreciation for the quiet and order which has prevailed in this community since the events of Saturday, and are authorized to say that the position taken by Her Majesty in regard to the promulgation of a new constitution, was under stress of her native subjects.

Authority is given for the assurance that any changes desired in the fundamental law of the land will be sought only by methods provided in the constitution itself.

Her Majesty's ministers request all citizens to accept the assurance of Her Majesty in the same spirit which it is given.

LILIUKALANI.
SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
W. H. CORNWELL,
Minister of Finance.
JOHN F. COLBURN,
Minister of the Interior.
A. P. PETERSON,
Attorney-General.

IOLANI PALACE, January 16, 1893.

[Inclosure C.]

[Proclamation of Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, January 17, 1893. Printed *ante* as inclosure with Mr. Stevens's No. 79 of January 18, 1893.]

[Inclosure D.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 17, 1893.

A Provisional Government having been duly constituted in the place of the recent Government of Queen Liliukalani, and said Provisional Government being in full possession of the Government buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and in control of the capital of the Hawaiian Islands, I hereby recognize said Provisional Government as the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

JOHN L. STEVENS,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

IMPERIAL GERMAN CONSULATE, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
Honolulu, January 18, 1893.

GENTLEMEN: I have the honor to own receipt of your esteemed favor of yesterday's date, and hereby take much pleasure to recognize and acknowledge, on behalf of the Government of Germany, the present Government of the Hawaiian Islands, and that I shall do all in my power to further and support the same.

I have the honor to remain, gentlemen, your most obedient servant,

H. F. GLADE,
Imperial German Consul.

MESSRS. SANFORD B. DOLE, J. A. KING, P. C. JONES, and WILLIAM O. SMITH,
Executive Council of the Provisional Government in Hawaii.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN CONSULATE, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
Honolulu, January 18, 1893.

GENTLEMEN: I have the honor to own receipt of your esteemed favor of yesterday's date, and hereby take much pleasure to recognize and acknowledge, on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Government, the present Government of the Hawaiian Islands, and that I shall do all in my power to further and support the same.

I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your most obedient servant,

H. F. GLADE,
Austro-Hungarian Consul.

MESSRS. SANFORD B. DOLE, J. A. KING, P. C. JONES, and WILLIAM O. SMITH,
Executive Council of the Provisional Government in Hawaii.

HONOLULU, *January 18, 1893.*

GENTLEMEN: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of yesterday's date, together with a copy of the proclamation issued yesterday, whereby you inform me that for reasons set forth the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and a Provisional Government established, the same being now in possession of the Government departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and whereby you request me to recognize the said Provisional Government on behalf of the Government of Italy as the existing *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands and to afford to it the moral support of my Government.

In response I have the honor to say that I comply with the above request and recognize the said Provisional Government as far as my authority as consul for Italy may permit me to act for and on behalf of His Italian Majesty's Government in the premises.

I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your very obedient servant,

F. A. SCHAEFER,
Consul for Italy.

HON. SANFORD B. DOLE, J. A. KING, P. C. JONES, and W. O. SMITH,
Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

VICE-CONSULATE OF RUSSIA,
Honolulu, January 18, 1893.

SIRS: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of 17th instant, and in reply beg to inform you that I take the pleasure to recognize the Provisional Government of Hawaii, as defined in the proclamation inclosed in your letter on behalf of the Government of Russia, and I shall afford to it my moral support as representative of the country last named.

I have the honor to be, sirs, your most obedient servant,

J. F. HACKFELD,
Acting Vice-Consul.

MESSRS. SANFORD B. DOLE, J. A. KING, P. C. JONES, and WILLIAM O. SMITH,
Executive Council of the Provisional Government of Hawaii, Honolulu.

HONOLULU, January 18, 1893.

GENTLEMEN: I have the honor to own the receipt of your communication of yesterday's date, together with a copy of the proclamation issued yesterday, informing me that for reasons set forth the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and a provisional government established, and requesting me to recognize the said Provisional Government, on behalf of the Spanish Government, as the existing *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands, and to afford to it the moral support of my Government.

In response I have the honor to say that I comply with the above request and recognize the said Provisional Government as the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands within the scope of my authority.

I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

H. RENJES,
Vice-Consul for Spain.

Hons. SANFORD B. DOLE, J. A. KING, P. C. JONES, and W. O. SMITH,
Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

KONGL. SWENSTA OCH WORSTA KONFULATET,
Honolulu, January 18, 1893.

GENTLEMEN: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excellencies' communication of January 17, informing me that the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and that a provisional government has been established in Hawaii for reasons set forth in a proclamation, of which you sent me a copy; also that such provisional government has been proclaimed, is now in possession of the Government departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and is in control of the city.

In reply to your request to recognize the Provisional Government and afford it the moral support of my Government, I beg to say that I do recognize it as the existing *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands, and that I shall report to my Government immediately.

Your excellencies' most obedient servant,

H. W. SCHMIDT,
Consul.

CONSULATE OF THE NETHERLANDS,
Honolulu, January 18, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the communication of the executive council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, announcing the abrogation of the Hawaiian monarchy; of your possession of the Government departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, as well as being in control of the city.

Added to the above is your request for the official recognition of the existing *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands on behalf of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which I have the honor to represent, and to give you the moral support of my Government.

In reply I take pleasure in assuring the gentlemen of the executive council that I cordially extend to them full assent to their claim for recognition, and of my intention to add such moral support as may come within the scope of my consular authority.

I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your very obedient servant,

JOHN H. PATY,
Consul for The Netherlands.

Messrs. S. B. DOLE, J. A. KING, P. C. JONES, and W. O. SMITH,
Executive Council, Hawaiian Provisional Government, etc.

ROYAL DANISH CONSULATE,
Honolulu, January 18, 1893.

SIRS: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of yesterday's date, inclosing a copy of proclamation issued last evening, informing me that for reasons set forth in said proclamation the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and a provisional government established, which is now in possession of the Government departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and request-

ing me, on behalf of the Government of Denmark, to recognize said Provisional Government as the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands, and to accord to it the moral support of my Government.

In reply I have the honor to state that I hereby comply with the above request, recognize the said Provisional Government as the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands, to the extent that my authority will allow me to act, pending a reply from my Government.

I have the honor to be, sirs, yours, most obediently,

E. C. MACFARLANE,
Acting Vice-Consul for Denmark.

MESSRS. SANFORD B. DOLE, J. A. KING, P. C. JONES, and WILLIAM O. SMITH,
Executive Council of Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

CONSULATE OF BELGIUM, *January 18, 1893.*

SIRS: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 17th instant, and in reply beg to inform you that I take pleasure to recognize the Provisional Government of Hawaii, as defined in the proclamation inclosed in your letter, in behalf of the Government of Belgium, and I shall afford to it my moral support as representative of the country last named.

I have the honor to be, sirs, your most obedient servant,

J. F. HACKFELD,
Consul.

MESSRS. SANFORD B. DOLE, J. A. KING, P. C. JONES, and WILLIAM O. SMITH,
Executive Council of the Provisional Government of Hawaii, Honolulu.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *January 18, 1893.*

GENTLEMEN: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of yesterday's date, together with a copy of the proclamation issued yesterday, informing me that for reasons set forth the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and a provisional government established, and requesting me to recognize the said Provisional Government on behalf of the Mexican Government as the existing *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands, and to afford to it the moral support of my Government.

In answer I have the honor to state that I comply with the above request and recognize the said Provisional Government as the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands, within the scope of my authority.

I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

H. RENJES,
Consul for Mexico.

HONS. SANFORD B. DOLE, J. A. KING, P. C. JONES, and W. O. SMITH,
Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

CONSULATE OF CHILE,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 18, 1893.

GENTLEMEN: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of yesterday's date, together with a copy of the proclamation issued yesterday, whereby I am informed that for reasons set forth the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and a Provisional Government established, the same being now in possession of the Government departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and whereby you request me to recognize the said Provisional Government as the existing *de facto* Government on behalf of the Government of Chile and afford to it the moral support of my Government.

In response I have the honor to say that I comply with the above request and recognize the said Provisional Government as the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands so far as my authority as consul of Chile may permit me to act for and on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Chile in the premises.

I have the honor to be, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

H. A. SCHAEFER,
Consul for Chile.

HONS. SANFORD B. DOLE, J. A. KING, P. C. JONES, and W. O. SMITH,
Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

OFFICE OF THE PERUVIAN CONSULATE,
Honolulu, January 18, 1893.

GENTLEMEN: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your valued communication of the 17th instant, inclosing a copy of the proclamation then issued, wherein it is set forth that the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and a Provisional Government established.

You request me to recognize said Government, on the behalf of the Government of Peru, as the existing *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands, and to afford it the moral support of my Government.

I have the honor to state in reply that I take pleasure in complying with your request, and I hereby recognize the said Government as the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands in so far as my authority in the premises will permit.

I have the honor to remain, gentlemen, your most obedient servant,

BRUCE CARTWRIGHT,
Consul for Peru.

Hons. SANFORD B. DOLE, J. A. KING, P. C. JONES, and WILLIAM O. SMITH,
*Members of the Executive Council of the Provisional Government
 of the Hawaiian Islands.*

CHINESE COMMERCIAL AGENCY,
Honolulu, January 19, 1893.

GENTLEMEN: We have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your circular letter of the 17th instant, covering a copy of the proclamation issued yesterday whereby you inform us that the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and a Provisional Government established, the latter being now in possession of the Government departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and whereby you request us to recognize the said Provisional Government on behalf of the Government of the Empire of China as the existing *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands, and to afford to it the moral support of our Government.

In answer we have the honor to say that we comply with your request and recognize the said Provisional Government as the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands so far as our authority as commercial agents of China may allow us to act for and on behalf of His Imperial Majesty's Government in this matter.

We have the honor to be, gentlemen, your most obedient servants,

GOO KIM,
Chinese Commercial Agent.
 WONG KWAI,
Assistant Chinese Commercial Agent.

Hons. SANFORD B. DOLE, J. A. KING, P. C. JONES, and WILLIAM O. SMITH,
Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

[Inclosure E.]

[Credential letters of the Hawaiian Commissioners. Printed *post* as paper No. 12.]

[Inclosure F.]

[Commissions of the Hawaiian commissioners. Printed *post* as paper No. 13.]

[Inclosure G.]

PROTEST OF QUEEN LILIUOKALANI.

I, Liliuokalani, by the grace of God and under the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against any and all acts done against myself and the constitutional government of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming to have established a Provisional Government of and for this Kingdom.

That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America, whose minister plenipotentiary, his excellency John L. Stevens, has caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the said Provisional Government.

Now, to avoid any collision of armed forces, and perhaps the loss of life, I do under this protest and impelled by said force yield my authority until such time as the Government of the United States shall, upon the facts being presented to it, undo the action of its representative and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

Done at Honolulu the 17th day of January A. D., 1893.

LILIUOKALANI R.
SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
WM. H. CROMWELL,
Minister of Finance.
JNO. F. COLBURN,
Minister of the Interior.
A. P. PETERSON,
Attorney-General.

S. B. DOLE, esq., and others,
Composing the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

(Indorsed:) Received by the hands of the late cabinet this 17th day of January, A. D. 1893. Sanford B. Dole, chairman of executive council of Provisional Government.

No. 12.

Credential letters of the Hawaiian Commissioners, exhibited to the Secretary of State February 4, 1893.

Sanford B. Dole, president of the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, to His Excellency Benjamin Harrison, President of the United States of America.

GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND: Reposing special trust in the wisdom, integrity, and ability of the Hon. Lorrin A. Thurston, one of our distinguished citizens, we have appointed and do hereby constitute and appoint him to be a *Special Commissioner* of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, with full power and authority to confer with your excellency, or your successors in office, or with any properly constituted and appointed persons and authorities of the United States Government, to negotiate and agree upon the terms of a union of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands and the Government of the United States of America, or to negotiate the terms upon which such union may be made.

He is well informed of the relative interests of the two countries, and of our earnest desire to further strengthen and cement the bonds that now exist between us, and from a knowledge of his fidelity, probity, and good conduct, we have entire confidence that he will render himself acceptable to your excellency and to the authorities of the United States Government by his constant endeavors to advance measures for the mutual benefit of both countries.

We therefore desire that your excellency will receive him favorably, and give full credence to what he may say as the "Commissioner of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands," and, most of all, when he shall assure your excellency of the earnest wish and desire of our Provisional Government for closer and more intimate relations than those now existing and of our abiding faith in the continued friendship of the great nation over which your excellency so ably presides.

We pray God to have your excellency ever in His safe and holy keeping.

Written at the Government house, at Honolulu, this eighteenth day of January, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and ninety-three.

SANFORD B. DOLE,

*President of the Executive and Advisory Councils of the
Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.*

By the President:

J. A. KING,

Minister of the Interior,

P. C. JONES,

Minister of Finance,

WILLIAM O. SMITH,

Attorney-General,

*Executive Council of the Provisional Government
of the Hawaiian Islands.*

(Similar letters of credence were delivered by the other Commissioners, Messrs. W. C. Wilder, William R. Castle, C. L. Carter, and Joseph Marsden.)

No. 13.

Commissions of the Hawaiian special commissioners, exhibited to the Secretary of State February 3, 1893.

Sanford B. Dole, president of the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, to Hon. Lorrin A. Thurston, greeting:

Know ye, that we, the executive council of the Provisional Government, reposing special trust and confidence in your wisdom, integrity, and fidelity, have constituted and appointed you, and do by these presents hereby constitute and appoint you a special commissioner to the President of the United States to negotiate with him, or another or others who may be appointed by him, certain matters detailed to you in your letter of instructions issued to you by said council, and to faithfully discharge and perform all the duties pertaining to said office under said instructions; and all persons are hereby commanded to respect this, your authority.

In witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands and the seal of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, in Honolulu, this eighteenth day of January, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-three.

[SEAL.]

SANFORD B. DOLE,
President.

By the President:

J. A. KING,

Minister of the Interior,

P. C. JONES,

Minister of Finance,

WILLIAM O. SMITH,

Attorney-General,

*Executive Council of the Provisional
Government of the Hawaiian Islands.*

(The text of the commissions of Messrs. Castle, Wilder, Carter, and Marsden read the same, *mutatio nominis*.)

No. 14.

The Hawaiian special commissioners to Mr. Foster.

WASHINGTON, D. C., February 4, 1893. (Received February 4.)

SIR: In accordance with the statement this day made by you to us that, by order of the President, you had confirmed the recognition of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands already extended to such Provisional Government by his excellency John L. Stevens, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States of America at Hawaii; and in accordance with your further statement, then made, that you accepted the credentials presented by us as special commissioners from the said Provisional Government to the Government of the United States of America for the purpose of negotiating a treaty between the said two governments by the terms of which full and complete political union may be secured between the United States of America and the Hawaiian Islands, and that you are now prepared to receive from us as such commissioners proposals in connection with the formation of such treaty for your consideration, we have the honor to state that, although we are invested by our Government with full discretionary power as to the terms of such treaty, subject to its final ratification, it is the desire of our Government that certain terms and conditions shall be incorporated in such treaty, and we hereby submit to you a general outline of such terms and conditions, viz:

(1) That such treaty may secure full, complete, and perpetual political union between the United States of America and the Hawaiian Islands.

(2) That the form of local government to be established in the Hawaiian Islands shall be substantially the form now existing in Territories of the United States, with such modifications, restrictions, and changes therein as the exigencies of the existing circumstances may require and as may be hereafter agreed upon.

(3) That all appointments to office in the Hawaiian Islands shall be made from among persons who have lived in said islands for a term of not less than five years.

(4) That the payment of the Hawaiian national debt, including the amounts due by the Government to depositors in the Hawaiian Postal Savings Bank shall be assumed by the Government of the United States of America.

(5) That the lands located at the said Hawaiian Islands heretofore known as government lands and crown lands and all other government property, and all the proceeds thereof and receipts therefrom shall continue to be the property of the local government of the said islands, under whatever form it may be established, and all the proceeds thereof devoted to the purposes and uses of such local government.

(6) That within a given period, say one year, or such other period as may be mutually agreed upon, the Government of the United States of America shall lay and thereafter maintain a telegraphic cable between the Pacific coast of the said United States of America and the Hawaiian Islands.

(7) That the United States Government shall, so soon as is reasonably practicable, open the entrance to Pearl Harbor and establish a coaling and naval station adjacent thereto.

(8) That articles, the produce or manufacture of the Hawaiian Islands, shall in all respects be treated and considered as products of the United States.

(9) That the United States laws now or hereafter to be enforced in the United States of America shall not be taken to prohibit at any time the introduction into the Hawaiian Islands of laborers who may be introduced exclusively for the purpose of agricultural labor and domestic service, and who by appropriate legislation shall be confined to such employment and to the Hawaiian Islands.

(10) That contracts for labor under the Hawaiian labor-contract laws now existing, or which shall be entered into prior to the promulgation of notice of the final ratification of such treaty, shall not be abrogated, but shall continue in force to the end of the several terms thereof. That with the exception of such labor contracts no labor contracts shall hereafter be penally enforceable.

(11) That all laws and the system of criminal and civil jurisprudence in force at the Hawaiian Islands at the date of the ratification of such treaty, which are not specifically abrogated or modified by the terms of such treaty, or which are not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, shall remain in force until the same are regularly repealed by the appropriate authority.

(12) That appropriate financial provision be made for the support of the ex-Queen Liliuokalani and the ex-heir presumptive Kaiuloni as long as they shall in good faith submit to the authority and abide by the laws of the government established by virtue of this treaty.

We have, etc.,

L. A. THURSTON,
W. C. WILDER,
J. MARSDEN,
WM. R. CASTLE,
CHARLES L. CARTER,

*Special Commissioners of the Provisional Government
of the Hawaiian Islands.*

No. 15.

The Commissioners of the Hawaiian Provisional Government to Mr. Foster.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 11, 1893.* (Rec'd Feb. 11.)

SIR: The ex-Queen of Hawaii, Liliuokalani, having sent to the President of the United States a protest against the action of the Hawaiian Provisional Government, we beg to make a brief reply to the statements contained in such protest.

The protest sets forth as the two main grounds of complaint the fact that certain of her subjects had revolted against her, aided by United States troops, and, secondly, that the Provisional Government had chartered the only available steamer at Honolulu, upon which they had sent commissioners to Washington and had refused to allow a representative from the Queen to come forward by the same steamer.

Before replying to these two statements we call attention to the fact that the protest entirely suppresses the fact that the Queen herself had been guilty of an illegal act; that she had herself initiated violence, and that the action taken by the subjects who had, as she says, revolted against her was in resistance to her own attempted subversion of the constitution and laws of the land. As the fact that she did make such

an attempt with threats against her legal advisers, and with a show and preparation, is not denied by the Queen or anyone on her behalf, we submit that the omission of any reference to such undoubted facts, so radically essential to a proper understanding of the matter, properly tends to throw discredit upon the Queen's statements.

In reply to the charge that United States troops assisted in the overthrow of the monarchy, we deny the statement most emphatically.

A brief recital of the facts, without argument on our part, is amply sufficient to show the incorrectness of the charge made.

Such facts are briefly these:

First. At the time of the initiation of the trouble by the attempt of the Queen to submit the constitution and promulgate a new one, the American minister and the American ship-of-war *Boston* were both absent from Honolulu and had been for ten days previously thereto.

Second. The first exhibition of force was made by the Queen on Saturday, the 14th of January, by the public parading of the entire military force, armed with repeating rifles and carrying a full supply of ball cartridges. The members of the police department were also armed. In addition thereto there were located at the palace and barracks and the police station an additional body of armed men to the number of 540 according to their own statement. This additional body of armed men was not authorized by law and was assembled contrary to a specific law of the Kingdom.

Third. The first call to arms in opposition to the Queen was issued by the cabinet on the afternoon of January 14.

Fourth. Although on Saturday, the 14th, Sunday, the 15th, and Monday, the 16th, the most intense feelings of hostility were publicly manifested between the adherents of the Queen on the one hand and the promoters of the movement for the establishment of a Provisional Government on the other, with every indication of an armed conflict which might be precipitated at any moment, it was not until 5 o'clock on Monday afternoon, the 16th of January, after the request had been made to the American minister by many American citizens, that the United States troops were landed.

Fifth. Upon landing, a guard was posted at the American consulate and legation, and the remainder of the troops were quartered that night in a public hall hired for that purpose. Up to the time the commissioners left Honolulu at 9 o'clock on the morning of the 19th of January, all of the American troops had remained upon the premises where they were respectively located. No demonstration was made by the troops in any manner whatever. The uniform of the United States was not seen upon the streets, except upon the persons of the individual officers passing between the points at which troops were located in the execution of their own business.

Sixth. At the time the Provisional Government took possession of the Government buildings, no American troops or officers were present or took part in such proceedings in any manner whatever. No public recognition was accorded the Provisional Government by the American minister until they were in possession of the Government buildings, the archives, and the treasury, supported by several hundred armed men, and after the abdication by the Queen and the surrender to the Provisional Government of her forces.

It is submitted that the foregoing statement of facts amply meets the charge made by the Queen that American troops coerced her action in abdication.

In reply to the second statement of the Queen, that the Provisional

Government took the only vessel available to go to San Francisco and refused to allow her representative to come to San Francisco thereon, we beg to state that the charge is entirely incorrect.

As a matter of fact, the Inter Island fleet of steamers consists of twenty vessels, all of which, with two exceptions, were built abroad and navigated to the islands. Of such vessels at least ten are as fully capable of making the trip to San Francisco as was the vessel chartered and dispatched by the Provisional Government.

As the Provisional Government had allowed a mail to be sent by the chartered steamer, they did not consider that there was any reason for financially assisting the Queen in forwarding to Washington an agent hostile to the Government and its objects. So far as is known to the commissioners, there is no reason why the Queen should not have chartered a steamer at Honolulu and forwarded an agent to San Francisco thereon if she had desired so to do. Certainly there was nothing done by the Provisional Government to prevent her doing so.

With assurances of the highest consideration, etc.,

L. A. THURSTON,
W. C. WILDER,
WM. N. CASTLE,
J. MARSDEN,
CHARLES L. CARTER,

Commissioners of the Hawaiian Provisional Government.

No. 16.

Mr. Carter to Mr. Foster.

WASHINGTON, D. C.,

February 11, 1893. (Received February 11, 1893.)

SIR: In response to your request for information on the subjects of the resources of the ex-Queen and the Princess Kaulani, the public lands, and the islands and dependencies of the Hawaiians, the inclosed statements have been prepared from such sources of information as were available to the commission, and are submitted for the use of your Department.

With assurance of esteem, I am, etc.,

CHARLES L. CARTER.

[Inclosure 1.]

RESOURCES OF THE QUEEN AND PRINCESS KAIULANI.

The Queen.—The private recourses of the ex-Queen are not definitely known, further than that she has some valuable lands, productive and unproductive, and that she was the sole devisee of her late husband, John O. Dominis, whose estate was appraised at \$20,000 in the probate court; probably her private income is in the neighborhood, per annum, of..... \$5,000

The public supplies for the sovereign for the current biennial period ending March, 1894, were as follows:

Her Majesty's privy purse	33,332
Her Majesty's household expenses.....	10,000
State entertainments	4,000

The Crown lands.—The agent of the commissioners of Crown lands informed Mr. Carter a few weeks ago that the net revenue was between \$55,000 and \$60,000; gross revenue, estimated..... \$60,000
No accounts are kept available to the public.

The ex-Queen was born on the 2d day of September, 1838, and is now in her fifty-fourth year.

The Princess Kaiulani (born October 16, 1875, and now in her eighteenth year).—The accounts of the guardian of this lady, filed annually in the probate court, to the best recollection of the commissioners, show an annual income from private sources of..... 4,000

The public supplies appropriated for the current biennial period were:
Direct allowance..... 10,000
Traveling expenses..... 4,000

[Inclosure 2.]

STATEMENT OF PUBLIC LANDS.

Crown lands.—These lands are those set apart for the maintenance of the royal state of Hawaiian sovereigns. They have been the subject of legislation from time to time. Three commissioners are empowered to lease them for terms not to exceed thirty years. The net revenue is paid to the sovereign.

These lands are situated on all of the main islands and comprise some of the finest tracts in the country. Total area, 876,000 acres. (See Report Minister of the Interior, 1890, p. 293.)

Government lands.—These lands were set apart to assist in defraying the expense of maintaining organized government. They have been in the care of the minister of the interior, subject to sale or lease at his discretion, with checks providing for publicity, due notice of disposal, etc. Total area, 875,500 acres.

School lands.—These were set apart for industrial purposes, and were for the greater part supplanted by Government bonds, as set forth in note to statement of public debt. There remain about 200 school sites of from one-fourth of an acre to 5 acres, and two tracts of about 2,000 acres.

[Inclosure 3.]

The Hawaiian Islands and dependencies.

Name.	Area.	Population, 1890.
Hawaii.....	4,210	26,754
Maui.....	760	17,357
Oahu.....	600	31,194
Kauai.....	590	11,643
Molokai.....	270	2,632
Lanai.....	150	174
Niihau.....	97	216
Kahoolawe.....	63	Nominal.
Nihoa or Bird Island.....	Not surveyed.	Do.
Johnsons or Cornwallis.....	do	Do.
Neckers.....	do	Do.
French Frigate Shoals.....	do	Do.
Brothers Reef.....	do	Do.
Garden Island.....	do	Do.
Allens Reef.....	do	Do.
Laysans Island.....	do	Do.
Lisiansky Island.....	do	Do.
Philadelphia or Bunkers.....	do	Do.
Pearl or Hermes Reef.....	do	Do.
Middle Island (Midway or Brooks Island).....	do	Do.
Ocean Island.....	do	Do.
Palmyra Island.....	do	Do.

And all outlying and adjoining reefs, atolls, islets, and unnamed islands.

No. 17.

*Mr. Tracy to Mr. Foster.*NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, February 11, 1893. (Received February 11.)

SIR: I have the honor to transmit for your information a copy of a translation of a cipher dispatch received this date from the commanding officer of the U. S. S. *Boston*, at Honolulu, Hawaii.

Very respectfully,

B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy.

[Inclosure—telegram.]

Mr. Wiltse to Mr. Tracy.

HONOLULU, *February 1, 1893. (San Francisco, Cal., February 10.)*

Capt. Wiltse reports that no change has occurred in the situation and that until the Government of Hawaii expresses a desire to have the forces withdrawn, and the minister approves such desire a battalion will be kept ashore for the protection of the lives and property of citizens of the United States in the island; he reports the progress of the Hawaiian Government which is daily gaining ground and has organized forces; he announces that the minister plenipotentiary of the United States placed the Government of Hawaii under the protection of the United States, during negotiations not interfering with the execution of public affairs, on this day at 9 a. m. in accordance with the request of the Provisional Government of Hawaii, and says that he has sent telegrams of the minister to the Secretary of State.

No. 18.

*Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.*DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 11, 1893.

SIR: Your cipher telegram, dated the 1st instant, and transmitted through the Navy Department's good offices, was received here at 4:30 p. m. on the 9th instant.

You therein make the following important statement:

To-day, at 9 a. m., in accordance with the request of the Provisional Government of Hawaii, I have placed government of Hawaii under the United States protection during negotiations, not interfering with the execution of public affairs.

The precise character and scope of the act thus announced by you do not appear from this brief recital. The press, however, prints full details of the occurrences of the 1st instant, as telegraphed from San Francisco on the arrival of the mail steamer *Australia* at that port on the morning of the 9th, and I therein find what purports, with appearance of general correctness, to be the text of a proclamation issued by you on the 1st instant, which reads as follows:

By authority to the Hawaiian people:

At the request of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, I hereby, in the name of the United States of America, assume protection of the Hawaiian Islands for the protection of life and property, and occupation of the public buildings

and Hawaiian soil, so far as may be necessary for the purpose specified, but not interfering with the administration of public affairs by the Provisional Government. This action is taken pending and subject to negotiations at Washington.

JOHN L. STEVENS,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

UNITED STATES LEGATION, *February 1, 1893.*

Approved and executed by C. C. Wiltse, captain, U. S. Navy, commanding U. S. S. *Boston*.

The manner and degree of the execution of your proclamation by the naval force are not related with particularity in a brief telegraphic report just received from Capt. Wiltse. He merely says:

To-day at 9 a. m. in accordance with request of Provisional Government of Hawaii, the United States minister plenipotentiary placed the Government of Hawaii under United States protection, during negotiations, not interfering with the execution of public affairs.

It appears from the press reports that the ceremonial for the execution of your orders consisted in the landing of a battalion from the *Boston*, its formation at the Government building in concert with three volunteer companies of the Provisional Government, the reading of your proclamation by Lieut. Rush, and the hoisting of the United States flag over the Government building. The Hawaiian flag on other public buildings in Honolulu is stated not to have been disturbed.

The phraseology of your proclamation in announcing your action in assumption of protection of the Hawaiian Islands in the name of the United States would appear to be tantamount to the assumption of a protectorate over those islands in behalf of the United States with all the rights and obligations which the term implies. To this extent it goes beyond the necessities of the situation and the instructions heretofore given you.

Your existing instructions, and those under which the commanders of naval vessels of the United States acted, were and are ample to provide all legitimate material protection in case of need, either in your discretion or at the request of the duly constituted authorities of the Hawaiian Islands, for the lives and property of American citizens endangered or menaced, or for the prevention of lawless and tumultuous acts of disturbance of the public peace and safety. The accordance of such measures of protection, or the unsolicited taking of the needful precautions to those ends is, however, not to be confounded with the establishment of a protectorate, which is in fact the positive erection of a paramount authority over or in place of the duly constituted local government, and the assumption, by the protector, of the especial responsibilities attached to such formal protection.

It is not thought probable that the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, in soliciting protection, contemplated more than the coöperation of the moral and material forces of the United States to strengthen its own authority and power, as a recognized sovereign Government, for the protection of life and property, as stated in your proclamation. Such a decree of protection you were, as I have said, already fully competent to accord, or to exercise in your discretion, in case of need.

Your proclamation expresses no reservation as to confirmation of your action by the Government of the United States. Its provisos are, that the assumed function of protection is to be exercised so far as may be necessary for the specified purpose of protecting life and property, without interference with the administration of public affairs by the Provisional Government, and that the action in question "is taken pending

and subject to negotiations at Washington." These qualifications are entirely in the line of my views of the scope and intent of the request made to you by the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands. The omission of reference to the necessary sanction of the Government of the United States is immaterial, for its function of revision and confirmation or disavowal of the acts of its agents is inherent and exercisable at its discretion..

So far, therefore, as your action amounts to according, at the request of the *de facto* sovereign Government of the Hawaiian Islands, the co-operation of the moral and material forces of the United States for the protection of life and property from apprehended disorders, your action is commended. But so far as it may appear to overstep that limit by setting the authority and power of the United States above that of the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, in the capacity of protector, or to impair in anyway the independent sovereignty of the Hawaiian Government by substituting the flag and power of the United States as the symbol and manifestation of paramount authority, it is disavowed.

Instructions will be sent to the commanding officers of the United States naval forces in the Hawaiian Islands confirming and renewing the instructions heretofore given them under which they are authorized and directed to coöperate with you for the preservation of American life and property, and the maintenance of good order in case of need. Your own instructions in the same sense are continued.

You are accordingly authorized, upon the receipt of these instructions, to arrange with the commanding naval officer for the continued presence on shore of such marine force as may be practicable and requisite for the security of the lives and property interests of citizens of the United States, and the repression of lawlessness and public disturbance threatening them, whenever in your judgment it shall be necessary so to do, or when such coöperative measures may be sought for good cause by the Government of the Hawaiian Islands; being, however, always careful to make due discrimination between those functions of voluntary or accorded protection and the assumption of a protectorate over the Hawaiian Islands by the United States. No step should be taken by you, or will be sanctioned by this Government, which might tend to derogate in anyway from the independence of the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, which the United States have recognized as sovereign and with which they treat on terms of sovereign equality.

A telegraphic instruction briefly outlining the substance of this dispatch, will be sent to you, by way of San Francisco, by the mail steamer sailing from that port on the 15th instant.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

No. 19.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 82.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,

Honolulu, February 1, 1893. (Received February 14, 5 p. m.)

SIR: Everything is moving on here quietly. The Provisional Government is discharging its responsibilities with firmness, discretion,

and in the spirit of conciliation and magnanimity. The annexation sentiment has constantly increased since the departure of the Commissioners for Washington, and with healthful earnestness is taking possession of all classes. Nearly all the Germans, the larger proportion of the respectable and responsible English, and almost the entire Portuguese population are warmly for annexation. This inclination of the Portuguese is quite important, for they number seven or eight thousand, and are among the most industrious and saving.

As to terms of annexation I still adhere firmly to the opinion expressed in my dispatch 74, that the sugar bounty to be paid to the Hawaiian sugar planters should be limited to 6 mills per pound, \$12 per ton, so long and only so long as the United States bounty system shall be maintained. To the objection that this allows only \$12 per ton on Hawaiian sugar, while the Hawaiian planters get twice the amount per acre that the Louisiana planters do, on the average, and as I said in my dispatch 74, the consensus of opinion among the leading planters here, obtained by me five or six months since, was and is that \$12 per ton bounty will place all the Hawaiian plantations worth maintaining on the road of financial safety and success.

As to the form of government for the islands I now only vary from views expressed in my 74 as to incline strongly to the opinion that the beginning should be substantially like that of President Jefferson and Congress in respect of Louisiana, in the act of 1804 (page 283, United States Statutes at Large), only differing from that by providing in addition to governor, attorney-general, a commissioner of finance, and commissioner of the interior, and a legislative council of thirteen or fourteen, all to be appointed by the President, unless it should be deemed best for the governor to appoint attorney-general and the commissioners of finance and of the interior, who would be practically a cabinet of three to aid the governor to carry on the government. This plan and method of government could be maintained as a transition government until experience should prove it best to change to a more popular form.

In the meantime the responsible voters would rapidly increase, and American ideas and interests would gain in force and volume. My private consultation with the Provisional Government since the departure of the commissioners for Washington has led us to think highly of the Jefferson act of 1804 for Louisiana as a transition expedient for Hawaii. This would cause no shock, and would allow affairs to move along on safe and conservative lines until time and experience demand something better. It would be fortunate to have such a man as Sanford B. Dole, the present head of the Provisional Government, the first American governor of Hawaii.

As to liquidation of all political claims of the fallen Queen and the crown princess, may I be allowed to suggest that the spirit and import of the March treaty plan of 1854 had better be adopted, which authorized the expenditure of \$100,000 for like purposes. I therefore suggest, that if a liquidation of this kind be now under consideration and \$150,000 should be allowed as the total sum for this purpose, \$70,000 should go to the fallen Queen, Liliuokalani, and \$70,000 to the crown princess, Kaiulani, and \$5,000 to each of the two young princes. The last named, the two princes, are harmless young persons, of little account, not chiefs by blood, but they were made princes by the late King Kalakaua, without any constitutional right or power to do so, the then boys being nephews of his wife, Kapiolani. Should the entire sum

granted for these purposes be greater or less than \$150,000 I advise that the above specified proportions be maintained.

As to the native Hawaiians and their native leaders at this time, things are tending favorably toward annexation. Mr. Kauhane, for many years a member of the legislature, and regarded, for many years, the best native in the islands in public life, a noble in the recent session of that body, is earnest for annexation. So is Mr. Kauhi, a member of the legislature, from this island. Hon. John W. Kalua, the ablest native lawyer in the islands, years a member of former legislatures, from the important island of Maui, thinks the fall of the Queen and the extinction of the monarchy a boon to Hawaii, and he is for annexation. Robert W. Wilcox, the half-white native, who led the Hawaiian revolt in 1889, which came so near being successful, is now for annexation. He was educated in Italy, at a military school, is 37 years of age, his father being a citizen of Rhode Island, and, it is said, is still living in that State. This Wilcox has more fighting ability than any other native Hawaiian, and will be proud to become an American citizen, and at a future time to serve in the Army or civil service of the United States.

The ablest of the native Hawaiian Christian ministers are strong in their American sympathies. The pastor of the large native Hawaiian church in this city, a native Hawaiian, is for annexation earnestly. The other large Hawaiian congregation and church in Honolulu has a favorite pastor, born here of American parentage, whose quiet influence is in the same direction. The native newspaper of much the largest circulation in the islands advocates annexation, stands by the Provisional Government, and is losing none of its circulation. The main part of the opponents of annexation are the lower class of natives, led by unscrupulous foreigners, of little property, mostly from California, Australia, and Canada, who wish to maintain the Hawaiian monarchy and its corruptions for their own unworthy purposes, and who think their opportunities for power and spoliation will be gone if annexation becomes a fact.

The Hawaiian pear is now fully ripe, and this is the golden hour for the United States to pluck it. If annexation does not take place promptly, or is held in doubt and suspense for six or ten months, there certainly will be here a revulsion to despair, and these people, by their necessities, might be forced toward becoming a British colony, for the English here of the monarchical type would then avail themselves of their opportunity and stir up all possible opposition to annexation. The wealthiest Englishman of these islands has to-day called at this legation, and no man in Hawaii is more earnest for annexation. His two sons, large business men, are with him in this regard, and the next wealthy old British resident, a Scotchman by birth, is with the first man named for annexation. I can not otherwise than urge prompt action at Washington.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

No. 20.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 84.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,

Honolulu, February 1, 1893. (Received February 14, 5 p. m.)

SIR: To-day the undersigned and Capt. Wiltse of the *Boston* are compelled to assume a grave responsibility. The inclosed copies of official notes will explain the reasons which have led to this action on our part.

I have time before the departure of the mail steamer only to state briefly the additional reasons which caused us to assume temporary protectorate of these islands. The Provisional Government must have time to organize a new police and to discipline a small military force. When the monarchy died by its own hand, there was no military force in the islands but the royal guard of about 75 natives, not in effective force equal to 20 American soldiers. These were promptly discharged by the Provisional Government, except 16 left as the guard of the fallen Queen at her house.

The white men here, as well as the natives, have not been much accustomed to the use of arms. There are scarcely any men familiar with military discipline. Companies are now being organized and drilled. They must have a few weeks for drill. Only a small force of a few hundred will be required, but these must be disciplined men. So far the Provisional Government has been sustained by the uprising and union of the business men and best citizens. Bankers, merchants, clerks, professional men, respectable mechanics have stood manfully by the new Government and kept guard by night. This kind of defense must give place to a small, reliable military force. Time is the necessity of the new Government. There are 40,000 Chinese and Japanese on the islands, and evil-disposed persons might stir some of them to disorder. But the chief elements of evil are in Honolulu, where are the renegade whites at the head of the lottery and opium rings, and a considerable number of hoodlum foreigners and the more vicious of the natives.

Another important reason for our action is the possibility of the arrival here of a British war vessel, and that the English minister here, thus aided, might try to press unduly the Provisional Government. With the islands under our protection we think the English minister will not attempt to insist that his Government has the right to interfere while our flag is over the Government building. This is all I have time to write before the departure of the mail. We shall continue to maintain our present position with great caution and firmness until we hear from the President through the Secretary of State. As a necessary precaution against all contingencies, I advise that Admiral Skerrett be promptly sent here with one or two ships in addition to the *Boston*.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

(One or two of the preceding numbers of the dispatches by this mail were written prior to this date, but they were dated February 1 because this is the day of the steamer's departure.)

[Inclosure 1.]

*Mr. Stevens to Capt. Wiltse.*UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 1, 1893.

SIR: The Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands having duly and officially expressed, to the undersigned, the fear that said Government may be unable to protect life and property and to prevent civil disorder in Honolulu, the capital of said Hawaiian Islands, request that the flag of the United States may be raised for the protection of the Hawaiian Islands, and to that end confer on the United States, through the undersigned, freedom of occupation of the public buildings of the Hawaiian Government and the soil of the Hawaiian Islands, so far as may be necessary for the exercise of such protection, but not interfering with the administration of the public affairs by said provisional government.

I hereby ask you to comply with the terms and spirit of the request of the Hawaiian Provisional Government, and to that end to use all the force at your command, in the exercise of your best judgment and discretion, you and myself awaiting instructions from the United States Government at Washington.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

Capt. G. C. WILTSE,

Commander of the U. S. Ship Boston.

[Inclosure 2.]

The Hawaiian Provisional Government to Mr. Stevens.

SIR: Believing that we are unable to satisfactorily protect life and property, and to prevent civil disorders in Honolulu and throughout the Hawaiian Islands, we hereby, in obedience to the instructions of the advisory council, pray that you will raise the flag of the United States for the protection of the Hawaiian Islands for the time being, and to that end we hereby confer upon the Government of the United States, through you, freedom of occupation of the public buildings of this Government, and of the soil of this country, so far as may be necessary for the exercise of such protection, but not interfering with the administration of public affairs by this Government.

We have, etc.,

SANFORD B. DOLE,

*President of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands,
and Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

J. A. KING,

Minister of Interior.

P. C. JONES,

Minister of Finance.

WILLIAM O. SMITH,

Attorney-General.

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

No. 21.

*Constitution of the Hawaiian Islands, signed by His Majesty Kalakaua,
July 6, and promulgated July 7, 1887.*

CONSTITUTION.

Whereas the constitution of this Kingdom heretofore in force contains many provisions subversive of civil rights and incompatible with enlightened constitutional government;

And whereas it has become imperative, in order to restore order and tranquility and the confidence necessary to a further maintenance

of the present government, that a new constitution should be at once promulgated:

Now, therefore, I, Kalakaua, King of the Hawaiian Islands, in my capacity as Sovereign of this Kingdom, and as the representative of the people hereunto by them duly authorized and empowered, do annul and abrogate the constitution promulgated by Kamehameha the Fifth, on the 20th day of August, A. D. 1864, and do proclaim and promulgate this constitution.

ARTICLE 1. God hath endowed all men with certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the right of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.

ARTICLE 2. All men are free to worship God according to the dictates of their own consciences; but this sacred privilege hereby secured shall not be so construed as to justify acts of licentiousness, or practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the Kingdom.

ARTICLE 3. All men may freely speak, write, and publish their sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and no law shall be enacted to restrain the liberty of speech or of the press.

ARTICLE 4. All men shall have the right, in an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble, without arms, to consult upon the common good, and to petition the King or legislature for redress of grievances.

ARTICLE 5. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus belongs to all men, and shall not be suspended unless by the King when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety shall require its suspension.

ARTICLE 6. No person shall be subject to punishment for any offense except on due and legal conviction thereof in a court having jurisdiction of the case.

ARTICLE 7. No person shall be held to answer for any crime or offense (except in cases of impeachment or for offenses within the jurisdiction of a police or district justice, or in summary proceedings for contempt) unless upon indictment, fully and plainly describing such crime or offense, and shall have the right to meet the witnesses who are produced against him face to face; to produce witnesses and proofs in his own favor; and by himself or his counsel, at his election, to examine the witnesses produced by himself, and cross-examine those produced against him, and to be fully heard in his own defence. In all cases in which the right of trial by jury has been heretofore used it shall be held inviolable forever, except in actions of debt or assumpsit in which the amount claimed is less than fifty dollars.

ARTICLE 8. No person shall be required to answer again for an offense of which he has been duly convicted or of which he has been duly acquitted.

ARTICLE 9. No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

ARTICLE 10. No person shall sit as a judge or juror in any case in which his relative, by affinity, or by consanguinity within the third degree, is interested, either as plaintiff or defendant, or in the issue of which the said judge or juror may have, either directly or through such relative, any pecuniary interest.

ARTICLE 11. Involuntary servitude, except for crime, is forever prohibited in this Kingdom. Whenever a slave shall enter Hawaiian territory he shall be free.

ARTICLE 12. Every person has the right to be secure from all un-

reasonable searches and seizures of his person, his house, his papers, and effects; and no warrants shall issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

ARTICLE 13. The Government is conducted for the common good, and not for the profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class of men.

ARTICLE 14. Each member of society has a right to be protected in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, according to law; and, therefore, he shall be obliged to contribute his proportional share to the expense of this protection, and to give his personal services, or an equivalent when necessary. Private property may be taken for public use, but only upon due process of law and just compensation.

ARTICLE 15. No subsidy, duty, or tax, of any description, shall be established or levied without the consent of the legislature; nor shall any money be drawn from the public treasury without such consent, except when, between the sessions of the legislature, the emergencies of war, invasion, rebellion, pestilence, or other public disaster shall arise, and then not without the concurrence of all the cabinet, and of a majority of the whole privy council; and the minister of finance shall render a detailed account of such expenditure to the legislature.

ARTICLE 16. No retrospective laws shall ever be enacted.

ARTICLE 17. The military shall always be subject to the laws of the land; and no soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by the legislature.

ARTICLE 18. Every elector shall be privileged from arrest on election days, during his attendance at election, and in going to and returning therefrom, except in case of treason, felony, or breach of the peace.

ARTICLE 19. No elector shall be so obliged to perform military duty on the day of election, as to prevent his voting, except in time of war or public danger.

ARTICLE 20. The supreme power of the Kingdom, in its exercise, is divided into the executive, legislative, and judicial; these shall always be preserved distinct, and no executive or judicial officer, or any contractor, or employee of the Government, or any person in the receipt of salary or emolument from the Government, shall be eligible to election to the legislature of the Hawaiian Kingdom, or to hold the position of an elective member of the same. And no member of the legislature shall, during the time for which he is elected, be appointed to any civil office under the Government, except that of a member of the cabinet.

ARTICLE 21. The Government of this Kingdom is that of a constitutional monarchy, under His Majesty Kalakaua, his heirs and successors.

ARTICLE 22. The crown is hereby permanently confirmed to His Majesty Kalakaua, and to the heirs of his body lawfully begotten, and to their lawful descendants in a direct line; failing whom, the crown shall descend to Her Royal Highness the Princess Liliuokalani, and the heirs of her body lawfully begotten, and their lawful descendants in a direct line. The succession shall be to the senior male child, and to the heirs of his body; failing a male child, the succession shall be to the senior female child, and to the heirs of her body. In case there is no heir as above provided, the successor shall be the person whom the sovereign shall appoint, with the consent of the nobles, and publicly proclaim during the sovereign's life; but should there be no such ap-

pointment and proclamation, and the throne should become vacant, then the cabinet, immediately after the occurring of such vacancy, shall cause a meeting of the legislature, who shall elect by ballot some native Alii of the Kingdom as successor to the throne; and the successor so elected shall become a new *stirps* for a royal family; and the succession from the sovereign thus elected shall be regulated by the same law as the present royal family of Hawaii.

ARTICLE 23. It shall not be lawful for any member of the royal family of Hawaii who may by law succeed to the throne, to contract marriage without the consent of the reigning sovereign. Every marriage so contracted shall be void, and the person so contracting a marriage, may, by the proclamation of the reigning sovereign, be declared to have forfeited his or her right to the throne; and after such proclamation, the right of succession shall vest in the next heir as though such offender were dead.

ARTICLE 24. His Majesty Kalakaua will, and his successor shall, take the following oath: I solemnly swear, in the presence of Almighty God, to maintain the constitution of the Kingdom whole and inviolate, and to govern in conformity therewith.

ARTICLE 25. No person shall ever sit upon the throne who has been convicted of any infamous crime, or who is insane or an idiot.

ARTICLE 26. The King is the commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and of all other military forces of the Kingdom, by sea and land; but he shall never proclaim war without the consent of the legislature; and no military or naval force shall be organized except by the authority of the legislature.

ARTICLE 27. The King, by and with the advice of his privy council, and with the consent of the cabinet, has the power to grant reprieves and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses, except in case of impeachment.

ARTICLE 28. The King convenes the legislature at the seat of Government, or at a different place, if that should become insecure from an enemy or any dangerous disorder, and prorogues the same; and in any great emergency he may, with the advice of the privy council, convene the legislature in extraordinary session.

ARTICLE 29. The King has the power to make treaties. Treaties involving changes in the tariff, or in any law of the Kingdom, shall be referred for approval to the legislature. The King appoints public ministers, who shall be commissioned, accredited, and instructed agreeably to the usage and law of nations.

ARTICLE 30. It is the King's prerogative to receive and acknowledge public ministers; to inform the legislature by royal message, from time to time, of the state of the Kingdom; and to recommend to its consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.

ARTICLE 31. The person of the King is inviolable and sacred. His ministers are responsible. To the King and the cabinet belongs the executive power. All laws that have passed the legislature shall require his majesty's signature in order to their validity, except as provided in Article 48.

ARTICLE 32. Whenever, upon the decease of the reigning sovereign, the heir shall be less than eighteen years of age, the royal power shall be exercised by a regent or council of regency, as hereinafter provided.

ARTICLE 33. It shall be lawful for the King, at any time when he may be about to absent himself from the Kingdom, to appoint a regent or council of regency, who shall administer the Government in his name; and likewise the King may, by his last will and testament, appoint a

regent or council of regency to administer the Government during the minority of any heir to the throne; and should a sovereign de cease, leaving a minor heir, and having made no last will and testament, the cabinet at the time of such de cease shall be a council of regency, until the legislature, which shall be called immediately, be assembled; and the legislature, immediately that it is assembled, shall proceed to choose by ballot a regent or council of regency, who shall administer the Government in the name of the King, and exercise all the powers which are constitutionally vested in the King, until such heir shall have attained the age of eighteen years, which age is declared to be the legal majority of such sovereign.

ARTICLE 34. The King is sovereign of all the chiefs and of all the people.

ARTICLE 35. All titles of honor, orders, and other distinctions emanate from the King.

ARTICLE 36. The King coins money and regulates the currency by law.

ARTICLE 37. The king, in case of invasion or rebellion, can place the whole kingdom, or any part of it, under martial law.

ARTICLE 38. The national ensign shall not be changed except by act of the legislature.

ARTICLE 39. The King can not be sued or held to account in any court or tribunal of the Kingdom.

ARTICLE 40. There shall continue to be a council of state for advising the King in all matters for the good of the state wherein he may require its advice, which council shall be called the King's privy council of state, and the members thereof shall be appointed by the King, to hold office during his majesty's pleasure, and which council shall have and exercise only such powers as are given to it by the constitution.

ARTICLE 41. The cabinet shall consist of the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of the interior, the minister of finance, and the attorney-general, and they shall be his majesty's special advisers in the executive affairs of the Kingdom; and they shall be *ex-officio* members of his majesty's privy council of state. They shall be appointed and commissioned by the King, and shall be removed by him only upon a vote of want of confidence passed by a majority of all the elective members of the legislature or upon conviction of felony, and shall be subject to impeachment. No act of the King shall have any effect unless it be countersigned by a member of the cabinet, who by that signature makes himself responsible.

ARTICLE 42. Each member of the cabinet shall keep an office at the seat of Government, and shall be accountable for the conduct of his deputies and clerks. The cabinet holds seats *ex-officio* in the legislature with the right to vote, except on a question of confidence in them.

ARTICLE 43. The minister of finance shall present to the legislature in the name of the Government, on the first day of each biennial session, the financial budget, in the Hawaiian and English languages.

ARTICLE 44. The legislative power of the Kingdom is vested in the King and the legislature, which shall consist of the nobles and representatives sitting together.

ARTICLE 45. The legislative body shall be styled the legislature of Hawaiian Kingdom and shall assemble biennially in the month of May. The first regular session shall be held in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and eighty-eight.

ARTICLE 46. Every member of the legislature shall take the follow-

ing oath: I solemnly swear, in the presence of Almighty God, that I will faithfully support the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom and conscientiously and impartially discharge my duties as a member of the legislature.

ARTICLE 47. The legislature has full power and authority to amend the constitution as hereinafter provided; and from time to time to make all manner of wholesome laws not repugnant to the constitution.

ARTICLE 48. Every bill which shall have passed the legislature shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the King. If he approve, he shall sign it, and it shall thereby become a law; but if not he shall return it, with his objections, to the legislature, which shall enter the objections at large on their journal and proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration it shall be approved by a two thirds vote of all the elective members of the legislature it shall become a law. In all such cases the votes shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of the legislature. If any bill shall not be returned by the King within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the legislature by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.

ARTICLE 49. The legislature shall be the judge of the qualifications of its own members, except as may hereafter be provided by law, and a majority shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner and under such penalties as the legislature may provide.

ARTICLE 50. The legislature shall choose its own officers and determine the rules of its own proceedings.

ARTICLE 51. The legislature shall have authority to punish by imprisonment, not exceeding thirty days, every person not a member who shall be guilty of disrespect to the legislature by any disorderly or contemptuous behavior in its presence; or who, during the time of its sitting, shall publish any false report of its proceedings, or insulting comments upon the same; or who shall threaten harm to the body or estate of any of its members for anything said or done in the legislature; or who shall assault any of them therefor, or who shall assault or arrest any witness, or other person ordered to attend the legislature, on his way going or returning; or who shall rescue any person arrested by order of the legislature.

ARTICLE 52. The legislature may punish its own members for disorderly behavior.

ARTICLE 53. The legislature shall keep a journal of its proceedings; and the yeas and nays of the members, on any question, shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the journal.

ARTICLE 54. The members of the legislature shall, in all cases, except treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the legislature and in going to and returning from the same; provided such privilege as to going and returning shall not cover a period of over twenty days; and they shall not be held to answer for any speech or debate made in the legislature, in any court or place whatsoever.

ARTICLE 55. The representatives shall receive for their services a compensation to be determined by law, and paid out of the public treasury, but no increase of compensation shall take effect during the biennial term in which it shall have been made; and no law shall be passed

increasing the compensation of representatives beyond the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars each for each biennial term.

ARTICLE 56. A noble shall be a subject of the Kingdom, who shall have attained the age of twenty-five years and resided in the Kingdom three years, and shall be the owner of taxable property in this Kingdom of the value of three thousand dollars over and above all encumbrances, or in receipt of an income of not less than six hundred dollars per annum.

ARTICLE 57. The nobles shall be a court with full and sole authority to hear and determine all impeachments made by the representatives, as the grand inquest to the Kingdom, against any officers of the Kingdom, for misconduct or maladministration in their offices; but previous to the trial of every impeachment the nobles shall respectfully be sworn truly and impartially to try and determine the charge in question according to evidence and law. Their judgment, however, shall not extend further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold or enjoy any place of honor, trust, or profit under this Government; but the party so convicted shall be, nevertheless, liable to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to the laws of the land.

ARTICLE 58. Twenty-four nobles shall be elected as follows: Six from the island of Hawaii; six from the islands of Maui, Molokai, and Lanai; nine from the island of Oahu; and three from the islands of Kauai and Niihau. At the first election held under this constitution the nobles shall be elected to serve until the general election to the legislature for the year of our Lord 1890, at which election, and thereafter, the nobles shall be elected at the same time and places as the representatives. At the election for the year of our Lord 1890, one-third of the nobles from each of the divisions aforesaid shall be elected for two years, and one-third for four years, and one-third for six years, and the electors shall ballot for them for such terms, respectively; and at all subsequent general elections they shall be elected for six years. The nobles shall serve without pay.

ARTICLE 59. Every male resident of the Hawaiian Islands, of Hawaiian, American, or European birth or descent, who shall have attained the age of twenty years, and shall have paid his taxes, and shall have caused his name to be entered on the list of voters for nobles for his district, shall be an elector of nobles, and shall be entitled to vote at any election of nobles: Provided—

First. That he shall have resided in the country not less than three years, and in the district in which he offers to vote not less than three months immediately preceding the election at which he offers to vote.

Second. That he shall own and be possessed, in his own right, of taxable property in this country of the value of not less than three thousand dollars over and above all encumbrances, or shall have actually received an income of not less than six hundred dollars during the year next preceding his registration for such election.

Third. That he shall be able to read and comprehend an ordinary newspaper printed in either the Hawaiian, English, or some European language.

Fourth. That he shall have taken an oath to support the constitution and laws, such oath to be administered by any person authorized to administer oaths, or by any inspector of elections:

Provided, however, That the requirements of a three years' residence and of ability to read and comprehend an ordinary newspaper, printed either in the Hawaiian, English, or some European language, shall not apply to persons residing in the Kingdom at the time of the promulga-

tion of this constitution, if they shall register and vote at the first election which shall be held under this constitution.

ARTICLE 60. There shall be twenty-four representatives of the people elected biennially, except those first elected under this constitution, who shall serve until the general election for the year of our Lord 1890. The representation shall be based upon the principles of equality and shall be regulated and apportioned by the legislature according to the population, to be ascertained from time to time by the official census. But until such apportionment by the legislature, the apportionment now established by law shall remain in force, with the following exceptions, namely, there shall be but two representatives for the districts of Hilo and Puna on the island of Hawaii, but one for the districts of Lahaina and Kaanapali on the island of Maui, and but one for the districts of Koolauloa and Waialua on the island of Oahu.

ARTICLE 61. No person shall be eligible as a representative of the people unless he be a male subject of the Kingdom who shall have arrived at the full age of twenty-one years; who shall know how to read and write either the Hawaiian, English, or some European language; who shall understand accounts; who shall have been domiciled in the Kingdom for at least three years, the last of which shall be the year immediately preceding his election; and who shall own real estate within the Kingdom of a clear value over and above all encumbrances of at least five hundred dollars; or who shall have an annual income of at least two hundred and fifty dollars, derived from any property or some lawful employment.

ARTICLE 62. Every male resident of the Kingdom of Hawaiian, American, or European birth or descent, who shall have taken an oath to support the constitution and laws in the manner provided for electors of nobles; who shall have paid his taxes; who shall have attained the age of twenty years, and shall have been domiciled in the Kingdom for one year immediately preceding the election, and shall know how to read and write either the Hawaiian, English, or some European language (if born since the year 1840), and shall have caused his name to be entered on the list of voters of his district as may be provided by law, shall be entitled to one vote for the representative or representatives of that district, provided, however, that the requirements of being domiciled in the Kingdom for one year immediately preceding the election, and of knowing how to read and write, either the Hawaiian, English, or some European language, shall not apply to persons residing in this Kingdom at the time of the promulgation of this constitution, if they shall register and vote at the first election which shall be held under this constitution.

ARTICLE 63. No person shall sit as a noble or representative in the legislature unless elected under, and in conformity with, the provisions of this constitution. The property or income qualification of representatives, of nobles, and of electors of nobles, may be increased by law; and a property or income qualification of electors of representatives may be created and altered by law.

ARTICLE 64. The judicial power of the Kingdom shall be vested in one supreme court and in such inferior courts as the legislature may, from time to time, establish.

ARTICLE 65. The supreme court shall consist of a chief justice, and not less than two associate justices, any of whom may hold the court. The justices of the supreme court shall hold their offices during good behavior, subject to removal upon impeachment, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office: *Provided, however,*

That any judge of the supreme court or any other court of record may be removed from office, on a resolution passed by two-thirds of all the members of the legislature, for good cause shown to the satisfaction of the King. The judge against whom the legislature may be about to proceed shall receive notice thereof, accompanied by a copy of the causes alleged for his removal, at least ten days before the day on which the legislature shall act thereon. He shall be heard before the legislature.

ARTICLE 66. The judicial power shall be divided among the supreme court and the several inferior courts of the Kingdom in such manner as the legislature may from time to time prescribe, and the tenure of office in the inferior courts of the Kingdom shall be such as may be defined by the law creating them.

ARTICLE 67. The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution and laws of this Kingdom and treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority, to all cases effecting public ministers and consuls, and to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.

ARTICLE 68. The chief justice of the supreme court shall be the chancellor of the Kingdom; he shall be *ex officio* president of the nobles in all cases of impeachment, unless when impeached himself, and shall exercise such jurisdiction in equity or other cases as the law may confer upon him, his decisions being subject, however, to the revision of the supreme court on appeal. Should the chief justice ever be impeached, some person specially commissioned by the King shall be president of the court of impeachment during such trial.

ARTICLE 69. The decisions of the supreme court, when made by a majority of the justices thereof, shall be final and conclusive upon all parties.

ARTICLE 70. The King, his cabinet, and the legislature shall have authority to require the opinions of the justices of the supreme court, upon important questions of law and upon solemn occasions.

ARTICLE 71. The King appoints the justices of the supreme court and all other judges of courts of record. Their salaries are fixed by law.

ARTICLE 72. No judge or magistrate shall sit alone on an appeal or new trial in any case on which he may have given a previous judgment.

ARTICLE 73. The following persons shall not be permitted to register for voting, to vote, or to hold office under any department of the Government, or to sit in the legislature, namely: Any person who is insane or an idiot, or any person who shall have been convicted of any of the following-named offenses, viz: Arson, barratry, bribery, burglary, counterfeiting, embezzlement, felonious branding of cattle, forgery, gross cheat, incest, kidnaping, larceny, malicious burning, manslaughter in the first degree, murder, perjury, rape, robbery, sodomy, treason, subornation of perjury, and malfeasance in office, unless he shall have been pardoned by the King and restored to his civil rights, and by the express terms of his pardon declared to be eligible to offices of trust, honor, and profit.

ARTICLE 74. No officer of this Government shall hold an office or receive any salary from any other Government or power whatever.

ARTICLE 75. The legislature votes the appropriations biennially, after due consideration of the revenue and expenditure for the two preceding years and the estimates of the revenue and expenditure of the two succeeding years, which shall be submitted to them by the minister of finance.

ARTICLE 76. The enacting style in making and passing all acts and laws shall be, "Be it enacted by the King and the legislature of the Hawaiian Kingdom."

ARTICLE 77. To avoid improper influences which may result from intermixing in one and the same act such things as have no proper relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in its title.

ARTICLE 78. Wherever by this constitution any act is to be done or performed by the King or the Sovereign, it shall, unless otherwise expressed, mean that such act shall be done and performed by the Sovereign by and with the advice and consent of the cabinet.

ARTICLE 79. All laws now in force in this Kingdom shall continue and remain in full effect until altered or repealed by the legislature, such parts only excepted as are repugnant to this constitution. All laws heretofore enacted, or that may hereafter be enacted, which are contrary to this constitution, shall be null and void.

ARTICLE 80. The cabinet shall have power to make and publish all necessary rules and regulations for the holding of any election or elections under this constitution prior to the passage by the legislature of appropriate laws for such purpose, and to provide for administering to officials, subjects, and residents the oath to support this constitution. The first election hereunder shall be held within ninety days after the promulgation of this constitution, and the legislature then elected may be convened at Honolulu upon the call of the cabinet council, in extraordinary session, at such time as the cabinet council may deem necessary, thirty days' notice thereof being previously given.

ARTICLE 81. This constitution shall be in force from the 7th day of July, A. D. 1887, but that there may be no failure of justice or inconvenience to the Kingdom from any change, all officers of this Kingdom at the time this constitution shall take effect shall have, hold, and exercise all the power to them granted. Such officers shall take an oath to support this constitution within sixty days after the promulgation thereof.

ARTICLE 82. Any amendment or amendments to this constitution may be proposed in the legislature, and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members thereof, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on its journal, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to the next legislature; which proposed amendment or amendments shall be published for three months previous to the next election of representatives and nobles; and if in the next legislature such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members of the legislature, such amendment or amendments shall become part of the constitution of this Kingdom.

KALAKAUA REX.

By the King:

W. L. GREEN,
Minister of Finance.

HONOLULU, Oahu, 28:

I, Kalakaua, King of the Hawaiian Islands, in the presence of Almighty God, do solemnly swear to maintain this constitution whole and inviolate, and to govern in conformity therewith.

KALAKAUA REX.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this sixth day of July, A. D. 1887.

A. F. JUDD,

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and Chancellor of the Kingdom.

(No. 22.)

*Statistical tabulated statements pertaining to the Hawaiian Islands.***A.***Census of Hawaii.*

	1878.			1884.			1890.			Registered voters, 1890.
	Males.	Females.	Total.	Males.	Females.	Total.	Males.	Females.	Total.	
Natives.....	44,088	40,014	34,436	8,777
Half-castes	3,420	4,218	6,186	777
Hawaiian-born foreigners.....	7,495	146
Americans.....	1,276	2,066	1,928	637
British.....	883	1,282	1,344	505
Germans.....	272	1,600	1,034	382
French.....	81	192	70	22
Portuguese.....	436	9,377	8,602	2,091
Norwegian.....	227	78
Chinese.....	5,916	17,939	15,301
Japanese.....	116	12,360
Polynesians.....	588	42
All others.....	419	136
Total ..	34,103	23,882	57,985	51,529	29,039	80,578	58,714	31,276	89,990	13,593

The estimated population of Hawaii, on July 1, 1892, according to the Hawaiian Annual, was 96,075.

B.**HAWAIIAN REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY.***Statement of assessments, real and personal property.*

Years.	Real.	Personal.	Total.
1882	\$14,978,547	\$16,230,790	\$31,209,337
1884	15,734,564	18,502,132	34,336,132
1886	15,602,214	19,352,823	34,955,047
1888	16,730,085	16,477,968	33,208,053
1889	17,702,939	17,213,527	34,916,466
1890	18,343,958	17,000,240	35,344,198

The value of real and personal property in the Kingdom for 1891 is estimated at about \$39,000,000.

The estimated value of Government property of all kinds, including cash in treasury, is \$6,189,303. (Consul-General Severance, Con. Repts. No. 142, p. 413.)

NOTE BY COMMISSIONERS.—To this amount should be added the value of the Crown lands, which, at a moderate estimate, are worth \$2,500,000.

C.

SCHOOL STATISTICS.

Hawaiian school attendance.

Year.	No. of schools.	Attendance.		
		Boys.	Girls.	Total.
1888.....	189	4,976	3,864	8,770
1890.....	178	5,532	4,474	10,006
1892.....	168	5,910	4,802	10,712

Classification of schools.

Classification.	1890.	1892.
Government native schools:		
Schools.....	36	28
Teachers.....	37	29
Pupils.....	768	552
Government English schools:		
Schools.....	94	99
Teachers.....	193	221
Pupils.....	6,575	7,148
Independent schools:		
Schools.....	48	41
Teachers.....	186	142
Pupils.....	2,663	3,012

Year.	No. of schools.	Pupils attending.	School revenue.	Total population.
1887.....	189	8,770	\$203,020	-----
1888.....	189	8,770	203,022	-----
1889.....	178	10,000	391,438	-----
1890.....	178	10,006	391,428	89,990
1891.....	178	10,000	326,920	95,805
1892.....	178	10,000	326,920	*96,075

* Estimated on July 1, Hawaiian Annual.

Nationality of pupils.

Nationality.	1880.	1888.	1890.	1892.
Hawaiians.....	5,657	5,320	5,599	5,353
Half-caste Hawaiians.....	955	1,247	1,573	1,866
Americans.....	247	253	259	371
English.....	90	163	139	131
Germans.....	37	176	199	191
Portuguese.....	55	1,335	1,813	2,253
Norwegians.....	-----	40	58	71
Chinese.....	85	147	262	353
South Sea Islanders.....	-----	16	40	38
Japanese.....	-----	54	39	60
Other foreigners.....	38	19	25	21
Total.....	7,164	8,770	10,006	10,712

School attendance is compulsory.

Nationality of school teachers, 1892.

Nationality.	Males.	Females.	Total.
Hawaiian	59	20	79
Half-caste	13	28	41
American	38	39	77
English	20	19	39
German	2	2	4
Others	2	8	10
Total	134	116	250

D.

HAWAIIAN PUBLIC-DEBT STATEMENT.

[From the Biennial Report of the Minister of Finance to the Legislative Assembly of 1892.]

On the 31st of March, 1890, the bonded debt was	\$1, 934, 000. 00
Of this there was paid during the period	7, 800. 00
	<u>1, 926, 200. 00</u>

Borrowed under authority of acts:

August 5, 1888	\$50, 000
October 24, 1890	95, 000
Postal Savings Bank account	29, 100
October 15, 1886	213. 700
	<u>387, 800. 00</u>

Bonded debt March 31, 1892	2, 314, 000. 00
Amount due depositors in Postal Savings Bank March 31, 1892, for which coupon 6 per cent bonds are on deposit in the Treasury by the Postmaster-General	903, 161. 13
Total bonded debt March 31, 1892	<u>3, 217, 161. 13</u>

Detailed statement of bonded debt March 31, 1892.

Act of August 5, 1882:

Stock A, 6 per cent	\$37, 000. 00
Stock E, 6 per cent	14, 500. 00
Stock O, 6 per cent	3, 300. 00
Stock U, 6 per cent	25, 000. 00
	<u>79, 800. 00</u>

[May be redeemed in 5 years, must be redeemed in 25 years.]

Act of October 15, 1886:

Loan in London	980, 000. 00
Stock A, 6 per cent	373, 000. 00
Stock E, 6 per cent	142, 000. 00
Stock U, 6 per cent	505, 000. 00
	<u>2, 000, 000. 00</u>

[May be redeemed in 10 years, must be redeemed in 25 years.]

Act of October 15, 1888:

Stock U, 6 per cent	50, 000. 00
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Act of October 15, 1890:

Stock A, 6 per cent	95, 000. 00
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[May be redeemed in 5 years; must be redeemed in 10 years.]

Postal Savings Bank account:

Stock A, 5 per cent	\$18, 000. 00
Stock E, 5 per cent	9, 000. 00
Stock O, 5 per cent	2, 100. 00
	<u>29, 100. 00</u>

[May be redeemed in 5 years; must be redeemed in 20 years.]

Act of September 27, 1876:

Stock A, 7 per cent.....	\$1,000.00
Stock E, 7 per cent.....	500.00

\$1,500.00

[Payable at time specified on face, to be not later than 20 years.]

Act of June 22, 1868:

Stock U, 9 per cent.....	10,000.00
Stock E, 9 per cent.....	2,000.00
Stock O, 9 per cent.....	500.00

12,500.00

[Stock U falls due during current biennial period; no dates as to balance, but the amount is inconsiderable.]

Board of education:

Stock A, 12 per cent.....	15,000.00
Stock E, 12 per cent.....	500.00
Stock I, 12 per cent.....	400.00
Stock O, 12 per cent.....	200.00
Stock U, 12 per cent.....	30,000.00

46,100.00

2,314,000.00

Due Postal Savings Bank depositors 903,161.13

3,217,161.13

[*Board of education:* Certain lands were originally set apart by the Hawaiian Government for the use of the board of education. These lands were afterward sold, and the amount realized (\$40,000) was, by act of the legislature, paid into the public treasury and these bonds issued to the board of education. They may be canceled at any time.]

[*Postal savings bank:* About \$200,000 to \$300,000 have been withdrawn since the date of the minister's report, about one-half of which has been paid from the general fund in the treasury, and the balance obtained by loans secured by treasury notes of the Hawaiian Government, authorized by an act of August 30, 1892, payable in from three to eighteen months, at 6 per cent.]

[The foregoing bonds are all payable in United States gold or its equivalent.]

NOTE TO HAWAIIAN DEBT STATEMENT—The matter bracketed [] was supplied by the Hawaiian commission.

E.**SUGAR ESTATES.**

[Consul-General Severance, March 22, 1892. Consular reports, No. 142, p. 413.]

The total value of plantations, as taken from the Planter's Monthly, is estimated at \$32,347,690, owned as follows: By Americans, \$24,735,610, or 74.17 per cent; by British, \$6,038,130, or 18.11 per cent; by Germans, \$2,008,600, or 6.02 per cent; by Hawaiians, \$266,250, or 0.80 per cent; other nationalities, \$299,100, or 0.90 per cent.

The average monthly wages of employes in January, 1890, were as follows: Contract laborers, \$17.74; skilled laborers, \$63.13.

The estimated area of land now under cane cultivation, including three new plantations of 3,700 acres, is 67,849 acres, from which the sugar exports reached 2 tons per acre, or 292,083,580 pounds.

Owing to the present low prices of sugar, the value of the crops will decrease from the year 1890, while the quantity of sugar exceeds that produced in 1890 by 16,000 tons.

F.

Hawaiian internal taxes for biennial periods, 1882-1891.

[Compiled, for the Hawaiian Annual, from finance and board of education reports.]

Biennial periods.	Real estate.	Personal property.	Pole.	Horses.	Mules.	Dogs.
1882.....	\$187,929	\$208,096	\$45,998	\$42,819	(*)	\$13,996
1884.....	223,100	254,286	52,964	24,975	\$1,941	13,924
1886.....	227,195	262,307	61,745	(†)	3,303	13,315
1888.....	252,362	299,974	63,115	(†)	6,279	11,985
1890.....	330,390	329,908	69,116	(†)	3,063	14,100
1891.....	† 358,745	† 341,225	78,064	(†)	4,156	13,660

Biennial periods.	Carriages.	Seamen.	Roads.	School.	Total.
1882.....	\$7,125	\$642	\$90,041	\$87,322	\$683,957
1884.....	8,759	402	103,054	100,278	780,674
1886.....	10,635	114	118,256	115,298	812,167
1888.....	11,835	120,872	119,565	885,987
1890.....	13,940	132,285	131,160	1,032,963
1891.....	14,628	152,137	151,906	1,114,521

*Insurance. †Included in personal property after 1884. ‡Corrected by the commissioners.

Tax per capita, annual.

1882.....	\$5.29
1884.....	5.07
1886.....	4.67
1888.....	5.71
1890.....	6.23
1891.....	5.85

G.

Hawaiian revenue and expenditures for biennial periods, 1878-1880 to 1890-1892.

	1878-1880.	1880-1882.	1882-1884.	1884-1886.	1886-1888.	1888-1890.	Estimated. 1890-1892.
REVENUE.							
Custom-house.....	\$582,846	\$719,245	\$944,638	\$986,417	\$1,204,365	\$1,082,766	\$1,355,744
Internal commerce.....	122,946	141,744	178,149	194,174	226,842	188,642	196,857
Internal taxes.....	465,252	556,615	680,397	696,869	766,422	901,603	963,496
Fines, fees, etc.....	190,205	219,069	233,710	96,490	149,483	608,316	458,623
Government realization and receipts of bureaus..	318,527	393,586	374,291	684,749	513,742	33,623	266,600
Government stocks.....	20,900	668,900	387,800
Farm loans.....	1,811,800	34,590	274,761
Postal savings.....	319,932	780,526	13,000
Crown commissions.....	12,000	12,000
Total.....	1,703,730	2,070,259	3,092,085	3,010,655	4,812,576	3,632,196	3,916,881
EXPENDITURES.							
Civil list.....	65,500	100,000	148,500	127,931	128,925	76,800	69,710
Permanent settlements....	15,075	19,512	20,347	14,028	8,967	4,885	4,685
Legislature and privy coun- cil.....	16,523	19,338	24,942	31,455	60,284	22,767	34,694
Judiciary department.....	79,667	92,874	115,892	129,057	154,566	175,979	177,251
Department of war.....	67,993
Department of foreign af- fairs.....	36,850	129,353	252,641	222,678	257,996	156,445	181,400
Department of the interior..	656,810	1,204,703	1,824,795	1,162,126	1,528,260	779,111	1,378,885
Department of finance.....	260,057	299,436	319,062	566,569	727,264	563,458	695,298
Department of attorney..
general.....	123,664	163,527	266,730	279,872	279,819	259,237	391,592
Bureau of public instruc- tion.....	79,605	84,249	91,735	131,693	165,913	197,610	280,269
Board of health.....	241,470	247,907	316,664	329,815
Miscellaneous.....	93,973	169,608	151,742	*76,821	†1,152,398	155,784	622,292
Contingent.....	15,494
Total.....	1,495,607	2,282,596	3,216,406	3,003,700	4,712,285	2,671,430	4,166,891

*Indemnity account for sundry expenses. †Including recall and cancellation of bonds, \$625,000.

H.

Receipts, expenditures, and public debt of Hawaii.

Years.	Revenue.	Expenditures.	Cash balance in treasury.	Public debt.
1880.....	\$1,703,737	\$1,495,697	\$338,880	\$388,900
1882.....	2,070,060	2,282,599	126,541	299,200
1884.....	3,092,085	3,216,406	2,220	898,800
1886.....	3,010,655	3,003,700	9,175	1,065,600
1888.....	4,812,576	4,712,285	109,466	1,936,500
1890.....	3,632,197	3,250,510	491,152	2,598,502
1892.....	4,408,891	4,095,891	*150,000	3,217,161

*Estimated by the Commissioners.

I.

IMPORTS BY ARTICLES.

Statement showing the imports, in detail, into Hawaii during the years ending with 1891.

[From Hawaiian Statistical Report.]

Articles.	1883.	1884.	1885.	1886.	1887.	1888.	1889.	1890.	1891.
Ale, porter, beer, and cider	\$68, 183	\$63, 061	\$81, 371	\$75, 984	\$77, 442	\$106, 679	\$93, 264
Animals and birds	148, 570	56, 746	101, 426	74, 024	69, 986	153, 935	119, 494
Building materials	153, 104	56, 301	103, 951	116, 215	100, 466	174, 763	185, 591
Clothing, hats, and boots	427, 255	268, 109	302, 064	342, 947	362, 658	407, 296	405, 712
Coal and coke	71, 576	98, 417	56, 887	118, 616	15, 477	167, 872
Crockery and glassware	47, 043	20, 458	29, 392	49, 540	40, 968	60, 028	46, 049
Drugs and druggists' wares	48, 762	35, 917	39, 498	42, 661	47, 929	61, 569	63, 372
Dry goods:
Cottons	282, 415	180, 430	230, 424	229, 731	291, 209	347, 735	293, 042
Linsens	20, 392	11, 778	30, 636	23, 820	25, 147	30, 296	33, 127
Silks	51, 496	26, 232	33, 753	41, 031	37, 756	30, 992	29, 377
Woolens	109, 472	48, 078	60, 898	107, 599	72, 800	108, 840	44, 756
Mixed	38, 129	16, 314	25, 709	28, 260	27, 165	34, 021	27, 539
Fancy goods, millinery, etc	131, 712	87, 467	108, 816	102, 713	125, 688	141, 809	148, 346
Fertilizers	28, 140	33, 036	41, 807	103, 528	106, 662
Fish, dry and salted	96, 630	70, 977	97, 148	96, 760	90, 555	105, 962	102, 074
Flour	167, 658	144, 358	150, 737	176, 863	171, 968	202, 068	273, 886
Fruits, fresh	9, 315	13, 097	10, 955	12, 720	11, 733	12, 782	12, 602
Furniture	110, 808	60, 823	75, 341	84, 382	69, 670	106, 977	112, 611
Grain and seed	190, 820	200, 448	237, 154	289, 067	245, 457	372, 265	464, 709
Groceries and provisions	530, 817	398, 632	495, 447	469, 501	489, 977	594, 047	629, 356
Guns and gun material	13, 739	10, 003	12, 523	22, 719	20, 395	27, 784	10, 399
Gunpowder, blasting, etc	7, 100	3, 862	4, 075	4, 778	4, 527	2, 688	11, 152
Hardware, tools, implements, etc	347, 416	168, 556	248, 472	237, 943	282, 213	376, 156	315, 960
Iron, steel, etc	62, 035	36, 616	43, 636	50, 583	43, 219	80, 465	98, 357
Jewelry, plate, clocks, etc	80, 917	22, 133	28, 421	56, 801	48, 228	71, 566	92, 826
Leather	51, 765	41, 346	47, 235	46, 897	41, 578	45, 092	40, 711
Lumber	344, 169	196, 047	227, 825	202, 370	240, 001	343, 521	296, 622
Machinery	296, 102	187, 745	258, 592	197, 951	357, 466	532, 080	854, 773
Matches	7, 495	11, 053	15, 761	13, 222	12, 567	13, 452	13, 840
Musical instruments	17, 152	10, 113	5, 447	13, 428	10, 324	19, 994	13, 356
Naval stores	80, 281	31, 738	45, 959	56, 149	76, 559	77, 578	84, 401
Oils, including kerosene	124, 535	66, 827	128, 702	85, 448	124, 636	140, 615	176, 346
Paints, paint oil, etc	31, 893	25, 658	35, 245	44, 742	35, 488	56, 819	71, 537
Perfumery and toilet articles	22, 205	11, 501	14, 883	17, 453	14, 184	20, 917	25, 236
Railroad material	77, 965	14, 446	16, 128	7, 403	110, 350	114, 617	105, 699
Saddlery, carriages, and material	89, 728	49, 281	66, 619	71, 599	65, 523	135, 621	91, 085
Shooks, bags, etc	122, 783	132, 999	151, 483	121, 142	66, 078	207, 137	157, 942
Spirits	127, 495	93, 340	114, 101	93, 437	168, 708	118, 871	107, 750
Stationery and books	69, 965	59, 865	79, 038	74, 328	74, 274	66, 891	72, 403
Tea	20, 587	17, 502	37, 392	19, 508	77, 239	24, 186	18, 459
Tinware	10, 356	4, 915	7, 545	7, 544	24, 506	9, 301	9, 270
Tobacco, cigars, etc	159, 183	132, 004	162, 221	134, 921	153, 432	184, 987	207, 506
Wines, light	23, 707	20, 535	55, 323	78, 670	82, 580	101, 332	121, 261
Total	5, 624, 240	4, 851, 787	3, 830, 545	4, 877, 739	4, 596, 534	4, 540, 887	5, 438, 791	6, 962, 201	7, 439, 433

J.

EXPORTS BY ARTICLES.

Statement showing the principal exports from the Hawaiian Islands.

QUANTITIES.

Articles.	1882.	1883.	1884.	1885.	1886.
Sugar.....pounds..	114, 177, 938	114, 107, 155	142, 644, 923	171, 350, 314	216, 223, 615
Molasses.....gallons..	221, 293	193, 997	110, 530	57, 941	113, 137
Rice.....pounds..	12, 169, 475	11, 619, 000	9, 493, 000	7, 367, 253	7, 338, 716
Paddy.....pounds..	459, 633	1, 368, 705	46, 224
Coffee.....pounds..	8, 131	16, 057	4, 231	1, 675	5, 931
Hides.....number..	26, 007	38, 955	21, 026	19, 045	31, 207
Tallow.....pounds..	77, 098	32, 252	2, 864	21, 305
Goatskins.....number..	23, 402	24, 798	20, 125	19, 782	21, 173
Wool.....pounds..	528, 913	318, 271	407, 623	474, 121	418, 784
Fungus.....pounds..	2, 111	3, 783	465
Bananas.....bunches..	28, 848	44, 902	60, 046	58, 040	45, 862

Articles.	1887.	1888.	1889.	1890.	1891.
Sugar.....pounds..	212, 763, 647	235, 888, 346	242, 165, 835	259, 768, 462	274, 983, 580
Molasses.....gallons..	71, 222	47, 965	54, 612	74, 926	55, 845
Rice.....pounds..	13, 684, 200	12, 878, 600	9, 669, 896	10, 579, 000	4, 900, 450
Paddy.....pounds..	400
Coffee.....pounds..	5, 300	7, 130	43, 673	88, 593	3, 051
Hides.....number..	28, 639	24, 494	27, 158	28, 196	26, 057
Tallow.....pounds..	56, 713	204, 743	97, 125	33, 876	27, 925
Goatskins.....number..	16, 223	17, 589	11, 715	8, 661	7, 316
Wool.....pounds..	75, 911	562, 289	241, 925	374, 724	97, 119
Fungus.....pounds..
Bananas.....bunches..	58, 936	71, 335	105, 630	97, 204	116, 660

VALUE.

Articles.	1882.	1883.	1884.	1885.	1886.
Sugar.....	\$8, 356, 061	\$9, 775, 132
Molasses.....	7, 050	14, 502
Rice.....	387, 297	326, 629
Paddy.....
Coffee.....	283	1, 067
Hides.....	71, 533	111, 911
Tallow.....	1, 011
Goatskins.....	15, 023	12, 644
Wool.....	49, 574	37, 700
Fungus.....
Bananas.....	58, 810	43, 824
All other.....
Total.....	\$6, 885, 437	\$7, 924, 727	\$7, 977, 909	\$9, 158, 818	\$10, 565, 886

Articles.	1887.	1888.	1889.	1890.	1891.
Sugar.....	\$8, 694, 964	\$10, 818, 883	\$13, 089, 302	\$12, 159, 285	\$9, 550, 938
Molasses.....	10, 522	5, 900	6, 185	7, 603	4, 721
Rice.....	554, 295	577, 583	451, 134	545, 240	263, 455
Paddy.....
Coffee.....	972	1, 698	8, 626	14, 737	1, 018
Hides.....	96, 851	85, 853	72, 974	70, 949	64, 032
Tallow.....	1, 121	7, 507	4, 214	1, 140	731
Goatskins.....	7, 358	8, 877	5, 461	3, 182	3, 212
Wool.....	7, 010	41, 084	23, 875	35, 396	8, 000
Fungus.....
Bananas.....	54, 708	69, 249	135, 278	176, 351	179, 501
All others.....
Total.....	9, 435, 204	11, 631, 465	13, 810, 071	13, 023, 304	10, 244, 325

K.

IMPORTS AND EXPORTS BY COUNTRIES.

Statement showing the value of imports into and exports from Hawaii, from and to the several countries.

From and to.	1884.	1885.	1886.	1887.	1888.	1889.	1890.	1891.
IMPORTS INTO HAWAII.								
United States.....	\$2, 835, 127	\$2, 940, 837	\$3, 724, 006	\$3, 059, 157	\$3, 844, 661	\$4, 302, 995	\$5, 264, 692	\$6, 495, 608
Great Britain.....	715, 532	550, 966	551, 711	660, 641	652, 171	674, 832	1, 204, 022	* 384, 146
Germany.....	197, 531	155, 893	144, 207	182, 343	182, 929	90, 747	147, 288	227, 392
Australasia.....	29, 375	16, 803	29, 352	157, 871	110, 924	116, 192	142, 494	185, 156
China and Japan..	178, 162	118, 884	257, 913	258, 885	119, 616	200, 926	313, 607	287, 956
France.....	21, 121	14, 384	11, 495	11, 605	10, 292	4, 781	7, 803	21, 666
All other countries.								
Total	4, 637, 514	3, 830, 544	4, 877, 738	4, 943, 841	4, 540, 857	5, 438, 791	6, 962, 901	7, 439, 483
EXPORTS FROM HAWAII.								
United States.....		8, 933, 206	10, 412, 827			13, 840, 523	13, 073, 477	10, 196, 278
Great Britain.....								
Germany.....			12, 209					10, 170
Australasia.....		17, 258	3, 322			5, 813	18, 110	4, 038
China and Japan..		15, 454	3, 198			11, 905	12, 536	34, 651
Islands in Pacific.						9, 684	30, 769	14, 153
All other places.								
Total	8, 184, 923	9, 069, 318	10, 565, 886	9, 529, 547	11, 707, 599	13, 874, 841	13, 142, 829	10, 258, 788

Total value of exports for 1883 was \$3,133,344.

L.

Annual value of Hawaiian imports and exports.

Years.	Imports.	Exports.†	Imports and exports.	Customs receipts.
1882.....	\$4, 547, 979	\$6, 885, 437	\$11, 433, 416	\$505, 391
1883.....	5, 624, 240	7, 924, 727	13, 548, 967	577, 343
1884.....	4, 854, 787	7, 977, 909	12, 832, 696	551, 737
1885.....	3, 830, 545	9, 158, 818	12, 989, 363	502, 337
1886.....	4, 877, 739	10, 565, 886	15, 443, 625	580, 444
1887.....	4, 596, 834	9, 435, 204	14, 032, 038	595, 003
1888.....	4, 540, 887	11, 631, 465	16, 172, 352	546, 143
1889.....	5, 438, 791	13, 810, 071	19, 248, 862	550, 010
1890.....	6, 962, 241	13, 023, 304	19, 985, 505	695, 957
1891.....	7, 439, 483	10, 244, 325	17, 683, 808	732, 595
Total	52, 713, 486	100, 657, 146	153, 370, 632	5, 836, 960

* As given in the Hawaiian customs returns. The Hawaiian Annual gives the following figures: From the United States, \$5,294,278.57; from Great Britain, \$1,201,329.43. The total imports agree in both publications. The commission consider, in this particular, that the Hawaiian Annual is correct.

† Domestic exports only.

M.

NATIONALITY OF SHIPPING.

Statement showing the nationality of vessels engaged in the foreign carrying trade of Hawaii.

CLEARANCES.

Nationality.	1882.		1883.		1884.		1885.		1886.	
	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.
American.....	179	103,591	195	117,952	191	135,618	184	131,011	220	128,224
Hawaiian.....	19	5,613	23	7,867	29	41,398	18	6,982	29	40,242
British.....	44	56,025	42	53,310	11	3,672	30	38,749	38	30,435
German.....	11	5,716	6	4,882	4	2,959	5	2,377	8	5,581
French.....	1	244	4	3,225	2	720
All other.....	4	1,430	1	1,305	2	954	4	3,817	7	6,206
Total.....	258	172,619	267	185,316	241	187,826	243	183,656	302	219,688

Nationality.	1887.		1888.		1889.		1890.		1891.	
	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.
American.....	177	120,108	164	113,069	185	125,196	224	153,398	233	169,472
Hawaiian.....	43	61,398	43	65,115	44	56,670	35	43,641	21	26,869
British.....	18	19,869	24	28,715	22	21,108	16	22,912	33	52,866
German.....	6	4,628	8	6,385	5	3,337	9	7,070	9	9,005
French.....
All other.....	8	6,486	8	6,892	13	12,268	9	9,980	15	16,640
Total.....	252	212,489	247	222,216	269	218,579	293	236,701	311	274,852



MESSAGE

FROM THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

TRANSMITTING

A report of the Secretary of State, with copies of the instructions given to Mr. Albert S. Willis, the representative of the United States now in the Hawaiian Islands, and also the correspondence since March 4, 1889, concerning the relations of this Government to those islands.

DECEMBER 18, 1893.—Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed.

To the House of Representatives:

In compliance with a resolution passed by your honorable body on the 13th instant, I hereby transmit a report of the Secretary of State, with copies of the instructions given to Mr. Albert S. Willis, the representative of the United States now in the Hawaiian Islands, and also the correspondence since the 4th day of March, 1889, concerning the relations of this Government to those islands.

In making this communication, I have withheld only a dispatch from the former minister to Hawaii numbered 70, under date of October 8, 1892, and a dispatch from the present minister, numbered 3, under date of November 16, 1893, because, in my opinion, the publication of these two papers would be incompatible with the public interest.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, December 18, 1893.

THE PRESIDENT:

The Secretary of State, to whom was referred a resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on the 13th instant, requesting the President to communicate to that House—

if not inconsistent with the public interest, copies of the instructions given to the representative of the United States now in the Hawaiian Islands in regard to the protection of the lives and property of American citizens there, or any contemplated change in the form of government, and all correspondence since the fourth day of March, eighteen hundred and eighty-nine in regard to Hawaii, not already transmitted to Congress;

has the honor to lay before the President, with a view to his determination touching their transmission to the House of Representatives in response to that resolution, copies of the correspondence called for.

In order that nothing might be omitted that may be deemed to come within the purview of the resolution, the Secretary of State has endeavored to include all correspondence of a political character concerning the Hawaiian Islands. It has seemed advisable in so doing to incorporate also sundry papers within the specified period which have been heretofore communicated to both Houses of Congress, together with the correspondence of the described character communicated to the Senate in February and March last, and printed by order of that body, to the end that the present collection may fairly respond to the request of the House of Representatives.

Respectfully submitted.

W. Q. GRESHAM.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 18, 1893.

LIST OF PAPERS.

Mr. Merrill to Mr. Blaine, No. 239, May 1, 1889.
 Same to same, No. 241, May 8, 1889.
 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Merrill, No. 127, May 27, 1889.
 Same to same, No. 128, May 31, 1889.
 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Merrill, No. 131, June 20, 1889.
 Same to same, No. 132, June 27, 1889.
 Mr. Merrill to Mr. Blaine, No. 249, July 9, 1889.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine, No. 1, July 12, 1889.
 Mr. Merrill to Mr. Blaine, No. 253, July 26, 1889.
 Same to same, No. 254, July 29, 1889.
 Same to same, No. 255, August 1, 1889.
 Same to same, telegram, August 2, 1889.
 Same to same, No. 257, August 6, 1889.
 Mr. Moore to Merrill, No. 136, August 12, 1889.
 Mr. Wharton to Merrill, No. 137, August 22, 1889.
 Same to same, No. 138, August 23, 1889.
 Mr. Merrill to Mr. Blaine, No. 260, August 29, 1889.
 Same to same, No. 262, September 7, 1889.
 Mr. Adee to Mr. Merrill, No. 139, September 10, 1889.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine, No. 2 *bis*, September 25, 1889.
 Same to same, No. 3, October 7, 1889.
 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens, No. 5, October 16, 1889.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine, No. 6, October 17, 1889.
 Same to same, No. 7, October 18, 1889.
 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens, No. 6, October 31, 1889.
 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens, No. 7, November 4, 1889.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine, No. 10, November 4, 1889.
 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens, No. 8, November 6, 1889.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine, No. 11, November 14, 1889.
 Mr. Adee to Mr. Stevens, No. 11, November 16, 1889.
 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens, No. 12, December 3, 1889.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine, No. 17, February 7, 1890.
 Same to same, No. 18, February 10, 1890.
 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens, No. 17, March 4, 1890.
 Same to same, No. 19, March 6, 1890.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine, No. 20, March 20, 1890.
 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens, No. 22, April 7, 1890.
 Same to same, No. 24, April 24, 1890.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine, No. 24, May 20, 1890.
 Same to same, No. 25, May 28, 1890.
 Same to same, No. 26, June 9, 1890.
 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens, No. 27, June 14, 1890.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine, No. 27, June 26, 1890.
 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens, No. 29, July 3, 1890.
 Mr. Adee to Mr. Stevens, No. 31, July 14, 1890.
 Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens, No. 2, August 16, 1890.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine, No. 30, August 19, 1890.
 Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens, No. 4, September 10, 1890.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine, No. 2, September 17, 1890.
 Same to same, No. 3, September 25, 1890.
 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens, No. 8, October 15, 1890.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine, No. 7, October 22, 1890.
 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens, No. 9, November 12, 1890.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine, No. 8, November 14, 1890.
 Same to same, No. 9, Nov. 20, 1890.
 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens, No. 11, December 5, 1890.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine, No. 16, February 5, 1891.
 Same to same, No. 18, February 9, 1891.
 Same to same, No. 19, February 16, 1891.
 Same to same, No. 20, February 22, 1891.
 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens, No. 15, February 28, 1891.
 Same to same, No. 16, March 2, 1891.
 Same to same, No. 19, March 10, 1891.
 Same to same, No. 20, March 14, 1891.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine, No. 21, March 26, 1891.
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 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Wharton, No. 28, July 23, 1891.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine, No. 30, August 20, 1891.
 Same to same, No. 31, September 3, 1891.
 Same to same, No. 32, September 5, 1891.
 Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens, No. 28, September 9, 1891.
 Same to same, No. 30, September 22, 1891.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine, No. 34, October 15, 1891.
 Same to same, No. 46, February 8, 1892.
 Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens, No. 39, March 3, 1892.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine, No. 48, March 8, 1892.
 Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens, No. 41, March 19, 1892.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine, No. 50, March 19, 1892.
 Same to same, No. 52, April 2, 1892.
 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens, No. 46, April 12, 1892.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine, No. 56, May 21, 1892.
 Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens, No. 50, June 7, 1892.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine, No. 57, June 11, 1892.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster, No. 64, September 9, 1892.
 Same to same, No. 65, September 14, 1892.
 Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens, No. 57, September 29, 1892.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster, No. 71, October 19, 1892.
 Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens, No. 59, October 26, 1892.
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 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster, No. 73, November 8, 1892.
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 Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens, No. 65, December 1, 1892.
 Same to same, No. 67, December 23, 1892.
 Same to same, No. 68, December 23, 1892.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster, telegram, January 18, 1893.
 Same to same, No. 79, January 18, 1893.
 Same to same, No. 80 January 19, 1893.
 Same to same, No. 81, January 26, 1893.
 Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens, telegram, January 28, 1893.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster, telegram, February 1, 1893.
 Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens, No. 70, February 1, 1893.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster, No. 82, February 1, 1893.

Same to same, No. 83, February 1, 1893.
 Same to same, No. 84, February 1, 1893.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster, telegram, February 8, 1893.
 Same to same, No. 85, February 8, 1893.
 Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens, telegram, February 14, 1893.
 Same to same, telegram, February 15, 1893.
 Same to same, No. 72, February 16, 1893.
 Same to same, No. 73, February 16, 1893.
 Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens, No. 74, February 17, 1893.
 Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens, telegram, February 22, 1893.
 Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens, No. 75, February 23, 1893.
 Same to same, No. 76, February 24, 1893.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster, No. 86, February 27, 1893.
 Same to same, No. 87, February 27, 1893.
 Same to same, telegram, March 1, 1893.
 Same to same, No. 88, March 1, 1893.
 Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens, No. 77, March 2, 1893.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Gresham, No. 89, March 7, 1893.
 Same to same, No. 90, March 7, 1893.
 Same to same, No. 91, March 7, 1893.
 Mr. Gresham to Mr. Stevens, No. 79, March 10, 1893.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Gresham, No. 92, March 15, 1893.
 Same to same, No. 93, March 24, 1893.
 Same to same, No. 94, April 4, 1893.
 Mr. Gresham to Mr. Stevens, No. 81, April 18, 1893.
 Mr. Gresham to Mr. Stevens, telegram, April 25, 1893.
 Mr. Adeo to Mr. Stevens, No. 82, April 27, 1893.
 Mr. Gresham to Mr. Stevens, No. 83, May 4, 1893.
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Gresham, No. 96, May 18, 1893.
 Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham, No. 1, May 24, 1893.
 Same to same, No. 2, May 24, 1893.
 Same to same, No. 3, May 29, 1893.
 Same to same, No. 4, June 1, 1893.
 Same to same, No. 5, June 1, 1893.
 Mr. Gresham to Mr. Blount, No. 5, June 23, 1893.
 Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham, No. 1, November 6, 1893.
 Same to same, telegram, November 6, 1893.
 Same to same, telegram, November 11, 1893.
 Same to same, No. 2, November 11, 1893.
 Same to same, telegram, November 16, 1893.
 Same to same, No. 4, November 16, 1893.
 Same to same, No. 5, November 18, 1893.
 Mr. Gresham to Mr. Willis, telegram, November 24, 1893.
 Same to same, telegram, December 3, 1893.
 Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham, telegram, December 4, 1893.
 Mr. Thurston to Mr. Gresham, December 5, 1893.

Mr. Merrill to Mr. Blaine.

No. 239.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, May 1, 1889.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that Her Royal Highness Princess Kaiulani, aged about 14 years, daughter of the late Princess Likelike and Hon. A. S. Cleghorn, will leave here on the 10th instant, going direct to England via San Francisco and New York.

The princess will travel in company with Mrs. T. R. Walker, the wife of the British vice-consul at Honolulu, and intends remaining in England, under the charge of Mrs. Walker, about one year, when Mr. Cleghorn, as he informs me, will visit Europe and return with the

princess, visiting the principal cities in America, when they hope to be able to avail themselves of an opportunity to pay their respects to the President of the United States.

His Majesty the King contemplates visiting Paris, and intended leaving here at the same time as Princess Kaiulani, but I am informed he has determined to delay his departure until some time next month.

During the absence of His Majesty, Her Royal Highness Princess Liliuokalani, heir apparent to the throne, and sister of the King, will be named as regent.

As to the route through and the time to be spent in the United States, the King has not determined.

I have, etc.,

GEO. W. MERRILL.

Mr. Merrill to Mr. Blaine.

No. 241.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, May 8, 1889.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that the U. S. S. *Alert* departed for Apia on the 18th ultimo.

The only national vessel now in the harbor is Her British Majesty's ship *Cormorant*, and evidently it is the intention of the British Government to retain a naval vessel in Hawaiian waters indefinitely.

Owing to the large American interests in Hawaii, and in the absence of cable communication, the comparatively isolated condition of the islands, and in view of an approaching political campaign, in which, no doubt, much animosity will be engendered, it is hoped it will be deemed advisable to so arrange that a United States ship will be able to remain in the waters of Hawaii.

While it is hoped that no occasion will offer for the employment of a naval force, yet I am convinced that the presence of passive power often prevents the maturing of turbulent schemes.

I have, etc.,

GEORGE W. MERRILL.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Merrill.

No. 127.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 27, 1889.

SIR: I have received your No. 241 of the 8th instant, representing the circumstances under which you regard it advisable for a United States ship of war to remain for the present in Hawaiian waters.

A copy of your dispatch has been submitted for the consideration of the Secretary of the Navy.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Merrill.

No. 128.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 31, 1889.

SIR: Adverting to my No. 127 of the 27th instant, I have now to apprise you of the receipt of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy of that date saying that the *Adams*, now fitting for service at the Mare Island navy-yard, was ordered some days since to proceed to Honolulu as soon as ready for sea.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Merrill.

No. 131.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 20, 1889.

SIR: Your dispatches numbered 239 to 242, inclusive, have been received.

I am, sir, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Merrill.

No. 132.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 27, 1889.

Transmits Mr. Merrill's letter of recall as minister.

Mr. Merrill to Mr. Blaine.

No. 249.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, July 9, 1889.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that the anniversary of the Independence of the United States was celebrated here with much enthusiasm, and the 4th instant was observed as a general holiday by both native and foreign residents.

The Government offices and the business houses in the city were generally closed.

A reception was held at the legation and was largely attended by all nationalities.

I inclose clippings from each of the daily papers, Advertiser and Bulletin, giving accounts of the proceedings of the day.

I have, etc.,

ED. W. MERRILL.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 249—Daily Advertiser.]

Fourth of July—How the glorious day was celebrated—Salutes, music, regatta, literary exercises, field sports, rifle practice, ball, etc.

The greater part of the evening and night of the 3d of July resounded in firing of pistols and guns and the letting off of fireworks of different kinds, and the morning of the Fourth was heralded by similar demonstrations, and a salute of thirteen guns

from the shore battery. At an early hour the population was astir, and holiday attire was the rule among those who could afford it.

THE REGATTA.

The rowing and yacht regattas were the first sports on the programme, and the wharves at 7:45 were crowded with people.

At 8 a. m. the tugboat *Eleu* left her wharf with the committee, to which had been committed the management of the regatta, and proceeded out to the harbor entrance.

Soon afterwards the six-oared gig race began by two boats starting simultaneously from the starting line and maintaining a close contest for several hundred yards. Finally the *Alice M.* forged ahead of the *Liliuokalani* and maintained the lead until the finish, when the *Alice M.* won by about twenty boat lengths. Time of the boats: *Alice M.*, 25 minutes; *Liliuokalani*, 25 minutes, 25 seconds.

The next was a six-oared gig race in which four boats started—the three war vessels, *Alert*, *Espiegle*, and *Pilcomayo*, having one boat each; and there was also a boat, the *Kapiolani*, manned by a native crew. The Hawaiian boat led from the start, and gradually increased its lead until the finish, when it entered the starting line about 200 yards ahead of the American boat, which was second. Until the home stretch was more than half done there was a close contest between the American and English boats. But finally the Englishmen fell astern, manfully pulling to keep up, but the Americans steadily forged ahead. The Chilean boat was far astern. In going out of the harbor the Chilean boat fouled the American boat, which had commenced to gain on the Englishman, and between the two latter the race was well contested throughout. To and around the bell buoy, and up to the light-house on the home stretch, the American boat gradually forged ahead of the Englishman and came in second, the Hawaiian boat winning the race. Following is the time taken by each boat: *Kapiolani*, the native boat, 29 minutes 10 seconds; *Alert*, the American boat, 31 minutes; *Puaala*, the English boat, 31 minutes 55 seconds; *Pilcomayo*, the Chilean boat, 33 minutes 30 seconds.

The yacht race began at 9:35 a. m., when a beautiful flying start was made. Five yachts, over five tons register, went off almost together, and spinnakers were set during the run out of the harbor.

BALLOON ASCENSION.

At the time of the start, Melville's balloon shot up from the slopes of Punchbowl hill, and very quickly reached an altitude of nearly 2,000 feet. The aeronaut was seen like a speck clinging to a rope below the balloon, but before many minutes elapsed the huge inflated bag was noticed to be descending rapidly. There was no parachute jump, and the balloon reached the ground in the neighborhood of Kakaako.

By this time the five yachts had reached the harbor entrance, and the large quantity of sail that they spread gave a fascinating appearance to these aquatic racers. They kept well together as far as could be seen from the P. M. Co.'s wharf, and were closely followed by the steam tug *Eleu*, from the deck of which vessel their movements were more easily observed. The names of the five yachts were *Healani*, *Spray*, *Hawaii*, *Helene*, and *Kahikilani*. These all started; but the latter, the *Kahikilani*, did not finish. At the stake boat, opposite the Hon. W. G. Irwin's residence, the following was the order in rounding: *Hawaii* 1st, *Spray* 2d, *Healani* 3d, *Helene* 4th, *Kahikilani* 5th. At the Pearl Harbor stake boat the order was *Hawaii* 1st, *Helene* 2d, *Healani* 3d, *Spray* 4th. At the harbor entrance the order was: *Healani* 1st, *Helene* 2d, *Hawaii* 3d, *Spray* 4th. The time taken by the yachts was: *Healani*, 4 hours 8 minutes 32 seconds; *Spray*, 4 hours 14 minutes 16 seconds; *Helene*, 4 hours 14 minutes 30 seconds; *Hawaii*, 4 hours 16 minutes 4 seconds.

SECOND-CLASS YACHT RACE.

At 10 a. m. eight small yachts, under 5 tons register, started in the wake of the five larger ones that left the harbor half an hour ago. The spread of canvas was even larger in proportion than on the larger vessels, and the speed of these smaller crafts appeared to be equally rapid. They all kept close together in rounding the reef, which operation was done in very beautiful style. The names of these yachts were *Edith L.*, *Kaohinani*, *Pookii*, *Laura*, *Onward*, *Laura Doone*, *Park-street*, and *Pauline*. The latter four, *Onward*, *Laura Doone*, *Park street*, and *Pauline*, did not finish. The time of these yachts was as follows: *Edith L.*, 3 hours 49 seconds; *Kaohinani*, 3 hours 50 seconds; *Pookii*, 3 hours 21 minutes 41 seconds; *Laura*, 3 hours 24 minutes 52 seconds. Judge's decision withheld.

The boat-boys' race was rowed at 10:18 a. m. There were four boats that started, but only three came in to finish, as follows: *Flying Fish*, 14 minutes 2 seconds; *Alameda*, 14 minutes 4 seconds; *Benecia*, 14 minutes 10 seconds.

The literary exercises took place at 10 o'clock at the opera house. The audience was small, the house being not more than half filled, owing to attractions in other parts of the city; but those who were there were well repaid. Berger's band opened the exercises with a medley of national airs. Prayer was then offered by Rev. George Wallace. His excellency George W. Merrill, American minister resident, made a few introductory remarks appropriate to the day and the occasion. This was the fifth time he has presided on similar occasions, the first having been in 1885.

After the singing of the opening hymn, Mr. A. V. Gear read the Declaration of Independence in a clear voice, occupying twelve minutes. This was followed by the choir and audience singing "My country, 'tis of Thee."

Mr. Merrill then introduced Rev. E. G. Porter, of Lexington, Mass., as the orator of the day, stating that the name was one that bore honorable mention in American history.

MR. PORTER'S ADDRESS.

Mr. Chairman, fellow-countrymen, ladies and gentlemen: When the invitation of your committee reached me a few days ago I was on the coast of Hawaii, returning from a trip to the volcano. My first thought was to decline the honor, as my time was wholly occupied in studying these islands, but on reaching Honolulu I was assured that I could meet the requirements of the occasion by giving such thoughts concerning our country as might readily occur to me as a traveler. With this understanding I have accepted the position, feeling that my refusal would be a poor return for the many acts of kindness extended to me during my visit.

We are assembled to commemorate an event in our history which is dear to every American heart—an event to which "the glorious Fourth" has been consecrated as the chief festival in our political calendar. Whoever has spent his boyhood in the States will recall the thrill of excitement with which the great holiday has always been ushered in. I confess I was hardly expecting to find in any foreign country such a demonstration as we had last night and this morning—the sharp and familiar explosives around your houses, revealing the presence of youthful patriots, with unabated zeal, the salute of thirteen guns from the shore battery at sunrise, the display of the national colors on so many private houses, on the shipping in the harbor, and even on the trams and carriage buses in the streets. And here in this large opera house we have the inspiring strains of national music and choral song to aid us in worthily celebrating the day. You have also made generous provision for aquatic and field sports which are sure to be in order at this time.

We are nominally commemorating the achievements of our country's Independence in 1776, the official declaration of which has just been read. We shall never forget the men who signed that immortal document, nor the results that flowed from it. The nation can never outgrow its early history. It will never be ashamed of its birth.

But the present year is suggestive of other events, and we need not dwell now upon the independence which the fathers secured for us, nor even the later conflict upon the question of political union which Webster argued with such eloquence in the Senate, and which President Lincoln maintained when he called the nation to arms. Those great issues are settled—we hope forever—and we can turn our thoughts the more willingly to themes relating to the development of our country in various directions.

The speaker then referred to the recent celebration in New York commemorating the inauguration of the first President under the Constitution; to the Victorian era, which covers a little more than half of the entire century of our national existence; to the character of the nation's founders; to the stability of American political institutions, and to the fact that not a country in Europe is now so firm and prosperous as the American Republic; which was owing in a large measure to the general diffusion of knowledge, which made the people the ruling power. He spoke of the wide distribution of property in America compared with other countries; to the munificent gifts of charity for public libraries, technical schools, colleges, and universities, now amounting to millions annually. Our foreign relations were referred to, and the respect shown by not only European nations, but by those of Asia, China, Japan, Korea, Siam, Hawaii, etc.

We are obliged by want of space to abridge this report of a most eloquent address, and give merely an outline of it.

The exercises closed with singing two verses of the national hymn, "Star Spangled Banner," followed by the band, which had assisted in the music throughout.

At noon a national salute of forty-two guns—one for each State now in the American Union—was fired from the shore battery.

RECEPTION AT THE LEGATION.

His excellency George W. Merrill and Mrs. Merrill received their friends at the legation, 2 till 6 o'clock, yesterday afternoon. During the entire afternoon the rooms were crowded, and many expressed their regrets that they were soon to leave and return to their country, to give place to new representatives of the great Republic. It is not certain how soon Mr. Merrill's successor will arrive, as he had not been named at the latest advices from Washington.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 249—Evening Bulletin.]

The glorious Fourth—Remarkably eventful holiday—Reports of all the festivities.

A finer day, except for some hours of great heat, could not have been desired for the glorious Fourth. Besides the various items of public celebration, many picnic parties went to the seaside or mountains. As full a report as possible of each part of the programme appears below. The American, British, and Chilean war ships were dressed with equal resplendence, the O. S. S. *Umatilla* was gaily bedecked, and there was a fine display of flags from other shipping and on shore. Salutes of thirteen guns each were fired at sunrise and sunset, and of thirty-eight guns at noon, from the shore battery.

THE REGATTA.

First race—Six-oared gig race. Sliding seats. Free to all. Prize, \$40. Donated by the 4th July celebration committee.

Lilioukalani—White and blue, Carl Widemann. *Alice M.*—Red and white, H. Gunn.

Second race—Galley or gig race. Six oars. Stationary seats. Free to all. First prize, \$50; second prize, \$25; third prize, saves stakes. Donated by the 4th July celebration committee.

Chilean Pilcomayo—White caps, Lieut. Espinosa. U. S. S. *Alert*—Blue, Lieut. Carmody. *Kapiolani*—Blue caps, Carl Widemann. *Puaala*—Red, H. B. M. S. Espiegle.

Third race—Yacht race. Open to all yachts over 5 tons and not exceeding 10 tons in measurement; provided, however, that this limitation shall not apply to yachts now in Hawaiian waters and that enter for the race this year. Prize, Hawaiian challenge cup and pennant for 1889.

Kahihilani, 8.14 tons—White and green, W. Williams. *Spray*, 6.07 tons—Sham-rock white, W. C. Sproull, for owners. *Healani*, 6.29 tons—Hawaiian flag, C. Brown, F. M. Hatch, C. P. Iaukea. *Hawaii*, 6.95 tons—White, W. O. Smith. *Helene*, 12.22 tons—White maltese cross, blue border, W. H. Baird, for owners.

Fourth race: Yacht race. Open to all yachts below 5 tons measurement. First prize, \$75; 2d prize, \$50; 3d prize, \$25; donated by the 4th of July committee.

Kaohinani, 3.40 tons, white burgee, red letters, W. W. Dimond; *Park St.*, — tons, white and blue, S. H. Priestly; *Laura*, 1.75 tons, blue, Hingley and Graham; *Pokii*, 1.91 tons, blue W in center, W. Williams; *Laura Doone*, — tons, blue, yellow and red, S. B. Dole; *Pauline*, — tons, —, W. L. Wilcox; *Edith L.*, 1½ tons, red, Alex. Lyle; *Onward*, — tons; blue with M. P. in white, J. A. Magoon.

Fifth race: Boat boys' race; opened to all licensed boats. First prize, \$10; 2d prize, \$5.

Dido, white; *Flying Fish*, American; *Benicia*, red; *Fair Play*, yellow; *Lita*, blue; *Alameda*, white and blue.

The regatta being the first event in celebration of the Fourth, mostly everybody consulted the weather immediately on awakening. The day dawned gloriously calm, and yachtsmen despaired.

A few minutes after 8 o'clock the first race came off, being that of six-oared gigs, sliding seats, between the Myrtle club's *Alice M.* and the Honolulu club's *Lilioukalani*. *Alice M.* won easily by 25 seconds; time of winning boat, 25 minutes.

Second race: Galley or gig, six oars, stationary seats. A good start was made but the native boat *Kapiolani* soon took the lead and walked away with the cake. The struggle between the U. S. S. *Alert* and H. B. M. S. *Espiegle* boats for second prize was closely contested. The *Espiegle* boat, *Puaala*, was in advance of the *Alert's* to the turning point, where the *Alert's* bow oar fouled the stern of the *Puaala*, but no foul was claimed. Although the *Alert's* boat lost some space by the collision she afterwards gradually crawled up on the *Espiegle* boat and passed her. Time of the boats: *Kapiolani*, 29:10; *Alert*, 31; *Puaala (Espiegle)*, 31:55, and *Pilcomayo*, 33.

Third race: Yachts of 5 tons measurement. Entered, *Spray*, 6.07 tons; *Healani*, 6.29; *Hawaii*, 6.95; *Kahihilani*, 8.14, and *Helene*, 12.22. A gentle breeze had sprung up, and at the signal to start the *Hawaii* took a big lead, and, setting all canvas, was away ahead in a short time.

The *Spray* crossed the starting line second, the *Kahihilani* third, *Helene* fourth, and *Healani* fifth. The wind, while beating up to Waikiki, was favorable to the smaller boats, being too light for the larger ones. The *Kahihilani* was the first to make an inshore tack on rounding the bell buoy. The *Hawaii* rounded the Waikiki stake boat a short distance in advance of the *Spray*, *Healani*, and *Helene*, which three vessels had gained handsomely on the *Hawaii*. On the run before the wind to Pearl River the *Hawaii* was considerably in the lead for the greater part of the distance, but when near the stake boat a stiff breeze sprang up and the *Helene* went ahead. A lull came before the stake boat was reached, however, and the *Hawaii*, forging a head, turned first. On the beat home the *Healani* stole a march by tacking away inshore, the *Helene* also going in considerably, while the *Hawaii* kept too much to sea. Near the bell buoy, on the return home, the *Healani* was leading handsomely. The *Helene* held a good position and weathered the buoy finely. The *Spray*, although far behind at one time, having gained by her inshore tack, came very near rounding the bell buoy before the *Hawaii*. While beating up the passage the *Healani*, which was ahead, became becalmed for a moment on the Ewa side of the passage, and the *Helene*, picking up a puff on the Waikiki side, carried it along with her and walked in ahead. The *Helene* crossed the line first, the *Healani* second, the *Hawaii* third, and the *Spray* fourth, very closely.

OFFICIAL TIME.

Hawaii, start 9:41, return 2:02:57, corrected time 4 hours 16 minutes 4 seconds.

Spray, start 9:41:35, return 3:03:22, corrected time 4 hours 14 minutes 16 seconds.

Kahihilani, start 9:42:05, out of race.

Helene, start 9:43:25, return 1:58:55, corrected time 4 hours 15 minutes 30 seconds.

Healani, start 9:44:09, return 2:0:12, corrected time 4 hours 8 minutes 32 seconds.

By time allowance the *Healani* is winner of the race, the *Spray* comes second, the *Helene* third and the *Hawaii* fourth.

Fourth race: Yachts below 5 tons measurement, rested between the *Kaohinani* and *Edith L.*, but has been decided in favor of the *Edith L.* The time of the *Edith L.* is 3 hours 49 seconds, and of the *Kaohinani* 3 hours 50 seconds.

Four boats started in the fifth race—of licensed boats—the *Flying Fish* winning, the *Alameda* crossing the line 2 seconds later, and taking second prize.

LITERARY EXERCISES.

The literary exercises were held in the Hawaiian opera house at 10 o'clock, and were very interesting, though not largely attended. Besides those performing the various parts, Prof. M. M. Scott, chairman; Hon. W. F. Allen and Mr. W. W. Hall, members of the committee on literary exercises; and Hon. J. H. Putnam, consul-general, were on the stage; also the choir of the Central Union church and a detachment of the Royal Hawaiian Band, under the lead of Prof. Berger.

The band played an overture consisting of a medley of American airs.

Rev. George Wallace, chaplain of the day, offered opening prayers.

His excellency, George W. Merrill, president, made introductory remarks. He was pleased to be with the Honolulu people once more, this being the fifth time he enjoyed with them the privilege of celebrating the Fourth of July. As the shadows of the nineteenth century deepened around us he wondered how many people outside of America would be glad that the United States had stood for a century under a Constitution that had abided all the tests and provided liberty, equality, and justice to the nation. In a glowing panegyric upon the men who gave them that Constitution he said they avoided the Scylla of disunion at home and repulsed the Charybdis of invasion from abroad. As he thought of it he had not words to express his feelings toward that godlike man Washington. Referring to the advancement of science contemporaneously with the development of the American Republic, the speaker said Boston was nearer London and New Zealand in communications to-day than New York and Albany were to each other a hundred years ago. It was possible that Hawaii might before long be enabled to learn changes in the price of sugar the day they occurred, while now the map of Europe might be changed and they could not learn of it in less than a week. He referred to the Samoan disaster as calling forth the same spirit in their nation's defenders that inspired their forefathers, which enabled them to give three rousing cheers to Britain's sons, when these gave back three cheers for the red, white, and blue and for the men who stood so bravely at their duty.

Mr. A. V. Gear, of Ohio, assistant teacher in Fort street school, was introduced with facetious remarks from the Chair about his State's officeholding resources, and in clear and measured tones read the Declaration of Independence.

"America" was sung by choir and audience to the accompaniment of the band.

Rev. E. G. Porter, introduced as coming from Lexington, Mass., where so many of their fathers fought and died, delivered an extempore oration of the day. He had only consented to fill the place on the assurance that no profundity of research or study would be exacted, as he could not think of giving up any considerable portion of his limited stay from the investigation of the points of interest in these delightful islands. He greeted them as fellow countrymen in a foreign land, which was a particularly pleasing privilege to him here, where there were so many evidences of American predominance—the numbers of houses displaying American flags, the juvenile demonstrations similar to their childhood's celebrations of the day, and, above all, the mark Americans had made in the country's civilization.

The Americans had done their moral work here unselfishly. They came not to make money but to benefit the people in the highest moral sense. That end had been greatly accomplished and those who had done it are gone to their well-earned rest.

They were met to celebrate an event second to none. Their country could not have a second birth; therefore he was glad of the establishment of this Fourth of July holiday. He referred with pleasure to the ample provisions made here for the celebration—in these exercises, aquatic and field sports, and so forth. It was well that the nation should perpetually commemorate the movement that led to the framing of that instrument in 1776 which had just been read to them. They had struggles not only to gain their national independence but to preserve the Union. That day of trial should be remembered on the Fourth.

The speaker considered that the course of affairs in their country could be viewed, in some respects, with more advantage from Sydney, Calcutta, Hongkong, or Honolulu than from within the country itself. One of the thoughts occurring at this time was that they could never forget the men who gave them their nation—those men who framed the early state papers, gave them a jurisprudence, interpreted the laws they made themselves. This Fourth might be celebrated as the anniversary of their Constitution. The assertion of independence was not the securing of it. They had strife and war to maintain independence. The inauguration of the first President was, perhaps, the beginning of their national life, but that could not take place without important antecedent events. Although the war did not continue thirteen years, their organization was not complete under that period.

They had no chief justice, with associates, to declare the purpose of the laws. Chosen men sat for five months, working seven hours a day, to make the Constitution. Samuel Adams, one of these, had been the first man to mention the word "independence," and not one of his fellow-patriots was with him, even Washington opposing him when he had uttered the sentiment in Faneuil Hall. The orator proceeded to eulogize the nation's founders by name, and described Washington's journey from the Potomac to receive the honors as President at New York. All the great men of the day—Governor Clinton, Roger Sherman, Col. Knox, etc., withdrew to a man and owned Washington as the only man for the position. Sketching the career of Washington from childhood, the speaker said he could find no names in history surpassing that of the "Father of his country." "I would not exchange the reputation of Washington for the reputation of any man who ever lived." (Applause.) They had no need to boast of him, for other nations had recognized him. Over all his qualities was nobility of character, of work, of life.

Mr. Porter dealt eloquently with the stability of American institutions, comparing this with the precarious tenure of existing conditions in certain European countries. He spoke of the increasing influence of America in international affairs, notwithstanding that she let other countries surpass her in foreign commerce for the development of boundless resources at home. Reference was made to America's superior general intelligence over that of other countries, to the munificence of her rich men toward higher learning from the foundation of Harvard College in 1636, and to her progress in establishing art and technical schools. The wide distribution of property in America was compared with the land-holding in few hands elsewhere. America's influence as extended by her Christian missions was alluded to, being strikingly exemplified in Korea, Japan, and Turkey. She sent "kerosene and missionaries" to Turkey; one giving light to the homes, the other to the hearts of the people. America had the torch to give light to the world. In conclusion, he was happy to congratulate them that the country was thriving at home and abroad. Wherever he had seen their flag he had felt at home, whether in foreign harbors or lonely bungalows of India. He was glad to see so many elements of joy in these islands. By striving to follow the examples of Washington and Lincoln, Americans would be a blessing to their own land and to the nations of the earth.

Mr. Merrill publicly thanked Mr. Porter for his able address. He added that, owing to events over which he had no control, he might visit America before the next Fourth,

and he thanked them for their kindly attention to these celebrations, to which his mind would always revert with pleasure. When he again stepped on the shores of America he should always feel proud of her Constitution, whether administered by the powers that sent him here, or that called him home, and forever shout three cheers for the "red, white, and blue," whether it waved victoriously over his party or another one. His excellency concluded with a cordial invitation for everybody to call on Mrs. Merrill and himself at the legation in the afternoon.

The singing of "Star Spangled Banner," and band music closed the exercises.

TARGET PRACTICE.

The eighth semiannual competition of the Hawaiian Rifle Association was held at the King street range. There was a fair attendance, but not so large as on former occasions, owing to the numerous sources of amusement offered elsewhere. The weather was good, although the light was somewhat changeable. With a few exceptions the shooting was hardly up to the standard of some former meetings of the association. It will be seen that Mr. Pratt made an excellent score in the midrange championship match. Mr. Fisher won the Brodie medal for the third and last time.

RECEPTION AT THE LEGATION.

His Excellency George W. Merrill, United States minister resident, and Mrs. Merrill were at home from 2 to 5 o'clock in the afternoon. There was a large number of callers, who were received with great cordiality by the popular host and hostess. Decorations of the legation were charming, and an elegant line of refreshments was served. Below will be found a list of visitors as nearly as possible correct:

A. Mons. G. B. d'Anglade, French commissioner; Hon. Taro Ando, Japanese consul-general; Mr. and Mrs. W. O. Atwater, Hon. W. D. Alexander, His Excellency Jona. Austin, minister of foreign affairs; Miss Millie Austin, Col. V. V. Ashford.

B. Brother Bertram, St. Louis College; C. O. Berger, Mons. Bellaguet, chancellor French legation; Rev. E. G. Beckwith, D.D., Rev. and Mrs. S. E. Bishop, Lieut. Bechler, U. S. Navy; E. Faxon Bishop, H. Berger, Mrs. A. E. Broad, Rev. H. Bingham.

C. Capt. Clarke, H. B. M. S. *Espiegle*; His Excellency H. A. P. Carter, Hawaiian minister to Washington; Misses Carter (2); Mr. and Mrs. J. O. Carter, Miss Mary Carter, Sadie Carter, Hon. A. S. Cleghorn, Miss Corney, Senhor A. de Souza Canavarro, Portuguese commissioner; Mrs. R. J. Creighton, Miss Creighton, Master Henry Cushman Carter, Cushman Carter, Mr. Conn.

D. Mrs. S. M. Damon, Mrs. Dudoit, Miss Dudoit, Mrs. John Dyer, B. F. Dillingham, Mrs. Demming.

E. Miss Elliott, Mrs. Everett, Mrs. M. M. Evans.

F. Mrs. A. Fuller, Clara Fuller, Brother Francis, St. Louis College; Justice and Mrs. William Foster.

G. Maj. and Mrs. C. T. Gulick, Lieut. Greene, U. S. Navy; Miss Gay (Kauai), Rev. H. H. Gowen, Commander James G. Green, U. S. S. *Alert*; H. F. Glade, German consul.

H. A. S. Hartwell, J. F. Hackfeld, Russian consul; J. A. Hopper, Mr. and Mrs. Heydtmann, Mrs. Haalelea, Rev. C. M. Hyde, D.D.

J. Hon. A. F. Judd, chief justice; P. C. Jones, Mr. and Mrs. Hamilton Johnson.

K. Absolom Kirby, chief engineer, U. S. Navy; Mrs. Knowles, Goo Kim, Chinese commercial agent; Ensign Knapp, U. S. Navy; Prince David Kawanakoa.

L. Curtis J. Lyons, Mrs. Langtry, Daniel Logan, Mr. and Mrs. Robert Lewers, W. H. Lewers, Miss Lewers, Dr. Lundy, Father Leonor, H. Lose, acting consul for Sweden and Norway, and Mrs. Lose.

M. Lieut. Moore, U. S. Navy; Capt. H. W. Mist, R. N., and Miss Mist, Rev. and Mrs. A. Mackintosh, Surgeon Marsteller, U. S. Navy; Dr. John S. McGrew, Miss Messrole, M. D. Monsarrat, Mrs. H. R. Macfarlane.

N. Hon. Paul Neumann, Gus Neth.

P. Hon. J. H. Putnam, U. S. consul-general; Lieut. Pritchard, H. B. M. S. *Espiegle*; Mrs. E. W. Peterson, Miss Payson, Miss Pecalta, J. H. Paty, consul for The Netherlands; Mrs. Pinney, Rev. E. G. Porter (Lexington, Mass.).

R. George J. Ross, Mr. and Mrs. Robinson (Kauai), Dr. and Mrs. C. T. Rodgers, J. W. Robertson, H. M.'s Acting Chamberlain, Miss Ritchie.

S. T. M. Starkey, Mr. Shields (Denver, Colo.), Prof. and Mrs. M. M. Scott, Maj. Seward, Paymaster Sullivan, U. S. Navy; F. A. Schaefer, Italian consul, and Mrs. Schaefer, O. C. Swain, Cadet Stafford, U. S. S. *Adams*.

T. Mr. and Mrs. H. P. Toler.

V. Capt. Valenzuela, Chilean warship *Pilcomayo*.

W. Maj. J. H. Wodehouse, H. B. M.'s commissioner, and the Misses Wodehouse (2), Rev. G. Wallace, Hon. and Mrs. W. C. Wilder, Hon. H. A. Widemann, the Misses

Winter (2), Commander Woodward, U. S. S. *Adams*; C. M. White, Hon. H. M. Whitney, Cadet Wiley, U. S. Navy; Mrs. Widdifield, Master Clifford White, Dr. and Mrs. J. M. Whitney, Bishop and Mrs. Willis.

GAMES AT MAKIKI.

It was difficult to get the prize sports through at Makiki, owing to the crowding in of people on the competitors.

The 50-yards race was won by G. Rosa, and W. Kaae second.

The 100-yards race was reversed, Kaae being first and Rosa second, and the 150-yards race went likewise.

Luahiwa made the best standing jump, Kaina second.

Kaina won in the three jumps, Luahiwa second.

Edwin won the sack race, John Pihi second.

A sailor caught the greased pig but let a native have it.

Running the bases was declared off at the desire of ball players.

In a saddle pull between two horses, that ridden by John Keimi beat one ridden by Wm. Holt.

The baseball match between the Honolulu and the Stars afforded the most amusement to the largest crowd, probably, of any match ever played on that diamond. Some estimates of the number of spectators are as high as 3,000. There was some of the worst and some of the best play of the season. Eleven innings were played, ending in a dispute. Honolulu made 4 runs in the first inning, 5 in the second, 1 in the eighth, and 1 in the ninth, 11 altogether. The Stars made 1 in first, 1 in second, 2 in fifth, 5 in sixth, making 9, even with Honolulu, 2 in seventh, 11 altogether. At the end of the eleventh inning, two being out, Winter made three strikes and ran for base. Chan Wilder, seeing the catcher muff the ball ran for home and passed the plate before Winter was put out at first. The Stars claimed Wilder's run and the game, which Umpire Boardman would not allow. After half an hour's disputing the matter was left to the league, and if the decision be against the Stars the match will be declared a draw.

THE EVENING.

In the evening the U. S. S. *Alert* replaced her flags in ship dress with lanterns, illuminated all the window ports, and made a display of fireworks. It made one of the grandest sights ever seen in the harbor.

A grand ball was given in the Hawaiian Hotel under the auspices of the subcommittee for that purpose. It was a very brilliant event, being attended by hundreds of residents and officers from the American, British, and Chilean warships. The rooms were beautifully decorated with flags, flowers, and foliage by the hands of Mrs. G. E. Boardman, assisted by Mrs. Ables, Mrs. Hebbard, Miss Afong, and Miss Katie Rose. The floor manager was Mr. E. F. Bishop, and committee were Maj. H. F. Hebbard, Messrs. F. E. Nichols, F. L. Winter, and T. F. Lansing. Dancing went on simultaneously in the dining room and parlor, at opposite ends of the house, a detachment of the Royal Band under Prof. Berger playing the music on the veranda. A splendid bill of refreshments was served and the ball broke up in the early hours of morning.

A very pleasant dancing party was given at the Arion Hall under the management of Messrs. C. J. Lane, D. W. Roach, and A. Brown, a committee appointed by a meeting of some who were dissatisfied with the arrangements of the general meeting for the Fourth. Music was furnished on the piano and by members of the Royal Band, and an elegant repast, including fine coffee, was served on the back veranda. There was a large party who enjoyed themselves intensely till after midnight.

THE BALLOON ASCENSION.

Prof. Melville went up in his balloon shortly before 10 o'clock. The balloon took fire before he was ready, and he gave orders to let it go. Away up it shot with the aeronaut hanging from it with hands and legs to a small rope, having neither trapeze nor parachute on the balloon. While thousands of eyes were watching from earth to see the parachute leap the balloon began a rapid descent and in a few seconds it lodged in a tree at Kakaako. Melville jumped about 20 feet to avoid the tree and landed without hurt in a swamp. The balloon was rent in four pieces but the professor says it can be stitched together again, and he intends going to the other islands to make ascensions. He claims to have gone to a height of 2,000 feet.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 1.]

AUGUSTA, ME., *July 12, 1889.*

SIR: Under the date of June 24 last, I had the honor to receive from the Secretary of State the official information that the President had appointed me United States minister resident to the Hawaiian Islands, inclosing therewith the necessary blank for me to take the oath of office, with the instruction to return the same to the Department of State.

On the reception of that communication I immediately complied with its directions by taking the oath of office before Judge Andrews of this city, and made the proper return to the Department of State. I now beg leave to say that I am making all the necessary preparations to leave Augusta with my family for my post at Honolulu about August 22, hoping to take the steamer which is to leave San Francisco September 13 for Honolulu. Presuming that my commission and instructions will soon reach me,

I have the honor to be, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Merrill to Mr. Blaine.

No. 253.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, July 26, 1889.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that, on the 15th instant, I received confidential information to the effect that a few half-caste native Hawaiians were organizing a scheme whereby they contemplated deposing His Majesty the King, installing his sister, Her Royal Highness the Princess Liliuokalani, in his place, and proclaiming a new constitution.

On the following day, in an interview with His Majesty's minister of foreign affairs, I learned that he had recently heard similar disquieting rumors, and further that the contemplated change was to be attempted after the departure of the U. S. S. *Adams*, which was then intending leaving forthwith for Samoa, and before the return to this port of H. B. M.'s S. *Espiegle*, then on a ten days' cruise among the islands.

While the minister of foreign affairs did not place much credence in such a change being attempted, and expressed a confidence in the ability of the regular authorities of the kingdom to defeat any such attempt, yet he thought if the *Adams* would remain until the return of the *Espiegle*, so as not to leave the harbor without a naval vessel, the probability of any riotous action would be greatly reduced.

I informed him that if he would make a written request in regard to the matter, I would communicate the same to the commander of the *Adams* and ask him if possible to remain a few days.

Accordingly, on the 17th instant, I received an unofficial note from the minister of foreign affairs, a copy of which I at once transmitted to the commander of the *Adams*, accompanied by one from myself. Copies of the correspondence I inclose herewith.

Commander Woodward, of the *Adams*, being also detained on account of the sickness of his surgeon, determined to defer his departure, and on the 23d instant H. B. M.'s S. *Espiegle* returned to port.

No disturbance, however, has occurred, nor does it now appear that there is a probability of any in the immediate future.

Although this place is very prolific in political rumors, yet I have never deemed it advisable to ignore them as without possible foundation, believing it better to be deceived by discovering their falsity than their truth.

In this instance I have quietly investigated the matter and am led to conclude that the disquieting reports arose in a large degree from a desire on the part of the leaders of the opposition to the present administration to excite and annoy, if possible, the leaders of the reform party and the official incumbents.

Doubtless these disquieting reports will become more frequent, while political excitement will increase and animosities be engendered in a greater or less degree, until after the election for members of the legislature in February next.

I am, etc.,

GEO. W. MERRILL.

[Inclosure No. 1.]

Mr. Austin to Mr. Merrill.

Unofficial.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, July 17, 1889.

MY DEAR MR. MERRILL:

In view of the fact that there are rumors of intention on the part of certain individuals to create disturbances if the harbor should be left without the presence of a warship, and of the fact that the U. S. S. *Adams*, the only one now here, is under orders to proceed to Samoa, I suggest that if her departure could be delayed until the return of H. B. M.'s *Espiegle*, or until some other naval vessel shall arrive, the probability of riotous action would be greatly reduced. The passive presence of a man of war in the harbor is sure to have a quieting influence, and I trust that you will feel that it is best that there be no interval without one.

Very truly, yours,

JONA. AUSTIN.

[Inclosure No. 2.]

Mr. Merrill to Mr. Woodward.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, July 17, 1889.

SIR: I inclose copy of an unofficial note, just at hand from Mr. Austin, His Hawaiian Majesty's minister of foreign affairs, respecting rumors of disturbance in Honolulu and the advisability of the presence of a naval vessel in the harbor at the present time.

If possible to comply with the request of Mr. Austin, I hope you may deem it advisable to delay your contemplated departure for a few days at least.

Very respectfully,

GEO. W. MERRILL.

Commander E. T. WOODWARD,
Commanding U. S. S. Adams, Honolulu.

Mr. Merrill to Mr. Blaine.

No. 254.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, July 29, 1889.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that on the 22d instant His Majesty, the King, appointed Hon. Samuel M. Damon minister of finance, vice Hon. William L. Green, resigned.

The resignation of Mr. Green is owing to advanced age and ill health.

Mr. Damon is a native of this Kingdom, his parents being citizens of the United States, and has been connected with the banking house of Bishop & Co., at Honolulu, twenty years or more.

The appointment is regarded by all parties here with much favor.

I have, etc.,

GEORGE W. MERRILL.

Mr. Merrill to Mr. Blaine.

No. 255.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, August 1, 1889.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose a very full account, from the "Bulletin" of Honolulu, of an attempt made on the 30th ultimo, by about 100 half-castes and natives, under the leadership of Robert W. Wilcox and Robert Boyd, two half-caste Hawaiians, to overthrow the present Government of Hawaii and depose the King.

This is supposed to be their purpose, although their exact intention is not yet fully known.

About 6 o'clock a. m. a message from the King informed me that an armed party, led by Mr. Wilcox, was in possession of the palace grounds, and soon thereafter it was learned that insurgents were in charge of the building containing the Government offices.

As soon as possible I had communication with Commander Woodward of the U. S. S. *Adams*, and at once all necessary preparations were made to land a force, if found necessary for protection of the people and property interests.

Soon thereafter I met His Majesty's minister of foreign affairs, who informed me that a cabinet council would be held forthwith.

Soon after the news of the affair became generally known, the British, Portuguese, and French commissioners called at the legation, and while comparing information regarding the situation, Mr. Damon, the newly appointed minister of finance, arrived and stated that it was the desire of His Majesty's ministers to meet the foreign representatives at once. It was deemed advisable to comply with this request without delay. On meeting the ministers they stated that they desired to fully inform us of their contemplated action in the present emergency, and that they had determined to occupy the tops of the buildings commanding a view of the palace grounds with sharpshooters, for the purpose of preventing the use of the cannon which were known to be in the possession of the insurgents inside the walls inclosing the palace grounds, gradually surround and finally dislodge them with other forces.

After learning the intention of the Government to operate at once with an armed force, I suggested the propriety of Mr. Damon, one of the members of the cabinet who speaks the native language fluently, endeavoring to communicate with Mr. Wilcox, the leader of the insurgents, and ascertain if possible the cause of his action and what his demands were,

if any; then, if Mr. Damon failed, that the representatives of foreign powers endeavor to obtain an interview with Wilcox, and by their good offices effect a peaceful settlement if possible.

This was cordially agreed to by all, and the representatives withdrew with the understanding that Mr. Damon would inform us of the result of his mission. In about one half hour Mr. Damon reported to me at the legation that Mr. Wilcox refused to receive any communication from him whatever, and that while he was seeking to communicate with him firing commenced; he deemed it not only imprudent, but suicidal for anyone to attempt to approach the palace grounds on a peace mission.

At this juncture, as the report of small arms and cannon came from the palace grounds and immediate vicinity quite rapidly, and as many with alarm were coming to the legation, I at once requested Commander Woodward to send to the legation a body of marines, which request he promptly complied with.

The appearance of the marines on the streets and at the legation had a very favorable effect on the populace. Soon the report of the large guns ceased by reason of the inability of the insurgents to operate them in the presence of the fire of the sharpshooters on the tops of the surrounding buildings.

The "bungalow" mentioned in the newspaper account and into which the insurgents retreated is a frame building situated in the corner of the palace grounds, sometimes used by the King as a dwelling and for offices.

The palace square comprises about 4 acres, situate two blocks from the central business part of the city, and is entirely inclosed by a concrete wall about 8 feet high, while the King's palace is situated in the center of the square.

In the afternoon, and as soon as I ascertained from one of the cabinet ministers that an attempt would be made to dislodge the insurgents from the "bungalow" before dark by the use of dynamite, and as there were large crowds of people congregated on several streets, I deemed it advisable to ask for the landing of the remainder of the forces from the *Adams* before dark as a precautionary measure in the event any assistance to preserve order might be required, and to be immediately available in the event a conflagration should start. In this matter Commander Woodward fully agreed, and by permission of the minister of foreign affairs the forces landed about 5 o'clock p. m. Early the following morning all the men belonging to the *Adams* returned to the ship.

The members of the cabinet and many prominent residents expressed much commendation of the prompt landing of the men, and remarked upon the very salutary effect their presence seemed to have among the people on the streets.

The U. S. S. *Adams* was the only naval vessel in port. The British ship *Espiegle* recently left under sealed orders on a cruise south.

This disturbance at this time was wholly unexpected by the Government officials as well as nearly every prominent resident.

Although for several weeks it was known that Wilcox was endeavoring to draw around him as many disappointed native political aspirants as possible, yet it was recently ascertained on what seemed very reliable authority that no overt acts would be committed prior to the next general election in February, when it was thought the present ministers would be defeated at the polls.

However, the success of the Government in subduing the insurgents, it is thought, will draw some to its support, and the general feeling is that the Government will be strengthened by the result of the conflict.

Immediately after the surrender of the insurgents the city was quiet and still remains so, while business is being transacted as usual. As to the exact number of the insurgents it is difficult now to determine, as some deserted in the early morning. About 80 prisoners were secured. No serious casualties occurred except to the insurgents.

In order that you may be promptly informed of the principal facts a week in advance of the regular mail, I will forward by the steamer leaving here to-morrow a telegram, to be wired from San Francisco, of which the following is a copy:

On July 30 unsuccessful attempt by about 100 half-castes and natives to overthrow Government and depose King. Insurrection suppressed by Hawaiian Government without foreign aid. Six insurgents killed, 12 wounded. Order restored same day. Men from U. S. S. *Adams* landed by permission, to protect lives and property if found necessary; afterwards returned to ship.

Before sealing this dispatch I shall inclose clippings from newspapers giving latest intelligence, but will be unable to properly paste and arrange them.

Trusting my action may merit the approval of the Department,
I have the honor, etc.,

GEO. W. MERRILL.

Mr. Merrill to Mr. Blaine.

[Telegram.]

HONOLULU, August 2, 1889.

On July 30 unsuccessful attempt by about 100 half-castes and natives to overthrow Government and depose King. Insurrection suppressed by Hawaiian Government without foreign aid. Six insurgents killed, 12 wounded. Order restored same day. Men from U. S. S. *Adams* landing by permission to protect lives and property if found necessary; afterwards returning to ship.

GEO. W. MERRILL.

Mr. Merrill to Mr. Blaine.

No. 257.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

Honolulu, August 6, 1889.

SIR: Realizing that the Department is desirous of being in possession of the latest information regarding affairs here, and availing myself of an opportunity offered by the departure of a sailing vessel for San Francisco, I have the honor to inform you that on Saturday, the 3d instant, in compliance with a request from the minister of foreign affairs, received on the preceding day, I attended a meeting of His Majesty's ministers at which meeting were also present the British, French, Portuguese, and Japanese commissioners.

On assembling, the ministers stated that in a few hours a cabinet council would be held, and that they desired to fully inform us of the propositions they intended submitting and insisting upon to His Majesty the King.

This information they desired to communicate in order that we might not be misled by false rumors in the event His Majesty declined acceding to their proposed demands.

They stated that they were convinced the time had arrived when, in the interest of peace and good government, the powers and responsibility of the ministers and His Majesty should be clearly understood and precisely defined. As the "Advertiser" daily, published here, in its issue of the 5th and 6th instants, authoritatively and correctly states, the demands of the cabinet and the termination of the controversy, I inclose clippings from that paper for the information of the Department. After being informed of the demands, the foreign representatives withdrew.

The cabinet met the King at noon of the 3d instant, and soon after the adjournment of the council I was informed that no settlement had been effected.

About 5 o'clock p. m. of the same day I was informed His Majesty wished to meet the British commissioner and myself, and at once we held an interview with him, in which he stated as his opinion that until the supreme court decided otherwise he had a constitutional right to exercise his discretion and withhold his approval of any of the acts embraced in the demands presented by his ministers; but, in reply to my question, he distinctly stated he would be governed by whatever decision the judges of the supreme court might make.

This gave confidence that a final and favorable termination could be reached.

On Monday, the 5th instant, it became known that His Majesty was to meet his ministers at noon when the opinion of the judges would be presented.

I, having previously learned the tenor of the opinion, did not have doubts about the amicable settlement of the matter, but as the news of the difference between His Majesty and the cabinet spread, a feeling of unrest, aggravated by many false rumors, pervaded the community, and, at the request of a prominent American resident here, I, in company with the British commissioner who chanced to be at the legation, after first stating our purpose to and obtaining the consent and cordial approval of the ministers, proceeded to the palace for the purpose of interviewing the King before he met the ministers in council.

His Majesty received us with much cordiality, and, upon his reference to the disagreement between himself and cabinet, I embraced the opportunity to assure him that the people felt great interest and much anxiety regarding the settlement of the matter, and it was hoped an amicable and honorable settlement of the controversy would be effected, which was certain to restore permanent confidence among the people.

Similar views were expressed by the British commissioner. His Majesty at once assured us he had decided to yield the points, and consent to the requests of his ministers.

At the present time appearances indicate a cessation of disquietude.

Since my No. 255 of the 1st instant, a report has gained credence that the object of the leaders of the insurrection was not so much for the purpose of dethroning the King as to obtain from him the promulgation of a new constitution and the dismissal of the present ministry.

However, the purpose of the insurgents and all the parties, directly and indirectly, connected with the insurrection are not yet known, but the whole affair is being investigated, and probably I may be able to inform the Department more fully by the next regular mail.

I have, etc.,

GEO. W. MERRILL.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 257. Advertiser, August 5, 1889.]

THE KING AND THE CABINET.

Numbers of exaggerated reports have been circulating through the city concerning the relations existing between the king and the cabinet. We are authorized to state that the following are the main points at issue: The King claims the right of exercising his personal discretion in executive matters coming before him and requiring his signature or act, while the cabinet claim that he has no such right, but is constitutionally bound to take the advice of the cabinet. The King has acted upon his claim in a number of cases, the particular one which has brought the question to issue being his refusal to sign the commission of Col. V. V. Ashford as colonel of the Hawaiian Volunteers. Mr. Ashford was elected to this office some months ago, but the King has continuously refused and still refuses to sign the commission, although advised then and now by the cabinet that it was his duty so to do.

The King also claims that he has the control of the military and munitions of war belonging to the Government, and refuses to recognize the authority of the minister of foreign affairs relative to the disposition of certain munitions of war stored at the barracks, although the statute gives such minister the express control of the same. Under these circumstances the cabinet felt the necessity of settling this question before going further, and accordingly submitted the following proposition to His Majesty on Saturday last:

"Before going further, the cabinet desire a thorough understanding with Your Majesty upon the following point, viz: The Government in all its departments must be conducted by the cabinet, who will be solely and absolutely responsible for such conduct. Your Majesty shall in future sign all documents and do all acts which, under the laws or the constitution, require the signature or act of the Sovereign, when advised so to do by the cabinet, the cabinet being solely and absolutely responsible for any signature of any document or act so done or performed by their advice."

The King declined to assent to this proposition, unless advised by the supreme court that it was in accordance with the constitution, he claiming that it was unconstitutional.

The cabinet have submitted the question to the supreme court for an opinion, and an answer will probably be received and made public to-day.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 257. Advertiser, August 6, 1889.]

The King conforms. He concedes all the points asked for by the Government upon learning that the supreme court had decided against the stand he had taken.

As was stated in the Advertiser yesterday, the King had refused to sign the commission of Col. V. V. Ashford, as commander of the Hawaiian Volunteers, although advised by the cabinet so to do. He also disputed the authority of the minister of foreign affairs to dispose of arms and ammunition then in charge of the corps known as the "King's Guard."

His Majesty has now receded from the position above stated, and the following documents explain how the change came about:

HONOLULA, H. I., August 3, 1889.

Hon. A. FRANCIS JUDD,
Chief Justice Supreme Court:

SIR: The cabinet desire to submit for your consideration the following statement of facts, and respectfully request the opinion of the supreme court upon the question hereinbelow stated:

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

His Majesty the King claims the right to exercise his personal discretion in and concerning the performance of official executive duties of the Sovereign, such as making appointments requiring the royal signature; appointment and removal of diplomatic and consular officers accredited by the Hawaiian Government abroad; the acknowledgment of foreign diplomatic and consular representatives from abroad to the Hawaiian Kingdom; the authority over and control of the military forces and munitions of war belonging to the Hawaiian Government, etc.

His assertion of and action in pursuance with this claim has now come to such a point that the orderly progress of the business of the Government is seriously interfered with and the preservation of the public peace menaced.

Under these circumstances the cabinet this day formulated and presented to His Majesty the following statement of principles, viz:

"Before going further, the cabinet desire a thorough understanding with Your Majesty upon the following point, viz: The Government in all its departments must be conducted by the cabinet, who will be solely and absolutely responsible for such conduct. Your Majesty shall in future sign all documents and do all acts which under the laws or the constitution require the signature or act of the Sovereign, when advised so to do by the cabinet, the cabinet being solely and absolutely responsible for any signature of any document or act so done or performed by their advice."

The cabinet advised His Majesty that such statement of principles is in accordance with the constitution and that it was his duty to assent thereto.

In reply to such advice by the cabinet His Majesty replied that he considered the request to consent to such statement of principles as uncalled for and insulting, and declined to assent thereto.

The cabinet, therefore, respectfully request the opinion of the supreme court upon the following question, viz:

Is the authority and responsibility of the cabinet, as set forth in the above statement of principles, in accordance with and in pursuance of the constitution or not?

L. A. THURSTON,
Minister Interior.

JONA. AUSTIN,
Minister Foreign Affairs.

S. M. DAMON,
Minister of Finance.

C. W. ASHFORD,
Attorney-General.

DEPARTMENT OF THE JUDICIARY,
Honolulu, August 3, 1889.

To His Majesty's Cabinet:

GENTLEMEN: The justices of the supreme court have received your letter of to-day's date, in which you state certain circumstances under which you to-day formulated and presented to His Majesty the following statement of principles:

"Before going further the cabinet desire a thorough understanding with Your Majesty upon the following point, viz:

"The Government, in all its departments, must be conducted by the cabinet, who will be solely and absolutely responsible for such conduct.

"Your Majesty shall in future sign all documents and do all acts which, under the laws or the constitution, require the signature or act of the Sovereign, when advised so to do by the cabinet, the cabinet being solely and absolutely responsible for any signature of any document or act so done or performed by their advice."

You further state that you advised His Majesty that such statement of principles is in accordance with the constitution, and that it was his duty to assent thereto.

You request the opinion of the justices of the supreme court upon the following question, viz:

"Is the authority and responsibility of the cabinet, as set forth in the above statement of principles, in accordance with and in pursuance of the constitution or not?"

We respectfully submit the following reply:

By article 21 of the constitution "the Government of this Kingdom is that of a constitutional monarchy," and although the constitution devolves upon the King, as the head of the Government, certain powers and directs that certain acts shall be done by him, so far certainly as these are executive powers and acts, the exercise of them is controlled by article 78 of the constitution, which reads that "wherever by this constitution any act is to be done or performed by the King or Sovereign, it shall, unless otherwise expressed, mean that such act shall be done and performed by and with the advice and consent of the cabinet."

Article 31 of the constitution declares that the King's person is sacred and inviolable and that his ministers are responsible, and article 41 prescribes that "no act of the King shall have any effect unless it be countersigned by a member of the cabinet who, by that signature, makes himself responsible."

There can be no dual government. There can be no authority without responsibility. The King is without responsibility. The constitution confirms the respon-

sibility of government upon the cabinet; they, therefore, have the authority. With this in view, we are unanimously of opinion that the principles formulated by you and presented to His Majesty, above set forth, are in accordance with and in pursuance of the constitution.

We wish to say, further, that on the occasion of His Majesty's considering the propriety of his approval of an act of the legislature of 1887 (which is now chap. 25 of the acts of 1887) the justices of the supreme court, at his request, sent him an opinion upon the proposed act. Its title is "An act to provide for and declare the construction to be placed upon the words 'the king' or 'the sovereign' in certain cases."

The opinion was as follows:

"We see no conflict of this act with article 16 or 48 of the constitution. This act is consistent with article 78 of the constitution, the principle of which is hereby applied in terms to statutes also.

"And we understand that it has always been the true intent of statutes that the acts of the King are done upon the responsibility of his cabinet unless it appears from express words or by the very nature of the case that the act is of a personal character."

We remain yours, respectfully,

A. F. JUDD,
LAURENCE MCCULLY,
EDWARD PRESTON,
RICHD. F. BICKERTON,
SANFORD B. DOLE.

At 12 o'clock Monday, August 5, the cabinet met His Majesty at the palace and submitted to him the opinion of the supreme court, and again requested his assent to the principle involved. His Majesty replied that he accepted the decision of the court, and assented to the proposition submitted by the cabinet, and requested that his assent be entered on the minutes of the council.

Upon presentation of the commission of Col. Ashford for signature, His Majesty stated that since last Saturday he had reread the military law and was convinced that the position taken by him was incorrect.

He therefore signed the commission.

In pursuance of the power given to the minister of foreign affairs he has, with the consent of the cabinet, removed Capt. Kahalewai, commander of the King's Guards, for complicity in the late insurrection, the command thereby devolving upon Lieut. Robert Parker.

Orders were issued for the immediate transfer of all arms, ammunition, and munitions of war, except those arms and ammunition individually in use by the King's Guards, from the palace and barracks to the station house. These orders were carried out by the marshal yesterday afternoon, with the assistance of the police and special officers; and among other material transferred were three beautiful brass fieldpieces of 3-inch bore, ordered by the King from Austria.

His Majesty has now conformed to the provisions of the constitution in the matters above related; and the anxiety manifested before he did so is now allayed and confidence in future peace restored.

Mr. Moore to Mr. Merrill.

No. 136.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 12, 1889.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of the 2d instant, touching an attempt made on the 30th of July last, to subvert the existing Government of the Hawaiian Islands and the landing of men from the U. S. S. *Adams* to protect lives and property.

I transmit for your files a copy* of the telegram as deciphered and have to express the satisfaction of the Government that the insurrection was suppressed with no greater losses than you report.

I am, etc.,

J. B. MOORE,
Acting Secretary.

* See under date of August 2.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Merrill.

No. 137.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 22, 1889.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Nos. 243-256.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
*Acting Secretary.**Mr. Wharton to Mr. Merrill.*

No. 138.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 23, 1889.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 255 of the 1st instant, relative to the attempt of July 30 last, to overthrow the Hawaiian Government.

The steps taken by the legation to protect the lives and property of our citizens at Honolulu, in that emergency, seem to have proved effectual. A copy of your dispatch will be sent to the Navy Department.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
*Acting Secretary.**Mr. Merrill to Mr. Blaine.*

No. 260.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, August 29, 1889.

SIR: Referring to political affairs I have the honor to inform you that, since the episode of the 30th ultimo and the judicially defined power of the King and cabinet, referred to in my No. 257 of the 6th instant, peace has prevailed and the people have pursued their usual avocations undisturbed by disquieting rumors.

At the present time sixty-four persons have been arrested in connection with the insurrection, variously charged with treason and conspiracy.

The trial of the insurgents will occur at the regular term of the court in October next.

I have, etc.,

GEO. W. MERRILL.

Mr. Merrill to Mr. Blaine.

No. 262.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, September 7, 1889.

SIR: Referring to the disturbance of July last, it now appears that among the influences operating to induce the native Hawaiians to attempt such a scheme was the fact that their minds had become

imbued with the belief that the foreign residents and the cabinet were in league for the purpose of destroying the autonomy of the kingdom, and this feeling was augmented by letters of indiscreet correspondents, published in the United States, advising the interference of our Government agents to influence the current of Hawaiian political affairs, which were freely quoted and harshly commented upon by the newspapers published here in the native language.

The native, in his simplicity, readily accepted these quotations and statements of the press as true and foreboding the loss of the independence of their country.

There also existed a feeling among many Hawaiians that they were not the recipients of a fair share of the official patronage under the present administration, and that a change of cabinet ministers ought to occur.

Relying upon the result of the revolution in 1887, it was believed that the only thing required to effect the change desired was to surround the Government building with an armed guard, take possession of the palace and the King, make a show of force, compel the promulgation of a new constitution, demand the resignation of the present members of the cabinet and the appointment of others.

In other words, it is asserted by the insurgents that the revolution attempted in July last was intended to be as peaceful and harmless to persons and property as that of June, 1887.

To the native mind generally it is difficult to distinguish any difference of rights in the premises or of the principles on which the two movements were based.

It is also noticeable that among the American residents here there are several who, from personal motives, contemplate with satisfaction periodical disquietude in this kingdom, hoping that frequent revolutionary epochs will force the United States Government to make this group a part of its territory, and to absorb into its body politic this heterogeneous population of 80,000, consisting of Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese, native Hawaiians, half-castes, and only about 5,000 of those who may be properly denominated the white race.

In order to keep affairs in as much turmoil as possible baseless rumors are constantly put in circulation, many of which find publication in other countries.

The latest agitation is one against the increase of Chinese, and a movement is now being made to call the legislature in extra session for the purpose of submitting a constitutional amendment on the subject to the people at the election in February next.

It is feared if such a question is submitted to the people as a ministerial measure, that the foreign residents representing the mechanical and planting interests of Hawaii will be divided, while the native Hawaiians will be united and succeed in defeating the measure, thus regaining full control of the Government.

For this reason many among those inclined to favor Chinese restriction oppose the calling of the legislature, fearing the defeat of the reform party as a consequence.

I have, etc.,

GEORGE W. MERRILL.

Mr. Adee to Mr. Merrill.

No. 139.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 10, 1889.

SIR: I have received and read with interest your dispatch No. 257, of the 6th ultimo, touching the political situation at Honolulu, growing out of the recent controversy between the King and his cabinet.

I am, etc.,

ALVEY A. ADEE,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 2 bis.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, September 25, 1889.

SIR: I improve the opportunity to report to the Secretary of State that, taking the usual route of travel by train and steamer, I arrived with my family at Honolulu September 20, and on the following day communicated with the minister of foreign affairs, who promptly arranged the day and the hour for my reception by the King. Monday, September 23, His Majesty received me in the customary manner, when I presented my sealed letter of credence from the President. I inclose a printed slip containing my remarks and those of the King in reply. All the facts and incidents attending my reception at the Hawaiian capital have been most cordial and satisfactory, and I appreciate that I assume my post of duty here under highly favorable auspices.

I have the honor, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[Inclosure in Mr. Stevens's No 2 bis.]

Mr. Merrill then presented to the King his excellency John L. Stevens, who addressed His Majesty in the following words:

"MAY IT PLEASE YOUR MAJESTY:

"SIRE: In presenting to His Majesty my letters of credence he will allow me to say that it is with an experience of pleasure that I am permitted to be the medium of communicating to him the good wishes of the President of the United States and of the sixty-five millions of people whom he ably and faithfully represents. It is in the spirit of international fraternity, which has greatly increased in force and elevation in recent times, that I am sent as the American agent to His Majesty's Government and to reside among the people of these beautiful islands, a cluster of gems in the Pacific Sea. It is proper for me to say, what His Majesty and Government well understand, that the Government and people of the United States cherish a deep interest in the prosperity and welfare of the Hawaiian Islands, so smiled upon by nature and so important to the future commerce and civilization of the countries contiguous to the Pacific.

"Your autonomy secured by the good will of the great nations, all true statesmen and generous citizens of other lands must wish that your Government may be successful in securing order, prosperity, and happiness to all your people. Though separated by a thousand miles of ocean, the United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom make a part of the new world, whose reciprocal interests of commerce tend to unity and to all that is liberal in policy and beneficent in the arts of peace. If my residence among you shall in any way conduce to these pacific and desirable ends, it will be my good fortune to faithfully represent the wishes of the people and Government of the great American nation."

The following is a copy of the autograph letter from the President of the United States to His Majesty presented by his excellency John L. Stevens:

Benjamin Harrison, President of the United States of America, to His Majesty Kalakaua, King of the Hawaiian Islands.

GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND:

I have made choice of John L. Stevens, one of our distinguished citizens to reside near the Government of Your Majesty in the quality of minister resident of the United States of America. He is well informed of the relative interests of the two countries and of our sincere desire to cultivate to the fullest extent the friendship which has so long subsisted between us. My knowledge of his high character and ability gives me entire confidence that he will constantly endeavor to advance the interest and prosperity of both Governments and so render himself acceptable to Your Majesty.

I therefore request Your Majesty to receive him favorably and to give full credence to what he shall say on the part of the United States, and to the assurances which I have charged him to convey to you of the best wishes of this Government for the prosperity of the Hawaiian Islands.

May God have Your Majesty in His wise keeping.

Written at Washington, the 26th day of June, in the year 1889.

Your good friend,

BENJ. HARRISON.

By the President:

JAMES G. BLAINE,
Secretary of State.

His Majesty replied to Mr. Stevens, as follows:

"MR. MINISTER: It is with pleasure that I receive from you the assurance of the continuance of the friendly regard of the President and the people of the American nation for the Sovereign and people of Hawaii.

"And I am well pleased to welcome to a residence in my kingdom a gentleman who is the choice of my great and good friend, President Harrison, as the representative of the American Government and people.

"The officers of my Government will be instructed to tender to you every attention and courtesy during your official residence in my dominions."

His Majesty was attended on this occasion by the Hon. A. S. Cleghorn, H. R. H. Prince Kawanānakoā, His Excellency Hon. Jona. Austin, minister of foreign affairs; James W. Robertson, esq., His Majesty's vice and acting chamberlain; Col. the Hon. Robert Hoapili Baker, A. D. C.; Maj. John Dominis Holt, A. D. C., and Capt. the Hon. E. K. Lilikalani, equerry in waiting.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 3.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, October 7, 1889.

SIR: There is at the present time a lively interest among the Hawaiian citizens in regard to proposed changes in the treaty relations between the United States and these islands. By some means, as to which I have not accurate information, a draft of a new treaty found its way into the newspapers here hostile to the present ministry. This has caused an earnest discussion of the subject involved in the public journals and in private and commercial circles. This has led the cabinet to deem it expedient to publish a correction of false impressions and to express its real opinion as to the necessity and terms of a new treaty. I inclose a copy of the statement of the minister of foreign affairs, which has been published in the papers here.

The facts, so far as they have come to my observation, lead me to conclusion that the chief opposition to the proposed new treaty arises from partisan opposition to the present ministry and from the representa-

tions of the English and French diplomatic agents, who have already called on the minister of foreign affairs to present their objections, which fact seems to have disturbed the ministry very little. I am much impressed by the strong American feeling pervading the best portion of the population, and which is especially manifest among the men of business and property. There is no doubt that "reciprocity" is doing much to Americanize these islands and to bind them to the United States.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[Pacific Commercial Advertiser.]

Reply of the cabinet—A full explanation of the Government position in regard to the treaty question.

The following is a copy of the reply of the cabinet delivered to the native mass-meeting committee Friday:

Messrs. A. ROSA, J. L. KAULUKOU, J. F. COLBURN, AND OTHERS:

GENTLEMEN: As a committee representing a public meeting of Hawaiian citizens you have asked from His Majesty's ministers certain information concerning their action in regard to the relations between this country and the United States of America.

Feeling that it is the right of the people to know the policy of the administration, the ministers take pleasure in informing you that they have for a long time had under consideration the practicability of extending our treaty relations with the United States so as to enhance and increase both the commercial and political benefits which the two countries now enjoy by reason of existing treaties.

As the result of nearly a year's consideration of this subject by the Cabinet, our minister resident at Washington has been instructed to ascertain whether the Government of the United States is willing to entertain propositions looking to the end above indicated, and, should he find such willingness to exist, he is instructed to open negotiations with that Government for the conclusion of a treaty which will effect the purposes hereunder indicated.

This statement of the present status of the subject renders it unnecessary to say that no proposition has been made or accepted by the United States and that no treaty has been submitted to His Majesty for signature.

The reasons which have moved the cabinet to adopt the course above indicated are numerous, and while an exhaustive enumeration and discussion of such reasons would exceed the scope of the present reply, a summary of the more salient among them is as follows:

1. The history of our staple products during the past thirteen years has demonstrated how essential to our commercial prosperity are the advantages secured to us by the existing treaty.

The development of our export trade from \$2,241,041 in 1876 to \$11,707,598 in 1888, during the life of that treaty, with its attendant advantages to all our citizens and residents, are witnesses of its stimulating effect upon our industries and commerce, and its beneficent influence upon our national welfare, and are fresh illustrations of the principle that no great material advantage can be enjoyed by any class dependent upon labor without the entire community partaking of such benefits.

By the terms of the existing reciprocity treaty with the United States, notice of termination within one year thereafter may be given in five years from now.

The interval between 1883 and 1887, during which time the treaty was subject to termination upon a year's notice, illustrated the evil effects to our commercial well-being of a dependence from year to year for the continuance of our treaty relations upon the uncertain humor of the American Congress.

The uncertainty involved has an unsettling effect upon capital and is detrimental to the making of large permanent investments, many of which now contemplated requiring heavy preliminary expenses.

With only the certainty of a five years' continuance of the treaty, the experience of the recent past in mind, and the strong probability that renewed and strenuous efforts will be made by our opponents in the United States to terminate the treaty at the end of the five years, it is the part of wisdom to prepare in the day of prosperity for the days that are to follow.

2. At the last session of the United States Congress there was developed a strong movement looking to the reduction of sugar duties and the payment of bounties upon sugar of American production.

The effect of this would be to discriminate against Hawaiian sugars in favor of American, and materially reduce to us the value of the existing treaty without any corresponding benefit.

We believe it to be the duty of the Hawaiian Government to endeavor to secure the placing of our products upon the same basis as American products in respect of bounties and privileges.

3. The existing treaty is limited in its extent. A large number of American products still pay duties in the Islands, while the products admitted by the treaty free of duty into the ports of the United States are practically limited to sugar, rice, bananas, hides, and tallow.

There are many articles which might be profitably produced here, upon lands which are not available for products now admitted under the treaty, were there a market for them.

If a mutual agreement can be arrived at whereby the products of either country can be admitted free into the other, a great stimulus will be given to new industries in the Islands, resulting in an increase of exports and of domestic and foreign shipping; the bringing into cultivation and increasing in value of many lands now waste; the consequent improvement in all departments of business, and a corresponding benefit to the United States by the increase in our imports to meet the necessary increased consumption by our people.

We believe that the additional value which each country would receive would many times over compensate them for the loss of the duties now levied.

4. The Hawaiian Islands are now the only group in the Pacific which is wholly self-governing. Our situation is peculiar. We have no military or naval strength of our own to maintain our autonomy against the pettiest naval power; and we have to-day no guarantee of our continued independence as against any foreign nation other than the sufferance or the mutual jealousies of the great powers.

Within the last few years the policy of annexation has prevailed among the European nations interested in Polynesia, which has resulted in the rapid absorption of nearly all the Pacific islands.

Within the year last past we have seen Samoa lose her position as a self-governing state. The acts of her Government are now subject to the approval of the Governments of the United States, England, and Germany, and had it not been for the good offices of the United States Government the probability is that she would have ere now been annexed by one or more European nations.

Within the past year the question of the disposition and absorption of the Hawaiian Islands, as well as of Samoa, has been the subject of serious consideration by certain of the nations interested in the Pacific.

The cabinet are of the opinion that the interests of this country, and of every race and industry resident or located therein, will be best served by the continuance of its present independent state, free from any protectorate or control on the part of any foreign government.

It is, and ever will be, the endeavor of the present administration to not only unqualifiedly maintain this status, but to obtain such assurances and guarantees thereof as will remove the question from the debatable politics of the world.

It has long been the custom of European nations to form alliances with neighboring countries for purposes of defense, safety, and commercial exchange. The time has, in the opinion of the cabinet, arrived when we should follow a precedent so well established and form an alliance with some great nation. If an alliance of this character is desirable it should be in the direction where our greatest interest lies.

The proximity of the United States, the cordial friendship which has been from the commencement of our civilization a marked characteristic of our relations with the American people, and the extensive commercial exchanges which are the result of such relations, point inevitably to that great country as our best friend, our most valuable commercial colleague, and our natural political ally.

Animated as we are by the desire to strengthen and extend the commercial ties which have done so much for our national prosperity, and to secure the safety and perpetuation of our institutions by an alliance whereby we shall have the positive and efficacious guarantee of a strong friend against interference by itself or others with our perfect autonomy, independence, and sovereignty, we have instructed our representative at Washington to ascertain if the United States would be willing to negotiate with us a convention whereby the following objects may be secured:

First. To continue in force all treaties and conventions now existing between the two nations, until they shall find it mutually advantageous to abrogate or modify such treaties or conventions, or any of them.

Second. That all products of either country which are by virtue of the reciprocity treaty admitted free of duty into the other country shall be treated in respect of bounties paid, exemptions or immunities, and in all other respects, as if such other articles were of the growth, produce, or manufacture of the country into which they are so admitted.

Third. To provide for the entry into either of the two countries, without payment of duty, of all products of the other, excepting, however, opium, spirituous liquors of more than 18 per cent alcoholic strength, and all articles prohibited by law in either country.

Fourth. A positive and efficacious guarantee by the United States Government of the perfect independence and autonomy of the Hawaiian Government in all its dominions, and its right of sovereignty over such dominions.

To enable the United States Government to do this without danger of complication with other powers, we do agree not to negotiate treaties with other nations without the knowledge of the United States Government.

The cabinet, for more than a year, has studied carefully many reasons for and against the points submitted for negotiation, and has taken counsel with others, both connected and unconnected with the Government, and has considered various propositions and suggestions, some of which have been approved and some disapproved.

Any statements of objects or intentions, and any purported draft of a treaty stating more or other than is above indicated, which may have been published, are unfounded and incorrect.

The ministers are strongly and unanimously of the opinion that the accomplishment of the objects above indicated will tend to greatly increase the material prosperity of the country and perpetuate the independence of Hawaii and the sovereignty of His Majesty and his successors over all his dominions.

I have the honor, on behalf of the cabinet, to remain

Your obedient servant,

JONA. AUSTIN,
Minister Foreign Affairs.

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 4, 1889.*

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 5.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, October 16, 1889.

SIR: I have received your No. 2 *bis.* of the 25th ultimo, and the copy which you inclose of the interesting addresses made on the occasion of presenting your credentials to the King of the Hawaiian Islands.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 6.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, October 17, 1889.

SIR: My predecessor in charge of this legation, Mr. Merrill, in his dispatch 255, dated August 1, 1889, informed the Department of State of the revolutionary attempt made July 30 by certain disaffected persons under the lead of Robert W. Wilcox and Robert Boyd, two half-breed Hawaiians, aided by a Belgian named Loomens. For the past two weeks the trial of the participants in this revolutionary effort has been going on in Honolulu before Chief Justice Judd, of the supreme court of the kingdom. Loomens, being a Belgian citizen, has been tried before a jury of white men, here termed a foreign jury. Robert Boyd,

one of the chief conspirators, turned state's evidence, and after a careful and impartial trial, as to which even his counsel made no complaint, Loomens was convicted of treason, though recommended to mercy, and several others have pleaded guilty or been convicted of riotous proceedings. The trial is tending plainly to show that the Hawaiians are numerous in sympathy with Wilcox, who is to be tried by a native jury, and whose conviction is regarded as very doubtful.

It is proper for me to convey the confidential information that so far as the examination of witnesses and the general course of the trials tend, in the opinion of many persons here, to implicate the King, at least in sympathy with the revolutionary movement, neither the Government attorney nor the counsel of the accused seem to mince words or spare His Majesty, and the court rules with independence and firmness.* I herewith inclose the charge of the chief justice in the case of Loomens, as published verbatim in the Commercial Advertiser. It is probable that when the trial of Wilcox takes place there will be an expression of native Hawaiian sentiment which may be indicative of the general opposition of the native Hawaiian voters at the election which is to occur in February. The feelings of hostility to the Government at the present time is being stimulated by foreign agitators, who are taking advantage of the simplicity of the natives for the promotion of their political and private ends. Out of these trials and the passions and prejudices they invoke may arise some disturbance in the near future, of which the February election for members of the two houses of the legislature may furnish the occasion. I will endeavor to keep the Department of State informed as to the course of events so far as they may be of importance.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 7.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, October 18, 1889.

SIR: In forwarding to the Department of State my dispatch 2, of September 26, 1889, containing an account of my first reception by the King, and the presentation of my letter of credence, I inclosed a printed copy of my remarks and of His Majesty's reply. On second thought I conclude that I should have sent the addresses in writing; therefore, I forward the inclosed and ask that the same be placed on file instead of the printed copies. I ask the indulgence of the Department for the error which I seek hereby to correct.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

The following is the text of my remarks on being presented to the King:

"SIRE: In presenting to His Majesty my letter of credence he will allow me to say that it is with an experience of pleasure that I am permitted to be the medium of communicating to him the good wishes of the President of the United States and of the sixty-five millions of people whom he ably and faithfully represents. It is in the spirit of international fraternity which has greatly increased in force and elevation in recent times that I am sent as the American agent to His Majesty's

Government and to reside among the people of these beautiful islands, a cluster of gems in the Pacific Sea.

"It is proper for me to say what His Majesty and Government well understand, that the Government and people of the United States cherish a deep interest in the prosperity and welfare of the Hawaiian Islands, so smiled upon by nature and so important to the future commerce and civilization of the countries contiguous to the Pacific. The autonomy of your country secured by the good will of the great nations, all true statesmen and generous citizens of other lands must wish that your Government may be successful in securing order, prosperity, and happiness to all your people. Though separated by a thousand miles of ocean, the United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom make a part of that new world whose reciprocal interests of commerce tend to unity and to all that is liberal in policy and beneficial in the arts of peace. If my residence among you shall in any way conduce to these pacific and desirable ends it will be my good fortune to faithfully represent the people and Government of the great American nation."

His Majesty replied to Mr. Stevens as follows:

"MR. MINISTER: It is with pleasure that I receive from you the assurance of the continuance of the friendly regard of the President and the people of the American nation for the sovereign and people of Hawaii.

"I am well pleased to welcome to a residence in my kingdom a gentleman who is the choice of my great and good friend, President Harrison, as the representative of the American Government and people.

"The officers of my Government will be instructed to tender to you every attention and courtesy during your official residence in my dominions."

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 6.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, October 31, 1889.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Nos. 1, 2, 2bis, and 3; also of Mr. Merrill's Nos. 257-265, one of which (No. 264) contains his inventory of the archives and property of the legation.

I am etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 7.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, November 4, 1889.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your interesting dispatch of the 17th ultimo, relating to the trial of the persons concerned in the revolutionary movement of July 30 last, at Honolulu.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 10.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,

Honolulu, November 4, 1889.

SIR: In my dispatch No. 6, dated October 17, 1889, I gave the information that the persons engaged in the riotous and revolutionary movement of July 30, 1889, were being tried before the chief justice of the Kingdom, and that Loomens, the Belgian, had been convicted of treason.

Others of the accused have been convicted of conspiracy or have pleaded guilty of that offense. But those convicted were tried before a foreign jury, for the reason that they were not native Hawaiians. Since the date of my former communication Wilcox, the half-caste Hawaiian, the leader in the revolutionary attempt, has been tried before a native jury, and after an elaborate and able prosecution by the Government, in which his guilt was conclusively proved by his own testimony, as well as by that of numerous witnesses, he has been acquitted by a jury vote of 9 to 3, a unanimous vote not being necessary for conviction nor acquittal under the Hawaiian laws. This preponderance of native opinion in favor of Wilcox, as expressed by the native jury, fairly represented the popular native sentiment throughout these islands in regard to his effort to overthrow the present ministry and to change the constitution of 1887, so as to restore to the King the power he possessed under the former constitution, which the natives believe would tend to give them more predominance in the Kingdom.

What will be the ultimate effect of this failure of the Government to convict the chief leader in the revolutionary attempt of July 30, I will not now presume to predict. The immediate consequence is certainly injurious to public order and good government, and indicates that tendency of opinion among Hawaiian natives which is likely to find strong expression in the national election which is to take place in February.

It is admitted by all of the most intelligent and best citizens here that the present Government is the wisest and most efficient which this country has ever had, and should it be defeated and thrown out by the native Hawaiian voters under their present leadership, it would afford occasion of regret to all true friends of Hawaiian independence and Hawaiian prosperity.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 8.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 6, 1889.

SIR: I transmit for your confidential information a copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, and its inclosure, relating to the political situation in Hawaii; also, a copy of the reply of this Department.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 8.]

Mr. Tracy to Mr. Blaine.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 1, 1889.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith, for the information of the Department of State, a copy of a report dated the 18th instant, from Rear-Admiral L. A. Kimberly, commanding the United States naval force on the Pacific station, with reference to the political situation in the Hawaiian Islands.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy.

The SECRETARY OF STATE.

[Inclosure in Inclosure 1 in No. 8.]

Rear-Admiral Kimberly to Mr. Tracy.

No. 165d.]

U. S. FLAGSHIP ALBERT (THIRD RATE),
Honolulu, October 18, 1889.

SIR: I have to report that, politically speaking, quietness prevails at present. There is an agitation quietly working as to the race question, which no doubt will become a prominent factor in the elections that come off in February.

The natives seem to have an uneasy feeling as to their rights being usurped by the whites and their gradual loss of prestige and power in the Government as laid down in the principles of the present constitution, which, to their ideas, circumscribes too much the kingly power.

It would promote a feeling of security to our own people, and, I think, other foreigners, if at the February elections we had a force here competent to preserve order should necessity arise.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. A. KIMBERLY,
Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 8.]

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Tracy.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 6, 1889.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 1st instant and of the copy of Rear-Admiral Kimberly's report of the 18th ultimo, which you inclose, on the political situation in Hawaii. In view of his opinion that the security of our citizens there would be promoted "if, at the February elections," the United States had a force in those waters competent to preserve order should the necessity arise, I trust that your Department may find it convenient to make such dispositions in that quarter as will subserve the desired object.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 11.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, November 14, 1889.

SIR: A careful survey of the present political situation in these islands and a due regard to my responsibility lead me to make this communication to the Department of State.

Of the recent revolutionary attempt to overthrow the present Hawaiian Government and to change the constitution in a retrograde direction the several dispatches of my predecessor and of the undersigned, have informed you. Beaten at their attempt by violence in July, Wilcox and his coadjutors are preparing to accomplish their purposes at the ensuing election of the members of the legislature in February. Apparently they are uniting the natives, who constitute nearly two-thirds of the voters, in the effort to obtain a native and revolutionary majority, and to some extent have enlisted the sympathies of the Chinese, who are not voters, but some of whom use their money to assist the natives in their political designs. Generally the principal land-owners and men of business and property are uniting in support of the present Government, regarding it the best the country has ever had. The complex character of the

population tends to complicate the political situation, and the most intelligent and thoughtful citizens are anxious about the immediate future.

The past of these islands, since 1835, has shown the usefulness of American naval vessels in the harbor of Honolulu. The revolutionary outbreak of July 30 strongly illustrated this. It is the opinion of the best-informed American residents here that one or more of our naval vessels should be constantly at Honolulu, at least until after the February election and the result of it has been fully tested, and with this view I fully agree, after mature investigation and deliberation. I think the probabilities are against any serious outbreak and that the crisis will be passed safely, but there are possibilities of riot and loss of life, unless prevented by a naval force in the harbor, of which the agitator and the unruly of the natives and of the foreign nationalities have salutary fear.

I presume the necessary instructions have already been given to our naval commanders in the Pacific, and so far as I have observed, Admiral Kimberly is alive to any contingency of danger and duty. None the less do I regard it my duty to report the facts to the Secretary of State, and to urge strongly that there be no possible failure of the retention here of one or more of our vessels of war, with the usual instruction to the officers in command as to an emergency of need.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Adee to Mr. Stevens.

[Confidential.]

No. 11.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 16, 1889.

SIR: I herewith inclose for your confidential information a copy of the instructions addressed by the Secretary of the Navy (and received with his letter of the 13th instant) to the commanding officer of the United States naval force on the Pacific station, relative to the retention of a sufficient number of vessels of his fleet in Hawaiian waters during the approaching February elections for the prompt protection of American interests, should occasion arise.

I am, etc.,

ALVEY A. ADEE,
Acting Secretary.

[Inclosure No. 11.]

Mr. Tracy to Mr. Blaine.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 13, 1889.

SIR: Referring to your letter of the 6th instant concurring in the opinion of Rear-Admiral Kimberly that security to our citizens there would be promoted if at the February elections the United States had a force in Hawaiian waters competent to preserve order, should necessity arise. The Department incloses herewith for your information a copy of its instructions issued this day to that officer for his guidance.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy.

[Inclosure in Inclosure in No. 11.]

*Mr. Tracy to Rear-Admiral Kimberly.*NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 13, 1889.

SIR: Referring to your letter No. 165 of the 18th ultimo with reference to the political situation in the Hawaiian Islands, and in which you state that "it would promote a feeling of security to our people and I think to other foreigners if at the February elections the United States had a force here competent to preserve order should necessity arise," the Department directs that you will keep as many of the vessels of your command in Hawaiian waters as you may deem expedient for the purpose of carrying out the object in view. A copy of the letter from the honorable the Secretary of State, concurring in your opinion as to the desirability of such action, is inclosed herewith for your information.

Very respectfully,

B. F. TRACY,
*Secretary of the Navy.**Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.*

No. 12.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 3, 1889.

SIR: I have received your No. 11 of the 14th ultimo, confirmatory of the statements of previous dispatches touching the importance of retaining one or more of our naval vessels in Hawaiian waters until after the elections of February next.

You were informed by instruction, No. 11 of the 16th ultimo, of the action of the Secretary of the Navy in this regard.

You can exhibit to the naval officers concerned copies of the dispatches referred to, and will in general keep such officers advised of any political events of importance.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 17.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 7, 1890.

SIR: I improve the earliest opportunity to inform the Department of State as to the result of the election in the Hawaiian Islands, which took place this week, February 5. It was for the choice of the 48 nobles and representatives which compose the national legislature that is largely to control the country the next two years. It has been looked forward to with the deepest interest by all the native and foreign residents, and the discussion and agitation have been very heated and determined, and on the part of the opponents of the present ministry extremely bitter and unscrupulous. The result is a triumph of the opponents of the present ministry and of the reform constitution. The election was conducted with exceeding fairness by the legal authorities, and the polls were kept open from 8 in the morning until 5 in the after-

noon. The most complete quiet and good order prevailed in all the voting precincts of Honolulu. An election conducted in the most intelligent and moral of American rural towns could be no more orderly.

The ministry had taken the most careful precautions for the maintenance of order; the liquor saloons were closed, the ballot was secret, and both parties worked with the utmost determination and precision to get their supporters to the polls. This defeat of the existing Government is deeply to be regretted, for it has been accomplished by a most reckless appeal to race prejudices and to all the elements of corruption and disorder in the Kingdom. It is well known to the Department of State that in July, 1887, the best citizens of these islands, composed of most of the property holders, the men of business, and the professions, chiefly Americans, English, and Germans—largely of the first named—were driven to a revolution, accomplished without bloodshed, resulting in the overthrow of the corrupt Gibson rule and the adoption of the reform constitution, by which the chief power was taken from the King and given to the Legislature and a responsible ministry. It has been under this constitution that the country has been governed the past two and a half years with signal success. Few of our American States in that time have had their affairs more honestly conducted, their laws more faithfully administered.

Two of the ministers are of the best American stock, the sons of missionaries, and another, the minister of foreign affairs, was born and educated in the State of New York, though he has been many years identified with this country. These three men have done their utmost to govern the Kingdom wisely and honestly. To do this they have been obliged to resist the King and all the worst elements of the islands. Among these are the men who thrived on former maladministration, whose plundering devices had been brought to an end. I am sorry to say that some of the worst men in bringing about the triumph of reaction are Americans, either by birth or adoption. Yet so successful has been the new constitution and the reform administration that the opposition party was obliged to pledge itself in speech and platform not to return to the former state of things, and to promise to carry on the Government according to the terms of the present constitution, which has so deeply intrenched itself in the existing state of things as not to be easily overthrown. Among the successful party there are some large property holders, who will be driven to restrain their political associates, and these, with the determined efforts of the minority reform party, will be likely to keep the country to constitutional rule in a considerable degree.

It is proper for me to say that among the leaders of the party just successful at the polls are those not friendly to the United States, and that the Department of State and this legation will have to deal with the incoming ministry with great caution and circumspection. The new legislature will meet in May, when a new ministry undoubtedly will be chosen. In a future dispatch I will give the result of my most careful observations as to the status of things here relative to the interests of the United States and her immediate duties and responsibilities as to these islands.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

N. B.—Above I have given the present estimate here of the election result. It is possible that full returns from the other islands may not sustain the present hopes of the reactionists.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 18.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 10, 1890.

SIR: I am pleased to be able to report to the Department of State that the slight hope which was expressed in the postscript of my dispatch, No. 17, February 7, that full election returns from all these islands might prove the success of the reform party and of the present ministry has been fully realized in fact. While Honolulu and the rest of this island elected but one reformer out of seventeen, the other islands have supported so generally the present Government as to give the reformers a small majority in the legislature, and the reactionists' majority in Honolulu on nobles is so small that a change of 75 votes would have given the reformers all of them, and thus have secured them two-thirds of the legislature.

The opposition in this election contest has had the support of the King and of all his dependents and parasites and the chief element of corruption in the Kingdom. The issue has been made largely between those who have American sympathies and interests on the side of the reformers and of the present ministry, while all the worst element of society and violent race prejudices have been with the opposition. It is safe to say that three-fourths of the property-holders of the Kingdom are with the reformers and favorable to good relations with the United States. Herewith I inclose duplicate copies of clippings from Honolulu papers, containing editorials and speeches of Hon. L. A. Thurston, minister of interior, the most influential member of the reform party and the most resolute of the four cabinet ministers, the grandson of a missionary who came to these islands from his native State, Connecticut, more than sixty years ago. These remarks of Mr. Thurston are an index of the direction the political contest here has taken. The German consul openly gave his influence to the reformers. Probably a majority of the English voters went with the reformers, while there is little doubt that the English and French commissioners desired the success of the opposition.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[The Times, Saturday, February 1, 1890.]

America's unfailing friendship to Hawaii, and to all nationalities within our borders, reaffirmed.—Hawaiian history and its application to present issues.

[A reply by L. A. Thurston to the National Herald.]

The Herald does me the honor of devoting practically its whole English issue of the 31st of January to a criticism of my remarks at the armory on Thursday evening. If the subject-matter related to me personally, only, I should not think of intruding upon the public at this juncture, when important issues demand the undivided attention of the reading public. But the subject-matter is so involved with an issue of vital import to the country, which issue awaits decision on the 5th of this month, that I make no further excuse for this statement.

I would first call attention to the circumstances under which, and the reasons for the allusion to the history of this country in connection with France, England, and the United States.

It has been publicly stated by the cabinet that they have initiated negotiations with the United States for the purpose of extending and rendering more permanent our present treaty relations with the United States.

The points concerning which the cabinet proposes negotiations, and the reasons therefor, have been publicly stated in all detail. It has also been publicly and offi-

cially stated that negotiations are preliminary in their character, of a nature necessary to bring the question up for discussion and action by the legislature, and that no final action is to be taken without full submission to and the approval of the legislature.

The published statement of the objects sought is a full enumeration of all that the cabinet has in view. The treaty sought is, we believe, a like preservative of the honor, dignity, and independence of the two countries, and conducive to their mutual commercial prosperity.

Without foundation therefor, regardless of the grave consequences of interference with the cordial relations existing between the two countries and solely for partisan influence upon the coming election, the gentlemen constituting the opposition to the present administration have for months filled the ears of the public, more particularly the native Hawaiians, with violent appeals and false statements concerning the intentions of the cabinet and of the United States. This has been the keynote of their whole campaign. They have placed their whole reliance upon the ignorance of the people of the facts and the prejudice which their misrepresentations have produced. They have worked up and are still working up, by every disingenuous method, a strong distrust, prejudice, and antagonism in the minds of many of the native people toward the United States upon a wholly false basis and by an entire perversion of facts and history.

Under these circumstances it was due the United States and essential to the welfare of Hawaii that the long-tried, continued, and more than generous friendship of the United States toward Hawaii should be stated, and the most signal and complete illustration of it, heretofore secret history, made public.

In order to do this intelligently it was necessary to state the historical facts which in logical sequence led up to it. For this purpose, and thus far only, was reference made to early history and the relations of Hawaii with other countries.

The Herald charges that I have "purposely and knowingly garbled and misstated Hawaiian history for political purposes," and that the demands of the French in 1849 and 1851 were based upon the differences existing between the two countries in 1839. In proof, and as sole proof, of these charges and statements, it prints a letter, dated 1839, signed by Hon. J. C. Jones, then American consul," and five other foreign residents, laudatory of Laplace and his actions in 1839.

The reference to the occurrences of 1839 in my argument at the armory was simply incidental in its nature, those events chronologically preceding the events of '49 and '51, and being illustrative of the arbitrary methods employed in those days in settling differences with this country in its weakness, the approved method being to submit peremptory demands and require immediate compliance therewith, with the alternative of the loss of independence. Otherwise the occurrences of 1839 are entirely unconnected with the events of '49 and '51, which led up to and were the direct cause of the treaty of cession to the United States of 1851.

I again affirm, and the evidence hereafter cited proves, that the events of 1839 were not the moving causes of the action of any of the parties in '49 and '51, and that the incidents and moving causes of the former are unessential to an understanding of the events of the latter period, except to illustrate the fact that redress for real or imaginary wrongs was obtained in those days by force.

The religious intolerance displayed by the Hawaiian Government during its early history toward the Catholic faith and its believers is a portion of the history of this country which every lover of the good fame of the nation and of religious liberty regrets. It is no more and no less excusable than have been much more serious acts of religious intolerance perpetrated at different periods of their history by enlightened England, France, and New England.

Suffice it to say that the letter published by the Herald is a mere chip upon the stream of literature concerning the subject, which occupies hundreds of pages of diplomatic correspondence and volumes of contemporaneous history, written by the immediate parties interested upon both sides. Had my object been to discuss the religious differences of the time, there is far stronger documentary evidence on both sides concerning the subject than the letter referred to by the Herald.

In proof of the fact that the difficulties with France in 1849 and 1851, which caused the execution of the treaty of cession to the United States, I cite the following facts:

1. The further merits or demerits of the Laplace controversy are not german to this issue. It is sufficient to say that, whatever the feelings of the Hawaiians on the subject, the French were satisfied and Laplace sailed away, which the Herald itself cites a letter to prove.

2. In 1839, a month before the arrival of Laplace, the Government had discontinued the policy of intolerance towards the Catholics, and in 1840 the King promulgated a constitution, guaranteeing religious liberty to all.

3. In 1843, England and France executed the famous "recognition" treaty, which was distinctly looked upon as a mark of friendly approval of the Hawaiian Government by those two countries.

4. In 1844, France voluntarily returned to the Hawaiian Government the \$20,000 which had been exacted by Laplace in 1839, the original packages of money being sent back in a French warship, specially detailed for that purpose; the return being accompanied with considerable ceremonial and mutual expressions of friendship and regard.

5. In 1845, the late Bishop Maigret, who, during his long life here, held the confidence and respect of all classes and nationalities, irrespective of religious faith, wrote to Capt. Le Compt, of the French ship *L'Heroine*, as follows:

“HONOLULU, Aug. 7, 1845.

“M. COMMANDANT:

“I am happy to be able to inform you that we enjoy, at this moment, perfect tranquility, that all our old subjects of complaint have entirely disappeared, and that it is, in a great part, to the conduct, prudent and full of sagacity, of our estimable consul, that we owe this happy result.

“The number of our neophytes amounts to-day to 14,000. We have a hundred schools and nearly 3,000 children who attend them; sites for our churches have been granted to us. Our schoolmasters have been licensed, and have even received encouragement. The marriages of our Christians are no longer thwarted. We can not, then, do otherwise than give our praises of the Government in respect to us, and we pray you instantly ‘to be pleased to instruct the Admiral.’

“Be pleased to receive the assurance of the perfect consideration, with which I have the honor to be M. Commandant,

“Your very humble and obedient servant,

“L. D. MAIGRET.

“Monsieur LE COMPT,

“*Commandant of the French Corvette L'Heroine.*”

6. In 1846 Bishop Maigret wrote a precisely similar letter.

7. In 1846 a new treaty was concluded with France, eliminating the harsh terms of the treaty of Laplace of 1839. This produced an exceedingly friendly feeling toward France, which continued unbroken until, unhappily for both parties, M. Dudoit retired in 1848 from the French consulship and M. Dillon was appointed in his place.

M. Dillon immediately initiated a systematic and irritating interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom, arising largely out of personal hostility to R. C. Wyllie, minister of foreign affairs, picking flaws and making matters of extended diplomatic correspondence over circumstances of trifling importance. This continued until 1849, when the French Admiral Tromelin arrived, and after a short conference with M. Dillon the celebrated “ten demands” were formulated and presented to the Hawaiian Government with the peremptory request for immediate action. *None of these demands referred to or mentioned the events of 1839.*

Pending negotiations for the settlement of these demands the unprovoked spoliation of the fort, the destruction of the governor's furniture, and the seizure and removal of the King's private yacht took place, and Admiral Tromelin sailed away without further enforcement of the demands.

8. In 1850 Hawaiian representatives went to France and attempted to obtain reparation for the losses and indignities sustained and to come to an understanding to prevent a repetition of them, but without results.

9. In 1851 a new French consul, M. Perin, was appointed. Upon his arrival here he immediately, to the surprise of every one, re-presented the same “ten demands” which had been presented in 1849 by M. Dillon, although part of them had been already settled. An immediate compliance with the demands was required.

10. In 1849 and 1851 the foreign residents of Honolulu of all factions and all nationalities were a unite in favor of the Hawaiian Government and against the demands of France. This is evidenced by the fact that one of the ten demands for payment of damages to M. Victor was immediately paid by subscription by the foreign merchants under the following circumstances, as appears by the correspondence hereunder set forth.

“HONOLULU, September 1, 1849.

“SIR: I have the honor to inclose you a copy of the subscription list signed by the most respectable portion of the foreigners residing in Honolulu, unconnected with the Government, together with the copies of the account of Victor Chancereel and his receipt, of which documents (bearing testimony as to the feeling of the community towards Her Hawaiian Majesty's Government in connection with the French claim, towards the officers and crew of Her Britannic Majesty's ship *Amphitrite*) you will make such use as you may deem proper.

“I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

“H. SEA.

“His Excellency R. C. WYLLIE,

“*Minister of Foreign Relations.*”

[Inclosure 1.]

Understanding that one of the demands of the French against the Hawaiian Government is for damages claimed by M. Victor, for disorderly conduct of some of the seamen belonging to Her Britannic Majesty's ship *Amphitrite*, we, the undersigned, not wishing any stain to rest on the *Amphitrite* or crew, agree to liquidate said claim:

G. W. Hunter.....	\$3. 50	Dugald Mactavish.....	\$3. 50
Sea & Sumners.....	3. 50	W. J. Robertson	2. 00
W. Wond	3. 50	William Gill	3. 50
A. Porter	3. 50	J. Macduff.....	2. 00
H. Macfarlane	3. 50	James Austin.....	2. 00
F. Withington.....	3. 50	R. S. Barker.....	2. 00
James Robinson & Co.....	7. 00	D. N. Flitner.....	3. 50
Isaac Montgomery.....	3. 50	Makee & Anthon	3. 50
John Meek.....	3. 50	A. B. Howe.....	3. 50
Robert G. Davis.....	3. 50	Swan & Clifford.....	3. 50
J. C. Spalding	3. 50	W. Phillips.....	2. 00
Andrew Auld.....	1. 00	Everett & Co	3. 50
C. H. Marshall.....	1. 00	S. W. Williams & Co.....	3. 50
J. M. Stanley.....	3. 50	A. H. Fayerweather.....	2. 00
C. P. Robinson.....	3. 50	A. H. Parker.....	2. 00
Joseph Booth.....	3. 50	T. Cummins.....	3. 00
E. Brown.....	3. 50	George Friel.....	2. 00
George Pelly.....	3. 50	Samuel Thompson.....	2. 00

A much larger sum was subscribed, but as so many persons wished to sign, the amount of subscription was lowered as above.

H. SEA.

[Inclosure 2.]

HONOLULU, August 30, 1847.

Received of Henry Sea, esq., the sum of \$93.50, being amount claimed by me against H. B. M.'s *Amphitrite* for damages done by her crew at the French hotel, kept by me in Honolulu, and being one of the demands made by Admiral de Tromelin against the Hawaiian Government.

\$93.50.

V. CHANCEREL.

Witness to signature,
WM. SUMNER.

A true copy of original receipt in my possession.

H. SEA.

It will be noticed that many nationalities are represented in this document, and two of the signers of the document of 1839, John Meek and George Pelly, were also signers of the above document, which they would not have been had the circumstances of the then French demand been based upon the differences of 1839. The "Hon. J. C. Jones" had left the country. Incidentally it may be stated that Mr. Jones was not United States consul in 1839, he having been removed from that office by his own Government, in 1838, on account of his disreputable character.

11. The unsubstantial nature of the French claims of 1849 and 1851 are evidenced by the fact that upon a knowledge of the situation relating to the United States coming to the French consul he withdrew the "ten demands" and substituted in place thereof a mild statement of four points which was presented for the "consideration" of the Hawaiian Government, which points were thereupon referred by M. Perin to his Government for consideration, and nothing further was ever said or done about the "ten demands."

There continued to be disconnected diplomatic correspondence with France upon various subjects until 1857, when a treaty was concluded with her much more favorable in its terms to Hawaii than any of the three previous treaties with France.

Since that date our relations with France have been without cause of complaint, and we are indebted to the French Government and people for many acts of kindness and courtesy, and are now upon the most cordial terms with France.

In view of the fact that the early religious difficulties between the Hawaiian Government and members of the Catholic faith have been practically made the basis of the charges against me, it is not inappropriate for me to here say for the last forty or fifty years the Catholic bishops and their subordinates in this country have ever been the warm friends of the Hawaiian Government during its many succeeding administrations, and the staunch supporters of peace and good order during the

many trying periods through which the country has been called upon to pass; and that this has been largely due to the highminded and liberal character of the late Bishop Maigret and his successors, by reason of which the Catholic and Protestant faiths have flourished in the country, side by side, with little or no friction.

Concerning the personal abuse heaped upon me by the Herald, I have nothing to say.

Concerning the aspersions upon the character of my ancestors in this country, I would say that their records are too deeply engraven upon the history of this country to require any defense by me.

If I have disproved the charge of having "purposely and knowingly garbled and misstated Hawaiian history for political purposes," I claim that, in the interest of civilized journalism, the responsible editor of the Herald should, at least, admit that he was misinformed as to the facts upon which he based his charges.

In conclusion, I here reaffirm the fact, which was the only point I sought to establish at the armory, that the United States of America has always, under all circumstances, and upon all occasions, been our true friend, and that she has ever exhibited toward, and extended to, the native Hawaiians and all residents of other nationalities dwelling within the borders of Hawaii, without discrimination of race or creed, the same unchanging kindly assistance, support, and good faith, and there is no indication of any change of such policy.

LORRIN A. THURSTON.

HONOLULU, February 1, 1890.

A rousing meeting.—A large gathering of citizens interested in reform at the Old Armory.

Yesterday evening a mass meeting of the fourth ward was held at the Old Armory. There was a large attendance, including many prominent citizens. The meeting throughout was of the most enthusiastic nature. It was called to order by Mr. J. H. Fisher, who nominated Mr. Theodore C. Porter as chairman amid applause. Mr. E. O. White undertook the duties of secretary, and Mr. Luther Wilcox was interpreter.

Mr. Porter said they had met to hear the views and expressions of their candidates and others. He would first call upon his excellency Mr. Thurston, minister of the interior.

Mr. L. A. Thurston, who was received with applause, said: The course of the opposition for the last few weeks reminds me of a statement recently made by Chauncey M. Depew in connection with the recent election in New York. He stated that formerly the Democratic party learned nothing and forgot nothing, that its present exponents learned nothing and forgot everything. That is just the situation with the present opposition, although the country has a history concerning its relations with France, England, and the United States for the past fifty years they have learned nothing from it, and have forgotten all of it that they ever knew. They ignore facts and history and are running a campaign on ignorance and prejudice. They are pursuing the same course and using the same incendiary arguments and appeals to race feeling that they did prior to the 30th of July last. It led to bloodshed then and will not be their fault if it does not lead to bloodshed now.

The question of our relations with our great neighbor is a live issue with us. It affects us, our children, and our future. The only argument of the opposition is that the Government is trying to sell out the country and that the United States is trying to gobble us up. They state that we shall have to keep a watch on the United States or else they will come and take away our independence. It shows they have learned nothing of our past history. I will state briefly what the history of this country with France and England has been. In 1839 a French man-of-war arrived and demanded \$20,000 damages. The Government was very poor and had to scratch around for money, finally getting it from white people, to save bombardment. At the point of the gun the captain forced the Government to make a most unjust treaty, one claim of which was that there should not be more than 5 per cent duty charged on imports from France. In 1843 France and England entered into a treaty. They agreed not to interfere with this Government, which was not a party to it. If either country chose to take the country to-day they could; the treaty is between themselves, so far as that treaty is concerned. In 1849 another French war vessel arrived, and, trumping up a lot of charges, said if the Government did not come to terms, the King would be deposed and they would take the country. He would not weary them with all the demands, simply mentioning, four as follows:

1. That all correspondence between the two countries should be in French.
2. That the Catholic schools should have paid Catholic inspectors (the schools had an inspector for both Protestant and Catholic schools).
3. A small boy having gone into the Catholic Church, made fun of the priest and stuck his finger in the holy water, that such sacrilege should not be repeated.
4. Because certain English sailors had gone into a Frenchman's saloon, got drunk on his brandy, and broke his glasses, a

bill was made out for damages. This last demand was so ridiculous that the merchants subscribed \$3.50 each and paid the damages. This clause was withdrawn. While the Government was trying to arrange matters, and while the prime minister was on board the French man-of-war, a squad of soldiers was sent ashore, who took possession of the fort, dismantled the guns, threw them into the harbor, went to Governor Kekuanaoa's house, smashed the furniture, and threw it into the yard. As a finale, the French took the private yacht belonging to Kamehameha III and sailed it to Tahiti. It has never been heard of since nor has any compensation ever been made for it. They finally withdrew their claims. Next year Dr. Judd went to England and France and tried to arrive at some definite settlement with the French and see that it should not be repeated. He was put off, and returned to the islands in 1851. He had not been home long before another French vessel came in with similar demands. The Government at that time was weak, and in desperation the legislature passed the following:

JOINT RESOLUTION.

Be it resolved by the nobles and representatives of the Hawaiian Islands in legislative council assembled, That, in the sense of this house, the demands of France are so clearly unjust, and contrary to the laws of nations and to treaty; and the course pursued by her is so incompatible with the existence of a regular independent government in these islands. If France should persist in such a course, it will be the duty of the King to shield himself and his Kingdom from insult and oppression, by placing this Kingdom under the protection of some friendly state, and that should such emergency be so urgent as not to admit of the legislative council being convened, it shall be left to His Majesty, by and with the advice of his privy council, under such emergency, to consult the honor and safety of his Kingdom according to His Majesty's best judgment; and that whatever he may do, will be binding upon the nation.

Passed both houses of the Legislature, June 21, 1851.

WM. L. LEE,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
KEONI ANA,
President of the House of Nobles.

Approved by the King, August 4, 1851.

KEONI ANA.

KAMEHAMEHA.

He would state some facts which formed part of the unwritten history of this country, which were probably not known by a dozen people. The Government invited General Miller, British consul, to see them, and after telling him of France's demands, asked him if England would protect the Islands, from France. General Miller replied, "I can not do it; we have a treaty (1843) with France." The Government then sent for Mr. Severance, father of the present United States consul-general, who at that time was the United States representative, and asked him if the United States would protect the Islands against France. He said, "They will." [Applause.] In accordance with the authority of the statute, a treaty was drawn up, and from this you can decide who has been the friend of this country when it needed a friend most. The treaty which is now made public for the first time is as follows:

We, Kamehameha III, by the grace of God of the Hawaiian Islands, King:

By and with the advice of our kuhina nui and counsellors of native chiefs, finding our relations with France so oppressive to my Kingdom, so inconsistent with its rights as an independent State, and so obstructive of all our endeavors to administer the government of our Islands with equal justice with all nations and equal independence of all foreign control and despairing of equity and justice from France, hereby proclaim as our royal will and pleasure that all our Islands and all our rights as sovereign over them are from the date hereof placed under the protection and safeguard of the United States of America until some arrangements can be made to place our said relations with France upon a footing compatible with my rights as an independent sovereign under the laws of nations and compatible with my treaty engagements with other foreign nations; or, if such arrangements be found impracticable, then it is our wish and pleasure that the protection aforesaid under the United States of America be perpetual.

And we further proclaim, as aforesaid, that from the date of publication hereof the flag of the United States of America shall be hoisted above the national ensign on all our forts and places and vessels navigating with Hawaiian registers.

Done at our palace at Honolulu this 10th day of March, A. D. 1851, and in the twenty-sixth year of our reign.

[L. S.]

KEONI ANA.

KAMEHAMEHA.

That King who signed it was the great and enlightened Kanikeaouli, who did more for his people than any other of the Hawaiian Kings, being the one who gave the people lands. He made the treaty, relying fully on the generosity and integrity of the United States, and his trust was not betrayed. [Applause.] That treaty was sent to the United States and laid there for months. The French admiral finally hearing something of the treaty withdrew his claim and left the country. [Laughter.] It may be of interest to mention that the U. S. S. *Vandalia*, so well known here, was in the harbor at the time and rendered assistance. Orders were given to Marshal Parke and he sewed Hawaiian and American flags together, the latter at the top, and sent them to all the sheriffs. He had one in the fort ready to hoist directly the French landed.

There was the situation, the country was ceded and the deed in the hands of the United States Government. The King, with the full knowledge and consent of the Legislature, of the chiefs and of his cabinet, had deliberately and formally ceded the country to the United States, and that Government had only to sit still and do nothing in order to hold the country. If they had done so this would have been United States territory to-day. The American Government on learning that this had happened under pressure and fear of the French, said it would not be fair to take advantage of the situation. The treaty, which had never been published, was returned, the flag was never hoisted, and we remain a free and independent country to-day solely through the generosity of the United States of America. [Loud applause.] The episode when the British took possession in 1843 is well known to all. For seven months the British flag floated over the islands. The King was deposed, ministers were out of office, the records of the Government show that the entire Government was carried on by Lord George Paulet and his subordinates. Another episode simply shows the feeling of the United States Government towards us. The United States frigate *Constitution* came into the harbor, the deposed King going on board. The royal standard was hoisted and a salute of 21 guns fired. Lord Paulet protested, saying "The islands are British territory, and you are saluting a man who has no authority."

The American admiral replied, "I have recognized the man who is the King of the country, and if you do not like it you can lump it." [Laughter.] England nobly atoned and has been a good friend to us ever since. Is there any question who has been our friend in the past, and who will continue to be our friend, first, last, and all the time? The United States has always been friendly towards these islands. The foreign office is full of expressions of regard and good-will from that country from the earliest records down to the last mail. A number of men in the opposition ranks were in the country and participated in these matters, but they have learned nothing from it and have forgotten it all. Now they have the cold impudence to come forward and talk about giving the United States the go-by and going to France for protection—through our distrust of the intention of the United States. They say that Thurston, Damon, and the other damned missionaries are going to sell the independence of the country; that they, the patriots, are the ones who will preserve it. Wilcox and men of his stripe are doing more to destroy the independence of this country than any other person. They are striving to produce a state of anarchy, and it will not take many more of such events of July 30 to lose our independence, and then who will we have to thank for it but the gallant leader of the opposition, R. W. Wilcox. [Loud and continued applause.]

The object of political discussion is to present arguments on principles involved, pro and con, and let the people decide at the polls. The opposition have a platform; do they discuss it? Do they discuss the Chinese question, development of the country, or the immigration question? On the contrary, we see Wilcox stigmatizing his countrymen as "traitors, murderers, thieves, and robbers," and he proposes "to break their necks, stamp on them, and throw them in the water and let the sharks eat them." Those are his arguments, by which he tries to show his patriotism. He went to Italy to be educated, and it has been the burden of his complaint that because the Government had supported and educated him for seven years it owed him an office and living, and that because he did not get it he was forced into despair and revolution. I have not heretofore stated that upon his return he came to me and asked me for something to do. I sent him to the superintendent of water works, who keeps in a book a record of water privileges, showing the distance from the sidewalk to the block. Mr. Wilson told Wilcox the record was two or three months behind, and he would give him \$100 a month to keep it, and more if he did the work satisfactorily.

Wilcox took up the record book, and said that as the figures were in feet and inches and he had been educated in meters he did not feel competent to undertake the work. [Laughter.] He walked sadly and slowly out of the office from the \$100 with unknown feet and inches to despair and revolution. [Laughter.] Wilcox's chief grievance was that his education had been cut off in the middle. If he could only have had two years more to complete his course he would have been equipped

for the battle of life. If he had had those two years more schooling he might then have been able to translate feet and inches into meters. [Laughter.] The Bulletin states there is no issue between the two parties; that whoever is elected, things will slide on about the same. I say there are live issues in this election and the future of this country depends a great deal on how it is decided. If Bush is to run bridge contracts and foreign diplomacy and Wilcox the engineering department, there will be a very different state of things to what the reform party has done. I leave it to you, next Wednesday, to say whether the reform Government shall go on with its work or whether you wish to see R. W. Wilcox sitting, with an Italian uniform on, in the Government building.

WILCOX'S LOVE OF LIBERTY.

The Voice of the Nation says that R. W. Wilcox has imbibed too much of the spirit of liberty to undertake to pull this Government back to arbitrary methods and the old order of things. This is pretty good, considering that Wilcox himself testified on the stand, under oath, that his new constitution which he had prepared was like the old constitution, with but few minor changes.

It will be remembered, also, that he testified that he showed his constitution to Mr. Pahia, who told him that he had better put some check upon the power of the King to arbitrarily dismiss his cabinet, but that he (Wilcox) replied: "If you have a king, make him a king, just like the European kings."

How much of the spirit of free institutions Mr. Wilcox has imbibed the reader can see, when he recollects that Wilcox complains continually in his speeches about the mixture of all classes in this country.

Who does not remember his hackneyed information that "there are three classes in Italy: First, royalty; second, the middle class; third, the rest of the people—farmers, traders, etc.; and that none of the third class can even get into the second class, never mind how much they improve their condition?"

AN IG-NOBLE SPEECH.

Mr. H. G. Crabbe is running as a noble for the Island of Oahu. While we are not sticklers for form or too much dignity and reserve, still we, in common with all people, recognize the fact that the position of noble is intended to represent the more conservative, dignified, and staid element in the legislative body.

Mr. Crabbe, so far from maintaining his dignity in the opposition meeting at Palama last week, indulged himself in the use of billingsgate that would have done credit to an artist in the use of such language.

Getting more and more personal, he called Mr. Achi a "little half-Chinese monkey," and wound up finally with an out-and-out filthy epithet in Hawaiian, which raised a murmur of disapproval among the native listeners that were standing by.

For fear that the reader will hardly credit this, and will take the opposition general denial as correct, we challenge Mr. Crabbe to deny it if he can.

WHO IS VIOLATING THE LAW?

Mr. Macfarlane is credited, in his speech to the natives last Saturday night at the old armory, with saying that the opposition would peaceably abide the result of the election if defeated, but that it looked as if the reform party would not; that already the reform party were taking steps to challenge and shut off opposition electors from their vote.

The trouble is that it is the opposition itself and not the reform party that purposes to break the law, and has already done so. Unquestionably a large number of parties have registered as noble voters at the instigation of runners of the opposition who are not qualified to vote for nobles or anywhere near it, and perjured themselves thereby. These men should be challenged, and undoubtedly will be, and without placing the reform party open to the charge of wishing to make a disturbance or to violate the law.

Mr. Macfarlane would do much better if he asserted more control over his party and urged his following not to attempt to vote the noble tickets next Wednesday, even though on the register of noble voters, if, as a matter of fact, they violate the law and their consciences in so doing.

To-morrow will be the election day in which eight men will be chosen, for better or worse, to hold power without further control on our part until the year 1896. Eight more will serve for four years, and the balance—both representatives and nobles—for two years.

The six-year men will be still in the legislature when our present treaty relations with the United States shall have expired, and all will have very important measures to pass upon before election day comes round again.

It is customary, we believe, to spring new matter on your opponents at the last minute, when it is too late for them to refute it.

We believe, however, that such a course is cowardly, and brings neither credit to the man who does it or much harm to the party against whom it is aimed, and we have refrained in this (practically) our last issue to present any new personal charges against the opposition. What charges we have made have been made openly and with full opportunity given the object of our attack to defend himself or themselves from it.

A charge kept back at the last minute is usually kept back because if put forward soon enough could be refuted. A well-founded charge should stand the test of a public sifting.

A SERIOUS CHARGE.

Mr. John Phillips is indignant that the board of education has had the temerity to advertise for bids for the erection of schoolhouses and accept the lowest bid in all cases where they were satisfied that the bidder was responsible and able to fulfill his contract. This is indeed a serious charge! Why, it gives the poor mechanic, even though he is a native Hawaiian, an equal chance, so far as the board is concerned, with the owner of a planing mill! Those who are opposed to such a fair way of transacting business will vote for Mr. Phillips.

A DENIAL BY THE CABINET.—THE PROPOSED TREATY NEGOTIATIONS AND THE LANDING OF THE TROOPS.

Some three months ago the cabinet met a committee of citizens who desired information concerning the proposed revision of our treaty relations with the United States.

Full information was verbally given at the time, and in the course of a few days a lengthy written statement was published.

The committee made no report to the meeting which appointed them, although they several times announced that they intended to report.

In yesterday's Herald a member of the committee makes an altogether false statement in the native language of what occurred at that interview. He states that the committee were told by the cabinet that the King had rejected two sections of a proposed treaty, they being sections which allowed the landing of troops with their munitions of war.

No such statement was made.

We would further state that no proposition to allow the landing of troops and munitions of war on Hawaiian soil has been made either by the United States or the Hawaiian Government, nor will any such proposition be entertained or supported by the present administration.

LORRIN A. THURSTON.
JONA AUSTIN.
S. M. DAMON.

AMERICA'S GOOD FAITH AND GENEROSITY.

Amid all of the snarling, wrangling, and blackguarding of the opposition, and their attempts to engender bad blood and prejudice against the United States, the fact stands out bold and clear that:

Hawaii voluntarily surrendered her independence to the United States and the United States voluntarily restored it.

TEN REASONS FOR SUPPORTING THE REFORM PARTY.

1. The Reform party has given us a free constitution.
2. It has vigorously instituted and carried on a policy of public improvements.
3. It has improved our reputation and credit abroad. (Under its administration government bonds have gone to a premium.)
4. It has borrowed money at a lower rate than ever before.
5. It has energetically pursued the policy of segregating the lepers.
6. It has introduced the principle of civil-service reform.
7. It has reduced the number of Chinese in the country by 3,000.
8. It has opened up several hundred holdings to settlers under the homestead act.
9. It has been economical.
10. It has swept away a corrupt régime with all its attendant abuses, and has thereby abolished the use of the civil service for partisan purposes, the control of the Legislature by the Crown, the misappropriation of public funds, the violation of law in the conduct of office, the wasting of the public resources in discreditable enterprises, impoverishing the country at home and disgracing it abroad, and the neglect of necessary public improvements, besides a host of other things which our space forbids us to mention.

TEN REASONS FOR NOT SUPPORTING THE "NATIONAL REFORM PARTY."

1. Because its prominent leaders are opposed to the new constitution.
2. Because it proposes to revise the constitution in some unknown way.
3. Because it proposes to modify or abolish altogether the property qualification.
4. Because it proposes the election of certain public officers by the people (which is not known).
5. Because its declared foreign policy is dangerous to the reciprocity treaty, and consequently to the commercial prosperity of the country.
6. Because it is unwise to abandon a party which has deserved well of the country.
7. Because a change of administration is always in itself a serious misfortune, and will be injurious to our credit abroad.
8. Because the candidates of the party, with some honorable exceptions, are composed of men either without any record or with a bad one.
9. Because the party has conducted the campaign by a systematic attempt to rouse race hatred and set the Hawaiian against the entire foreign element.
10. Because this campaign is an undisguised attempt to nullify all the fruits of the revolution of 1887, and to carry out the insurrection of 1889.

Which ticket are you going to vote?

VOTE FOR PERMANENT RECIPROCITY. ITS EFFECT ON WOOL.

Wool, upon which a duty of ten cents a pound exists and which now barely pays the expense of putting on the market, and which we now ship across two oceans to Germany and elsewhere, would go through the Golden Gate, and the abolition of the duty would put sheep on every available spot on the mountain slopes of Mauna Loa and Mauna Kea, where the single station of Humuula now tells what might be done with sheep if an impossible duty did not shut our wool out from the market which nature has ordained to be our national outlet.

VOTE FOR PERMANENT RECIPROCITY. ITS EFFECTS UPON OUR FRUIT INDUSTRY.

Permanent reciprocity means that every banana, lime, pineapple, orange, cocoa-nut, etc., that we raise goes into the United States free of duty until the crack of doom. It means that fruit orchards, which under a seven years' treaty there is no use to create or spend any money on, will cover that home of tropical fruit, the two

Konas, and cultivated bananas will be found in every one of the thousand gulches of the Hilo district, which, too steep for cultivation of sugar, now lie idle between the fields of cane. It means that the wood lands, running 60 miles from Hilo to Kukuiahaele, too high for cane, will afford a home for the lime and coffee tree, where one can now set limes as large and coffee as healthy as ever gladdened the eye of man.

Waialua, whose orange trees, neglected and slighted as they are, still insist on bearing fruit which discount California's best, will be as familiar an object in the hotels of the Pacific slope as Florida's favorites are in the markets of the East.

VOTE FOR PERMANENT RECIPROCITY. ITS EFFECT ON CLERKS.

Clerks can remember the Hon. Charles R. Bishop, P. C. Jones, J. C. Glade, T. H. Davies, and many others, who came here and worked their way up the ladder step by step, and with the upward movement of permanent reciprocity commence to climb the stairs themselves. It looks as if the clerks of this city were now booked to remain such for good, or else be fired out by Asiatics; but new times will make a change.

Remember that a name scratched is a vote lost for the party that constitutes the backbone and enterprise of the land.

That a vote for the best man on the other side, as the issues have narrowed down, is a vote for all that that man has identified himself with.

VOTE FOR PERMANENT RECIPROCITY. ITS EFFECT ON MECHANICS.

Mechanics can remember that Young, and Renton, and Thomas, and Daniel Foster, and many others coming here as mechanics, worked their way to the front on the tide of prosperity which came with reciprocity, and from their example can take heart that in a newer and broader commercial dispensation they, too, will work their way to that competency which is the legitimate ambition of every honest man, but which seems shut out by the absorption of one developed industry.

Remember that your vote is essential to the sure and complete overthrow of the reactionary elements among us;

That the men on your ticket represent the spirit of progress among us, and as such should be elected to a man.

VOTE FOR PERMANENT RECIPROCITY. ITS EFFECT ON CAPITAL.

Abiding, which can not be revoked without mutual consent, means the settling of values and the restful confidence of capital. The complaint against the steady withdrawal from the country of hundreds of thousands of dollars made in it would cease, for there would be no occasion for it.

REFORM PARTY. GENERAL ELECTION OF 1890. PLATFORM.

1. We pledge ourselves to maintain inviolate the autonomy and independence of this Kingdom, while securing at the same time the amplest commercial benefits in our treaty relations with the United States.

2. To secure adequate legislation, by constitutional amendment or otherwise, whereby Asiatic immigration shall be restricted to the agricultural necessities of the country, and Chinese not now engaged in trade or the mechanical occupations shall be prohibited from hereafter engaging therein.

3. To favor wise and liberal appropriations for internal improvements, and to sustain a progressive policy in the development of our national resources.

4. To secure such an extension of the present homestead act as will facilitate the settlement of small landholders throughout the Kingdom.

5. To procure for the people an honest, economic, and efficient administration in all departments of the Government.

CANDIDATES.

For Nobles—Island of Oahu.—Hon. W. C. Wilder, Hon. M. P. Robinson, Hon. W. O. Smith, six years. Hon. J. I. Dowsett, sr., Robert Lishman, R. J. Greene, four years. S. M. Kaunkal, E. S. Kunha, B. F. Dillingham, two years.

For Representatives—District of Kona, Oahu.—District 1: Hon. Cecil Brown. District 2: S. K. Kane. District 3: M. A. Gonsalves. District 4: James F. Morgan. District 5: W. C. Achi. District 6: J. L. Kaulukou. District 7: ——. District 8: J. I. Dowsett, jr.

For Nobles—Island of Hawaii.—J. Kauhane, J. M. Horner, six years. R. R. Hind, Hon. Dr. J. Wight, four years. Hon. Samuel Parker, Dr. C. H. Wetmore, two years.

For Representatives—Island of Hawaii.—South Hilo: R. Rycroft. Central Hilo: Geo. Kaihenua. North Hilo: Albert Horner. Hamakua: W. H. Rickard. Kohala: J. W. Moanauli. Kona: ———. Kau: ———.

For Nobles—Island of Maui.—Hon. H. P. Baldwin, W. Y. Horner, six years. W. H. Cornwell, R. D. Walbridge, four years. Jas. Anderson, L. Von Tempsky, two years.

For Representatives—Island of Maui.—Wailuku, district 1: W. K. Makakoa. Wailuku, district 2: Patrick Cockett. Makawao: W. H. Halstead. Hana: Jos. U. Kawaiui. Lahaina: ———. Molokai: ———.

For Nobles—Island of Kauai.—Hon. Geo. N. Wilcox, six years. Hon. P. P. Kanoa, four years. Hon. P. Isenberg, sr., two years.

For Representatives—Island of Kauai.—Hanalei: Hon. A. S. Wilcox. Lihue: Hon. W. H. Rice. Waimea: V. Kuudsen.

To the readers of the Times:

When your eyes shall rest upon this last issue of the Times, election day will already have partly run its course.

At such a time above all others we would make no mad appeal for the Reform party, no loud declamation against the opposition; but wish only to address you in the language of soberness and truth.

A strong movement, like that begun on the 30th of June, by the Reform party must naturally expect some day to have to meet the reactionary wave that is always sure to follow. That wave has come to-day full-crested with the accumulated passions, prejudices, and disappointment of those who, like the Bourbon of France, "decline to forget anything or to learn anything new," and while you are now scanning these lines those two waves are meeting in a clash and collision that will settle things one way or other before the sun goes down.

If, after the collision, the Reform party is found still moving on, then reaction is gone forever. Bush, Wilcox, and their partisans have lost their employment for good. Nothing can then revive the past.

If, however, reform goes down, the leadership of Wilcox and his following are assured, and hundreds of dubious hearts will follow in his train and hasten to enforce his mandates and back up his demands who now are waiting to see which way the tide will turn.

We believe this country will never see social or political place as long as men can run politics on race lines or consent to reap the advantages to such work when done by hirelings. Every man who is opposed to such methods should see to it that Messrs. Widemann, Macfarlane, Muller, Phillips, and others are rebuked to-day for such a course, to the end that it may be established in this land of varied races from now on, that any political party, however laudable its objects may be, which seeks to secure them at the price of stirring up ill-will and race prejudice among the people, will for that act alone be snowed under so deep that even Gabriel's political trumpet will fail to rouse it from its slumbers.

We believe that an intelligent glance at the platform of the Opposition shows clearly, and the tone of its campaign confirms the fact, that it will if successful inaugurate a foreign policy inimical to the United States and imminently dangerous to our present commercial relations with that country. Feeling as we do that the whole fabric of society with us, political, social, and commercial, rests on that sheet of parchment we call the treaty, we can not, as a public organ, but warn the people against the folly of provoking results which will blight and bankrupt the country, drive out mechanics, force property on the market until it becomes a drug, and compel the delivery of the country once and for all over to Asiatics as the only class that could survive the collapse and save the forty millions invested in sugar.

Let us hold to our present treaty relations with the United States as a drowning man clings to the life buoy. Let us in all honorable ways promote the good will and fellowship now existing between our neighbor and ourselves, and press for such broader and more permanent commercial relations as will give this country and all the spare capital within it a new start, and to the young men of the land fuller and increasing opportunities to make a start in life for themselves.

With these words the Times bids the public farewell, with many thanks for its kind reception. Aloha nui!

Remember! That your opponents will vote the straight party ticket.

That they will not scratch any names in favor of men on your ticket whom you like best.

That those who advise you to scratch do so in the interests of the party whom you wish to see defeated.

That if the Reform party wins the election, progressive constitutional government is assured.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 17.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 4, 1890.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your confidential dispatch (No. 17) of the 7th ultimo, touching the result of the late election in the Hawaiian Islands, and its probable effect on the interests of the United States. It has been read with attention.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 19.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 6, 1890.

SIR. I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 18 of the 10th ultimo, by which I learn that, contrary to the indications of the first "returns" of the late elections in the Hawaiian Islands, the result throughout the islands proves favorable to the "reform party" and the present ministry.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 20.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, March 20, 1890.

SIR: The archives of the Department of State are conclusive evidences of the interest which the Government of the United States has long taken in the affairs of the Hawaiian Islands. That these territories are of great importance to the future development and defense of American commerce in the Pacific, hardly will be questioned. To secure the influence over them which the United States so long has considered its right and duty to maintain, some decisive steps must soon be taken which, in the past, were not of pressing necessity. For more than half a century the American Missionary Board, with the agencies and influences in its control, has served as a strong fortress to the United States in these islands. The large financial contributions, amounting to nearly one million of dollars, which that organization obtained through innumerable channels of American benevolence and religious zeal, and the large number of educated and resolute agents which it sent to these islands, secured an influence over the ruling chiefs and native population which held them as firmly to America as a permanent military force could have done.

But a change of facts and circumstances in recent years is bringing near the time when this well-sustained power must be strongly reinforced. In a large and increasing degree other influences have come in to counterbalance and relatively to decrease the American missionary influences. The native population of sixty years ago is reduced to

less than a third it then was, and is continually growing less. The chiefs, who were formerly the supports of monarchy and mainly controlled the affairs of the islands and who for many years were largely influenced by the teachings of the American pastors, no longer exist. The grave has closed over them forever. The native pastors, who now hold the places once occupied by the American missionaries, have not the strong American sympathies of their predecessors, and if they had they possess not the strength of character to hold their parishes by any effective influence relative to affairs of government. Of the ninety thousand population now on these islands less than one-half is of the original Hawaiian race, and but a small proportion of the lands and other property are in their possession.

The following is believed to be very nearly the present make-up of the population: Natives, 37,500; half-cast, 5,000; Chinese, 19,000; American, 3,000; Hawaiian, born of foreign parents, 3,000; Britons, 1,250; Portuguese, 12,000; Germans, 1,500; French, 150; Japanese, 8,400; Norwegian, 250; other foreigners, 500; Polynesian, 500; total, 92,050. It is not necessary for me to elaborate the argument to show that a population thus composed has not the inherent tendencies and unity of force to hold them to American interests. It is doubtless true that more than one-half of the property of the country to-day is possessed by those of American birth or of American blood. But wealthy men of other nationalities are becoming numerous here, and the number of adventurers and of those of cosmopolitan ideas, caring little for any country, is always considerable in lands peopled as this now is, with commercial and political circumstances as they are.

To thwart and hold in check the increasing influences here hostile to the United States some effective measures are absolutely necessary. In view of the facts as they existed for half a century a drifting policy was safe enough. Rapidly changing circumstances demand a prompt abandonment of the drifting policy of the past. Left to themselves, the prevailing logical force of things would ultimately drive out the best American elements and swamp these islands with adverse influences. To hold an assimilating control of the largely preponderating Asiatic and native Hawaiian population there must be maintained an American policy, strong, conservative, but not costly, if adopted in time. The longer this is postponed the more difficult and expensive it will be in the end to secure the desired result. The laying of an ocean cable from San Francisco to Honolulu, with the aid of the United States Government, and the expenditure of a sufficient sum of money to make a fair commencement of the improvement of Pearl Harbor would be of immediate benefit to American commerce, would be a salutary notice to foreign powers of our intentions in these waters, and operate as a powerful incentive to retain and to increase an enterprising and influential American population in these islands.

As monarchy and feudalism, formally so strong here, have no longer any solid foundation, and government has become constitutional, and largely by the ballot, the moral pressure of the United States is absolutely necessary to enable the Americans and other intelligent citizens of the country to withstand the Asiatic and other influences adverse to Christian civilization, its laws, and agencies. Fairly governed and retained under auspicious American influences, these islands are capable of supporting a population of 250,000, possessing financial resources ample to pay all the taxes necessary for the support of their institutions and the ordinary means of defense. The vital question, one that can not be possibly ignored or held in abeyance, is: Shall Asiatic or

American civilization ultimately prevail here? The near future is to show conclusively that only the strong pressure and continual vigilance of the United States can enable American men and American ideas to hold ascendancy here and make these islands as prosperous and valuable to American commerce and to American marine supremacy in the North Pacific as the isles of the Mediterranean have been and are to its adjacent nations. The data in possession of the Department of the Navy, and doubtless well known to the Department of State, show how valuable Pearl Harbor easily can be made as a commercial marine and naval station, and the great and pressing importance of an ocean cable, under American control, is so plainly obvious as to require no elaborate argument for its clearer demonstration.

The most careful study of the situation here leads me to urge a limited appropriation for Pearl harbor, financial aid to the ocean cable, and such modification of the existing treaty as shall increase the American population here and permanently strengthen the bonds between Hawaii and the United States. The sooner this is done the less difficult and expensive it will be in the end. It is certain that time and events will not wait for us, and that a drifting and waiting policy is now the most hazardous.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

From the Minister of Finance I have just received the inclosed report of the Collector of Customs, a single advance type-written copy, showing the increased commercial importance of these islands to the United States.

HONOLULU, H. I., March 13, 1890.

His Excellency S. M. DAMON,

His Majesty's Minister of Finance :

SIR: In conformity with the provisions of section 553 of the Civil Code, I have the honor to submit to your excellency the annual report of the business of this bureau for the year ended December 31, 1889.

I beg to call your excellency's attention to the reports with each table, which, I think, will give more information than in former years. Your attention in particular is called to tables numbers 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16.

The exports have increased from \$4,875,694 in 1880 to \$13,874,341 in 1889, and the imports from \$3,673,268 in 1880 to \$5,438,790 in 1889.

The trade with the United States has increased 5.78 per cent during the past year, and is now 79.10 per cent of our entire imports.

Our exports, virtually, all go to the United States. The exports of our principal product, sugar, has increased over the exports of previous years, as follows: 1889, 242,165,825 pounds, against—

Year.	Quantity.	Increase.	Year.	Quantity.	Increase.
	<i>Pounds.</i>	<i>Pounds.</i>		<i>Pounds.</i>	<i>Pounds.</i>
1877	25, 575, 965	216, 589, 879	1883	114, 107, 155	128, 058, 680
1878	38, 431, 458	203, 734, 377	1884	142, 654, 923	99, 510, 912
1879	49, 020, 972	193, 144, 863	1885	171, 350, 314	70, 815, 521
1880	63, 584, 471	178, 581, 364	1886	216, 223, 615	25, 942, 220
1881	93, 789, 483	148, 376, 352	1887	212, 763, 647	29, 402, 188
1882	114, 177, 938	127, 987, 897	1888	235, 888, 346	6, 277, 489

An average increase of 119,035,144 pounds per year.

Rice has fallen off from the output of 1888, 3,208,704 pounds; a large amount of this shortage is due to the number of Japanese laborers having been introduced. The true amount of rice produced in this Kingdom can never be ascertained from the records of this Bureau for the reason that this article is used to a greater or less extent by our own population.

Wool has decreased to 241,925 pounds. The export of this article reached its highest point in 1882 and its lowest in 1887.

Bananas have increased in the number of bunches exported from 1876 to the present year, when it reached 105,630 bunches.

Tallow has decreased from the amount exported last year.

Molasses has increased slightly.

The manifested value of sugar for the past year was 5.45 cents per pound.

It will be seen by reference to the table that the United States received practically all of our domestic products.

Japan imported 92 head of Hawaiian cattle.

China did not import anything. In former years a large amount of betel leaves and tallow have been exported there.

Our import trade with the various countries of the world has increased to a considerable extent. The aggregate of our imports for 1888 was \$4,540,887, while for 1889, \$5,438,790, an increase of \$897,903. Reviewing our trade with each country, we find that we imported from the United States 79.10 per cent, an increase of 5.78 per cent over the previous year, or more particularly an increase of \$976,108 from that country alone; from Great Britain 12.38 per cent, a falling off from the previous year; from China and Japan 3.68 per cent, also a slight falling off; and from other countries a similar falling off. The relation which our imports from the United States of free by treaty and goods paying duty bear to each other is as 4 of the former to 1 of the latter. The class of goods which compose the duty-paying class are to a great extent of foreign origin, and American beer and wines.

The United States received the bulk of our trade, both in exports and imports; Great Britain received 3.45 per cent, and China and Japan 1.10 per cent.

The trade of the United States with this Kingdom has increased 1.61 per cent over that of 1888.

The total imports and exports have increased from \$16,248,486 in 1888, to \$19,313,132 for the period just ended.

The increase in the imports and exports carried by American vessels in 1868 was 66.19 per cent, while in 1889 it carried 72.34 per cent. The percentage carried by vessels of other nations has decreased in each case.

The imports of specie for the year just ended amounted to \$1,146,925, and \$1,207,555 for the previous year, showing a slight falling off.

The exports of gold increased from \$23,935 for 1888, to \$40,477 for 1889.

The value of our foreign and domestic goods exported amounted to \$13,874,341. The value of foreign goods exported amounted to \$64,270, it being the smallest amount exported for ten years past.

The value of our domestic exports has increased \$2,178,635 over the previous year, and it represents a production of \$172.62½ per capita for the entire population, basing the calculation on the census returns of 1884.

The vessels engaged in carrying our domestic products were divided among principally four nationalities. American, gauged by the value, carried 80.22 per cent against 73.09 per cent in 1888; Hawaiian, 15.20 per cent against 21.72 per cent for the previous year, the falling off being occasioned by one of the regular steamers being laid up for repairs and an American vessel taking its place.

The number of Hawaiian-registered vessels has decreased in number as well as in tonnage. This has been caused through the sale abroad of the bark *Kalakaua* and the brigantine *Allie Rowe*, the breaking up in port of the bark *Lilian* and the brigantine *Hazard*, and the losing of the bark *James A. King* and the schooner *Jennie Walker* by being wrecked.

The additions to the list were the steamers *Hawaii* and *Akamai*; the bark *Andrew Welch* and *Fookng Suey*, and the brigantine *Geo. H. Douglass*, and the sloop *Keaolani*, all vessels of the first class.

We have in our merchant marine five vessels built of iron, three being steamers, and among the coasters one iron steamer. The number of men employed by all vessels, both merchantmen and coasters, is 850, in the capacity of sailors.

The number and tonnage of vessels entered and cleared at all ports, Hawaiian Islands, remain about the same as in the previous year. The total number entered has increased, while the tonnage has decreased, showing that vessels of smaller tonnage have been employed.

Vessels under the American flag had a total tonnage of 129,095, and in 1888, 113,459; British, 19,139, and in 1888, 29,519; Hawaiian, 54,813, against 64,607; German, 4,197, against 5,820 for the previous year.

There was an excess of departure of passengers and tourists of 53 during the year, as against 499, excess of departures in 1888; while there was an excess of arrivals of immigrants of 1,358, which indicates that there was a gain to the population of this Kingdom of 1,305. The Chinese population has decreased by 1,059 persons; 32 Chinese females have arrived, and 43 have departed.

The consumption of spirits in this kingdom varies very little from that of 1888, save in the withdrawals of beer, which has increased from 40,000 gallons to 61,000 gallons for the year just ended. The consumption of light wine remains about the same. European wines, which have been always of a high test, have been all along displaced by California wines; but during the past year the experiment was tried of importing a quantity of a lower test, corresponding to its California rival. The result is a small increase in its consumption.

There has been an unexpected increase in the receipts for duties in some articles which showed a decrease in 1888, while others have unexpectedly fallen off, but the total amount shows a slight increase over the previous year. It largely exceeds our estimate for the biennial period, which was estimated at \$500,000 per year.

Marine railway.—I would draw your excellency's attention to the increasing importance of the marine railway, and since the arrival of the warship *Nipsic* from Samoa was placed on the railway for extensive repairs many foreign vessels have taken advantage of it through the experience gained from that vessel.

The number of coasters and merchantmen placed thereon during 1889 was 70, of which number 33 were steamers, the largest being 1,070 tons and the smallest 18 tons; and the other 37 were sailing vessels, the largest being 1,088 tons and the smallest 6 tons. The demands made upon the statistical department of this Bureau has largely increased during the past year, and is likely to increase with the increase of our commerce and as we become better known abroad. It is on account of these ever increasing demands, and increasing commerce that our report is later than usual.

I have the honor to be, sir, your excellency's most obedient servant,

A. S. CLEGHORN,
Collector-General of Customs.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 22.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, April 7, 1890.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Nos. 4-19.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 24.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, April 24, 1890.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 20 of the 20th ultimo, touching the commercial relations of Hawaii with the United States. A copy of your dispatch has been confidentially communicated to the Secretary of the Navy.

I am, sir, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 24.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, May 20, 1890.

SIR: The import and intent of the reciprocity treaty between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands are well understood by all Americans who have a patriotic regard for the future commercial

growth and power of their country in the Pacific. The bearing which the continuance of the terms and advantages of the present reciprocity treaty has on the political relations of the Hawaiian kingdom with the United States renders it proper for me to inform the Department of State of the present alarm caused here by the sugar provisions of the tariff bill reported by the Committee on Ways and Means of the Washington House of Representatives. The production of sugar is the principal business of these islands, as the figures of the nearly \$14,000,000 of exports to the United States in 1889 plainly show. Sugar is the chief source of the financial life—is the banking capital—on which the present and future prosperity of this country depends. To destroy this productive industry and chief source of wealth is to spread ruin and disaster throughout the islands.

It is certain that the present treaty is the chief cause of the present large dimensions of sugar production, having already more than doubled the entire property of the islands. In the opinion of all well-informed persons here, to place sugar on the free list would be the virtual annulment of the reciprocity treaty and the destruction of the prosperity of the islands. Thus it is easy to understand why there is so deep an anxiety among the business men of Hawaii as to the present aspect of the sugar question in Congress. They clearly understand that it is a matter of life and death to the Hawaiian kingdom. To all sincere Americans here it is especially alarming, as they see plainly that the virtual destruction of the chief productive industry of the country is to weaken essentially its fraternal relations with the United States. It would have been better never to have had the treaty than now to annul its chief financial advantage and knock the main props from the business of the islands. I am sure that these fears are not exaggerated. The business men here have no more faith in the "bounty system" than have the business men of the United States.

It certainly seems highly inopportune to abandon the protective principle as to sugar just at the time when in various sections of the United States extensive arrangements are being made to invest large sums of money to produce sugar from cane, beet, and sorghum. That the sugar tariff has not already led to a large production of sugar in the United States is no conclusive reason why it will not in the future, now that greatly improved methods of producing sugar have recently come into use and capital is much more available for sugar-raising than formerly. There are strong reasons to believe that if sugar-raising can be protected in the future, say by a specific duty of 50 per cent on the raw product, it will increase on a large scale and become a very important interest in eight or ten States of the Union, and that at no distant day the United States and its dependencies and allies will produce sugar sufficient to supply the increasing demands of the American people. Logically and practically there seems to be no stronger reasons for abandoning the protective principle as to sugar than as to any other agricultural interest or productive industry of the country. Believing the commercial and political relations of these islands to be of inestimable importance to the United States, duty impels me to state the grave injury and danger there are involved in the proposed annulment of the sugar tariff. I am sure I have not overestimated the calamity it would bring to Hawaii, and I am clearly of the opinion that a 50 per cent specific duty on raw sugar would be well for the ultimate interests of the United States.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 25.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, May 28, 1890.

SIR: I improve the first mail opportunity to inform the Department of State that the Hawaiian Legislature assembled May 21 and was opened by the King with the customary formalities. Contrary to the hope of the best citizens of the islands, the reform party, through whose agency the present constitution was made and carried into effect, is found in minority. Two or three members-elected by the reformers, half-caste and native Hawaiians, have joined the opponents of the present order of things. The opponents of the ministry elected the speaker and other legislative officers by a small majority, and the committees appointed are similarly constituted. The resolutions thus far offered and the discussions had in their regard indicate a matured purpose of the majority to force out the present ministry and put in its place one hostile to the present constitution or that regards its requisitions of secondary importance.

The situation is somewhat complicated by the fact that one of the ministers, the attorney-general, a Canadian by birth and sympathy, has deserted his colleagues and become a bitter partisan of the present legislative majority. Not long since he made a visit of several months to Canada, spending, I think, a few days in Washington, and returned here since the Hawaiian election an earnest opponent of a new treaty with the United States and an advocate of an ocean cable and a reciprocity treaty with the Canadian Dominion. It is strongly suspicioned here that he is now in the pay of the Canadian Pacific Railroad, if not an agent of Sir James McDonald, the Canadian premier. Recently, instead of following the advice of the three more respectable and responsible members of his cabinet and the united opinion of the supreme court as to cabinet power and responsibility, the King has adopted the opinion of this Attorney-General Ashford that a single cabinet member can neutralize and block the decision of the other three members.

This course of the attorney-general and the diverse heterogeneous and irresponsible elements of which the majority in the Legislature is composed render the present political situation less favorable than could be wished. The aspect of the "sugar question" in Congress at Washington strengthens the opponents of the existing ministry and continues to depress and alarm the Americans here and those who hold that the United States is the best ally and the real hope of the Hawaiian Kingdom. As soon as the present legislative majority agree upon a new cabinet there is no doubt that a probably successful effort will be made to carry a vote of "want of confidence" in the present ministry, though some signs of discord begin to be manifest among the opponents of the three best members of the cabinet. I inclose two copies of the King's speech well known to have been formulated by the three responsible ministers.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

The King's speech at the opening of the Legislature May 21, A. D. 1890.

Nobles and Representatives:

The meeting of the Legislature to-day affords me the opportunity to congratulate the nation upon the measure of prosperity enjoyed by it during the period which has elapsed since the commencement of the last session.

The friendly relations between this Kingdom and foreign nations continue to promote the happiness and security of our subjects, and of all sojourners within our borders.

During the biennial period just closed, the country has enjoyed a great degree of prosperity. Industry and enterprise have been well rewarded, and as will appear from the reports of the several departments of the Government, great progress has been made in the development of our material interests.

It is a source of gratification that our credit is good, and that our financial affairs have been placed upon a sound basis.

I sincerely trust that the laws which you shall enact for the welfare of the Kingdom will foster and encourage the extension of public improvements in the full confidence that they will return to us rich rewards, and I recommend for your consideration, liberal expenditures for the development of the industries of the Kingdom, especially in the encouragement of railroads and other facilities for the transportation of merchandise and of passengers.

The authorities charged with guarding the health of the people have been vigilant, and have succeeded in a great measure in the suppression of our chief malady.

The subject of education, so closely connected with the foundation of good government, has received the earnest consideration of those appointed to forward its interests, and our progress in this important branch of human welfare has received the commendations of all nations, as expressed at the Paris Exposition, where our educational exhibit was rewarded with the highest order of prizes.

In view of the probable completion of an interoceanic ship canal in the near future, and of the promised extension of lines of steam communication, it is of the highest importance that our harbors should be prepared to furnish accommodation to the great increase of commerce which will surely follow.

Let us also hope that arrangements may be made during the present period, whereby an electric cable under the Pacific shall place us in instantaneous communication with the thoughts and feelings of the whole human race, and add largely to our commercial advantages.

We shall deem it wise with your concurrence to pledge the credit of the Hawaiian Kingdom for such purposes and it can not be doubted that the material welfare of the nation will be thereby greatly enhanced.

Nobles and representatives: Invoking the blessings of the Almighty upon your deliberations, I now declare the Legislature of the Kingdom open.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 26.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, June 9, 1890.

SIR: I improve the first mail opportunity to forward two copies of the speech of Hon. L. A. Thurston, Minister of Interior, just delivered in the Hawaiian Legislature. It is a clear, strong statement of facts, as I had previously ascertained them by careful investigation, and these plainly indicate the actual political situation here, showing that in my former dispatches I had not been mistaken as to my general views of the condition of affairs.

Mr. Thurston is a gentleman of marked ability, of tried integrity, and of real courage. He is a native of the islands, as were his father and mother, both of his grand parents being of sturdy Connecticut stock, having come here as missionaries nearly seventy years ago. He has been, from its beginning, a bold and earnest leader in the reform party, and has the entire confidence of the best men of the islands. He can always be relied on as a friend of the country of his ancestry. His speech has made so decided an impression that it is possible that the heterogeneous majority of the opposition party in the Legislature may become a minority and not be able to force out the present ministry.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[Inclosure.]

[From the Honolulu Commercial Advertiser of June 7, 1890.]

THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR: I am ready to speak to the question of privilege in regard to the reply of the attorney-general to the questions of Nobles Crabbe and Muller. The answer of the attorney-general amounted to a general charge against the cabinet of interfering with him in the discharge of his duties and of acting in a manner derogatory to the interests of the community, in maintaining last April an armed guard at the police station. The charges of the attorney-general resolve themselves into three, which I shall take up in turn.

1. That the marshal maintained, during April last, an armed guard in the police station, with the approval of the majority of the cabinet, and against the approval of the attorney-general.

2. That such action was unwise, unnecessary, and groundless.

3. That if there was any reason to apprehend a disturbance the action taken was such as to precipitate the very disorders it was intended to prevent.

Mr. President, I admit the first charge. I admit that the majority of the cabinet maintained a guard at the station house not only without the consent of the attorney-general, but that he did everything in his power to prevent it. The thing that he did not do was to godown and find out what was actually going on. I think that instead of censuring the marshal, he deserves the thanks of the community that in spite of the resistance of his superior officer he had the principle and the courage to take measures which, I think, prevented the recurrence of happenings similar to those of the 30th of July last.

Having admitted the first charge, that the marshal defied his superior officer and the cabinet approved it and advised it, only a strong reason can exculpate the cabinet, and if I do not give sufficient reason for their action, I ask that they be condemned as they should be.

Our defense is that at that time the majority of the cabinet had good reason to believe that Volney V. Ashford and Robert W. Wilcox were contemplating violence, and that the attorney-general, if not actually assisting, was conniving at it. Now I maintain that I have not got to furnish legal proof of this, such as would be needed to procure a conviction before a jury; but if I show that we had good reason to believe it we were justified in the action which we took. I don't propose to indulge in rhetoric or adjectives, but to make plain statement of facts and of the information which I received, and then let the gentlemen here draw their own conclusion. The reasons which actuated us involve a considerable amount of the secret history of this country during the last three years. I do not propose to state any facts which are not essential. There are a large number which bear on the subject which I have stricken out, but I think that I have retained enough to convince the house.

I will show first why we had cause to distrust R. W. Wilcox and to believe that he was intending to disturb the peace.

As you all know, Mr. Wilcox was several years a ward of this country studying abroad, until his return in 1887. A fact not so generally known is that he organized at that time a conspiracy to dethrone the King, overthrow the ministry, and proclaim a new constitution. One of those who assisted him in drawing up the constitution is now present in this house. They went so far as to actually have the constitution engrossed, and Wilcox, with others, went into the palace and demanded of the King that he abdicate and declare his sister Queen. They even had the form of abdication written out for him to sign. If it had not been for the faithful service of Robt. Parker, the matter which came to a head in July, 1889, might have come to a head in the early part of 1888. The tactics which Wilcox pursued were almost identical with those which he employed in last July, except that he went into it so subtly that he managed to draw in a great many innocent persons, who did not understand it until they were so deep in that they could not withdraw. One of these became frightened and came and told us, and that is how we came to know about it. As soon as I learned about it, I sent for several of the prominent conspirators, one after another, and charged them with it, and they confessed. I put their statements in writing and they signed them, and I have those statements to-day. The object was, straight and simple, to compel the King to abdicate. They had the abdication all written out and they tried to compel him to sign it. Within a day or two after the matter came to my knowledge, they all knew that I knew it. The wife of R. W. Wilcox came to me (as she said, at the request of her husband) and begged me with tears that they might be allowed to go away. She said they would go back to Italy and that would be the last of it. It may be said that the cabinet ought to be condemned for not bringing it all out at that time, and so preventing the trouble of July 30.

Perhaps we were right and perhaps we were wrong. The reason we did not was that the country had been disturbed and we did not wish to again arouse alarm.

Nobody knew of the affair, and they promised to reform. Robt. Wilcox came to me himself and admitted the whole affair; said that he had been wrong, that he saw his mistake, but had been desperate, living as he was on charity. That he was angry with the King for not giving him an office which he had expected and been promised. He said he would go back to Italy and take service in the Italian army where they were fighting in Arabia, and that perhaps he would obtain promotion there. It seemed to us best, after mature deliberation, not to prosecute, and so no arrests were made, no publicity was given to it. Wilcox was allowed to go and he went. After this there were no disturbances, no rumors—everybody went about his business with the unconsciousness that everything was all right and that the country was secure.

This state of things continued until Wilcox came back in 1889. He had scarcely arrived before we began to receive information that he was trying to bring about the same thing again. There is no need of my repeating the events of July last, as it has all been before the courts. Now, after all that had happened in 1888, after his exposure and failure, his repentance and promises, he came back and repeated his attempt, and to-day he has the blood of 7 poor Kanakas on his head. The results of his second attempt you all know. He was tried and acquitted. You know what has happened since. He made a triumphal tour through the country, not only expressing no regret and repentance for what he had done, but glorifying in it, representing himself as a patriot and saying that if he had a chance he would do the same thing again. So things went on until some time before the election. Then rumors again began to go around, and I received direct information that he was again discussing schemes of violence and that as a first step he intended to take the station house; that he had been discussing that with V. V. Ashford, and with his assistance was devising plans as to how it might be accomplished. R. W. Wilcox stated to several of his friends the substance of his conversation with V. V. Ashford. Two of them gave me their statements in writing. They are persons who were politically opposed to me. It is unnecessary for me to state that one of them was Antone Rosa, since he has stated the same thing over his own signature in the public press.

I went immediately to Mr. Rosa, upon hearing that he knew of the matter, and said: "You and I are not politically in accord, but we both know that there is nothing will so damage the country as a repetition of July 30. We can sink our political differences in the attempt to prevent anything of this kind. I shall certainly do all that I can, and I think it is your duty to do all you can to prevent anything of the kind." He said that he took the same view, and would do what he could to ferret out what was going on, and he did. I think Mr. Rosa deserves the thanks of this house and of the community for sinking his political differences and doing what he could to prevent what would have injured the country.

Mr. V. V. Ashford soon heard of the rumors with regard to his conversation with Wilcox and sent for him and asked him if he had made any such statement. Mr. Wilcox said he had not. Mr. Ashford asked him if he would put that in writing, and Wilcox said he would. Mr. Ashford prepared a written statement which Robert Wilcox signed, and that statement is now in Mr. V. V. Ashford's possession. Then Wilcox went after Rosa for having told of it. Mr. Rosa said: "Didn't you tell me what I say that you did." Wilcox replied: "Yes; but I told you in confidence, and not to tell anyone else."

This put a quietus on Mr. Wilcox for some time. After the election Mr. Wilcox felt jubilant. He said that he had made the party successful and was entitled to the leadership of it, and would be made minister. Upon this some of the respectable members of his party began to grow restive, and expressed themselves in very decided language to the contrary. Then Mr. Wilcox told some of his friends that he was beginning to suspect the good faith of his haole associates, and that they would not help him to become minister and that he must look out for himself. He accordingly consulted with some of those who had been associated with him in July last, and asked them if they would be willing to help him again, if necessary. Some of them said yes, some were kanakua, and some said that they had had enough. Feelers were sent out and various persons were asked if they would assist in turning the Government out if matters came to a head. I have information from a gentleman in whom every member of this house has confidence, who was asked in front of the post-office by one of Wilcox's intimate friends if he would help take the station house; that they were going to have a meeting that night to discuss it.

Several of my informants were then, and still are, members of the opposition party. One actively expressed himself during the election for the express purpose of getting the cabinet out of office.

This brings the matter to the 17th of April, which the attorney-general considers the culminating iniquity of the cabinet.

The second question which I shall consider is why the cabinet distrusted V. V. Ashford and believed that he was favorable to creating a disturbance. I will not go back to the 30th of July last, although there are a number of earlier instances

which I might mention. Shortly after July 30 rumors and statements began to be circulated that V. V. Ashford, although he commanded the force against Wilcox, yet knew more than he ought to about that movement, and that his heart was not entirely in the action which he took that day. At first I did not take much stock in these rumors, for people talk as much here as they do anywhere; but as time passed on I received intimations that there were facts at the bottom of these reports, and I thought that I ought to investigate. I did not consult C. W. Ashford. Blood is thicker than water. Although I will state that I had at that time implicit confidence in the attorney-general. As a result of my investigations I have statements in writing from friends of the Government, from enemies, and from neutrals, and I state unhesitatingly that V. V. Ashford knew of and counseled and advised the disturbance of last July; that he sent messengers to Wilcox saying that the King and the cabinet were at loggerheads, and that now was the time to act.

Matters were quiet after the 30th of July, so far as his action was concerned, except that his conduct was characterized by the most violent denunciations of the cabinet, publicly and without stint, to such an extent that a member of the diplomatic corps came to a member of the cabinet, and although as he said he was acting beyond the scope of his official duty, warned them not to have confidence in a man talking as V. V. Ashford was.

V. V. Ashford became a frequent contributor to opposition newspapers, declaiming against the Government in the bitterest terms, giving out false statements with regard to the cabinet, and stating that he got them from his brother, although I did not believe anything of the sort. As an illustration, one of the members of this house lately told me that at about that time Mr. Ashford told him that he was so anxious to have this ministry turned out that he would rather have the country go back to the old régime than see it go on with them in office, and would rather see the country reduced to ashes than have them remain.

So matters continued, Mr. President, until two or three weeks before the election. That was a time of a good deal of uncertainty. Both parties were confident, and neither was sure. At that time V. V. Ashford had a quarrel with his political friends. Although in a position, as commander of the volunteer forces, of high responsibility and trust under the Government, he had been an active political worker against the Government. Then he sent word to me and asked for a truce between himself and the Government, and asked that I make an appointment with him (which for reasons was not kept), a second, which also was not kept, and finally a third was made, which was kept in my office. In the presence of a mutual friend the interview was held, and he made this statement. He said that he wished to be perfectly frank. He said that he had worked against the Government, admitted that he had been writing for the Elele to a large extent, but was sick of his associates, they were a mean lot generally and he wanted to be done with them. He offered either to retain his position as colonel and work secretly for us or to resign altogether and take the stump openly. He made, however, one condition. He said, "My reason for opposition to you has been my belief that you and the other members of the cabinet were engaged in a conspiracy against my brother. But if you and the others will promise to stand by him in the next Legislature, I will do all that I can for you."

I heard all that he had to say, and then replied what we wanted is votes. Votes are what counts, and that we should be glad of your assistance and vote and the votes that you control. As for promises, I have stood by you straight through and have done nothing for you that I ever agreed to do, and the only result has been that you have constantly villified me. I consider myself discharged of any obligations to you and will make no promises and no agreements with you. As far as the relations of the cabinet to C. W. Ashford are concerned your course will have nothing to do with it. C. W. Ashford has stood by us so far as I know and we propose to stand by him, and if we go down we will go down together.

Shortly after the election of the colonel came up, and V. V. Ashford was elected. The election was certified up to the cabinet and it became our duty to decide whether to approve or reject it, and it was not until after consideration of all the facts that I have mentioned, that we came to the conclusion that it was our duty not to indorse the election, and that we would be faithless to the interests of the community if we again allowed that man to go in as the head of the military. I don't say that we had evidence to warrant his arrest and trial. We did not feel justified in taking that action, but we did feel justified in refusing to ratify his election, as we knew that he was a man in whom we could not confide in case of another 30th of July.

We therefore did not recommend him to the King, and the matter was referred back to the officers again. Mr. V. V. Ashford asked for our reasons. We refused to give them orally, but said that if he would make application in writing we would state them in writing. He stated that he would apply in writing, but later he sent a letter to the minister of foreign affairs stating that he would make no written application, as it was contrary to military principles and etiquette.

The next step was his reelection by a majority of the officers. Before we took action on the reelection the attorney-general returned.

This brings me to the third branch of my statement, viz, the reason why we have distrusted C. W. Ashford, and this brings me to one of the most painful experiences of my life, because C. W. Ashford has not only been my official companion for three years, but because ever since he came here, seven years ago, he has been my intimate friend, and in this world intimate friends are not many. I have worked with him, trusted him, have passed through trying periods with him, shoulder to shoulder, have stood by him. When prominent members proposed to put him out of the cabinet last Legislature and go on with a new minister, I said no, if we go out we go out together. And I wish to say here that I believe, and know from previous experiences many years, that we have never had an attorney-general who has worked harder and more faithfully in the conduct of the business of his office than he has.

The relations of the cabinet with the attorney-general continued most cordial up to the time of his departure for the United States. He has mentioned a point of difference of opinion with regard to the treaty. It did not interfere with our cordial relations and was solely a matter of discussion, and was adjusted by the cabinet. As evidence of this and against the published statements made by C. W. Ashford, over his own signature, and before the finance committee I will read from the reply on October 4 last to the committee which waited on the cabinet concerning the treaty.

This reply was constructed in the following manner: After full discussion of the whole topic, each member of the cabinet made a draft of a reply. Then sections were taken from each and embodied in the final draft, so that the three replies, including Mr. Ashford's, are there. The beginning shows that it is the reply of the whole cabinet, and the title so states. The ministers take pleasure in informing you, etc. It is signed by the minister of foreign affairs because it was a matter of his department. I will read a passage, showing that there was no difference of opinion at that time:

"Animated as we are by the desire to strengthen and extend the commercial ties which have done so much for our national prosperity, and to secure the safety and perpetuation of our institutions by an alliance whereby we shall have the positive and efficacious guarantee of a strong friend against interference by itself or others with our perfect autonomy, independence, and sovereignty, we have instructed our representative at Washington to ascertain if the United States would be willing to negotiate with us a convention whereby the following objects may be secured."

"The cabinet for more than a year has studied carefully many reasons for and against the points submitted for negotiation, and has taken counsel with others, both connected and unconnected with the Government, and has considered various propositions and suggestions, some of which have been approved and some disapproved.

"Any statements of objects or intentions, and any purported draft of a treaty stating more or other than is above indicated which may have been published, are unfounded and incorrect.

"The ministers are strongly and unanimously of the opinion that the accomplishment of the objects above indicated will tend to greatly increase the material prosperity of the country, and perpetuate the independence of Hawaii and the sovereignty of His Majesty and his successors over all his dominions."

Mr. Ashford left on November 16, 1889, with the utmost cordiality of feeling between the cabinet. He left, as he stated, on account of his health, expecting to stay over one steamer. Two personal notes were all we had from him until his return on March 8, 1890. We had otherwise no direct communication with him, but saw numerous interviews in the papers in which he discussed all sorts of subjects, treaties, steamship and telegraph communication from Canada, all vital matters which should have been dealt with by one in his office only with the advice and consent of the cabinet. What he did in Canada we do not know. He gave us the barest outline of what he did. He did state that he had an interview with the Canadian prime minister, that he traveled as a guest of the Canadian Pacific Railroad in a private car—[Attorney General, No]. Then some one else told me about the private car; and to this day we don't know what his objects were or what he did. The first question which came up after his return was the colonelcy.

The attorney-general having returned just before the second election, when the question came up he immediately called upon the cabinet to reverse its decision on the matter, to nominate Mr. V. V. Ashford to the King, and to appoint him. It is unnecessary to say that the cabinet pursued no such stultifying course, but followed its previous decision. The attorney-general stated that he considered this action against his brother as simply an attack upon the Ashford family, and he was not going to stand it. The question had to be settled, and the attorney-general was requested to state whether he intended to carry his opposition so far as to advise the King not to confirm the nominee of the cabinet. Mr. Ashford refused to state

what he would advise the King. I said it is an anomalous thing, something unheard of in this or any other cabinet, to go to the King divided. He admitted it was anomalous and regretted it, but said that he could not change his course on that account, but would take the matter into consideration. He considered for a few days and then stated that he declined to inform us what his course would be, as he did not choose to abridge any of his legal rights, and should reserve to himself the right to advise the King as he saw fit when the time came. We accordingly held a cabinet council with His Majesty, March 21, in which three members of the cabinet stated that they did not consider Mr. V. V. Ashford a fit man for the place and recommended H. F. Hebbard. The attorney-general then advised His Majesty not to concur in this advice and not to appoint Hebbard, because, first, there was no reason why V. V. Ashford should not be appointed, and, second, on the technical ground that the period of incumbency of the present colonel had not expired. His Majesty stated that he wished to do what was proper, and asked each party for an opinion in writing, which was given. He answered in writing laying down the broad principle that he should take no action in any matter requiring by law the advice of the cabinet unless he chose, unless he had the advice of the whole cabinet. As this raised a vital principle, striking at the very roots of constitutional government, it seemed proper to submit the matter to the supreme court, and we did so, after first submitting our statement of the case to the attorney-general, which he admitted contained a correct statement of the facts. The supreme court gave a decision upholding the position of the majority of the cabinet, that the majority should govern, as the majority of the legislature and of every other body governs. On April 10 we met His Majesty again. There were two subjects for discussion, first, the appointment of colonel, and, second, the commissioning of Mr. Carter to negotiate the treaty. The majority of the cabinet advised His Majesty to appoint Mr. Hebbard, and presented him with the opinion of the supreme court, stating that it was his duty to follow the advice of the majority of the cabinet. The attorney-general then advised His Majesty as follows (the exact words were taken down at the time): "The opinion of the supreme court is not in the slightest degree binding and is of no more effect than that of any other three men of equal ability. I advise Your Majesty to decline to follow the advice of the majority of the cabinet and that of the supreme court."

This brings us down to the time when an armed force was being maintained at the station house.

Now as to the special charge that the guard was kept in such a manner as to excite disturbance. The attorney-general has in unmeasured terms denounced it, here and elsewhere, and has declared that it was in a high degree improper and unwise, and detrimental to the public good, for from five to eight men, citizens, to guard the police station, arms being in the station, available for volunteers and regular forces if necessary. This at a time when R. W. Wilcox was at liberty; when, as he states in his reply, street rumors connected V. V. Ashford with disturbance; when the town was so disturbed that the heads of business houses were consulting as to what should be done to protect life and property; and this, although his words in August last, when the country was roused, when Wilcox and his confederates were in jail, locked up in prison, were what I shall now quote.

On the 28th of August, 1889, the attorney-general wrote the following letter to the marshal:

"DEPARTMENT OF ATTORNEY-GENERAL,

"Honolulu, H. I., August 28, 1889.

'J. H. SOPER, esq., marshal:

"SIR: In regard to the protection of the arms and munitions of war now under your charge at the police station in this city, the subject has been discussed by the cabinet, whose ideas I here put upon paper, in the form of instructions to you, in order that none of the misapprehensions to which verbal instructions are liable may in any way interfere with a full mutual understanding of the situation.

"The cabinet regard it as of the highest importance that those munitions shall be vigilantly and effectively guarded, and that all other matters in your department, existing or reasonably to be apprehended, shall be made subordinate to the due protection of the police-station building, its inmates, and contents.

"I understand you have now in operation a system of guarding that building with six foreign policemen (two from each watch), in addition to those who are necessarily or incidentally on the premises as officers of the respective watches, turnkeys, etc. This, in addition to D. H. Hitchcock, jr., whom I understand is still retained as special night watchman in your own office, will make a special guard of seven foreigners, which, if its members are intelligent and vigilant, should be sufficient, supported, as it ever is, by the prevailing facilities for defense and the opportunity to secure prompt reinforcements by telephone.

"But in order to its highest effectiveness, such guard should be under the immediate charge and command of some particular officer, and a definite system should be

observed as to the place and character of the vigils of the different members. In addition to this, there should be adopted a definite rule as to admissions to the building during the night, and such rule should and must be strictly enforced.

The necessity in this latter direction is best illustrated by a recital of circumstances actually witnessed during the present month, during the day as well as at times during the evening hours, I having been the witness as to some of them myself. Thus there are certain foreigners in town whose fidelity to the present conditions is at least questionable and their sympathy with the late insurrection at least suspected. In addition to these are some native and half-white members of the bar, whose hostility upon this point is hardly a matter of doubt. And yet it is no uncommon thing for the parties referred to, sometimes several at once, to enter the police building and walk unchallenged through any part of at least the ground floor thereof. For instance, they have been seen to go, as a matter of course, into the back recesses of your office, whence the route to the armory is through a door unsecured, as a general rule, by either lock or guard. The key to the armory, moreover, has very recently been accessible to any one from that recess.

I recite these facts, not in a spirit of complaint, but as tending to show how easy it might be for half a dozen armed and determined men, gaining the advantage of such an entrance, either day or night, to spring upon and overpower, shoot down, or intimidate the unsuspecting officer in charge and thus capture the building. If it be thought that such an event is not probable, the answer is that our aim must be to guard against possible and not alone probable attacks.

I have, therefore, to request your careful attention to the following system of guarding that building, which may, of course, be supplemented by any details you may think necessary to add, viz:

That the main door and all other means of access to said building, except the door to the receiving station, be closed and bolted (unless upon special occasions) not later than 8 o'clock in the evening, and I think an even earlier hour preferable. That the special guard shall always have among their own number a leader whose orders they will be obliged to obey, and who shall be responsible for the due execution by the guard of their stipulated duties, and who, in the absence of the captain of the watch or other superior officer, shall have full command of the building and all the officers therein and thereabout. From the fact of his being on watch during the entire night and not changing with the different watches, I should suppose Mr. Hitchcock (if satisfactory in other respects) an eligible man for this position.

The guard should be armed with clubs and pistols, and should have, each man, his rifle and filled cartridge belt conveniently at hand, elsewhere than in the receiving station. At least one of the guard (I think two preferable) should be kept constantly on patrol in Merchant street between Nuuanu and Kaahumanu, to observe movements in the three streets named, as well as Bethel street. These patrolmen should be relieved, say, every two hours, by other members of the guard, and should be kept diligently on the move and observant of events. Half-hourly circuits of the block in which the building stands should be made by one of such patrolmen, *i. e.*, around to and along Queen street. The rest of the guard should be on the alert, so disposed throughout the building as to be able to rally on any point immediately upon call, and at least one of them should be in the receiving station all the time, whence the means of access to the yard and ground cells is very easy.

The patrols will of course give the earliest possible notice of any persons or events in the locality out of the natural order, and thus the entire guard will be ever ready to meet any exigency or repel any attack. In this connection let me caution you that nothing short of a tragedy within plain sight, or orders from the marshal, should tempt any member of the guard away from the building or his beat.

In case of an attack they should meet it upon the sidewalk, at the doors, or retreat within the building, secure the doors and defend the premises from the windows, as the force and direction of the attacking party might suggest to the one in command, and telephone at once to the marshal or his deputies. Seven resolute men, well armed, should be able to hold that building for hours against any force that could be brought against it from the front.

I understand that the hours of special guard are now from 8 p. m. to 6 a. m. While I do not now think it necessary to extend these hours, yet captains of watches coming on duty at 6 p. m. and 6 a. m., respectively, should be especially instructed to give particular attention to the guarding of the building prior to the advent and after the departure of the special guard evening and morning. This, I think, during one hour of each of those watches, should take the form of a small detail of their foreign patrols for this service.

Now as to the indiscriminate admission of all comers to the different offices of the building. This should be guarded against during the day by some practicable yet reasonable rule, that will at once permit the despatch of business and secure the privacy of portions of the premises. After office hours in the evening no one except

members of the force, regular or special, or other officers of the Government, and attorneys and others upon legitimate business, to be stated to the officer in charge, should be admitted to the building. Let this principle be enforced.

In particular I would call your attention to the oft-recurring absence of "all hands" from your own office during business hours, which of course leaves open opportunities such as should not exist for any venture such as herein discussed. I have frequently (and several times during the present month) tried in vain to ring up some occupant of your office. A trial of both telephones convinced me that no one was present. I need not assure you that this should not be, particularly at the present juncture, and I shall expect to see it remedied.

Not wishing to handicap you by the enumeration of details to be observed in the carrying into effect of the foregoing instructions, I leave them chiefly for your own device and application. The main purpose, and in fact the only purpose, of my writing thus at length is to secure the ample protection to that building which its present importance demands.

I repeat, that nothing herein is penned in a spirit of complaint but of caution and admonition only. I shall expect the main object of these instructions to be scrupulously observed and lived up to. I purpose to myself test the efficiency and vigilance of the guard in question from time to time, and recommend the same course to you. While I desire that they should have a general notice to this effect, for the purpose of keeping them on their mettle, I shall give no special notice of the hours of my visits.

Yours faithfully,

C. W. ASHFORD,
Attorney-General.

That was the opinion of the attorney-general in August last, when he thought that we ought to guard against possible, not merely probable, danger; when he thought that it was necessary to have men armed to the teeth with clubs, pistols, rifles, and cartridge belts. Now, when we have a volunteer guard at night only, with no weapons on them, he complains and sees a threat and a menace to the community.

The statement that there was unnecessary ostentation and display is without foundation. As a matter of fact, the guard was there two weeks before the public knew anything of it.

At this time garbled accounts of what was being done by the cabinet appeared in both English and native, which could only have come from the attorney-general. Arguments which the attorney-general made in the cabinet, down even to the underscoring, came out next day in the newspapers with those very points in italics. If anyone wants to know what it is to be in hell without waiting for eternity, let him be in a divided cabinet, knowing that every word and act is being reported and misconstrued by a traitor, with the knowledge that a man is among you whom you can not trust and the possibility of another 30th of July hanging over your head.

That was the situation. What was to be done? The attorney-general was giving demoralizing and revolutionary advice to the King. Never before has the King refused to follow the advice of the supreme court. That was the bulwark of the country, and the King never dreamed of refusing to follow their advice, until the attorney-general advised him to do so. I say the action of the attorney-general was revolutionary, and it has brought the King into a revolutionary position, which he has maintained ever since. The chairman of the foreign affairs committee has referred to my "brutal statements" to the King. Mr. President, I am no courtier; I never was and never shall be one; I believe in speaking the truth, and I have done it. I have made no brutal statements to the King. I have treated him with perfect respect, but with perfect candor. When he was taking a course contrary to the law and the constitution, I did not tell him that he was doing right, but that he was taking a course that would bring disaster upon himself and upon the country.

In this situation, with the history of Robert Wilcox before us, with the facts in regard to V. V. Ashford before us, with the attorney-general in open hostility to the cabinet, refusing to resign and saying that he would stay to paralyze all action, in this situation I say that even if there had been no truth in the report which came to us there would still have been ample ground for taking the precautions urged by the attorney-general in August last. The marshal came to me to consult. He had received information from a different source from mine of a similar character. He felt that he could not consistently with his duty to the community and to himself go to the attorney-general and tell him what he knew. After talking it over with the other members of the cabinet, the marshal stated that he could get volunteers, and stated who they were, men of the most respectable standing, clerks, bookkeepers, etc., as well as a few Government employés, who took steps, and the station house was guarded for several weeks before it was known at all.

Now in regard to the night of the 17th of April, when the minister of the interior "was there," the Gatling gun run out, and the 40 armed men on hand.

A 1 a. m. I was rung up with the statement that a policeman had seen a body of armed men. I thought it sufficient to put us on our guard. I went down, found 5 men on guard, and we telephoned for 3 or 4 more. No one else was there. The statement as to 40 men is entirely without foundation. We stayed till daybreak. The guns were not put out into the street; there was no unnecessary exhibition of force; there was no guard sent out to the Rifle's armory, unless you consider one lame prisoner such a guard. One or two men patrolled. I took the statement of the policeman in writing. He stated that there was a passer who could confirm it, and the next day he brought the man who stated that he had seen some armed men in that neighborhood. Whether there were any armed men there, you know as well as I. At anyrate there was the information, and I considered it was my duty to be on hand, and for the marshal to be on his guard. Suppose no precaution had been taken, and the station had been captured, then what?

The fact is it was the duty of the attorney-general to inquire into the situation and guard the peace. He did nothing whatever, and the rest of the cabinet had to take the responsibility of guarding, not merely against "probable," but "possible" dangers.

As to the statement that these precautions were calculated to create a disturbance, this strikes me as one of the thinnest, flimsiest and most ridiculous propositions that I ever heard. Precautions of this kind are the first thing to prevent a disturbance. Look at Berlin on the 1st of May, labor day; it was a garrison. Look at London a few years ago at the Hyde Park riots, and citizens were sworn in as special police by the thousand. And yet it is claimed that the precautions taken here tended to excite a disturbance; that the presence of a few men at the police station, probably playing cards when not on duty, must so tend to excite Mr Wilcox's nerve centers as to lead him to shoulder a musket and try to capture the police station, just because there were a few men there who had a perfect right to be there.

Mr. President, on this statement I am ready to leave it to the house whether the inaction of the attorney-general is to be commended, or the positive course of the majority of the remainder of the cabinet. Taking into consideration what happened on the 30th of July, would we not have been responsible for any loss of life or property, if we had neglected these precautions and a disturbance had occurred. I am willing to leave it to the house, but if every man votes against me, I would still, in a similar situation, when I thought the country was threatened with a possibility of danger, act as I have, whether the attorney-general approved it or not.

Representative Bush moves to amend by referring to printing committee to have both replies printed in English and Hawaiian.

Representative Brown seconded the amendment.

The motion as amended was carried.

House adjourned at 1:10 p. m. until Monday.

Diplomatic reception—Brilliant entertainment at the United States legation.

His excellency J. L. Stevens, United States minister resident, and Mrs. Stevens, held a reception at the legation, Nuuanu avenue, from 3 to 6 o'clock yesterday afternoon. It was an event both brilliant and pleasant. Flags almost covering the house showed their bright colors to the street through interstices of the luxuriant foliage. Lovely bouquets, clusters of gorgeous lilies, and other floral designs, with profuse traceries of vines, made the interior a delight to the eye, while filling the air with fragrance. An elegant collation was spread in the dining room, and no guest was permitted to depart without receiving an invitation to be refreshed.

His excellency and amiable lady gave a cordial greeting to all. Mrs. Stevens was assisted in receiving and in dispensing the hospitalities of the legation by the Misses Stevens, Mrs. Severance and Miss Severance, Mrs. J. O. Carter and the Misses Carter, Mrs. W. Foster, the Misses Winter, and Miss Waterhouse.

The band of the United States flagship *Charleston*, sixteen pieces, under Bandmaster Carlo, played on the grounds alternately with the Royal Hawaiian Band. The playing of the naval band was very much admired. The programme of the concert was the following:

Overture—Masaniello	Auber.
Chorus—Tanhäuser	Wagner.
Gavotte—Festival	Latann.
Reminiscences of Verdi	Godfrey.
Fantasia—Recollections of the War	Beyer.
Waltz—1,001 Nights	Strauss.
Patrol—Guard Mount	Eelenberg.
Medley—Ye Olden Times	Catlin.

The Star Spangled Banner.
Hawaii Ponol.

Their majesties and the heir apparent were among the callers. The King was attended by Mr. Jas. W. Robertson, vice-chamberlain, and His Majesty's staff. Mrs. Robertson was lady-in-waiting to the Queen. Hon. A. S. Gleghorn was present with Princess Liliuokalani. Visitors were coming and going during the three hours, the following being some of them:

Their excellencies Jona. Austin, minister of foreign affairs and C. W. Ashford, attorney-general; Hon. C. R. Bishop, Hon. and Mrs. W. F. Allen, Hon. and Mrs. J. B. Atherton, Miss Atherton, Hon. and Mrs. W. G. Irwin and Mrs. Ivers, Hon. and Mrs. W. D. Alexander, Mrs. J. I. Dowsett and the Misses Dowsett; Major J. H. Wodehouse, British commissioner, Mrs. and Miss Wodehouse; Mr. G. C. B. d'Anglade, French commissioner; Mr. A. de Souza Canavarro, Portuguese commissioner, and Mrs. Canavarro; Mr. Masaki, Japanese diplomatic agent, and members of his legation; Rear-Admiral Brown, U. S. N.; Mr. H. W. Severance, United States consul-general, Mrs. and the Misses Severance; Mr. F. A. Schaefer, consul for Italy and dean of consular corps; Mr. H. W. Schmidt, Swedish consul, and Mrs. Schmidt; Mr. C. Afong, Chinese commercial agent, and Miss Afong; Mr. A. W. Richardson, United States vice-consul-general; Mr. T. R. Walker, British vice-consul; Capt. Remey and staff, U. S. flagship *Charleston*; Capt. Green and staff, U. S. S. *Adams*; Capt. McCurley and staff, U. S. S. *Nipsic*; Lieut. Dyer, Lieut. Blow, and Mr. Cole (of the admiral's staff); Lieut. Qualtrough, Fleet Surgeon Woods, Dr. Weiber, Fleet Paymaster Arthur Burtis, with Mrs. Burtis; Fleet Engineer Inch, and Mr. Hollis, with Mrs. Hollis, U. S. flagship *Charleston*; Chief Engineer Webster, U. S. S. *Nipsic*; Rt. Rev. the Bishop of Honolulu and Mrs. Willis, Rev. and Mrs. H. Bingham, Rev. and Mrs. S. E. Bishop, Rev. and Mrs. W. C. Merritt, Rev. and Mrs. A. Mackintosh and Miss Von Holt, Mrs. R. F. Bickerton, Mrs. W. Foster, Dr. and Mrs. A. B. Lyons, Dr. and Mrs. C. T. Rogers, Dr. Lindley of Kentucky, Dr. and Mrs. J. S. McGrew, Dr. J. S. Emerson, Dr. Kimball, Col. V. V. Ashford, Capt. Mist, R. N., and Miss Mist, Prof. and Mrs. M. M. Scott, Prof. and Mrs. G. Sauvlet, Maj. and Mrs. C. T. Gulick, Hon. Jas. Anderson, Mr. and Mrs. J. O. Carter and the Misses Carter; Hon. and Mrs. B. F. Dunning, Misses Dunning and Clarke, Mrs. Helen Mather, New York; Mr. and Mrs. George Fritch, Mrs. Eugene B. Rail, Mr. and Mrs. Layton, San Francisco; Mrs. S. C. Allen, Mr. and Mrs. W. W. Hall, Mrs. G. E. Boardman, Mrs. Robt. Lewers and Miss Lewers, Mr. and Mrs. T. F. Lansing, Mrs. W. W. Dimond, Mr. and Mrs. W. C. Wilder, Mr. G. K. Wilder, Mr. and Mrs. B. F. Dillingham, Mr. and Mrs. J. G. Spencer, Mr. and Mrs. C. L. Carter, Mr. and Mrs. E. A. Jones, Mr. and Mrs. H. H. Renjes, Mr. and Mrs. H. F. Wichman, Mrs. S. B. Rose and Miss Rose, Misses Chamberlain, Waterhouse, Winter, Payson, Atkinson, Brewer, and Snow; Messrs. H. Waterhouse, W. C. Parke, W. H. Baird, J. Dyer, T. M. Starkey, G. C. Potter, and Paul Hamill.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 27.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 14, 1890.

SIR: I have received your No. 25, of the 28th ultimo, apprising me of the unexpected change in the attitude of "two or three" of the new members of the Hawaiian Legislature, by which the opposition to the reform party gains strength enough to control that body; also of the fact that one member of the present ministry, of Canadian birth, is in declared agreement with the opposition party.

Noting your reference to the circumstance that the present "aspect of the sugar question" in our Congress "strengthens the opponents of the existing ministry and continues to depress and alarm the Americans" in Hawaii,

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 27.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, June 26, 1890.

SIR: Corresponding to strong indications of which I have previously informed the Department of State, there has been made an entire change in the Hawaiian ministry. The attorney-general, C. W. Ashford, a Canadian by birth, since his return here in April from a visit in Canada, where he is known to have been in intercourse with the leading members of the Dominion ministry, had completely changed in his attitude towards his colleagues and in his views as to commercial relations with the United States. He is believed to have strongly entered into the Canadian plans of connecting these islands with the Canadian Pacific Railway by cable and steamer and commercial arrangements. He suddenly took ground against the reform party, with which he had been identified, and sought to sustain himself by uniting with the party he had before strongly opposed, and stimulating the reactionary tendencies among the less responsible portion of the citizens and residents here. The other three ministers, finding it impossible to carry on the Government with him, tested their strength by a motion of want of confidence in Ashford. The vote in the Legislature was a tie—24 to 24. At once the three ministers offered their resignations, and this forced the resignation of Ashford.

A new ministry has been formed, composed of two from each party. John A. Cummins, a half-caste and a large sugar planter, is the minister of foreign affairs. Godfrey Brown, minister of finance, was born in England, leaving his native country at three years of age; he lived years in New York and California, and has recently spent a while in the city of Washington. C. N. Spencer, the minister of interior, is a native of New York State, but came to these islands in childhood. A. P. Peterson, the attorney-general, is a native of Massachusetts, and is regarded the ablest man of the new cabinet. As a whole, the ministry has less intellectual force and character than its predecessor. The reform party is in a measure satisfied, because it is better than it feared. The more numerous portion of the party of the King and of the native factions is dissatisfied because it has only two of the four ministers, and these not of the most pronounced type. It is less decidedly American than the three best of the retiring cabinet, yet it is reasonable to hope that it will favor strong friendly relations with the United States.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 29.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 3, 1890.

SIR: I have read with interest your No. 26, of the 9th instant, in which you transmit a copy of a speech delivered on the 6th June last, in the Hawaiian Legislative Assembly, by Hon. L. A. Thurston, minister of the interior, relative to the political situation in Hawaii.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Adee to Mr. Stevens.

No. 31.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 14, 1890.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 27, of the 26th ultimo, announcing a recent change in the cabinet of His Majesty and communicating a sketch of its members.

I am, sir, etc.,

ALVEY A. ADEE,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 2.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 16, 1890.

SIR: I inclose for your confidential information copy of a letter recently received from the Acting Secretary of the Navy, transmitting one from the commander in chief of the United States naval force in the Pacific station, in regard to political affairs in the Hawaiian Islands. The letter in question seems to confirm the general tenor of your dispatches on the same subject.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 30.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, August 19, 1890.

SIR: I regret to be obliged to report to the Department of State that the political affairs of this island Kingdom have recently assumed a less assuring aspect. It is well known that the present constitution was gained by the people, especially by the property holders and business men, in 1887, much as the Magna Charta of England was gained by the barons from King John in 1215. Kalakaua has always been restless under this constitution, to which he has solemnly sworn. The result of the elections last February encourages him to hope that the constitution might be so changed as to restore to him much of his former autocratic power. A movement has been put on foot to this end. A popular delegation, composed mainly of the less intelligent natives, led chiefly by unscrupulous demagogues, has formally marched to the palace and presented petitions in a revolutionary sense, asking the call of a constitutional convention. The King, without having consulted or received the sanction of his cabinet, has commended the objects of these petitions in a message to the Legislature.

The constitution specifically provides how it may be amended, which is by voting proposed amendments by the Legislature, which amendments must be resubmitted and voted by another Legislature two years

subsequently. The businessmen and the more responsible citizens of the islands are greatly disturbed. For good reasons they fear to have the country convulsed by such an issue. The English commissioner and the undersigned have been urged confidentially by the leading member of the cabinet and by the most conservative of the Legislature to counsel the King against the rash and dangerous step. My English colleague, who has been here twenty years, fully agrees with me as to what the situation demands of us. Yesterday, in a confidential interview, the commissioner and myself gave our opinions and advice to His Majesty. Of his bearing toward us we have no reason to complain. The two ablest of his four ministers are against changing the constitution in the revolutionary way proposed, and it now looks as though the other two will decide to go with their colleagues. A careful count in the Legislature indicates that a small majority will vote to adhere to the constitution as it is, consenting to small amendments to be made in the way provided. There is some fear of a mob in surprise to force a revolutionary vote by intimidation, and there is little reliance placed on the native police in an emergency. The King professes that he is neutral in the controversy, and that he has only brought popular grievances to the attention of the Legislature. But the facts are conclusively against this pretension. None of the best citizens here have the least faith in these royal professions. He and a few corrupt parasites are at the center of the conspiracy, back of which is a big loan in London for their corrupt handling.

Under the circumstances it is my duty to say that one United States ship of war should remain at Honolulu. The English commissioner thinks it highly necessary that one English ship should continue here constantly. All of the more responsible business men here are of like opinion. The presence of this force has a suggestive meaning to the disorderly element here. I shall continue to act cautiously but firmly, in the light of former precedents of the Department of State and of this legation, varied only by different facts and circumstances. Admiral Brown, who was here two months, who had former experience here, before he left on the *Charleston* a few days since was strongly of the opinion that one vessel, or more, of the United States Pacific naval force should be kept here, though when he left the aspect of affairs was apparently more auspicious than at present. The *Nipsic* is here, and I understood from the Admiral that on the departure of this vessel her place would be taken by the *Iroquois* or *Mohican*. I assume such to be the naval orders.

I have the honor, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 4.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 10, 1890.

SIR: I inclose copy of a letter of the Secretary of the Navy and a copy of the report therewith on the serious political situation in Hawaii, which as confirmatory of your No. 30 of the 19th ultimo will doubtless be read with interest.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 2.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, September 17, 1890.

SIR: My commission as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary has been duly received at this legation, and I have officially communicated the fact to the Hawaiian Government, and the King has received me formally in said capacity as the following authoritative publication shows:

BY AUTHORITY.

Foreign office notice.

FOREIGN OFFICE,
Honolulu, September 8, 1890.

This day had audience of the King his excellency John L. Stevens, United States minister resident, to present his credentials as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States of America.

His excellency Hon. John A. Cummins, His Majesty's minister of foreign affairs, presented to His Majesty the King his excellency John L. Stevens, who addressed His Majesty as follows:

"SIR: In appointing me envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, placing the representative to His Majesty's Government on an equality with the American representatives to the great nations of the world, the Government of the United States once more manifests its strong friendship for the Hawaiian kingdom and its firm resolution to respect its autonomy and to promote its welfare.

"His Majesty may be sure that it always will be my earnest effort faithfully to carry out the instructions of my Government.

"In doing so I shall endeavor to show proper respect to His Majesty, and in any counsel or advice which I may give I shall seek the peace and prosperity of his kingdom. Thus I shall help to foster good relations between the two countries so closely united by near neighborhood and common interests."

His Majesty was pleased to reply to His Excellency John L. Stevens as follows:

"MR. ENVOY: It is with pleasure that I receive from you the assurance of the continuance of the friendly regard of the President and the people of the American nation for the sovereign and people of Hawaii.

"And I am well pleased to receive as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States a gentleman who has already in the capacity of minister resident given so many proofs of the good-will and kindly feelings entertained by him towards my kingdom, myself and my people.

"And I fully appreciate the honor done to my crown and kingdom by the action of the President of the United States in placing the representative of the United States in my kingdom on an equality with the American representatives to the great nations of the world, and the expression thereby of his firm resolution to respect our autonomy and to promote our welfare.

"The officers of my government will be instructed to tender to you every attention and courtesy during your official residence in my dominions.

His majesty was attended on this occasion by the Hon. John O. Dominis, Hon. A. S. Cleghorn, his honor the Chief Justice A. F. Judd, Hon. John S. Walker, president of the Legislature; his excellency, Hon. J. A. Cummins, minister foreign affairs; colonel, the Hon. G. W. McFarlane, his majesty's chamberlain; J. W. Robertson, esq., his majesty's vice chamberlain; Maj. John D. Holt, jr., A. D. C.; captain, the Hon. Edward K. Lilikalani, equerry in waiting.

I have the honor, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 3.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,

Honolulu, September 25, 1890.

SIR: In my dispatch 27 of August 15, I gave an account of the political status of things here touching a constitutional convention and the advice of the English commissioner and myself privately given to the King. Since the date of that dispatch the situation has gradually improved. The counsel we gave His Majesty appears to have operated even more favorably than we expected. By the intent or want of restraint of the King the fact that we had advised him against the revolutionary scheme of the convention became known to the public, as we presumed it probably would. The effect of this has been to unify and strengthen the efforts of the best citizens who are opposed to the convention, and to lessen the numbers and influence of its supporters. The King is not of those who stick to a losing cause.

Seeing the increasing strength of the opponents of the convention in the legislature, and among the chief property holders and responsible citizens, he is more ready to appreciate our advice. We have it from good sources that the King is now opposed to the convention, and present appearances are that the convention scheme will be defeated in the Legislature by a decisive vote. The committee having the matter in hand, originally supposed to be in favor of the convention, have just made a majority report against it by a vote of two-thirds of its members. It is agreed that the question shall be taken up by the Legislature September 29. There are threats of attempts to constrain the Legislature by intimidation and violence. But at present writing it looks like a pacific solution by the legislative approval of some constitutional amendments in the manner prescribed by the constitution as it is.

By the next mail following this I hope to be able to announce the decision of the Legislature and the final adjournment of that body.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 8.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, October 15, 1890.

SIR: I have received your No. 3 of the 25th ultimo, informing me that the majority report of the committee on the bill in the Hawaiian Legislature to convene delegates to frame a new constitution, is opposed to such a convention, and stating, also, that His Majesty is believed to be now opposed to such a convention.

I am, sir, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 7.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, October 22, 1890.

SIR: Though it may be somewhat outside of the conventional rules of my office, a due regard for the interests of the United States Government seems to require that I should make a brief statement in respect to a coal depot in Honolulu. Admiral Brown has called my attention to the subject and asked me to express my views thereon to the Department of State. Previously to the admiral's arrival here circumstances had led me to the conclusion which I shall here indicate. I need not repeat the well-known truths as to the necessity of good stopping places and coaling stations for vessels of commerce and vessels of war. Napoleon's adage that armies march on their bellies has an equally strong application to the agents and servants that win commercial and naval victories on the seas. It goes without saying that the Hawaiian Islands have a commanding position in the North Pacific. The Government of the United States has long recognized this fact. If it is well to have a coaling station at the Samoan group, how much more important it is to have one at Honolulu. To one familiar with the facts it is plain that the supply of its naval vessels here should not depend on private parties and local dealers. The price of coal greatly varies at these islands, owing to the distance from the sources of supply and the irregularities and varying contingencies of the demand. At one time the wholesale price is nearly double what it is at another. If our Government can have proper and convenient landing and building for its coal, filled from our mines at home or by cargoes purchased here at the lowest market rates, I am confident that a large saving can be made in the cost of coal supplies to our naval vessels, which thus would not be subjected to undue exactions of the local dealers and to uncertain contingencies. I am clearly of the opinion that the views of Admiral Brown on the subject are based on substantial facts, and are those which business men would carry out in their private affairs. The owners of the land of whom he speaks are personally known to me as reliable and responsible men, and I think their terms for the first twenty-five years of lease are reasonable, and that it would be well to secure the option of a subsequent lease unless our Government should decide to make an absolute purchase at the present time, which I would regard preferable.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 9.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 12, 1890.

SIR: I have received your No. 7 of the 22d October last, favoring the establishment of a coal depot at Honolulu, for the use of our naval force.

A copy has been sent to the Secretary of the Navy.

I am, sir, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 8.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, November 14, 1890.

SIR: After a session of 146 days the Hawaiian Legislature adjourned finally to-day. The general course of its proceedings has been more deliberate and conservative than it was generally anticipated by the most thoughtful citizens.

As my previous dispatches have indicated, the first months of the session were somewhat stormy and there was considerable public excitement, mainly growing out of the attempt to change the constitution in a revolutionary way and in a reactionary direction. The defeat of this movement was so complete and decisive that the malcontents gradually lost a large degree of their influence and gave up their efforts as hopeless, at least for the present. Some amendments to the constitution have been voted nearly unanimously, while the constitutional convention scheme was rejected by a large majority. But the amendments thus passed through their first stage do not restore to the King any of the power taken from him by the constitution of 1887, and the functions of the Legislature and of the ministry are not at all impaired. This result has been largely owing to the good conduct and superior ability of the reform members, who, with a majority of two or three against them at the beginning of the session, were enabled largely to control the Legislature. In this they had the coöperation of some of the most conservative of the opposition party. A careful review of what has transpired confirms the opinion that the earnest advice which the English commissioner and myself gave His Majesty was expedient and salutary.

In this connection I may be allowed to remark that the sudden return here by Admiral Brown in the *Charleston* from Puget Sound, about which more or less comments were made by the Pacific Coast press, was not at my solicitation, but was entirely unexpected by me, my request having been only for the retention of one United States ship here. But it is just to say, that it is the judgment of the best informed and most responsible men here that the coming into the harbor of that powerful ship of war, the circumstances being as they were, had a very pacifying effect on the disorderly elements here. The average native mind and the more irresponsible of the foreign population looked upon it as a plain determination of the United States Government not to tolerate disorder on these islands.

After the decision of the question of the constitutional convention the most exciting and important issue before the Legislature has been that of "labor." The sugar and rice farmers have a pressing need for seven or eight thousand more laborers than are attainable in the islands. The Japanese and Chinese are regarded the most available, and a majority of the planters prefer the latter. Yet there is among all classes a strong aversion to receiving into the country more Asiatics. The Legislature has passed, finally, with general unanimity, a very stringent bill, allowing the admission of more Chinese under a specific contract, with adequate bonds that they shall engage in no other employment than on the sugar and rice plantations, and that at the close of their terms of engagement they shall return to China. This measure does not apply in any of its provisions to persons now in the islands.

The amount of appropriations voted are large, considering the population of the country. The total amount for the two years covered is

\$4,774,171. Of this sum \$200,000 is for the improvement of Honolulu harbor and its entrance; \$63,000 for the new wharves and sea wall at Honolulu; \$275,500 for additional water supply and the improvement of the works; \$244,500 for the care of the lepers; and \$270,000 for educational purposes and school buildings. The liberal annual subsidy of \$24,000 for the San Francisco steamers is continued, and subsidies to the amount of \$15,000 have been voted for a monthly steamer to Tahiti, and an equal sum for a monthly steamer to Southern California. Liberal appropriations have been made for roads and bridges, thus continuing the wise and highly necessary policy greatly enlarged and stimulated by the reform party when it came into power in 1887. A resolution has been passed, nearly unanimously, requesting the ministry to open negotiations with the Government of the United States for the purpose of enlarging the free list of the two countries under Reciprocity.

While some bills have been passed which are not creditable in their character, in the main the doings of this Legislature have been such as to receive the approval of the best public opinion.

I have, &c.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

N. B.—Allow me to express the earnest hope that no part of my dispatches relating to any feature or fact of Hawaiian politics be allowed to go into the published volumes of the Department of State.

The official copy not having yet been received at this legation, I inclose newspaper copy of the resolution passed yesterday relative to Reciprocity.

J. L. S.

Whereas, recent tariff legislation by the United States has, to a great extent, diminished the value to Hawaii of the existing treaty of reciprocity with that country, and

Whereas, the history of the relations of the two countries has been such that Hawaii can with confidence ever depend upon the integrity, good faith, and generous friendship of the United States of America,

Now, therefore, be it resolved that it is the sense of the nobles and representatives of this Kingdom in the Legislature assembled that the Hawaiian Government should, while guarding most zealously the freedom, autonomy, and independent sovereignty of the Kingdom of Hawaii, enter into negotiations with the United States Government for a treaty revision looking toward the extension of the principle of reciprocity between the two countries to other articles which may be the product or manufacture of the two countries with a view to the continuance and increase of the mutual benefits which have heretofore accrued to both countries under the existing reciprocity treaty.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 9.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, November 20, 1890.

SIR: His Majesty, King Kalakaua, with consent of his cabinet and friends, will probably take passage on board the U. S. ship *Charleston*, Admiral Brown in command, Tuesday, February 25, for San Francisco. He makes this visit to the Pacific coast for the benefit of his health, at this time not very good. I understand he would be pleased to have official recognition on his arrival at San Francisco, but there-

after would wish to travel incog., or in a private manner. It is not now supposed that he will go east of the mountains, unless on his arrival at San Francisco he should receive advices from Minister Carter to the import that it is an opportune time to enter on new negotiations at Washington relative to Reciprocity. The belief prevails here among the best informed that the fitting time for this will not be before late in the winter or in the spring.

If deemed necessary and proper, a telegram can be sent from Washington directing that the usual salutes be fired on the arrival of the King in the *Charleston*. It is thought that the passage from Honolulu to San Francisco will take from twelve to fourteen days. The King will be accompanied by his chamberlain, Col. George W. McFarland.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 11.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 5, 1890.

SIR: I have received your No. 9 of the 20th ultimo, relative to the departure of His Majesty, the King of Hawaii, for San Francisco.

Stating that every proper courtesy will be shown to His Majesty on his arrival,

I am, sir, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 16.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 5, 1891.

SIR: Eight days prior to its reception at this legation the Department of State had received the sad intelligence of the death of His Majesty, King Kalakaua, in San Francisco, and of the attending circumstances. The *Charleston*, Admiral George Brown in command, arrived here on the morning of the 29th with his remains, causing a deep impression among the native and foreign population. In the afternoon of the same day, commencing at precisely 5 o'clock, the body was taken from the *Charleston* and transferred to the royal palace, the hearse being followed by the Hawaiian ministers, members of the diplomatic corps, American and English naval officers, escorted by a body of marines and sailors from the *Charleston*, the *Mohican*, and the English naval vessel, the *Nymph*, and an immense concourse of citizens. This display of honor was admirably conducted, largely under the direction of Admiral Brown, the chief portion of the military escort being American.

By a note from the minister of foreign affairs, the evening of the 29th, I was officially informed that the remains of the King would lie in state from 11 a. m. to 11:15 of the 30th, for the observation of the diplomatic corps, and in company with Mrs. Stevens I improved the opportunity in an appropriate manner.

In the afternoon of January 29th, prior to the removal of the royal remains from the *Charleston*, the new sovereign was proclaimed, of which fact I was duly informed by the following communication:

FOREIGN OFFICE,
Honolulu, January 29, 1891.

SIR: I have the honor to inform your excellency that on this day Her Royal Highness, Princess Liliuokalani, Regent, was publically proclaimed as successor to His late Majesty, Kalakaua, deceased, as Queen of the Hawaiian Islands, in accordance with the twenty-second article of the constitution, under the style and title of Liliuokalani.

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect and esteem,
Your excellency's most obedient humble servant,

JOHN A. CUMMINS,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

JOHN L. STEVENS,
United States Envoy Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary, Honolulu.

The remains of the deceased King will remain in state at the royal palace until the 15th instant, when the final funeral obsequies will take place. The present ministers perhaps will continue in office until the meeting of the legislature in 1892, the Queen not having the power to change them without the previous action of that body. This sudden and unexpected change of sovereigns has been made without commotion and with no extraordinary excitement.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 18.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 9, 1891.

SIR: Herewith inclosed I transmit to the Department of State a copy of resolutions adopted at a public meeting of a large number of influential native-born citizens of the Hawaiian Islands, relative to the death, and its attending circumstances, of the late King Kalakaua. I also inclose a copy of my remarks addressed to the committee who called at this legation and placed the said resolutions in my hands.

I forward likewise a copy of resolutions adopted at a less numerous assemblage of native Hawaiian citizens, among whom I may name John E. Bush, formerly a Hawaiian minister, now editor of a native newspaper, and a present member of the legislature, a half caste, R. W. Wilcox, leader of the revolutionary attempt of July, 1889, and others of similar political sympathies.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 18.]

RESOLUTIONS.

Whereas the unbounded courtesy and kind attentions extended to his late Majesty, King Kalakaua, in his recent visit to California by the United States Government, the State of California, the city of San Francisco, as well as citizens and residents in San Francisco, and by Rear-Admiral George Brown and the officers and men of the United States Flagship *Charleston* have placed the Hawaiian nation under a deep debt of gratitude to the United States and to citizens of said country, and to said Rear-Admiral Brown, his officers, and men: Therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Hawaiian people recognize, with the deepest gratitude, the great courtesy of the United States Government, and of officials and citizens of the

State of California, in the courtesies extended to his late Majesty, the King, upon the occasion of his recent visit to California, where he met his most untimely death; and be it further

Resolved, That we recognize a like debt of gratitude to Rear-Admiral Brown, of the American Flagship *Charleston*, and to his officers and men, in their more than courteous treatment and care of his late Majesty, King Kalakaua, both in going to California and in their tender care and attention during his illness and in returning his remains to our midst; and be it further

Resolved, That an engrossed copy hereof be presented to his excellency John L. Stevens, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States in Honolulu, for transmission to Washington; that a like copy be sent to the governor of California; another to the mayor of the city of San Francisco, and another be presented to Rear-Admiral Brown, on behalf of his late Majesty's grateful subjects and friends.

HONOLULU, H. I., 5th February, A. D. 1891.

PAUL P. KOMOA,
W. L. HOLOKOHILI,
S. K. KANE,
J. KALUA KABOOKANO,
JOHN LOT KAULAKOU,
JOHN F. COLBURN,
PARK P. ROBINSON,
SAMUEL PARKER,
WM. G. IRWIN,
E. C. MACFARLANE,
WM. R. CASTLE,
ALEX. YOUNG,
C. O. BERGERY,
PAUL R. ISENBERG,
F. M. SWANZY,
JOHN W. KALVA,
A. ROSA,

Committee.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 18.]

Remarks of Minister Stevens.

GENTLEMEN: It is with no ordinary emotions that I meet you under the afflictive circumstances which call you to this legation. I recognize in your committee the honored representatives of a large and influential portion of the native citizens of Hawaii, all equally interested in the welfare of their country. As the American minister at this capital I receive the resolutions which you place in my hands as the expression of the warm and sincere feelings cherished by the citizens of Hawaii for the citizens and Government of the United States. The manner in which these sentiments are called forth, and the attending circumstances of your late Sovereign's death, can not fail to strengthen permanently the fraternal and friendly relations between this island Kingdom and the American nation, which are united by the triple bonds of moral sympathy, of near neighborhood, and of common interests.

It will be my duty as well as my pleasure to transmit copies of your resolutions to the President of the United States, to the governor of California, and to the mayor of San Francisco.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 19.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 16, 1891.

SIR: The Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu, an important commercial body, wishing to express thanks to the United States Government and to the people of California for the honors and kindness shown to the late King Kalakaua in his visit, illness, and death, has adopted resolutions, an engrossed copy of which is here inclosed, which is forwarded to the Department of State agreeably to request.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[Inclosure in No. 19.]

Resolutions unanimously passed by the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce.

Whereas the Hawaiian nation is under the highest obligation to the United States Government, to the State of California, to the corporation of San Francisco, and to the citizens of said State and city, for their truly royal welcome and entertainment of His Majesty King Kalakaua, and for the distinguished feelings of friendship and esteem exhibited toward him and the Hawaiian people in their tender and sympathetic care of the King during his recent illness, and in the funeral obsequies held in San Francisco, and in returning His Majesty's remains to its home; and

Whereas a like obligation has been incurred to Rear-Admiral George Brown and his staff, and to the officers and crew of the U. S. S. *Charleston* for their unflinching care and attention to the King in his recent visit to California, and in the return of his remains to Hawaii: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce joins with all others in this country in expressions of the most cordial thanks to the United States Government, to the State of California, to the corporation of San Francisco, and to the citizens of said State and city for their courteous attentions to His Majesty the King during his recent visit and for the like respectful and tender care of the dead King's remains, and

Resolved, That we likewise tender to Rear-Admiral George Brown and his staff and to the officers and crew of the U. S. S. *Charleston* the heartfelt thanks of this association for the courteous attentions paid to His Majesty during his visit to the Pacific coast and in the honorable attentions paid to his remains upon their return to the land of his birth.

Resolved, That an engrossed copy of the above preamble and resolutions be forwarded to the Secretary of State of the United States, to the governor of the State of California, to the mayor of the city of San Francisco, to Rear-Admiral George Brown and Captain Remy, commanding U. S. S. *Charleston*.

Resolved, That the above preamble and resolutions be spread upon the records of this Chamber of Commerce and that the same be published in the newspapers of this place.

F. A. SCHAEFFER, *Vice-President*.
I. B. ATHERTON, *Secretary*.

HONOLULU, *February 4, 1891.*

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 20.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 22, 1891.

SIR: The funeral services, with the customary honors, of King Kalakaua, took place February 15, a full account of which being contained in the printed slips which I forwarded with a previous dispatch. In the two weeks while the royal remains were lying in state in the palace, there was a good deal of friction between the dowager Queen, Kapiolani, and the reigning Queen. Almost from the day of the arrival of the news, by the *Charleston*, of the death of Kalakaua, there has been a deep interest here as to what may be the course of the new sovereign as to the cabinet and the persons who may have her confidence. Unfortunately, from the first hour of her accession she has been surrounded by some of the worst elements in the country, persons of native and foreign birth. The present ministry has been but a few months in office, and the best men of the islands, including nearly all the principal business men, wish the present ministry to remain, who, by the present constitution, are chiefly independent of the Crown and can not be removed except by impeachment, or by the vote of the Legislature.

Under her extreme notions of sovereign authority and the influence of her bad advisers, the Queen is trying to force the resignation of the ministers and to get a cabinet composed of her tools. So far the min-

isters have refused to resign and the best public opinion increases in their support. Should the supreme court sustain the right of the ministers, which is very clearly and strongly intrenched in the constitution, the ministers will be supported by such a united determination of the business men and other better citizens of the islands as will force the Queen to yield; if she should still persist and attempt to form a ministry of her own, without the consent of the Legislature, she will surely imperil her throne. She is well known to be much more stubborn in character than her brother, the late King, but my present belief is that she will finally yield to the legal and other legitimate forces operative against her present course, and place herself in the hands of the conservative and respectable men of the country as the only way to retain her throne.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[Inclosure in No. 20.]

FOREIGN OFFICE NOTICE.

FOREIGN OFFICE, *Honolulu, February 16, 1891.*

This day had audience of the Queen: Her excellency John L. Stevens, United States envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.

His excellency Hon. John A. Cummins, Her Majesty's minister of foreign affairs, presented to Her Majesty his excellency John L. Stevens, who addressed Her Majesty in the following words:

"MADAM: It is my official duty to offer to Your Majesty congratulations on your accession to the throne in accordance with the provisions of the constitution of your Kingdom. Turning from the funeral scenes through which we have just passed, I address Your Majesty words of hope as to the future of your reign. Standing on the border land of death and the future world, of which we have been so solemnly reminded by what has just transpired within our midst, and reverent toward the Supreme God, to whom all are accountable, the minister of the United States expresses his earnest gratification that Your Majesty has taken the firm resolution to aid in making your reign a strictly constitutional reign; to maintain the constitutional right of your ministers to administer the laws, and always to acknowledge their responsibility to the Legislature in the performance of their sworn obligations. In the wish thus to respect the supreme authority of the constitution and the laws Your Majesty places yourself in the exalted rank of the best sovereigns of the world, and thus will avoid those embarrassments and perplexities which have so often disturbed the peace and crippled the prosperity of countries not blessed with free and enlightened constitutions. It is my earnest prayer that Your Majesty may be able to carry out your noble resolution, and thus have full time and opportunity to discharge the duties which Your Majesty justly regards necessary to the success of your reign and beneficial to your whole people. In endeavoring to make good these auspicious promises, Your Majesty will have the full sympathy and the good wishes of the Government which I have the honor to represent at this capital."

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 15.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 28, 1891.

SIR: I have received your No. 16, of the 5th instant, relating to the death of King Kalakaua and the accession of Queen Liliuokalani; and your No. 18, of the 9th instant, transmitting a resolution of Hawaiian citizens expressive of the gratitude to the Government of the United States, the governor of California, and the mayor of San Francisco, and through them to the people they represent, for courtesies extended to the late King during his recent visit to California, and of their thanks to Rear-Admiral Brown and the officers and men under his command,

on the United States flagship *Charleston*, for the attentive entertainment of His late Majesty on his way to this country, and the solicitude and care with which his remains were returned to Honolulu on board that ship.

This Government is gratified to be apprised of the accession of Her Majesty Queen Liliuokalani, surrounded and sustained as she is by the good will and sympathy of her people; and I hasten to express on its behalf, not congratulations and good wishes alone, but the confident expectation that the high duties devolved upon her by the act of Providence will be wisely and beneficently discharged.

By his visits to this country, where he was always assured of a sincere and cordial welcome, the person of the late King had become familiar to many of the people, and his approachableness, the simplicity and amiability of his manner and the kindness of his disposition had rendered him the object of their friendly regard and aroused the desire on their part to testify their sentiments by such hospitalities as they might offer with propriety. It is therefore not necessary to emphasize the fact that his death among them became the cause of something more than a merely formal expression of sorrow, or that he will be long and pleasantly borne in remembrance.

The many years of friendship between his late Majesty and the Government of the United States, and the neighborhood and common interests of the Hawaiian and American peoples made it peculiarly fitting that the last honors should be paid to him, and his body be returned to his people, by officers and men of the American Navy, and on board an American ship of war.

Your address to the committee of Hawaiian citizens, at whose hands you received the copy of resolutions transmitted by you, is approved.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 16.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

Washington, March 2, 1891.

SIR: I have received your Nos. 21-30, and 21 *bis* of the old series, and Nos. 1-16 and No. 18 of the new series.

I am, sir, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 19.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, March 10, 1891.

SIR: I have received with great appreciation the copy of the resolutions of February 4, 1891, of the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce which accompany your No. 19 of 16th ultimo, relating to the late visit of His Majesty King Kalakaua to this country, and to his lamented death; as also to the attention paid him while here and the solemn conveyance of his remains by one of our war-ships, from California to Honolulu.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 20.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 14, 1891.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 20, of the 22d ultimo, on the political situation in Hawaii. It has been read with interest.

I am, sir, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 21.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, March 26, 1891.

SIR: Your dispatch 15, of February 28, was received at this legation March 15. The chief portion thereof, all that relates to the late King Kalakaua and to Her Majesty the Queen, was duly communicated to the minister of foreign affairs, with the request that it should be read or otherwise made known to her, in a note dated March 17, to which I have received a response, a full copy of which is herewith inclosed.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[Inclosure in No. 21.]

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, March 24, 1891.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's dispatch of the 17th instant, announcing that you had received from your Government a communication through the Secretary of State, Hon. James G. Blaine, relative to the death of King Kalakaua and the accession of Queen Liliuokalani, and the resolutions of various bodies of Hawaiian citizens expressive of gratitude for the kindness shown by the Government and people of the United States to his late Majesty, and favoring me with a copy of the chief portion of said communication for Her Majesty's consideration.

In reply I beg to state that I have had the honor of conveying to Her Majesty the Queen a copy of the honorable Secretary's communication and have received her commands to acknowledge its receipt. Her Majesty is inexpressibly touched with the sincere sentiments of friendship for her departed brother and late Sovereign, for the Hawaiian nation, and for herself, so feelingly expressed by the Secretary of State for the Government of the United States. The duties of the high position Her Majesty has been called upon to assume will, under the guidance of the Supreme Ruler, be discharged with the sole aim of benefiting her people and in thus obtaining and endeavoring to maintain the esteem and friendship of all nations, but more especially of the Government represented by your excellency, whose friendship has been tried and tested in innumerable instances and to whose assistance and encouragement the nation is deeply indebted.

With the highest esteem, I remain, etc.,

SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 23.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, April 4, 1891.

SIR: Since the date of my dispatch, 20, of February 23, the situation here has improved in some degree. Contrary to what seems to be the plain terms of the Hawaiian constitution and to the opinions of framers of that document, as well as of the principal lawyers here, a majority of the supreme judges decided that the cabinet of Kalakaua ceased to have legal existence at his death. Two of the four judges were appointed under the old monarchical régime prior to the adoption of the reform constitution, and have been regarded as not specially sympathetic with that document. But from whatever cause or motive, the decision of the supreme court was in accord with the earnest wish of the Queen, who was especially averse to having Hon. John A. Cummins, the half-white planter, in the ministry. Wilson, the half-white of Tahitian birth, named in my No. 20, whom, it is believed, the Queen desired for the premier, was unable to form a cabinet that the public would be likely to tolerate, of those who would consent to serve with him, and is obliged to be content with the marshalship of the Kingdom.

As now composed the ministry consists of Messrs. Widemann, Parker, Spencer, and Whiting—equally divided between the two political parties in the islands. Widemann is a German by birth, long a resident here, a man of wealth, well advanced in years, formerly in the cabinet, somewhat erratic, quite irascible, and hardly calculated to get along well with his associates. He is married to a native Hawaiian. Samuel Parker, minister of foreign affairs, is of three-fourths Hawaiian and one-fourth American blood, a general favorite among the Hawaiians, and very friendly to the United States. He has appointed for his chief clerk Mr. F. Hastings, formerly for years a clerk in the United States consulate here, and a native of Calais, Me. Whiting is an American lawyer, from Boston, a resident here eight years or more. Spencer is a native of the State of New York, having come to the islands when a small boy, with his father, who was United States consul at Lahaina.

The present indications as to the course of the new Sovereign are more favorable than they were the first two or three weeks after her accession. Her present bearing, and that of her husband, toward myself seem all that could be desired. It may be proper for me to say that I have it from the best sources, that my remarks on her accession, of which I sent a copy with my dispatch of February 23, have done good.

Were it not for the peculiar characteristics of Widemann, the minister of finance, I would indorse the prevailing impression here, that "the present cabinet probably will continue until the next meeting of the Legislature," in June, 1892.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Wharton.

No. 28.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, July 23, 1891.

SIR: In reply to dispatch circular of the Department of State of June 25 relative to the inquiry of the Acting Secretary of the Treasury relative to sugar bounties, I have to reply that the Hawaiian Government pays no bounty whatever "directly or indirectly" on the production or the exportation of Hawaiian sugar.

I am, sir,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 30.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, August 20, 1891.

SIR: Touching the import of the inclosed clipping from the San Francisco Chronicle, which has the appearance of being authentic, it is proper for me to say that the present political aspect here is peaceful. All the parties, since the death of Kalakaua, have been trying to gain the support of the new Sovereign and the influence of the palace, and this is tending to help keep things quiet in the immediate present. The selection of a new Legislature will occur in January, and the business men, as well as the leading political factions, are each hoping to secure a majority at the polls, and this tends to maintain present quiet. The probabilities strongly favor the presumption that a United States war ship will not be pressingly necessary in the two or three immediate months.

But as early as the first of December, without fail, the month preceding the election, and for sometime thereafter, there should be a United States vessel here to render things secure. I have strong reluctance to being regarded an alarmist, but with due regard to my responsibility I am impelled to express the opinion that a proper regard for American interests will require one ship here most of the time in 1892. In case of disturbance the only legal force here is the city police and the palace guard of 60 men, both composed of natives and half-castes, a very frail and uncertain reliance in the time of special need. The rifle companies, composed of whites, were dissolved a year since by vote of the Legislature, which was done mainly to propitiate native prejudices and to secure native votes. The best security in the future, and the only permanent security, will be the moral pressure of the business men and of what are termed "the missionary people," and the presence in the harbor of Honolulu of an American man-of-war. The presence of a United States vessel not only operates strongly to secure good order among the many nationalities here, but it is a standing notice to foreign nations that the United States has a special care for these islands.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS,

[Inclosure in No. 30.—From the San Francisco Chronicle.]

Ordered to China.—*The Charleston* to sail for Shanghai at once.—*The steamers Marion, Alert, and Mohican, are to go direct from Bering Sea.*

[Special dispatch to the Chronicle.]

WASHINGTON, August 10.

Orders were issued to-day for the *Charleston* to prepare at once to sail for Shanghai. This means she will leave San Francisco to-morrow or Wednesday. She will go via Honolulu, and if her immediate presence is not required there she will continue on her journey, which, it is estimated, can be completed in fifteen or eighteen days. This will bring her into Shanghai during the first week in September, when, if the expected outbreak of Chinese students should occur, her services will be most needed.

I learn, also, that a further draft is to be made on the vessels in Bering Sea. Orders are now on the way for the *Marion* to leave Bering Sea at once for Nankin, and for the *Alert* to follow as soon as she can be spared from her present police duty. Instructions will go from San Francisco, by another Alaskan steamer leaving this week, for the *Mohican* to follow the *Marion* and *Alert* through the Aleutian Islands to the China coast.

The Department's orders to the *Alert* and *Mohican* are in a measure discretionary with their respective commanding officers. From the instructions now on the way they will understand that the situation in China is serious, and that they are expected to proceed posthaste to that country the moment the ships can safely leave the sealing grounds.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 31.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, September 3, 1891.

SIR: Proper respect to the Government to which I am accredited, renders it proper for me to inform the Department of State that the Prince Consort, husband of the present Queen, John Owen Dominis, died in Honolulu August 27. For several years his health has been imperfect, and for a considerable time before his death he had been confined to his room. He was born in Schenectady, N. Y., in 1832. His father was of Italian birth, and his mother a native of Boston, Massachusetts. He came to these islands a child with his parents, his father being a master marine. He was educated at a Honolulu school, and for a while served as a mercantile clerk in San Francisco, and afterwards in one of the principal American commercial houses of Honolulu, until he was appointed private secretary to Kamehameha IVth, the reigning sovereign. Subsequently he was appointed governor of Oahu, which position he held for twenty years. In 1862 he was married to the lady who is now Queen, by whom, on her accession to the throne, a few months since, he was proclaimed His Royal Highness, Prince Consort. In 1874 he visited Washington and other American cities with King Kalakaua. By his associates he has been regarded amiable in character and of strong American sympathies. His remains are now lying in state at the Royal Palace, and Sunday, September 6, will be buried with royal honors.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 32.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, September 5, 1891.

SIR: The Hawaiian cabinet, with the approval of the responsible citizens and the Queen, is about to renew the effort for a revision of the treaty with the United States, and the aim will be to secure entire free trade, with the exception of opium and distilled liquors. Believing that such an extension of the trade relations would be beneficial to both countries, I will endeavor to condense what seem to me the chief reasons why such a treaty as proposed should be made and carried into effect with reasonable promptness. The present reciprocity treaty has been highly advantageous to this country, has largely developed its resources, added to its wealth, and much increased American interests and influence here. It is just to say that it has had a tendency to carry investments and business enterprise too exclusively in a single channel. The repeal of the sugar duty by the United States has struck the principal material product of Hawaii a very severe blow, and with the most favorable estimate it now looks as though bankruptcy must be the inevitable fate of more or less of the sugar-planting firms and corporations.

It is fair to state that a large proportion of the liberal profits of sugar-raising made under the present treaty while the United States maintained the sugar tariff recently repealed has been expended in starting new plantations, in the building of expensive mills, purchasing improved machinery, and securing expensive methods and means of irrigation. It is obvious enough that no probable legislation or treaties can give the production of sugar here the prosperity it has had in recent years. It is equally obvious that a more diversified industry, a more varied business and development, would be for the ultimate welfare and civilization of these islands whose resources are much greater than the present population and the general American estimate of them seem to indicate. But reconstruction of business, like reconstruction in architecture and in government, is expensive to those who make it, whether by choice or compulsion.

A new, enlarged, and liberal treaty with the United States would aid the present business men and holders of property here to parry the blow which the free-sugar policy of the United States has dealt their chief industry and means of commerce, and would tend to foster other agricultural products and commercial interests. A liberal and comprehensive policy, in the direction indicated, is absolutely necessary to save these islands from grave disaster and secure the American interests and influence here which our Government has so long held of vital importance. In default of such a treaty and policy, Americans and the sons of Americans, who reside and have their investments here, will be driven to California, to Oregon, and Washington, in the desire of benefitting their fortunes and of enjoying the full citizenship of the United States. Much as Americans may desire the rapid growth and great prosperity of these splendid Pacific States, whose great future is so well assured, it is manifestly not for the best interests of the United States to have their population of business men increased by depleting these islands of those who are now the very best sentinels and supporters of American interests here. Bear in mind that the prospects and prosperity of the American Pacific States are becoming more and more attractive to Americans here, and it is no imaginary danger of which I speak.

It is also becoming more and more obvious that these islands are to be of commanding importance in the near future to American trade in the North Pacific. Great Britain, France, Germany, and Spain have taken possession of nearly all of the principal groups in the South Pacific and of the small isolated islands in the Central Pacific. If the Hawaiian group should slip from our control our national rivals would gain great naval and commercial advantage in the North Pacific, whose dominance fairly belongs to the United States. Nothing can be plainer than that it is our imperative duty to hold these islands with the firm resolution and the invincible strength of the American nation. To ignore their prospective value and to treat them other than with a liberal and fostering policy would be one of those blunders which justly have their place among the crimes of statesmen. Nothing should be done or neglected to be done, which would drive them into the control of England or Germany. At the present time the German plantation owners and the German commercial houses tend strongly towards the United States and want Hawaii to become an American dependency, and would even favor annexation. A majority of the English would yield readily to the same tendency if our Government should not hesitate.

The thrifty and prosperous Chinese merchants and property-holders are ready to follow the lines of their interests in the same direction. But coldness and neglect on our part could not fail to strengthen foreign political interests here to the future embarrassment and injury of the United States. The rapid decay of the native race of these islands now reduced to two-fifths of the inhabitants, and the increase of the foreign population, are tending to create new political and commercial contingencies and duties which can not be ignored, nor safely disregarded. A prompt and vigorous American policy would prove the safest and most economical in the end. A liberal and wise consideration of present exigencies and opportunities, the laying of a cable from San Francisco to Honolulu, and the opening of the Nicaragua Canal would make these islands a garden, with a population thrice its present numbers, with taxable resources enough to pay the expenses of their government and institutions, and help make Honolulu and Pearl Harbor impregnable with fortifications securely backed as they are by walls of highlands and mountains. Commercially and politically they can be rendered of more value to the United States than Malta and Cyprus are to Great Britain.

Napoleon's axiomatic remark that "an army marches on its belly" has an equally forcible application to commerce as to war. Whether the agencies of transport are caravans, railroads, steamers or electrical forces, there must be feeding places, coaling stations, and store-houses. No thoughtful legislator or commercial agent with a good marine map before him, can fail to see that in the grand future now dawning on the Pacific, these islands will be of immense importance to the United States, and that necessarily and inevitably they must continue under the increased fostering care of the United States, or fall under foreign control. A niggardly, hesitating, and drifting policy towards them would be as unwise and unsafe as unstatesmanlike. There is certainly no possible objection to negotiating and carrying into effect a full free trade treaty with them, for the aggregate of their products would be relatively so small compared with the vast productive resources and requirements of the United States as to make little perceptible difference in American markets and prices.

Believing that the views I have herein expressed are in accord with much in the past course of the American Government and in harmony with the opinions of the President and of the Department of State, I submit them for what they are worth. As an American citizen, loving my country and caring for its welfare and its future greatness, I can say no less. As the official representative of the Government of the United States in these special circumstances I can properly say no more.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 28.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 9, 1891.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 30 of the 20th ultimo, in relation to the need of an American ship of war at Honolulu.

A copy of your dispatch has been transmitted to the Secretary of the Navy.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 30.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 22, 1891.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch No. 31, of the 3d instant, in relation to the death of the Prince Consort.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 34.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, October 15, 1891.

SIR: It is proper for me to inform the Department of State that, in consequence of the serious and probably prolonged illness of Minister Carter, the Hawaiian Government has appointed Hon. J. Mott Smith, special envoy extraordinary to negotiate with the United States a treaty of the character of which I gave an account in my dispatch 32, of September 5. Mr. Smith is an American, is the present minister of finance, and has the marked confidence of the business men of these islands. Formerly he had resided here twenty or thirty years, but of late has been a resident of Boston, Mass. He has still considerable property interests on the islands. Arriving in Honolulu a few months since, he was strongly urged by leading citizens and the Queen to become minister of finance, and some years ago he was in the cabinet of Kalakaua, and visited Washington in behalf of reci-

procuity, about 1876. Though my acquaintance with him is brief, I have good reasons to think the Department of State will find him a safe agent with whom to negotiate a treaty favorable to the interests of the two countries concerned. I deem it safe to say that now is a good time to secure Pearl Harbor in practical perpetuity. Mr. Smith leaves here on the 17th.

I have, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 46.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 8, 1892.

SIR: The semiannual election of members of the Hawaiian Legislature took place February 3, after several weeks of exciting canvass. The principal issue on the part of the business men and more conservative and responsible citizens was in respect of treaty relations with the United States. These supporters of the proposed new treaty, which they believe has been negotiated at Washington, had the approval of the principal Government officials, though the cabinet is far from being vigorous and influential. The opposition, or "liberals," as they term themselves, composed mostly of the irresponsible white voters, half-castes, and of a large majority of the native Hawaiians, push their canvass on three lines—a new constitution, opposition to the present cabinet, and hostility to the proposed treaty, though it finally hedged and disclaimed more or less in regard to the last.

These so-called liberals were led by Wilcox, the half-cast, who was at the head of the revolutionary outbreak in July, 1889, and by C. W. Ashford the Canadian member of the cabinet, who betrayed and deserted his associates when Minister Carter was trying to negotiate a new treaty in 1889. This Ashford has some ability, any amount of audacity, and is utterly without scruples, and has done his utmost to influence the prejudices and passions of the native Hawaiians. Both he and Wilcox secured their election as representatives from this island. The Legislature is composed of 48 members, one-half being nobles, elected by property holding or income voters. The conservatives and friends of the treaty have secured most all of the nobles and enough of the representatives to give them a decisive majority, sufficient, it is thought, to secure the approval of the treaty, even with the Pearl Harbor grant in perpetuity. Not improbably there may be a change of cabinet when the Legislature assembles in May.

There are increasing indications that the annexation sentiment is growing among the business men as well as with the less responsible of the foreign and native population of the islands. The present political situation is feverish and I see no prospect of its being permanently otherwise until these islands become a part of the American Union or a possession of Great Britain.

The intelligent and responsible men here, unaided by outside support, are too few in numbers to control in political affairs and to secure good government. There are indications that even the liberals, just beaten at the election, though composed of a majority of the popular vote, are about to declare for annexation, at least their leaders, their chief newspaper having already published editorials to this effect. At a future time, after the proposed treaty shall have been ratified, I shall deem it

my official duty to give a more elaborate statement of facts and reasons why a "new departure" by the United States as to Hawaii is rapidly becoming a necessity, that a "protectorate" is impracticable, and that annexation must be the future remedy, or else Great Britain will be furnished with circumstances and opportunity to get a hold on these islands, which will cause future serious embarrassment to the United States.

At this time there seems to be no immediate prospect of its being safe to have the harbor of Honolulu left without an American vessel of war. Last week a British gunboat arrived here, and it is said will remain here for an indefinite period.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 39.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, March 3, 1892.

SIR: I have received your No. 46, of 8th ultimo, in which you give a careful review of the political situation in Hawaii.

I am, sir, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,

Acting Secretary.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 48.]

HONOLULU, *March 8, 1892.*

SIR: In view of possible contingencies in these islands I ask for the instructions of the Department of State on the following, viz:

If the Government here should be surprised and overturned by an orderly and peaceful revolutionary movement, largely of native Hawaiians, and a Provisional or Republican Government organized and proclaimed, would the United States minister and naval commander here be justified in responding affirmatively to the call of the members of the removed Government to restore them to power or replace them in possession of the Government buildings? Or should the United States minister and naval commander confine themselves exclusively to the preservation of American property, the protection of American citizens, and the prevention of anarchy? Should a revolutionary attempt of the character indicated be made, there are strong reasons to presume that it would begin by the seizure of the police station, with its arms and ammunition, and this accomplished, the royal palace and the Government buildings containing the cabinet officers and archives would very soon be captured, the latter buildings being situated about one-third of a mile from the police station.

In such contingencies would it be justifiable to use the United States forces here to restore the Government buildings to the possession of the displaced officials? Ordinarily in like circumstances the rule seems to be to limit the landing and movement of the United States force in foreign waters and dominion exclusively to the protection of the United States legation and of the lives and property of American citizens. But, as the relations of the United States to

Hawaii are exceptional, and in former years the United States officials here took somewhat exceptional action in circumstances of disorder, I desire to know how far the present minister and naval commander here may deviate from established international rules and precedents in the contingencies indicated on the first part of this dispatch.

I have information, which I deem reliable, that there is an organized revolutionary party in the islands, composed largely of native Hawaiians and a considerable number of whites and half whites, led chiefly by individuals of the latter two classes.

This party is hostile to the Queen and to her chief confidants, especially opposed to the coming to the throne of the half-English heir-apparent now being educated in England, and means to gain its object either by forcing the Queen to select her cabinet from its own members or else to overthrow the monarchy and establish a Republic, with the ultimate view of annexation to the United States of the whole islands. A portion of this party mean only the former, and the other portion intend the latter. Failing to accomplish the former, the most of the party would seek the latter alternative. I have little doubt the revolutionary attempt would have been made ere this but for the presence here of the United States ship of war. I still incline to the opinion that the revolutionary attempt will not be made so long as there is a United States force in the harbor of Honolulu. But it would be rash to assume or assert this positively. Therefore I deem it my official duty to ask for instructions in view of possible contingencies.

I may add that the "annexation" sentiment is increasing quite as much among the white residents and native Hawaiian and other workmen who own no sugar stock as with the sugar planters.

I am sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 41.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 19, 1892.

SIR: The Department has received your Nos. 19, 46, and 42 bis.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 50.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, March 19, 1892.

SIR: The Department of State will not deem it outside of the duties of this legation to report that a highly interesting manifestation of official courtesy has taken place to-day in the harbor of Honolulu. By due arrangement Queen Liliuokalani and the entire Hawaiian cabinet, as well as the royal chamberlain and court attendants, paid a visit to the United States ship *San Francisco*, Rear Admiral George Brown in command, who had sent the ship's boats to take the party on board. By the request of the Admiral, I was on board of the *San Francisco* to

receive Her Majesty at the rail gate of the ship. She was received with the salute of twenty-one guns and the excellent music of the *San Francisco* band. The Queen and party were conducted about the ship by Admiral Brown and officers, and other civilities were shown to the royal party. At the close of the visit another salute of twenty-one guns was given and appropriate music played by the band as the boats containing the visitors passed to the shore. The weather during the day has been exceedingly fine, and the occasion passed off in the best manner. The *San Francisco* is the finest ship ever seen in the harbor of Honolulu. Admiral Brown and his officers exhibited admirable taste and courtesy to the official visitors, and there is no doubt of the good influence of the honors and politeness shown the Hawaiian representatives.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 52.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, April 2, 1892.

SIR: That the Department of State may be well informed as to what is transpiring here in matters of politics and government it is necessary for me to report that the palace authorities have been seriously alarmed recently by what they believed to be strong indications of an armed insurrection. During the night of Sunday, March 27, by the direction of the marshal of the Kingdom the royal guard of sixty men were hastily put to the task of fortifying the approaches to the palace with bags of sand, fearing an attack. But no hostile force appeared, and public opinion decides that there was needless alarm. The Queen has lost much in public regard of late, and has incurred the special ill will of many of the native Hawaiians. This is largely owing to her having taken to her close intimacy and confidence a half-caste Tahitian, by the name of Wilson, who became marshal soon after her accession to the throne, and whom she wished to have appointed to the most important place in the cabinet, the ministry of interior.

Responsible men would not serve in the cabinet with him and therefore he was made marshal of the Kingdom, an office of great importance, as under his immediate control is the chief police force of the country. He now lives in or near the palace, and the Queen appears to be largely in his hands. The administration of his office results in very gross abuses, and it is a striking evidence of the forbearance and restraint of the white and native population that they endure it.

The great lack here now is an intelligent and efficient executive, which it is impossible to have with the existing monarchy. For twenty years the palace has been the center of corruption and scandal, and is likely to remain so as long as the Hawaiian native monarchy exists.

There is little doubt that the less responsible and more resolute opponents of the Queen and the marshal are strong enough to capture the palace and Government buildings, but the more responsible and conservative citizens favor only pacific measures and urge forbearance. The existing state of things fully justify what I have said in former dispatches as to the need of a United States vessel here, whose pres-

ence has undoubtedly prevented an outbreak so far. I have strong hopes that quiet will be maintained until the meeting of the Legislature, five or six weeks hence, which will then largely control affairs. In the meantime "the annexation" sentiment has grown rapidly. Quoting those who would seek annexation by first creating a republic, to the larger number and more responsible citizens, the chief property holders, who wish to use only pacific measures, they would carry all before them, provided the latter could get any encouragement that the United States would take these islands as a territory.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 46.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, April 12, 1892.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 50 of 19th ultimo, relative to a visit made that day by Her Majesty, the Queen of the Hawaiian Islands, and by her Cabinet to the U. S. ship *San Francisco*, in the harbor of Honolulu. The Department has found pleasure in making its contents known to the Secretary of the Navy.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Stevens to Mr Blaine.

[Confidential.]

No. 56.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, May 21, 1892.

SIR: That the Department of State may have a clear understanding of affairs here at the present time, I must state what is transpiring of some significance.

May 19, at 5 p. m., the minister of foreign affairs and the attorney-general called at this legation and informed me that the Government had decided to arrest that night or the next day a considerable number of persons charged with treasonable designs, and that the papers had already been issued by the judge. My opinion had not been asked, and it was then too late for me to oppose effectively and too short a time for me to investigate the proofs they claimed to have against the accused parties. In this confidential interview I was careful to have it understood that I would assume no responsibility in regard to the proposed proceedings; yet the line of my inquiries and the reasonable implications of my language indicated that I strongly doubted the expediency of these proposed arrests, especially as the Legislature would assemble within eight days. Subsequently I learned that the minister of foreign affairs, a native Hawaiian, had held back for some time against the proposed arrests, but finally yielded to the palace influences.

On the following day, the 20th, seventeen arrests were made, and warrants were issued to arrest forty to fifty other persons. The arrested men include V. V. Ashford, R. W. Wilcox, and other leaders of,

the party, composed mainly of native Hawaiians and half-whites one of them being member-elect of the Legislature about to assemble Wilcox was the leader of the revolutionary outbreak of 1889. Ashford, the ablest man of those arrested, a lawyer by profession, is a Canadian by birth, who served in the Union army during the American war of the rebellion, but is still a British subject. The present belief among intelligent men is that there can be no conviction of the accused persons by jury trial, with the possible exception of Ashford, who will be tried before a foreign jury; and so strong is the prejudice against him that he may be convicted by a foreign jury, though the evidence against him were inadequate. Wilcox and the other half-whites and native Hawaiians must be tried by a native jury, and nobody believes they will be convicted. If these presumptions should be verified, Wilcox and other arrested natives will come out of prison only more influential than they were before. Why did the Government postpone these arrests so long and show this vigor just as the Legislature is about to assemble, there having been committed no act of violence, no hostile gathering in the streets?

Obviously for the following reasons: The Attorney-General unwittingly allowed me to understand what facts and circumstances otherwise informed me. The cabinet is very weak in its makeup. It had entirely lost prestige with the public. It knew that it was likely to be voted out by the Legislature because of its inefficiency. It hopes to gain strength by these arrests of persons against whom there is a strong prejudice with the legislative members elect. Who was and is the controlling factor back of the cabinet that forces this issue at so late an hour? The Tahitian half-caste marshal, the former reputed, if not the present paramour of the Queen, who terrifies her with the fear of an insurrection. This cabinet was mainly the choice of the marshal and the Queen, has never been passed upon by the legislature, that body never having been in session since its appointment, and does not dare resist what the Tahitian and the Queen see fit to do. This largely gives the marshal the key of the situation. In a mistaken hour, immediately after the death of the late King, a majority of the judges in an era of good feeling, knowing that the Queen was importunate to select a cabinet of her own, gave a decision of policy, that she had the right to remove the cabinet then existing and select her own, in the exceptional case of the death of the sovereign, though the most level-headed judge—an American, McCulley, recently deceased—gave a counter opinion in accordance with the plain terms of the constitution, for the exclusive right of the Legislature to remove the ministers is the vital and essential provision of the constitution, made in 1887, so intended by the men now living here, who placed it in the constitution, and so regarded by the principal lawyers here. That decision of good-natured policy to conciliate the Queen had the immediate result of making her Tahitian favorite the most potent man at the palace. She wanted to make him minister of interior, the most responsible member of the cabinet, but he found it impossible to find associates. But a cabinet was formed, who immediately made him marshal of the Kingdom, with the entire police force, such as it is, in his hands, with an attorney-general largely under his influence.

These are the circumstances which have given Wilcox, Ashford, and their associates their opportunity to increase their political influence. While the best and most responsible men of the islands are disgusted with the relations of the Queen and the Tahitian favorite, they will not follow such agitators as have just been arrested. They wish to secure

a change by peaceful measures, and look to the Legislature, which was fairly and quietly elected, and is believed to have a safe majority of prudent men, several of them being of the chief men of the islands, of good American blood.

Of course an American ship of war is still needed here; one is ample. And when the *San Francisco* leaves I presume another ship will have arrived. *One whose captain or other commander is cautious, reticent, and firm* is specially needed where circumstances are so exceptional as they are here.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 50.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 7, 1892.

SIR: I have received your No. 56, of 21st ultimo, relative to the arrest of several prominent persons at Honolulu, on a charge of treason, and have advised the Secretary of the Navy of your suggestions as to the presence of a war vessel of this Government at that port.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine.

No. 57.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, June 11, 1892.

SIR: I forward herewith two copies of Her Majesty's speech at the opening of the Legislature, May 28. Of what is transpiring in that body and all of importance that may be done the first month of its session I will give an account in a future dispatch.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[Inclosure in No. 57.]

The Queen's speech at the opening of the Legislature of 1892.

NOBLES AND REPRESENTATIVES: Since the Legislature of this Kingdom last assembled death has taken from us your lamented King and my beloved brother. His reign of nearly seventeen years marked an extraordinary epoch in our country's history, an era of unparalleled commercial advancement, of educational enlightenment, and political progress. His late Majesty's memory will be held sacred by his friends, and his successful labors in the interests of his people properly estimated and respected by all.

The decree of Providence and the constitution of the Kingdom having called me to occupy the throne of Hawaii, it is my earnest prayer that divine assistance may be vouchsafed to enable me to discharge the duties of the exalted position to the advantage of my people and the permanent benefit of Hawaii.

With the consent of the nobles of the Kingdom, I have appointed Her Royal Highness the Princess Victoria Kawekiu Kaiulani Lunailo Kalaninuiahilapalapa as my successor.

Fully recognizing that by the constitution and laws of the Kingdom my station is that of a constitutional monarch, accepting the will of my people, as pronounced

by them through their representatives in the Legislature and my constitutional advisors, the ministers of the Crown, I shall firmly endeavor to preserve the autonomy and absolute independence of this Kingdom, and to assist in perpetuating the rights and privileges of all who are subject to our laws and in promoting their welfare and happiness.

I am gratified to state that my relations with foreign powers are of the most cordial and friendly nature.

The treaty of commercial reciprocity between this Kingdom and the United States, which has hitherto proved so beneficial to both countries in building up and maintaining a larger commerce and exchange of productions, has been seriously affected by tariff legislation made by the Congress of the United States, the effect of which on our principal industry is being severely felt. I trust that such legislation as may tend to relieve the consequent depression will receive your early and careful attention.

I recommend the appointment of a special commission to ascertain the most practical manner of developing and expanding the several industrial and agricultural resources of the Kingdom; and more especially with a view to enable small landholders to add to the wealth and progress of the Kingdom by raising such products as the soil and climate of the country foster.

The probability of a decrease in the revenues of the Kingdom requires economy and retrenchment in the expenditures of the public funds, but I earnestly hope that every effort will be made to carry out all necessary internal improvements throughout the Kingdom.

I note with pleasure that surveys are being made between the western coast of the United States of America and these islands, for the purpose of laying a submarine cable. I sincerely hope that every effort to connect Hawaii by an electric cable with the outside world will continue to receive your assistance.

I commend to your earnest attention the invitation received by my Government from the President of the United States of America to participate in the celebration of the four hundredth anniversary of the discovery of America by Christopher Columbus by sending an exhibit to the World's Columbian Exposition to be held at the city of Chicago in 1893.

My ministers will submit for your consideration the reports of their several departments and the laws necessary for the welfare of the Kingdom and the promotion of the objects I have referred to.

Nobles and representatives, invoking the blessing of Divine Providence upon your deliberations, I now declare the Legislature of the Kingdom open.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 64.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, September 9, 1892.

SIR: I presume the Department of State already has information of the seizure of Gilbert Islands by the English Government. But I deem it well to send you the inclosed slips from the New Zealand Herald.

I also inclose copy of the recent change in the Hawaiian customs rates. When the official pamphlets of laws is published after the adjournment of the Legislature, I will forward copies.

At the present time there is considerable excitement here in regard to a new cabinet.

The old cabinet has been voted out by a large majority, mainly because it was very weak and was very much dominated by the Tahitian favorite of the Queen and persons in whom the best portion of the citizens had no confidence.

In trying to get a new cabinet the Tahitian and his associates push the Queen to resist the responsible men of the islands and the majority of the legislature.

In my next dispatch I hope to announce the new cabinet.

I have, etc,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

[Confidential.]

No. 65.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, September 14, 1892.

SIR: In my dispatch, No. 64, of September 9, I expressed the hope that I would be able to send the information by this mail that a new Hawaiian cabinet had been formed to take the place of the one so emphatically voted out by the Legislature, but the deadlock between the Queen and the Legislature continues. She has announced a new cabinet, but it is so unsatisfactory to the legislative majority and the business men of the islands that it will undoubtedly be rejected to-day; but the vote will not be taken in time to send the information of the fact by this mail, which closes at 11 a. m. The Tahitian half-caste favorite of the Queen, the marshal of the little Kingdom, and his band of adventurers, still dominate the palace and defy the responsible men of the Legislature and the islands. An associate of the half-caste favorite is an American renegade by the name of Whaley, a disgraced and expelled San Francisco custom-house officer, now at the head of the "opium ring," and one of the supposed owners of the *Halcyon*, the notorious smuggling schooner which flits between these islands and British Columbia. This man Whaley has more brain than the Tahitian favorite.

The better portion of the English residents are in substantial accord with the principal Americans in support of the Legislature, and the chief German commercial houses and influential German residents are in full agreement with the Americans; but more or less of the English are so jealous of the strong American sentiment in the Legislature that they support the Queen and the Tahitian openly or covertly. The native Hawaiians, composing half of the Legislature, are about equally divided. The unscrupulous adventurers of different nationalities—Americans, English, and Germans, without character, and most of them without property—are with the half-caste Tahitian favorite and the Queen. A majority of the Legislature and the best citizens of the islands are exercising remarkable forbearance and self-control.

It is proper for me to say that just at this time Mr. Mott Smith, the present minister at Washington, is likely to be misinformed as to the real condition of things, for the rejected minister of foreign affairs, a native Hawaiian, of the Queen's supporters, still occupies the foreign office, and the American deputy would hardly dare send any advices to Minister Smith not indorsed by the acting head of the department.

The U. S. ship *Boston* is in the harbor, and Capt. Wiltse will coöperate with me in exercising careful circumspection. In about twelve days from this I can send another dispatch.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

No. 57.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 29, 1892.

SIR: I have received your No. 65 (confidential) of the 14th instant describing the deadlock existing between the Hawaiian Legislature and the Queen over the constitution of a ministry, and have inclosed a copy to the Secretary of the Navy for his confidential information.

I am, etc.,

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JOHN W. FOSTER.

No. 71.]

*Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.*LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, October 19, 1892.

SIR: According to what I expressed in my dispatch 70 of October 12 as likely to transpire here, on the 17th a resolution of want of confidence in the cabinet passed the legislature by a vote of 31 to 15; the 24 members specified in my No. 70 having been increased by 7 natives, thus making 17 native members in opposition to the cabinet and 10 in favor. As indicated in preceding dispatches the most potent factor in the pending issue is, whether the Tahitian favorite and the Queen shall defy the intent of the constitution as to the choice of ministry and the retention in office of the Tahitian marshal with all the abuse and corruption which surround him and the Queen. Though he has a wife, for years he has been regarded as her paramour, and her infatuation for him is now so excessive that he is believed to have almost absolute control of her official action. The two-thirds majority of the Legislature represent the chief men of the islands, and the friends of order and good government generally. The faction of the Tahitian has with it most of the anti-American element, and this is the reason why the ultra Englishmen all are on the same side, with more or less approval of the English legation, the last simply because the legislative majority is strongly American in sympathy. As in the previous vote, two English members on the 17th voted with the minority, and the three Americanized Englishmen voted with the majority.

The newspaper report of the debate I send gives indication of the drift of things in the Legislature. The minister of finance, who, in the debate, claims to be an American, was born here of Scotch-English parentage, and by plans and interest is hostile to the United States. Some years since he resided awhile in San Francisco, and it is said took out the preliminary papers for naturalization. But he and his brother are the chief members of an importing firm, mainly of liquors, and are the agents of English manufacturers. As stated in my No. 70, they were engaged in making the English loan in 1886, the negotiations of which cost this Government from \$50,000 to \$100,000. It is known that his plan was, if he had been retained in the cabinet, to push another heavy loan in England, thus aiding to mortgage these islands to English bondholders. To this scheme all the best men here are opposed.

The insult to the American minister, spoken of in the resolutions and debate, was in certain anonymous communications published in the Bulletin, the official organ here, reflecting unjustly on the American minister, consul-general, and naval commander here for not ordering the U. S. ship *Boston* to hunt for the crew of the ship *Wm. A. Campbell*, wrecked in a gale 2,300 miles from Honolulu, of which the consul general has forwarded an account to the Department. I deemed it my duty to call the attention of the Queen and minister of foreign affairs to the falsehoods and insults in the Bulletin communications. Her Majesty's Government expressed in writing strong regrets for the offensive publications and the attorney-general pronounced them libellous, and offered to prosecute. I did not deem it wise to demand prosecution, but required only full apology. The apology made is not wholly satisfactory to me nor to this Government. I leave the matter with Her Majesty's Government, which makes strong promises for the future. The Bulletin newspaper in reality is the organ of the Tahitian favorite, of the ultra English, and of the more disreputable persons who sustain

the palace against the legislative majority. The editor is a Nova-Scotian, aided by an Australian and an Englishman.

At this writing it is thought that there will be a "deadlock" of a week or two between the palace and the Legislature as to the appointment of a new cabinet. There is a prevailing anxiety in the public mind as to the actual state of things. The Tahitian favorite of half-English blood does not mean to yield, and were there not an American ship-of-war here, he would perhaps try to use his police and a mob of "hoodlums" to break up the Legislature, restore the old constitution, and thus render the palace master of the situation. My present impression is that the Queen and her faction will have to yield, otherwise the entire overthrow of the monarchy could not be long delayed.

I may say here that the personal relations of the English minister and myself are still pleasant. I can not yet believe that he advises the Queen to hold out against the Legislature, as some private rumors indicate, though he is undoubtedly apprehensive that the success of the legislative majority means more or less an American cabinet.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[Inclosure in No. 71.]

Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser, October 18, 1832.

THE LEGISLATURE.—One hundred and eighth day,
MONDAY, October 17

The house met at 10 a. m.

The minutes of the preceding day were read and approved.

Rep. Waipuilani moved the following resolution of want of confidence:

"Whereas the present cabinet has not announced or given any intimation or evidence of any financial policy which will extricate the country from its present dangerous financial situation; and

"Whereas it is essential to the commercial progress of the country that more favorable treaty relations with the United States be obtained whereby our products can obtain a free market in that country; and

"Whereas the present cabinet has shown no disposition to favor any such policy, and the present head of the cabinet has displayed conspicuous hostility toward the representative of that country in this kingdom, and the general tone of the administration has been and is one of opposition and hostility to the United States of America and American interests, thereby rendering it improbable that any changes in our treaty relations favorable to Hawaii can be negotiated by this cabinet; and

"Whereas the cabinet has given no evidence of any intention to attempt to remedy existing scandals in the police department, and have otherwise failed to evince any ability to successfully guide the nation through the difficulties and dangers surrounding it: Therefore be it

"Resolved, That the Legislature hereby expresses its want of confidence in the present cabinet."

Rep. Waipuilani said it was proper that he should explain in a few words his reason for bringing this resolution. Such a resolution had been brought once before, and he had voted against it because the cabinet was then new and he thought it should have an opportunity to express itself by deeds. The cabinet had now been in office a number of weeks. Week after week was slipping by and nothing was done by them, although a policy had been promised. But none had been announced and nothing done, and the house was tired of waiting. It would be a waste of time for him to go on and discuss the matter in detail. Business was dull, closer relations with the United States were necessary and the conduct of the present cabinet was not likely to produce that. Everyone knew what the head of the cabinet had done. He had brought in a resolution against the American minister, which had been expunged from the minutes of the house. All knew that the Bulletin, which was supposed to be under the control of the cabinet, had adopted a course antagonistic to the minister and to the whole of the United States, and the cabinet, which might have stopped it, had allowed it to go on.

If the cabinet allowed that paper to go on insulting the minister and remain silent themselves, they make themselves responsible, and antagonize the whole American people against us, and under such circumstances how could we expect to get a more favorable treaty. He favored free trade with the United States, which would be of great benefit to the whole country, and especially to the district which he represented, where pineapples could be canned and exported if it were not for the American duty of 35 per cent. Everyone knew that the reciprocity treaty was of the greatest benefit to this country, increasing values 10 to 100 fold. How could any more favorable treaty be hoped for if the cabinet adopted a policy of incessant irritation toward the United States?

Perhaps not the least reason for this motion was the fact that the cabinet had looked quietly on at the great scandal in the police department, and had done nothing. Moreover, the attorney-general had the other day actually proposed to refer the whole matter to another committee after it had already been investigated by several. Either that was an insult to the committees which had already spent so much time on the subject, or, if not so intended, the idea was to prevent a report and stave off all further investigation. No one had been removed at the police station. Let any member of this house go down on Maunakea street and he will see *che fa* played openly, with no attempt at concealment, the police mixing with the crowd. Opium was smuggled unchecked. The fame of the opium scandals had gone abroad and affected the good name of this Government. The attorney-general might institute proceedings to stop some of this, but the cabinet could not take to itself a stiff backbone and cleanse the evils oppressing the Government.

Rep. Kapahu moved the resolution be made the special order for Thursday. The introducer of the resolution was prepared; the speaker was not, not having known the resolution was to be brought in. Moreover, the minister of the interior was not present, and no one liked to attack an empty seat. The adoption of this resolution was no small matter, and justice required some delay.

Rep. Kauhi favored considering the resolution to-day. The majority must decide. This was the second resolution of the kind brought against the cabinet, and they must be prepared already.

Rep. Kapahu wished to know whether this resolution was the same as the other.

Rep. Kauhi said there was a strong family resemblance between them. The other resolution was really carried, but was thrown out on a question of law. Before sunset we should know what the fate of the resolution is to be.

(Minister Gulick entered and took his seat during the remarks of Rep. Kauhi.)

Rep. Nawahi said it made no difference to him personally whether the resolution was considered to-day or Thursday. But the house was sitting as judges, and if the defendants—the cabinet—wished a delay to prepare themselves, let them have it. If they were ready let the house proceed at once. When the late cabinet was on trial, the twenty-seven hour attorney-general said they were ready to go on.

Rep. Kamaooha said a resolution had been brought before, which he had opposed for reasons very similar to those given by the member from Kona. He was disappointed in the present cabinet. He had thought they would do something about cleansing the police department. These complaints against the marshal had been made for a long time, and so it was with a feeling of disappointment that he had heard the attorney-general recommend reference of the matter to another committee. The minister of finance had, with the other members of the finance committee, presented a very strong report severely criticising the police department. How is it that he does not join in now that he is a minister and insist on carrying these recommendations out? He had had confidence that this would be done, but that confidence was now severely shaken.

Another thing which inclined him to vote for this resolution was the fact that the attorney-general was the introducer of a bill—the registration act—which was very obnoxious to the Hawaiian people. Another thing which shook his confidence in the attorney-general was the bill authorizing the O. R. and L. Co. to mortgage their franchise to foreigners. The attorney-general might say that was not a cabinet measure. It had, however, the support of the cabinet, which made it to all intents and purposes a Government measure. Owing to the McKinley bill, the great industry of the country had come to a standstill. Yet the present cabinet had nothing to offer. The country could not afford to have a cabinet in office which was in open hostility to the United States or its representative, or which showed that disposition. We ought to conciliate in every way the United States, and show a friendly disposition toward that nation. Representing, as he did, the district of Kohala, one of the largest sugar districts of the Kingdom, he felt it his duty to support this resolution.

Rep. Kanealii said he agreed with the first and last grounds set forth in the resolution, but favored the striking out that part which related to the personal relations of the cabinet with the ministry, because to drag in personal matters would only intensify feeling. All knew that the present head of the cabinet brought in a reso-

lution against the American minister. The house had cleansed itself of that matter by striking the resolution from the records of the house. The speaker thought that bringing that up again was inexpedient. He favored the resolution with that amendment, and he favored considering the resolution to-day. The claim that the cabinet was unprepared had nothing in it. This resolution had been the talk for a long time, and the cabinet were doubtless as ready to meet it now as they ever would be. We all wanted the flesh of this cabinet.

Noble Hoapili called on the cabinet to say whether they wanted the delay or not. Attorney-General Neumann said he had not been aware that the resolution was to be brought this morning. He was ready to take some of the matters up to-day. There were allegations based upon street rumors, to which he was ready to make answer immediately; on other matters he would like a delay until to-morrow. He would like to have a few words to say on the registration act, etc. He had no desire to sit as a minister, and was ready to resign at any moment. He proposed to defend his action on the registration bill and O. R. & L. Co. bill as long as he had a voice and vote in the house. There were none so blind as those who would not see, nor so deaf as those who would not hear. If the house chose to grant time until to-morrow, the cabinet would be thankful. If not, it was ready to proceed to-day.

Noble Hoapili, continuing, said the remarks of the attorney-general raised doubts in his mind. (Attorney-General: "Well, I'll remove them if I can.") This was the fourth resolution of want of confidence brought in this session. One was withdrawn, the second was carried; on the last he had voted with the minority in favor of the ministry. Since that time the ministry had stayed here, and the house had certainly waited a long, long time for them to announce a policy. For a long time there had been a general feeling throughout the country that there was a great deal of corruption in the police department and that the marshal should be removed. The cabinet had known that that was the almost unanimous feeling of the house. Yet they did nothing. He had no hesitation in saying that he supported the resolution on that account. A few days ago there had been a big disturbance on the street corner and the police had been called on to stop it, but they would do nothing.

Minister Macfarlane (sotto voce). It was a luau.

Noble Hoapili. He asked the police officer why he made no arrest, and the officer said the marshal gave the orders not to arrest anybody except when caught in some act of violence. A hack was there without lights, and vile and obscene language was being used. The police would do nothing, and finally Peter High took the matter up and with speaker's assistance a man was arrested and punished. These things were a scandal, and if the attorney-general could not stop it someone else must be got. On the other hand, people came to him and told him that the idea was to remove the cabinet, so as to get an annexation cabinet in, and annex the country to the United States. If he believed that, he would support the cabinet. He would rather have corruption and scandal than annexation. He was distinctly opposed to annexation, and was so instructed by his constituents, but he favored close relations with the great "makua" over there.

Rep. R. W. Wilcox had but a few words to say. The attorney-general had suggested waiting until to-morrow, but the attorney-general was noted for his readiness, and could defend himself to-day as well as to-morrow. So far as the announcement of a policy was concerned, every man, boy, and child in the country knew the cabinet had done nothing; so, what could be said in their defense? The same could be said in regard to the police department; nothing had been done. The matter of relations with the United States had not been much discussed in the Hawaiian papers, and as to that something might be said; but without it there was enough and the question should be settled this afternoon.

Attorney-General Neumann. How does the member know that nothing has been done about the police department?

Rep. R. W. Wilcox. Have not the committee made their report and recommendations?

Attorney-General Neumann said he had also made his report and had wished a committee appointed in order that he might explain to them why their recommendations could not be carried out.

Rep. R. W. Wilcox said the proposition to appoint a new committee was an insult to the house and showed that the attorney-general was not fit to occupy his position. He admitted his weakness. He came here and admitted that he could not tell the house why he could not carry out the recommendations of the committee. He would therefore favor the resolution. The part about the relations with the United States might be stricken out as there was enough without that.

Rep. Nawahi said if there had been any publications in the newspapers regarding the American minister, the latter would have his remedy in the courts. He, therefore, favored striking out that part of the resolution. As to the rest, he did not need to state his views. The cabinet has had fair warning. He had voted against the last resolution simply to give the cabinet a trial. When it had been here a

month it was in order to say to them, you have been tried and found wanting. A man could not talk on an empty stomach, so he favored a recess till 1:30 p. m.

Carried at 12:01.

AFTERNOON SESSION.

The house met at 1:35 p. m.

Noble Thurston proposed to say but a very few words. He had stated his opinion a month ago, and had seen nothing to change his mind since. The present resolution was introduced by one who voted against the former resolution. It had been tacitly agreed that the opposition should not filibuster, but should quietly go about its business. That policy has been pursued up to the present time. There were a number of members who voted against the resolution then because they wished to see what the cabinet proposed to do. In the meantime they had been deciding what they themselves would do; this resolution was the result. Two members had stated that they favored the resolution on two of the grounds set forth, but not on the other. Here were five of the original supporters of the cabinet who had now declared against them, except that two of them were not agreed with one of the reasons set forth.

The question now to be settled was whether the house had confidence in the cabinet or not. Those who had confidence in the cabinet would vote against the resolution, and those having no confidence in them should vote for the resolution, no matter what their reasons might be. All would not necessarily have the same reasons. For himself he did not care whether there was any preamble or not. He was prepared to vote for a resolution of a single line. Others might have a preamble if they liked. He was ready to state his reasons for his vote, and others might state or conceal their reasons as they saw fit. The member from Wailuku and the member from Hilo had both stated that the third ground, the scandals in the police department, was their main reason for supporting the resolution. That was their reason. The speaker on the other hand considered the attitude of the cabinet toward America the leading reason, and upon this second point he proposed to speak. In regard to the marshal, it might be that everything which the members from Hilo and Wailuku alleged was true, but that was a matter which would eventually be remedied. Whether it was remedied to-day or to-morrow, would not vitally affect the future of the country. There had been bad administration there before. The present cabinet had the right and duty to remedy that, and it was entirely within their power. The responsibility was upon them to do it or not. They have ample power. That is the point.

The other charge is that they have developed no financial policy. That also was not so absolutely vital a point as the one upon which the speaker would lay stress. The second reason therefore contained something which might or might not be within their power, viz, to cope with the financial situation; but the third reason was something which struck right down into the vitals and pockets of the country, and it was something with which this cabinet could not cope. Pineapples were being planted on Hawaii, in Manoa, and at Ewa. Pineapple-raising could be carried on with large returns. In Cona all you had to do was to stick the top into the ground. Why were not pineapples raised? Because the American duty of 35 per cent destroyed the margin of profit. Why were these people starting in? Because they hoped we could negotiate a treaty and get that duty taken off. If it were taken off 500,000 pineapples would be exported inside of three years. It was not only on pineapples that there was a duty of 35 per cent, but on every species of preserved fruit. The member from Lahaina had brought in a bill about guava jelly. Thurston and his one guava bush in Manoa was made the text of a number of speeches at the last campaign, but the guava jelly will march triumphantly over the head of the speechmaker.

If this duty can be got rid of, when guava jelly gets to paying a handsome profit not only the capitalist will benefit, but the poor man in Hamakua, for instance, where the bushes cover the land from the sea to the bush as thick as they can grow in unbroken masses for miles, and all you have to do is to go out and pick them. These were but two items which had been brought before the house by petitions and bills. He might go on the whole afternoon enumerating others. It was, therefore, obvious that whether the cabinet was on friendly terms with the United States was important, not merely to the capitalist, but to all the poor throughout the land. Two years ago the cabinet were charged with trying to sell out this country. They got them out and as soon as they did they adopted the programme of their predecessors and tried to get the same treaty negotiations. It was pigeonholed.

They tried in every way to stir up feeling here against America and the Americans and then sought favors from the United States. Had they succeeded? The government which went in then was not personally hostile to the United States. The ministry went with their party. But now we have a cabinet whose leader

went out of his way to insult the United States on the floor of this House, and their organ carried on the same thing to-day. It was useless to deny government ownership in this organ. Government ownership did not alone make an organ. The New York Tribune was the organ of the Republican administration, but it was not owned by the government. It was immaterial whether the paper was controlled by the cabinet, or as he was informed, partially owned by them. He had reason to believe that the cabinet did have something to do with the Bulletin, and that its late apology, which apologized and then rubbed it in alternately, was written with their cognizance, and that the anti-American tone of the paper was an expression of the attitude of the cabinet. He did not propose to inquire whether the minister of finance had good reason for his resolution, etc. It was sufficient to point out the fact that there was the antagonism of the cabinet toward the representative of the American interests here.

With the fact staring us in the face, was it not perfect folly to go home and let the cabinet stay there expecting them to do anything for Hawaiian agricultural interests? He was not talking on an annexation basis, but was speaking on the same basis as the attorney-general on the late want of confidence debate, who had expressed his views to a dot. The United States would never take possession of this country against the will of its people. It was not a live issue now, and when it was introduced it was done solely with a view to mislead. Annexation was brought up and trotted out regularly, and was simply a substitute for the old missionary cry. When an election, etc., was over it would not be heard of again until a similar occasion arose. Before being frightened by the annexation scarecrow it was well to stop and think. All history belied the idea that the United States would ever take this country against the will of the people. It had been the first to recognize its independence. Follow the history down. When Lord George Paulet hauled down the Hawaiian flag, what was the position of the United States? A United States frigate appeared here, refused to acknowledge the foreign usurper and, in defiance of him, fired a royal salute.

Passing over this episode, which the British Government right royally retrieved, what was the position taken by the United States at the time of the French usurpation? A treaty of cession was signed and sent to Washington, where it lay for four solid months untouched, and when the danger was over it was returned without pretence of any right to retain what had been freely given without solicitation. The French have gone on until they now own a hundred islands. Daniel Webster said that if the French took the islands they would take them back and restore their independence if it took the whole power of the United States to do it. That was their position, and it had been consistently maintained ever since.

Again, it had not been foreigners who proposed all this. Kamehameha III himself proposed to cede the islands, and just before he was going to do so he was taken sick and died. The treaty lies in the foreign office ready for his signature, and may be seen by anybody. It was unnecessary to come down to the events of the last twenty years. They were within the knowledge of everybody. The United States had, out of its bounty, given us a treaty for which it received almost no monetary return, which had put millions into the pockets of this country. The advantages of this treaty were now gone, and additional ones must be sought. Not only was it a fact that the United States had stood between Hawaii and France, between Hawaii and England, had held our independence in their hands, had given us a treaty, but during the reign of the present sovereign a ship of war had been asked by Her Majesty's Government if it would assist in preserving order against internal enemies. Apart from these financial and material interests, common decency and common gratitude should prevent these slurs and insinuations on the United States. It was an insult to the opposition which was not less loyal than the cabinet, and the ideas were advanced simply to keep the cabinet in power. In conclusion, the speaker said it made no difference on what ground members united against the cabinet if they agreed in having no confidence in it.

Rep. Bipikane said it had always been his practice to scrutinize every cabinet. He had watched this one. He saw no advantage to be gained by delay. If there was a majority in favor of the cabinet, the resolution would not pass; if there were not, it would, and that was the sum of the matter. The resolution brought in before was carried, so far as numbers go. He voted for the cabinet then to give them a chance to do something. They had done nothing at all. If the cabinet had not power enough to remove the marshal, they had better remove themselves. There was no use in delay. The question did not need any discussing. He had been watching cabinets for thirty years, and never seen anything like this before. Why did not the attorney-general put out the men whom the people wanted put out? This was the fourth resolution of want of confidence which had come in. That ought not to be so. A few small branches had been lopped off, but the stump—the marshal—was still there. They voted a want of confidence, and the marshal was there still. If they voted another, he would still be there; and if that was the way

things were going to go, the house might as well pack up and go home, and let the cabinet own the country and make the laws.

Let the cabinet stick to their marshal and run the Government without any aid or vote of money from the Legislature. All he wanted was to have the right done. It was the general wish of the country to have the marshal removed. The cabinet should have whispered in the ear of marshal: "If you have any regard for us please resign, or we will not be able to keep our seats." He would like to know whether, if we would promise to support them, they would make an oath that no more opium should be smuggled? Who was benefited when opium was smuggled in? All of them—they were all benefited. He did not make these remarks to assist the passage of the resolution—that was a foregone conclusion—but on the scriptural principle: "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear." The cabinet had ears, and they had heard his opinion of them, but they had not done anything. He moved the previous question. Withdrawn.

Noble Pua said this was the second resolution against this cabinet. Such resolutions had been common since 1887. The first reason announced was that the cabinet had no financial policy. Yet they had the confidence of moneyed men. If the introducer of the resolution and the member for the Third ward had been ministers they would not have been able to borrow one cent. He was sorry to see the disposition among native members to favor this resolution. It was very foolish to go on removing cabinet after cabinet. When Mr. Gibson was minister everything was prosperous; yet there was a clique which was not satisfied, and their dissatisfaction culminated in a revolution. Everything was prosperous in 1887, and then the reform party took the Government and ran it into the ground.

Now, after they had ruined the country and themselves, they came begging for help, and yet when measures were proposed like the lottery bill to make the country prosperous they opposed them. The Government has been run on a moral and holy plan long enough. Let us try some of the schemes got up by the devil and see how they work. Morality has failed; let us try the devil and his plan for a while. Let us have a change. The good plan is played out. The lottery bill will give us \$12,000,000, and the missionaries will put them in their pockets fast enough and ask no questions. The lottery bill will give us our gold, and Horner's bill our paper. All this talk about the works of the devil will then wear out, and people will consider it very good money after all. The resolution said that the cabinet were opposed to American interests, and not on good terms with the American minister. He would like to ask the ministers about that.

Minister Parker said he would say something on that score after the member was through. He had all the documents there.

Noble Pua, proceeding, said the idea was to get rid of the cabinet and have a better one. Did the member from Kona expect to get four angels from heaven?

Rep. Waipuilani said his business was to record his vote in this case against the cabinet. If Her Majesty wished to import four angels from heaven that was her affair.

Noble Pua, said the member, was like a boy who went fishing without any bait. Proceeding, the speaker said he himself would make a good deal better minister than many who might be named. He favored indefinite postponement of the resolution.

Minister Parker said he had not intended to say anything in defense of the cabinet, but he would make a few remarks on the allegations regarding the relation of the cabinet to the American minister. There might be some truth in the statement in regard to the relation of the premier to the minister, but the resolution on the whole gave a wrong impression. The documents in his hand would show what the situation was. The policy of the Government was the same as that of the honorable noble from Maui would be if he were a minister. The documents it would hardly be proper to make public, but, if necessary, the clerk of the house might read them. The honorable noble had made statements of facts which he might have learned from the Advertiser, perhaps, or through spies. It was true that insulting articles had been published in the Bulletin, but the cabinet was not in any way responsible for them. (Rep. Ashford: "Will you allow a question?") After I get through. I know the question. It is true I own a little of the stock. That does not make the Cabinet responsible because I own a little of the stock.

Rep. Kamanoha asked if there had been any feeling of irritation between the American minister and the cabinet, and, if so, whether that feeling had been done away with?

Minister Parker could not speak for the relations of the minister of finance with the American minister, but his own relations were cordial. As to the consideration of the resolution, he, personally, was ready to have it proceeded with at once.

Rep. Kaunamano said it is alleged that the present head of the cabinet was insolent to the minister of the United States. He had brought in a resolution against the minister of the United States, but that resolution was laid on the table and no action was taken on it. If that is all that is alleged in the present resolution, it is

not right to bring that up now. It is all over. But if it is anything which has transpired since, that is different. Therefore, if all the foundation of this resolution is the one that Minister Macfarlane brought in then, then the house should not entertain this resolution, but should lay it on the table. I have heard it said that the American minister took umbrage that the Hawaiian people should wish a ship of war sent out for the relief of a wrecked vessel. If that is the only reason that this resolution is brought in, then it should not be entertained for a minute. Therefore I say that if this resolution is passed on the resolution brought in by Minister Macfarlane when he was noble, then it should be dismissed. But it is put into the resolution because the opposition was to create ill-feeling here, that they wish to force the United States to take this country.

We know that every difficulty of this country for the last fifty years has not been caused by Hawaiians. Fifty years ago it was a few Englishmen who caused the trouble, then the French people, now it is the white people, not the natives. So this clause is put in this resolution to keep prodding the United States till they come down here and take this country. This resolution says the cabinet has not given any notice of a policy. The minister of finance has announced that the policy of the Government was to reduce the expenses of the Government. This was hailed with delight by the house. They may not have announced a policy in regard to the banking bill, but they have in regard to economy, and that is very important. The cabinet enjoys the confidence of the business men of this community. They can go out and get money to pay salaries at the end of the month. The house should take this into consideration. I move that the house take a recess until 7 o'clock.

Lost.

Rep. White moved to take a recess till 7:30.

Rep. Ashford did not believe in a recess. Every member had made up his mind how to vote, and it was unnecessary to take a recess.

Rep. White said he wished to have an opportunity to convince the members from the third that he is wrong in supporting this resolution. I move the house take a recess till 7:30.

Rep. R. W. Wilcox. I move the previous question.

Minister Macfarlane. I claim it is an unfair advantage to take of the ministry to spring a motion of the previous question on us.

Rep. Smith. I would request the motion be withdrawn.

Noble Baldwin. We should give the ministers a chance to speak on this question.

Rep. R. W. Wilcox. I am willing that the ministers should have a chance to speak.

Minister Neumann. I express my thanks to the member from Waialua, and I believe the member from the third wishes to close this discussion, because he thinks I wish to speak about him.

Rep. White said this resolution alleges three grounds for being introduced. Any man who is going to announce a policy waits for a favorable occasion to announce a policy. I have been informed that this cabinet has the intention of giving this house a policy in a very few days. It is not right in us to try to put them out before they have a chance to do anything. As to the second clause of this resolution, that the head of the cabinet was hostile to the American Government, who is the head of the cabinet? There is no head of the cabinet. The constitution provides no head to any cabinet, and therefore this clause falls to the ground. As for the removal of the marshal, this house has given no reason for removing him. If this house is to remove men as they want to, we had better dispense with the judiciary department and all other departments of the Government. The marshal is doing his duty. He is doing all he can to enforce the law. There are opium cases in the courts all the time. Two or three days ago the marshal made a capture of over eight hundred tins of opium. What more can he do? He stopped the last uprising in this country by his forethought and sagacity. The marshal is not perfect; very few men are. But he has done excellently in his position. If every man was perfect there would be no world. This would be heaven, not earth. Those who are advocating a change in the cabinet are only those who wish to further their own ends.

Rep. Bush rose to a point of order. He said Rep. White had the floor more than the time allowed.

President Walker. This is a part of the free fight, and there has been no restriction on time. I shall have to rule that the gentleman will have to take his seat.

Rep. Bush said there was only one speech that day that was over the half-hour limit. We have given the ministry all the chance to speak that they could possibly want, and they have not taken advantage of it.

Rep. Kamaooha moved that the member from Lahania be allowed to speak. Lost.

Noble Marsden said that the member had a little habit of speaking all day. He was perfectly willing to give him another half hour, but to give him unlimited time, never. He therefore moved that he have another half hour. Carried.

Rep. White. I move that we take a recess till 7:30. Amended to 7 o'clock; amended to 10 o'clock on Tuesday.

Minister Macfarlane. The cabinet is prepared to go on to-night, and moved to take a recess till 7 o'clock.

Rep. Ashford wanted to go ahead now.

Carried till 7 o'clock.

EVENING SESSION.

The house reassembled at 7:03 p. m.

Rep. White. The second clause relating to the American minister should be stricken out. As for the marshal, he had proved himself in many respects a very efficient officer. As for opium, some was brought in only a few days ago, in the vessel *S. N. Castle* in containers marked C. & C. Just as much was smuggled during the Thurston administration. The resolution might pass, but the reasons assigned for it had very little weight. Some of the members had very little patience. The work of the session was by no means complete. This resolution should be postponed until after the passage of the appropriation bill. A popular vote would keep the cabinet in their seats by a large majority. One of the things which won the hearts of the natives for the cabinet was their saying they did not favor annexation.

Rep. R. W. Wilcox said he did not want to shut off the member from Lahaina, but he had already used up his extension. The house wanted to hear the ministers. He had withdrawn his motion of the previous question in order to allow the minister of finance to speak, but the latter did not seem disposed to speak.

Minister Macfarlane said he had been waiting patiently to hear why the cabinet should be voted out, but no foreign member had spoken except Noble Thurston. That was his reason for his delay. He wished to hear from the foreign members why this cabinet did not enjoy their confidence. Two weeks ago the ministry had been sustained. Since then a general election had been held and the ministry overwhelmingly indorsed, no other issue being raised. He had little to say, but would refer to some of the statements made by members. The ministry was not being voted out because the allegations of the resolution were true. They were known by the introducer to be unqualifiedly false. The cabinet was voted out for the same reason as two weeks ago, because they would not have them under any consideration.

One of the charges in the resolution complained of a lack of financial policy. It was well known that for the past two weeks the ministry had been incessantly busy working on the appropriation bill in order to be able to formulate and lay before the house a policy, hoping to keep the expenses within the revenue, but at every step they had been thwarted by the men whose sole idea was to rule the country or to ruin it. Only three days since he had informed the house that he would ask the house to refer section 1 of the appropriation bill to the printing committee, so that he could present it to the house with retrenchments from one end of it to the other, and he would have been able to present it in such a shape that it would have been perfectly acceptable to the house and country. It was also well known that Her Majesty had instructed him to commence with her privy purse. To-day was the day set for him to begin. But instead he meets a cut and dried resolution calling on the cabinet to go out of office. They wanted no policy, no retrenchment—nothing but the dismissal of the cabinet. Such a policy was damnable, and it would be so viewed that he believed that not one of these men would be returned to this house. It had been stated by some of the members that the cabinet had sat here doing nothing. No intelligent man could make such a charge. Not one minute had been wasted; \$167,000 had been cut out of the appropriation bill, and he had on his desk six or seven bills, all revenue measures.

Under such circumstances it was not just nor true to say that no financial policy was forthcoming. Those measures would have added largely to the revenue. His successor would perhaps do better; but when they said the cabinet had no policy they said what was not true. They wanted no policy from this cabinet. They wanted nothing but their scalps. If he had been idle, he had been idle to the further extent of putting the assessor's office in order and simplifying it. As to the charge that the cabinet was inimical to the United States, that was an unqualified falsehood, trumped up to rouse feeling. When had he ever placed himself before the community in such a light that such a charge could be made. It was not true. The noble for Maui had referred to his alleged animosity and had mentioned the resolution introduced three months ago. It had seemed to him at that time that the words of his excellency the American minister contained an improper reference to the affairs of this country. The American minister had disclaimed, and he believed the disclaimer to be true. That had not changed his feeling. He was an American citizen not from the accident of birth, but because he preferred to be a citizen of America rather than of any other country in God's world. If those objections were urged against the cabinet because he was a member of it, why had the noble from Maui urged him to accept a position in the cabinet two months ago? These charges were specious, groundless, untrue, and dastardly; and those who made them knew

that he was proud to be an American citizen, and three members of this cabinet were American citizens to-day.

Rep. Smith asked if the minister was not a Hawaiian subject.

Minister Macfarlane said he was one of the last to take the oath of allegiance, and then only on the advice of Minister Merrill that he would not lose his American citizenship. He was a better American than the member from Lihue was a Hawaiian, or he would not be advocating annexation. He believed in annexation and the Advertiser was in favor of annexation, and nothing but annexation would satisfy them. Two weeks ago these gentlemen were fighting for the constitutional principle involved. That is lost sight of now and new charges are trumped up to defeat what we have been trying to do in the interests of the country. The gentlemen had charged that they were opposed to American interests, and that these struggling industries were throttled in their infancy because the cabinet was hostile to the United States. That was the veriest bosh and nonsense, and this cabinet would be as able to negotiate a treaty as anyone, and the correspondence would prove that, and he wished the house might see it. Such statements were simply dust-throwing to make it appear that only these gentlemen of the opposition could bring about a treaty with the United States. It had also been stated by the noble from Maui that the utterances of the Bulletin were chargeable to the cabinet. Those statements were utterly untrue, and the cabinet had no control over that paper whatever. He would read, with the permission of the house, the correspondence with the minister, which would show that the course of the cabinet had been fully straightforward and manly, and not as had been represented by the noble from Maui. The correspondence was somewhat extended, but it would show the facts. It would be proper to have the correspondence read if the house so requested, and he would ask the house to request that the correspondence be read.

Noble Williams moved it be read.

Noble Thurston said if the minister wished to have the correspondence read he must do so on his own responsibility, and not endeavor to shift the responsibility to the house.

Rep. Ashford endorsed the remarks of the last speaker. The minister might read it on his own responsibility if he wanted to, but he hoped he would not want to. Not that he feared to have anything read, but to judge from the remarks of the premier it must be twaddle.

Rep. Waipulani thought the minister had no right to read the correspondence. In any case the house should be cleared.

Rep. Kaunamano wished it read.

Minister Macfarlane said it was somewhat irregular, but he would read it with the concurrence of the house and not without. It would show the statements of the members of the other side to be false. It would show that the cabinet were in no way responsible for the bulletin.

The president stated that the minister was asking too much of the house. He might read it if he chose.

Minister Macfarlane contended that he might read it if the house asked for it.

Rep. ASHFORD. We shan't ask for it.

Minister MACFARLANE. Then you won't hear it, and you don't want to, either.

Minister Parker asked the minister of finance to give way for a moment. The allegation was made here that the cabinet were on unfriendly terms with the American minister. This correspondence was brought here to disprove that. If the house were not willing to hear the correspondence, then they should strike out the corresponding part of the resolution.

Rep. Kapahu said no amount of talking would change anybody's mind. Noble Thurston had expatiated on a quarrel supposed to exist between the cabinet and the American minister, but when the correspondence was brought in they were scared and didn't want it read. This correspondence should be examined. A committee should be appointed to examine into the truth about it. There was nothing in any of the charges against the ministry. The opposition were like a man who pulls a banana plant up every twenty-four hours to see whether it is growing. It was only the other day that when the minister wanted to fix the appropriation bill, this house told him to take it and fix it. Now they want to put him out, before he has had a chance to do anything about it. This house has no right to tell the attorney-general to remove the marshal. This rests with the attorney-general alone. We have no right to try public officials for their actions. Much fault has been found with the cabinet because they do not put down gambling. Gambling has gone on under all administrations here. Was it stopped during the term of office of the noble from Maui? No. Therefore the house should not censure the marshal or the cabinet for these things now.

Mr. NEUMANN. The cabinet is not on the defensive, but I will ask if any member of this house wishes to speak, for I want to close. It is our right to close this debate, and I will give way to anyone who wishes to speak. On behalf of the cabinet, he

could say they would be glad to go out, and wish joy to their successors. [Rep. Bush: What, in going out?] No; in coming in. The house was like a theater, in which various motions were brought out; but he had never felt the emotion of pity as he had for the once great, wise, and truthful noble for Maui. He had detailed truthfully and eloquently how much the United States had done for us; but his love for the United States was like Horace Walpole's gratitude—a lively anticipation of future favors. The bounty, however, would not come. He had gloried in the strength of the member for Maui, and had looked on him as one of the best and most patriotic young men in the country until to-day.

We will now look at this resolution, and see what sort of language it is written in. (The minister then read the second clause of the resolution.) I congratulate his excellency the minister of finance that he was important enough to have made so much trouble. If you had read as much fiction as I have, you would say that Dumas, who wrote the Count of Monte Christo, should hide his head in shame. He is "not in it" with Mr. Thurston. Who the brilliant author is I do not know. I suspected at first that it came from the facile pen of the member of the Third ward. But it is miles above his imagination. If the Legislature should vote this cabinet out on this ground, it would be laughed at in Washington. I hope you will not be laughed at. I am a Hawaiian by residence, denizenship, and citizenship, and I do not wish harm or ridicule to come to the Hawaiian people; and this second clause is dragged in as a reason to put this cabinet out. I am not here in defense of the cabinet. It has been said that the cabinet has no policy. Anyone who is not wilfully blind can see that it has a policy. It has the policy of economy, of renewing the credit of this country abroad. Now, he did not desire to retaliate upon the member from Maui, who had robbed him of one of his dearest illusions—his admiration of him, but if Hawaiian bonds were ever worth 113 it was none of his doing. The \$900,000 in the Postal Savings Bank was gone, unaccounted for.

During his incumbency the treaty which Mr. Carter had brought to perfection was rejected. So much for American enmity. By the grace of his late Majesty the speaker was made a denizen. He was practically a Hawaiian, but first an American, and would remain one. Now, however, he proposed to make the interests of this country his first care. The want-of-confidence motion was cut and dried or it would not have been brought. He did not question the motives of the members who voted for the cabinet two weeks ago. Some of them had a slight lapse of honesty four years ago, when a reform house voted them out of it. He wished them now a good digestion of the acquisition. Perhaps the conduct of these members now had motives similar to those which actuated them in 1888. He understood that a good deal of the persuasion had come from a member who gives luaus, and who has offered a member of this house a valuable piece of land. He held himself responsible for what he said and he would not be afraid to meet him when he came to him if he was in hearing. One of these men was a member of a benevolent society and had not turned in the funds which he had collected. He did not propose to leave the subject without tearing off the mask, and if the reform party got its support from such foul and impure sources, he could only congratulate them.

It had been strikingly said by his friend the noble from Maui that he would form a coalition with the devil, and he had come as near to it as he could when he found these two coadjutors. These men when they went back to their constituents would wear a blush which would shame the woods on fire. This cabinet was not necessary to the prosperity of the country. He could pick out quite as good a one from this house, but let the house be honest, strike out the preamble and do not pretend that you have any honest reason for the vote. The member from Maui had charged the cabinet with raising the sham cry of annexation. Not a word had been said by the cabinet on annexation except in reply to what the opposition had advanced, and when a fellow ran at the head of a crowd and shouted stop thief, he was usually the man who should be locked up. It had been well said that no remarks from anyone would change the views of anyone. No amount of talk could move those men who had such cogent reasons for changing their minds.

In regard to the marshal, he wished to thank the members for all their courtesies but he would say that not ten houses could make him do any unjust act—he would not condemn a man unheard. Mr. Bush's report contained a number of citations from encyclopedias, etc., which even he had not read. He had learned more about opium from that pamphlet than he had ever known before, but nothing about the marshal except a few vague rumors. As to the other opium report, he had been as astonished that there had not been at least a little paltry flame after so much smoke and noise. But there was nothing but glimmering ashes. There was nothing in the reports on which a rational man could take action. He would say to the gentlemen who were going to vote for the resolution, that he could not admire their sense or justice. They could not hurt him, for he wanted no position which brought nothing but abuse from every quarter. He thanked them for their attention.

Noble Thurston did not propose to go into details. The attorney-general in a late campaign speech had taken occasion to charge him with losing \$900,000. The attorney-general knew that he was speaking an untruth, and he knows it to-night. He said the bonds could only be sold for 90. The treasury balance when he took office was about \$13,000. Bonds could not be sold at any price. Bonds had to be placed

England at a cost of \$100,000. The treasury balance March 31st, 1888, was \$109,55; March 31st, 1890, it was \$491,152. Hawaiian Government bonds sold at public auction here at 113. The minister wrote to London to buy bonds at par and could not get any for nearly a year. As to the postal savings bank, the minister of finance's report gives every dollar and every cent of expenditure of the funds for that service. During that period \$579,000 was received from the bank. (The speaker read a large number of items showing that the money was expended in useful public improvements.) So that when the attorney-general makes such statements he knows, or could know, it was false, and should have the decency to get up and admit it. [Attorney-General: I said it had been wasted.] You said it had disappeared, and left no record and no trace.

Attorney-General Neumann asked indulgence of the house to set himself right. He had not charged any stealing. The honorable member claimed that there were pipes. So there were. Iron pipes resting at Wailuku—an electric plant which was most worthless. (Noble Thurston: And a balance of \$491,000 in the treasury.) Perhaps he had erred in his figures. The member might have wasted but \$600,000.

Rep. Kamaooha said he had not intended to say anything more, but the attorney-general had reflected on the motives of the members. The attorney-general had suddenly developed the idea that going to luaus was wrong. What then did he say about the luaus given at Waikiki when this resolution was up before. What about the title dinners that used to be given at the hotel. Did the attorney-general mean to admit that these were given for the purpose of influencing votes? The reason for the change of the members was that they had been disappointed in the conduct of the cabinet. As for the members going back to their constituents with a blush on their cheeks, there would be no need of that, and their chance of being returned was a good deal better than the attorney-general's. He would move the previous question.

Rep. Waipuilani said the insinuations of the attorney-general, that certain members had taken bribes, were an insult to the house. (Some sparring took place between the member and the attorney-general at this point.) The minister of finance had intimated that this resolution had been got up at the luau yesterday. It was proposed last week and given to the interpreter to translate. He hoped every member would vote honestly and moved the ayes and noes be taken.

The motion to indefinitely postpone was lost on the following division:

Ayes—Nobles Hopkins, Pua, Peterson, Williams, Maile, Hind, Cornwell, and Dreir, 15.

Noes—Nobles Ena, Cummins, Kaulane, J. M. Horner, Hoapili, Marsden, Young, Baldwin, W. Y. Horner, Walbridge, Anderson, Thurston, G. N. Wilcox, and Kanoa; 31.

Absent—Noble Berger.

Rep. Nahinu explained his vote. He voted no on account of the registration bill and the O. R. & L. Co. bill.

The motion to adopt the resolution was carried on the same division.

A motion to reconsider was made and lost.

The house adjourned at 10:18 p. m.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

[No. 59.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, October 26, 1892.

SIR: I have received your dispatch No. 70, of the 8th instant, in relation to the political situation in Hawaii. It has been read with much interest and attention.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

[Confidential.]

No. 72.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, October 31, 1892.

SIR: In dispatch 71, of October 19, I gave account of the rejection of the new cabinet appointed by the Queen in defiance of a previously expressed majority of the Legislature. The deadlock continues. Though two weeks have elapsed since the decisive action of the Legislature, no ministers have been designated to fill the vacancies. The Tahitian favorite and the Queen still refuse to take the legislative majority and the leading business men of the islands into their confidence. The palace is still thronged and surrounded by the worst elements, and the responsible citizens feel that they are not welcomed as advisors. The Queen and the Tahitian have made several new ministerial slates, with one responsible man and three of the other kind; but no responsible man, so far, can be found who will go into the cabinet with the three whom only a minority of the Legislature will accept.

Thus there is here, on a small scale, the old historic issue between autocracy and parliamentary responsibility. The foreign adventurers and renegades stand by the Tahitian favorite because he is the instrument which they can use, and he adheres to them because he needs their support. In the meantime the Legislature is unable to do business and has been in session only a few hours for several weeks. If that body holds firm, the Queen will have to yield, and a responsible ministry would probably be the result. The ultra-English influence is strongly with the half-English Tahitian favorite and the Queen, for the one reason only, that the success of the legislative majority would be the appointment of a cabinet strongly American in sympathy and purpose. There are strong reasons for the belief that were it not for the presence of the American naval force in the harbor the Tahitian marshal and his gang would induce the Queen to attempt a coup d'etat by proclaiming a new constitution, taking from the legislature the power to reject ministerial appointments.

The recent arrival here from England of T. H. Davies, the head of a strong English house in Honolulu, formerly a resident here for many years, has served to intensify the ultra-English feeling and to strengthen the American sentiment. This T. H. Davies having made himself rich under the sugar provisions of the reciprocity treaty, now resides in England and has a kind of supervisory care of the half-white Hawaiian crown princess, for several years and still at school in England. When a resident here at the time the Pearl Harbor provision was pending, Davies strongly opposed that provision. He comes now with revived zeal against the Pearl Harbor concession. It is not thought that he has any encouragement to this course from the home Government of England, but that his course is his own, and that his zeal is increased by the Canadian Pacific Railroad managers, of whom Davies is the agent. The desperate efforts of that road to save itself embrace the scheme of a cable, and Pacific steamer lines to Australia and China, including the design of antagonizing the interests of the United States in these islands. This involves the plan of controlling the Hawaiian monarchy through the present Queen and her favorite, and especially by having in hand the crown princess, the general belief being that the present Queen will not live many years. Davies, who has this supervising care

of the crown princess in England, is a Tory. Of course these facts, so apparent to intelligent observers here, are telling on all friends of the United States.

The other of the two principal English commercial houses here, older and nearly as wealthy as those of Davies & Co., is thoroughly Americanized and stands firmly against the efforts of T. H. Davies, and is for the United States on every issue. This house owns several hundreds of thousands (of dollars worth?) of property in Iowa and California, its head being father-in-law of Gen. Dimond, the head of the United States mint in San Francisco.

Perhaps it is well to state that it is the rumor here that the last rejected cabinet, only holding their places until others are appointed, have sent a dispatch to Washington asking the recall of Consul-General Severance. I do not credit this rumor. But influential parties have called at this legation who say that if any such step has been taken by this rejected cabinet, the American merchants and business men, as well as other leading citizens, will send a strong memorial to the Department of State against any such action of a dead ministry. I have not encouraged any such action in our behalf, believing it to be unnecessary. So far I am supported here by all the responsible Americans and others to a degree more than I had the right to expect. This so much the more impresses on me the necessity of prudence as well as of firmness. To keep the Department of State well informed as to affairs here, I deem it well to give these particulars.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[Later.]

NOVEMBER 1, 1892.

Names of the new cabinet sent to the Legislature this morning. Resolutions of "want of confidence" passed in one house, and thirty minutes after the names of the new ministry were read, and only 13 votes out of 48 members of whom the Legislature is composed were in their favor. The strongest objections are to the minister of foreign affairs and to the minister of finance—Joseph Mamohi and William H. Cornwell—both of them unqualified and very unacceptable to the more responsible men of all nationalities. As they will assume to hold their places until their successors shall have been appointed, they may attempt to do some strange things. As Cornwell, for some reason, is hostile to the American minister and to the consul-general, would not be surprised should he induce his associates to ask for our recall. Possibly they may hold their places one week, as the Legislature has adjourned for six days to allow the Queen time to select their successors.

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

No. 61.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 5, 1892.

SIR: I have received and read with attention your dispatch No. 71, of the 19th ultimo, in relation to the Hawaiian political situation.

I am, etc.,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

[Confidential.]

No. 62.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 3, 1892.

SIR: Adverting to your current dispatches in relation to the course of political events in the Hawaiian Islands, many of which are marked by you "Confidential" and for obvious reasons, I desire to suggest that you endeavor to separate your reports into two classes, one of which shall aim to give the narrative of public affairs in their open historical aspect, and the other to be of a strictly reserved and confidential character, reporting and commenting upon matters of personal intrigue and the like so far as you may deem necessary for my full understanding of the situation. Many of your dispatches combine these two modes of treatment to such a degree as to make their publication, in the event of a call from Congress or other occasion therefor inexpedient and, indeed, impracticable, without extended omissions.

I am, etc.,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 73.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, November 8, 1892.

SIR: The prolonged struggle between the Queen and the Legislature has terminated to-day by the triumph of the latter. A new ministry has just been appointed, of quite different material from that of its several predecessors. Mark P. Robinson, Foreign Affairs; Peter C. Jones, Finance; G. N. Wilcox, Interior; Cecil Brown, Attorney-General. These are of the responsible men of the islands, none of them needing the salaries, all being of comparative wealth, their aggregate property being estimated at nearly one million of dollars. Mr. Jones is a native of Boston, Massachusetts, in active business here for a quarter of a century, though he has lived the past year in his native city, having recently returned to Honolulu.

Wilcox, the wealthiest man of the four, was born on one of the islands, of American missionary parentage. Robinson is the most respected man of the islands, of mixed blood, three quarters white, born here. The first three are strong in American feeling and purpose. Brown, the attorney-general, was born here, of English parentage, and is said to be more American than English as to the future of Hawaii. It is possible the Tahitian favorite may be continued as marshal for the present, but his dictatorship is practically overthrown. The success of the Legislative majority and the appointment of this cabinet are regarded as the triumph of the better citizens of Hawaii over the worse, and especially a proof of American ascendancy over ultra English and other anti-American elements and sentiments. This new cabinet is justly considered the most positively American there has been here since the Reform ministry went out two and a half years ago. I am happy to say that my official and personal relations with this ministry are likely to be most friendly and cordial.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

[Confidential.]

No. 74.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, November 20, 1892.

SIR: Fidelity to the trust imposed on me by the President, the Department of State, and the Senate, requires that I should make a careful and full statement of the financial, agricultural, social, and political condition of these islands. An intelligent and impartial examination of the facts can hardly fail to lead to the conclusion that the relations and policy of the United States toward Hawaii will soon demand some change, if not the adoption of decisive measures, with the aim to secure American interests and future supremacy by encouraging Hawaiian development and aiding to promote responsible government in these islands. It is unnecessary for me to allude to the deep interest and the settled policy of the United States Government in respect of these islands, from the official days of John Quincy Adams and of Daniel Webster to the present time. In all that period, we have avowed the superiority of our interests to those of all other nations, and have always refused to embarrass our freedom of action by any alliance or arrangement with other powers as to the ultimate possession and government of the islands. Before stating the present political condition of the little kingdom, it is well to review the substantial data as to its area, its resources, its financial and business condition, its capabilities of material development, its population, the status of its landed property, its government, revenues, and expenditures, etc.

PHYSICAL DIMENSIONS.

The total area of the kingdom is about 6,000 square miles. Not including several small islands of little importance, the chief value of the land area is in the six islands of Oahu, Kauai, Maui, Molokai, Lanai, and Hawaii, the last named being nearly the size of all the rest of the group. The plains, valleys, and lowlands are fertile, while the highlands are adapted to the raising of extensive herds of cattle, horses, and sheep. The arable lands are adapted to the production of sugar, coffee, rice, bananas, oranges, lemons, pineapples, grapes and maize. Of the arable lands only such as are fitted for the production of sugar and rice have been much brought into use. The coffee raised is of superior quality, and finds ready market for home consumption and in San Francisco. There is no doubt that this product can be greatly extended. This opinion is sustained by the examination of experts and has been verified by successful results in coffee-raising, to which there is now being given special attention.

The banana culture can be greatly extended, and the opportunities for the production of oranges are large and promising. Ripening at a time in the year different from those of southern California, the Hawaiian oranges can find a ready market in San Francisco, and especially in the cities of Oregon and Washington, where these islands procure most of their lumber for buildings and fences, and from which they procure coal, the consumption of which will necessarily increase for use in the sugar mills and the supply of steamers. For a quarter of a century the profits of sugar-raising have tended to divert capital and enterprise almost exclusively to the cane culture, to the neglect of the other industries and interests of the islands. Good government

and the building of necessary roads and bridges, the Government assumption of the "crown lands," and the conversion of them into small homesteads for raising the crops already specified, would speedily stimulate general prosperity and increase the American and European families and freeholders, and aid to constitute a large number of responsible voters, thus giving stability to legislation and government.

There are nearly 900,000 acres of "crown lands," and these, in the main, are among the most valuable of the islands. The rent paid for them goes to the sovereign, and the amount of the income received is no doubt much less than it would be if these lands were owned and managed by private individuals. There have long been more or less abuses in the leasing of these lands, and it is well understood that the leases have been prolific sources of political favoritism and corruption. Well handled and sold at fitting opportunities, the proceeds of the crown lands would pay the national debt, provide adequate pensions for the two or three royalties, in case monarchy should be abolished, and yet leave a balance of considerable amount for a permanent school fund.

COMMERCIAL AND NAVAL IMPORTANCE OF THE ISLANDS.

The value of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States for commercial and naval purposes has been well understood by American statesmen for more than half a century. The examination of the Hawaiian harbors and a careful consideration of their capabilities of defense, twenty years since, by Gen. Schofield and naval officers, whose opinions are on record in the Washington departments, plainly indicate how important these islands and harbors are to the future American commerce of the Pacific. Even to a nonexpert the great value and the easy defensibility of the harbors of Pearl City and of Honolulu are unmistakably obvious. Only six miles from each other, with narrow entrances backed by a continuous wall of mountains, each terminus of this natural barrier reaching to the sea, at relatively small expense these harbors can be impregnably fortified against all attack by sea and land. The harbor of Honolulu can now be entered by ships drawing 30 feet of water. But Pearl Harbor is larger and much preferable for naval purposes. It is only necessary to deepen the entrance by removing the bar of coral formation. This coral obstruction can be removed with comparative ease, and the expense would not be large. Opinions of practical men here, who have had to do with these coral formations, as well as my personal observation, as to how easily it can be broken up by pick and crow-bar, go to show how readily it can be removed by modern explosives and the improved mechanical agencies.

With a large island between it and the sea, a capacious, safe, and beautiful harbor is secured for American commercial and military marine just where the future greatness and the necessities of the United States imperatively require. Only those who have carefully examined the vast resources of the American Pacific States, and considered that nearly two-fifths of the immense area of the United States, through the transcontinental railways and by rivers and sounds, outlet on the Pacific, and have studied the data surely pointing to the vast future commerce of this western world, can adequately appreciate the importance of these harbors to the American nation, and the necessity of securing them against foreign rivals. If we neglect them the present occupants must suffer, and their necessities will force them in directions unfriendly to American interests. Circumstances are pressing, and no time should

be lost in looking at the facts as they really exist. The strong inclination of several European powers to gain possession of all the islands in the Pacific, except such as are expressly protected by the United States, is plainly shown by what has taken place in recent years.

The seizure of Gilbert, Johnson, and other islands, in the past few months, and what recently transpired in regard to Samoa, emphatically show that England certainly has not moderated her policy in the indicated regard, to which course the Canadian Government is undoubtedly the inspiring cause. The enormous cost of the Canadian Pacific Railway impels its managers to make the most desperate efforts to secure freight and passengers, and hence its aggressive plans to secure Pacific commerce and to gain political and commercial influence in these islands. The scheme of a British cable from Vancouver via Honolulu to Australia, as well as to Japan and China, and of establishing commercial and mail lines of steamers on the same route, is not an idle dream. Powerful agencies are already working to these ends, and to effectively safeguard American interests on the Pacific and in these islands there is no time for hesitation and delay. If the United States Government does not very promptly provide for laying a cable from San Francisco or San Diego to Honolulu or Hilo, it may be regarded as certain that a cable will be laid by British capital and be controlled by British managers. Pearl Harbor for a coaling station and an American cable between California and Hawaii are of immediate vital importance to American commercial and naval interests and to the maintenance of American influence on these islands.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLANDS.

A question of vital importance to Hawaii and of American interest in and care for its future is that of its government. There has been in the last twenty years a great change in the political status of things here. Formerly the facts and circumstances appertaining to government on these islands were essentially different from what they are today. Then the population was chiefly native Hawaiian. The natives had long lived under a kind of feudal system, with rigid laws and customs, which gave to the numerous chiefs and the King absolute despotic power. The wisdom and the religious zeal of the Christian missionaries enabled them to acquire and exercise a strong influence for good over the chiefs and King as well. Thus a system of government and laws was established which was a great improvement on the former condition of things. The general good character of the men who effectively aided the Hawaiian monarch to carry on the Government for years secured fairly successful administration of law and the maintenance of public order at limited cost, the public revenues being small. But the numerous Hawaiian chiefs are in their graves. Their families are extinct. The original native Hawaiians are now so decreased as to number less than two-fifths of the population of the islands.

The coming to the throne of the late King Kalakaua in 1873 was by legislative election, and but for the presence in the harbor and on shore of American marines and sailors, of the United States vessels of war, he would have failed to secure his Crown against a determined mob in the interest of another aspirant. The great prosperity of the islands under the reciprocity treaty, stimulating the production of sugar, leading to a large American, European, and Asiatic immigration, caused a great increase of the Government revenues. This prosperous state of things also soon resulted in a large increase of the Government expenditures,

in the addition of new offices, a large augmentation of salaries, thus stimulating the desire for official places and patronage, exciting the greed of adventurous and too often unworthy political partisans. Easy going, unused to and incapable of safe and economical administration, the King, Kalakaua, too often, in his seventeen years of reign, fell into the hands of unscrupulous associates and advisers. The Government expenditures soon reached figures much above what the area and population of the little Kingdom justified. But so long as the great profits of sugar-raising under the American tariff flowed into the islands, the excessive Government expenses could be paid without the principal taxpayers very sensibly realizing the burden.

The adoption of a new constitution in 1887, taking from the King much of his former power and establishing legislative and ministerial responsibility, effected a beneficial change. But the great reduction of the profits of sugar-raising, rendering some of the plantations nearly worthless, and greatly lessening the income and market value of the others, has brought a condition of affairs which compels all the reflecting and responsible citizens to see that the present expenses of the Government are much beyond what the islands can pay and much higher than wise legislation and proper economic administration require. But the difficulty of getting out of the old grooves, of scaling down salaries, and abolishing useless offices is hard to overcome. Nearly one-half of the population of the country have no voice in political affairs, unless exerted through corruption and bribery. The voting population is made up of several nationalities—Hawaiian, Portuguese, American, English, German, and others, the more intelligent and responsible of these generally acting together sufficiently to exercise a beneficial influence on legislation and administration. But the palace patronage and influence are still considerable, costing the country more than it is able to pay and returning to the country no positive advantages.

Directly and indirectly, the palace probably costs the little Kingdom \$150,000 per year. A governor, at \$5,000 a year, acting in harmony with the responsible men of the Legislature, would be far better for the islands than the present monarchical arrangement. In truth, the monarchy here is an absurd anachronism. It has nothing on which it logically or legitimately stands. The feudal basis on which it once stood no longer existing, the monarchy is now only an impediment to good government—an obstruction to the prosperity and progress of the islands. Incapable of comprehending the principles of constitutional government, more likely to take the advice of unworthy counsel than of the more competent, the reigning Sovereign insists in dealing with what properly belongs to the Legislature and to the ministers. Thus the palace is constantly open to superficial and irresponsible courtiers and to unprincipled adventurers of different nationalities. Instead of exercising a salutary influence on public affairs it is the center of maladministration and of the most vicious kind of politics. It is now, and it has been for the last twenty years, and is always likely to be, a fruitful source of public demoralization.

It may be asked, Why do not the people of the islands at once reform this state of things? There is a considerable number of intelligent, energetic, and excellent citizens, of the different nationalities, in possession of the elective franchise. They are largely Americanized in their opinions and manners. They are sympathetic with American institutions. This is so of the Portuguese, the Germans, more or less of the English, and of the native Hawaiians and half-whites, as well as

of the most of those of American parentage. But these unaided and alone can not well make the necessary changes in the existing condition of things. As a crown colony of Great Britain, or a Territory of the United States, the government modifications could be made readily, and good administration of the laws secured. Destiny and the vast future interests of the United States in the Pacific clearly indicate who, at no distant day, must be responsible for the government of these islands. Under a territorial government they could be as easily governed as any of the existing Territories of the United States.

The men qualified are here to carry on good government, provided they have the support of the Government of the United States. Why not postpone American possession? Would it not be just as well for the United States to take the islands twenty-five years hence? Facts and obvious probabilities will answer both of these interrogatives. Hawaii has reached the parting of the ways. She must now take the road which leads to Asia, or the other, which outlets her in America, gives her an American civilization and binds her to the care of American destiny. The non-action of the American Government here in thirty years will make of Hawaii a Singapore, or a Hongkong, which could be governed as a British colony, but would be unfit to be an American Territory or an American State under our constitutional system. If the American flag floats here at no distant day, the Asiatic tendencies can be arrested and controlled without retarding the material development of the islands, but surely advancing their prosperity by diversifying and expanding the industries, building roads and bridges, opening the public lands to small farmers from Europe and the United States, thus increasing the responsible voting population, and constituting a solid basis for American methods of government.

Two-fifths of the people now here are Chinese and Japanese. If the present state of things is allowed to go on the Asiatics will soon largely preponderate, for the native Hawaiians are growing less at the rate of nearly one thousand per year. At the present prices of sugar, and at the prices likely to hold in the future, sugar-raising on these islands can be continued only by the cheapest possible labor—that of the Japanese, the Chinese, and the Indian coolies. Americanize the islands, assume control of the "Crown lands," dispose of them in small lots for actual settlers and freeholders for the raising of coffee, oranges, lemons, bananas, pineapples, and grapes, and the result soon will be to give permanent preponderance to a population and a civilization which will make the islands like southern California, and at no distant period convert them into gardens and sanitariums, as well as supply stations for American commerce, thus bringing everything here into harmony with American life and prosperity. To postpone American action many years is only to add to present unfavorable tendencies and to make future possession more difficult.

It is proper to consider the following facts: The present Sovereign is not expected to live many years. The princess heir apparent has always been, and is likely always to be, under English influence. Her father is British in blood and prejudices, firmly intrenched here as collector of customs, an important and influential office. She has been for some years and still is in England; her patron there, who has a kind of guardianship of her, T. H. Davies, is a Tory Englishman, who lived here many years, who still owns large property in the islands, and is a resolute and persistent opponent of American predominance, bitterly denouncing even the American acquisition of Pearl Harbor. Mr. Wodehouse, the English minister, has long resided here; his eldest son is

married to a half-caste sister of the Crown Princess, another son is in the Honolulu post-office, and a daughter also is married to a resident of one of the islands. The death of the present Queen, therefore, would virtually place an English princess on the Hawaiian throne, and put in the hands of the ultra English the patronage and influence of the palace.

In the existing state of things, with non-American intervention, these palace influences, skillfully handled, are nearly equal, frequently superior, to the power of the Legislature. Add to this palace power, in British hands, the influence of an adventurous, impecunious, and irresponsible mob of "hoodlums," and there results a state of things which would put it in the power of Canadian and ultra-British schemers, with a subsidy fund of \$50,000, to secure control of the Legislature, and by prompt and vigorous action secure Canadian and British franchises, privileges, and rights entirely legal, to get rid of which would cause embarrassment and expense to the United States and her allies here. As is well known to the Department of State, Secretary Marcy, with the approval of President Pierce and Cabinet, authorized the negotiation of a treaty for making these islands a Territory of the United States. Commissioner Gregg was authorized to facilitate the negotiation by the promise to pay \$100,000 for pensions to the King, chiefs, and other official persons, on condition that the sovereignty and property of the islands should be transferred to the United States.

Commissioner Gregg exceeded his instructions by stipulating to pay, in all, three times the sum which Secretary Marcy named in his instructions. These terms were deemed onerous and unacceptable by the Washington Department of State, and consequently the treaty was dropped, after all negotiations had been completed, the King finally being induced by his Scotch minister of foreign affairs not to sign it, though the King and cabinet had previously given their support to the spirit and terms of the negotiations and the conclusions reached. The embarrassments and objections that then existed as to the number of the royal princes and chiefs, the small number of the American population, the want of ready communication with the United States, and distance from Washington, now no longer stand in the way of making Hawaii a well-governed and prosperous United States Territory. The reasons for annexation in 1854 were certainly much less adequate and pressing than they are now.

THE EXISTING BUSINESS STATUS.

It is well to consider the existing state of things here resulting from the change in the United States sugar tariff. Only personal observation and a careful investigation of the facts can give one an adequate idea of the severe blow sugar raising here has received. The production of sugar being the main business of the islands, the great reduction of the market price has affected powerfully the entire affairs and condition of the islands. I think it understating the truth to express the opinion that the loss to the owners of the sugar plantations and mills, etc., and the consequent depreciation of other property by the passage of the McKinley bill, wise and beneficial as that measure is proving to be for the vast interests of the United States, has not been less than \$12,000,000, a large portion of this loss falling on Americans residing here and in California. Unless some positive measures of relief be granted, the depreciation of sugar property here will continue to go on. Wise, bold action by the United States will rescue the property

holders from great losses, give the islands a government which will put an end to a worse than useless expenditure of a large proportion of the revenues of the country, using them for the building of roads and bridges, thus helping to develop the natural resources of the islands, aiding to diversify the industries and to increase the number of the responsible citizens.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

One of two courses seems to me absolutely necessary to be followed, either bold and vigorous measures for annexation or a "customs union," an ocean cable from the Californian coast to Honolulu, Pearl Harbor perpetually ceded to the United States, with an implied but not necessarily stipulated American protectorate over the islands. I believe the former to be the better, that which will prove much the more advantageous to the islands, and the cheapest and least embarrassing in the end for the United States. If it was wise for the United States, through Secretary Marcy, thirty-eight years ago, to offer to expend \$100,000 to secure a treaty of annexation, it certainly can not be chimerical or unwise to expend \$100,000 to secure annexation in the near future. To-day the United States has five times the wealth she possessed in 1854, and the reasons now existing for annexation are much stronger than they were then. I can not refrain from expressing the opinion with emphasis that the golden hour is near at hand. A perpetual customs union and the acquisition of Pearl Harbor, with an implied protectorate, must be regarded as the only allowable alternative. This would require the continual presence in the harbor of Honolulu of a United States vessel of war and the constant watchfulness of the United States minister while the present bungling, unsettled, and expensive political rule would go on, retarding the development of the islands, leaving at the end of twenty-five years more embarrassment to annexation than exists to-day, the property far less valuable, and the population less American than they would be if annexation were soon realized.

It may be said that annexation would involve the obligation of paying to the Hawaiian sugar-producers the same rate of bounties now paid to American producers, thus imposing too heavy a demand on the United States Treasury. It is a sufficient answer to this objection to say that it could be specifically provided in the terms of annexation that the United States Government should pay 6 mills per pound—\$12 per ton—to the Hawaiian sugar-raisers, and this only so long as the present sugar-bounty system of the United States shall be maintained. Careful inquiry and investigation bring me to the conclusion that this small bounty would tide the Hawaiian sugar-planters over their present alarming condition and save the islands from general business depression and financial disaster. Could justice to American interests in the islands and care for their future welfare do less than this?

To give Hawaii a highly favorable treaty while she remains outside the American Union would necessarily give the same advantages to hostile foreigners, those who would continue to antagonize our commercial and political interests here, as well as those of American blood and sympathies. It is a well authenticated fact that the American sentiment here in 1890, the last year of the great prosperity under the sugar provisions of the reciprocity treaty, was much less manifest than before that treaty had gone into effect, and less pronounced than when

Secretary Marcy authorized the negotiation of the annexation treaty in 1854. It is equally true that the desire here at this time for annexation is much stronger than in 1889. Besides, so long as the islands retain their own independent government there remains the possibility that England or the Canadian Dominion might secure one of the Hawaiian harbors for a coaling station. Annexation excludes all dangers of this kind.

Which of the two lines of policy and action shall be adopted our statesmen and our Government must decide. Certain it is that the interests of the United States and the welfare of these islands will not permit the continuance of the existing state and tendency of things. Having for so many years extended a helping hand to the islands and encouraged the American residents and their friends at home to the extent we have, we can not refrain now from aiding them with vigorous measures, without injury to ourselves and those of our "kith and kin" and without neglecting American opportunities that never seemed so obvious and pressing as they do now. I have no doubt that the more thoroughly the bed rock and controlling facts touching the Hawaiian problem are understood by our Government and by the American public, the more readily they will be inclined to approve the views I have expressed so inadequately in this communication.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Hon. JOHN W. FOSTER,
Secretary of State.

NOTE.—On the following pages will be found statistics from the Hawaiian census reports of 1890, touching the population, the different nationalities, the principal property owners, the amount of Government revenues and expenditures, Government property, etc., which will help elucidate the views I have expressed in the preceding pages.

J. L. S.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 75.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, November 28, 1892.

SIR: Your dispatch No. 62 of November 8 received. Hereafter I will comply as nearly as practicable with your suggestion that I separate my reports into two classes, one of an "open historical aspect" and the other of a "strictly reserved and confidential character."

My dispatch 74, marked confidential, was written and copied before your 62 was received. The reason why I have deemed it necessary to consider most of my dispatches confidential is because of the peculiar state of things here. Anything which gets out in Washington in relation to affairs here is sure at once to be taken up by San Francisco papers, some of which are highly sensational. These newspapers are brought here in large numbers by the mail steamer, not followed by another usually before two weeks. Thus a falsehood or misrepresentation stands here unrefuted for two weeks, doing mischief.

So far the new cabinet holds well and gives satisfaction to the responsible men of the islands.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

No. 65.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 1, 1892.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of dispatches numbered 47-73 and 53 B.

I am, etc.,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

No. 67.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 23, 1892.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch No. 74, of the 20th of November, marked "confidential," relative to the financial and political condition of Hawaii, which has been read with interest.

I am, etc.,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

No. 68.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 23, 1892.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch No. 75, of the 28th ultimo, regarding confidential dispatches.

I am, sir,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

[Telegram.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, H. I., January 18, 1893.

Events in Hawaii in the past few days have moved rapidly. An entire overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy and the establishment of a provisional government in the interest of the whole people of the islands, without the sacrifice of a single life. The new Government is in full possession of the islands and was promptly recognized by all the diplomatic representatives. The four men of whom it is composed are of high character, one of whom resigned his position as one of the supreme judges to assume the place. Full dispatches by the mail leaving Honolulu to-day by special steamer.

STEVENS,
United States Minister.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 79.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 18, 1893.

SIR: In my 73, of November 8, I gave full information of the surrender of the Queen to the wishes of the Legislature by the formation of a ministry composed of men of intelligence and wealth, possessing the entire confidence of the business men and the more responsible citizens of the country. But this surrender of the Queen and of those surrounding her was only seeming. As soon as the principal appropriations had been voted and the legislative work was nearly concluded, several of the best members having already left for their homes, a remarkable conspiracy was revealed.

The undersigned, for the first time since he has been at the head of this legation, January 4 took passage for Hilo and the volcano on the U. S. S. *Boston* for the benefit of the health of himself and of his daughter, it being also desirable that the town of the second importance in the islands should have this attention at the time the *Boston* was making a visit to Hawaii, the chief island in the group. Beyond all doubt, immediately after the *Boston* and myself had left Honolulu the unscrupulous adventurers around the Queen improved the opportunity to push through the Legislature an astounding lottery franchise with the obvious intent to sell it out to the Louisiana lottery men. This was worked by some of the same parties supposed to be of the powerful opium ring whose four points of operation are Vancouver, San Francisco, Honolulu, and Hongkong. They distributed the lottery stock among the native members of the Legislature in large figures.

Notwithstanding the strong opposition of all the best people of the islands, including whites and natives, and the emphatic opposition of the chamber of commerce, the Queen and her palace favorite gave their warmest support to the lottery bill and signed it at once. She was to be immediately compensated by being allowed to proclaim a new constitution, restoring to the Crown the old despotic prerogatives in direct violation of the existing constitution, which provides for the only mode of change, which is by the action of successive legislatures.

Returning on the *Boston* from our Hilo trip on the 14th instant, we found the Legislature was to be prorogued at 12 a. m., one-half hour after my arrival at the legation. The prorogation completed, members of the Legislature, diplomatic corps, judges of the supreme court, and other officials went to the palace by invitation. In the meantime it began to be known in public circles the Queen's intention to proclaim the revolutionary constitution. This resulted in raising an excitement which alarmed her confidants and caused some of them to draw back. This consumed time, so that she could not secure the signatures of her new cabinet as she had expected. In the meantime the diplomatic corps grew weary and left the palace, realizing that the invitation to be present was a trick.

As I had just returned, weary from my voyage, I had not received the invitation, the chamberlain knowing I was absent when he invited the English, Portuguese, French, and Japanese diplomatic representatives the day before. In the short meanwhile I had suspicioned the trick. Finally, the Queen appeared in the throne room, before the supreme judges and other officials, in an extreme passion of anger, and avowed her purpose to postpone her revolutionary constitution for a brief period, and then went upon the balcony and spoke with great passion in the same strain to those around the palace, principally her

retainers and the royal guard, her determination to proclaim her constitution at another time. What I have described as to the lottery legislation, the forcing out of the responsible cabinet of November 8 and appointing the lottery cabinet, two of whom had been voted out of the ministry during the legislative session by a two-thirds vote for the best of reasons. It was the lottery bribe and the autocratic design of the Queen that quickly precipitated events.

A mass meeting of the citizens was called to meet on Monday, the 16th, at 2 p. m., which assembled in the largest hall in the city. Short as was the notice, over 1,300 of the principal citizens of Honolulu and from other islands, who happened to be in the city, were in attendance. This meeting included merchants, bankers, professional men, the principal business men, and the mechanics, the chief German and some of the leading English merchants and other nationalities, as well as American residents. It is said such an assemblage was never before equaled in Honolulu. Intelligent American visitors here say that such a public meeting would do credit to a meeting of a similar class of citizens in our best American cities.

The assemblage was a unit in feeling and purpose. The speeches and resolutions are on the printed slips I herewith inclose. This remarkable uprising of the best citizens, including nearly all of the chief property holders, the Tahitian marshal and palace favorite did not dare attempt to suppress. A committee of public safety was at once created to meet the emergency and to prevent anarchy and riot. It was fortunate that the *Boston* was in the harbor. The committee on public safety called on me for aid. I promptly addressed to the commander of the *Boston*, Capt. G. S. Wiltse, the following note:

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 16, 1893.

SIR: In view of the existing critical circumstances in Honolulu, including an inadequate legal force, I request you to land marines and sailors from the ship under your command for the protection of the United States legation and United States consulate, and to secure the safety of American life and property.

Very truly, yours,

JOHN L. STEVENS,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

Capt. G. C. WILTSE,
Commander U. S. S. Boston.

A copy of the call of the committee of public safety for aid is inclosed.

Promptly the men from the *Boston* were landed. Detachments were placed around the legation and the consulate, the principal members having marched to a central hall for shelter and headquarters; the night being at hand, the public anxiety being especially strong as to what might be done by irresponsible persons in the night, the landing of the men of the *Boston* so promptly gave immediate relief to the public anxiety.

As soon as practicable a Provisional Government was constituted, composed of four highly respectable men, with Judge Dole at the head, he having resigned his place on the supreme bench to assume this responsibility. He was born in Honolulu, of American parentage, educated here and in the United States, and is of the highest reputation among all citizens, both natives and whites. P. C. Jones is a native of Boston, Mass., wealthy, possessing property interests in the islands, and a resident here for many years. The other two members are of the highest respectability. The committee of public safety forthwith

took possession of the Government buildings, archives, and treasury, and installed the Provisional Government at the heads of the respective departments. This being an accomplished fact, I promptly recognized the Provisional Government as the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands. The English minister, the Portuguese chargé d'affaires, the French and the Japanese commissioners promptly did the same; these, with myself, being the only members of the diplomatic corps residing here.

All is quiet here now. Without the sacrifice of a single life this change of government has been accomplished. Language can hardly express the enthusiasm and the profound feeling of relief at this peaceful and salutary change of government. The underlying cause of this profound feeling among the citizens is the hope that the United States Government will allow these islands to pass to American control and become American soil. A commission of citizens, duly accredited, will go by the steamer that takes this dispatch to Washington, to state the wishes of the Provisional Government and of the responsible people of the islands, and to give a complete account of the existing state of things here.

It is proper that I should add, that the presence of the *Boston* here has been of the highest importance, and the behavior of officers and men has been admirable. Capt. Wiltse has exercised prudence and great firmness, while he and the undersigned have recognized only accomplished facts and have not allowed the use of the United States force for any but the most conservative reasons.

I am, sir,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Written copy by future mail.

S.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 79.]

PROCLAMATION.

In its earlier history Hawaii possessed a constitutional government honestly and economically administered in the public interest.

The Crown called to its assistance as advisers able, honest, and conservative men, whose integrity was unquestioned even by their political opponents.

The stability of the Government was assured, armed resistance and revolution unthought of, popular rights were respected, and the privileges of the subject from time to time increased and the prerogatives of the sovereign diminished by the voluntary acts of the successive Kings.

With very few exceptions this state of affairs continued until the expiration of the first few years of the reign of His late Majesty Kalakaua. At this time a change was discernible in the spirit animating the Chief Executive and in the influences surrounding the throne. A steadily increasing disposition was manifested on the part of the King to extend the royal prerogatives; to favor adventurers and persons of no character or standing in the community; to encroach upon the rights and privileges of the people by steadily increasing corruption of electors, and by means of the power and influence of officeholders and other corrupt means to illegitimately influence the elections, resulting in the final absolute control of not only the executive and legislative, but to a certain extent the judicial departments of the Government in the interests of absolutism.

This finally resulted in the revulsion of feeling and popular uprising of 1887, which wrested from the King a large portion of his ill-gotten powers.

The leaders of this movement were not seeking personal aggrandizement, political power, or the suppression of the native Government. If this had been their object it could easily have been accomplished, for they had the absolute control of the situation.

Their object was to secure responsible Government through a representative cabinet, supported by and responsible to the people's elected representatives. A clause

to this effect was inserted in the constitution, and subsequently enacted by law by the Legislature, specifically covering the ground that in all matters concerning the state the sovereign was to act by and with the advice of the cabinet, and only by and with such advice.

The King willingly agreed to such proposition, expressed regret for the past, and volunteered promises for the future.

Almost from the date of such agreement and promises up to the time of his death the history of the Government has been a continual struggle between the King on the one hand and the cabinet and Legislature on the other, the former constantly endeavoring by every available form of influence and evasion to ignore his promises and agreements and regain his lost powers.

This conflict upon several occasions came to a crisis, followed each time by submission on the part of His Majesty, by renewed expressions of regret and promises to abide by the constitutional and legal restrictions in the future. In each instance such promise was kept until a further opportunity presented itself, when the conflict was renewed in defiance and regardless of all previous pledges.

Upon the accession of Her Majesty Liliuokalani, for a brief period the hope prevailed that a new policy would be adopted. This hope was soon blasted by her immediately entering into conflict with the existing cabinet, who held office with the approval of a large majority of the Legislature, resulting in the triumph of the Queen and the removal of the cabinet. The appointment of a new cabinet subservient to her wishes and their continuance in office until a recent date gave no opportunity for further indication of the policy which would be pursued by Her Majesty until the opening of the Legislature in May of 1892.

The recent history of that session has shown a stubborn determination on the part of Her Majesty to follow the tactics of her late brother and in all possible ways to secure an extension of the royal prerogatives and an abridgment of popular rights.

During the latter part of the session the Legislature was replete with corruption; bribery and other illegitimate influences were openly utilized to secure the desired end, resulting in the final complete overthrow of all opposition and the inauguration of a cabinet arbitrarily selected by Her Majesty in complete defiance of constitutional principles and popular representation.

Notwithstanding such result the defeated party peacefully submitted to the situation.

Not content with her victory Her Majesty proceeded on the last day of the session to arbitrarily arrogate to herself the right to promulgate a new constitution, which proposed, among other things, to disfranchise over one-fourth of the voters and the owners of nine-tenths of the private property of the Kingdom, to abolish the elected upper house of the Legislature and to substitute in place thereof an appointive one, to be appointed by the Sovereign.

The detailed history of this attempt and the succeeding events in connection therewith is given in the report of the committee of public safety to the citizens of Honolulu and the resolution adopted at the mass meeting held on the 16th instant, the correctness of which report and the propriety of which resolution is hereby specifically affirmed.

The constitutional evolution indicated has slowly and steadily, though reluctantly and regretfully, convinced an overwhelming majority of the conservative and responsible members of the community that independent, constitutional, representative, and responsible government, able to protect itself from revolutionary uprisings and royal aggression, is no longer possible in Hawaii under the existing system of government.

Five uprisings or conspiracies against the Government have occurred within five years and seven months. It is firmly believed that the culminating revolutionary attempt of last Saturday will, unless radical measures are taken, wreck our already damaged credit abroad and precipitate to final ruin our already overstrained financial condition; and the guaranties of protection to life, liberty, and property will steadily decrease and the political situation rapidly grow worse.

In this belief, and also in the firm belief that the action hereby taken is and will be for the best personal, political, and property interests of every citizen of the land—

We, citizens and residents of the Hawaiian Islands, organized and acting for the public safety and the common good, hereby proclaim as follows:

- (1) The Hawaiian monarchical system of government is hereby abrogated.
- (2) A Provisional Government for the control and management of public affairs and the protection of the public peace is hereby established, to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon.
- (3) Such Provisional Government shall consist of an executive council of four members, who are hereby declared to be Sanford B. Dole, James A. King, Peter C. Jones, William O. Smith, who shall administer the executive departments of the Government, the first named acting as president and chairman of such council and

administering the department of foreign affairs, and the others severally administering the departments of interior, finance, and attorney-general, respectively, in the order in which they are above enumerated, according to existing Hawaiian law as far as may be consistent with this proclamation; and also of an advisory council, which shall consist of fourteen members, who are hereby declared to be S. M. Damon, L. A. Thurston, J. Emmeluth, J. H. McCandless, F. W. McChesney, W. R. Castle, W. C. Wilder, A. Brown, J. F. Morgan, H. Waterhouse, E. D. Tenney, F. Wilhelm, W. G. Ashley, C. Bolte. Such advisory council shall also have general legislative authority.

Such executive and advisory council shall, acting jointly, have power to remove any member of either council and to fill such or any other vacancy.

(4) All officers under the existing Government are hereby requested to continue to exercise their functions and perform the duties of their respective offices, with the exception of the following-named persons: Queen Liliuokalani; Charles B. Wilson, marshal; Samuel Parker, minister of foreign affairs; W. H. Cornwell, minister of finance; John F. Colburn, minister of the interior; Arthur P. Peterson, attorney-general; who are hereby removed from office.

(5) All Hawaiian laws and constitutional principles not inconsistent herewith shall continue in force until further order of the executive and advisory councils.

HENRY E. COOPER.
ANDREW BROWN.
J. A. MCCANDLESS.
THEODORE F. LANSING.
JOHN EMMELUTH.
C. BOLTE.
ED. SUHR.
HENRY WATERHOUSE.
W. C. WILDER.
F. W. MCCHESENEY.
WILLIAM O. SMITH.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 79.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *January 17, 1893.*

SIR: The undersigned, members of the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government this day established in Hawaii, hereby state to you that for the reasons set forth in the proclamation this day issued, a copy of which is herewith inclosed for your consideration, the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and a Provisional Government established in accordance with the said above-mentioned proclamation.

Such Provisional Government has been proclaimed, is now in possession of the Government departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and is in control of the city. We hereby request that you will, on behalf of the United States of America, recognize it as the existing *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands, and afford to it the moral support of your Government, and, if necessary, the support of American troops to assist in preserving the public peace.

We have the honor to remain your obedient servants,

SANFORD B. DOLE.
J. A. KING.
P. C. JONES.
WILLIAM O. SMITH.
S. M. DAWSON.
JOHN EMMELUTH.
F. W. MCCHESENEY.
W. C. WILDER.
J. A. MCCANDLESS.
ANDREW BROWN.
JAS. F. MORGAN.
HENRY WATERHOUSE.
E. D. TENNEY.
F. J. WILHELM.
W. G. ASHLEY.
C. BOLTE.

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
United States Minister Resident.

[Inclosure 3 in No. 79.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *January 17, 1893.*

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

[Order No. 1.]

All persons favorable to the *Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands* are hereby requested to forthwith report to the Government at the Government buildings and to furnish to the Government such arms and ammunition as they may have in their possession or control as soon as possible, in order that efficient and complete protection of life and property and the public peace may immediately and efficiently be put in operation.

SANFORD B. DOLE,
J. A. KING,
P. C. JONES,
WILLIAM O. SMITH,
Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
JOHN EMMELUTH,
ANDREW BROWN,
C. BOLTE,
JAMES F. MORGAN,
HENRY WATERHOUSE,
S. M. DAMON,
W. G. ASHLEY,
E. D. TENNEY,
F. W. MCCHESENEY,
W. C. WILDER,
Advisory Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

[Inclosure 4 in No. 79.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *January 17, 1893.* (Issued 6 p. m.)

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

[Order No. 2.]

It is hereby ordered and decreed that until further ordered, the right of the writ of habeas corpus is hereby suspended and martial law is hereby declared to exist throughout the island of Oahu.

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
J. A. KING,
Minister of Interior,
P. C. JONES,
Minister of Finance,
WILLIAM O. SMITH,
Attorney-General,
Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

[Inclosure 5 in No. 79.]

[Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser, January 17, 1893.]

MASS MEETING—CITIZENS DETERMINED TO RESIST AGGRESSION—AN ENTHUSIASTIC GATHERING AT THE RIFLES' ARMORY PROTESTS AGAINST THE REVOLUTIONARY ATTITUDE OF THE QUEEN—RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED AND THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY AUTHORIZED TO TAKE FURTHER STEPS.

At 2 p. m. yesterday the Honolulu Rifles' armory was the scene of one of the largest and most enthusiastic mass meetings ever held in Honolulu. It was called by the committee of public safety for the purpose of protesting against the revolutionary aggressions of the Queen. At 1.30 citizens began to assemble, and before 2 o'clock the large building was crowded to its utmost capacity, 1,260 being present, by actual count, while many others came later. Every class in the community was fully represented, mechanics, merchants, professional men, and artisans of every kind being

present in full force. The meeting was intensely enthusiastic, being animated by a common purpose and feeling, and most of the speakers were applauded to the echo. Hon. W. C. Wilder, of the committee of safety, was the chairman.

Mr. WILDER said: Fellow citizens, I have been requested to act as chairman of the meeting. Were it a common occurrence, I would consider it an honor, but to-day we are not here to do honor to anybody. I accept the chairmanship of this meeting as a duty. [Applause.] We meet here to-day as men—not as any party, faction, or creed, but as men who are bound to see good government. It is well known to you all what took place at the palace last Saturday. I need not tell you the object of this meeting, and no such meeting has been held since 1887. There is the same reason now as then. An impromptu meeting of citizens was called Saturday to take measures for the public safety. The report of the committee will be read to you. We do not meet as revolutionists, but as peaceful citizens who have the right to meet and state their grievances. [Loud applause.] We will maintain our rights and have courage to maintain them. [Universal cheers.]

Noble Thurston being introduced by the chairman read the report of the committee of safety.

“REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF SAFETY.

“*To the citizens of Honolulu :*

“On the morning of last Saturday, the 14th instant, the city was startled by the information that Her Majesty Queen Liliuokalani had announced her intention to arbitrarily promulgate a new constitution, and that three of the newly-appointed cabinet ministers had, or were about to, resign in consequence thereof.

“Immediately after the prorogation of the Legislature at noon the Queen, accompanied, by her orders, by the cabinet, retired to the palace; the entire military force of the Government was drawn up in line in front of the building, and remained there until dark, and a crowd of several hundred native sympathizers with the new-constitution project gathered in the throne room and about the palace. The Queen then retired with the cabinet, informed them that she had a new constitution ready, that she intended to promulgate it, and proposed to do so then and there, and demanded that they countersign her signature.

“She turned a deaf ear to their statements and protests that the proposed action would inevitably cause the streets of Honolulu to run red with blood, and threatened that unless they complied with her demand she would herself immediately go out upon the steps of the palace and announce to the assembled crowd that the reason she did not give them the new constitution was because the ministers would not let her. Three of the ministers, fearing mob violence, immediately withdrew and returned to the Government building. They were immediately summoned back to the palace, but refused to go on the ground that there was no guaranty of their personal safety.

“The only forces under the control of the Government are the household guards and the police. The former are nominally under the control of the minister of foreign affairs and actually under the control of their immediate commander, Maj. Nowlein, a personal adherent of the Queen.

“The police are under the control of Marshal Wilson, the open and avowed royal favorite. Although the marshal is nominally under the control of the attorney-general, Her Majesty recently announced in a public speech that she would not allow him to be removed. Although the marshal now states that he is opposed to the Queen's proposition, he also states that if the final issue arises between the Queen and the cabinet and the people he will support the Queen.

“The cabinet was absolutely powerless and appealed to citizens for support.

“Later they reluctantly returned to the palace, by request of the Queen, and for nearly two hours she again endeavored to force them to acquiesce in her desire, and upon their final refusal announced in a public speech in the throne room and again from the upper gallery of the palace that she desired to issue the constitution, but was prevented from doing so by her ministers and would issue it in a few days.

“The citizens responded to the appeal of the cabinet to resist the revolutionary attempt of the Queen, by gathering at the office of William O. Smith.

“Late in the afternoon it was felt that bloodshed and riot were imminent; that the community could expect no protection from the legal authorities; that, on the contrary, they would undoubtedly be made the instruments of royal aggression. An impromptu meeting of citizens was held, which was attended by the attorney-general, and which was addressed, among others, by the minister of the interior, J. F. Colburn, who stated to the meeting substantially the foregoing facts.

“The meeting unanimously passed a resolution that the public welfare required the appointment of a committee of public safety of thirteen, to consider the situation and devise ways and means for the maintenance of the public peace and the protection of life and property.

“Such a committee was forthwith appointed and has followed its instructions.

"The first step which the committee consider necessary is to secure openly, publicly, and peaceably, through the medium of a mass meeting of citizens, a condemnation of the proceedings of the party of revolution and disorder, and a confirmation from such larger meeting of the authority now vested in the committee.

"For such purpose the committee hereby recommends the adoption of the following resolution:

"RESOLUTION.

"1. Whereas Her Majesty Liliuokalani, acting in conjunction with certain other persons, has illegally and unconstitutionally and against the advice and consent of the lawful executive officers of the Government, attempted to abrogate the existing constitution and proclaim a new one in subversion of the rights of the people;

"2. And whereas such attempt has been accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed and a display of armed force, and such attempt and acts and threats are revolutionary and treasonable in character;

"3. And whereas Her Majesty's cabinet have informed her that such contemplated action was unlawful and would lead to bloodshed and riot and have implored and demanded of her to desist from and renounce such proposed action;

"4. And whereas such advice has been in vain, and Her Majesty has in a public speech announced that she was desirous and ready to promulgate such constitution, the same being now ready for such purpose, and that the only reason why it was not now promulgated was because she had met with unexpected obstacles and that a fitting opportunity in the future must be awaited for the consummation of such object, which would be within a few days;

"5. And whereas at a public meeting of citizens held in Honolulu on the 14th day of January instant a committee of thirteen to be known as the 'committee of public safety' was appointed to consider the situation and to devise ways and means for the maintenance of the public peace and safety and the preservation of life and property;

"6. And whereas such committee has recommended the calling of this mass meeting of citizens to protest against and condemn such action, and has this day presented a report to such meeting denouncing the action of the Queen and her supporters as being unlawful, unwarranted, in derogation of the rights of the people, endangering the peace of the community, and tending the excite riot and cause the loss of life and destruction of property:

"Now, therefore, we, the citizens of Honolulu of all nationalities and regardless of political party affiliations, do hereby condemn and denounce the action of the Queen and her supporters;

"And we do hereby ratify the appointment and indorse the action taken and report made by the said committee of safety; and we do hereby further empower such committee to further consider the situation and further devise such ways and means as may be necessary to secure the permanent maintenance of law and order and the protection of life, liberty, and property in Hawaii."

Mr. THURSTON said: Mr. Chairman, Hawaii is a wonderful country. We are divided into parties and nationalities and factions, but there are moments when we are united and move shoulder to shoulder, moved by one common desire for the public good. Three times during the past twelve years this has happened—in 1880, 1887, and to-day. They say it is ended, it is done, there is nothing to consider. Is it so? [Calls of no! no!] I say, gentlemen, that now and here is the time to act. [Loud cheers.] The Queen says she won't do it again. [Cries of humbug.] Fellow-citizens, have you any memories? Hasn't she once before promised—sworn solemnly before Almighty God to maintain this constitution? What is her word worth? [Calls of nothing! nothing!] It is an old saying that a royal promise is made to be broken. Fellow-citizens, remember it. We have not sought this situation. Last Saturday the sun rose on a peaceful and smiling city; to-day it is otherwise.

Whose fault is it? Queen Liliuokalani's. It is not her fault that the streets have not run red with blood. She has printed a proclamation and at the same time, perhaps sent out by the same carriers, her organ prints an extra with her speech with bitter language than in the Advertiser. She wants us to sleep on a slumbering volcano which will one morning spew out blood and destroy us all. The constitution gives us the right to assemble peacefully and express our grievances. We are here doing that to-day without arms. The man who has not the spirit to rise after the menaces to our liberties has no right to keep them. Has the tropic sun cooled and thinned our blood, or have we flowing in our veins the warm, rich blood which loves liberty and dies for it? I move the adoption of the resolution.

[Tumultuous applause.]

Mr. H. F. GLADE. The Queen has done an unlawful thing in ignoring the constitution which she had sworn to uphold. We most decidedly protest against such revolutionary proceeding, and we should do all we possibly can to prevent her from repeating actions which result in disorder and riot. We now have a promise from the Queen that proceedings as we experienced on Saturday shall not occur again; but we should have such assurances and guaranties for this promise that will really

satisfy us and convince us of the faith and earnestness of the promise given, of which we now have no assurance. What such guaranties and assurances ought to be I can not at this moment say or recommend. This should be referred to the committee of safety for their careful consideration. I second the motion.

Mr. YOUNG, in addressing the meeting, spoke as follows:

Mr. Chairman and fellow-citizens: In June, 1887, I stood on this same platform and addressed an audience almost as large as the one now before me. At that time we had met to consider a resolution that looked toward a new constitution, which proposed constitution was considered the most effectual method of removing some flagrant abuses in governmental affairs, practiced by the King and his cabinets. The constitution was promulgated. To-day we have met to consider the action of Her Majesty in attempting to set aside the constitution we all worked so hard to have promulgated, in the lost interests of the Sovereign and the people at large, as well as for the redemption of the credit of the Kingdom abroad. It has long been reported that at some favorable opportunity the Queen would spring a new constitution upon the people and place matters even more in the hands of the Sovereign than they were before the revolution of 1887. Some did not believe the rumors, but the actions of the Queen in the last few days have convinced the most skeptical that the rumors were well founded and that she had been pregnant with this unborn constitution for a long time; but it could not be born till under the propitious star.

In trying to promulgate this long-promised constitution the Queen has therefore premeditatedly committed a breach of faith with one portion of her subjects in order to satisfy the clamors of a faction of natives urged by the influence of a mischievous element of foreigners who mean no good to the Queen or the people, but simply for the purpose of providing avenues for carrying out more perfectly the smuggling of opium and diverting the contents of the treasury into their own pockets. A by-authority circular has now been handed around setting forth that the Queen and her cabinet had decided not to press the promulgation of a new constitution; but can we depend on this promise of Her Majesty? Is this promise any more binding upon her than the oath she took before Almighty God to support and maintain the present constitution? Has not the Queen resorted to her questionable methods in an under-handed way to remove what, to the people, was one of the most acceptable cabinets ever commissioned by any sovereign in this Kingdom, in order that four other ministers might be appointed that would carry out her behest, treasonable or otherwise, as might be most conveniently within their scope?

I say, have we any reasonable assurance that the Queen and her ministers have abandoned finally the new constitution promulgation scheme? [Roars of "No" from the audience.] My fellow citizens, while the Queen and her cabinet continue to trifle with and play fast and loose with the affairs of state there can be no feeling of security for foreign families residing within these domains. There can be no business prosperity here at home, and our credit abroad must be of the flimsiest and most uncertain nature. And you, business men, who are toiling honestly for your bread and butter, will have to put up with thin bread and much thinner butter if this farcical work is continued. In order that matters may be set to rights again, and that honest, stable, and honorable government may be maintained in Hawaii, I support the resolution and trust that it will be passed unanimously by this meeting.

Mr. C. BOLTE. Since the resolution which was read here has been written things have changed. On Saturday the Queen promised the native people that she would give them a new constitution under all circumstances; she did not say exactly when but as soon as possible. This morning a proclamation was issued, in which she says that her attempt to promulgate a new constitution last Saturday was made under stress of her native subjects, but that she will not do it again. An attempt to change the fundamental law of the land is a very serious matter, a matter that requires a good deal of consideration, and I am well convinced that this matter has been weighed and considered for more than a day by the Queen, and that there was no acting on the spur of the moment under the stress of her native subjects about it. It was her well premeditated conclusion that she would change the constitution so as to suit herself on the day of prorogation of the Legislature. Many people knew this several days ago, but there have been so many rumors about all sorts of things that not very much attention was paid to it; it was expected that she might change her mind before that day would come. But she did not change her mind as soon as that; she told the native people that she was ready to give them a new constitution right then and there, but that she could not do it because her ministers would not let her. Now she has changed her mind; she makes a sort of excuse for what she did, and says she will never do it again.

It seems to me that the question that your committee has to ask now, and which is for you gentlemen here in the meeting to decide, is this: Are you satisfied with the assurance given in to-day's proclamation signed by the Queen and the four ministers, and will you consider this matter ended, or do you desire greater and stronger guaranties for the safety and preservation of your life and liberty and property? I am one of the citizens' committee of public safety; my views on the situation are ex-

pressed in the resolutions which have just been read, and I trust you will show that you are of the same mind as the committee by adopting these resolutions.

Hon. H. P. BALDWIN. I feel, with the rest of you, that the actions of the Queen have put the country in a very critical situation. Before this revolutionary act of Her Majesty we were getting along. A ministry had been appointed which would probably have been able to pull us through. The McKinley bill had put the whole country into a critical situation. We were working up new industries. Mr. Dillingham was trying to build a railroad around this island. The Queen seems to have blinded herself to all these things. She has followed a whim of her own—a whim of an irresponsible body of Hawaiians—and tried to establish a new constitution. We must stop this; but we must not go beyond constitutional means. I favor this resolution, but think the committee should act within the constitution. There is no question that the Queen has done a revolutionary act; there is no doubt about that. The Queen's proclamation has not inspired confidence; but shall we not teach her to act within the constitution? [Loud calls of "No."] Well, gentlemen, I am ready to act when the time comes.

J. EMMELUTH wished to say a few words on the situation. He had heard the Queen's speech at the palace, and noted the expression of her face. It was fiendish. When the petitioners filed out he reflected on the fact that 30 men could paralyze the business of the community for 24 hours. It was not they that did it, but the schemers behind them, and perhaps a woman, too. It was not the Hawaiians that wanted the new constitution; not those who worked. This was the third time that he had shut his doors, let his men go, and came up to this building. It would be the last time. If we let this time go by we would deserve all we would get. An opportunity came once in every lifetime. It had come to us, and if we finished as we should a repetition of last Saturday would never occur in this country again. [Applause.] We must stand shoulder to shoulder. There was but one course to pursue, and we would all see it. The manifesto of this morning was bosh. "I won't do it any more; but give me a chance and I'll do it again." If the Queen had succeeded last Saturday, myself and you would have been robbed of the privileges without which no white man can live in this community. "Fear not, be not afraid," was written in my Bible by my mother twenty-five years ago. Gentlemen, I have done. As far as the Hawaiians are concerned, all have an aloha for them, and we wish to have laws enabling us to live peaceably together.

R. J. GREENE. Fellow citizens, among the many things I never could do was to make an impromptu speech. I have tried it over and over again and never succeeded but once, and that was after five weeks' preparation. Our patience has been exhausted. We all agree about the case. The question is, the remedy. John Greene, of Rhode Island, entered the war of the Revolution and served throughout. His son, my father, served through the war of 1812, until that little matter was settled. In 1862 John Greene, my father, stood before a meeting like this, and said he had four sons in the war, of whom I was the youngest, and would serve himself if he was not too old. This experience has biased my judgment as to some matters of civil government. It is too late to throw obstacles across the path of its progress here. I have adopted this flag and am loyal to it, but I am not willing to go one step back in the name of civil liberty, and I will give the last drop of Rhode Island blood in my veins to go forward, and not back. [Cheers.]

Chairman Wilder read the latter part of the resolution.

It was passed by a unanimous standing vote, without a dissenting voice, and amid tremendous cheers, after which the meeting broke up.

[Inclosure 6 in Nov. 79.]

[Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser, January 18, 1893.]

THE NEW ERA—THE REVOLUTION TERMINATED BY THE ESTABLISHING OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT—CITIZENS RISE AND SEIZE THE GOVERNMENT BUILDING—THE MONARCHY ABROGATED—ENTHUSIASTIC VOLUNTEERS RALLY ROUND THE NEW GOVERNMENT—THE LATE QUEEN AND CABINET YIELD AND LEAVE THE TOWN UNDER THE QUIET PROTECTION OF ITS OWN CITIZENS—FULL TEXT OF THE PROCLAMATION AND ORDERS.

All day yesterday the community were in a state of expectancy, looking to the committee of public safety to do something to end the state of tension, and to secure the rights of all citizens against encroachment once and for all. The committee in the meantime was not idle, but was incessantly occupied completing its organization and perfecting the final arrangements necessary to the proclamation of the Provisional Government and its protection by an armed force. At about 2.30 o'clock an attempt was made by three native policemen to arrest the progress of a wagon which was being driven up Fort street by Mr. Benner and Mr. Good. Those in charge of the wagon resisted the attempt of the officers to arrest its course. One

of the officers making a motion to draw a revolver, Mr. Good drew his own, and calling attention to the fact that he was justified in shooting, he fired, seeking however, to avoid the infliction of a dangerous wound. The wagon pursued its way, followed by a policeman in a hack. This episode precipitated the movement. Citizens hurried to the Beretania street armory, where they were formed into companies and marched to the Government building.

In the meantime the committee of public safety, accompanied by members of the Government about to be formed, proceeded to the Government building. They were entirely unarmed. Arrived at the Government building the committee inquired for the cabinet, but the ministers were not to be found. They then demanded and received of Mr. Hassinger the possession of the building. The party now proceeded to the front steps and, in the presence of a rapidly increasing crowd, the following proclamation was read:

Before the reading of the proclamation was completed the volunteers from the Rifles' armory began to assemble in force. The grounds of Aliiolani Hale were cleared and a guard set at all the gates.

The following orders were then promptly issued by the Provisional Government:

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
January 17, 1893.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

[Order No. 1.]

All persons favorable to the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands are hereby requested to forthwith report to the Government at the Government building and to furnish the Government such arms and ammunition as they may have in their possession or control as soon as possible, in order that efficient and complete protection of life and property and the public peace may be immediately and efficiently put into operation.

SANFORD B. DOLE,
J. A. KING,
P. C. JONES,
WILLIAM O. SMITH,
Executive Counsel of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

JOHN EMMELUTH,
ANDREW BROWN,
C. BOLTE,
JAMES F. MORGAN,
HENRY WATERHOUSE,
S. M. DAMON,
W. G. ASHLEY,
E. D. TENNY,
F. W. MCCHESENEY,
W. C. WILDER,
J. A. McCANDLESS,
W. R. CASTLE,
LORRINA A. THURSTON,
F. J. WILHELM,

Advisory Counsel of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, January 17, 1893.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

[Order No. 2.]

It is hereby ordered and decreed that until further ordered the right of the writ of habeas corpus is hereby suspended, and martial law is hereby declared to exist throughout the Island of Oahu.

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
J. A. KING,
Minister of the Interior,
P. C. JONES,
Minister of Finance,
WILLIAM O. SMITH,
Attorney-General,
Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

The Provisional Government sent for the late ministers, who were at the police station. Two of them came, and finally all four repaired to the headquarters of the new Government, where formal demand was made upon them for the possession of the police station. The ex-ministers asked for time to deliberate upon this demand. They went to the palace in company with Hon. Samuel M. Damon, and held a consultation with Liliuokalani. The result was a compromise proposition, which was rejected by the Provisional Government. After further consultation the following protest was noted:

I, Liliuokalani, by the grace of God and under the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against any and all acts done against myself and the constitutional Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming to have established a Provisional Government of and for this Kingdom.

That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America, whose minister plenipotentiary, his excellency John L. Stevens, has caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the said Provisional Government.

Now, to avoid any collision of armed forces and perhaps the loss of life, I do, under this protest, and impelled by said force, yield my authority until such time as the Government of the United States shall, upon the facts being presented to it, undo the action of its representative and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as the constitutional Sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

Done at Honolulu this 17th day of January, A. D. 1893.

LILIUOKALANI, R.
SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
WM. H. CORNWALL,
Minister of Finance.
JNO. F. COLBURN,
Minister of the Interior.
A. P. PETERSON,
Attorney-General.

S. B. DOLE, Esq., and others,

Composing the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

(Indorsed:) Received by the hands of the late cabinet this 17th day of January, A. D. 1893. (Signed) Sanford B. Dole, chairman of the executive council of Provisional Government.

The late Queen and cabinet accordingly yielded unconditionally, and the police station was turned over to Commander Soper and Capt. Ziegler with forty men from Company A. Mr. Wilson made a short address to the police force assembled in the station, telling them that resistance was no longer feasible.

The Provisional Government sent notifications of the situation to the representatives of foreign powers. The following answer to the request for recognition was received from his excellency John L. Stevens:

"A Provisional Government having been duly constituted in the place of the recent Government of Queen Liliuokalani, and said Provisional Government being in full possession of the Government building, the archives, and the treasury, and in control of the capital of the Hawaiian Islands, I hereby recognize said Provisional Government as the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

"JOHN L. STEVENS,
"Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States."

At latest advices the Provisional Government was in complete possession of the city, and the only Government possessing, exercising, or claiming any authority or power whatsoever.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 80.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 19, 1893.

SIR: The Provisional Government of Hawaii, by special steamer, send a commission to Washington with full powers to negotiate with the Government of the United States. It is composed of six representative men of the highest respectability. Hon. William C. Wilder is the president and chief manager of the Inter-island Steamship Company,

running steamers among the islands, and he has large property interests in Honolulu. Hon. C. M. [surname omitted] is a leading lumber merchant, doing business with Puget Sound and Oregon, born here of the best American stock. Hon. L. A. Thurston is one of the most, if not *the* most, talented and influential man on the islands, and is of the highest respectability. He and his father were born on the islands, of Connecticut parentage. Though a young man, he was the leading member of the reform cabinet from July, 1887, to 1890.

Hon. William H. Castle is a lawyer of eminence, born on the islands, of western New York parentage, his father still living here at the age of 84, having resided in Honolulu nearly half a century, and for many years exercised a large influence here. Mr. Charles P. Carter is the son of the recent Hawaiian minister at Washington, Hon. H. P. Carter, and is an accomplished and most reliable gentleman, American to the core, and has a Michigan wife. Hon. Mr. Marsden is of English birth, is a prominent business man and a noble in the Legislature.

These six commissioners represent a large preponderating proportion of the property holders and commercial interests of these islands. They are backed by the influences which will enable them to fully carry out their agreements with the United States Government.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

[Confidential.]

No. 81.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 26, 1893.

SIR: By the steamer taking this dispatch, goes Mr. Paul Neuman to Washington, the attorney of the deposed Queen. Nominally he may make at the Department of State a "protest" as to the way his client lost her crown. In reality his mission is to get a large fee out of whatever sum it is supposed may be paid by the treaty of annexation to the fallen monarch and the Crown Princess. This attorney, as the Hawaiian Commissioners now in Washington may inform you, was a former resident of San Francisco, where he had and still has an unsavory reputation. For years his influence in politics here has been pernicious. He was a boon companion of the debased Kalakaua, the recent King; shared in his corruptions, and is reputed to have won at cards the money of the weak monarch.

He was twice voted out of the cabinet by the recent Legislature by a large majority, every reputable member each time against him. He is believed on strong reasons to have been the head man in getting through the Legislature in the closing hours of the session the infamous lottery bill, which so much aided in precipitating the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy. This man, the Queen's attorney, is a good-natured, "jolly fellow," who, seeing the strong drift of things here, now avows himself unqualifiedly for annexation. I think it my duty to give to the Department of State this amount of information about the fallen Queen's attorney, and the Commissioners now in Washington can give you as much more as they deem proper.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Since the preceding dispatch was written Paul Neuman, as the attorney of the Queen, has called on me and explained his mission to Washington. I will take back nothing as to his former political career here; but he is good natured and politic lawyer. While he will probably urge the request to have the United States restore the fallen Queen to the throne as a matter of form and good faith on his part to his royal client, I have impressed on him the logic of the situation and the absolute impossibility of restoring the deposed Queen. I think he sees this clearly, however otherwise he may at first talk, and that his only hope is to obtain a good cash consideration for all her claims. I think he has "full power of attorney" to this end. He takes with him the young man, Prince David, as he is called here, one of the two princes made by Kalakaua, spoken of in my No. 82, page 9.

STEVENS.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 28, 1893.

Your dispatch, telegraphed from San Francisco, announcing revolution and establishment of a Provisional Government, was received to-day. Your course in recognizing an unopposed *de facto* Government appears to have been discreet and in accordance with the facts. The rule of this Government has uniformly been to recognize and enter into relation with any actual Government in full possession of effective power, with the assent of the people. You will continue to recognize the new Government under such conditions. It is trusted that the change, besides conducing to the tranquillity and welfare of the Hawaiian Islands, will tend to draw closer the intimate ties of amity and common interests which so conspicuously and necessarily link them to the United States. You will keep in constant communication with the commander of the United States naval force at Honolulu, with a view to acting, if need be, for the protection of the interests and property of American citizens and aiding in the preservation of good order under the changed conditions reported.

FOSTER.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

[Telegram.]

HONOLULU, February 1, 1893.

Provisional Government of Hawaii gaining power and respect. Everything is quiet. Annexation sentiment is increasing. Dead monarchy and opposition to annexation is supported chiefly by lottery and opium ring. To-day at 9 a. m., in accordance with the request of Provisional Government of Hawaii, I have placed Government of Hawaii under the United States protection during negotiations, not interfering with the execution of public affairs. Have mailed important dispatches. Have sent duplicate copies of dispatches. It is advisable that Commodore Skerrett proceed at once to Honolulu, Sandwich Islands, with one or more United States ships as precautionary measures.

STEVENS.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

No. 70.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, Feb. 1, 1893.

SIR: I append a copy of telegraphic *correspondence with your legation, relative to the new Government of Hawaii.

I am, etc.,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 82.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,

Honolulu, February 1, 1893.

SIR: Everything is moving on here quietly. The Provisional Government is discharging its responsibilities with firmness, discretion, and in the spirit of conciliation and magnanimity. The annexation sentiment has constantly increased since the departure of the commissioners for Washington, and with heartfelt earnestness is taking possession of all classes. Nearly all the Germans, the large proportion of the respectable and responsible English, and almost the entire Portuguese population are warmly for annexation. This inclination of the Portuguese is quite important, for they number seven or eight thousand, are among the most industrious and saving, and they are thoughtfully led by Senor Canavarro, their chargé d'affaires, who has resided here for years, and commands the respect and confidence of all the best citizens of the island of whatever nationality. Canavarro's wife, on account of health and business, is obliged to spend much of her time in California, where she owns valuable property. Annexation and the United States have good friends in the Canavarros.*

As to terms of annexation, I still adhere firmly to the opinion expressed in my despatch No. 74 that the sugar bounty to be paid to the Hawaiian sugar planters should be limited to 6 mills per pound—\$12 per ton, so long, and only so long as the United States bounty system shall be maintained. To the objection that this allows only \$12 per ton on Hawaiian sugar while the Hawaiian planters get twice the amount per acre that the Louisiana planters do on the average, and as I said in my despatch 74, the consensus of opinion among the leading planters here, obtained by me five or six months since, was, and is, that \$12 per ton bounty will place all the Hawaiian plantations worth maintaining on the road of financial safety and success.

As to the form of Government for the islands, I now only vary from views expressed in my 74 as to incline strongly to the opinion that the beginning should be substantially like that of President Jefferson and Congress in respect of Louisiana in the act of 1804, page 283, United States Statutes at Large, only differing from that by providing, in addition to governor, attorney-general, a commissioner of finance, a commissioner of the interior, and a legislative council of thirteen or fourteen, all to be appointed by the President, unless it should be deemed best for the governor to appoint the attorney-general, and the commissioners of finance and the interior, who would be prac-

* See Mr. Stevens's telegram of January 18, 1893, and Mr. Foster's telegram of January 28, 1893, in reply.

* The remarks relative to Senor Canavarro, the Portuguese chargé, strictly confidential.

tically a cabinet of three to aid the governor to carry on the Government. This plan and method of Government could be maintained as a transition Government until experience should prove it best to change it to a more popular form. In the meantime the responsible voters would rapidly increase and American ideas and interest would gain in force and volume. My private consultation with the Provisional Government since the departure of the commissioners for Washington has led us to think highly of the Jefferson act of 1804 for Louisiana as a transition expedient for Hawaii. This would cause no shock and would allow affairs to move along on safe and conservative lines until time and experience demand something better. It would be fortunate to have such a man as Sanford B. Dole, the present head of the Provisional Government, the first American governor of Hawaii.

As to liquidating all political claims from the fall of the Queen and the Crown Princess, may I be allowed to suggest that the spirit and import of the Marcy treaty plan of 1854 had better be adopted, which authorized the expenditure of \$100,000 for like purposes. I, therefore, suggest that if a liquidation of this kind be now under consideration and \$150,000 should be allowed as the total sum for this purpose, \$70,000 should go to the fallen Queen Liliuokalani and \$70,000 to the Crown Princess Kaiulana, and \$5,000 to each of the two young princes. The last named—the two princes—are harmless young persons, of little account, not chiefs by blood, but they were made princes by the late King Kalakaua without any constitutional right or power to do so, the then boys being nephews of his wife Kapiolani. Should the entire sum granted for these purposes be greater or less than \$150,000 I advise that the above specified proportions be maintained.

As to the native Hawaiians and their native leaders at this time, things are tending favorably towards annexation. Mr. Kauhame, for many years a member of the Legislature, and regarded for years the best native in the islands in public life, a noble to the close of the recent session of that body, is earnest for annexation. So is Mr. Kanihi, a member of the Legislature from this island. Hon. John W. Kahia, the ablest native lawyer in the island, years a member of former Legislatures from the important island of Maui, thinks the fall of the Queen and the extinction of the monarchy a boon to Hawaii, and he is for annexation. Robert W. Wilcox, a half-white native, who led the Hawaiian revolt in 1889, which came so near being successful, is now for annexation. He was educated in Italy at a military school, is 37 years of age, his father being a citizen of Rhode Island, and, it is said, is still living in that State. This Wilcox has more fighting ability than any other native Hawaiian, and will be proud to become an American citizen and at a future time to serve in the army or civil service of the United States.

The ablest of the native Hawaiian Christian ministers are strong in their American sympathies. The pastor of the large native Hawaiian church in this city, a native Hawaiian, is for annexation earnestly. The other large Hawaiian congregation and church in Honolulu has a favorite pastor born here of American parentage, whose quiet influence is in the same direction. The native newspaper of much the largest circulation in the islands advocates annexation, stands by the Provisional Government, and is losing none of its circulation. The main part of the opponents of annexation are the lower class of natives, led by unscrupulous foreigners, of little property, mostly of California, Australia, and Canada, who wish to maintain the Hawaiian monarchy and its corruptions for their own unworthy purposes, and who think their

opportunities for power and spoliation will be gone if annexation becomes a fact.

The Hawaiian pear is now fully ripe, and this is the golden hour for the United States to pluck it. If annexation does not take place promptly, all is held in doubt and suspense for six or ten months, there certainly will be here a revulsion to despair, and these people, by their necessities, might be forced towards becoming a British colony, for the English here of the monarchical type would then avail themselves of their opportunity and stir up all possible opposition to annexation. The wealthiest Englishman of these islands has to day called at this legation, and no man in Hawaii is more earnest for annexation. His two sons, large business men, are with him in this regard, and the next old British resident, a Scotchman by birth, is with the man first named for annexation. I can not otherwise than urge prompt action at Washington.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 83.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, February 1, 1893.

SIR: In my No. 81, by this mail, I have given information as to the going of Paul Neumann to Washington by this steamer to represent the interests of the fallen Queen. I have since learned that it is not improbable that there also will go to Washington, of the Queen's faction, Mr. H. A. Widemann and Mr. C. O. Berger. The former is a Hessian German who came to these islands nearly forty years ago. He is married to a pure native wife, and has acquired property through his relations to natives and by the American sugar tariff under reciprocity. His views are widely different from all the other principal Germans here. His relations have been close with the fallen Queen and he was voted out of her cabinet early in the session of the recent Legislature, all of the best members voting against him. He is, and always has been, strongly anti-American. He was of the small clique in Honolulu bitterly against us from 1861 to 1865. He was the leading man of the *only five* who, in the Legislature two years since, voted to put an end to all further negotiations with the United States. For years he has had relations with the English minister here, though the latter has not always approved of Widemann's eccentricities, for which the latter is well known.

Widemann is 70 years of age, somewhat broken, and says he is going only to California for his health. He takes with him Mr. O. C. Berger, his son-in-law, a German or a Swede, who came here from the United States. Berger is reputed to be of few scruples. He was a member of the recent Legislature, always voted with the thieves, voted for the lottery franchise, and had "a job" with the recent Government which made much talk here unfavorable to Berger. It is thought now that he cares little for the old palace dynasty, but goes only to please and to take care of the health of Widemann,* of whose property, as son-in-law, he hopes soon to share. Possibly Widemann and Berger tell the

* It is now understood here that Widemann goes to Washington with Paul Neumann. Both of them have taken tickets for the steamer which leaves here to-morrow for San Francisco.

truth in saying that they are going only to San Francisco, but rumor and strong suspicion say that they will go with Neumann to Washington to help the case of the deposed Queen and to oppose annexation.

Another leaf of valuable information I wish to give the Department of State: The old "palace gang" for the past ten days have been busy here and in the other islands in getting the signatures of natives to a remonstrance against annexation, in the hope thus to restore the monarchy. The signatures to these petitions or remonstrances are being obtained by utterly false representations as to the purposes of the United States, by promises, and other unscrupulous means. This dirty work is managed exclusively by the same white men, American renegades, Australians, and Canadians, who have thrived on the palace corruptions under the recent King Kalakaua and his sister, the deposed Queen. There will be no certainty that half the signatures* to the petitions or remonstrances are genuine.

Possibly a Mr. Bush and a Mr. Namahi will be the bearers of these petitions. The former is a half-white, a minister of Kalakaua in the brief and famous "Moreno fiasco," and Bush and Namahi were members of the recent Legislature and voted for the lottery franchise. These and the whole lottery and palace gang are directly interested in discrediting the Provisional Government, for that Government has just annulled the lottery charter, which the palace gang hoped to sell out to the Louisiana Lottery men for a half million dollars, more or less. There is also some talk that Antone Rosa, a half-white lawyer, with a doubtful reputation, may go with Bush and Namahi. It is possible that none of these named—Widemann, Berger, Bush, Namahi, and Rosa—will go to Washington. Bush, Namahi, and Rosa have no following among the better class of the native Hawaiians, and their representations would be entirely unreliable. The members of the Provisional Government's commission, now in Washington, thoroughly know the character and backing of Widemann, Berger, Namahi, Bush, and Rosa. There is no doubt that the palace gang of white men will pay the bills of Bush, Namahi, and Rosa, if they go on their visit to Washington.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 84.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 1, 1893.

SIR: To-day the undersigned and Capt. Wiltse of the *Boston* are compelled to assume a grave responsibility. The inclosed copies of official notes will explain the reasons which have led to this action on our part.

I have time before the departure of the mail steamer only to state briefly the additional reasons which caused us to assume temporary protectorate of these islands. The Provisional Government must have time to organize a new police and to discipline a small military force. When the monarchy died by its own hand, there was no military force in the islands but the royal guard of about 75 natives, not in effective force equal to 20 American soldiers. These were promptly discharged

* Have received absolutely reliable information that the signatures of the natives to the petitions above specified are secured by paying so much a head to the signers or to the agents who secure them. The white palace and lottery men are working this plan of action.

by the Provisional Government, except 16 left as the guard of the fallen Queen at her house.

The white men here, as well as the natives, have not been much accustomed to the use of arms. There are scarcely any men familiar with military discipline. Companies are now being organized and drilled. They must have a few weeks for drill. Only a small force of a few hundred will be required, but these must be disciplined men. So far the Provisional Government has been sustained by the uprising and union of the business men and best citizens. Bankers, merchants, clerks, professional men, respectable mechanics have stood manfully by the new Government and kept guard by night. This kind of defense must give place to a small, reliable military force! Time is the necessity of the new Government. There are 40,000 Chinese and Japanese on the islands, and evil-disposed persons might stir some of them to disorder. But the chief elements of evil are in Honolulu, where are the renegade whites at the head of the lottery and opium rings, and a considerable number of hoodlum foreigners and the more vicious of the natives.

Another important reason for our action is the possibility of the arrival here of a British war vessel, and that the English minister here, thus aided, might try to press unduly the Provisional Government. With the islands under our protection we think the English minister will not attempt to insist that his Government has the right to interfere while our flag is over the Government building. This is all I have time to write before the departure of the mail. We shall continue to maintain our present position with great caution and firmness until we hear from the President through the Secretary of State. As a necessary precaution against all contingencies, I advise that Admiral Skerrett be promptly sent here with one or two ships in addition to the *Boston*.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

(One or two of the preceding numbers of the dispatches by this mail were written prior to this date, but they were dated February 1 because this is the day of the steamer's departure.)

[Inclosure 1.]

Mr. Stevens to Capt. Wiltse.

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 1, 1893.

SIR: The Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands having duly and officially expressed to the undersigned, the fear that said Government may be unable to protect life and property and to prevent civil disorder in Honolulu, the capital of said Hawaiian Islands, request that the flag of the United States may be raised for the protection of the Hawaiian Islands, and to that end confer on the United States, through the undersigned, freedom of occupation of the public buildings of the Hawaiian Government and the soil of the Hawaiian Islands, so far as may be necessary for the exercise of such protection, but not interfering with the administration of the public affairs by said Provisional Government.

I hereby ask you to comply with the spirit and terms of the request of the Hawaiian Provisional Government, and to that end to use all the force at your command, in the exercise of your best judgment and discretion, you and myself awaiting instructions from the United States Government at Washington.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

Capt. G. C. WILTSE,

Commander of the U. S. Ship Boston.

[Inclosure 2.]

*The Hawaiian Provisional Government to Mr. Stevens.*HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *January 31, 1893.*

Sir: Believing that we are unable to satisfactory protect life and property, and to prevent civil disorders in Honolulu and throughout the Hawaiian Islands, we hereby, in obedience to the instructions of the advisory council, pray that you will raise the flag of the United States of America for the protection of the Hawaiian Islands for the time being, and to that end we hereby confer upon the Government of United States, through you, freedom of occupation of the public buildings of this Government, and of the soil of this country, so far as may be necessary for the exercise of such protection, but not interfering with the administration of public affairs by this Government.

We have, etc.,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
President of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands,
and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
 J. A. KING,
Minister of Interior.
 P. C. JONES,
Minister of Finance.
 WILLIAM O. SMITH,
Attorney-General.

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

[Telegram.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, February 8, 1893.

The affairs of state continue to be hopeful. Hoisting flag in protection of this Government was expected. Subjects who were doubtful, now for annexation. The natives showed unexpected regard of the United States flag. Prudent conduct of Capt. Wiltse, the officers and crew of the *Boston*, credit to the Navy. Can not send by mail.

STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 85.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 8, 1893.

SIR: As I have already indicated by cipher telegram of this date, political affairs here continue to have a hopeful aspect. The raising of the United States flag and the published proclamation of temporary American protectorate of the islands, so far, appear to be having a more beneficial effect than could have been reasonably anticipated. Foreign residents, before in doubt, are now expressing satisfaction that the American flag has been raised here, and are hoping that it will not be lowered, believing annexation best for all concerned. The native Hawaiians are showing an unexpected regard for our flag. The fallen Queen has conducted herself so shamefully and shown so much favoritism to foreign adventurers that all the better portions of the natives had ceased to have legal reverence for her. Her bold, unblushing associa-

tion with the Tahitian half-white palace favorite weakened the hold of the Queen on the natives nearly as much as the official confidence she gave to the American and Australian adventurers of the lottery and opium rings.

Information from all the principal islands of the group is favorable; more so than could have been anticipated. The local government affairs are moving on with little friction, and the courts are transacting their regular and customary business. The interruption to private business and labor is comparatively little, while the hope of annexation is exerting an invigorating financial influence. As soon as it can become a certainty that these islands are to remain under the United States flag as a part of American territory, there is little doubt that all the principal native leaders will wish to become American citizens, and their assistance can be had to help bring the native people into ready obedience to American law and fidelity to the American flag.

As stated in my cipher telegram of this date, the conduct of Capt. Wiltse, of the *Boston*, and of the officers and men under his command has been admirable. Their deportment on shore and in public places, whether on duty or otherwise, has been such as to command the favorable comment of all. The time of Capt. Wiltse here is understood to expire February 10. I have no doubt it would be a just gratification to him could he remain on duty here until the question of annexation shall have been substantially decided.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 14, 1893.

Your telegram of the 1st instant has been received, with coincident report from commander of the *Boston*. Press telegrams from San Francisco give full details of events of 1st instant, with text of your proclamation. The latter, in announcing assumption of protection of the Hawaiian Islands in the name of the United States would seem to be tantamount to the assumption of a protectorate over those islands on behalf of the United States, with all the rights and obligations which the term implies. It is not thought, however, that the request of the Provisional Government for protection or your action in compliance therewith contemplated more than the coöperation of the moral and material forces of the United States to strengthen the authority of the Provisional Government, by according to it adequate protection for life and property during the negotiations instituted here, and without interfering with the execution of public affairs. Such coöperation was and is within your standing instructions and those of the naval commanders in Hawaiian waters. So far as your course accords to the *de facto* Sovereign Government, the material coöperation of the United States for the maintenance of good order and protection of life and property from apprehended disorders, it is commended; but so far as it may appear to overstep that limit by setting the authority of the United States above that of the Hawaiian Government in the capacity of protector, or to impair the independent sovereignty of that Govern-

ment by substituting the flag and power of the United States, it is disavowed.

Instructions will be sent to naval commanders confirming and renewing those heretofore given them, under which they are authorized and directed to coöperate with you in case of need. Your own instructions are likewise renewed, and you are accordingly authorized to arrange with the commanding officer for the continued presence on shore of such marine force as may be practicable and requisite for the security of the lives and property interests of American citizens and the repression of lawlessness threatening them, whenever in your judgment it shall be necessary so to do, or when such coöperation may be sought for good cause by the Government of the Hawaiian Islands; being, however, always careful to distinguish between these functions of voluntary or accorded protection and the assumption of a protectorate over the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, which the United States have recognized as sovereign and with which they treat on terms of sovereign equality.

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 15, 1893.

A treaty of annexation has been signed and will be sent to the Senate without delay.

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

No. 72.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 16, 1893.

SIR: I append copies of my telegrams to you of the 15th instant in relation to your recent bereavement, and to the treaty annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States.

I am, etc.,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

No. 73.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 16, 1893.

SIR: I append on the overleaf a copy of a telegram * sent to you on the 14th instant, relative to the Hawaiian revolution.

I am, etc.,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

* See under date of February 14, 1893.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 74.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 17, 1893.

SIR: I append for your information copy of an instruction to the consul-general at Honolulu, of this date, directing him to report fully as to the shipping under Hawaiian registry on the 17th day of January, 1893, and any transfers of vessels to the Hawaiian flag which may have been or may be effected since that date.

You will kindly lend Mr. Severance your counsel and aid in preparing the indicated report.

I suggest, moreover, for your confidential guidance, that it may be well for you to make such friendly and discreet intimation to the present Government as may discourage the placing of foreign shipping under its flag at this juncture.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

[Inclosure in No. 74.]

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Severance.

No. 74.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 17, 1893.

SIR: I have to request that you will prepare, at as early a day as may be possible, and forward to the Department, a table showing all vessels, bona fide, under Hawaiian registry on the 17th of January last, giving names, character, tonnage, horse-power, if steamers, where and when built, and how owned at that date, whether by Hawaiian citizens or foreigners.

You will also be expected to report what vessels, if any, have been or may be transferred from foreign registry to the Hawaiian flag since the 17th of January, giving the same particulars.

It is said, but with what positive foundation is not here known, that a movement is on foot to place a number of foreign vessels under Hawaiian registry, with a view to eventually obtain the benefits of United States registry. Your inquiries, which should be discreet, and your report should aim to throw light on this subject.

The minister has been informed of this instruction, and you may confer with him on the subject.

I am, etc.

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 22, 1893.

The treaty of annexation is still pending in the Senate. Confirming previous instructions, you are directed, in coöperation with the naval authorities, to support the Provisional Government in the maintenance of security to life and property and good order, until action shall be had upon the treaty.

FOSTER.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 75.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 23, 1893.

SIR: I append a copy of your telegram* of 8th instant on Hawaiian affairs.

I am, sir, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 76.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 24, 1893.

SIR: I append a copy of a telegram *sent you on 22d instant.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 86.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 27, 1893.

SIR: The political status of affairs here remains much the same as at the date of my last previous dispatch, with improving indications as to these islands becoming a part of the territory of the United States, to the great satisfaction of nearly all of the responsible citizens, whites as well as native Hawaiians.

The raising of the United States flag over the Government building continues to have a pacifying influence. The qualified United States protectorate, which has been temporarily assumed at the request of the Provisional Government, is being exercised with caution and reservation, in no way interfering with Hawaiian sovereignty nor with the administration of Hawaiian public affairs by the duly constituted authorities. My understanding of the spirit and terms of our temporary protectorate is in entire accord with the spirit and terms of the Secretary of State's dispatch to me of February 14, and implied in my dispatch No. 84, of February 1st, and the papers accompanying the same.

There are now on shore about one hundred and twenty marines and sailors of the U. S. S. *Boston*, with their officers, and their conduct so far has been highly creditable to the American Navy.

All present indications are to the import that if annexation becomes a fact the white population will be nearly unanimous in its favor; that most of the native Hawaiians will readily acquiesce, and that the permanent good order and prosperity of the islands will be secured. The most recent advices from all the principal islands indicate quiet, good order, and general acquiescence in the rule of the Provisional Government.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

* See under date of February 8, 1893.

* See under date of February 22, 1893.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 87.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 27, 1893.

SIR: In my dispatch 84, of February 1, I gave as one of the reasons for our action in assuming a qualified and temporary "protectorate" over these islands, the possibility of the arrival here of a British war vessel, and stated that the English minister thus aided might try to press unduly the Provisional Government. On the 13th instant the British cruiser *Garnet*, an iron ship of 2,120 tons, 240 men and officers, Capt. H. F. Hughes-Hallet in command, arrived here. Only three or four days had elapsed when the manifest unfriendliness of the English sailors as well as of some of the officers of the *Garnet* was displayed. The men of the *Garnet* being allowed to go on shore in the customary way, they soon showed marked sympathy for the fallen Queen's cause and indulged in insulting remarks towards the United States marines and sailors of the *Boston* on duty ashore by the request of the Provisional Government and with my approval.

There came very near being a riot and severe quarrel in the public streets. Only the forbearance and self-possession of the officers and men of the *Boston* prevented the English sailors getting a severe beating, with unhappy incidents. It at once became necessary for the Provisional Government to take precautionary steps as to the men from foreign naval vessels being on shore, providing that only those of one nationality should be on shore the same day. I cannot think that Capt. Hughes-Hallet, of the *Garnet*, gave countenance to this insulting and disorderly conduct of the men of his ship, though some of the under officers may have done so. Neither the captain of the *Garnet* nor his officers have made the customary call on the Provisional Government, and so far as possible they seem to wish to ignore it. It is generally supposed, and I think correctly, that the English minister here, Hon. J. H. Wodehouse, whose son is married to the sister of the Hawaiian Crown Princess, is largely responsible for this unfriendliness to the Provisional Government. By those best informed as to Hawaiian Government affairs in the past twenty years, it is said that Mr. Wodehouse in his persistent resistance to American predominance here has never been well supported by the British cabinet in London, and it is believed that he will not be now.

Were it not that our flag is over the Government House there is little doubt that this British unfriendliness would have done much more mischief in stirring up the "hoodlum" elements, of which the lottery and opium gang of the fallen Queen's supporters have more or less control. At a great American reception and ball here on the evening of the 25th instant, the largest and most imposing ever had in Honolulu, partly as a testimonial to Captain Wiltse, of the *Boston*, about to leave for the United States, the English, the English diplomatic and consular officials, nor the officers of the *Garnet* attended, though they were invited.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

[Telegram.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, March 1, 1893.

All quiet throughout archipelago. Protectorate is preventing pressure of the British minister. The Japanese representatives telegraphed Government January 19. Japanese ship *Naniwa* arrived February 23. *Kongo* arrived January 28. It is believed that the Japanese representative who arrived November 28 is urged by the British minister. It is believed that the British ship *Warspite* has been ordered here to provide for contingencies. It is advisable to send here at once the most powerful American ship available. I have sent particulars by mail.

STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster.

No. 88.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, March 1, 1893.

SIR: My telegram preceding this dispatch informed the Department of State that quiet and general regularity in political and business affairs prevailed throughout the islands.

Our qualified protectorate appears to work favorably. It not only tends to increase American and annexation sentiments, but it also operates to prevent foreign complications. It makes it very difficult for the English Minister here—very hostile to American predominance—from interfering.

He is very desirous of bringing about a state of things to afford a pretext for landing English marines and sailors, and to bring about a tripartite management of Hawaiian affairs. Hence his efforts to secure the Japanese commissioner to his design. With the former Japanese commissioner, a gentleman of education and intelligence and very fair-minded, I had most cordial relations.

The present commissioner, here only a few weeks, is a different man. He had been in the consular service in San Francisco and New York and evidently has a certain degree of anti-American prejudice.

When he telegraphed Tokio for the great iron clad which arrived here February 23, the Provisional Government had not got fairly to work, and our "qualified protectorate" had not been established.

Not fully understanding the situation he acted hastily. So far the commanders of the two Japanese vessels have followed the example of the English commanders in not calling on the Provisional Government, though both the English minister and the Japanese commissioner had acknowledged it as the Hawaiian Government *de facto*. The French commissioner and the Portuguese chargé are on most friendly terms with the Provisional Government, as are nearly all the foreign consuls.

I still hope to separate the Japanese commissioner from the English minister. He has already avowed himself quite well satisfied with the course of the Provisional Government, and acknowledges the unsupportable state of things the last weeks of the Hawaiian monarchy.

It is possible he has some connection with the middlemen who have been supplying contract laborers for the Hawaiian plantations, and fears annexation might spoil the occupation and profits of middlemen.

Whether any suggestions should be made to our minister at Tokio to say anything to the Japanese Government touching Hawaiian affairs, it is for the Department of State to decide.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

NOTE.—In requesting that war vessels be sent here I have considered that the Department of State might probably have information prior to arrival of my cipher dispatch rendering the granting of my request unnecessary.

But I also consider that if I do not give the view as it appears at this distant standpoint at this date, I would fail of duty.

STEVENS.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 77.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 2, 1893.

SIR: I transmit a letter of the President in reply to the letter of January 24, 1893, of his excellency the President of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, relating to political events; and a copy thereof. You will send the copy to the foreign office, and deliver the original at a time and in a manner agreeable to his excellency.

I am, sir, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

[Enclosure in No. 77.]

Benjamin Harrison, President of the United States of America, To His Excellency, Sanford B. Dole, President of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

WASHINGTON, March 1, 1893.

GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND: I have received your letter of January 24, 1893, by which you inform me that the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands has been quietly and peaceably established under a proclamation formally and publicly made at the door of the Government building in Honolulu, on the 17th day of January, 1893, and that the said Government has honored you with the office of President of the Provisional Government and chairman of the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

I am pleased to note the expression of your earnest desire to maintain and strengthen the strong friendship which has for so many years existed between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands, and to assure your excellency that I shall omit no effort which may conduce to the accomplishment of a purpose which I so heartily desire.

May God have your excellency and the people of the Hawaiian Islands in His wise keeping.

Your good friend,

BENJ. HARRISON.

By the President:

WM. F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary of State.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Fresham.

No. 89.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, March 7, 1893.

SIR: Believing it to be proper and just for the administration of President Cleveland to have the appointment of a United States minister abroad who fully represents its views as to foreign policy, I hereby tender my resignation as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in Honolulu. It is not improper for me to say that I should have offered my resignation about this date had President Harrison been reëlected, it having been my firm resolution when I came here in 1889 not to remain longer than four years at most. I am aware that the present Hawaiian Government and most of the Americans and friends of the United States in these islands have a strong desire that I should continue to hold my official position here at present, owing to my thorough acquaintance with Hawaiian affairs.

But if annexation is near being accomplished, I think by the 1st of May I can leave here without detriment to public interests, and that whatever further duties may be required of a diplomatic official can be safely intrusted to Hon. H. W. Severance, the present consul-general. He is well informed as to the history of recent political events here. In addition to his four years of consular service in Honolulu he had had in former years an extensive acquaintance with these islands. He is a gentleman of correct life and has the confidence of the best men here, being about 64 years of age. As neither a United States minister nor consul is likely to be needed here long, I would advise that Mr. Severance be continued in office so long as his official services may be necessary.

If annexation is not at present to become an accomplished fact, and a minister should be needed here, you will allow the suggestion that he should be a superior man of tact, firmness, integrity, and correct life, and American to the core. To avoid risks I would advise he be not a Californian politician of any party, for owing to contiguity and near commercial association a Californian might not be entirely unbiased on some questions and interests.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Gresham.

No. 90.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, March 7, 1893.

SIR: The political situation here at this time is much the same as it was at the dates of my two preceding dispatches. There is general quiet throughout the islands and the Provisional Government is getting along exceedingly well, all circumstances considered. It is giving satisfaction to all the better and more responsible citizens. Of course, all are awaiting with deep anxiety the result of the action of the Senate on the annexation treaty. Mr. Wodehouse, the British minister, is trying to embarrass it in several particulars, especially its freedom of action in respect to its negotiations with the United States. He has tried to induce it to request the return to their ship of the marines and sailors of the *Boston*, about 120 in all. He is assuming to urge that the

annexation treaty if ratified by the Senate should be submitted here to a popular vote, hoping to stir up all the factional and irresponsible elements thus to defeat annexation, though none knows better than he that such a procedure here under existing conditions would be a farce and no test of the opinions of the responsible people of the islands.

Of course, the views of the English minister in this regard get to the public ears and the factional and irresponsible elements are stirred more or less by the Canadian, Australian, and American adventurers here, of the lottery and opium rings. I think the Provisional Government has answered the English minister very effectively by pointing him to the general course of the British Government in its numerous annexations of Pacific Islands as well as of other countries.

In my dispatch 74 I have given the special personal and family reasons why Minister Wodehouse wishes the Hawaiian monarchy restored and American ascendancy here weakened. Annexation alone will put an end to these ultra British intrigues and give Hawaii responsible government and great prosperity.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

No. 91.]

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Gresham.

[Confidential]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, March 7, 1893.

SIR: By the American newspapers it appears, and I have the information from other sources, that a Mr. E. C. Macfarlane is in Washington, professing to be an ardent American, sometimes claiming to be an annexationist, but avows himself hostile to the Hawaiian Provisional Government and to the course of the Hawaiian commissioners.

It is proper for me to inform the Department of State that this man is one of the firm of George Macfarlane & Co., referred to by my predecessor here, Minister Merrill, in his dispatch 78, to Secretary Bayard, of September 2, 1886, page 558 of printed volume of diplomatic documents. Again, the minister refers to the same firm in his dispatch 138, of August 2, 1887, page 832, printed volume, by which it is seen that the firm was a party to defrauding the Hawaiian Government of more than \$100,000 in negotiating a loan with a London house. For years this firm has been ultra English in its political affiliations and mercantile plans.

A few months since this E. C. Macfarlane, by intrigues and associations became one of the recent Queen's ministers, minister of finance. So unsatisfactory was he to all the best members of the Legislature and to the business men of the Islands, that he remained in the ministry but a few days, being voted out by the Legislature though the English minister, openly and by personal effort, and his wife more conspicuously in the legislative hall, worked to retain him. After Macfarlane was voted out, the English minister used the former as a go-between to the Queen to get her to appoint another pro-English cabinet, but the effort failed. This E. C. Macfarlane is referred to in my 70 and 71. This is the man who sought to get access to President Cleveland, at Lakewood, according to the New York and Washington papers, and is now posing as an American and is said to be asking a

hearing at Washington. He and his brother were born here of Scotch parentage, and E. C. lived several years in California. But American interests here have no more unrelenting foe than this liquor-importing house of G. W. Macfarlane & Co.

E. C. Macfarlane is a fitting confederate in Washington, as he has been in Honolulu, with Paul Neuman, the deposed Queen's attorney, whose character is described in my dispatch 81 of January 26.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Stevens.

No. 79.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 10, 1893.

SIR: I append a copy of a telegram* received on 8th instant, over your signature.

I am, etc.,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Gresham.

No. 92.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, March 15, 1893.

SIR: That the Department of State may fully understand the present status of affairs here, it is necessary for me to state as accurately as possible the practical working of the qualified and restricted protectorate which the United States officials are exercising here. We have never understood this practically to allow us to go much, if any, beyond the spirit and terms of Secretary Bayard's dispatch to Minister Merrill of July 12, 1887, in printed volume of Foreign Relations of that year, page 581, and both the Provisional Government and myself have ever construed it as strictly within the limitations specified in Secretary Foster's dispatch 71 of February 11, 1893, fully understanding that the United States representatives here shall not interfere with the sovereignty nor with the administration of the public affairs of these islands. This restricted protectorate has proved more necessary and beneficial than was fully perceived when assumed.

When the Hawaiian monarchy collapsed and the Provisional Government was instituted, there were corruptions and abuses wherever the palace power had exercised predominating influence in the selection of officials. Time was necessary for the eradication of these evils, for the creation of a reliable police, and for the organization and drilling of a small military force. Besides the English minister, for reasons indicated in previous dispatches, was bitterly dissatisfied that I had acted independently of him, landing the men of the *Boston* when they were imperatively needed, while there was then no British vessel here. According to what was anticipated might occur, not long after our restricted protectorate was assumed the British war ship *Garnet* arrived. It was then too late for the English minister to make effective any demand to land troops or to insist on dual action with the United States minister. Still more, the Japanese commissioner arriving here but a short time before the fall of the monarchy, and not fully understanding the situation, began to manifest a wish to land men from the Japanese

* See under date of March 8, 1893.

war vessel in the harbor, and telegraphed Tokio via San Francisco, two days after the fall of the monarchy, for another war vessel, and February 23, as previously stated in my dispatch 88, one of the largest ships of the Japanese navy arrived here. But it was then too late for the intrigues and pressure of the English minister and the arrival of the increased Japanese naval force to intervene. It was found that the prompt American action had given so much moral support to the new Hawaiian Government that neither the Government nor the United States officials here would consent to any temporary dual or tripartite arrangement as to Hawaiian affairs.

Yesterday, the 14th, the British ship *Garnet* left for Vancouver, and to-day or to-morrow the *Kongo*, the smallest Japanese ship, will leave for Japan. There is no doubt that but for our protectorate, restricted as it is, the British minister would have insisted on the same right to land troops that he had formerly exercised here, while our action of February 1 and of the days preceding closed the door against complications, saved the Provisional Government from foreign pressure, leaving the United States complete master of the situation. The Japanese commissioner and naval commanders now fully recognize the Provisional Government by official and ceremonial calls, and their attitude toward this legation and our naval commanders here appear to be cordial. But I have learned positively and beyond all doubt that had not the monarchy here fallen and this Government had remained in its former condition of weakness, it was the intention of the newly arrived Japanese commissioner to have demanded the same political rights in Hawaii, including the voting franchise for Japanese, as, under the constitution of 1887, have been exercised by resident foreigners of Christian nations. I am equally convinced that with annexation to the United States the Japanese Government will attempt no pressure of this kind, that Government fully understanding that the United States is a reliable friend of Japan and that the Japanese subjects in these islands will be well protected should Hawaii come fully under the rule of the United States. While I say this I shall be allowed to express the opinion that there is occasion for keeping a sharp eye on Tokyo and British and perhaps other foreign intrigues there against our plans of predominance in the North Pacific.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Gresham.

No. 93.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, March 24, 1893.

SIR: In my previous dispatches I have given some facts and surmises regarding Japanese ambitions as to these islands. I presume the Department of State has knowledge of the elaborate article of Sir Edward Arnold in the London Telegraph of February 24, strongly anti-American and favoring the surrender of Hawaii to Japanese predominance and protection. By residence in Japan, as well as by some previously acquired taste of Calcutta and Hindostan life, Arnold seems to accept readily Japanese morals and civilization, warmly flatters the easily susceptible vanity of the Japanese, the real Frenchmen of Asia. My only reason for referring to Sir Edward Arnold and his copyrighted London article is because of certain Japanese indications in this neighborhood.

How far these indications have substantial basis in Tokyo of course I am unable to say. It is reasonable to presume that this Japanese interest in Hawaiian affairs is cherished and pushed forward by at least one of the political cliques in the Japanese capital. The sudden coming here of the *Naniwa*, a powerful iron clad, at the telegraphic call of the Japanese diplomatic agent here, though the *Kongo*, a Japanese war ship of 2,200 tons, was then here, indicates some sensitive spring of action at Tokyo. Just before the fall of the Queen, the Japanese commissioner had positively indicated to me his purpose to press on the Hawaiian Government the demand for the amendment of the Hawaiian constitution so as to give the Japanese in the islands the same rights of suffrage enjoyed by European and American foreigners and Hawaiians. He was to demand this in virtue of stipulations which he regarded to be in a Japanese treaty with Hawaii secured under the old Hawaiian régime prior to the adoption of the reform constitution of 1887.

There is every reason to believe that had not the United States flag been raised over the Hawaiian Government building, and American protection thus secured, it was the intention of the Japanese Commissioner to have demanded and asserted the right of landing Japanese forces from the *Naniwa* and the *Kongo*, and thus to have placed Japanese officials here on equal footing with the representatives of the United States, thus establishing a *dual* arrangement and protection in Hawaiian affairs. But when the *Naniwa* arrived here February 23 our action of February 1 raising the flag over the Government building had completely closed the door, and the Japanese commissioner and naval commander saw it would not do to encroach on ground covered by United States protection. Of course, the only hope of the Japanese jingo to carry out the suffrage scheme would be in the restoration of the Queen, who is ready secretly to promise anything for Japanese help in her monarchical design. Lately I have had several interviews with the Japanese commissioner of a friendly character. I have reminded him of the long-existing friendship and good relations between Japan and the United States, and why those relations are likely to exist in the future.

I called his attention to and explained our many years of special relations to and interest in these islands, and gave him to understand that we would view any encroachment on the sovereignty and soil of Hawaii by a foreign power much the same as an encroachment on the soil and rights of the United States. I assured him that in case annexation should become a fact we should strictly protect the life, property, and interests of all residents of the islands. I approached this point with so much caution and with such friendly words that I am confident he appreciated the weight of my reasons and the kindly vigor with which I stated them. Since these interviews with the Japanese commissioner I have learned of his saying to one of the principal men of the Provisional Government that he thinks it does not matter much who control the islands provided that the laws were well enforced and the life and property of the residents well secured.

Apparently at this writing the Japanese commissioner is more responsive to the wishes and purposes of the United States representatives here than to those of any other power. Yet I can but regard it all important for us to hold our position on shore firmly, especially so long as the *Naniwa* remains in Hawaiian waters.

There is no doubt that the foreign adventurers here, especially the lottery and opium rings that drew the Queen to her overthrow, will do

their utmost to seduce the Japanese officials by stimulating their animosities and aspirations. Among these adventurers are well known here to be Paul Neuman, the fallen Queen's attorney, now or recently in Washington. He is in the paid employ of the Tokyo contract labor importing ring, who for years have been bleeding the Hawaiian planters and the Japanese laborers out of large sums of money. There are the best reasons for the belief that this Tokyo ring and their co-partners here are opposing annexation because they believe that American possession will put an end to their corrupt work and large gains. Careful inquiry leads to the conclusion that this Tokyo ring, aided by Englishmen and others like Sir Edward Arnold, are stimulating Japanese ambitions and interference here. Highly-placed Englishmen will do this, because they prefer Japanese influence should predominate rather than American. Annexation would end forever all schemes of this kind. Certain it is that at present it would be risking too much to withdraw our protecting flag and armed marines from Honolulu until this Japanese menace shall have completely terminated and the unscrupulous ring of foreign adventurers can no longer make use of it as an agency of reaction and misrule.

All friends of the United States in these islands, and none more keenly than the Provisional Government, appreciate this, and are anxious for the continued support and protection of the United States. Had I failed to give to the Department of State the information and suggestions contained in this dispatch, I would have keenly realized that I had failed of my duty as an American minister at this important juncture of Hawaiian affairs.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

NOTE.—I have in the above and a preceding dispatch spoken of the presence here of the Japanese war ship, the *Kongo*. While in these waters that ship made a visit to Hilo early in March. While at Hilo the conversation related in the inclosed paper took place on board that ship, which may be read in connection with my accompanying dispatch 93. I also inclose printed slips of the Honolulu Advertiser, the chief newspaper on the islands, strongly American in its views and sentiments:

Copy of language used by the captain of the Japanese war ship Kongo while in the harbor of Hilo, March 5 or 6.

INTERVIEW OF JAPANESE INTERPRETER.

I have just had a long talk with Mr. LeRoy, the Japanese interpreter for the Hilo district. He was the only one who had a talk with the captain of the *Kongo* during her presence in the harbor, and I quote his own language.

"Sunday afternoon when the *Kongo* arrived the surgeon of the ship called upon me and asked about the health of the port. I referred him to Dr. Williams, the Government physician, and then he handed me a sealed letter; upon the upper corner of the envelope were the words 'official business.'

"Upon opening it I found a communication from the captain of the *Kongo*, who asked me to visit the ship the next day. I accepted, and Monday afternoon went on board. The captain took me into his cabin, away from the others, and, after a few introductory remarks, he said:

"'What is the sentiment of the Japanese on the islands? Do they not side with the natives?' I assured him that such did not seem to be the case.

"'In case,' he continued, 'that there should be trouble, would they not bear arms with the Hawaiians?'

"This question rather puzzled me, but I told him I did not think so.

"He went over the same ground several times, and, from what he said, I am convinced he was not pleased with the attitude the Japanese had taken.

"I then asked him what the *Kongo* had come to Hilo for, and he replied, 'To protect the rights of Japanese.'

"How so?"

"Well, there are many ways.' I asked him if he intended to take any definite action. 'No,' said he, 'I must consult with the captain of the *Naniwa*. I have to consult with him at Honolulu.' I then referred to the appearance of the U. S. S. *Alliance*. He shrugged his shoulders, and I said, 'I suppose she came to watch us; but she is a wooden tub, anyway.'"

Stevens to Mr. Gresham.

No. 94.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, April 4, 1893.

SIR: Your dispatch of March 11 was placed in my hands by Special Commissioner Hon. James H. Blount. So long as I remain in service here I shall endeavor faithfully to carry out the instructions of the Secretary of State.

The presence of the men from the U. S. S. *Boston* on shore from January 16 to April 1 had a remarkably beneficial influence on public affairs in the islands, safeguarding American life and property and encouraging the elements of public order. When the Hawaiian monarchy fell under the weight of its astounding corruptions and by its own suicidal hand, there remained here no reliable organized police, and there was no military force in all the islands with a population of nearly 100,000. The supporters of the Provisional Government having had little or no military experience, an organized military force could not be created at once. Time was absolutely necessary. The presence of the few United States soldiers with their country's flag was of incalculable importance to the only existing and only possible government for Hawaii. When the men of the *Boston* went to their ship, April 1 the Provisional Government had at its command a military force of 400 men—the most effective ever known in the islands—and an organized police with a tried and efficient man at the head. The remarkable change accomplished in seventy-five days had been without the loss of life or the destruction of property. Had the United States minister and the naval commander not acted as they did they would have deserved prompt removal from their places and the just censure of the friends of humanity and of civilization.

The general aspect of Hawaiian affairs at this time is highly encouraging. The Provisional Government is gaining in public confidence and popular support. There is complete good order throughout the islands. The present government is supported by all the more responsible citizens and by seven-eighths of the property of the country. By all the best citizens it is regarded the best government the islands have had for many years. The friends of annexation continue to increase and now include all the supporters of the Provisional Government, the principal property holders, and a large number of native Hawaiians.

With my family I intend to leave Honolulu for our home in Maine in the steamer of May 24. Unless otherwise directed, I will leave the archives, books, and other property of the legation in care of Hon. H. W. Severance, the consul-general. Owing to the advanced years and imperfect health of Mrs. Stevens and myself, it will be necessary for us to have repeated stopping for rest on our long journey, though we expect to make our home transit inside of the thirty-five days allowed by law.

I am, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Stevens.

No. 81.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, April 18, 1893.

SIR: I have received your No. 92, of the 15th ultimo, relative to the Provisional Government recently established in Hawaii, and the attitude of the British and Japanese representatives with respect thereto.

I am, etc.,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Stevens.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, April 25, 1893.

In view of your tender of resignation dated March 7 and of your dispatch 94 of April 4, I am directed by the President to inform you that your resignation is accepted. You are therefore authorized to quit your post at your early convenience, leaving the archives and property of the legation in custody of Consul-General Severance without diplomatic functions.

GRESHAM.

Mr. Adee to Mr. Stevens.

No. 82.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, April 27, 1893.

SIR: I have received your dispatches numbered 89 and 94, of 7th ultimo and 4th instant, and with reference thereto append a copy of a telegram* of 25th instant accepting your resignation.

I am, etc.,

ALVEY A. ADEE,
Acting Secretary.

*See under date of April 25, 1893.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Stevens.

No. 83.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 4, 1893.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 93, of the 24th March last, and the newspaper extracts therewith, concerning rumors and reports of a desire on the part of Japan to improve its footing in the Hawaiian Islands.

I am, etc.,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Gresham.

No. 96.]

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, May 18, 1893.

SIR: Agreeably to your instructions I have turned over the archives and other property of the legation to Hon. James G. Blount, my successor as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States. Herewith is inclosed his receipt for the same. A duplicate copy I leave at the legation. I leave here with my family and the remains of my deceased daughter May 24. Had it been possible to have secured proper steamer accommodations we would have left Honolulu ten days earlier, though that would have been several days prior to your dispatch directing me to place the legation in charge of Mr. Blount.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 1.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, May 24, 1893.

SIR: I received by the *Australia* arriving here on the 17th instant two telegrams from you, dated on the 9th instant, forwarded through W. A. Cooper, United States Dispatch agent at San Francisco.

I regret very much that it was found necessary to appoint me as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Hawaiian Islands.

On the afternoon of the former date I took the oath of office—which I inclose herewith—and have taken charge of the records and property of the legation.

I have done so because I supposed from the circumstance that I was appointed against a declaration on my part to you in Washington that I could not accept it, that some important reason, not contained in the telegram, made it desirable to the President and yourself that Mr. Stevens' connection with the legation should be promptly severed.

I inclose herewith my resignation of the office, with the request that it be accepted, and my successor appointed as soon as practicable.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JAMES H. BLOUNT.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 1.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, May 24, 1893.

SIR: I herewith tender my resignation of the office of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States to the Hawaiian Islands, to take effect on your acceptance thereof.

With profound admiration for you officially and personally,

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,

*Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.*His Excellency GROVER CLEVELAND,
President of the United States of America.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 2.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, May 24, 1893.

SIR: The letters of Mr. Nordhoff to the New York Herald, on the situation of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, have produced intense resentment in the minds of American residents and of white annexationists generally here.

On the 21st instant Dr. J. C. McGrew, who claims to be an American citizen, and who is a leading member of the Annexation Club, and the editor in chief of the Hawaiian Star, which belongs to the Annexation Club and is a quasi official organ of the Government, reported to Admiral Skerrett that there had been quite an excitement all day long amongst persons who were offended by Mr. Nordhoff's letters, and that he had scarcely been able to restrain them from insulting Mr. Nordhoff by applying to him a coat of tar and feathers.

I immediately addressed a note to Mr. Dole, a copy of which I inclose herewith. (Inclosure No. 1.)

Later in the day Dr. McGrew informed Admiral Skerrett that there would be no effort to tar and feather Mr. Nordhoff, but that proceedings would be taken the next day in court against him.

The following day brought no answer from President Dole to my communication.

In the afternoon of the 22d instant, a paper was served upon Mr. Nordhoff—a copy of which I inclose.

The assertion of a power under the color of law to hold Mr. Nordhoff responsible for the publication of his letters in the New York Herald being regarded as without warrant of authority and in violation of his rights as an American citizen, I determined immediately to communicate to the Government a denial of their right to proceed against him on account of said publication.

Desiring to avoid any semblance of too great readiness to enter into a controversy with the Hawaiian Government over this matter, I went to see President Dole, and called attention to the action of the attorney general and informed him that the Government of the United States would not submit to the exercise of such a prerogative on the part of the Hawaiian Government; that I deemed it proper to hold a conversation with him, hoping to avoid thereby any official correspondence which might produce acerbity or the slightest estrangement. He replied that he was very much obliged to me for having taken such a course, and that the question raised would be examined and the conclusions reached communicated to me.

He then referred to my letter, saying that he would have answered it, but supposed that it was intended simply to give him notice of the facts stated. I replied that I regretted he had not seen fit to give me any information concerning the matter in writing in order that the same might be forwarded to the Government of the United States; that I hoped the additional subject of controversy, to which I invited his attention, would be adjusted in a manner consistent with the honor of the United States, and so speedily that I might be able to communicate this also to the home Government. After some conversation on this subject he informed me that the advisory council had requested Mr. Nordhoff to come before it, and asked me if I thought he would come, as it was only a request. To this I answered, "I presume not. Whatever information Mr. Nordhoff may have obtained carried with it an obligation of privacy, which I do not believe he would violate."

All this occurred on the street, and as we were about to part, I said to him that I should call on Mr. Nordhoff, and let him know the status of the affair; that I felt it my duty to give him such assurances as would conduce to his sense of security. To this he responded: "I have taken precautions against any violence being done to him, although I do not think he is in any danger."

I immediately sent to Mr. Nordhoff's house and was at first prevented from entering the yard by two policemen. I am persuaded, however, that this was an unintentional error on their part and not in pursuance of their instructions.

In conversation with Mr. Nordhoff he told me he had been summoned before the advisory council. On reaching home I found the document, a copy of which I inclose herewith (No. 3).

It had very little the appearance to my mind of a request. On the 23d I had Mr. Nordhoff come to the legation headquarters at 9 o'clock, and requested him to remain there until I should return from the Government building where I was about to proceed to make formal announcement of my appointment as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.

I do not deem it necessary to report the speech of myself or President Dole, but simply to say that they contained those manifestations of friendship usually occurring on such occasions between friendly powers.

After this ceremony was over President Dole expressed a desire to speak with me on the subject of the legal proceedings instituted by the attorney-general against Mr. Nordhoff, and likewise the action of the advisory council and my verbal complaint in relation thereto. He began by desiring an appointment with me sometime during the day in order to communicate with me what had occurred in the matter of the consideration of the subject by the law officers of the Government. I said that I hoped it would be disposed of as promptly as possible; and that I had foreborne any written communication on the subject in the interest of good will between the two countries; that unless the matter was disposed of speedily I must address him a communication.

He asked me if Mr. Nordhoff would go before the council and make an apology? To this I responded that I did not think he would; that I could not advise him to such a course; that after denunciation by the "Star," the Annexation Club organ, threats of insult by tarring and feathering, proceedings instituted by the attorney-general in the local courts, and the action of the advisory council, such an apology would have the appearance of compulsion, to which I was not willing to see an American citizen subjected.

At this hour (10:40) I am awaiting a communication from the Government. To avoid any additional complications I have advised Mr. Nordhoff to remain at the legation.

At 2:10 p. m. a communication was received from President Dole, through his secretary, a copy of which I inclose herewith (No. 4). Whereupon Mr. Nordhoff left the legation for his residence.

At 4:30 p. m. of the same day, the 23d instant, not hearing anything from President Dole, I sent my secretary, Mr. Mills, to inquire whether he would call during the day, and if so, at what time? He sent me a verbal message by Mr. Mills to the effect that he was not under the impression that he was to have any further conversation with me, having had one at the Government building. Of course this was a misunderstanding between us. He further stated that the advisory council had referred the subject to the attorney-general, to inquire

whether any civil or criminal proceedings would be taken against Mr. Nordhoff.

Thereupon I determined to forward to him a letter (a copy of which I inclose, No. 5), which I had written on yesterday afternoon, but had withheld it, hoping for a speedy adjustment of the difference without its being placed in writing.

I recognize the obligation of an American citizen residing in a foreign country to obey its laws.

It has appeared to me that the doctrine laid down by Mr. Bayard in the case of A. K. Cutting, September 9, 1885, is applicable to the pending case. If this be true then the issue may as rightfully be made before the consideration of the cause as subsequent thereto.

Yesterday afternoon the Hon. John L. Stevens called to see me. He was exceedingly bitter against Mr. Nordhoff—charging him with treasonable conduct and displaying the most eager interest in the matter of the action of the Hawaiian Government against him. Amongst other things he alleged that Mr. Nordhoff had been conspiring with the royalists to overthrow the Provisional Government, and that the Government had the evidence against him in black and white. I asked him how this came to his knowledge? He replied, "Well, I have it, anyhow; and they ought to have it."

I very much fear that his relations to the people here, and his bitter feeling against Mr. Nordhoff, has contributed to produce an abnormal excitement against the latter.

I believe the situation was such as made it necessary for me to promptly act in the manner related.

The objectionable correspondence heretofore referred to was published in the Daily Bulletin. So far as I know it is not claimed by the authorities here that Mr. Nordhoff had anything to do with its publication.

I inclose herewith a copy of a communication from him (No. 6).

I expect that action will be taken requiring Mr. Nordhoff to leave the country. Should this occur I shall not deem it my duty to make objection.

I am, etc.,

JAMES M. BLOUNT,
*Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of the United States.*

[Inclosure 1 in No. 2.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, May 21, 1893.

SIR: I beg your attention to the following statement from Admiral Skerrett:

"I was informed to-day upon reliable authority—the authority being Dr. J. S. McGrew—that some exasperated citizens of Honolulu had taken great offense at the wording of a letter supposed to have been written by Mr. Nordhoff, a United States citizen, and newspaper correspondent of the New York Herald, which statement that he had received from certain persons in Honolulu, he communicated to his paper.

Threats have been made with regard to his possible maltreatment, such threats being tar and feathering, and other things."

Mr. Nordhoff being an eminent citizen of the United States, I deem it proper to call your attention to this matter.

Very respectfully,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
United States Special Commissioner.

Hon. S. B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 2.]

DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL,
Honolulu, May 22, 1893.

SIR: The inclosed statement, which you have caused to be published in the New York Herald, and which has been republished in the Honolulu Bulletin, is known by this Government to be false, and is regarded as malicious and libelous. Unless you retract the same at once, and give the retraction equal publicity with the libel, proceedings will be instituted against you.

I have, etc.,

WILLIAM O. SMITH,
Attorney-General.

Mr. CHARLES NORDHOFF.

MINISTER STEVENS' INTRIGUE.

Minister Stevens has been engaged all the last week in an intrigue having for its object to alarm the Queen and cause her to abdicate. Mr. Dole, head of the Provisional Government, has been, it is understood, working with the American minister at this enterprise, and reports have been set afloat that President Cleveland wishes her to make a cession of the islands to the United States; that Commissioner Blount would be pleased if she did; that Mr. Blount is going away soon; that he intends to land troops again and hoist the American flag; that he is unhappy over the situation; that he is afraid to leave here even to visit some of the other islands without first putting an American garrison in possession of Honolulu, and so forth.

[Inclosure 3 in No. 2.]

IN THE NAME OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS:

To the Marshal of the Hawaiian Islands, or his deputy on the Island of Oahu greeting:

Whereas, by a resolution of the executive and advisory councils adopted on the 22d day of May, A. D. 1893, a copy of which is as follows:

"Whereas the following statement, among others, has been published in the Daily Bulletin in a letter purporting to have been written by Mr. Charles Nordhoff, viz:

"SHREWD LOTTERY MEN.

"It is not necessary to give more names. A good many retail merchants, grocers, clothing sellers, etc., are on the lottery petitions, and I am told the labor union men, now all annexationists, went in almost in a body for the lottery, as well as most of the members of the Provisional Assembly."

And whereas said statement, as far as it applies to the Provisional Assembly, is wholly false,

Resolved, That said Charles Nordhoff be cited to appear before this assembly on Tuesday, May 23, A. D. 1893, at 11 o'clock a.m., to show upon what authority he has based such assertions. It was voted that Charles Nordhoff be cited to appear before said Assembly on Tuesday, the 23d day of May instant, at 11 o'clock a.m., to show upon what authority he based his said assertion.

Now, therefore, you are commanded to cite said Charles Nordhoff, if he can be found within your jurisdiction, to appear before the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government, at the Council Chamber in Honolulu, on Tuesday, the 23d day of May, A. D. 1893, at 11 o'clock a.m., to answer to such complaint as may be made against him.

Witness: Hon. Sanford B. Dole, President of the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government at Honolulu, this 23d day of May, A. D. 1893.

CHARLES T. ROGERS,
*Secretary Executive and Advisory Councils.*HONOLULU, OAHU, *Hawaiian Islands, May 22, 1893.*

I hereby certify the within to be a true and correct copy of the original *in re* the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands *vs.* Charles Nordhoff, citation to be and appear before the executive and advisory councils of the said Provisional Government.

C. G. HITCHCOCK,
Marshal, Hawaiian Islands.

[Inclosure 4 in No. 2.]

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, May 23, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's letter a United States Special Commissioner of the 21st instant, calling my attention to a statement by Rear Admiral Skerriitt, that threats had been made by exasperated citizens of Honolulu of maltreatment of Mr. Charles Nordhoff, a citizen of the United States and the correspondent of the New York Herald.

In reply I beg to express regret that any such violence as your letter suggests has been threatened Mr. Nordhoff, and have called the attention of the proper authorities of the Government to the matter, and have taken steps for his protection against any violence whatever during his residence here.

With sentiments of the highest regard and esteem,

I have the honor to be, sir, your excellency's obedient servant,
 SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency JAMES H. BLOUNT,
United States Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Honolulu.

[Inclosure 5 in No. 2.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, May 22, 1893.

SIR: I have been handed the following communication from Mr. Charles Nordhoff. (See inclosure No. 2, Attorney-General W. O. Smith to Mr. Nordhoff.)

The New York Herald is a paper not published in the Hawaiian Islands, and the proposition that the Government thereof can take jurisdiction of the author of the article aforesaid on account of its publication in the United States is wholly inadmissible. It is equivalent to asserting that the Hawaiian Government can take jurisdiction over the authors of the various criticisms of political affairs in the Hawaiian Islands which appear in the newspapers of the United States.

To an assumption of such jurisdiction by the Hawaiian Government the Government of the United States will not submit. It will not permit that this prerogative shall be in any degree usurped by the Hawaiian Government, nor will it permit a citizen of the United States to be called to account by the Hawaiian Government for acts done within the boundaries of the United States.

On this ground I insist that no proceedings shall be taken against Mr. Nordhoff such as are indicated in the letter signed W. O. Smith, Attorney-General.

Since writing the foregoing I find the following paper has been served on Mr. Nordhoff. (See inclosure No. 3.—“In the name of the Provisional Government, etc.”)

Permit me to say that in my judgment this, and the foregoing proceeding, under the color of law, is a violation of the rights of Mr. Nordhoff as an American citizen.

When I remember how on the 16th of January last, at the request of your leading citizens, American troops were landed and brought quiet to the homes of the people of this city, it is passing strange to me to find an eminent citizen of the United States subjected to such outrage at the hands of the Provisional Government of these Islands.

I can but hope that this action will be, on reconsideration, repudiated.

While I desire to promote the kindest feelings between your Government and mine, I shall not forget that one of the proudest reflections of the American people is their disposition and ability to protect an American citizen throughout the civilized world.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
E. E. and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

Hon. SANFORD B. DOLE,
President, etc., of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

[Inclosure 6 in No. 2.]

HONOLULU, *May 23, 1893.*

DEAR SIR: In reply to your question I say that the publication in the Bulletin of my letters to the New York Herald was without my knowledge and consent; that is to say, I knew nothing at all about it.

Yours, truly,

CHARLES NORDHOFF.

His excellency JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Minister of the United States.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 3.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, May 29, 1893.

SIR: Just before the leaving of the *Australia*, on the 24th instant, there came to me, too late for mailing to you, a communication from President Dole, a copy of which I inclose (No. 1).

At this date (May 29) nothing further has been heard.

I suggested to President Dole and the attorney-general, in conversations with them, that if Mr. Nordhoff was so obnoxious they might possibly require him to leave the country. This did not seem to impress them favorably. Indeed, the whole proceeding in relation to him seems to have been animated by the spirit of crushing out all opposing opinions by forceful methods.

I do not expect the Government to recur to this matter again until a mail from the United States brings some letter to the Herald from Mr. Nordhoff, criticising the action of the annexationists. Then I expect it to be very much stirred again with anger toward him.

The action I have already taken will restrain it from excesses.

The Hawaiian Star, which is the annexation organ, commenting on the stay of proceedings against Mr. Nordhoff, published an editorial entitled "The Cutting Precedent," a copy of which I inclose herewith. (No. 2.)

I also inclose another comment from the same paper, entitled "The Farce of Protection." (No. 3.)

The editor-in-chief of this paper, prior to my taking any notice of the temper of the community towards Mr. Nordhoff, went to Admiral Skerrett late in the afternoon and informed him that he had been all day endeavoring to prevent the people from tarring and feathering Mr. Nordhoff; that up to that time he had been able to prevent it, and called on Admiral Skerrett to do what he could with the same view.

Admiral Skerrett communicating the facts to me I communicated them to President Dole. On his motion he sent the police to Mr. Nordhoff's house.

The situation, therefore, will appear somewhat graver than in my former dispatch, in which the statement of Admiral Skerrett was not as full as herein contained.

I hope you will not underrate the excitement which prompted all my actions in regard to Mr. Nordhoff.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 3, Diplomatic Series.]

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, May 24, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 22d instant relating to Mr. Nordhoff, and to state in reply that upon full consideration of the questions involved this Government has decided to take no criminal proceedings against Mr. Nordhoff for what was suggested as contempt against the advisory council of this Government.

In respect of the matters referred to in the attorney-general's letter to Mr. Nordhoff, this Government does not propose to take any proceedings in contravention of the view of international law expressed by the United States Government in the Cutting case; but there is apparently this distinction to be noted in the two matters, viz, That Mr. Cutting was in the United States when he made the publication

objected to by the Mexican Government, whereas Mr. Nordhoff, while in the Hawaiian Islands and under the jurisdiction of its courts, has written articles defamatory of this Government, which were published in the United States in a newspaper which is freely circulated in the Hawaiian Islands, and which articles have been republished here.

I beg to inform you that this Government will rigidly adhere to the rules of international law in respect of this matter as in all other matters, and in that view has referred to its law advisers the question of Mr. Nordhoff's civil liability in the premises.

I have the honor to be Your Excellency's obedient servant,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

To His Excellency J. H. BLOUNT,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at Honolulu.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 3.]

[From the Hawaiian Star, May 24, 1893.]

THE CUTTING PRECEDENT.

The Cutting case, which was cited by United States Minister Blount in behalf of Charles Nordhoff, is a well-remembered episode in the criminal practice of international law. Mr. Cutting was a citizen of the United States, who lived at Juarez, formerly Paso del Norte, on the Mexican side of the Rio Grande border. At outs with an official of the Mexican Government, he assaulted him bitterly in a paper published on the Texas side of the line at El Paso, for which offense he was arrested by the Mexican authorities and thrust into jail. The American Secretary of State thereupon demanded and enforced his release on the ground that a citizen of the United States could not be criminally punished by the Government of a foreign country for a libelous publication made on American soil, holding that the injured party must seek redress in the courts within the jurisdiction of which the offense of publication had been committed.

Such a rule as this would, for example, apply to George Kennan, author of the Century papers on Siberia, in case he should, upon another visit to Russia, be criminally prosecuted by the Czar for the libels which the Russian Government claim he committed in his accounts of official cruelties practiced upon Siberian convicts. The Imperial Government would doubtless be informed by the American Foreign Office that its only remedy—except the deportation of Mr. Kennan as an undesirable visitor—lay in his prosecution in the courts of the United States and before a jury of his peers. No doubt in Mr. Kennan's case the validity of this argument would be as promptly admitted by Russia as it was when applied a year ago to Poultney Bigelow and Frederick Remington, who went into the Empire on a mission similar to that of Kennan, but were arrested for it and expelled from the country. That they would have been otherwise punished but for the force of the international rule laid down in the Cutting case can hardly be doubted by any one who is familiar with the tendencies of the Czar towards those who write, speak, or act against his mode of government.

Mr. Nordhoff is of course fortunate that by appeal to American precedent he has escaped another humiliation; but that fact does not alter the circumstances that, morally speaking, and in a way amenable to civil damages, he libeled Minister Stevens and President Dole and deserved the punishment which Hawaiian criminal law would have been likely to inflict upon him. His guilt is patent, though the consequences of it may have been avoided. The only gratification he can feel is that of an apprehended miscreant who escapes his deserts through a merely technical plea against the jurisdiction of the judge.

[Inclosure 3 in No. 3, Diplomatic Series.]

[From the Hawaiian Star, May 23, 1893.]

THE FARCE OF PROTECTION.

A broad smile of amusement went across the face of the town last evening, when it was learned that Mr. Nordhoff had applied for protection to the United States minister, and that, at the request of the latter, the Provisional Government had detailed

two native policemen to guard the Herald correspondent's lodgings. In view of the fact that Mr. Nordhoff is as safe in Honolulu as he could be at his sequestered home on Coronado Beach, the whole episode becomes a tax upon the risibles.

Careful inquiry shows that the only basis for the Herald man's fears—apart from that conscience which, as the poet says, "Doth make cowards of us all"—was a stray remark here and there that he ought to be tarred and feathered. As Mr. Nordhoff is well aware, such talk is often heard in times of political debate, and is but the smallest of small change in the circulation of public opinion. It is the coinage of idle chat merely; in this case particularly so, as the annexation party is standing on its dignity as a representative Hawaiian body, asking admission to the American brotherhood on the ground, among other grounds, that in civilization, Christianity, and moral purpose it is worthy of the fellowship. It could not be induced to do or permit a ruffianly act, a fact which we believe Mr. Nordhoff himself appreciates as well as anyone else.

Why, then, did he ask protection? Wait and see! If he doesn't use the fact that he got it to fill the columns of the Herald with a lurid tale of how he escaped death at the hands of an infuriated annexation mob, only to be saved by the intervention of Minister Blount and the reluctant display of provisional force, then the Star misses a reasonable guess. The two shirt-sleeved native policemen who dawdle about his palace dozing and yawning will doubtless be magnified into a garrison of men in buckram surrounded and besieged by bloodthirsty planters or missionaries all eager to flesh their daggers in the heart of the one bold correspondent who had exposed their foul conspiracies and haled their cause to the bar of public judgment. Life will hardly be worth Mr. Nordhoff's living until he can get some such phantasmagoria before the Herald's readers, as evidence that all he had previously said against the nature and personnel of the annexation movement is true.

In the meantime it is to be hoped that the two native guardians of Mr. Nordhoff's person and peace will manage to keep awake during the drowsy days and soporific nights which envelop the pastoral region of Nuuanu street.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 4.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, June 1, 1893.

SIR: I send you a communication to-day signed as special commissioner because it relates to the object for which my appointment in that capacity was made.

I was sworn in as minister because I believed that some public reason for my temporary appointment influenced it. I could not under the circumstances do otherwise.

I now earnestly urge the immediate appointment of some person as my successor.

My resignation was forwarded in the form which you have seen because I did not deem it respectful to tender it absolutely when some temporary and public reason might have made it seem improper for me to do so.

If you have appointed a good man for consul-general here I do not see why he might not take charge of the affairs of the legation.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 5.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, June 1, 1893.

SIR: Last night about 11 o'clock three sticks of giant powder were found, accompanied by some preparation of mercury. Suspicion is rife with royalists and annexationists.

The place where they were found is near the Barracks. Believing it was intended to blow up the Barracks the soldiers have been removed this morning into the Palace grounds.

The mail leaves very soon and I can not get any full or accurate statement.

I do not think it indicates any general movement, but rather seems to be confined to a few white persons.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Blount.

No. 5.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 23, 1893.

SIR: I transmit for your information a copy of a note of the minister of Hawaii, touching the recall by the Provisional Government of the Commission appointed last January for the purpose of negotiating terms for the union of the Hawaiian Islands with the United States and announcing his readiness to resume the subject at any convenient time.

I am, etc.,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 1.?)

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 6, 1893.

SIR: I beg to inform the Department that I reached San Francisco on the 27th ultimo and sailed the following day, arriving in this city on Saturday, November 4th, at 9 a. m.

On Saturday night I was tendered a serenade by the band of the Provisional Government, which passed off quietly and pleasantly. Having received information through our consul-general, Mr. Mills that the Royalist party were contemplating a counter serenade and demonstration to-night, I strongly discouraged such action and it has been abandoned.

I addressed a note this morning to Hon. Sanford B. Dole, minister of foreign affairs, asking him to designate a convenient time and place when I could present the letters of recall and of credence which I bore a copy of which I transmit herewith together with his reply, designating 11 o'clock of the forenoon, to-morrow, the 7th instant, as the time for the presentation at the Executive building. I also inclose the remarks which I propose to make upon the occasion referred to, a copy of which I sent to the Provisional Government.

Admiral Skerrett and his staff paid me the usual official call at 10 o'clock this morning, which in company with Consul-General Mills returned this afternoon at 3, receiving from the flagship the customary official courtesies. I afterwards called on Capt. Nelson, commanding the *Adams*, where I also met with a cordial reception.

I send by mail to-morrow per steamship *China* a cipher telegram, and to the landing from steamship *Australia* last Saturday, of Winchester

rifles and ammunition, and the reported intention of the Provisional Government to issue a proclamation establishing a republic, the constitution for which, it is said, has been already prepared by Mr. Hatch, a member of the present cabinet.

The city is full of rumors, and the excitement is increasing every hour. I shall, therefore, avail myself of the earliest opportunity, after my credentials are approved, to carry out the instructions of the Department. The next steamer leaving here after to-morrow will be the *Australia*, which sails on Saturday, the 11th of November, by which time I hope to be able to give you reliable information as to the present attitude of all parties.

Mr. Mills has given me active and valuable assistance.

I have thus far had no communication with either of the opposing parties, except as herein stated.

With sentiments of high regard, I am, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 1.]

Mr. Willis to Mr. Dole.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 6, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you of my arrival in this city, bearing sealed letters, open official copies whereof are herewith transmitted, addressed by the President of the United States of America to the President of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, recalling Mr. James H. Blount, who has for sometime past resided near your Government in the character of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America, and accrediting the undersigned as his successor. By reason of his having resigned the office while in the United States, Mr. Blount is unable to present in person his letter of recall.

In pursuance of my instructions, I respectfully request you to designate a convenient time and place at which I may have the honor of presenting in person such original letters of recall and of credence.

With assurances of the most distinguished consideration, I am, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 1.]

Mr. Dole to Mr. Willis.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 6, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's communication of this day's date informing me of your arrival in this city and that you are the bearer of sealed letters from the President of the United States of America to the President of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, recalling Mr. James H. Blount, sometime United States Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at this Capital and accrediting you as his successor, which fact is duly authenticated by the inclosed copies of your excellency's letter of credence, and soliciting that a time and place be designated for the presentation of the original letters of recall and credence.

In reply I have the honor to state that it will give me pleasure to designate 11 o'clock of the forenoon to-morrow the 7th instant, as the time for the presentation at the Executive building.

I beg your excellency to accept the assurance of the high consideration and esteem with which I have the honor to be, sir, etc..

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

[Inclosure No. 3.]

Remarks of Mr. Willis to Mr. Dole.

MR. PRESIDENT: Mr. Blount, the late Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States to your Government, having resigned his office while absent from his post, I have the honor now to present his letter of recall and to express for him his sincere regret that he is unable in person to make known his continued good wishes in behalf of your people and his grateful appreciation of the many courtesies of which, while here, he was the honored recipient.

I desire at the same time to place in your hands the letter accrediting me as his successor. In doing this I am directed by the President to give renewed assurances of the friendship, interest, and hearty good will which our Government entertains for you and for the people of this island realm.

Aside from our geographical proximity and the consequent preponderating commercial interests which centre here, the present advanced civilization and Christianization of your people, together with your enlightened codes of law, stand to-day beneficial monuments of American zeal, courage, and intelligence.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the United States were the first to recognize the independence of the Hawaiian Islands and to welcome them into the great family of free.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

[Telegram.]

HONOLULU, November 6, 1893.

Two hundred sixty rifles and ammunition arrived by steamer Saturday. Rumor that Provisional Government will declare for a Republic, with constitution already prepared.

WILLIS.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

[Telegram.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, November 11, 1893.

Report can be sent to Congress on 19th November.

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

[Confidential.]

No. 2.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, November 11, 1893.

SIR: On the 7th instant, at 11 o'clock, I presented to the Provisional Government Mr. Blount's letter of recall and the letter accrediting me as his successor. I inclose an extract from the Commercial Advertiser giving an account of the proceedings. The time since then has been occupied with the reception of executive, judicial, and diplomatic representatives of the Provisional and foreign Governments. I have not, therefore, had an opportunity of executing more fully your instructions, nor was fuller action advisable while the excitement was so great. I expect on next Monday morning to have an interview with the Queen which, if satisfactory, will be followed immediately by one with the Provisional Government. I have, therefore, inclosed a telegram to

your dispatch agent at San Francisco as follows: "Report can be sent to Congress on 19th November," it being my understanding that you desired to have all the facts presented before any decisive action here.

The *Alameda*, the next vessel leaving here after next Monday, will not reach San Francisco until November 23, during which interval it is hoped some definite result may be secured.

On the afternoon of the 6th the British minister, Major Wodehouse, called my attention to the following paragraph in the "*Hawaiian Star*" of the same date: "It would serve the ex-Queen well to pray to her gods that the peril of restoration will never come to her"—which he interpreted to be a threat of assassination, and inquired whether our Government was ready and willing to extend to her its protection. I replied that, without reference to her royal claims, she stood in such relations to the United States that she was entitled to and would receive the amplest protection at their hands. As a matter of fact, I had already ascertained that, at present, she did not desire our protection. After next Monday, however, and earlier if necessary, I shall insist on her coming to the legation.

Neither side has the vaguest idea, as yet, of the attitude of our Government, and consequently no outbreak has occurred, although every night is filled with rumors. I inclose several extracts from the "*Commercial Advertiser*" (annexation) morning daily; the "*Star*" (annexation) evening daily; the "*Bulletin*" and "*Holomua*," both evening royalist papers, which will give you the situation here from a newspaper standpoint.

The U. S. S. *Philadelphia* and *Adams* are connected with Honolulu by telephone, but in the event of riot Admiral Irwin, now in command, has made arrangements for rocket signaling.

On Monday next I will, by request, meet a committee of the "American League," which one who claimed to be a member informed me was "six hundred strong, well armed with Winchester rifles, and would never permit the restoration of the Queen." He further intimated that the League had some fear that the Provisional Government "would make concessions and surrender their rights, and if so, they would overthrow it," etc. There is undoubtedly in this Government, as in all governments, a class of reckless, lawless men, who, under the impression that they have the moral support of some of the better class of citizens, may at any moment bring about a serious condition of affairs. Fortunately the men at the head of the Provisional Government are acknowledged by all sides to be of the highest integrity and public spirit, which, combined with the large material interests they represent, will, it is hoped, cause them to stand firmly and successfully for peace and good government.

The Japanese consul-general, Mr. Suburo Fujii, has just called to say that his people, who now number nearly one-third of the male population, are very apprehensive of immediate disturbances. He desired to know whether I would advise him to send for a man-of-war. I declined to give him any advice. He then inquired whether his people could expect protection from the United States troops. I told him that if it was his request, and that if his people were nonparticipants in any trouble, that he could probably rely upon the protection of our Government. The American interests here are so extensive and all interests are so close that it is impossible to touch one without involving all.

With sentiments of high regard, I am, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

[Telegram.]

NOVEMBER 16, 1893.

Views of first party so extreme as to require further instructions.

WILLIS.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 4.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, November 16, 1893.

SIR: On last Monday, November 13, I received a call from three gentlemen who said they were a committee representing the "American League." The chairman, Mr. Van Houton, made a speech of welcome, covering substantially the statements contained in the papers which I send herewith.

I replied thanking them for their words of welcome and friendship, and stating in very general terms the circumstances under which I came, and saying to them that it was the duty of all Americans, whether at home or abroad, to coöperate in executing the will of their Government when it was declared. After some further remarks as to the desirability of free institutions, provided the people were adapted to them and prepared for them, the committee withdrew. The chairman came back, after several hours, to inform me that he neglected to state that the "league" was opposed to the restoration of the monarchy. Nothing was said in the conversation as to the status of affairs here or of the instructions of our Government. I mention this as the committee, I am informed, have placed a different construction on the interview.

With high regard, I am, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

[Inclosure.]

*The Committee of the American League to Mr. Willis.*HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *November 13, 1893.*

SIR: As you are doubtless aware, a considerable number of citizens of the United States reside in the Hawaiian Islands. Having a love and veneration for the United States it is but natural that a fraternal feeling should exist among men so far from native land; and being desirous of cultivating these fraternal feelings an organization has been effected, where only citizens of the United States have been admitted to membership. The aims and objects of the organization may be briefly summarized as follows: To bear true allegiance to the United States, and, so far as possible, advance the interests of our native country. To aid and protect the members of the organization, and to assist in all honorable ways the members of the organization in obtaining employment, and advocate the just cause of the members and others owing allegiance to the United States of America.

The organization has assumed the name of the American League, and for the better protection of its members has adopted a simple ritual and has a password to be changed as often as necessary. While eligibility to membership is based on United States citizenship, the application must go into the hands of a committee, who investigate as to the qualifications of the candidate, including character and habits, with the object of receiving only those who are reliable and worthy.

The members of the league earnestly desire that the Hawaiian Islands should become a part of the United States, and with that object in view the organization

will support the present Provisional Government of Hawaii, and in all honorable ways aid in accomplishing annexation.

Believing that you would desire to know something of the aims and methods of work of the organization this committee was appointed to visit you and give you such information as you desire, and to extend to you cordial greeting. It would afford us pleasure to meet and greet you under the most ordinary circumstances, but, coming as you do as a representative of the President and the people of the United States, and considering the importance of your mission, it affords us peculiar pleasure to give you welcome.

Some of our members have resided in Hawaii for many years, while others have come within the last few years and some have arrived within the last year, yet whether we have been away from America a few months or many years; whether native-born citizens of the Union or citizens by adoption, we still venerate and love our country, and will coöperate with you in advancing its best interests and looking out for the welfare of the citizens of the United States, whether they are such from birthright or adoption. If at any time there is an opportunity for us to aid you feel free to command us, and be assured that under all circumstances we desire to make your stay here pleasant to yourself and beneficial to the country that you represent, for it is our common country and in its welfare we are all interested.

We have delayed somewhat in calling on you, believing that your official duties and the numerous calls being made would fully occupy your time for the first few days.

Again expressing the pleasure it affords us to greet and welcome you, we are, very respectfully, yours,

GEO. VAN HOUTEN,
JAMES F. HILBUS,
JOS. L. CURTIS,
Committee American League.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 5.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, November 18, 1893.

SIR: In the forenoon of last Wednesday, November 15, Hon. S. M. Damon, Minister of Finance, notified me in person that there were rumors of an attack that night or the ensuing night upon the Government building, in consequence of which the regular guard would be increased and one of the volunteer companies would be ordered under arms for the night. On the royalist side apprehensions for the safety of the Queen were expressed. The next day was King Kalakaua's birthday, an event which generally attracts a large crowd here, and is celebrated with various festivities. A concert in honor of the occasion was advertised under the auspices of the native Hawaiians.

In view of these facts, I thought it proper in an informal way to make public the fact that there would be no decisive action taken by our Government for three or four weeks, or until I heard from Washington. I also thought it proper, with the private knowledge and consent of all factions, to say that mob violence would not be allowed during this interval.

The effect of these announcements was to reassure the people and to stop active military preparations. Many representatives of foreign governments and prominent citizens, officially representing both parties, have called to express their gratification at the result.

The excitement has been continuous for so long that the slightest circumstances are magnified, and rumors fill the air, both night and day.

It is impossible to exaggerate the unhappy condition of this people, nor can I, in words, picture their pathetic surroundings. Almost every movement is under espionage, the most meaningless expression is

given an important significance, and speeches are quoted which were never delivered or thought of. In my dispatch No. 4, of November 11, I referred to the visit of a committee from the American League, to whose address I made a brief formal response, not having even the remotest bearing upon the question pending here. In yesterday's Star, a paper whose life began with the so-called revolution, was my alleged reply, which I inclose to you. This is a fair sample of the prevailing spirit of misrepresentation. I inclose, also, an extract from the Pacific Commercial Advertiser, also an annexation organ, upon the same subject.

I send this by a sailing vessel which leaves to-day. The next steamer leaves here December 9. The next steamer arriving from San Francisco, the *Monowai*, due December 23.

With high regard, I am, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS.

[Hawaiian Star, November 17, 1893.]

WILLIS FOR THE FLAG—HIS REPLY TO THE AMERICAN LEAGUE—HE WILL DO NOTHING HERE TO CONFLICT WITH HIS ARDENT AMERICAN PRINCIPLES.

The Star has obtained with much difficulty a complete and authentic report of the remarks made by Minister Willis to a delegation of the American League which presented him with a memorial some days ago. After a few words of welcome to his visiting countrymen, he said:

"GENTLEMEN: I am an ardent American. I would like to see the stars and stripes waving, under proper conditions, not only over the Pacific islands, but over any other territory which would be beneficial to the United States. I have my instructions, which I can not divulge. You will understand this. But this much I can say, that the policy of the United States is already formulated regarding these islands, and that nothing which can be said or done either here or there can avail anything now. I do not come here as did Mr. Blount. I come here as an executive officer. I come to act. When the proper time arrives I shall act. I am sorry that I can not tell you when or how. I wish you to understand that, knowing the policy of the United States, I could not have accepted the position of an executive officer had it been in conflict with the principles I hold. While performing my duties in carrying out the United States policy I shall have no need of aid from you or other resident Americans. I wish to state positively that any outside interference will not be tolerated by the United States."

[The Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser, Saturday, November 18, 1893.]

Be just and fear not;
Let all the ends thou aim'st at be
Thy country's, thy God's, and truth's.

A reporter who willfully and purposely falsifies the language of a diplomatic representative, as was done by the Star reporter, on Thursday last, in an interview with Minister Willis, as shown by his published statements, deserves to be branded as unworthy of public credence. Minister Willis may be thus compelled in future, for self-protection, to follow Mr. Blount's example and refuse all press interviews.

This paper is now, as it always has been, since the day when the monarchy was forever banished from Hawaii, the firm and unflinching advocate of annexation to the United States, without any compromise in any shape or form whatever. Nor can one word be produced to show a contrary determination. To this paper more than to any other is due the credit of firmly standing by and defending the Provisional Government and the cause it represents. It yields to no other paper a firmer allegiance to the principles which the Government and its supporters represent.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Willis.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 24, 1893.

The brevity and uncertainty of your telegrams are embarrassing. You will insist upon amnesty and recognition of obligations of the Provisional Government as essential conditions of restoration. All interests will be promoted by prompt action.

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Willis.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 3, 1893.

Your dispatch, which was answered by steamer on the 25th of November, seems to call for additional instructions.

Should the Queen refuse assent to the written conditions, you will at once inform her that the President will cease interposition in her behalf, and that while he deems it his duty to endeavor to restore to the sovereign the constitutional government of the islands, his further efforts in that direction will depend upon the Queen's unqualified agreement that all obligations created by the Provisional Government in a proper course of administration shall be assumed, and upon such pledges by her as will prevent the adoption of any measures of proscription or punishment for what has been done in the past by those setting up or supporting the Provisional Government. The President feels that by our original interference and what followed, we have incurred responsibilities to the whole Hawaiian community, and it would not be just to put one party at the mercy of the other.

Should the Queen ask whether if she accedes to conditions active steps will be taken by the United States to effect her restoration; or to maintain her authority thereafter, you will say that the President can not use force without the authority of Congress.

Should the Queen accept conditions and the Provisional Government refuse to surrender, you will be governed by previous instructions. If the Provisional Government asks whether the United States will hold the Queen to fulfillment of stipulated conditions you will say, the President acting under dictates of honor and duty, as he has done in endeavoring to effect restoration, will do all in his constitutional power to cause observance of the conditions he has imposed.

GRESHAM.

Mr. Thurston to Mr. Gresham.

HAWAIIAN LEGATION,
Washington, December 5, 1893.

SIR: In confirmation of the claims presented to you by myself during several recent interviews, concerning suggested action by the United States Government towards the Provisional Government of Hawaii, as

outlined in your communication to the President recently published, and affirmed in the President's message sent yesterday to Congress, I have the honor to hereby submit to you the claims of the Government which I represent in and concerning the premises.

If I correctly apprehend the propositions advanced by the Government of the United States they are:

First. That the Hawaiian monarchy was subverted by the action of the United States representatives and forces.

Second. That but for such action the monarchy would not have been subverted nor the Provisional Government created.

Third. That such conclusions are based upon the report made by the Hon. James H. Blount.

Fourth. That in view of such action by those representing the Government of the United States, it is proposed that the latter Government shall restore the status existing prior to such subversion of the monarchy.

In opposition to such proposed action I hereby, on behalf of the Government I represent, submit the following claims and reasons:

First. The Provisional Government of Hawaii is a duly organized and fully recognized independent Government, holding diplomatic relations with nearly all the nations of the world.

It has accredited its diplomatic representatives to the United States Government, which has received them in the manner customary in dealing with the representatives of friendly independent nations.

The United States Government has, in turn, accredited its representatives to the Provisional Government of Hawaii, and they have in like manner been formally received by it.

There is nothing lacking to constitute the present Government of Hawaii a full, free, and independent sovereignty, subject to all the obligations and entitled to all the rights, privileges, and courtesies accorded by the United States Government to the most favored nations with whom it is in treaty relations.

Second. It is submitted that the Government of the United States has acquired no jurisdiction over the independent sovereign state of Hawaii. There being two distinct sovereignties, jurisdiction by the United States can only be obtained in three ways, viz: (1) by conquest; (2) by treaty; (3) by voluntary submission to the decision of the United States Government in the nature of arbitration.

There is no claim made that the sovereignty of Hawaii is subordinate to that of the United States by reason of conquest, nor has it been surrendered by treaty.

There is a suggestion, however, in the communication by yourself to the President, above referred to, that authority by voluntary submission in the nature of a power to arbitrate has been conferred upon the Government of the United States. I refer to that portion wherein you state that, "The Government of Hawaii surrendered its authority under a threat of war, until such time as the Government of the United States, upon the facts being presented to it, should reinstate the Constitutional Sovereign; and the Provisional Government was created 'to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon.'"

I submit that no such authority has been conferred, and in support of such contention present the following reasons: (1) If the parties in Hawaii contending for the control of the Government had intended to submit their differences to the arbitration of the United States, a formal statement to such differences and the points to be settled would

have been drawn up and signed in the usual form of an agreement for arbitration.

No such action has been taken. (2) An arbitration is essentially a judicial proceeding, the elemental features of which, under the principles and forms of procedure in use both in the United States and Hawaii, are, first, notice of the charges made or points at issue; second, opportunity to hear and cross-examine evidence produced by the opposing party; third, opportunity to produce evidence in support of claims made and to meet that of the opposing party; fourth, a full and fair hearing accorded to both parties in open court.

In no particular have these particulars, fundamental to the just and equitable decision of the simplest judicial issue, been observed in this admittedly complicated question.

The Government of Hawaii, acting under its international right, has made a formal proposition to, by treaty, change the political relation existing between the two countries.

The authority of the Hawaiian Government to make such a proposition was not questioned, and a treaty for the accomplishment of such purpose was duly signed by the representatives of the executives of the two countries.

Pending the final ratification of such treaty, by desire of the Government of the United States, negotiations were suspended over nine months ago, and an investigation was instituted by the Government of the United States by a special commissioner.

During all such time the Hawaiian Government has peaceably administered its own affairs and faithfully carried out all its treaty obligations with all foreign powers.

Up to the present time the Hawaiian Government has received no information that such investigation was for any purpose other than to determine the policy of the Government of the United States concerning such proposition of the Government of Hawaii.

It has not been a party to such investigation, which has been *ex parte* and conducted in secret.

It has been accorded no opportunity to meet the evidence produced nor to present evidence or argument in its own behalf.

The names of the witnesses and the character of the evidence upon which it is proposed to be subverted were unknown to it until published simultaneously with the announcement of the conclusion of the investigating commissioner.

It has received no notice that it was on trial for its life, and has not even been informed that it was charged with having taken action for which it was responsible to the United States or whereby it had brought itself within the jurisdiction of such Government.

The proclamation issued by the Provisional Government of Hawaii defining its objects and causes does, indeed, state as quoted in your communication above referred to, that it was created "to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon." But I submit that neither legally, logically, nor grammatically does such phrase indicate that because annexation has not yet been consummated the Provisional Government is therefore and thereby terminated.

On the contrary, I submit that its meaning is clearly and distinctly the exact opposite of that suggested.

The Provisional Government was formed with a fixed, definite purpose in view, viz, annexation to the United States. If the date of the consummation of such object had been known it could have been

in the place of the phrase actually used. As such date was not and could not be known, an appropriate phrase was used signifying that the Government should continue to exist until the object *was* accomplished. A government was established not absolutely but conditionally. If the wording of the proclamation had been "to exist until the Government of the United States refuses to agree to annexation," a refusal would then have constituted a condition the happening of which, in and of itself, would have terminated the Provisional Government.

There was, however, but one condition named in the proclamation, the happening of which should terminate the existence of the Government thereby created, viz, "Union with the United States of America." There is no other terminating condition. Unless and until that condition happens the Government continues in existence. If the happening of the condition is postponed for one, two, or ten years, or for an indefinite period, the Government continues to exist for a like period. The fact that annexation has not yet taken place does not negative the possibility of its happening in the future. So long as the terminating condition has not happened, but may happen, so long does the Government continue to exist, unless changed or terminated by its own act or the act of the people of Hawaii.

I further submit that if the reasoning last above set forth is incorrect, and the failure to have yet secured annexation does logically terminate the existence of the Provisional Government, such fact does not confer jurisdiction upon the United States to construe such instrument, but that the construction and interpretation of the wording of such proclamation is purely a matter of domestic concern to be settled by the parties in interest in Hawaii in such manner as the Government and laws of that country may provide.

Third. While neither admitting nor questioning the correctness of the allegations of fact reported by Mr. Blount, I purposely omit discussion or criticism thereof, for the reasons, first, that the Hawaiian Government has not been a party to such investigation, and therefore can not be bound by same; and, second, if it be true that the representatives of the United States exceeded their powers, as alleged, such fact does not vest any jurisdiction in the Government of the United States to now infringe upon Hawaiian sovereignty.

It is an axiom of law that no man may take advantage of his own wrong. The fact that the United States minister, with or without the authority of his Government, may have trespassed upon the international rights of Hawaii, does not thereby confer jurisdiction upon the Government of the United States to now again, and deliberately, trespass upon such rights.

If the United States minister or naval officers have exceeded their authority or violated their instructions they are responsible to their Government therefor. The Hawaiian Government had no control over them. It is not responsible for what they did, and is not and can not be held answerable to the Government of the United States for their acts, nor to have forfeited any of its attributes of independent sovereignty by reason of their actions whether the same were right or wrong, authorized or unauthorized.

In like manner, if the allegation is true, that the ex-Queen abdicated under the belief that the Provisional Government would submit the question to the United States Government, such fact does not vest in the Government of the United States any jurisdiction over the subject-matter. If the ex-Queen was warranted in such belief and an agreement was made between her and the Provisional Government, which I

do not admit, the Government of the United States was no party to such agreement, and neither the making, nor the failure to carry it out, if made, confers any jurisdiction upon the Government of the United States to construe such agreement, nor in any manner to intervene between the contending parties in Hawaii, nor control or direct which of such parties shall at any given time exercise the functions of government in Hawaii.

Fourth. If after consideration of the reasons hereinbefore advanced it is maintained by you that they do not establish the claims advanced, and that the Government of the United States has jurisdiction, notwithstanding the independent sovereignty of Hawaii, to decide upon the form, and who shall carry on the Government of Hawaii, I then submit that neither international law nor the usage of nations authorize the Government of the United States to enforce, against the will of the parties, the conclusions to which it may come.

It is not suggested in the report of Mr. Blount than any such power was agreed upon, either between the ex-Queen and the Provisional Government or otherwise.

Even if a formal submission to the United States Government had been made, and full hearing had thereon, and a decision announced, such fact would not vest in the United States any power to carry out such decision or to compel either party to abide thereby.

Unless the method of enforcement of such decision is agreed upon by the parties, the carrying out of the decision rendered is purely a matter of good faith as between the parties in interest, with no power in the arbitrating Government to compel the recognition by either party of the decision rendered.

I beg also to re-affirm in this connection my firm conviction, based upon an intimate acquaintance with all the persons and conditions involved, that the restoration of the ex-Queen, regardless of the method by which the same may be accomplished, will, unless she is maintained by the troops of some foreign power, be speedily followed by the forcible overthrow of the monarchy, involving the probable loss of life and destruction of property.

Such action will be taken, as in the past, by the intelligent, law-abiding, property-owning portion of the community, for the same reasons that the same persons took similar action last January, viz: that the long and bitter experience under the monarchy has convinced them that so long as the monarchy exists no material improvement in the methods of conducting the Government can be expected and that a further continuance of the misrule of the past years is intolerable.

It is unnecessary for me to state that such a condition of affairs will be disastrous in the extreme to every material interest in the islands, and to all trade and commerce connected therewith, the greater portion of which is owned and carried on by American citizens and capital.

Allow me to reiterate that neither this statement nor any act done by the Provisional Government or by myself is with any spirit of hostility to the people or Government of the United States. On the contrary, so far from being in any manner hostile, the Provisional Government and its supporters have demonstrated by their acts that they are not only friendly in the ordinary acceptance of the word, but that they have such faith in the Government of the United States that they have taken up arms and risked their lives and property to place themselves, almost unreservedly and unconditionally, under the jurisdiction and control of that Government, asking only in return that they may share

in the freedom of its flag and the stability and equality of its Government.

All that I seek by this statement is to convey to you a plain frank statement of what the Provisional Government of Hawaii conceives to be its rights under international law in and concerning the premises, and to indicate to you, as it is my duty to do, what in my opinion the conditions are and will be if action on certain suggested lines is taken.

I have, &c.

L. A. THURSTON.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

[Telegram.]

HONOLULU, *December 4, 1893.*

Understand message. Had no communications from Washington, D. C., either to the United States Admiral or to me since my (our) arrival. One British man-of-war and one Japanese man-of-war are here. Active defensive preparations for several days; otherwise situation about the same. The feeling intense, but hope to preserve status until further instructed. Government last Wednesday inquired as to authenticity of your published letter and intentions of the President. I have declined to-day to answer. Prompt action desirable.

WILLIS.

House Ex. Doc. No. 47, Fifty-third Congress, second session.

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

RELATING TO THE

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

DECEMBER 18, 1893.



MESSAGE.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

In my recent annual message to the Congress I briefly referred to our relations with Hawaii and expressed the intention of transmitting further information on the subject when additional advices permitted.

Though I am not able now to report a definite change in the actual situation, I am convinced that the difficulties lately created both here and in Hawaii and now standing in the way of a solution through Executive action of the problem presented, render it proper, and expedient, that the matter should be referred to the broader authority and discretion of Congress, with a full explanation of the endeavor thus far made to deal with the emergency and a statement of the considerations which have governed my action.

I suppose that right and justice should determine the path to be followed in treating this subject. If national honesty is to be disregarded and a desire for territorial extension, or dissatisfaction with a form of government not our own, ought to regulate our conduct, I have entirely misapprehended the mission and character of our Government and the behavior which the conscience of our people demands of their public servants.

When the present Administration entered upon its duties the Senate had under consideration a treaty providing for the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the territory of the United States. Surely under our Constitution and laws the enlargement of our limits is a manifestation of the highest attribute of sovereignty, and if entered upon as an Executive act, all things relating to the transaction should be clear and free from suspicion. Additional importance attached to this particular treaty of annexation, because it contemplated a departure from unbroken American tradition in providing for the addition to our territory of islands of the sea more than two thousand miles removed from our nearest coast.

These considerations might not of themselves call for interference with the completion of a treaty entered upon by a previous Administration. But it appeared from the documents accompanying the

treaty when submitted to the Senate, that the ownership of Hawaii was tendered to us by a provisional government set up to succeed the constitutional ruler of the islands, who had been dethroned, and it did not appear that such provisional government had the sanction of either popular revolution or suffrage. Two other remarkable features of the transaction naturally attracted attention. One was the extraordinary haste—not to say precipitancy—characterizing all the transactions connected with the treaty. It appeared that a so-called Committee of Safety, ostensibly the source of the revolt against the constitutional Government of Hawaii, was organized on Saturday, the 14th day of January; that on Monday, the 16th, the United States forces were landed at Honolulu from a naval vessel lying in its harbor; that on the 17th the scheme of a provisional government was perfected, and a proclamation naming its officers was on the same day prepared and read at the Government building; that immediately thereupon the United States Minister recognized the provisional government thus created; that two days afterwards, on the 19th day of January, commissioners representing such government sailed for this country in a steamer especially chartered for the occasion, arriving in San Francisco on the 28th day of January, and in Washington on the 3d day of February; that on the next day they had their first interview with the Secretary of State, and another on the 11th, when the treaty of annexation was practically agreed upon, and that on the 14th it was formally concluded and on the 15th transmitted to the Senate. Thus between the initiation of the scheme for a provisional government in Hawaii on the 14th day of January and the submission to the Senate of the treaty of annexation concluded with such government, the entire interval was thirty-two days, fifteen of which were spent by the Hawaiian Commissioners in their journey to Washington.

In the next place, upon the face of the papers submitted with the treaty, it clearly appeared that there was open and undetermined an issue of fact of the most vital importance. The message of the President accompanying the treaty declared that “the overthrow of the monarchy was not in any way promoted by this Government,” and in a letter to the President from the Secretary of State, also submitted to the Senate with the treaty, the following passage occurs: “At the time the provisional government took possession of the Government buildings no troops or officers of the United States were present or took any part whatever in the proceedings. No public recognition was accorded to the provisional government by the United States Minister until after the Queen’s abdication and when they were in effective possession of the Government buildings,

the archives, the treasury, the barracks, the police station, and all the potential machinery of the Government." But a protest also accompanied said treaty, signed by the Queen and her ministers at the time she made way for the provisional government, which explicitly stated that she yielded to the superior force of the United States, whose Minister had caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support such provisional government.

The truth or falsity of this protest was surely of the first importance. If true, nothing but the concealment of its truth could induce our Government to negotiate with the semblance of a government thus created, nor could a treaty resulting from the acts stated in the protest have been knowingly deemed worthy of consideration by the Senate. Yet the truth or falsity of the protest had not been investigated.

I conceived it to be my duty therefore to withdraw the treaty from the Senate for examination, and meanwhile to cause an accurate, full, and impartial investigation to be made of the facts attending the subversion of the constitutional Government of Hawaii, and the installment in its place of the provisional government. I selected for the work of investigation the Hon. James H. Blount, of Georgia, whose service of eighteen years as a member of the House of Representatives, and whose experience as chairman of the Committee of Foreign Affairs in that body, and his consequent familiarity with international topics, joined with his high character and honorable reputation, seemed to render him peculiarly fitted for the duties entrusted to him. His report detailing his action under the instructions given to him and the conclusions derived from his investigation accompany this message.

These conclusions do not rest for their acceptance entirely upon Mr. Blount's honesty and ability as a man, nor upon his acumen and impartiality as an investigator. They are accompanied by the evidence upon which they are based, which evidence is also herewith transmitted, and from which it seems to me no other deductions could possibly be reached than those arrived at by the Commissioner.

The report with its accompanying proofs, and such other evidence as is now before the Congress or is herewith submitted, justifies in my opinion the statement that when the President was led to submit the treaty to the Senate with the declaration that "the overthrow of the monarchy was not in any way promoted by this Government", and when the Senate was induced to receive and discuss it on that basis, both President and Senate were misled.

The attempt will not be made in this communication to touch

upon all the facts which throw light upon the progress and consummation of this scheme of annexation. A very brief and imperfect reference to the facts and evidence at hand will exhibit its character and the incidents in which it had its birth.

It is unnecessary to set forth the reasons which in January, 1893, led a considerable proportion of American and other foreign merchants and traders residing at Honolulu to favor the annexation of Hawaii to the United States. It is sufficient to note the fact and to observe that the project was one which was zealously promoted by the Minister representing the United States in that country. He evidently had an ardent desire that it should become a fact accomplished by his agency and during his ministry, and was not inconveniently scrupulous as to the means employed to that end. On the 19th day of November, 1892, nearly two months before the first overt act tending towards the subversion of the Hawaiian Government and the attempted transfer of Hawaiian territory to the United States, he addressed a long letter to the Secretary of State in which the case for annexation was elaborately argued, on moral, political, and economical grounds. He refers to the loss to the Hawaiian sugar interests from the operation of the McKinley bill, and the tendency to still further depreciation of sugar property unless some positive measure of relief is granted. He strongly inveighs against the existing Hawaiian Government and emphatically declares for annexation. He says: "In truth the monarchy here is an absurd anachronism. It has nothing on which it logically or legitimately stands. The feudal basis on which it once stood no longer existing, the monarchy now is only an impediment to good government—an obstruction to the prosperity and progress of the islands."

He further says: "As a crown colony of Great Britain or a Territory of the United States the government modifications could be made readily and good administration of the law secured. Destiny and the vast future interests of the United States in the Pacific clearly indicate who at no distant day must be responsible for the government of these islands. Under a territorial government they could be as easily governed as any of the existing Territories of the United States."

* * * "Hawaii has reached the parting of the ways. She must now take the road which leads to Asia, or the other which outlets her in America, gives her an American civilization, and binds her to the care of American destiny." He also declares: "One of two courses seems to me absolutely necessary to be followed, either bold and vigorous measures for annexation or a 'customs union,' an ocean cable from the Californian coast to Honolulu, Pearl Harbor perpetually ceded to the United States, with an implied but not ex-

pressly stipulated American protectorate over the islands. I believe the former to be the better, that which will prove much the more advantageous to the islands, and the cheapest and least embarrassing in the end to the United States. If it was wise for the United States through Secretary Marcy thirty-eight years ago to offer to expend \$100,000 to secure a treaty of annexation, it certainly can not be chimerical or unwise to expend \$100,000 to secure annexation in the near future. To-day the United States has five times the wealth she possessed in 1854, and the reasons now existing for annexation are much stronger than they were then. I can not refrain from expressing the opinion with emphasis that the golden hour is near at hand."

These declarations certainly show a disposition and condition of mind, which may be usefully recalled when interpreting the significance of the Minister's conceded acts or when considering the probabilities of such conduct on his part as may not be admitted.

In this view it seems proper to also quote from a letter written by the Minister to the Secretary of State on the 8th day of March, 1892, nearly a year prior to the first step taken toward annexation. After stating the possibility that the existing Government of Hawaii might be overturned by an orderly and peaceful revolution, Minister Stevens writes as follows: "Ordinarily in like circumstances, the rule seems to be to limit the landing and movement of United States forces in foreign waters and dominion exclusively to the protection of the United States legation and of the lives and property of American citizens. But as the relations of the United States to Hawaii are exceptional, and in former years the United States officials here took somewhat exceptional action in circumstances of disorder, I desire to know how far the present Minister and naval commander may deviate from established international rules and precedents in the contingencies indicated in the first part of this dispatch."

To a minister of this temper full of zeal for annexation there seemed to arise in January, 1893, the precise opportunity for which he was watchfully waiting—an opportunity which by timely "deviation from established international rules and precedents" might be improved to successfully accomplish the great object in view; and we are quite prepared for the exultant enthusiasm with which in a letter to the State Department dated February 1, 1893, he declares: "The Hawaiian pear is now fully ripe and this is the golden hour for the United States to pluck it."

As a further illustration of the activity of this diplomatic representative, attention is called to the fact that on the day the above letter was written, apparently unable longer to restrain his ardor, he issued a proclamation whereby "in the name of the United

States" he assumed the protection of the Hawaiian Islands and declared that said action was "taken pending and subject to negotiations at Washington." Of course this assumption of a protectorate was promptly disavowed by our Government, but the American flag remained over the Government building at Honolulu and the forces remained on guard until April, and after Mr. Blount's arrival on the scene, when both were removed.

A brief statement of the occurrences that led to the subversion of the constitutional Government of Hawaii in the interests of annexation to the United States will exhibit the true complexion of that transaction.

On Saturday, January 14, 1893, the Queen of Hawaii, who had been contemplating the proclamation of a new constitution, had, in deference to the wishes and remonstrances of her cabinet, renounced the project for the present at least. Taking this relinquished purpose as a basis of action, citizens of Honolulu numbering from fifty to one hundred, mostly resident aliens, met in a private office and selected a so-called Committee of Safety, composed of thirteen persons, seven of whom were foreign subjects, and consisted of five Americans, one Englishman, and one German. This committee, though its designs were not revealed, had in view nothing less than annexation to the United States, and between Saturday, the 14th, and the following Monday, the 16th of January—though exactly what action was taken may not be clearly disclosed—they were certainly in communication with the United States Minister. On Monday morning the Queen and her cabinet made public proclamation, with a notice which was specially served upon the representatives of all foreign governments, that any changes in the constitution would be sought only in the methods provided by that instrument. Nevertheless, at the call and under the auspices of the Committee of Safety, a mass meeting of citizens was held on that day to protest against the Queen's alleged illegal and unlawful proceedings and purposes. Even at this meeting the Committee of Safety continued to disguise their real purpose and contented themselves with procuring the passage of a resolution denouncing the Queen and empowering the committee to devise ways and means "to secure the permanent maintenance of law and order and the protection of life, liberty, and property in Hawaii." This meeting adjourned between three and four o'clock in the afternoon. On the same day, and immediately after such adjournment, the committee, unwilling to take further steps without the coöperation of the United States Minister, addressed him a note representing that the public safety was menaced and that lives and property were in danger, and concluded as follows:

"We are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and therefore pray for the protection of the United States forces." Whatever may be thought of the other contents of this note, the absolute truth of this latter statement is incontestable. When the note was written and delivered, the committee, so far as it appears, had neither a man nor a gun at their command, and after its delivery they became so panic-stricken at their position that they sent some of their number to interview the Minister and request him not to land the United States forces till the next morning. But he replied that the troops had been ordered, and whether the committee were ready or not the landing should take place. And so it happened that on the 16th day of January, 1893, between four and five o'clock in the afternoon, a detachment of marines from the United States steamer *Boston*, with two pieces of artillery, landed at Honolulu. The men, upwards of 160 in all, were supplied with double cartridge belts filled with ammunition and with haversacks and canteens, and were accompanied by a hospital corps with stretchers and medical supplies. This military demonstration upon the soil of Honolulu was of itself an act of war, unless made either with the consent of the Government of Hawaii or for the *bona fide* purpose of protecting the imperilled lives and property of citizens of the United States. But there is no pretense of any such consent on the part of the Government of the Queen, which at that time was undisputed and was both the *de facto* and the *de jure* government. In point of fact the existing government instead of requesting the presence of an armed force protested against it. There is as little basis for the pretense that such forces were landed for the security of American life and property. If so, they would have been stationed in the vicinity of such property and so as to protect it, instead of at a distance and so as to command the Hawaiian Government building and palace. Admiral Skerrett, the officer in command of our naval force on the Pacific station, has frankly stated that in his opinion the location of the troops was inadvisable if they were landed for the protection of American citizens whose residences and places of business, as well as the legation and consulate, were in a distant part of the city, but the location selected was a wise one if the forces were landed for the purpose of supporting the provisional government. If any peril to life and property calling for any such martial array had existed, Great Britain and other foreign powers interested would not have been behind the United States in activity to protect their citizens. But they made no sign in that direction. When these armed men were landed, the city of Honolulu was in its customary orderly and peaceful condition. There was no

symptom of riot or disturbance in any quarter. Men, women, and children were about the streets as usual, and nothing varied the ordinary routine or disturbed the ordinary tranquillity, except the landing of the *Boston's* marines and their march through the town to the quarters assigned them. Indeed, the fact that after having called for the landing of the United States forces on the plea of danger to life and property the Committee of Safety themselves requested the Minister to postpone action, exposed the untruthfulness of their representations of present peril to life and property. The peril they saw was an anticipation growing out of guilty intentions on their part and something which, though not then existing, they knew would certainly follow their attempt to overthrow the Government of the Queen without the aid of the United States forces.

Thus it appears that Hawaii was taken possession of by the United States forces without the consent or wish of the government of the islands, or of anybody else so far as shown, except the United States Minister.

Therefore the military occupation of Honolulu by the United States on the day mentioned was wholly without justification, either as an occupation by consent or as an occupation necessitated by dangers threatening American life and property. It must be accounted for in some other way and on some other ground, and its real motive and purpose are neither obscure nor far to seek.

The United States forces being now on the scene and favorably stationed, the committee proceeded to carry out their original scheme. They met the next morning, Tuesday, the 17th, perfected the plan of temporary government, and fixed upon its principal officers, ten of whom were drawn from the thirteen members of the Committee of Safety. Between one and two o'clock, by squads and by different routes to avoid notice, and having first taken the precaution of ascertaining whether there was any one there to oppose them, they proceeded to the Government building to proclaim the new government. No sign of opposition was manifest, and thereupon an American citizen began to read the proclamation from the steps of the Government building almost entirely without auditors. It is said that before the reading was finished quite a concourse of persons, variously estimated at from 50 to 100, some armed and some unarmed, gathered about the committee to give them aid and confidence. This statement is not important, since the one controlling factor in the whole affair was unquestionably the United States marines, who, drawn up under arms and with artillery in readiness only seventy-six yards distant, dominated the situation.

The provisional government thus proclaimed was by the terms of

the proclamation "to exist until terms of union with the United States had been negotiated and agreed upon". The United States Minister, pursuant to prior agreement, recognized this government within an hour after the reading of the proclamation, and before five o'clock, in answer to an inquiry on behalf of the Queen and her cabinet, announced that he had done so.

When our Minister recognized the provisional government the only basis upon which it rested was the fact that the Committee of Safety had in the manner above stated declared it to exist. It was neither a government *de facto* nor *de jure*. That it was not in such possession of the Government property and agencies as entitled it to recognition is conclusively proved by a note found in the files of the Legation at Honolulu, addressed by the declared head of the provisional government to Minister Stevens, dated January 17, 1893, in which he acknowledges with expressions of appreciation the Minister's recognition of the provisional government, and states that it is not yet in the possession of the station house (the place where a large number of the Queen's troops were quartered), though the same had been demanded of the Queen's officers in charge. Nevertheless, this wrongful recognition by our Minister placed the Government of the Queen in a position of most perilous perplexity. On the one hand she had possession of the palace, of the barracks, and of the police station, and had at her command at least five hundred fully armed men and several pieces of artillery. Indeed, the whole military force of her kingdom was on her side and at her disposal, while the Committee of Safety, by actual search, had discovered that there were but very few arms in Honolulu that were not in the service of the Government. In this state of things if the Queen could have dealt with the insurgents alone her course would have been plain and the result unmistakable. But the United States had allied itself with her enemies, had recognized them as the true Government of Hawaii, and had put her and her adherents in the position of opposition against lawful authority. She knew that she could not withstand the power of the United States, but she believed that she might safely trust to its justice. Accordingly, some hours after the recognition of the provisional government by the United States Minister, the palace, the barracks, and the police station, with all the military resources of the country, were delivered up by the Queen upon the representation made to her that her cause would thereafter be reviewed at Washington, and while protesting that she surrendered to the superior force of the United States, whose Minister had caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the provisional government, and that she

yielded her authority to prevent collision of armed forces and loss, of life and only until such time as the United States, upon the facts being presented to it, should undo the action of its representative and reinstate her in the authority she claimed as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

This protest was delivered to the chief of the provisional government, who endorsed thereon his acknowledgment of its receipt. The terms of the protest were read without dissent by those assuming to constitute the provisional government, who were certainly charged with the knowledge that the Queen instead of finally abandoning her power had appealed to the justice of the United States for reinstatement in her authority; and yet the provisional government with this unanswered protest in its hand hastened to negotiate with the United States for the permanent banishment of the Queen from power and for a sale of her kingdom.

Our country was in danger of occupying the position of having actually set up a temporary government on foreign soil for the purpose of acquiring through that agency territory which we had wrongfully put in its possession. The control of both sides of a bargain acquired in such a manner is called by a familiar and unpleasant name when found in private transactions. We are not without a precedent showing how scrupulously we avoided such accusations in former days. After the people of Texas had declared their independence of Mexico they resolved that on the acknowledgment of their independence by the United States they would seek admission into the Union. Several months after the battle of San Jacinto, by which Texan independence was practically assured and established, President Jackson declined to recognize it, alleging as one of his reasons that in the circumstances it became us "to beware of a too early movement, as it might subject us, however unjustly, to the imputation of seeking to establish the claim of our neighbors to a territory with a view to its subsequent acquisition by ourselves". This is in marked contrast with the hasty recognition of a government openly and concededly set up for the purpose of tendering to us territorial annexation.

I believe that a candid and thorough examination of the facts will force the conviction that the provisional government owes its existence to an armed invasion by the United States. Fair-minded people with the evidence before them will hardly claim that the Hawaiian Government was overthrown by the people of the islands or that the provisional government had ever existed with their consent. I do not understand that any member of this government claims that the

people would uphold it by their suffrages if they were allowed to vote on the question.

While naturally sympathizing with every effort to establish a republican form of government, it has been the settled policy of the United States to concede to people of foreign countries the same freedom and independence in the management of their domestic affairs that we have always claimed for ourselves; and it has been our practice to recognize revolutionary governments as soon as it became apparent that they were supported by the people. For illustration of this rule I need only to refer to the revolution in Brazil in 1889, when our Minister was instructed to recognize the Republic "so soon as a majority of the people of Brazil should have signified their assent to its establishment and maintenance"; to the revolution in Chile in 1891, when our Minister was directed to recognize the new government "if it was accepted by the people"; and to the revolution in Venezuela in 1892, when our recognition was accorded on condition that the new government was "fully established, in possession of the power of the nation, and accepted by the people."

As I apprehend the situation, we are brought face to face with the following conditions:

The lawful Government of Hawaii was overthrown without the drawing of a sword or the firing of a shot by a process every step of which, it may safely be asserted, is directly traceable to and dependent for its success upon the agency of the United States acting through its diplomatic and naval representatives.

But for the notorious predilections of the United States Minister for annexation, the Committee of Safety, which should be called the Committee of Annexation, would never have existed.

But for the landing of the United States forces upon false pretexts respecting the danger to life and property the committee would never have exposed themselves to the pains and penalties of treason by undertaking the subversion of the Queen's Government.

But for the presence of the United States forces in the immediate vicinity and in position to afford all needed protection and support the committee would not have proclaimed the provisional government from the steps of the Government building.

And finally, but for the lawless occupation of Honolulu under false pretexts by the United States forces, and but for Minister Stevens's recognition of the provisional government when the United States forces were its sole support and constituted its only military strength, the Queen and her Government would never have yielded to the provisional government, even for a time and for the

sole purpose of submitting her case to the enlightened justice of the United States.

Believing, therefore, that the United States could not, under the circumstances disclosed, annex the islands without justly incurring the imputation of acquiring them by unjustifiable methods, I shall not again submit the treaty of annexation to the Senate for its consideration, and in the instructions to Minister Willis, a copy of which accompanies this message, I have directed him to so inform the provisional government.

But in the present instance our duty does not, in my opinion, end with refusing to consummate this questionable transaction. It has been the boast of our Government that it seeks to do justice in all things without regard to the strength or weakness of those with whom it deals. I mistake the American people if they favor the odious doctrine that there is no such thing as international morality, that there is one law for a strong nation and another for a weak one, and that even by indirection a strong power may with impunity despoil a weak one of its territory.

By an act of war, committed with the participation of a diplomatic representative of the United States and without authority of Congress, the Government of a feeble but friendly and confiding people has been overthrown. A substantial wrong has thus been done which a due regard for our national character as well as the rights of the injured people requires we should endeavor to repair. The provisional government has not assumed a republican or other constitutional form, but has remained a mere executive council or oligarchy, set up without the assent of the people. It has not sought to find a permanent basis of popular support and has given no evidence of an intention to do so. Indeed, the representatives of that government assert that the people of Hawaii are unfit for popular government and frankly avow that they can be best ruled by arbitrary or despotic power.

The law of nations is founded upon reason and justice, and the rules of conduct governing individual relations between citizens or subjects of a civilized state are equally applicable as between enlightened nations. The considerations that international law is without a court for its enforcement, and that obedience to its commands practically depends upon good faith, instead of upon the mandate of a superior tribunal, only give additional sanction to the law itself and brand any deliberate infraction of it not merely as a wrong but as a disgrace. A man of true honor protects the unwritten word which binds his conscience more scrupulously, if possible, than he does the bond a breach of which subjects him to

legal liabilities ; and the United States in aiming to maintain itself as one of the most enlightened of nations would do its citizens gross injustice if it applied to its international relations any other than a high standard of honor and morality. On that ground the United States can not properly be put in the position of countenancing a wrong after its commission any more than in that of consenting to it in advance. On that ground it can not allow itself to refuse to redress an injury inflicted through an abuse of power by officers clothed with its authority and wearing its uniform; and on the same ground, if a feeble but friendly state is in danger of being robbed of its independence and its sovereignty by a misuse of the name and power of the United States, the United States can not fail to vindicate its honor and its sense of justice by an earnest effort to make all possible reparation.

These principles apply to the present case with irresistible force when the special conditions of the Queen's surrender of her sovereignty are recalled. She surrendered not to the provisional government, but to the United States. She surrendered not absolutely and permanently, but temporarily and conditionally until such time as the facts could be considered by the United States. Furthermore, the provisional government acquiesced in her surrender in that manner and on those terms, not only by tacit consent, but through the positive acts of some members of that government who urged her peaceable submission, not merely to avoid bloodshed, but because she could place implicit reliance upon the justice of the United States, and that the whole subject would be finally considered at Washington.

I have not, however, overlooked an incident of this unfortunate affair which remains to be mentioned. The members of the provisional government and their supporters, though not entitled to extreme sympathy, have been led to their present predicament of revolt against the Government of the Queen by the indefensible encouragement and assistance of our diplomatic representative. This fact may entitle them to claim that in our effort to rectify the wrong committed some regard should be had for their safety. This sentiment is strongly seconded by my anxiety to do nothing which would invite either harsh retaliation on the part of the Queen or violence and bloodshed in any quarter. In the belief that the Queen, as well as her enemies, would be willing to adopt such a course as would meet these conditions, and in view of the fact that both the Queen and the provisional government had at one time apparently acquiesced in a reference of the entire case to the United States Government, and considering the further fact that in any event the provisional

government by its own declared limitation was only "to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon," I hoped that after the assurance to the members of that government that such union could not be consummated I might compass a peaceful adjustment of the difficulty.

Actuated by these desires and purposes, and not unmindful of the inherent perplexities of the situation nor of the limitations upon my power, I instructed Minister Willis to advise the Queen and her supporters of my desire to aid in the restoration of the status existing before the lawless landing of the United States forces at Honolulu on the 16th of January last, if such restoration could be effected upon terms providing for clemency as well as justice to all parties concerned. The conditions suggested, as the instructions show, contemplate a general amnesty to those concerned in setting up the provisional government and a recognition of all its *bona fide* acts and obligations. In short, they require that the past should be buried, and that the restored Government should reassume its authority as if its continuity had not been interrupted. These conditions have not proved acceptable to the Queen, and though she has been informed that they will be insisted upon, and that, unless acceded to, the efforts of the President to aid in the restoration of her Government will cease, I have not thus far learned that she is willing to yield them her acquiescence. The check which my plans have thus encountered has prevented their presentation to the members of the provisional government, while unfortunate public misrepresentations of the situation and exaggerated statements of the sentiments of our people have obviously injured the prospects of successful Executive mediation.

I therefore submit this communication with its accompanying exhibits, embracing Mr. Blount's report, the evidence and statements taken by him at Honolulu, the instructions given to both Mr. Blount and Minister Willis, and correspondence connected with the affair in hand.

In commending this subject to the extended powers and wide discretion of the Congress, I desire to add the assurance that I shall be much gratified to coöperate in any legislative plan which may be devised for the solution of the problem before us which is consistent with American honor, integrity, and morality.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

Washington, December 18, 1893.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, October 18, 1893.

The PRESIDENT:

The full and impartial reports submitted by the Hon. James H. Blount, your special commissioner to the Hawaiian Islands, established the following facts:

Queen Liliuokalani announced her intention on Saturday, January 14, 1893, to proclaim a new constitution, but the opposition of her ministers and others induced her to speedily change her purpose and make public announcement of that fact.

At a meeting in Honolulu, late on the afternoon of that day, a so-called committee of public safety, consisting of thirteen men, being all or nearly all who were present, was appointed "to consider the situation and devise ways and means for the maintenance of the public peace and the protection of life and property," and at a meeting of this committee on the 15th, or the forenoon of the 16th of January, it was resolved amongst other things that a provisional government be created "to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon." At a mass meeting which assembled at 2 p. m. on the last-named day, the Queen and her supporters were condemned and denounced, and the committee was continued and all its acts approved.

Later the same afternoon the committee addressed a letter to John L. Stevens, the American minister at Honolulu, stating that the lives and property of the people were in peril and appealing to him and the United States forces at his command for assistance. This communication concluded "we are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and therefore hope for the protection of the United States forces." On receipt of this letter Mr. Stevens requested Capt. Wiltse, commander of the U. S. S. *Boston*, to land a force "for the protection of the United States legation, United States consulate, and to secure the safety of American life and property." The well-armed troops, accompanied by two gatling guns, were promptly landed and marched through the quiet streets of Honolulu to a public hall, previously secured by Mr. Stevens for their accommodation. This hall was just across the street from the Government building, and in plain view of the Queen's palace. The reason for thus locating the military will presently appear. The governor of the Island immediately addressed to Mr. Stevens a communication protesting against the act as an unwarranted invasion of Hawaiian soil and reminding him that the proper authorities had never denied permission to the naval forces of the United States to land for drill or any other proper purpose.

About the same time the Queen's minister of foreign affairs sent a note to Mr. Stevens asking why the troops had been landed and informing him that the proper authorities were able and willing to afford full protection to the American legation and all American interests in Honolulu. Only evasive replies were sent to these communications.

While there were no manifestations of excitement or alarm in the city, and the people were ignorant of the contemplated movement, the committee entered the Government building, after first ascertaining that it was unguarded, and read a proclamation declaring that the existing Government was overthrown and a Provisional Government established in its place, "to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon." No audience was present when the proclamation was read, but during the reading 40 or 50 men, some of them indifferently armed, entered the room. The executive and advisory councils mentioned in the proclamation at once addressed a communication to Mr. Stevens, informing him that the monarchy had been abrogated and a provisional government established. This communication concluded:

Such Provisional Government has been proclaimed, is now in possession of the Government departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and is in control of the city. We hereby request that you will, on behalf of the United States, recognize it as the existing *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands and afford to it the moral support of your Government, and, if necessary, the support of American troops to assist in preserving the public peace.

On receipt of this communication, Mr. Stevens immediately recognized the new Government, and, in a letter addressed to Sanford B. Dole, its President, informed him that he had done so. Mr. Dole replied:

GOVERNMENT BUILDING,
Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

SIR: I acknowledge receipt of your valued communication of this day, recognizing the Hawaiian Provisional Government, and express deep appreciation of the same.

We have conferred with the ministers of the late Government, and have made demand upon the marshal to surrender the station house. We are not actually yet in possession of the station house, but as night is approaching and our forces may be insufficient to maintain order, we request the immediate support of the United States forces, and would request that the commander of the United States forces take command of our military forces, so that they may act together for the protection of the city.

Respectfully, yours,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Chairman Executive Council.

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
United States Minister Resident.

Note of Mr. Stevens at the end of the above communication.

The above request not complied with.

STEVENS.

The station house was occupied by a well-armed force, under the command of a resolute capable officer. The same afternoon the Queen, her ministers, representatives of the Provisional Government, and others held a conference at the palace. Refusing to recognize the new authority or surrender to it, she was informed that the Provisional Government had the support of the American minister, and, if necessary, would be maintained by the military force of the United States then present; that any demonstration on her part would precipitate a conflict with that force; that she could not, with hope of success, engage

in war with the United States, and that resistance would result in a useless sacrifice of life. Mr. Damon, one of the chief leaders of the movement, and afterwards vice-president of the Provisional Government, informed the Queen that she could surrender under protest and her case would be considered later at Washington. Believing that, under the circumstances, submission was a duty, and that her case would be fairly considered by the President of the United States, the Queen finally yielded and sent to the Provisional Government the paper, which reads:

I, Liliuokalani, by the grace of God and under the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against any and all acts done against myself and the constitutional Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming to have established a Provisional Government of and for this Kingdom.

That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America, whose minister plenipotentiary, his excellency John L. Stevens, has caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the Provisional Government.

Now, to avoid any collision of armed forces and perhaps the loss of life, I do, under this protest, and impelled by said force, yield my authority until such time as the Government of the United States shall, upon the facts being presented to it, undo the action of its representative and reinstate me and the authority which I claim as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

When this paper was prepared at the conclusion of the conference, and signed by the Queen and her ministers, a number of persons, including one or more representatives of the Provisional Government, who were still present and understood its contents, by their silence, at least, acquiesced in its statements, and, when it was carried to President Dole, he indorsed upon it, "Received from the hands of the late cabinet this 17th day of January, 1893," without challenging the truth of any of its assertions. Indeed, it was not claimed on the 17th day of January, or for some time thereafter, by any of the designated officers of the Provisional Government or any annexationist that the Queen surrendered otherwise than as stated in her protest.

In his dispatch to Mr. Foster of January 18, describing the so-called revolution, Mr. Stevens says:

The committee of public safety forthwith took possession of the Government building, archives, and treasury, and installed the Provisional Government at the head of the respective departments. This being an accomplished fact, I promptly recognized the Provisional Government as the *de facto* government of the Hawaiian Islands.

In Secretary Foster's communication of February 15 to the President, laying before him the treaty of annexation, with the view to obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate thereto, he says:

At the time the Provisional Government took possession of the Government building no troops or officers of the United States were present or took any part whatever in the proceedings. No public recognition was accorded to the Provisional Government by the United States minister until after the Queen's abdication, and when they were in effective possession of the Government building, the archives, the treasury, the barracks, the police station, and all the potential machinery of the Government.

Similar language is found in an official letter addressed to Secretary Foster on February 3 by the special commissioners sent to Washington by the Provisional Government to negotiate a treaty of annexation.

These statements are utterly at variance with the evidence, documentary and oral, contained in Mr. Blount's reports. They are contradicted by declarations and letters of President Dole and other annexationists and by Mr. Stevens's own verbal admissions to Mr. Blount.

The Provisional Government was recognized when it had little other than a paper existence, and when the legitimate government was in full possession and control of the palace, the barracks, and the police station. Mr. Stevens's well-known hostility and the threatening presence of the force landed from the *Boston* was all that could then have excited serious apprehension in the minds of the Queen, her officers, and loyal supporters.

It is fair to say that Secretary Foster's statements were based upon information which he had received from Mr. Stevens and the special commissioners, but I am unable to see that they were deceived. The troops were landed, not to protect American life and property, but to aid in overthrowing the existing government. Their very presence implied coercive measures against it.

In a statement given to Mr. Blount, by Admiral Skerrett, the ranking naval officer at Honolulu, he says:

If the troops were landed simply to protect American citizens and interests, they were badly stationed in Arion Hall, but if the intention was to aid the Provisional Government they were wisely stationed.

This hall was so situated that the troops in it easily commanded the Government building, and the proclamation was read under the protection of American guns. At an early stage of the movement, if not at the beginning, Mr. Stevens promised the annexationists that as soon as they obtained possession of the Government building and there read a proclamation of the character above referred to, he would at once recognize them as a *de facto* government, and support them by landing a force from our war ship then in the harbor, and he kept that promise. This assurance was the inspiration of the movement, and without it the annexationists would not have exposed themselves to the consequences of failure. They relied upon no military force of their own, for they had none worthy of the name. The Provisional Government was established by the action of the American minister and the presence of the troops landed from the *Boston*, and its continued existence is due to the belief of the Hawaiians that if they made an effort to overthrow it, they would encounter the armed forces of the United States.

The earnest appeals to the American minister for military protection by the officers of that Government, after it had been recognized, show the utter absurdity of the claim that it was established by a successful revolution of the people of the Islands. Those appeals were a confession by the men who made them of their weakness and timidity. Courageous men, conscious of their strength and the justice of their cause, do not thus act. It is not now claimed that a majority of the people, having the right to vote under the constitution of 1887, ever favored the existing authority or annexation to this or any other country. They earnestly desire that the government of their choice shall be restored and its independence respected.

Mr. Blount states that while at Honolulu he did not meet a single annexationist who expressed willingness to submit the question to a vote of the people, nor did he talk with one on that subject who did not insist that if the Islands were annexed suffrage should be so restricted as to give complete control to foreigners or whites. Representative annexationists have repeatedly made similar statements to the undersigned.

The Government of Hawaii surrendered its authority under a threat of war, until such time only as the Government of the United States, upon the facts being presented to it, should reinstate the constitutional

sovereign, and the Provisional Government was created "to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon." A careful consideration of the facts will, I think, convince you that the treaty which was withdrawn from the Senate for further consideration should not be resubmitted for its action thereon.

Should not the great wrong done to a feeble but independent State by an abuse of the authority of the United States be undone by restoring the legitimate government? Anything short of that will not, I respectfully submit, satisfy the demands of justice.

Can the United States consistently insist that other nations shall respect the independence of Hawaii while not respecting it themselves? Our Government was the first to recognize the independence of the islands and it should be the last to acquire sovereignty over them by force and fraud.

Respectfully submitted.

W. Q. GRESHAM.

[Confidential.]

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Willis.

No. 4.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, October 18, 1893.

SIR: Supplementing the general instructions which you have received with regard to your official duties, it is necessary to communicate to you, in confidence, special instructions for your guidance in so far as concerns the relation of the Government of the United States towards the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

The President deemed it his duty to withdraw from the Senate the treaty of annexation which has been signed by the Secretary of State and the agents of the Provisional Government, and to dispatch a trusted representative to Hawaii to impartially investigate the causes of the so-called revolution and ascertain and report the true situation in those islands. This information was needed the better to enable the President to discharge a delicate and important public duty.

The instructions given to Mr. Blount, of which you are furnished with a copy, point out a line of conduct to be observed by him in his official and personal relations on the Islands, by which you will be guided so far as they are applicable and not inconsistent with what is herein contained.

It remains to acquaint you with the President's conclusions upon the facts embodied in Mr. Blount's reports and to direct your course in accordance therewith.

The Provisional Government was not established by the Hawaiian people, or with their consent or acquiescence, nor has it since existed with their consent. The Queen refused to surrender her powers to the Provisional Government until convinced that the minister of the United States had recognized it as the *de facto* authority, and would support and defend it with the military force of the United States, and that resistance would precipitate a bloody conflict with that force. She was advised and assured by her ministers and by leaders of the movement for the overthrow of her government, that if she surrendered under protest her case would afterwards be fairly considered by the President of the United States. The Queen finally wisely yielded to the armed forces of the United States then quartered in Honolulu, relying upon the good faith and honor of the President, when informed

of what had occurred, to undo the action of the minister and reinstate her and the authority which she claimed as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

After a patient examination of Mr. Blount's reports the President is satisfied that the movement against the Queen, if not instigated, was encouraged and supported by the representative of this Government at Honolulu; that he promised in advance to aid her enemies in an effort to overthrow the Hawaiian Government and set up by force a new government in its place; and that he kept this promise by causing a detachment of troops to be landed from the *Boston* on the 16th of January, and by recognizing the Provisional Government the next day when it was too feeble to defend itself and the constitutional government was able to successfully maintain its authority against any threatening force other than that of the United States already landed.

The President has therefore determined that he will not send back to the Senate for its action thereon the treaty which he withdrew from that body for further consideration on the 9th day of March last.

On your arrival at Honolulu you will take advantage of an early opportunity to inform the Queen of this determination, making known to her the President's sincere regret that the reprehensible conduct of the American minister and the unauthorized presence on land of a military force of the United States obliged her to surrender her sovereignty, for the time being, and rely on the justice of this Government to undo the flagrant wrong.

You will, however, at the same time inform the Queen that, when reinstated, the President expects that she will pursue a magnanimous course by granting full amnesty to all who participated in the movement against her, including persons who are, or have been, officially or otherwise, connected with the Provisional Government, depriving them of no right or privilege which they enjoyed before the so-called revolution. All obligations created by the Provisional Government in due course of administration should be assumed.

Having secured the Queen's agreement to pursue this wise and humane policy, which it is believed you will speedily obtain, you will then advise the executive of the Provisional Government and his ministers of the President's determination of the question which their action and that of the Queen devolved upon him, and that they are expected to promptly relinquish to her her constitutional authority.

Should the Queen decline to pursue the liberal course suggested, or should the Provisional Government refuse to abide by the President's decision, you will report the facts and await further directions.

In carrying out these general instructions you will be guided largely by your own good judgment in dealing with the delicate situation.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Willis.

[Telegram sent through dispatch agent at San Francisco.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 24, 1893.

The brevity and uncertainty of your telegrams are embarrassing. You will insist upon amnesty and recognition of obligations of the Provisional Government as essential conditions of restoration. All interests will be promoted by prompt action.

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Willis.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 3, 1893.

Your dispatch, which was answered by steamer on the 25th of November, seems to call for additional instructions.

Should the Queen refuse assent to the written conditions, you will at once inform her that the President will cease interposition in her behalf, and that while he deems it his duty to endeavor to restore to the sovereign the constitutional government of the islands, his further efforts in that direction will depend upon the Queen's unqualified agreement that all obligations created by the Provisional Government in a proper course of administration shall be assumed and upon such pledges by her as will prevent the adoption of any measures of proscription or punishment for what has been done in the past by those setting up or supporting the Provisional Government. The President feels that by our original interference and what followed we have incurred responsibilities to the whole Hawaiian community, and it would not be just to put one party at the mercy of the other.

Should the Queen ask whether if she accedes to conditions active steps will be taken by the United States to effect her restoration or to maintain her authority thereafter, you will say that the President can not use force without the authority of Congress.

Should the Queen accept conditions and the Provisional Government refuse to surrender, you will be governed by previous instructions. If the Provisional Government asks whether the United States will hold the Queen to fulfillment of stipulated conditions, you will say, the President, acting under dictates of honor and duty as he has done in endeavoring to effect restoration, will do all in his constitutional power to cause observance of the conditions he has imposed.

GRESHAM.



LIST OF PAPERS—Correspondence.

1. Mr. Gresham to Mr. Blount, March 11, 1893.
2. Same to Mr. Stevens, March 11, 1893.
3. Same to Mr. Severance, March 11, 1893.
4. Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham, No. 1, April 6, 1893.
5. Same to same, No. 2, April 8, 1893.
6. Same to same, No. 3, April 26, 1893.
7. Same to same, No. 4, May 4, 1893.
8. Same to same, No. 5, May 6, 1893.
9. Same to same, No. 6, May 9, 1893.
10. Same to same, No. 7, May 24, 1893.
11. Same to same, No. 8, June 1, 1893.
12. Same to same, No. 9, June 6, 1893.
13. Same to same, No. 10, June 17, 1893.
14. Same to same, No. 11, June 28, 1893.
15. Same to same, No. 12, July 7, 1893.
16. Same to same, No. 13, July 17, 1893.
17. Same to same, July 17, 1893.
18. Same to same, No. 14, July 19, 1893.
19. Same to same, No. 15, July 26, 1893.
20. Same to same, July 31, 1893.

PART I.—CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 1.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Blount.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 11, 1893.

Hon. JAMES H. BLOUNT, *etc.* :

SIR: The situation created in the Hawaiian Islands by the recent deposition of Queen Liliuokalani and the erection of a Provisional Government demands the fullest consideration of the President, and in order to obtain trustworthy information on this subject, as well as for the discharge of other duties herein specified, he has decided to dispatch you to the Hawaiian Islands as his special commissioner, in which capacity you will herewith receive a commission and also a letter, whereby the President accredits you to the president of the executive and advisory councils of the Hawaiian Islands.

The comprehensive, delicate, and confidential character of your mission can now only be briefly outlined, the details of its execution being necessarily left, in great measure, to your good judgment and wise discretion.

You will investigate and fully report to the President all the facts you can learn respecting the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, the causes of the revolution by which the Queen's Government was overthrown, the sentiment of the people toward existing authority, and, in

general, all that can fully enlighten the President touching the subjects of your mission.

To enable you to fulfill this charge, your authority in all matters touching the relations of this Government to the existing or other government of the islands, and the protection of our citizens therein, is paramount, and in you alone, acting in coöperation with the commander of the naval forces, is vested full discretion and power to determine when such forces should be landed or withdrawn.

You are, however, authorized to avail yourself of such aid and information as you may desire from the present minister of the United States at Honolulu, Mr. John L. Stevens, who will continue until further notice to perform the usual functions attaching to his office, not inconsistent with the powers entrusted to you. An instruction will be sent to Mr. Stevens directing him to facilitate your presentation to the head of the Government upon your arrival, and to render you all needed assistance.

The withdrawal from the Senate of the recently signed treaty of annexation, for reëxamination by the President, leaves its subject-matter in abeyance, and you are not charged with any duty in respect thereto. It may be well, however, for you to dispel any possible misapprehension which its withdrawal may have excited touching the entire friendliness of the President and the Government of the United States toward the people of the Hawaiian Islands or the earnest solicitude here felt for their welfare, tranquility, and progress.

Historical precedents and the general course of the United States authorize the employment of its armed force in foreign territory for the security of the lives and property of American citizens and for the repression of lawless and tumultuous acts threatening them; and the powers conferred to that end upon the representatives of the United States are both necessary and proper, subject always to the exercise of a sound discretion in their application.

In the judgment of the President your authority, as well as that of the commander of the naval forces in Hawaiian waters should be, and is, limited in the use of physical force to such measures as are necessary to protect the persons and property of our citizens; and while abstaining from any manner of interference with the domestic concerns of the Islands, you should indicate your willingness to intervene with your friendly offices in the interest of a peaceful settlement of troubles within the limits of sound discretion.

Should it be necessary to land an armed force upon Hawaiian territory on occasions of popular disturbance, when the local authority may be unable to give adequate protection to the life and property of citizens of the United States, the assent of such authority should first be obtained, if it can be done without prejudice to the interests involved. Your power in this regard should not, however, be claimed to the exclusion of similar measures by the representatives of other powers for the protection of the lives and property of their citizens or subjects residing in the Islands.

While the United States claim no right to interfere in the political or domestic affairs or in the internal conflicts of the Hawaiian Islands otherwise than as herein stated, or for the purpose of maintaining any treaty or other rights which they possess, this Government will adhere to its consistent and established policy in relation to them, and it will not acquiesce in domestic interference by other powers.

The foregoing general exposition of the President's views will indicate the safe courses within which your action should be shaped and

mark the limits of your discretion in calling upon the naval commander for coöperation.

The United States revenue cutter *Rush* is under orders to await you at San Francisco and convey you to Honolulu.

A stenographic clerk will be detailed to accompany you and remain subject to your orders.

It is expected that you will use all convenient despatch for the fulfillment of your mission, as it is the President's desire to have the results before him at the earliest possible day. Besides the connected report you are expected to furnish you will from time to time, as occasion may offer, correspond with the Secretary of State, communicating information or soliciting special instruction on such points as you may deem necessary. In case of urgency you may telegraph, either in plain text or in the cipher of the Navy Department, through the kind offices of the admiral commanding, which may be sent to Mr. W. A. Cooper, United States dispatch agent at San Francisco, to be transmitted thence.

Reposing the amplest confidence in your ability and zeal for the realization of the trust thus confided to you,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

[Inclosure.]

President Cleveland to President Dole.

Grover Cleveland, President of the United States of America, to his excellency Sanford B. Dole, President of the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND: I have made choice of James H. Blount, one of our distinguished citizens, as my special commissioner to visit the Hawaiian Islands and make report to me concerning the present status of affairs in that country. He is well informed of our sincere desire to cultivate and maintain to the fullest extent the friendship which has so long subsisted between the two countries, and in all matters affecting relations with the Government of the Hawaiian Islands his authority is paramount. My knowledge of his high character and ability gives me entire confidence that he will use every endeavor to advance the interest and prosperity of both Governments and so render himself acceptable to your excellency.

I therefore request your excellency to receive him favorably and to give full credence to what he shall say on the part of the United States and to the assurances which I have charged him to convey to you of the best wishes of this Government for the prosperity of the Hawaiian Islands.

May God have your excellency in His wise keeping.

Written at Washington this 11th day of March, in the year 1893.

Your good friend,

GROVER CLEVELAND.

By the President:

W. Q. GRESHAM,
Secretary of State.

No. 2.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Stevens.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 11, 1893.

SIR: With a view to obtaining the fullest possible information in regard to the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands the President has determined to send to Honolulu, as his Special Commissioner,

the honorable James H. Blount, lately chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Blount bears credential letters in that capacity, addressed to the President of the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government, and you are requested to facilitate his presentation.

In all matters pertaining to the existing or other Government of the Islands the authority of Mr. Blount is paramount. As regards the conduct of the usual business of the legation, you are requested to continue until further notice in the performance of your official functions, so far as they may not be inconsistent with the special powers confided to Mr. Blount. You are also requested to aid him in the fulfillment of his important mission by furnishing any desired assistance and information, and the archives of the legation should be freely accessible to him.

Mr. Blount is fully instructed touching his relations to the commanding officer of the United States naval force in Hawaiian waters.

I am, &c.,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

No. 3.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Severance.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, March 11, 1893.

SIR: With a view to obtaining the fullest possible information in regard to the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, the President sends to Honolulu, as his Special Commissioner, the honorable James H. Blount, lately chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

You are requested to aid Mr. Blount in the fulfillment of his important mission by furnishing any desired assistance and information; and the archives of the consulate-general should be freely accessible to him.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

No. 4.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 1.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, April 6, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that about noon on the 29th ultimo the *Rush* anchored at Honolulu. I was immediately met by the American minister, Mr. Stevens. He informed me that the annexation committee, which came on board with him, had rented one of the most eligible residences in the city for my use; had provided servants, among others an American steward, and a carriage and horses, etc., for my use. I could pay whatever I wanted to for it, from nothing up. He urged me very strongly to accept the proposed arrangement.

I replied to him that I could accept no favors at the hands of any parties in the islands, and that I should immediately go to a hotel.

The annexation committee then came up and insisted that I should take the accommodations which they had seen fit to provide on the terms already indicated by the American minister. I again declined, stating that I should resort to a hotel and make my arrangements there.

At this time there was an immense collection of natives on shore, men, women, and children, evidently in a state of joyous expectation.

One of the annexation committee said to me: "When you reach the shore the natives will desire you to take their carriages and allow them to escort you to your hotel." This was said with anxiety. I replied: "I shall go to my hotel in my own carriage."

Soon after this a Mr. Robertson appeared on the scene as the Queen's ex-chamberlain, to request that I would accept her carriage to convey me to my hotel. I returned thanks to her, but stated that I would use my own conveyance.

On Thursday, March 30, at 4 o'clock in the evening, in company with the American minister, I called on the President of the Provisional Government. I communicated to him the friendly disposition of our Government towards his and towards the Hawaiian people. I assured him of its purpose to avoid any interference with the domestic concerns of the islands unless it became necessary to protect the persons and property of American citizens. I then offered my letters of credence, which were accepted by President Dole, accompanied with expressions of great friendship for my Government and confidence in myself.

The Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser of March 31, 1893, reports the proceedings of the Hawaiian Patriotic League, from which the following is taken: "Mr. Joseph Nawahi, one of the speakers, said that all Hawaiians were in favor of monarchy, and then he asked his hearers if they wanted their queen to be restored. They all answered 'yes,' as a matter of course. He then went on to say that the Commissioner was sent here to feel their pulses, and for all Hawaiians to ask him for a return of the old order of things. He told the people to show by their actions that they did not want annexation, and as a greater power than the Government had arrived among them, a memorial would be read without fear of arrest."

The resolutions adopted by the meeting are as follows:

Whereas His Excellency Grover Cleveland, President of the United States of America, has honored the Hawaiian Nation by sending to us the Hon. James H. Blount as a special commissioner, to find out the true wishes of the Hawaiian people as to the proposed annexation of their country to their great friend the United States: Therefore, we, the people of the Hawaiian Islands, in mass meeting assembled, take this mode of submitting our appeal and expression of our unanimous wishes to the people of our great and good friend the Republic of the United States of America, with whom we always entertained the most cordial relation, whom we have learned to look upon as our patrons and most reliable protectors, and in whose honor, integrity, and sense of justice and equity we have ever confidently relied for investigation into the grievous wrongs that have been committed against us as a people, against the person of our sovereign and the independence of our land;

And while we are anxious to promote the closest and most intimate political and commercial relations with the United States, we do not believe that the time has yet come for us to be deprived of our nationality and of our sovereign by annexation to any foreign power;

And, therefore, we do hereby earnestly and sincerely pray that the great wrong committed against us may be righted by the restoration of the independent autonomy and constitutional government of our kingdom under our beloved Queen Liliuokalani, in whom we have the utmost confidence as a conscientious and popular ruler.

Previous to this, accompanied by Mr. Stevens, the American minister, I had called upon the President of the Provisional Government and briefly stated the friendly disposition of our Government towards the Hawaiian people. Care had been taken on this occasion to avoid any reference to the use of the American troops. It had seemed to me up to the action of the aforesaid meeting that it would be wise to take a few days to ascertain the situation of affairs before causing the troops to be removed to the vessels and the ensign hauled down.

A Major Seward called on the morning of March 31, desiring to know when it would be convenient for me to receive a committee from the mass meeting of the preceding evening, which desired to present the resolutions adopted. It was quite clear that in the mind of that assemblage, there were apprehensions that I was here vested with power to reinstate Queen Liliuokalani.

The reception of a committee so avowedly hostile to the existing Government raised a question as to whether this would consist with a recognition of existing authority and the policy of noninterference. The messenger was informed that the subject would be taken into consideration and that he might call at 2 o'clock of the same day for my reply.

Very soon after his departure I called on President Dole, and called his attention to the meeting and resolutions. I said that, under existing circumstances, I deemed it proper at once to say to him that I should cause the ensign of the United States to be hauled down, and the troops ordered on board their respective vessels. I informed him further that they would be used only to protect the persons and property of American citizens, and that our Government would not acquiesce in the interference by any other Government in the establishment or maintenance of any form of Government on the islands. He desired to know when the troops would be removed and the ensign hauled down. I replied, to-day or to-morrow. He expressed a preference that it should be done on the morning of the following day, April 1. To this I agreed. I asked if he was satisfied he could preserve order when our troops were withdrawn. To this he replied that he had no doubt of it. He added that when the troops were first furnished they could not have gotten along without their aid. He was given to understand that this question was not intended as a guide to me in the removal of the troops, but simply to ascertain whether disorders were likely to occur.

Soon afterwards the following order was issued to Admiral Skerrett:

HONOLULU, *March 31, 1893.*

SIR: You are directed to haul down the United States ensign from the Government Building, and to embark the troops now on shore to the ships to which they belong.

This will be executed at 11 o'clock on the 1st day of April.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

Rear Admiral J. S. SKERRETT,
Commanding Pacific Squadron.

On the afternoon of this day (March 31) I informed the messenger of the mass meeting that I would receive them at 4 o'clock on the following day. This was done in order that when the committee called, the ensign would have been hauled down and the troops ordered aboard of their vessels, and I could state freely to the committee that it was not my purpose to interfere in their domestic concerns; that the United States troops would not be used to maintain or restore any form of government, but simply to protect the persons and property of American citizens. This reply I hoped would allay any action on the part of the people based on erroneous impressions as to my future conduct.

On the night before the flag was taken down, the American minister came to me with a Mr. Smith, correspondent of the *San Francisco Chronicle*, whom he introduced as a gentleman of intelligence and high character desiring to make an important communication to me. This gentleman claimed to know that it was the purpose of the Japanese commissioner, who had learned that the American flag was to be hauled

down and the troops sent on board their respective vessels, to enter Honolulu with troops for the purpose of restoring authority to the Queen.

This story was credited by the American minister, who urged that I should not take down the flag until diplomatic intercourse between the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan should determine the correctness of this information.

Very little observation had satisfied me that all sorts of rumors arise in this community almost every hour, and are credited without reference to the probabilities.

Conscious of the power and policy of our own Government in these islands, and that of these the Japanese Government was well informed, I maintained my purpose to insist upon the order to Admiral Skerrett.

At 4 o'clock on Saturday, April 1, a committee, consisting of nineteen members, very intelligent, respectable half-castes, called at the headquarters of the commission. The spokesman, Mr. John E. Bush, stated that at the mass meeting of the natives resolutions had been adopted which they desired to present to me to be transmitted to the President of the United States. He declared the high esteem and affection his people had for the people of the United States, and spoke of the friendly disposition our Government had always manifested towards them. He said that up to my arrival the people had borne patiently the existing condition of things, trusting in the disposition of the American Government to do absolute justice by them. I replied that he did not misinterpret the kindly feeling of the Government and people of the United States for all classes of citizens in these islands. I said I would accept their resolutions in no other sense than as I would any other fact to be communicated in the way of information to the President of the United States; that I could not discuss with them the objects of my mission, nor the purposes of my Government. To this, response was made by Mr. Bush, that this was all they could reasonably expect.

I append herewith a copy of a letter, marked Inclosure 1, from Admiral Skerrett, containing a statement of the circumstances attending the hauling down of the ensign and the removal of the troops.

I also append a copy of a letter from Capt. Hooper, of the *Rush* (Inclosure No. 2), a very intelligent gentleman, whom I had asked to be present on the occasion and report the circumstances.

Mr. Parker, the last secretary of state under the late Queen, a half-caste of wealth and intelligence, called on Monday morning, April 3. In his conversation he stated that he and other leaders of the Kanaka population, loyal to the Queen, had been very active in impressing upon their followers that the lowering of the flag and the withdrawal of the troops must be accepted by them without any manifestations of their opinions or feelings.

On Sunday, April 2, I called on the American minister. While there he related that he had had a conversation with the Japanese minister, and satisfied him that our Government would not consent to Japanese interference in these islands. I was glad to find that he himself was not suffering from any apprehensions over the flag incident.

The American minister and consul-general seem to be very intense partisans for annexation. I do not yet see how they will embarrass me in the purposes of my mission. While they seemed to give out the impression that the troops will be brought back here in the event of trouble, my presence discredits the authority of their statements. I have uniformly stated that the troops would only be used for the pur-

pose of protecting the property and persons of American citizens; that I could not tell in advance what specific contingency would justify me in doing so. At this time I think I may pursue all my inquiries in the midst of peaceful surroundings.

Since my arrival visitors are constantly calling upon me and Mrs. Blount. It appears to be a manifestation of regard on the part of all classes of political opinion and of all races towards the Government of the United States. Most of my time has been occupied in this way. I do not know that it could have been employed more usefully. I think I shall cautiously but surely find my way to the political feeling of all classes. I shall commence soon to make inquiry in regard to the various questions naturally arising in connection with the relations of the United States to the Hawaiian Islands from persons whose opinions I shall have decided are of any valuable significance.

I feel assured that I can successfully ascertain much valuable information in this way.

I have, &c.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

Admiral Skerrett to Mr. Blount.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 1.]

No. 110.]

U. S. S. MOHICAN, FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, April 1, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to inform Special Commissioner Blount that in obedience to his directions, the United States ensign over the Government building was lowered at 11 a. m. of this date, and the force withdrawn from the building and the place designated as Camp Boston, at the same hour. I learn that quite a number of people congregated about the Government building at the time. The force of marines stationed there were relieved by a force of the Provisional Government. There was no demonstration made by the populace present. No cheering nor any other signs of either joy or grief.

I went on shore this afternoon and saw quite an access in numbers of those who were wearing the Annexation club badge. There has been no evidence shown of unruly or riotous characters. Absolutely there appears to be peace and quiet.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. SKERRETT,
Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 1.]

Capt. Hooper to Mr. Blount.

U. S. REVENUE STEAMER RUSH, *Honolulu, April 2, 1893.*

MY DEAR SIR: I witnessed the hauling down of the American flag and the raising of the Hawaiian flag over the Government building at this place yesterday, and was surprised not only at the absence of any indication of the violent and partisan feeling which I had been led to expect, but by the apparent apathy and indifference of the native portion of the assembled crowd, and also their politeness and evident good feeling towards Americans. As I passed freely around among them, accompanied by my son, we were kept busy returning their friendly salutes. The greatest good order prevailed throughout. There were no demonstrations of any kind as the American flag came down, and not a single cheer greeted the Hawaiian flag as it was raised aloft. The native men stood around in groups or singly, smoking, and chatting and nodding familiarly to passing friends or leaning idly against the trees and fences, while the women and children, which formed a large proportion of the assemblage, were talking and laughing good-naturedly. As the hour for hauling down the American flag approached, many people, men, women, and children, could be seen approaching the Government square in a most leisurely manner, and show-

ing more interest in the gala day appearance of the crowd than in the restoration of their national flag. The air of good natured indifference and idle curiosity with which the native men regarded the proceedings, and the presence of the women and children in their white or bright colored dresses, was more suggestive of a country "fair" or horse race than the sequel to a "revolution."

Even the presence of the "armed forces" of the Provisional Government, numbering perhaps 200, parading the corridors of the Government house, failed to elicit any sign of a feeling of anger or resentment.

In half an hour after the exchange of flags had been made the crowd had dispersed and only the "force" of the Provisional Government, which I was told was necessary to prevent mob violence, remained to indicate that a "revolution" had recently taken place. While among the crowd I looked carefully for indications of "arms" upon the persons of the natives, but saw none, although with the thin clothing worn by them, the presence of a revolver or such an arm could easily have been detected.

If any danger of mob violence on the part of the natives existed, all outward signs of it were carefully concealed. Only evidences of the greatest good feeling were apparent.

Hoping that this short statement of the facts as they appeared to me may prove of interest to you,

I am, etc.,

C. L. HOOPER,
Captain U. S. Revenue Marine.

No. 5.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 2.] HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, April 8, 1893.

SIR: I send you by the steamship *China* the following documents:

Report of the president of the Bureau of Immigration to the Legislature of 1892;

Constitution of the Hawaiian Islands for 1887;

The Honolulu Almanac and Directory for 1886, containing the Constitution of 1884, and

The Hawaiian Annual for 1892.*

These contain much valuable information, which may be useful in properly understanding the political movements and the disposition of different classes of persons in these islands. I forbear any comment now. It seems to me important to gather all the information I can, in every direction, before permitting myself to reach conclusions or indulge in comments. I am conversing with many persons of all shades of political opinion. Some of these conversations I have in writing. They will cover much space, and, unless especially desired by you, I will not, as a rule, forward them by mail.

I send a conversation between Admiral Skerrett and myself, taken down by my stenographer and approved as correct by Admiral Skerrett. (Inclosure No. 1.)

I inclose a copy of a letter from Mr. Thurston to Mr. Antone Rosa, the original of which I have seen. Also an explanation of Hawaiian words used in Mr. Thurston's letter. (Inclosure No. 2.)

I inclose also a copy of a letter written by Mr. Thurston to Mr. J. T. Colburn, who was in the last ministry of the Queen. (Inclosure No. 3.)

I think the annexation party is endeavoring to impress the Royalists with the belief that, although the American ensign has been hauled down and the American troops ordered to their vessels, under color of protecting the persons and property of American citizens the troops

* Omitted from present publication.

will be returned, if need be, to suppress an outbreak against the existing Government.

As a class, American citizens here have been the most active in dethroning the Queen, and are active in maintaining the existing Government. If they are thus to participate in the affairs of these islands, and when force is used to suppress such movements on their part the forces of the United States are to be called in to protect their persons and property, it does seem that our Government encourages them to lawlessness, and its good faith is impugned.

My present impression is that the existing Government owes its being and its maintenance to this perverted influence. Of course, time and further inquiry may furnish a different and better opinion.

It is not easy for me to impress persons here with the complete idea of our noninterference policy, coupled with exceptions. The protection of the persons and property of American citizens here has come to mean aid to or enforcement of the laws whenever force is used against existing authority. This may be used to create a new Government and maintain it.

To meet the situation here may require a clear, defined, and thoroughly advertised announcement of when and how our troops are to be used. I know much must always be left to the sound direction of the representative of the United States here. Any suggestion or instruction to me, additional to what has been already given, would be very helpful.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
United States Commissioner.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 2.]

Interview between Admiral Skerrett and Mr. Blount.

APRIL 8, 1893.

Col. BLOUNT. When did you come to the islands?

Admiral SKERRETT. February the 10th of the present year.

Col. BLOUNT. Were you in Washington prior to that?

Admiral SKERRETT. Yes; I was in Washington on the 31st day of December, or the 30th day of December.

Col. BLOUNT. Did you have any conversation with the Secretary of the Navy about coming down here?

Admiral SKERRETT. Yes.

Col. BLOUNT. Please be kind enough to state it.

Admiral SKERRETT. I called at the Navy Department on the 30th of December to see Mr. Tracy, the Secretary of the Navy, to ask him if he had any final instructions for me, as I was going to leave the next day for San Francisco to assume command of the Pacific squadron. He replied: "Commodore, I have no instructions to give you. You will go there and perform your duty, as I know you will, and everything will be satisfactory." I remarked: "Mr. Tracy, I want to ask you about these Hawaiian affairs. When I was out there twenty years ago I had frequent conversations with the then United States minister, Mr. Pierce, on the subject of the islands. I was told then that the United States Government did not wish to annex the islands of Hawaii."

He replied: "Commodore, the wishes of the Government have changed. They will be very glad to annex Hawaii." He said as a matter of course none but the ordinary legal means can be used to persuade these people to come into the United States.

I said: "All right, sir. I only wanted to know how things were going on as a cue to my action," and I bade him good-bye.

Col. BLOUNT. Admiral, please give me your opinion as to the disposition amongst the opponents of the existing Government to resort to force.

Admiral SKERRETT. The only means I have of knowledge is what I glean from newspapers. I am never in conversation with any of the party; never been brought in contact with them or anybody I knew to be opposed to the annexation movement.

Col. BLOUNT. Do you see any symptoms of any disposition to resort to force of any kind?

Admiral SKERRETT. I have never since my arrival—and I have been on shore many times—seen any indications of such a disposition.

Col. BLOUNT. Up to this time?

Admiral SKERRETT. Up to this time.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 2.]

Mr. Thurston to Mr. Rosa.

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 16, 1893.

FRIEND ROSA: Yours of March 1st is duly at hand. I am very sorry that the band boys have taken the course which they have. It is certain that they can not get work enough in Honolulu to support themselves from the receipts of an independent band, as there are not people enough there who could afford to pay for a band of that size to give the boys a living.

With regard to my taking charge of them in Chicago, I thank you for the interest you have taken in the matter, and their confidence in me; but for several reasons I would be unable to do it. In the first place, the expenses of so large a number of men are very heavy, and it is only by a systematic arrangement that the business part of the trip could be made a success. This would require the laying out of a regular series of entertainments, with detail arrangements with theaters, fairs, etc. This time I can not possibly give to them, as my own business at Chicago will necessarily take a great deal of time. In the second place, I should not think of such a thing as undertaking to engineer such a combination as the Hawaiian band without a thoroughly competent musical leader such as Berger. I think they will make a great mistake if they go on there under the leadership of the Manila man that you speak of, or any of their own members. It requires something besides the ability to blow in the end of a trumpet to conduct a band. You yourself know how rapidly the band has always deteriorated when Berger has been away. Of course there are other men in the world just as good as Berger, but the boys are a peculiar lot, and I know of no one who has been able to handle them or get music out of them as he has. I should, therefore, very seriously doubt the advisability of their going at all unless they can get him as a leader.

I hope that something can be done by which their differences with Berger and the Government can be fixed up so that they can go to Chicago, as I think their presence there would be of great benefit to Hawaii. You can tell any of those gentlemen in Honolulu, who you say are interesting themselves to keep the band out of my control, that they need not worry themselves any longer about it. If the band comes to Chicago I will do everything in my power to assist them and forward their interests, and shall be glad to employ them during part of the time to play at the Volcano building. Further than this I have no desire nor intention to have anything to do with, or any control over them, although I presume this will be difficult for some of our peanut-souled friends, who can not imagine anyone doing anything except for private gain, to understand.

I am glad you have succeeded in settling up the Aylett suit with the Bishop estate. I will write to W. O. Smith to represent me in the matter, as the probability is that I will be unable to come back until after the opening of the fair, and after that my movements are uncertain.

You say that you hope that we will do what is fair for all of you here. You ought to know by this time that we desire nothing else. I think, Rosa, that you have got an opportunity now to take a stand that will not only will be beneficial to yourself, but in the highest degree beneficial to your people. I desire to say a few words to you on the subject, knowing that from your superior education and associations you can appreciate the logic of events and what the future is likely to bring forth, as very few of those who look to you for guidance and as a leader can. What is done within the next month or two is going to affect the future of Hawaii for a great many years. A vast number of natives will look to you and Colburn and a few others for their opinions and information, and whether you take a narrow view of matters or a broad one is going to be a radical factor in the settlement of the question at issue. There are several things which are settled and determined, and if we all recognize them and act upon that basis the results will necessarily be very different from what they otherwise will be. One of these certainties is that the monarchy is *pau*. The Queen

and her immediate partisans may not appreciate this, and will probably continue to labor under the delusion that there is a possibility of her restoration. T. H. Davies is over here now maundering about the restoration of Kaulani, but there is no more possibility of it than there is of the restoration of Dom Pedro to Brazil.

It is a simple waste of energy on the part of anybody to spend their time in attempting to restore what has fallen through its own weakness. Neumann recognizes this condition fully here, and is now confining his fight to get as much money as he can out of it for the Queen. The question for you and me and the others of us who expect to continue to live in Hawaii to consider is, what is coming next? If the native leaders hang back in a sullen way and oppose annexation tooth and toe nail, it may very likely have some influence upon the immediate adoption of an annexation treaty. It will only cause delay, however, but can not interfere with ultimate annexation. It will also generate much ill-feeling and perpetuate differences of opinion on race lines, which of all things is the one which we ought to do the most to discourage. As I said, the most that opposition to annexation will succeed in affecting is delay. That is to say, the Provisional Government will remain in power. The United States recognizes it as the Government and will continue to do so until some other understanding is arrived at by mutual agreement.

If through native opposition, annexation does not take place, a protectorate will be the result; as I said before, this will not be a protectorate of the Hawaiian Government under the monarchy, but will be a continuation of the present Government under the protection of the United States. In either case, that of simple delay or of the protectorate, a continuation of the present autocratic system of Government will result, which is a thing which neither you nor those you represent, nor the Provisional Government desire. It means a government of force with the attendant probable conspiracies against it, and general unsettlement of business and degeneration of values which will prevent business enterprise from development and be injurious to us all, while no end of personal and party differences and hard feeling will be generated. If the Provisional Government and its leaders were bent on the rule or ruin policy, with no other object in view but to secure control of the Government, which Peterson and his boodle friends are always harping upon, we would want nothing better than the protectorate proposition which would leave us in control of the Government with Uncle Sam's troops to keep order. We want nothing of the kind, however, and have resisted all propositions from the Government here looking to a government on that basis, although we could secure a treaty of that description without difficulty, as the entire opposition in the United States to annexation advocates freely the execution of a treaty on the line above indicated.

As I have stated above, however, we have no desire to perpetuate any government of this description, nor to secure any laws, terms, or conditions which would operate to establish any differences between the citizens of Hawaii on a color or race line. We do not propose to ask for nor accept any legislation which shall apply to either natives or white men that does not apply equally to the other. If, instead of a protectorate, with its attendant evils, we secure absolute annexation, one thing is certain, the natives and white men equally will have no less liberties as American citizens than they did as Hawaiians; while, as far as their financial condition is concerned, there is no comparison of the two situations. With annexation Hawaii will inaugurate such a condition of commercial development as will put the development of 1876 and succeeding years entirely in the shade; no one class in the community will reap the benefit of it.

It may be said that the treaty which we have proposed does not cover a number of points which ought to be covered, to wit, a removal of duties, prohibition of carpet-baggers, securing American citizenship to Hawaiian citizens, and similar points. In reply, I would say that once we become American territory, there is not the slightest reason to believe that we will be treated in any manner differently from other portions of the United States. All the subjects spoken of are matters of detail legislation, which have to be covered by legislation passing both houses of Congress, and are not covered by the treaty for that reason, as that would have caused delay which we are seeking to avoid. As to the offices being given to Malihinis there is no reason to believe that there would be such difficulty, as it has become an unwritten law in connection with the territories that the offices shall be filled from local residents, and with very few exceptions that rule is now and has been for a number of years carried out. If you and others will take hold and frankly work with us, explaining to the natives the situation, and doing what you can to correct the impressions being given out by the demagogues, I believe that within a year from now we will have a prosperous, contented community, with no more thought of revolution or conspiracy than there is in Washington; but that if the agitation against annexation and the accompanying stirring up of the Kanakas against the Haoles goes on, it will result in a situation disastrous to business interests, if not dangerous to the peace.

I hope you will show this to Colburn, Bob Wilcox, and any others whom you may choose, and that you will take it in the spirit in which it is intended, that is, the

forwarding of the common interests of our country and people. I have got no ax to grind, do not want and will not accept any office, and am actrated by no impulse but to secure the advancement of Hawaii and her people to a freer political and more prosperous commercial condition than she has ever occupied before. I write to you because, although we have been of opposite political parties, I believe you can see through a grindstone when there is a hole in it, and that if you believe that the best interests of the natives lie in the direction of annexation, you will use your influence in that direction, even though it may not be the popular side among them to begin with.

Me ke aloha nui ia oe a me ke one hanau o kaua, Owau no,

L. A. THURSTON.

Definition of Hawaiian words used in Hon. L. A. Thurston's letter to A. Rosa, of March 16, 1893:

"Pau" means "finished," or "over with."

"Malihinis" means strangers.

"Kanakas" means "men," but generally applied to native Hawaiians.

"Haoles" means "white foreigners."

"Me ke aloha nui ia oe a me ke one hanau o kaua, Owau no."

"With much love to you and the land of our (two) birth, I am,"

L. A. THURSTON.

[Inclosure 3 in No. 2.]

Mr. Thurston to Mr. Colburn.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *March 16, 1893.*

FRIEND COLBURN: I have just written to Antone Rosa on the subject of annexation, and asked him to show you the letter. Please consider that portion of the letter written as much to you as it is to him.

Whatever our political differences may have been in the past, I give you credit, as I believe you do me, for acting as you thought best in the interest of Hawaii and the Hawaiians. I see by the papers that your name is more or less connected with that of Ashford, Peterson, and other political agitators of that stripe. Without any personal animosity against either of those gentlemen, I do feel that their past history, which is known to you as well as it is to me, is indicative of their disinterestedness in the advice which they now give and action which they now take. A tremendous responsibility rests upon you and others who have been identified with the opposition in the recent movement, but who, from their knowledge of the situation, must know the ultimate advantages of annexation to the United States. Your influence thrown against it will, of course, tend to perpetuate the race feeling now existing; if thrown in favor of it, while it may not be immediately popular, will, under the circumstances, have a very strong effect. With annexation there will, of course, come a temporary reconstruction period, during which the necessary legislation is being formulated for the reconstruction of the government, and when the government will not be carried on under representative lines; but, if we are within the United States system, this can be but temporary. In the long run we will receive all the benefits and privileges of American citizens, and it behooves us to look to the future, and not be governed entirely by the immediate present.

With *aloha nui*, I remain, etc.,

L. A. THURSTON.

This is a correct copy of the letter written to me by L. A. Thurston, and received by me Thursday, April 7, 1893.

JOHN F. COLBURN.

No. 6.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 3.] HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *April 26, 1893.*

SIR: On the 7th instant the *Alameda* reached this place. Among its passengers were Dr. William Shaw Bowen and Mr. Harold M. Sewall. The San Francisco papers announced that they had refused

to say that they were not joint commissioners with myself to Honolulu. The former represented himself to me as a correspondent of the New York World, and said he would be glad to give me any information he could gather here. Thinking it a mere matter of courtesy, I thanked him. On Sunday, the 16th instant, I was out walking and met him on the street, riding in a buggy. He left his buggy in the hands of his friend, Mr. Sewall, and joined me in a walk of some length. Before it was concluded he said to me that he and Paul Neumann were arranging a meeting between President Dole and the Queen, the object being to pay her a sum of money in consideration of her formal abdication of the throne and lending her influence to the Provisional Government with a view to annexation to the United States. He repeated this statement frequently, at intervals, to which I made no response.

Finally he asked me if I did not think it would simplify the situation very much here and facilitate annexation. Suspecting that my answer was designed to be used to induce the Queen to yield to solicitations to abdicate: I replied "I have nothing to say on this subject." Dr. Bowen said: "I did not ask you officially, but simply in a private way." I responded: "I am here as a Commissioner of the United States and must decline to converse with you on this subject."

The next morning early I had an interview with President Dole. I told him that I had seen in the San Francisco newspapers intimations that Dr. Bowen and Mr. Sewall were here as representatives of the President of the United States; that the former told me that he had arranged to bring him and the Queen together on that morning; that I desired to say to him that neither Dr. Bowen nor Mr. Sewall, nor any other person was authorized to act for the Government in that or any other matter relating to the present condition of affairs in the islands save myself; that I did not know absolutely that these two gentlemen had claimed to have such authority. He replied that he had been informed that they were here representing the Government. He did not give his authority.

He said that there had been some approaches from the Queen's side with propositions of settlement; that he had responded: "I will consider any reasonable proposition."

I told him I would not permit the Government of the United States to be represented as having any wish in the matter of any negotiations between the Queen and the Provisional Government. He asked if I would be willing to authorize the statement that I believed it would simplify the situation. I replied that I was not willing to do this, that I was not here to interfere with the opinions of any class of persons.

Since this interview with President Dole I have heard that Dr. Bowen, when asked by newspaper people if he represented the President of the United States, declined to answer, saying that all would be revealed hereafter.

He is representing himself in various quarters as an intimate friend of the President. I can but think that these statements are made to create the impression that he is here authorized to bring about negotiations for a settlement between the Queen and the Provisional Government.

On the day before yesterday Dr. Bowen came over to my table to say that a meeting between the Queen and President Dole had occurred, and terms were agreed upon. I said I did not care for him to talk with me on that subject.

On the 21st instant Mr. Claus Spreckels called to see me. He said

that he suspected there was an effort at negotiation between the Queen and the Provisional Government, and that he had urged the Queen to withdraw her power of attorney from Paul Neumann. I inclose herewith a copy of that power of attorney (Inclosure No. 1) which Mr. Spreckels says was derived through the agency of Mr. Samuel Parker, the last secretary of foreign affairs. He told me that Paul Neumann would leave for Washington by the next steamer, under pretense that he was going to the United States and from there to Japan. How much or how little Mr. Spreckels knows about this matter I am unable to say, as I do not know how to estimate him, never having met him before. He promised to see me again before the mail leaves for the United States on next Wednesday and give me such information as he could acquire in the meantime.

I believe that Dr. Bowen, Mr. Sewall, and Mr. Neumann have pretended that the two former knew the opinions of Mr. Cleveland and assured the Queen that annexation would take place, and that she had better come to terms at once.

Mr. Neumann leaves here on the next steamer, probably with a power to act for the Queen, with authority derived from her out of these circumstances.

The question occurs to my mind whether, if the United States desired the adjustment as probably agreed on, it had better not be accomplished through its representative here, either myself or the successor of Mr. Stevens as minister here, that assurance might be had that the action of the Government was free from any suspicion of indirection in the transaction.

I know the American minister, Mr. Stevens, has said that he had learned that Mr. Blount believed that such a settlement as indicated would simplify the situation. I called on him yesterday and told him that I did not think it was proper for him to speak of my views on the subject; that declarations of that sort coming from him would give rise to the suspicion that the Government of the United States was behind Dr. Bowen and Mr. Sewall in whatever they might see fit to represent in regard to the views of the President. During this interview I called his attention to the following conversation between Mr. Spreckels and myself on the 21st instant:

MR. BLOUNT. Please state whether or not you have had any message from the American minister, and whether any conversation with him.

A. I have.

Q. Be kind enough to state it.

A. He sent down on Tuesday about 3 o'clock, whether I would be kind enough to come up to his house to see him. I took a carriage and saw him at 4 o'clock that Tuesday afternoon. He told me that Mr. Parker had no influence with the Queen, but that Paul Neumann could control her, and, if I would, I could control Paul Neumann; that Paul Neumann tell the Queen that she be in favor of annexation, and tell the Kanakas, who follow her, to go all for annexation. He said that he expected to be here only thirty or forty days, and he would like for annexation to be before he left. Some words to that effect.

He said he thought Mr. Spreckels misunderstood him as to his declaration that he wanted to finish up annexation before he left. I then told him that I felt assured that it would be displeasing to the Secretary of State and the President if they were informed that he was seeking to mold opinion here on the matter of annexation of these islands; that I was here instructed in part to inquire into that very subject; that it was certainly very unseemly, while I was making the inquiry, for him to be urging annexation; that he must know by the fact of my presence alone that he was not authorized to represent the views of the present administration in relation to any matter growing out of the

proposition to annex these islands to the United States. At first he said that his position had been made known through the publication of his dispatches, and that he never could go back on them.

To this I replied that the proposition of going back on his dispatches was one thing, and that his undertaking to form public opinion here on the subject of annexation at this time for an Administration not of his own political party, and when I was present to represent it especially in such matters, scarcely seemed fair in the light of the courtesy which had been manifested towards him. I said to him that I hoped in future that he would not undertake to advance or retard the cause of annexation or to represent the Government in any way in that connection, and that whenever it was necessary for him to speak on the matter that he would refer persons to me. This he agreed to. All this colloquy was characterized by kindness on my part, and, so far as I could observe, by courtesy on the part of Mr. Stevens. He complained somewhat that I did not confide in him and did not seek his opinion about men and things here. I replied that I was engaged on certain lines of inquiry and might in the future find occasion to seek his opinion.

On Tuesday, the 18th instant, President Dole sent Mr. Frank Hastings, his private secretary, to say that Mr. Stevens had requested, on application from Admiral Skerrett, permission for the United States troops to land for the purpose of drilling, and said that he thought proper, before consenting to it, he should make this fact known to me. I replied that I did not desire the troops to land. I then sent for Admiral Skerrett and told him that there were circumstances of a political character which made the landing of the troops for any purpose at this time inadvisable. This was entirely satisfactory to him.

On the 21st the aforesaid Mr. Hastings called and asked how he should answer Mr. Stevens' note for permission to land the troops. I replied by simply saying that the Commissioner had informed him that he disapproved of it.

The landing of the troops, pending negotiations between the Queen and President Dole, might be used to impress the former with fear that troops were landed to lend force to the Provisional Government in bringing her to an adjustment. I did not think proper to communicate this reason to Mr. Stevens or any other person, save Admiral Skerrett, and to him confidentially.

A great many hearings have been given to persons classed as Reformers or as Royalists. The former justify the dethronement of the Queen, because of her revolutionary attempt to subvert the constitution of 1887, and by proclamation to create a new constitution in lieu thereof, containing provisions restoring to the Crown the right of appointing nobles and of appointing ministers responsible only to it. In speaking of the controversy they refer to one party as whites and the other as natives. They represent the political contests for the last ten or twelve years as running parallel with racial lines. A confidence is sometimes expressed that the revolution of 1887 taught the whites that whenever they desired they could do whatever they willed in determining the form of government for these islands, and had likewise taught the natives that they would be unable to resist the will of the whites.

It is urged that the aid of the Government of the United States was not needed to make the revolution successful. Closer scrutiny reveals the fact that they regarded the revolution as successful when they should be able to proclaim a constitution from some public building, believing that the presence of the United States troops signified their use for the preservation of public order, which latter, in the minds of

the people of Honolulu, means the prevention of hostile combat between opposing parties. Whatever may be the truth, I am unable to discover in all the testimony any apprehension that the troops would be inimical to the revolutionary movement. In all of the examinations of persons thus far this fear has never manifested itself for an instant. The natives, on the other hand, insist that the Queen never contemplated proclaiming a new constitution without the assent of the ministry. They argue that the establishment of a new constitution by the proclamation of the Queen was as justifiable as that of 1887, in which a mass meeting of whites in the city of Honolulu extorted the proclamation of a new constitution from King Kalakaua, which had never been ratified by any vote of the people. They represent that the proclamation of a new constitution by the Queen was founded on the universal wish of the native population, which is in overwhelming majority over other races participating in the affairs of this Government.

They allege that on the day the Queen sought to proclaim a new constitution a committee representing the Hui Kalaiaina were waiting on her by direction of that organization. They represent that various petitions had been presented to the Queen and to the legislature for a series of years, asking for a new constitution similar to that existing prior to the revolution of 1887. Testimony on these two lines of thought has been taken. In addition to this, very much evidence has been given in the form of voluntary statements as to the causes of the revolution and the circumstances attending it, especially as to how far the whites compelled the Queen to acquiesce in their movement on the one side, and on the other as to the entire success of the movement of the whites, depending on the action of the United States troops and the American Minister in support of this movement.

It is not my purpose at this time to enter into an elaborate consideration of the evidence which has been adduced, because many other statements are yet to be made, which will be considered.

I invite your attention to the following copy of a memorial from the Hui Kalaiaina, because of its striking disclosure of the native Hawaiian mind in its aspirations as to the form of government, and, in connection with that, a colloquy between myself and a committee of that organization taken down by a stenographer and approved by them:

Statement of facts made by the Hui Kalaiaina (Hawaiian Political Association) in behalf of the people to J. H. Blount, the United States Commissioner, showing why the people urged the Queen to promulgate a new constitution for the Hawaiian people.

To the Honorable J. H. BLOUNT, the United States Commissioner, greeting:

We, the Hawaiian Political Association, in behalf of the people of the Hawaiian islands—an association organized in the city of Honolulu, with branches organized all over these islands, which association has been in existence since the overthrow of the constitution of Kamehameha IV by the descendants of the sons of missionaries who are seeking to usurp the Kingdom of our Queen for themselves—

And for this reason the people did ask King Kalakaua to revise the constitution of 1887 now in force, and during his reign many petitions were made to him and to the Legislature with thousands of signatures attached, but the desire of the people was never fulfilled.

Therefore, the people petitioned to him for redress according to these statements now submitted to you:

First. This constitution deprived the Crown of Hawaiian Islands of its ancient prerogatives.

Second. This constitution based the principles of government on the forms and spirit of republican governments.

Third. This constitution opens the way to a republican government.

Fourth. This constitution has taken the sovereign power and vested it outside of the King sitting on the throne of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

Fifth. This constitution has limited the franchise of the native Hawaiians.

For these five reasons was King Kalakaua petitioned by his people to revise the constitution, but it never was carried out until the time of his death.

During the reign of Queen Liliuokalani the same thing happened. Numerous petitions were laid before her by and from the people, and from this association to the Legislature and to the Queen. These petitions contain over eight thousand names, and this Hawaiian Political Association did repeatedly petition the Queen to revise and amend or to make a new constitution, to which she finally consented to lay this request from her people before the cabinet, but the wishes of the people were not carried out.

On the 14th of January, 1893, at the time of the prorogation of the Legislature, in the afternoon, this political association came and petitioned Her Majesty Liliuokalani to issue a new constitution for the people, to which she consented, with the intention of listening to the desires of her people, but her cabinet refused.

A short while afterwards the descendants of the missionaries came forward in their second attempt to usurp the Kingdom of our Queen Liliuokalani, and said attempt would not have succeeded had it not been for the support given it by the American Minister Stevens—therefore our Queen yielded the Kingdom into their hands through the superior force presented by the men of the American warships, who had been landed on the Hawaiian soil.

Queen Liliuokalani yielded her Kingdom into their hands, not with good will, but because she could not defend it, and because the Queen did not desire to see the blood of her Hawaiian people shed on this land of peace.

Therefore, we submit to you our humble petition and statements, as you are in possession of vast powers in your mission to do justice to the Hawaiian people, our independence, the throne, and the Hawaiian flag; we beg you to restore our beloved Queen Liliuokalani to the throne with the independence of the Hawaiian people, as you have restored the Hawaiian flag.

Submitting these statements and petitions to you we pray that the Almighty God would assist you in your responsible duties, that the prayers of our people may be granted, that continued friendship may exist between us and the American nation.

We, the undersigned subscribers of the Hawaiian Political Association.

W. L. HOLOKAHIKI,
Chairman.

JOHN KEEUI,
J. ALAPAI,
J. AKAHOONEI,
J. B. KURHA,
J. KEAN,
D. W. KANOELEHUA,
T. C. POHIKAPA,
Committee.

In accepting the copy of the resolutions Mr. Blount responded as follows:

GENTLEMEN: Very much of the duties of my mission I cannot communicate to you. I will say, however, that your papers which have been presented I will accept and forward to the President in the nature of information indicating the opinions of your people in these Islands in reference to the inclination on your part to support the existing condition of things—that is to say, whether you are in favor of the Provisional Government and annexation, or whether your preference is for royalty. I am gathering information on these lines for the purpose of submitting it to the President. That is the extent of what I can say to you by way of response. I would like to ask, however, a few questions. Which is the chairman of your committee?

INTERPRETER. W. L. Holokahiki, of Honolulu.

(These questions were given and answered through the interpreter.)

Q. On the day of the prorogation of the Legislature a number of natives are reported to have gone in to see the Queen—about thirty in number—and that their object was to ask for a new constitution. Was that a committee from this organization?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many voters—people who vote for representatives—are there in this order?

A. Some thousands; as we have it in our books about 3,000 of native Hawaiians.

Q. What did the Queen say in response to your request?

A. That she was quite ready to give a new constitution, but her cabinet is opposed to it. Her cabinet refused it so that she could not do otherwise. She told the people that they had to go home quietly and wait for the next session of the Legislature.

Q. When would that be if the Government had not been overthrown?

A. The time, according to our laws, was two years, and that would run us up to 1894.

Q. Then the information was that nothing could be done under two years on account of the disapproval of the cabinet?

A. Yes; the Queen could do nothing.

Q. She said she could do nothing?

A. Yes; because the constitution said she could do nothing without being approved by her Cabinet.

Q. What did the committee do when they went out? Did they give this information to the native people?

A. Yes, sir. This committee shortly after they came out—they told the people they could do nothing now; that they would have to wait until the next session. Also, the Queen came out and told the people she could not give them any constitution now because the law forbids.

A great many petitions were exhibited—sometimes they were to the Queen and sometimes to the Legislature—asking for a new constitution.

A book was also shown containing the names of members of the organization throughout the island, and giving the numbers as follows:

Oahu, 2,320; Mani, 384; Hawaii, 266; Kauai, 222, and Molokai, 263.

Q. (To interpreter.) Why don't other natives join the organization?

A. They sometimes go to meetings. When anything happens they go together.

Q. These are active members of the organization?

A. Yes.

Q. In matters of this sort the natives followed the lead of this organization?

A. Yes, sir.

Prior to the constitution of 1887 the nobles were appointed by the Crown and the representatives were elected by the people, with but little obstruction in the qualification of the elector. The number of nobles was 20 and the number of representatives was 28, and these, constituting one body, enacted the laws. The cabinet was only responsible to the King. The majority of voters was overwhelmingly native. It is easy to understand how completely the native people could, if they desired, control the Government as against the white race. Under the constitution of 1887 the number of nobles and representatives is equal. The qualification of an elector of a noble required him to own property of the value of \$3,000, unincumbered, or an income of \$600. Practically this vested the power of electing nobles in the white population, or, as it is sometimes termed, the reform party. A cabinet could not be removed by the Crown except on a vote of want of confidence by the Legislature. The ability to elect a small number, even one of the representatives, enabled the white race to control legislation and to vote out any ministry not in accord with them. This placed the political power in the hands of the white race. I use the words "white" and "native" as distinguishing the persons in the political contests here, because they are generally used by the people here in communicating their views to me.

I had supposed up to the appearance of this memorial that the real demand of the native was for a just proportion of power in the election of nobles by the reduction of the money qualification of an elector. This I had derived from interviews with some of the intelligent half-castes. This memorial indicates an opposition to the new constitution because it takes away from the Crown the right to appoint nobles and the right to appoint and remove cabinets at will. There is no aspiration in it for the advancement of the right of the masses to participate in the control of public affairs, but an eager, trustful devotion to the Crown as an absolute monarchy. I had wondered whether or not this race of people, which up to 1843 had no rights of property, and over whom the king and chiefs had absolute power of life and death, had fully cast off the old system and conceived the modern ideas in the United States of the control of the government by equal participation by every citizen in the selection of its rulers. Up to the appearance of this memorial I had received but little satisfaction on this line of thought.

In this connection I invite your attention to Inclosure No. 2, being a copy of resolutions presented on the 16th instant by a committee of the "Hui Aloha Aina"—the Hawaiian Patriotic League.

Taken in connection with the foregoing memorial of the Hui Kalaiaina, it is strongly suggestive of blind devotion to arbitrary power vested in the crown worn by a person of native blood. I have forwarded these two documents because they present a phase of thought which had not been so well defined in anything I had seen in publications relating to these islands. They seem to go very far in the matter of the capacity of these people for self-government.

I have received communications from every source when offered, not to support any theory, but simply to see what might be derived from them in the way of information. I have studiously avoided any suggestion that the President contemplated the consideration of the restoration of the Queen, the support of the existing Government, or the question of annexation on any terms. I have intended to invite the freest expression of thought without any indication that it was to be considered with a view of guiding the action of the Government in the determination of any proposition. In all this I find my action most heartily approved by both whites and natives.

In several local papers, beginning with the 13th instant, editorials have appeared advising in terms somewhat indefinite, and yet pointing to the extreme action which should be taken towards the Queen and her adherents, and deploring the want of such action on the part of the Provisional Government. On the night of the 14th instant a prominent half-caste called upon me. He had always assured me hitherto of the quiet intention of the native population. On this latter occasion he said: "We are in trouble. It is said the Queen is to be put out of the way by assassination, and her prominent followers to be prosecuted for treason or deported."

These apprehensions naturally grew out of the editorials alluded to. I said to him I had no idea there was any foundation for his fears in the purposes of the Government. Before he left me he seemed to be relieved.

On the morning of the 15th I called on President Dole, and invited his attention to the newspaper articles above referred to and to the visit of the half-caste, with his expressions of fear and my response. I said to him that perhaps I had gone farther than propriety would suggest in my opinion to the half-caste on the evening before, but that I was impelled solely by that humane feeling which would regret to see disorder and bloodshed inflicted on any portion of the community. I also intimated that if he deemed it desirable, owing to the kindly feeling the native population had manifested towards me, I might, without pretending to represent the Government, allay their anxieties and contribute to the public peace by assuring them that the extreme measures advocated by the press I did not believe were approved by the Government. To this he responded that it would be very gratifying to him and to those in political accord with him for me to act as I had suggested. He furthermore declared that it was the purpose of the Government to confine its action only to the preservation of order, and to take no extreme steps against any parties here unless it should be to meet a forcible attack on the Government.

When the ensign was hauled down and the troops ordered to the vessels there was some comment on the omission to recite in the order or by some public declaration the exact import of this action.

In the above conversation I referred to the subject and said that at the time I believed that any speech or written declaration might be liable to many and false constructions, and that the action of hauling down the ensign and the removal of the troops would in a few hours

tell with more simplicity and accuracy and with better results than any utterances of mine could do.

To this he replied that at first there was some criticism, but that all minds had come to the conclusion that I had taken the wiser course.

He took occasion to say to me that all men everywhere could only think that I was governed by the highest motives in all my actions here.

At 10 o'clock on the morning of the 22d instant Mr. Spreckels called to see me. He assured me that Mr. Neumann was going to San Francisco and then to Japan. I said to him: "But he is going to Washington." He said: "Yes; but in order to take some dispatches from Mr. Stevens to the Washington Government."

On the 21st, in the conversation with Mr. Stevens, to which reference has already been made, he told me for the first time of a letter he had written to you concerning certain matters which had passed between him and the Japanese commissioner at this place. The extent of it was that by representations that the United States was opposed to the presence of a Japanese war vessel here that it was determined that the Japanese Minister should ask his Government to cause the afore-said vessel to be withdrawn.

In view of my instructions, I felt bound to give assurances to the Japanese commissioner that the present Administration does not view with displeasure or suspicion the presence of one of her war vessels here.

Mr. Paul Neumann is generally regarded here as a bright, plausible, unscrupulous person. Permit me to suggest that if the Administration should entertain any proposition from Mr. Neumann in connection with a contract between the Queen and the Provisional Government in the matter of her abdication, the consummation of it is surrounded by so many circumstances indicating that the Government of the United States has been made to appear to the Queen as favoring such action on her part that it would be far better to decline to entertain anything from Mr. Neumann, but for the Government to accomplish its purpose in a more direct manner. If such an adjustment is desirable, instructions to the American representative here to endeavor to bring about such an arrangement would be a much more honorable course on the part of the United States.

The representatives of the Provisional Government are conscious that the movement inaugurated on the 14th of January last for the dethronement of the Queen and annexation to the United States is a much more desperate one than they then realized.

The white race, or what may be termed the Reform party, constitute the intelligence and own most of the property in these islands and are desperately eager to be a part of the United States on any terms rather than take the chances of being subjected to the control of the natives. With them we can dictate any terms. The feeling of the natives is that while they do not want annexation, if the United States does it will be accomplished, and they will acquiesce. The situation is so completely under our control that I should regret to see Mr. Neumann's agency in the matter of abdication of the Queen, with his connection with Dr. Bowen and others and the attendant circumstances, recognized by the Government. You will readily understand that this is not intended as impertinence, but only as a suggestion.

Since writing the foregoing portion of my letter relating to attempts to represent the views of the President of the United States by unauthorized persons in connection with the subject of an agreement between ex-Queen Liliuokalani and the Provisional Government, I have deemed it proper to have an interview with the former in order to understand,

as far as I might, from her whether any negotiations had been authorized by her, and if so, how far they had gone. Before doing so, I called on President Dole and informed him of my purpose to see her in connection with this subject, stating to him that I was not willing that persons should make fraudulent representations to her as to that matter. I told him that I had abstained from seeing her lest my visit might be construed in a way to produce disorders, but now I felt all danger of this had passed. He concurred in my views as to the propriety of my calling, if I saw fit to do so.

I said to the ex-Queen that I had been informed that certain persons had sought to impress her with the idea that the President desired some such adjustment as indicated to be made; that I wished to say that no person was authorized by the President nor by myself to place the Government of the United States in such an attitude; that, while I would interpose no objection to such negotiation, I wanted her to know that whatever she did in the matter was free from any moral influence from the Government of the United States. I further said to her that I desired to be able to inform my Government whether she had been engaged in such negotiations or contemplated them, or whether anybody was authorized to act for her in any such matter; that I wished the information simply to put the Government at Washington in possession of the true state of facts.

She replied that parties who had represented her in other matters had talked to her on the subject; that she had declined to indicate any disposition to act in the matter; that she had said to some of them that she would wait until President Dole came to see her in person, and had heard what he had to say; that she did not intend to enter into any negotiations until the Government at Washington had taken action on the information derived through my report. She said she had sent Mr. Neumann to Washington to prevent the ratification of the treaty and to have a commission sent out here, and he reported that he had been successful in both. I then asked her what she desired me to say to the Government at Washington as to her purpose in the matter of this negotiation. She expressed a wish that I should say from her that no one was authorized to act in her behalf in this matter and that she should take no action until the Government at Washington had passed upon the information derived through the Commissioner.

Lest she might make improper inferences from my visit or something I had said I told her that one of the objects of my visit was to get all the facts connected with her dethronement and the disposition of the people of the Islands in relation to the present Government; that she could readily see that that was a matter to be hereafter considered by the Government in such manner as it saw fit. Without any apparent connection with what had been said, she remarked that much depended on Mr. Spreckels as to the future; that he and Mr. Bishop had been in the habit of furnishing money to the Government, and that if Mr. Spreckels did not advance to the Government she thought it would go to pieces. To this I made no response. It is evident that she is being impressed with the idea that the present Government could not get money enough to run itself long.

I am not sufficiently informed to express any views on this proposition at this time.

I think the operations of Dr. Bowen and Mr. Sewall have been conducted through Mr. Neumann. I shall, perhaps, know more before closing this communication.

I send you a map, marked Inclosure No. 3. You will find it useful

in considering the location of the various military forces connected with the revolution, to which I may refer in this and especially in subsequent communications.

I send you a written statement from F. Wundenburg (Inclosure No. 4), who says that his information is derived from being personally present in all the conferences of the committee of safety and that his utterances are based on his personal knowledge. He appears to be an intelligent man. He says that he acted with the committee in good faith until the American flag was hoisted, and then he ceased communication with them. He is at this time deputy clerk of the supreme court. I think in my next communication I may be able to give you information strongly corroborating all that Mr. Wundenburg has said.

I may say that the peaceful surroundings of the revolution are confirmed by all persons with whom I have communicated, and that Judge Cooper, who was and is an intense annexationist, let drop, in answer to a question of mine, that when the Government building was entered by the committee of safety and the proclamation dethroning the Queen and establishing the new Government was read by him there was not a soldier of the Provisional Government or of the Queen on the ground.

I send you, in original, a communication from Mr. William H. Cornwell, a member of the Queen's cabinet at the time of her dethronement (Inclosure No. 5).

I also send you, in original, a communication from Mr. John F. Colburn, a member of the Ex-Queen's cabinet and a half-caste (Inclosure No. 6).

These are forwarded in advance of the testimony or voluntary statements in response to interrogatories by himself, because they present the views of these gentlemen as to the circumstances attending the revolution and which do not appear in any of the papers relating to the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands printed by the United States so far as I have been furnished with them.

It is my purpose to examine them in person so as to have an opportunity of thoroughly sifting them.

I inclose you a copy of a communication from the committee of public safety—which conceived and executed the dethronement of the Queen—addressed to the American Minister (Inclosure No. 7). On page 12 of Executive Document No. 76, Fifty-second Congress, second session, this paper is simply referred to in the following language: "A copy of the call of the committee of public safety for aid is inclosed." It appears significant enough to have justified its being printed in full. To be imploring protection from the Government of the United States on the 16th and establishing the provisional government and dethroning the Queen without firing a gun on the next day—without any reference to the presence of United States troops—is quite a draft on my credulity.

This paper may have been overlooked, and hence my calling your attention to it.

I send you a pamphlet, entitled "Papers of the Hawaiian Historical Society No. 3" (Inclosure No. 8),* on the subject of the evolution of the Hawaiian land tenures. To this I will add further information in relation to the tenure of lands in these islands. It appears from all information attainable that the great mass of the natives have at all times had but little interest in real property. This will throw some light on the little development attained by them, and how the real property

*Footnote omitted on account of length.

has, by virtue of the operation of these laws, resulted in the ownership by large landed proprietors, mostly of foreign birth.

I see in the newspapers that the War Department is issuing in a documentary form information of various sorts in relation to the islands. In one of them it is stated that the natives generally speak the English language. This is quite contradictory to my information from intelligent persons here and my own observation. In Honolulu, where the situation is most favorable to development, the groups of children playing along the streets use their native tongue. The natives of mature age whom you meet are generally unable to converse with you in English or to understand what is said to them. They learn in the schools the English text-books as an American child would learn the Latin or Greek languages. This done, their capacity to think or speak English seems very slight.

I am very much impressed with a belief that a large majority of the people of these islands are opposed to annexation and that the proofs being taken will verify this opinion.

I have not indicated any purposes of the United States on the subject of annexation in seeking to ascertain the sentiment of the people towards existing authority. A response to this necessarily involves the question of how the people feel towards annexation. The Provisional Government being avowedly a part of a scheme towards annexation, and the opposition taking the form of opposing it, I have from necessity been compelled to put my inquiries more or less in a form answering to this division of sentiment. I have never claimed to mold the disposition of the administration on that question nor indicated my own.

The condition of the public mind is very peaceful. I think it important to maintain this situation that a representative of the United States should be here before my departure who will maintain the attitude of noninterference in local affairs which I have observed. The contrary course on the part of an American representative would immediately produce much bitterness and discontent in one or the other of the parties now dividing the people. I can see no advantage in my remaining here longer than the month of May. I trust that you will consent to my return at such time during the month of June as I may choose. I prefer to write my report on my return to Washington rather than while here. Interruptions on the part of people who are constantly seeking my attention make this preferable.

It is difficult to get passage from here to the United States on account of the great amount of travel, and arrangements must be made some weeks in advance.

Please be kind enough to telegraph me in response to the subject of my return.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 3.]

Power of attorney for Mr. Neumann.

To all persons and to the Government of the United States of America and to all other Governments whatsoever: To all bodies corporate as well as bodies politic, and more especially to the President and to the Secretary of the Department of State of the United States of America, I, Liliuokalani, of the city of Honolulu, in the Island of Oahu, one of the Hawaiian Islands, send greeting:

Whereas on the seventeenth day of January, A. D. 1893, at the city of Honolulu aforesaid, I did yield to the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands my authority as Sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands under protest;

And whereas by so doing I claim to be entitled by international law and in the high forum of conscience and equity to receive consideration and provision both for myself and family and for Kaiulani, who was my legally appointed successor as such Sovereign;

And whereas it is my intention and desire by these presents to authorize, secure, accomplish, and finally complete and to ratify by such arrangements as may conduce to the greatest welfare and benefit of all the people of the Hawaiian Islands and also of myself and family and the said Kaiulani;

And whereas I repose the fullest confidence in the ability, integrity, and fidelity of Paul Neumann, esq., of the city of Honolulu aforesaid, counsellor at law, and have entrusted him with full power and authority to act for me in the premises;

Now, therefore, know ye, that in consideration of the premises, I, Lilioukalani, aforesaid, have made, constituted, and appointed, and by these presents do hereby make, constitute, and appoint the aforesaid Paul Neumann, esq., my true, lawful, and sufficient attorney, for me and in my name, place, and stead, to negotiate, arrange, and agree with the United States of America and the President and the Secretary of the Department of State thereof, and with any other (if any) representative or official thereof having authority in the premises for such official, or the consideration, benefit, and advantage as in the opinion of my said attorney shall, may, or can be obtained from the United States of America as well for myself and family as for the said Kaiulani, in consideration of existing conditions and circumstances. And if no official consideration for myself or said Kaiulani shall in the opinion of my said attorney be attainable from the United States of America, then and thereupon, and in such case to arrange and agree upon such pecuniary considerations, benefits, and advantages as can or may be secured for myself and family, and for said Kaiulani, from the United States of America, and whether the same shall be in the form of payment at one time of a sum of money to myself for or distinct sums of money to myself and said Kaiulani, or in payment of stated sums of money annually, or oftener, for a fixed period or periods of time, and upon ascertaining that such pecuniary considerations, benefits, advantages, or payments of money from and on the part of the said United States can be secured to agree upon, receive, and accept the same, and in my name and behalf to make, execute, and deliver such agreements, releases, and acquittances of all my claims, demands, and pretensions whatsoever upon the throne of the Hawaiian Islands and upon the Government of the United States of America, as well as of the Hawaiian Islands and upon all persons having had anything to do with or having been or being in any way concerned in the said Provisional Government as shall be requisite to accomplish and secure such pecuniary considerations, benefits, advantages, and payments, or which shall be required therefor by the President or the Secretary of the Department of State aforesaid, or by any other (if any) representative or official of the United States authorized to act or agree in the premises, and all that my said attorney shall do or cause to be done in the premises I do hereby for myself and my successors, executors, administrators, and assigns ratify and confirm, and further I do hereby covenant with my said attorney and his executors and administrators and with the President of the United States of America and with any other person and persons representing the said United States of America in the premises, and with each of them, and with their respective successors both jointly and severally that all and whatsoever my said attorney shall in my behalf agree to do or cause to be done or agreed upon by virtue of these presents I will and my successors, heirs, executors, and administrators shall ratify and confirm, and that I will at any time thereafter execute, sign, seal, acknowledge, and deliver such other and further releases, acquittances, assurances and instruments in writing, as shall in the opinion of my said attorney or in the opinion of the President of the United States of America or of any officer or representative thereof having the matter in charge be requisite and proper in order to carry out the full intent and meaning of these presents.

In witness whereof I hereunto and also to two other instruments of the same date and time have set my hands and seals at the city of Honolulu aforesaid this day of _____ in the year A. D. 1893.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 3.]

Hawaiian Patriotic League to Mr. Blount.

We, the women of the Hawaiian Islands, for our families and the happiness of our homes, desire peace and political quiet, and we pray that man's greed for power and spoils shall not be allowed to disturb the otherwise happy life of these islands, and

that the revolutionary agitations and disturbances inaugurated here since 1887, by a few foreigners, may be forever suppressed.

To that effect we believe that, in the light of recent events, the peace, welfare, and honor of both America and Hawaii will be better served, for the present, if the Government of the great American Republic does not countenance the illegal conduct and interference of its representatives here and the rash wish of a minority of foreigners for annexation.

Therefore, we respectfully but earnestly pray that Hawaii may be granted the preservation of its independent autonomy and the restoration of its legitimate native monarchy under our Queen Liliuokalani, in whom we have full confidence.

And we hope that the distinguished citizen, who so wisely presides over the United States, may kindly receive this our petition, for which we shall evermore pray for God's blessing on him and his Government.

MRS. JAMES CAMPBELL, *President.*

MRS. J. A. CUMMINS, *Vice-President.*

MRS. AL. FERNANDEZ, *Treasurer.*

MRS. C. K. STILLMAN, *Secretary.*

MRS. JOSEPH NAUAI,

MRS. JUNIUS KAAE,

MISS HATTIE HIRAM,

MRS. M. KAHAI,

MRS. LULIA AHOLO,

MRS. L. KEKUPUWOLUI MAHELONA,

MRS. W. H. ALDRICH,

MRS. M. A. LEMON,

Executive Committee.

They were evidently persons of intelligence, and refined in their deportment. After reading the papers handed to me I responded that I would forward them to my Government as a matter of information, but that I could not enter into any discussion of the situation; that I would accept and transmit their papers, as I did all other facts, for purposes of information. To this they responded that they did not expect me to communicate anything to them as to my views or the disposition of the Government of the United States.

[Inclosure 4 in No. 3.]

A report from Mr. Wundenburg to Mr. Blount.

The committee of safety met at the office of W. O. Smith in Fort street, Honolulu, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon of Monday, the 16th day of January, 1893, for the purpose of discussing the necessary steps to be taken in forming a new government.

Shortly after the committee met it was decided that they were not ready for the landing of the American troops, and a committee of three, with Thurston as the chairman, was immediately dispatched to the American legation to prevail upon Mr. Stevens to delay the landing of the *Boston's* men. The committee returned shortly and reported that Mr. Stevens had said to them: "Gentlemen, the troops of the *Boston* land this afternoon at 5 o'clock, whether you are ready or not."

The foregoing report of Mr. Stevens's reply to the committee is as near literal as can be remembered, and gives a correct idea of the meaning conveyed. The committee of safety adjourned to meet the same evening, at 7:30 o'clock, at the house of Henry Waterhouse, in Nuuanu Valley. The American troops landed at 5 o'clock, as Mr. Stevens had told the committee they would, and marched up Fort street to Merchant, and along Merchant street, halting in King street, between the palace and Government building.

At the time the men landed the town was perfectly quiet, business hours were about over, and the people—men, women, and children—were in the streets, and nothing unusual was to be seen except the landing of a formidable armed force with Gatling guns, evidently fully prepared to remain on shore for an indefinite length of time, as the men were supplied with double cartridge belts filled with ammunition, also haversacks and canteens, and were attended by a hospital corps with stretchers and medical supplies. The curiosity of the people on the streets was aroused, and the youngsters more particularly, followed the troops to see what it was all about. Nobody seemed to know, so when the troops found quarters the populace dispersed, the most of them going to the band concert at the hotel, which was very fully attended, as it was a beautiful moonlight evening, all who were not in the secret still wondering at the military demonstration.

The committee met at Mr. Waterhouse's residence, according to adjournment,

at 7:30 o'clock p. m. of the same day, January 16. The formation of some sort of government was under discussion, and it was decided that a commander in chief of the forces supporting the proposed new government should be appointed. The position was offered to Mr. John H. Soper, who demurred, as he did not see any backing whatever to support the movement. Mr. Soper was answered by members of the committee that the American minister would support the move with the troops of the *Boston*. Mr. Soper still doubted, so a couple of the committee escorted him over to the legation, which, by the way, was in the adjoining premises, and the three came back after a time, reporting that Mr. Stevens had given them the full assurance that any proclamation of the Government put forward at the Government building, or any other building in Honolulu for that matter, would receive his immediate recognition and the support of the *Boston's* men. This assurance seemed to satisfy Mr. Soper, and he accepted the position.

On Tuesday afternoon, January 17, the committee of thirteen, or committee of safety, proceeded from the office of W. O. Smith up Merchant street to the Government building and read the proclamation of a new government at 2.40 o'clock, there being practically no audience whatever. As the reading proceeded a dozen or so loungers gathered, and near the close of the ceremony about thirty supporters, variously armed, came running into the side and back entrances of the yard and gathered about the committee.

At this moment the United States troops, in the temporary quarters in the rear of the Music Hall (less than 100 yards from where the committee stood) appeared to be under arms and were evidently prepared for any emergency.

During all the deliberations of the committee, and in fact throughout the whole proceedings connected with plans for the move up to the final issue, the basis of action was the general understanding that Minister Stevens would keep his promise to support the movement with the men from the *Boston*, and the statement is now advisedly made (with a full knowledge of the lack of arms, ammunition, and men, also the utter absence of organization at all adequate to the undertaking), that without the previous assurance of support from the American minister and the actual presence of the United States troops no movement would have been attempted, and if attempted, would have been a dismal failure resulting in the capture or death of the participants in a very short time.

(Having been present at the several meetings referred to in this statement, I hereby certify that the same is correct in every essential particular. F. WUNDENBURG.)

(NOTE.—This person appears to be highly esteemed here. He was tendered the position of collector of customs recently by the Provisional Government and declined it. I send an extract from the *Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, showing its esteem of him.):

A PROJECTED APPOINTMENT.

It is stated that the council at its meeting yesterday recommended the appointment of F. W. Wundenberg as collector-general of customs. The appointment would be in all respects a worthy one. Mr. Wundenberg is thoroughly qualified by long business experience for the position. He is a man of great energy and character, and of unimpeachable integrity. If made collector he may be trusted to make no compromise with evil, but to fight it to the bitter end.

Mr. Wundenberg was identified with the revolution from the 14th of January until the danger was over. He was placed in charge of the police station at a time when everything depended on reliable leadership, and if an uprising should occur he would follow the cause into the cannon's mouth to-day. As a recognition of valuable service at a critical moment his appointment would be peculiarly appropriate.

Mr. Wundenberg has an abundant crop of enemies. In this he does not differ from most men of positive traits. The fact will recommend him to all who desire to see a strong and fearless man collector-general.

[Inclosure 5 in No. 3.]

Mr. Cornwell to Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, April 24, 1893.

The following statement does not purport to be an exhaustive or full history or report of the resolution of the 17th day of January, but are simply plain facts relating to that political incident as they came within my personal knowledge and observation as a minister in Her Majesty's cabinet.

On the 14th of January Her Majesty prorogued the Legislature, with the usual ceremony pertaining to such occasion. It was noted that the foreign members of

the Legislature absented themselves as an expression of their disapproval and opposition to the cabinet, thereby indicating their threatening attitude against the Government and giving color to the rumors, which already, then, had reached us, that the reform party was conspiring to take some steps to, if possible, recover their lost power. After prorogation Her Majesty informed the cabinet that she wished to see them at the palace, and we responded to her order at about 1:30 p. m. After our arrival the Queen stated to us that, at the request of some 8,000 of her native subjects, she had decided to promulgate a new constitution, in which the grievances of her petitioning subjects would be remedied, and she asked us to sign the document with her. We all declined to become a party to this move and refused to comply with her request, and we earnestly advised her to give up her intention, although we were well aware that more than two-thirds of the electors of the country were in favor of the change, and that nearly all the representatives in the Legislature were elected on a platform in which the main plank was a new constitution. However, after talking with her and explaining the impossibility of taking such a step, she admitted that we were in the right, although calling our attention to the precedent which the Reform party had created by the revolutionary constitution which was promulgated in 1887.

The Queen then told the people's delegates, who were assembled in the throne room, that she could not grant their request at this time, but asked them all to return home quietly and await in peace the time when a proper course could be adopted to carry out the will of the people. The people dispersed quietly, and in a short time there were no Hawaiians in the palace grounds. A few remarks were made by the Hon. William White, the representative for Lahaina, to the effect that, while the people regretted the Queen's inability to grant the wishes of the people, they would accept the assurances of the Queen and await the proper time, which, if they were successful at the next election to be held, would be at the meeting of the Legislature in 1894. The insurgents have falsely reported the remarks of Mr. White, and in their press and otherwise represented him as making an incendiary and threatening speech. The falsehood of such statement, well known to us who were witnesses at the scene, will shortly be proven in the courts of justice, as Mr. White has retained counsel for the purpose of bringing a damage suit for malicious libel against the Pacific Commercial Advertiser, the principal organ of the reform party. Saturday evening and night were as peaceful and quiet as at any other time, but the conspirators were at work.

On Sunday morning, January 15, Mr. Thurston, the head of the revolutionary party, called on my colleagues, Ministers Colburn and Peterson, and asked them to join with himself and others in deposing the Queen, assuring them that such movement would be perfectly safe, as Minister Stevens had promised them the support of the United States forces and also that he would recognize and support a provisional government as soon as such a step could be taken. My colleagues naturally refused to entertain the infamous proposition of Mr. Thurston, and immediately communicated with myself and Minister Parker. The cabinet held several consultations with leading citizens of known loyalty to the Queen, and, knowing the strength of our forces, we felt confident that we easily could cope with any insurrection of the few malcontents.

On Monday, the 16th, we were informed that the conspirators had decided to establish a revolutionary government, giving as a reason that Her Majesty had attempted to violate the constitution, but the cabinet still felt sure that no such attempt could succeed if the insurgents depended on their own forces. The cabinet then advised the Queen to issue a proclamation to the people, in which she explained her reasons for desiring to promulgate a new constitution, and at the same time assured them that she would not make any further attempt or proposition to gain that object. This was done, and at 11 a. m. the proclamation was printed and distributed all over town. Assurances to a similar end were also sent to the foreign representatives and accepted as satisfactory. In the afternoon two mass meetings took place, one at the armory, where the actions so far taken by the so-called safety committee were indorsed, and one on Palace square, where the proclamation of the Queen was accepted and responded to in a resolution.

I will here state that of the large number of citizens who gathered at the armory meeting, perhaps not fifty understood or desired that any further steps should or would be taken. Of this I have been assured by a number of prominent citizens with whom I am on terms of friendship, although differing with them politically, and who went to that meeting simply for the purpose of giving a public expression that the community disapproved of the step which the Queen had desired to take, and who believed that the matter would be dropped right there. The issue of the Queen's proclamation was done after a consultation which the cabinet held Monday morning with the foreign representatives. We stated to the members of the corps diplomatique, who were present, what we intended to do, and were told that it was considered a wise step which they believed would be satisfactory. Present at the consultation were the representatives of England, France, Japan, and Portugal.

Minister Stevens declined to be present, which did not surprise us, knowing his sympathy for the revolutionists. At about 4 p. m. we were informed that the United States forces were landing.

Ministers Parker and Peterson immediately called upon Minister Stevens and gave him to understand that the Government was perfectly able to take care of the situation, and requested him to keep the troops on board. He answered that he had landed the troops for the protection of American life and property and proposed to keep them ashore. The troops then marched up by the palace, passed as far out on King street as the residence of Mr. J. B. Atherton, a distance of about 600 yards, and later on returned and quartered for the night in the Arion hall, a building opposite the government building and the palace. It is noteworthy that the Arion hall and all the buildings in the immediate vicinity are not American property, so if the troops were landed solely for the protection of American property, the placing of them so far away from the center of the property of Americans and so very close to the property of the Hawaiian Government was remarkable and very suggestive.

On Tuesday, the 17th, we were informed that the insurgents would proclaim a provisional government in the afternoon, and the cabinet called upon Minister Stevens, asking him if he would afford any assistance to the legal and lawful Government of the country to which he was accredited in case that such assistance should be required. He refused in unmistakable terms, and made us understand that he should acknowledge and support the revolutionary government as soon as it was established. We then proceeded to the station house, where we held a council of war. Our forces were enthusiastic, and volunteers enrolled so rapidly that it became necessary to close the doors of the station house. A little after 3 o'clock p. m. we were informed that a handful of citizens had entered the government building and that a proclamation had been read claiming that a provisional government had been established and that the Queen was deposed, and also that the United States forces, under command of Capt. Wiltse, were marched up ready for action, with sharp loaded cannon and guns.

The Government had decided not to place forces in the Government building, as the immediate vicinity of the United States troops would endanger the lives of the men from the *Boston* in case of a conflict with the rebels, and the Government desired, at all hazards, to avoid giving Minister Stevens any excuse or pretense for his hostile actions. After the information relating to the establishing of the Provisional Government had been received the cabinet wrote a letter from the station house to Minister Stevens and sent it to him by Mr. Charles Hopkins, a noble of the Legislature. The letter was a request to the American minister to inform the Queen's Government if he intended to recognize or support the lawful Government or the revolutionary government, which it was claimed was in existence. Mr. Stevens received the letter, and, through his daughter, informed Mr. Hopkins that he would answer it in due time. Mr. Hopkins demanded, cautiously but firmly, an immediate answer, and after considerable waiting a letter was handed to him addressed to His Excellency Samuel Parker, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which Mr. Stevens stated that he had recognized the Provisional Government because they were in possession of the Government building, and that he intended to support them.

We realized then that any steps from our side to dislodge and arrest the rebels would unavoidably lead us into a conflict with the United States forces, and we decided to surrender to the Provisional Government with the full understanding that such surrender was under protest, the United States Government to decide if the action of their minister and the use of their forces to destroy a friendly Government was justifiable and according to American principles. The conference between the Provisional Government was carried on by Mr. S. M. Damon on their behalf and the cabinet on behalf of the Queen. Other stipulations were agreed upon, the Provisional Government showing itself ready to promise anything so long as a fight could be avoided, but all such stipulations and promises were totally ignored after the surrender was made. It was after 7 o'clock p. m. when finally the arms and ammunition of the Queen's Government were turned over to the Provisional Government, or about three hours after Minister Stevens had acknowledged that he had recognized the revolutionary government.

As a man who, for years, has taken an active part in Hawaiian politics, and as a practical sugar planter of many years' experience, it is not difficult for me to realize the true cause for the late revolution and for the subsequent desire for annexation. The depression in the sugar business which, since the passage of the McKinley bill, has made havoc with the handsome dividends which we have enjoyed since 1875 and the loss of power by the reform party were the only and true reasons for the revolution. The prospects of the sugar bounty was and is the main motive for the desire to be annexed on the part of the handful of responsible men who still desire such step to be taken. That such plans were fully in accord with the policy of the late American Government, from which Mr. Stevens received his instructions, was the only reason why the scheme became feasible. The very idea of losing their independence as a nation is distasteful to the Hawaiians, and I say unhesitatingly,

although I am an American citizen, to a large contingent of the foreign residents here.

The Queen's attempt to give a new constitution is not the only reason which is given by the insurgents as an excuse for the revolution. The passage of the lottery bill and the opium license bill has also been used both by Mr. Stevens and the insurgents as extenuating circumstances. I opposed and voted against the lottery bill, although it was a measure of my party, because I do not believe in the principle of such a law. But the measure was favored and supported by nearly all the Americans in Honolulu, the very men who revolted and who now claim that the lottery was the cause of the revolution.

On the day of the prorogation of the Legislature Minister Stevens returned to town, after a visit to Hawaii, too late to be present at the ceremony of the prorogation, but he called at the Government building where he saw Minister Parker and myself. After having made his excuses for not attending the prorogation he asked if the Queen had signed the lottery bill. Answered in the affirmative, he became very excited, and striking the table with his clenched fist he exclaimed, over and over again: "Gentlemen, this is a direct attack on the United States Government." I told him that the Queen had signed the bill because the measure seemed to be the wish of the people, and that the petitions favoring the bill from Honolulu contained a large number of names of prominent and responsible men, and although I was personally opposed to the bill I did not consider it justifiable for the cabinet to advise the Queen to veto it.

The opium license act I consider a wise measure, and as an employer of a large number of men I claim that the regular sale of opium is of greater advantage to all classes than the prohibition of it, which no government can enforce owing to the facility for smuggling offered by the large territory of coast on the islands. The opium license law was passed not alone as a revenue measure, but for the purpose of checking the wholesale corruption which the smuggling of the drug carried with it, and was, if anything, a measure in favor of the morality of the country rather than a measure of corruption. The bill was supported by many of the leading men in the present Government and also by many planters, irrespective of political sentiments or party.

In concluding this statement I wish to call attention to the fact that Minister J. L. Stevens, in one of his official dispatches to Secretary Foster, now published, has expressed himself to the effect that I am entertaining feelings of hostility and enmity towards him. I am not aware of ever having given Mr. Stevens any reason for making such an assertion, which is utterly without foundation, and I only call the attention to the matter to avoid a possible impression that anything which I have here stated should be construed as biased or influenced by any private motives or the result of any alleged unfriendly relations with the American minister.

WM. H. CORNWELL.

[Inclosure 6 in No. 3.]

Mr. Colburn to Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, April 15, 1893.

SIR: As a member of Her Majesty Liliuokalani's cabinet that was deposed with her by a handful of citizens backed by the troops of the good ship *Boston* of the U. S. Navy, I called on you on the evening of Saturday, April 8, and paid my respects to you. You received me kindly, and during our conversation you asked me to prepare for you a statement of the facts connected with the Hawaiian revolution and all that was incident to it, and other important matters *in re* Hawaii, from my own knowledge and observation.

In response to your request I submit to you the following, trusting that it may be of value to you in summing up your conclusions in all that has happened, and the position of Queen Liliuokalani and the Hawaiian people.

In opening up my statement, I desire first to introduce myself thoroughly to you, so that you will recognize at once that I propose to take the responsibility of all that I write, and will produce to the extent of my ability, all such evidence as you may require, to corroborate what I write should you so desire it.

My name in full is John Francis Colburn. I was born on the 30th day of September, 1859; my father was an American and my mother a Hawaiian. My father died when I was but 2 years of age, and I, with my brother and sister, was brought up by my mother, who labored and toiled for our support with a sewing machine. I have received the whole of my education right here and have never traveled further than beyond San Francisco, Cal., when my presence was called there on business, and I made four different trips to that large city. At the age of 16 years I entered

into employment, receiving such from the firm of Lewers & Cooke, the latter being one of the commissioners of the Provisional Government who went to Washington to secure annexation. At the age of 20 years I was married, and have living to-day five children; for the last seven years I have conducted a large hay, grain, and feed business on my own account, and am still following that pursuit. I omitted to mention that I had a large number of relatives on my father's side residing in different parts of the United States, chief among them being the husband of my father's own sister, J. H. Gans, residing in Red Bud, Ill., a strong Democrat and an applicant to President Cleveland for the position of American minister to this country in place of J. L. Stevens. My great grandfather, Thomas Colburn, was the first man killed at the battle of Bunker Hill in 1775, fighting as a patriotic American.

Liliuokalani was proclaimed Queen of the Hawaiian Islands January 29, 1891; her first cabinet had Mr. Samuel Parker as premier; he and his colleagues were voted out by a resolution of want of confidence, introduced by Mr. W. C. Wilder, one of the commissioners to Washington to seek annexation. After they were voted out the Queen appointed and commissioned a cabinet with E. C. Macfarlane as premier; they reported to the legislature and immediately upon sight L. A. Thurston moved an adjournment for two days. After adjournment, and when the members had taken their seats, W. O. Smith, the present attorney-general of the Provisional Government, introduced a resolution of want of confidence. After a long and heated discussion a vote was taken, and only twenty-four members responded to adopting the resolution; it was only lost to be resurrected again at another day. Time rolled on, and two weeks after another resolution of want of confidence was introduced against this same cabinet, but this time, through the intrigue of Thurston and his party, it was brought in and read by a native member. A vote was taken and a sufficient number of votes were cast to oust them.

They retired and the Queen, appointed another cabinet, of which W. H. Cornwell was premier. This cabinet, as soon as it presented itself to the house, was voted out on sight; the reason of it was, that the intrigue was worked so well on some of the native members of the legislature by paying them bribes and a weekly support, that they agreed with Thurston and his faction to vote out any cabinet the Queen chose to send to the legislature, unless it be a certain four of their own party, who they wanted to get in as the cabinet, and control the affairs of the country. The funds put up for this purpose was partly by S. M. Damon and C. Bolte, also by Mr. H. P. Baldwin, a large sugar plantation owner. When the Cornwell cabinet was voted out the Queen was puzzled as to what to do. She looked upon this reform party, who was doing all this work, as bringing about a conflict with her and the legislature; this reform party wanted to dictate to the Queen who the cabinet should be, and she, on the other hand, did not wish to recognize them to that extent, because the whole of the opposition, who had been voting cabinets out, were a mixture of three different political parties, and she was well informed that bribery was at the bottom of the whole affair.

She stood the Legislature off for a week or ten days; in the meantime she asked several well-to-do conservative business men to consult with her as to what course she should pursue, and considerable advice was given her to make the appointments of the persons whom the reform party was clamoring for, so as to bring about quiet and contentment in the business community, who was worked up to a certain pitch about the fact that the only work the Legislature was doing was to oust cabinets, and it was affecting business. The Queen paid heed to this advice given, and commissioned what was known as the Wilcox or the missionary cabinet. They reported to the Legislature, and to show you that they were not a popular cabinet, twenty-five members were ready to vote them right out, and it was only through the influence of some of us that the resolution was not introduced then, so that this cabinet could have a fair trial. It staid in power two months when, on the 12th day of January, 1893, a resolution was introduced and they were voted out. The reform party or the missionaries, as they are better named and called, were disgruntled and dissatisfied and discouraged at this work, and openly said we will get even with you, meaning the Hawaiians. They knew this vote meant their losing their power and influence in this country for years to come, and they were hostile. However, the majority of the people were satisfied that they were voted out, and looked to the prospects of the Queen appointing a cabinet with at least two Hawaiians in it, so that the race prejudice which had been created for quite a while would wear away and the Hawaiians and foreigners would work together; the Queen also realized this matter as of great importance, and on Friday, January 13, 1893, she summoned and appointed the writer, minister of interior; Samuel Parker, minister of foreign affairs; W. H. Cornwell, minister of finance, and A. P. Peterson, attorney-general; the first two of us being the Hawaiian representation and the last two the foreign.

We repaired to the Legislature who was waiting for the Queen's new cabinet, and as this cabinet approached the Government building from the palace the former was thronged with people who were anxious to see the new cabinet and extend their

congratulations to us. That was a scene that has never before been witnessed upon the appointment of former cabinets; however, we arrived at the Legislature and amidst great cheering we took our seats. The house went through its work and then adjourned. The next day was the time that had been previously set for proroguing the Legislature. At 10 o'clock of that day, January 14, 1893, Mr Peterson informed me that he had heard it rumored that it was the Queen's intention to promulgate a new constitution. I replied to him that she was making a mistake and I would oppose her if she really intended to do it. I called out to Messrs. Parker and Cornwell, and the four of us consulted over the matter. We all agreed that if the Queen was determined upon doing this work, and pleasing only the native element, we would oppose her. Mr. Parker went over at once to the palace to find out correctly if there was any truth to this rumor, but he was unable to see her, as she was preparing herself to prorogue the Legislature. He returned and informed us that he could not see her, and we decided to wait until the closing of Parliament.

In the meantime, however, I felt as though we should place ourselves in the right light before the foreign element of the community, and to get their view on the matter in case the Queen's intentions were really as rumored and she would make it an issue with us, I left my colleagues at the Government building and repaired at once with all haste to the office of A. S. Hartwell, an old and esteemed friend of mine, and told him about the rumor we had heard, the consultation we had had, and the position we would take if the Queen could not be guided by our advice, and that was to resign. He asked me if he could ask Messrs. Thurston and Smith (the Provisional Government commissioner at Washington and the present attorney-general of the Provisional Government) to be together with him, and we would all consult the matter over together. I consented and he summoned them. When they arrived I went over what I had told Mr. Hartwell a short time previous and when I got through Thurston spoke up and said, "Colburn, don't you resign under any conditions; if the Queen makes this an issue with you, we (meaning the foreign element) will back you up and I feel sure Minister Stevens will." He further asked, "are you alone in your stand?" and I replied, "no, I was positive Peterson took the same view as I did." He spoke up again, "bring Peterson down here; we want to talk to him."

I repaired at once to the Government building, told Peterson what I had done, and asked him to come down to Hartwell's office with me. He consented, and we both came down. Upon arriving there we held a consultation. Thurston submitted in writing a plan for action in case the Queen was going to carry out her desire. We took the document, which was written by Thurston himself, and told him we would await developments. We then left them and went to the Government building. This was now approaching the noon hour. At 12 m., precisely, the Queen arrived at the Government building and prorogued the Legislature. Immediately after the Queen had left to return to the palace, Mr. Parker came up and said to us that the diplomatic corps wanted to have an interview with us at once in the foreign affairs office. We all consented and went directly upstairs to meet them.

After we were all seated, Mr. Wodehouse opened the conversation by asking us if we knew that a new constitution was to be promulgated that afternoon by the Queen? Mr. Parker replied that the cabinet were not aware of it, but they had heard rumors of it; he asked again what position the cabinet would take if the Queen did attempt to promulgate a new constitution, and Mr. Parker replied that the cabinet would oppose it. The conversation then drifted into their inquiring as to what reason could prompt the Queen to do anything like this, if the rumors that they and ourselves had heard were true, and we answered that it must be from the petition the natives had got up, signed, and presented to her. Mr. Wodehouse then said the Queen must not promulgate a new constitution, and if she had any idea of it she must abandon it. We assured him we would do all in our power to avoid anything of this kind happening. During all this conversation Mr. J. L. Stevens, who had kept perfectly quiet, not saying anything, spoke up now and asked if the Queen had signed the lottery bill? Mr. Parker replied in the affirmative; he asked again, did the cabinet advise the Queen to sign it? Mr. Peterson replied that the Queen considered that the bill having passed the Legislature by a majority she should sign it as she had no reason for vetoing it, and the cabinet acquiesced in her action. Mr. Stevens instantly raised his cane and stamped it on the floor and said the passing of the lottery bill and the signing of it by the Queen is a direct attack upon the United States; and he picked up his hat and walked out of the room, but before he was fairly out he spoke up and said, he wanted the cabinet to inform him at once if the Queen was going to attempt what we had a little while before discussed; we replied to him that we would, and we parted company.

The cabinet then went directly from the Government building to the palace where there was in waiting the Queen, members of the legislature, members of several political societies, and a large number of the public. Upon our arrival at the palace we entered the blue room and met the Queen. After seating ourselves she said to us that she had received a petition signed by nine thousand of her native subjects ask-

ing her for a new constitution, and she thought this was an opportune time to grant them their prayer and asked us to countersign her signature that she wanted to place on the document. Each one of us got up, one after the other, and told her that we could not accede to her wishes, and advised her to abandon the idea. She was very determined at first, and said she should promulgate it anyway. We reasoned with her and left her to think the matter over again, and at the same time take rest.

Messrs. Cornwell, Peterson, and myself left the palace and went to the Government building; we held a consultation and sent a message to each of the diplomatic corps; they all arrived and we entered into consultation again. The gentlemen of the diplomatic corps urged us very strongly to return to the palace and inform Her Majesty that she must abandon the idea at once. While this was going on at the Government building, Thurston and others who had heard of this matter were enrolling names down town with the avowed object of supporting the Cabinet in their positions and the stand they had taken. Thurston then came up to me and said to oppose the Queen's intention as the foreign element of the community did not want a new constitution, and we could receive support, all that we wanted, even if it was necessary to depose her. At 3 o'clock, of that day we left the Government building again, and started over to the palace as the Queen had just sent us a message she wanted to see us at once.

As we were hurrying over there, and just before I had got out of the gate at the entrance of the Government building yard, W. O. Smith, the present attorney-general, came rushing in in a hack very much excited, and said, "Colburn, don't be alarmed; buck the Queen all you can; the troops of the *Boston* will assist in supporting you in your stand; make all the haste you can. Mr. Stevens has sent an order to the captain of the *Boston*, and his men with their guns and ammunition are already in the boats of the ship ready to come ashore at once." I made no reply to him except telling him we were then on our way to the palace. He left me and I sung out to my colleagues, and told them what Smith had said to me. We arrived at the palace, and the Queen, who was waiting for us, asked us if we would read the new constitution she wanted to promulgate, and compare it with the one forced upon the late King Kalakaua by the Reform party in the revolution of 1887, and also the one promulgated by Kamehameha V in 1864. We replied that we would, sat down, and after comparing it we found some defects in it and pointed them out to her and advised her again to abandon the idea. After a little while she spoke up, and asked us if we were a unit in our advice, and we all replied yes. She then said she would pay heed to it and would inform her people who were still waiting, that she could not give them what they wanted, and to endure their grievances (this implied to the Constitution of 1887). She did so, and the people departed for their homes.

Mr. Peterson and myself went down town to the office of W. O. Smith, where there was a large gathering of the foreigners, and they asked me to speak to them. I did so and told them all that happened; some of them asked if we did not think the Queen would promulgate it at some other time, and I assured them we would never allow her to do it as long as the people who lived here were not a unit on such a subject. A little later about 4:30 p. m. of that day, Mr. Thurston came to me with a document written out by him and said, "Colburn, this is a request on Minister Stevens and Capt. Wiltse to land the troops from the *Boston* and render you support; you and Peterson and Cornwell must sign it and place it in my hands so that in case you are imprisoned by the Queen's orders that she can put this project of hers through, then this letter can be delivered." I replied to him that I did not think it was necessary, as I felt sure the Queen had abandoned the idea altogether; he insisted on my taking it, and I took it and handed it to Peterson; where it now is I do not know, but we never signed it, as there was no reason for it.

The next morning, Sunday, January 15, 1893 at 6 a. m., Thurston came to my house and asked me to go with him to Peterson's house. I asked him what he wanted with us at such an early hour, and his reply was, pressing business. I consented and accompanied him to Peterson's house. Upon our arriving there we entered the room, and when we were seated, the three of us, he said that he represented a committee of safety who had had a meeting at his house on Saturday evening and decided to send him to us with a proposition, and that was that we, Peterson and Colburn, should depose the Queen. We asked him who this committee of safety was, and he replied thirteen gentlemen picked out from all those that had enrolled to support the cabinet in opposing the Queen against her desires *in re* new constitution. We asked him to furnish their names and he did so. He then said, it is the desire of this committee you two should depose the Queen and declare a provisional government. Don't say a word about it to Parker and Cornwell, as Parker is a treacherous liar, and Cornwell is not fit for anything, and simply does what Parker tells him to do. He went on to say that it was their desire to get a division in the cabinet, and the deposing of the Queen should appear to be done by a part of her own cabinet, or a portion of the Government itself; and he went on to say that he could inform us that

Mr. Stevens had given this committee the assurance that if we two signed a request to him to land the troops of the *Boston* he would immediately comply with the request and have them landed to assist in carrying out this work; and further, that if we did not agree to the proposition that we could not receive aid and support from them in the future if we needed it. We told him that we would have to take the matter under advisement and would inform him as to our conclusions later on. He pressed for an answer then, but we refused to give it to him.

After his departure we sent for Parker and Cornwell, and imparted to them what Thurston had proposed to us, and we entered into consultation. We decided to summon at least six responsible and conservative business men of the community to consult with us, and to get their views. We did so, and, at 1:30 p. m. of that Sunday, the following gentlemen met us: Messrs. F. A. Schaeffer, J. O. Carter, S. M. Damon, W. M. Giffard, S. C. Allen, and E. C. Macfarlane. We told them what Thurston, on behalf of the committee of thirteen, had proposed, and asked them for their views. Each one asked if the Queen had given up the idea of promulgating a new constitution altogether, and we replied in the affirmative. They said, in that case the Queen and cabinet should issue a proclamation, giving the community the assurance that this matter was at an end.

We asked them to dictate a proclamation and they did so; they one and all decided that we should inform this committee that we could not consider their proposition, and ask them to accept the assurances that were to be given in the proclamation. They also asked if the Government was in a position to suppress any uprising, and we told these gentlemen that the Government was ready and able to cope with any emergency that might happen, and to suppress any revolt. Mr. S. M. Damon spoke up and said the troops of the "*Boston*" are going to be landed. Before proceeding further, I may say right here that Mr. Damon's remark seemed insignificant at the time, but as things turned out he was in with the revolutionists and knew perfectly well the attitude of Mr. Stevens, and when he made the remark at our meeting it signified a good deal; it meant that those forces were going to depose Queen Liliuokalani and place the situation of the country in the position that it is in to-day.

The next day (Monday) the proclamation dictated by these gentlemen was printed and posted and distributed all over town. Later on in the day two mass meetings were held, one by the native element and the other by the foreign element. At the former the natives accepted the proclamation, although it was directly contrary to what they wanted (a new constitution), and the latter denounced the Queen and left everything in the hands of the committee of safety spoken about. At 5 p. m. of that day the troops of the *Boston* were landed. Immediately upon the information being conveyed to the cabinet that such was the case, Mr. Parker and myself drove with all haste to the residence of J. L. Stevens. When we arrived there, we asked him the reason the troops were being landed, and his reply was that he had received a request from a committee of safety, and he had consulted with Capt. Wiltse. He went on to say that there were a number of women and old men in the town besides children that were alarmed with the rumors of a revolution, and he wanted to offer protection. Mr. Parker replied that the Government was in a position to offer everyone protection, was able to suppress any rebellion, and would offer protection to him (Stevens) and noted his protest. Mr. Stevens replied that he was informed that the Government *was* in a strong position to suppress any revolt, but he could not help the matter of landing, and as the troops were ashore they would stay ashore. I asked him if he intended to annex the country and he replied "No," and further said those troops are ashore to preserve the Queen on her throne, you gentlemen in your offices, and to offer protection to the community at large. We told him again we did not want the troops ashore, and we could preserve law and order ourselves. He replied by saying make your protest in writing, and if you make it in a friendly spirit I will answer in the same tone.

On Tuesday information was conveyed to us that the Queen was to be deposed and a Provisional Government declared; we got everything in readiness to suppress the revolt expected; we had under arms 600 men with rifles, and 30,000 rounds of ammunition, 8 brass Austrian field cannon, and 2 Gatling guns. A little before 2 p. m. of that day the cabinet drove up to Mr. Stevens's residence to inquire of him as to the position he was going to take in this matter, as we were informed and suspected from all that Thurston and his followers had said that the American troops were going to assist these usurpers, who everyone knew would not attempt to bring about any such change as they were going to if they were not assured of support by the American forces. We arrived at Stevens's house and after talking quite awhile with him he gave us no definite answer and we left him and returned to the police station to make our headquarters there and to write to Mr. Stevens about his position. While the letter to Stevens was being dictated by Mr. Peterson, information was brought to us that about 30 unarmed men had taken possession of the Government Building, had read their proclamation, and had committed acts of treason.

We paid no attention to them but sent our letter with all haste at a few minutes before 3 p. m., by Mr. C. L. Hopkins to Mr. Stevens. After Stevens read the letter,

he told Hopkins to go away and come back again in an hour. Hopkins replied that the cabinet had instructed him to bring a reply forthwith, so that they would know how to act, and Stevens refused. He kept Hopkins waiting on his veranda one hour and then handed him a reply to us. While Stevens was keeping Hopkins waiting, the usurpers were preparing to resist the Government in case of attack, and we did nothing, but kept our men ready for action. The letter from Stevens carried by Hopkins to us reached us 5 minutes of 4 p. m., and after reading its contents, we concluded to surrender and yield to America.

I want to impress upon you that we never surrendered the palace, police station, and barracks till after we had received Stevens's letter, and not until we had filed our protest with the Provisional Government. The surrender was a little after 6 in the evening; these usurpers could never have overthrown the Government, as they did not have sufficient arms and ammunition; and on the other hand, it will be admitted by themselves, I think, that the munitions of war that we had would have annihilated them were it not for the United States troops and Minister Stevens.

I remain, etc.,

JOHN F. COLBURN.

[Inclosure 7 in No. 3.]

Citizens' committee of safety to Mr. Stevens.

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, Honolulu, January 16, 1893.

SIR: We, the undersigned citizens and residents of Honolulu, respectfully represent that, in view of recent public events in this Kingdom, culminating in the revolutionary acts of Queen Lilioukalani on Saturday last, the public safety is menaced, and lives and property are in peril, and we appeal to you and the United States forces at your command for assistance.

The Queen, with the aid of armed force, and accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed from those with whom she was acting, attempted to proclaim a new constitution; and, while prevented for the time from accomplishing her object, declared publicly that she would only defer her action.

This conduct and action was upon an occasion and under circumstances which have created general alarm and terror.

We are unable to protect ourselves without aid and therefore pray for the protection of the United States forces.

HENRY E. COOPER,
F. W. MCCHESENEY,
W. C. WILDER,
C. BOLTE,
A. BROWN,
WILLIAM O. SMITH,
HENRY WATERHOUSE,
THEO. F. LANSING,
ED. SUHR,
L. A. THURSTON,
JOHN EMMELUTH,
WM. R. CASTLE,
J. A. MCCANDLESS,

Citizens' Committee of Safety.

No. 7.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham:

No. 4.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, May 4, 1893.

SIR: Up to the period of the hauling down of the United States ensign from the Government building there had been inaction on the part of those opposed to annexation. Since then, inspired by that fact, the natives have seemed to act with freedom in expressing their views on the subject of annexation and of the revolution dethroning Lilioukalani. Annexationists and antiannexationists have been active

in procuring subscribers to declarations in favor of and against annexation.

I have abstained from any indication of my opinion or wishes concerning the question. When memorials and petitions have been presented, I have made it a rule to state substantially that I would accept the papers simply as a fact in the situation in the Islands, but could not enter into any expression of views thereon.

At this time the indications are unmistakable that a large majority of the people of the Islands are utterly opposed to annexation. I do not look for any change from this situation through future information. I shall be careful, however, to keep myself free to entertain any and all facts in relation thereto, that I may report with accuracy to you.

There is a strong disposition on the part of the annexation element to suppress expressions against annexation by social and business hostility.

I inclose you herewith a newspaper extract containing proceedings of the executive and advisory councils on the subject of the restoration of the monarchy (Inclosure No. 1).

The morning following, delegations from all the Islands were to assemble for the purpose of presenting resolutions to the United States Commissioner indicating their opinion on the present political situation. The reform party are in favor of annexation. The opponents of this party are generally in favor of the restoration of Liliuokalani, but a small minority are inclined to an independent Republic.

I send you a memorial presented to me by a committee of delegates of all the branch associations of the Hawaiian Patriotic League (Inclosure No. 2). It was presented by a committee composed of John Richardson, J. A. Akina, Ben. Nanakana, J. R. Kaihiopulani, and S. H. K. Ne.

To this memorial I made response, taken down by our stenographer, Mr. Mills, in the language following:

I will accept it, as I have all memorials, as a matter of information. I can not enter into a discussion of it with you. I am glad to meet you, gentlemen.

It was this body which incited Mr. Emmeluth to offer his resolution, I presume.

I have five petitions signed by natives in favor of annexation, but always coupled with a condition that the right to vote is to be preserved to them. This is the feeling of all the natives who have signed petitions for annexation. It is by assurances that the right of suffrage will be preserved to them that some are induced to sign the petitions. In the future all petitions presenting the views of the people will be fully reported.

I send you an interview with Mr. S. A. Damon, president of the advisory council (Inclosure No. 3); also one with Mr. Henry Waterhouse, a member of the advisory council (Inclosure No. 4); also a letter, in original, from Mr. J. O. Carter; also a copy of a letter from Lieut. Swinburne, and affidavits from Messrs. Charles L. Hopkins, I. F. Colburn, and A. B. Peterson.

These are sent simply as indicating something of the elements which brought about the dethronement of Liliuokalani. I will endeavor to dissipate all the mists connected with this subject before a great while.

I think it will be shown that the American minister recognized the Provisional Government when the chief points of defense of the Queen, to wit: the station house and barracks, had not surrendered, and would not have surrendered but for that recognition. It is unquestionably the fact that Liliuokalani was induced to sign the protest already com-

municated to the State Department by Mr. Stevens and to surrender her forces by the belief that she could not successfully contest with the United States, which appeared to her mind to be a party in the impending conflict of arms. She was induced to believe that she would have a hearing on the merits of the interference by the American minister, and gave to it doubtless the fullest faith.

The mail leaves in two and a half hours from now, and this makes it necessary for me to avoid any attempt to elaborate on the condition of affairs at this time.

I am, etc.,

J. H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

Since closing the foregoing dispatch I have received an affidavit from Charles B. Wilson, which I send as Inclosure 10. I shall gather all the evidence on this subject which I can obtain from both sides touching the question as to whether the recognition came before or after the surrender of the forces of Liliuokalani. This Wilson is the man described in Minister Stevens's dispatches as the paramour of the Queen. Whatever there may be in these charges (concerning which I have little information), I am very much inclined to think his affidavit is substantially true.

J. H. B.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 4.]

HAWAIIAN DAILY STAR, MAY 1, 1893.—PROVISIONAL LEGISLATURE.

* * * * *

Mr. Emmeluth moved a resolution that agitation in favor of the restoration of the monarchy be declared as coming under the terms of the sedition act.

Mr. Waterhouse moved that the resolution pass. It was high time to take action when treason was being conducted under their noses. Here were natives coming from the other islands to agitate for restoration, and receiving encouragement from the Queen, who told them to have hope and courage.

Mr. Emmeluth held that as annexation was the object for which this Provisional Government was formed, it should be regarded as treason for anybody to discuss restoration or an independent republic. It would be only justice to the ignorant Hawaiians to give a clear expression of the Government on this matter. He related an instance of superstition among the natives. A Hawaiian neighbor of his died after four days' illness, and his widow asked the speaker what her late husband had done that the Government people should have done that to him?

Mr. Young was one who would go the farthest towards toleration, but he believed Mr. Emmeluth was right in the main. It was time they knew whether they were to have a government or not.

Minister Smith said the question had come before him in requests for advice from sheriffs. The Government should deal with the matter cautiously, as there was danger of going too far. Peaceful discussion of the situation he did not think came within the category of sedition. It was certainly lawful under the constitution.

Mr. Brown counseled going slow. Mr. Blount was sent here, it was understood, to ascertain the sentiment of the Hawaiian people, and nothing should be done to obstruct his investigation. Hawaiians loved their flag above everything else. They were like children. If they could retain their flag they would not think much about the loss of the monarchy. Were the monarch of the Kamehameha line it might be different. As it was he thought only a few in Honolulu were wanting restoration, and these because they believed in that event they should come on top.

Mr. Emmeluth was not for suppressing those who were misled, but those who were misleading the Hawaiians.

Mr. Damon thought if the Government was weak it ought to jump on any movement looking toward restoration. The freedom of speech and the freedom of the press was favorable to safety. The Government surely had sufficient standing by this time to be past the necessity for extreme measures.

Mr. Young withdrew his motion to pass, and the resolution was referred to the executive council.

The council went into executive session at 3:35.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 4.]

Petition of natives.

Whereas His Excellency, Grover Cleveland, President of the United States of America, has honored the Hawaiian nation by sending to us the Hon. James H. Blount as a Special Commissioner to find out the true wishes of the Hawaiian people as to the proposed annexation of their country to their great friend the United States; therefore,

We, the people of the Hawaiian Islands, through the delegates of the branches of the Hawaiian Patriotic League of all the districts throughout the kingdom, in convention assembled, take this mode of submitting our appeal and expression of our unanimous wishes to the people of our great and good friend, the Republic of the United States of America, with whom we always entertained the most cordial relations, whom we have learned to look upon as our patrons and most reliable protectors, and whose honor, integrity, and sense of justice and equity we have ever confidently relied for investigation into the grievous wrongs that have been committed against us as a people, against the person of our sovereign, and the independence of our land.

And while we are anxious to promote the closest and most intimate political and commercial relations with the United States, we do not believe that the time has yet come for us to be deprived of our nationality and of our sovereign by annexation to any foreign power.

And therefore we do hereby earnestly and sincerely pray that the great wrongs committed against us may be righted by the restoration of the independent autonomy and constitutional government of our Kingdom under our beloved Queen Liliuokalani, in whom we have the utmost confidence as a conscientious and popular ruler.

DELEGATES ISLAND OF HAWAII.

S. T. Pūhōnua.
Henry West.
K. M. Koahou.
D. Hoakimaa.
T. P. Kaæææ.
J. H. Halawale.
S. H. K. Ne.
W. E. N. Kanealili.
C. G. Naope.

ISLAND OF MAUI.

R. H. Makekau.
J. K. Kealoali.
D. Kanaha.
John Richardson.
Thomas Clark.
Thos. Benj. Lyons.
John Kaluna.
J. Kamakele.
S. D. Kapers.
S. W. Kaai.

ISLAND OF MOLOKAI.

J. N. Uahinui.
J. K. Kaipeopulani.

Approved:

HONOLULU, *March 2, 1893.*

ISLAND OF MOLOKAI—Continued.

D. Himeni.
J. P. Kapoehaale.
Kekoowai.
S. K. Kahalehulu.
S. K. Piiapoo.

ISLAND OF OAHU.

F. S. Keike.
C. Keawe.
John Kapamawaho Prendergast.
Enoch Johnson.
Sam K. Pua.
S. K. Kaupu.
D. W. Keliokamoku.
S. W. Kaiieha.
Benj. Naukana.
Kimo.

ISLAND OF KAUAI.

Chas. Kahee.
Geo. W. Mahikoa.
J. A. Akina.
D. N. Kamaliikaue.
Sam P. Kaleikini.
J. Molokui.

JOSEPH NAWAHO,
President Patriotic League.

[Inclosure 3 in No. 4.]

Interview between Mr. Damon and Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, April 29, 1893.

MR. BLOUNT. How long have you lived here?

MR. DAMON. I was born here in 1845. I have been away several times—perhaps to the extent of three or four years in that time.

Q. Where were you on the 14th of January, 1893, at the time the proclamation dethroning the Queen and establishing the Provisional Government was read?

A. I was at Honolulu. I was one of the members of that body who went up.

Q. The paper was read by Mr. Cooper?

A. By Judge Cooper.

Q. How many of you were there in that body which went up—about?

A. The whole body. There would be four of the executive and fourteen of the advisory.

Q. Please look at this paper and see if they are the persons (Senate Ex. Doc. No. 76, Fifty-second Congress, second session).

A. Thurston was not present, and I do not think Wilhelm was there.

Q. Where did you start from?

A. From W. O. Smith's office on Fort street.

Q. And what street did you take going from there?

A. We walked up directly to the Government house on Merchant street. It was suggested that a part should go by the way of Queen street, but a majority of us went by way of Merchant street.

Q. What was the idea for dividing the committee?

A. So that it should not attract so much attention, and it would be safer perhaps to have it divided than going in mass.

Q. Was it because it occurred to them that it might invite attack if they went in mass?

A. That was partly the idea—that it was more prudent. I think we, most of us, walked together—not compactly, but together.

Q. Any crowd following you?

A. No; the crowd was attracted to the corner of Fort and King streets, owing to the shot that was fired by Mr. Good at a policeman. In fact, the crowd cleared from the Government house and was attracted there. From all directions they centered at the corner of Hall's store.

Q. You found, then, scarcely anyone at the Government house when the committee arrived?

A. Scarcely anyone there except porters. After Mr. Cooper began to read the proclamation—then different ones came out of the offices—clerks and officials—while the proclamation was being read.

Q. Some of the Provisional Government troops, or rather troops raised at the direction of the Committee of Safety, came on the ground before the reading of the proclamation was finished?

A. When we arrived there was but one man with a rifle on the premises, Mr. Oscar White; but some little time later they commenced to come in from the armory, troops that were under the supervision of Col. Soper.

Q. Was that before or during the reading of the proclamation?

A. During the reading. Toward the end of it.

Q. How many troops came in? Do you have any knowledge of the number you had enlisted?

A. There were enough came in to make us feel more decidedly at ease than before they arrived.

Q. You could not say how many there were?

A. No; they kept coming in right along. They got to be quite a body.

Q. After the reading of the proclamation the late ministers were sent for?

A. After the reading of the proclamation we adjourned to the office of the Minister of the Interior, and then we commenced to formulate our plans and get ourselves into working order. Mr. Dole was at the head. While we were there in consultation Mr. Cornwell and Mr. Parker came up there from the Station House and held a conference with us.

Q. What was the purport of that conference?

A. The result of that conference was that Mr. Bolte and myself were requested to return with Mr. Cornwell and Mr. Parker to the Station House and recommend and urge upon the parties in power at the Police Station to surrender to the Provisional Government. We had a conference with the ministers in the room occupied generally by the deputy marshal. There were present Messrs. Peterson, Colburn, Parker, Cornwell, Bolte, and later Mr. Neumann, who was asked to come in. After consultation of the matter of their yielding up their power to the Provisional Government they asked to be let alone for a few moments, and I went into one of the rear cells in

the corridor with Marshal Wilson and urged him very strongly to give up any hope or any thought of making any attack, or resistance, more properly.

Q. What reason did you give him?

A. I can not remember at the present moment giving him a reason, but I remember distinctly saying to him: "Now, if you will coöperate with us, if in future I can be of service to you I will do so.

Q. Was there any suggestion of sympathy on the part of the United States Minister in your movement?

A. While I was in the Station House a man by the name of Bowler said to me: "We are all prepared, but I will never fight against the American flag."

Q. Was there anything in the conversation between you and him in which any intimation direct or indirect that the United States Minister was in sympathy with you or the United States troops and officers?

A. I can not remember any definite thing, but from Mr. Bowler's remark they must have thought that the United States troops were here for some purpose.

Q. Was Mr. Bowler with the Queen's party?

A. He was. He was part of the force in the Station House.

Q. Did you say anything at all indicating an opinion that there was any sympathy on the part of Mr. Stevens or Capt. Wiltse with the movement for the new government?

A. I can not remember. I may possibly have said so.

Q. Did you think so at that time?

A. I may have had an impression, but I know nothing about it.

Q. What was your impression?

A. My impression was, seeing the troops landed here in this time of excitement and turmoil, that—well, I suppose I might say that they could not stand it any longer—the Americans could not stand it any longer.

Q. Your impression, then, was that the American Minister and Captain Wiltse and the troops were in sympathy with the movement of the white residents here in the pending controversy between them and the Queen?

A. While we were in the Government building and during the reading of the proclamation and while we were all extremely nervous as to our personal safety, I asked one of the men with me there: "Will not the American troops support us?" Finally I asked one of the men to go over and ask Lieut. Swinburne if he was not going to send someone over to protect us? The man returned and said to me, "Capt. Wiltse's orders are 'I remain passive.'" That is all I know of what passed between us.

Q. You speak of your impression. That relates to a particular conversation between two or three persons; but what was your impression as to the matter of whether or not the American Minister and the American naval officers were in sympathy with the movement?

A. I was perfectly nonplussed by not receiving any support. I could not imagine why we were there without being supported by American troops, prior to the troops coming from the armory. We were not supported in any way.

Q. You had not been in council with the Committee of Public Safety up to that time?

A. No.

Q. Well, the troops were—how far off from the reading of the proclamation?

A. They were over in that yard known as Gilson yard in the rear of the music hall. They were quartered there.

Q. Any artillery?

A. I think they had a small gun—Gatling gun and howitzer.

Q. Where were they pointed—in what direction?

A. I can not tell you.

Q. You were surprised that they did not come into the grounds while the proclamation was being read. Is that what you mean by not supporting you?

A. I had no definite information what the movement was, as I told you before in a private interview, but knowing that they were on shore I supposed that they would support us, and when they did not support us, and we were there for fifteen or twenty minutes I was perfectly astonished that we were in that position without any support.

Q. How far would you say, in yards, it was from where the proclamation was being read to where the nearest troops were?

A. I think about 75 yards.

Q. Was there a piece of artillery in the street between the building the troops were stationed in and the Government building?

A. The only piece of firearms of any kind in that street was Oscar White's rifle. We met him as we came around the corner.

Q. Did you have occasion to look there to see?

A. We stopped before turning into the side gate to converse with Oscar White, before proceeding into the Government building.

Q. Are you sure there was not a piece of artillery in that street before the reading of the proclamation?

A. I can not tell you; but the only gun I could see was Oscar White's. I remarked: "Oscar, this is not so very prudent for you to be here with only one rifle in this street."

Q. Where did you see the troops first?

A. I came up from Monolalua by a back street and turned into Nuana street, one house above Mr. Stevens', and as I turned the corner I saw the American troops marching up towards Mr. Stevens' house, and directly in front of his house.

Q. Did you meet Mr. Henry Waterhouse?

A. I met him there at that time.

Q. What conversation passed between you?

A. I think I said: "Henry, what does all this mean?" If I remember rightly now, he said: "It is all up."

Q. And what did you understand by the expression, "It is all up?"

A. I understand from that that the American troops had taken possession of the island. That was my impression.

Q. And was that favorable to the Queen or favorable to the other side, as you understood it?

A. That was distinctly favorable to the foreign element here.

Q. You mean the movement for a Provisional Government?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see Mr. Stevens that day?

A. No; I did not see him that day.

Q. What is Mr. Waterhouse doing now?

A. Henry? He is a member of the council.

Q. Was he a member of the Committee of Public Safety?

A. If I remember right, he was.

Q. Is that his signature [exhibiting letter of Committee of Public Safety to Mr. Stevens]?

The letter is as follows:

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *Honolulu, January 16, 1893.*

SIR: We, the undersigned, citizens and residents of Honolulu, respectfully represent that in view of recent public events in this Kingdom, culminating in the revolutionary acts of Queen Liliuokalani on Saturday last, the public safety is menaced, and lives and property are in peril, and we appeal to you and to the United States forces at your command for assistance.

The Queen, with the aid of armed force and accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed from those with whom she was acting, attempted to proclaim a new constitution, and while prevented for the time from accomplishing her object, declared publicly that she would only defer her action.

This conduct and action was upon an occasion and under circumstances which have created general alarm and terror.

We are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and therefore pray for the protection of the United States forces.

HENRY E. COOPER,
F. W. MCCHESENEY,
W. C. WILDER,
C. BOLTE,
A. BROWN,
WILLIAM O. SMITH,
HENRY WATERHOUSE,
THEO. F. LANSING,
ED. SUHR,
L. A. THURSTON,
JOHN EMMELUTH,
WM. R. CASTLE,
J. A. McCANDLESS,
Citizens' Committee of Safety.

His Excellency, JOHN L. STEPHENS,
American Minister Resident.

A. Yes, it is.

Q. Did he seem then pleased or alarmed?

A. He was very much strained and excited. There was no pleasure in it, but still there was a feeling of security. That was it. He evinced a feeling of security. He was not smiling or joking.

Q. It was not a joking time. Well, you say there was nothing in the first visit of yours to the Station House to indicate any impression on your part that you

believed the United States Minister or the United States troops, or both, were in sympathy with the movement of the committee of safety?

A. I was nonplussed. I did suppose they were going to support us.

Q. You did not say anything to the people in the Station House to lead them to suppose you were hopeful of aid?

A. I can not remember saying it now; I might have done so.

Q. Did you say it at any place?

A. I do not remember; I may have said it.

Q. Was there an effort on the part of those who were moving for a change of government to make that impression?

A. I think there was.

Q. Was that impression among the whites generally.

A. That I can not say. I know there was that impression. Some of the members tried to convey that impression.

Q. On what occasion?

A. Many occasions. One particular occasion was while we were in the Government building the day the proclamation was read.

Q. What was said, and who said it?

A. Charles Carter said to me: "After you are in possession of the Government building the troops will support you." I think that was his remark.

Q. Was he on the committee of public safety?

A. I think so.

Q. Was he in the party that went up to read the proclamation?

A. He was present there during the time it was read. Whether he went up with us or not I do not remember.

Q. It was during that time he made that remark?

A. Yes.

Q. Was he an active promoter of the movement?

A. I think he was.

Q. Has he any connection with the Government to-day?

A. No, except he is one of the Commissioners in Washington.

Q. You have been in previous revolutions here?

A. I have been in the Wilcox revolution. I took quite a prominent part in its suppression. I was one of the ministers at the time.

Q. You had a conversation with Mr. Carter about the time the proclamation was being read?

A. Yes.

Q. You were somewhat anxious as to whether or not you would be supported by United States troops?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you express any fear in the presence of Mr. Carter?

A. Well, no man likes to tell he was afraid.

Q. I do not mean in a cowardly sense.

A. Well, with others, I was convinced that we were in a position of danger.

Q. What did Mr. Carter say?

A. He gave me to understand that we would be protected.

Q. By United States troops?

A. Yes; and when we were not protected by them I wanted to know the reason why.

Q. Do you mean by that that you expected them to march over?

A. I was under the impression that they would.

Q. What did you accomplish by that first visit to the Station House—any agreement?

A. We accomplished this—that it was a virtual giving up.

Q. What was said? What did the ministers say?

A. This is my impression of it to-day: That if they had only to contend with the Provisional Government and the forces of the Provisional Government that they would not give up. That was the impression that I gathered from them; that they felt themselves equal to the occasion so far as the Provisional Government went.

Q. Then having that sort of feeling, what did they propose to do?

A. They proposed to immediately deliver up. Then they went up, four of them, and had a parley with Mr. Dole and the Provisional Government. They agreed to desist, but said they must go to the Queen and get her to confer with them.

Q. So far as they were concerned they were willing to yield, provided the Queen was?

A. Yes. Then I went along with them to the palace. We all met in the Blue Room. There were present the Queen, two young princes, the four ministers, Judge Widdeman, Paul Neumann, J. O. Carter, E. C. McFarland and myself. We went over between 4 and 5 and remained until 6 discussing the situation.

Q. In that conversation you asked for a surrender of the forces, and the ministers advised it?

A. The different ones spoke and they all recommended it. Each one spoke. A

first, Judge Widdeman was opposed to it, but he finally changed his mind on the advice of Mr. Neumann. Mr. Neumann advised yielding. Each one advised it.

Q. Was this advice of Neumann and the cabinet based on the idea that the Queen would have to contend with the United States forces as well as the forces of the Provisional Government?

A. It was the Queen's idea that she could surrender pending a settlement at Washington, and it was on that condition that she gave up. If I remember right I spoke to her also. I said she could surrender or abdicate under protest.

Q. And that the protest would be considered at a later period at Washington?

A. At a later period.

Q. Did the cabinet in recommending her to yield to the Provisional Government give her to understand that they supposed that the American minister and the United States troops were in sympathy with the Provisional Government or with the Committee of Public Safety?

A. I know it was the Queen's idea that Mr. Stevens was in sympathy with this movement.

Q. But I am asking now as to what reasons the ministers gave for her acquiescence.

A. It was their idea that it was useless to carry on—that it would be provocative of bloodshed and trouble if she persisted in this matter longer; that it was wiser for her to abdicate under protest and have a hearing at a later time. That the forces against her were too strong.

Q. Did they indicate the United States forces at all in any way?

A. I do not remember their doing so.

Q. Do you know whether or not at that time they were under the impression that the United States forces were in sympathy with the revolution?

A. Beyond an impression I know nothing definite.

Q. What was the result of this conference with the Queen? What was agreed on?

A. She signed a document surrendering her rights to the Provisional Government under protest.

Q. Is this the protest on page 22, Ex. Doc. No. 76, 52d Cong., 2d Sess?

A. Yes. This was written out by Mr. Neumann and J. O. Carter while we were present. She was reluctant to agree to this, but was advised that the whole subject would come up for final consideration at Washington.

Q. Did you at the time consent to recommend this proposition or not?

A. I was there as a member of the Provisional Government, but I did not advise as to the wording of it. I did tell her that she would have a perfect right to be heard at a later period.

Q. By the United States Government?

A. Yes.

Q. You, yourself, at that time, before consulting with your colleagues, were favorably impressed with that settlement?

A. Well, it was the only settlement that could be brought about. Personally I was satisfied with it.

Q. And you took that back to the Provisional Government?

A. Yes.

Q. And they rejected it?

A. It was received and indorsed by Mr. Dole.

Q. Now, was there any message sent to the Queen after that?

A. No.

Q. No message declaring that they would not accept it?

A. No.

Q. The surrender was then made on that proposition?

A. Yes; well, then she sent down word through Mr. Peterson to Mr. Wilson to deliver up the Station House. That wound up the whole affair. We immediately took possession of it. It was not delivered up until after this conference.

Q. Now how long after that was it before the Provisional Government was recognized?

A. Mr. Stevens sent Cadet Pringle, his aid, and Capt. Wiltse sent one of his officers to personally examine the building and report if the Provisional Government was in actual possession of the Government building. That was done that afternoon.

Q. What time?

A. Between 4 and 5.

Q. What time was the interview with the Queen?

A. After 4, and ended at 6.

Q. You took reply?

A. Mr. Neumann took the reply to Mr. Dole.

Q. Now, when this interview was going on between you, the cabinet ministers, and the Queen, it was known then that the Government had been recognized?

A. That the Queen knew it? I do not think she was told. I do not remember of it being spoken of.

Q. Didn't you know it?

A. I think I knew it.

Q. Didn't these ministers know it then?

A. They may have been present. I can not say. The Provisional Government were all present when Mr. Stevens recognized it as the *de facto* government.

Q. What I mean is this: Before you took the message of the Queen back—this protest—the Provisional Government had been recognized?

A. Yes; that is my impression.

Q. Had that been done at the time you left the Government house to go with the cabinet ministers to talk with the Queen?

A. If my memory serves me right, it had.

Q. Did not the cabinet officers know of it at this time?

A. I can not say.

Q. What do you know about the contents of the constitution she wanted to proclaim?

A. It is too long to write down. I can tell you my connection with it.

Q. Have you seen it?

A. No.

Q. What is the aspiration of the native mind as to the form of government?

A. I think that their ambition is to obtain the power through the vote. They have tasted what it is to hold the control by the vote, and they are very tenacious of that right. They are to a certain extent clannish in that idea; but the trouble comes in that they have not used that power wisely, and it is the fact of the Polyne-sians combining in their votes to retain the power—and forgetting the intelligent power of the Anglo-Saxons, even when in a minority—that has caused the trouble. The real break in the Hawaiian system of government commenced at the time of Kamehameha V, when he took away their old constitution and gave them a constitution of his own making. That started revolutions in this country. There is the starting point where the roads diverged which has brought about the succession of unrest in different governments from that day to this. Now, the Hawaiians from that date, or within close proximity to it, commenced to feel what it was to have the vote, and what influence they could exert, and naturally the Hawaiian, as the weaker race, have attempted in every succeeding Legislature to work together, but there has always been a disintegration in every Legislature. They could not hold themselves together compactly as a body. Whenever they have had the opportunity to exercise this power it has not been at the level of the intelligent Anglo-Saxon idea of making laws or carrying out a system of government. It has chafed the Anglo-Saxon. He would not tolerate it. He has found that he could control it indirectly, if he could not directly, by his superior education and intelligence. The Hawaiians had grown to a feeling of independence, and in company with the Queen they wanted to throw off that Anglo-Saxon domination which has been with them and controlled them all these years. When it came to that point that they felt that they could do it, then the clash came. Of course there are other reasons which brought it about. But it is the clashing of two nationalities for supremacy.

Q. That was the great underlying cause? The financial questions were incidental questions?

A. That was the underlying cause—the Hawaiian thinking, because he had a majority of votes, that it gave him power. He didn't recognize that the intelligence and strong will of the Anglo-Saxon would beat him every time.

Q. The Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1891 states that in the general election for 1890 the total vote for nobles throughout the islands was 3,187, and that the total vote for representatives was 11,671. That is about correct?

A. I should judge so—that is a very correct source of information.

Q. That would make 8,484 more for representatives than for nobles?

A. Yes.

Q. Does that difference grow out of the fact that there is no moneyed qualification to vote for representatives, but for nobles there is required a property qualification of \$3,000 (unincumbered) or an income of \$600?

A. Unquestionably. That disparity of numbers, if it had been carried to a fine point, would have been very much larger, but there was and is a laxity in the admittance of many people to vote for nobles.

Q. Now, that 3,187 votes for nobles was generally a white vote, was it not?

A. There was a good many Hawaiians in that vote for nobles.

Q. What proportion would you say as between whites and natives?

A. I think those statistics could be got for you. It would not be wise for me to say. I should think about 25 per cent.

Q. Native vote?

A. Yes.

Q. The balance was a white vote?

A. Yes.

Q. It was in the power, then, of the whites united to elect the body of nobles, was it not?

A. The whites as a rule used all their influence to control the noble vote.

Q. Why did the whites use all their influence to control the noble vote?

A. Because it was their only hope of controlling or influencing legislation.

Q. How many nobles and how many representatives were there under the constitution?

A. Equal—about 24 each.

Q. If the whites could get the 24 votes of the nobles, then they had an absolute bar to any action by the representatives or the King?

A. That was the intention.

Q. If they got two or three representatives they had control of legislation so far as that legislative body was concerned?

A. If it had been carried out to its logical conclusion it would have been so, but as the result proved, they were not able to entirely control the noble vote.

Q. Now, if they had been able to entirely control the noble vote, and to get some of the representatives, they could have determined the question of the cabinet?

A. Yes.

Q. They could have removed any cabinet that did not suit them?

A. Yes; provided all the whites had banded together.

Q. I suppose sometimes the whites didn't keep banded together—and the natives in all things?

A. Yes.

Q. You had within yourselves those sources of power?

A. Yes.

Q. That was the principal cause of agitation for many years in elections?

A. Yes. Where the Hawaiian felt that his cause was weak, and it was to that point that, so far as they were able, they were striving so as to maintain the control.

Q. Now, Mr. Damon, do you think that you could have good government here on the basis of an educational qualification for voters, so as to allow everybody who could read and write to vote?

A. Yes; provided there was some strong power, as one might say it—as in an unruly school—to preserve order.

Q. Do you think that you could maintain a state government like the states of the American Union with that sort of suffrage?

A. My personal opinion is that we could grow up into that by a period of trial, until the voter appreciated what a vote really meant.

Q. How long do you think that would take to get the native population up to the high standard of the whites on that question? Can you see any time definitely or clearly?

A. I am of this opinion—that they have had so much given to them in this country—everything has been so free to them, that they have not appreciated the advantages that they have; but when they get to be deprived of the franchise for a period of, say, five years, until they have wrestled for it and waited for it, that when it is given to them eventually they will appreciate it.

Q. Do you think that in five years after annexation you could give to every native who could read and write the right to vote?

A. Yes; provided the franchise was extended to other nationalities here.

Q. What other nationalities here?

A. There is a growing Portuguese element here. There is a growing intelligent Japanese element here of the better classes, and those Chinese who are born in the country and have interests here.

Q. What sort of interests?

A. Either commercial, agricultural, or professional.

Q. You make the same qualification as to votes for all of them?

A. Yes.

Q. Suppose the Chinese were not allowed to vote—then what?

A. They have not the same desire except in isolated cases for voting that the Hawaiians, Portuguese, and Japanese have. They have not been accustomed to it.

Q. Do you allow any Japanese to vote here now?

A. No; not at present.

Q. I mean before the revolution?

A. No.

Q. Any Chinese allowed to vote?

A. No.

Q. Is there anything you desire to say Mr. Damon other than what you have said?

A. I would say that I was born here, brought up here, and have a sincere regard for the Hawaiian people, because they have many good traits. They have shown a desire, especially the generation which is now and that which is coming on, to put themselves forward if they knew how, and though they may be a diminishing race

they are a hopeful race that have not given up the struggle to keep up the Hawaiian name. If we are going to educate them it is just so much thrown away unless they can have some hope held before them that they will be recognized as men in future, and if there is anything I could do to assist them, especially the young and upright Hawaiians, I would like to do it, because they have invariably treated me—whether sovereign, chief, or common Hawaiian—with such invariable kindness that I should be lacking in manhood if I did not want to help them up if possible.

Q. As to integrity in business matters, how do they compare with people in their condition in life generally?

A. I think the mistake has been made that you take a Hawaiian and compare him with the Anglo-Saxon standard and expect him to be up even with him when he has not had time and opportunity to fit himself for that standard. You should compare the Hawaiian with what he is to-day and what he was fifty years ago.

Q. It is better to compare him with some race that exists to-day.

A. He does lack what is called backbone to carry out to a finish any project that he has.

Q. Business or otherwise?

A. Yes.

Q. But would you say that generally he was an honest man?

A. I should say so; yes.

Q. Is there any fear of violence to the persons of women on the part of the natives?

A. I think he is in advance of what is called the ordinary white man in that respect.

Q. That is a striking feature in his make up, and that is always appreciated by the best elements here?

A. Yes; and why it is so is that it is only a few years since he looked to the white men as a superior race, and he at heart feels that they are a superior race to-day.

Q. Now is that entirely correct?

A. A more powerful race, perhaps.

Q. Well now, as to another point let me ask you: Wilson lived in the bungalow with his wife and children?

A. His son is in California. He has no other child.

Q. He lived with his wife then?

A. Yes. I have heard that he had a strong influence over the Queen for many years, because Dominis, her husband, was a weak man. Wilson is a strong-willed, powerful man, and she has looked to him as a protector.

Q. He was in command of the police forces?

A. Yes; at the time, and ever since she was Queen.

Q. The Palace gates have been guarded?

A. Always.

Q. Who commanded the guards?

A. Nowlein and Wilson commanded the police force. Both were intimate friends of the Queen.

Q. He lived in the Palace?

A. He lived in the bungalow—report said so. He has his own dwelling about a mile from here.

Q. You do not understand that he and his family lived in the Palace proper, with the Queen?

A. No; they had a house in the yard.

Q. If the question of annexation was submitted to the people of these islands, with no property qualification, but only the qualification that the elector should read and write, and conducted on what is sometimes termed the Australian-ballot law, what do you think would be the result of a free expression of the people in the matter of annexation at this time?

A. The sentiment is a growing sentiment, but at this time I think a majority would not vote in favor of it, but, given time to realize it, they would.

Q. How much time do you think would be necessary to bring about such a condition of things in these islands?

A. I think if the Provisional Government is kept in very long they will home to it very quick. They do not like the Provisional Government, for the reason that it is a government that has not been placed there by their votes. I am quite sure I have given you a correct answer.

Q. At the time of the dethronement of the Queen was it known in the other islands?

A. No.

Q. They knew nothing of it until after it was accomplished?

A. They did not.

Q. Then it was accomplished by the Honolulu movement?

A. Yes.

Q. What is your condition here as to the matter of acquiescence of the natives with existing authority—their observing order?

A. If they had a real, able leader, in whom they had perfect confidence, he could collect quite a force to follow him.

Q. To attack the existing Government?

A. Yes.

Q. You do not apprehend any such movement?

A. No, unless that in a period of excitement it should spring up; and, therefore, I have advised a strong force being retained, because we did not know but in some moment of excitement somebody would take advantage of it and make trouble.

Q. What number of troops have you under pay?

A. One hundred and seventy in all.

Q. The artillery is hardly to be spoken of—but one company?

Q. How many pieces?

A. They have some eight or ten pieces, but, from motives of prudence, they have locked up the intricate parts in vaults.

Q. So far as you know, the natives have no artillery?

A. No.

Q. No arms?

A. No great quantity. They have scattered rifles and pistols.

Q. Do they amount to anything in case of contest?

A. We have no means of telling at this time.

TUESDAY, May 2, 1893.

Q. Mr. Damon, at the time of the writing of the protest of the Queen on the 17th day of January, 1893, signed by herself and Ministers, had the Provisional Government been recognized by the American Minister, Mr. Stevens?

A. It is my impression that it had been, but I can not say positively.

Q. Would the conversation you had with the Queen on that day aid you in determining that fact?

A. I do not think it would.

Q. In referring to Mrs. Wilson living with the Queen, in a previous part of this statement, did you mean to say that she stayed with her at night.

A. I meant to say that she was with the Queen a great deal of the time—both day and night.

Q. As a companion?

A. Yes; as a personal friend and companion.

Q. But where do you suppose she slept—at the bungalow or palace?

A. My impression is that her quarters were with her husband in the bungalow.

I have carefully read through the foregoing and pronounce it an accurate report of the two interviews between Mr. Blount and myself.

S. M. DAMON.

[Inclosure 4 in No. 4.]

Interview between Mr. Waterhouse and Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, May 2, 1893.

MR. BLOUNT. How long have you lived in Honolulu?

A. I came here in 1851.

Q. Born where?

A. In Tasmania.

Q. What nationality were your ancestors?

A. My father and mother were from the old country—from England.

Q. How old were you when you came here?

A. Six years old.

Q. You have lived here ever since?

A. Yes.

Q. In this city?

A. Yes, in Honolulu.

Q. Where were you on January 14, 15, 16, and 17, 1893?

A. I was in Honolulu.

Q. What was the cause of the revolution that resulted in the dethronement of Liliuokalani?

A. It started from the lottery bill and the opium bill and the bribery and corruption we had heard of. It came to me first through minister of finance John F. Colburn. That was the first intimation I had. There was no idea of the dethronement of the Queen at that time. That did not come until after the committee of safety was formed on Saturday. That was the first time we anticipated anything of the kind, but before that, on Tuesday, we called upon Mr. P. C. Jones, minister of finance. I told him what was going to happen. This information came from Mr. Colburn, the

last minister of finance. I do not know that I ought to mention it. It came from Marcus Colburn, brother of John F. Colburn. He was feeling troubled. He said, "I want to tell you, Henry, that it is of importance that the ministry should understand what John, my brother, is up to. Do not give me away. If you do I will be discharged from the office." He said in substance that Mr. P. C. Jones was to receive an anonymous letter from his brother, and he wished me to say to Mr. Jones not to be alarmed, but at the same time not to tell who it was that gave him this information; also that the Queen was going to promulgate a new constitution, and in case she was not able to get out the Wilcox ministry the plan was, after the prorogation of the legislature, to invite the four ministers over there—that is, the Wilcox ministry—and lay before them a constitution that she had prepared and in case they didn't sign they would be held prisoners. That was the information I gave to Mr. Jones. Of course he acted upon it.

The ministry after that was put out by a vote of the legislature. I can state right here that the vote was carried by bribery. The money was placed in Mr. Sam Parker's hands, some \$7 000, to assist in voting them out. Quite a number of members of the legislature—Hawaiians—came down to talk to me, those who were against putting out the ministry, and also those who were in favor of doing so. One in particular—Hoapoli—told me what he wanted was good, stable government, and he felt sure if we kept the Wilcox ministry in we would have it. He was sent for by the ex-Queen and she persuaded him. She said if he had any love for her that he would vote against the ministry. Quite a number of the other members came and asked if I would assist them in money; said that they were getting short; had been down here so long. I told them no; that was not my business. I did not propose to advance them any money. A few days after they all seemed to be quite flush, and after the legislature was prorogued they went home. They had new furniture and seemed to be well provided for in every way.

On Saturday, about 10 o'clock, John Colburn, minister of finance, came down to the office.

Q. What office?

A. My office on Queen street. He was very anxious to talk with me. I was out. When I came back I went over to his office. He had left word with his brother to say that the Queen was going to promulgate a new constitution immediately after the prorogation of the legislature, and wanted me to know. Between 1 and 2 o'clock I was up near W. O. Smith's office. That seemed to be the center then to get the news. News came down that the ex-Queen was attempting to force the ministry to sign the new constitution.

Q. Who did this news come by?

A. It was sent by Mr. Colburn to the office of W. O. Smith.

Q. By whom?

A. I can not state. There were so many there at the time. They met in the back office of W. O. Smith. There were a great many in front of the office at the time to talk over the situation. I sat beside Paul Neumann. We were all very much excited, feeling that our rights were being taken away from us, and we decided then and there we would not submit to it. After a short time we heard that the ministers had gone back to the Government house. The way they put it—they ran away. The parties who came from the Government house put it in that way. I remember stating to Mr. Neumann that I was glad we were at last of one opinion. He said this was a thing we ought not to tolerate. After discussing the matter for some time John F. Colburn and the attorney-general, Mr. Peterson, both came down. Mr. Colburn made a statement that the ex-Queen had got them into the room and had requested them to sign this new constitution, and, after talking with her sometime he said they had asked her for half an hour's time to think over it. In the meantime the natives were talking quite loud and as Mr. Colburn expressed it, he thought it was about time for him to get out of it. So they went out the back way back to the Government house.

Q. The back way was the direct way to the Government house?

A. No; but if they had gone out the front way the natives were all in front, and they were afraid. He wanted to know if the merchants would support them in their position. After discussing the matter there was a committee of safety appointed. They considered it very important that such a committee should be appointed. There was a great deal of talk that came to the ears of certain parties in regard to the way in which the natives had been talked up—inflammatory talk—and we all felt that it was very important we should keep a strict watch on their movements.

Q. Did you think they were in sympathy with the Queen?

A. There was what they called the Hui Kalaiaina, a lot of old men. They formerly met right opposite our office, on Queen street. They were in sympathy with her principally. After the committee of safety had been appointed we met and talked over the situation and decided to call a mass meeting.

During the meeting on Monday we were threatened that if we held any more meetings we would be arrested. Marshal Wilson came right up and said to Mr. Thurston that we would be arrested. Mr. Thurston answered right up and said if he wished to arrest us we were ready. We were not doing anything against the Government, that it was for the interest of the country that we had been appointed as a committee of safety. All that we were doing was talking in regard to a mass meeting. We had not decided when it was to be held. We decided afterwards to call a public meeting on Monday afternoon at 2 o'clock—that was the 16th.

Q. You mean you decided that on Saturday?

A. No; we decided that on Sunday after talking it over. It was to talk up the situation and to make a report from the committee of safety. The meeting was held at 2 o'clock Monday. In the meantime Marshal Wilson had sent around to all Government employes to muster in the station house, and after the meeting they all seemed to be quite demoralized on account of the number that turned out and was in sympathy with the committee of safety. The question that was uppermost in their minds was stable government. They had fully made up their minds not to allow their rights to be trampled on. After the meeting the committee of safety met again to consider what should be next done, as power had been given them by the meeting which had been held that afternoon. After discussing the matter we decided that the only course to do was to call out those who were in sympathy with us and take possession.

Q. Of what?

A. Of the Government house and take possession of the Government. That was on Monday afternoon. Monday evening we met again at my house on Neumann avenue. We there planned what should be done on Tuesday, the 17th. We met again on Tuesday morning, when the proclamation was discussed for the first time. That was the first time we had it before us. I do not remember having it before. Of course we had a committee to frame the proclamation. We met again on Tuesday morning and decided to take possession at 2 o'clock that afternoon. At 2 o'clock we marched up to the Government house, expecting to have them resist us, as we had heard the report that there was to be a hundred men up there under Mr. McCarty. We arrived up there and took possession. While we were going into the door the various volunteers kept coming into the yard with their rifles. That is as far as I know of that. Where do you want me to go from there?

Q. Just go on and tell the whole story.

A. Then the council met, after we had taken possession of the Government house, and decided to take the station house. We had only possession of the Government house and had to take the station house, where all the arms were. They had taken all arms there from various houses, so as to have them on hand. After discussing it we sent word. I think Mr. Damon went down and had an interview with the four ministers in the station house.

Q. You were not present?

A. No, I was not present. I know nothing in regard to that. Afterwards part of the ministers came up to the Government house to talk with the council.

Q. You were a member of the council?

A. I am. I was then. I was a member of the committee of safety also. They agreed to give up the station house. We took possession.

Q. Do you mean that that happened just that way? That they agreed to give it up and you took it? Do you mean that those things followed right after one another just as quick as you relate them?

A. No. Mr. Damon had to go down to the station house and Hopkins came up. The ministers were afraid to come up. They thought that it was a trap to get them up there. When they came up they said: "It does not seem to us that we need be afraid. You seem to be acting in a square, friendly manner in regard to treating us as men." They spoke of that at the time. The first thing that was done we declared martial law. That was one of the first acts.

Q. Do you know what hour the station house was given up?

A. I can not say. I was very much excited that day. I think it was somewhere near 5 o'clock.

Q. Have you anything to help you fix 5 o'clock in your mind?

A. I know we were afraid of its getting dark, and it would be much harder for us to take the building after dark, and were we planning what to do in case of darkness. That is what makes me think it was somewhere near that time.

Q. You spoke of the causes of the revolution being lottery and opium legislation and bribery. Now, as to the lottery bill, do you know of money being used there?

A. Of course I could not go on the stand and say that there was, but men who ran it were very flush.

Q. Is that what you judge from?

A. Yes.

Q. The same as to the opium bill?

A. Well, that was supposed to be a measure from the outside, as some of those in the Legislature expected to get money from the Chinese.

Q. Was that a supposition, or did you have any evidence of the fact of the use of money to pass the opium bill in the way of bribing members?

A. That is just a supposition.

Q. You spoke of money being used for purposes of bribery. Did you mean in the sense that you just stated—that it was supposition that it was done?

A. I stated it from what a party said, who could substantiate what he said.

Q. Who was he?

A. Cecil Brown.

Q. Did he tell you he would be able to prove that money was used for the purpose of getting out the ministry?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he tell you who furnished the money?

A. From the ex-Queen.

Q. He told you it came from her?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you had any knowledge of any money being used by the other side—by the reform party—in controlling votes at any time on any of these questions or any question?

A. Only what I saw in opposition papers. I do not know anything of my own knowledge.

Q. Do you know it on any information you had from others?

A. John Colburn told me that he had used money.

Q. Who did he say he got it from?

A. It was from his own money. He was trying to get the McFarland cabinet out.

Q. He was acting as a liberal?

A. Yes.

Q. And the liberal and reform party were acting together in the matter of getting out this cabinet?

A. I do not know about the reform so much. I dropped out from the reform party when they joined with the liberal. We were all split up then.

Q. Could you have voted out that cabinet unless you had had the reform party and the liberal party combined?

A. We could not. It took both parties to vote them out.

Q. Did Colburn tell you he was using his own money?

A. He claimed that he had promises from other parties.

Q. Who did he say they were?

A. He did not give me names. I was going away to the States at the time.

Q. You say on Monday Wilson came and notified the committee of safety through Mr. Thurston that he intended to arrest them?

A. He did, and Mr. Thurston replied—told him to go ahead if he saw fit to arrest us.

Q. Your statement was that he could arrest you if he wanted to—that you were doing nothing against the Government?

A. Yes; I said that. We were only discussing the meeting.

Q. Were you discussing the question of the dethronement of the Queen?

A. We were not then. We were discussing in regard to the meeting to be held.

Q. Had you in your Saturday's meeting or any time in your meetings debated the matter of the dethronement of the Queen?

A. I think we had spoken of it. We all felt we could not stand the monarchy. We had made up our minds to that.

Q. Then the expression that you were doing nothing against the Government was a strategic expression?

A. Yes. Wilson, of course, wanted very much to declare martial law then, but Cleghorn declined to sign the declaration.

Q. Who was Cleghorn?

A. He was governor.

Q. You held a mass meeting at 2 o'clock?

A. Yes; 2 o'clock on the 16th.

Q. There was no declaration for dethronement in that meeting?

A. I do not know if it came out. You could understand by expressions that they were all there for good government. Of course, they did not come right flat-footed out.

Q. How many troops had you then organized and armed; can you state accurately?

A. I can not.

Q. About how many; have you any information?

A. I have not. We were backed up by the mass meeting. Nearly all were ready at a moment's notice. Those who backed up the committee of safety were willing to back them up in everything they did.

Q. Did you poll the meeting to see how many would support you?

A. I think so. I think that they got the signatures of quite a number.

Q. How many?

A. I can not tell you.

Q. You could not say that the whole of the mass meeting signed?

A. I could not.

Q. Could you say that as many as half the mass meeting signed?

A. I should think so.

Q. Have you examined the signatures?

A. No. There were various committees. I was a committee for a portion of the rally and went around to their residences to see what arms they had and if they were prepared in case of trouble.

Q. In case of any trouble, did you tell them that you were going to dethrone the Queen and ask if they would be ready in case of resistance? Did you say that when you got signatures?

A. When I went around I didn't get signatures. I got it verbally from them to find out if they had arms and were ready to support the committee of safety.

Q. Did you mention to them the purpose to dethrone the Queen?

A. That was understood.

Q. Did you communicate to them in reference to arms?

A. The fact of the case is I did not know exactly what we were going to do.

Q. So that when you went around, you simply wanted to know if they had arms, in the event of trouble?

A. Yes.

Q. It was in that way that you judged of their sentiments in the matter of supporting the committee of safety in the effort to dethrone the Queen?

A. Yes.

Q. After the mass meeting what did the committee do?

A. The committee of safety met that afternoon shortly after the mass meeting.

Q. What did you do in that afternoon meeting?

A. We discussed the matter. We did not have a very long session in the afternoon. In the afternoon, at first, we were all going right up then and there, but afterwards considered it. The fact is, we hadn't our papers all ready. It was getting dark. We thought it was better to have daylight on our side. We decided to meet again on Monday evening and get everything in shape. It was after the mass meeting that we fully decided to take the step.

Q. What hour of Monday did you determine to take the step?

A. It was immediately after the mass meeting.

Q. Did anybody communicate the determination to the American minister?

A. I cannot say. He must have seen by the way the people were excited that day, and the incendiary talk among certain of the other side in regard to their setting fire to buildings.

Q. How many times did you hear it?

A. A great many times.

Q. How many?

A. People would keep coming into the office and meet me and say: "We are going to have trouble."

Q. Did you hear any persons say they proposed to fire the town?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many; I mean the people opposed to you?

A. No; I didn't hear the people actually say it. It was rumors from outside. It was not direct from them or they would have been locked up.

Q. You do not know anything at all of anybody having talked to Mr. Stevens about the situation on Monday in regard to the movement that you were all making or contemplated making. Was there anybody who said in the meeting that Mr. Stevens knew anything of what was going on?

A. I guess he must have kept posted.

Q. I want to know whether there was anything said by Thurston or anybody else of Mr. Stevens's knowledge of the movement?

A. I can not say positively.

Q. What is your impression?

A. My impression is that there was. I can not remember what it was that was said.

Q. Was it to the effect that he had knowledge of the movement of the reform party?

A. I do not remember. It just comes upon me as a flash.

Q. What is the impression you say you have?

A. I do not see how he could have helped it.

Q. I will ask you again. In the meeting of the committee of safety in the afternoon of Monday, after the mass meeting had adjourned, was there anything said on

the part of Mr. Thurston, or any other member of the committee of safety, indicating that the American minister knew anything of the movement of the reform party?

A. Yes; I should say that there was.

Q. By whom?

A. Either Carter or Thurston.

Q. What did they say?

A. I can not state. There was something said. It does not come to my mind now.

Q. Was the purport of it that he knew of the movement?

A. Yes, it was; that is, after the meeting.

Q. How did they know that he knew of the movement?

A. I suppose they had had an interview with him. I can not say for certain.

Q. Did they say as much?

A. That is what I understood at the time.

Q. Well, now, in that meeting was the subject discussed of asking him to land the American troops?

A. I think that was done by the committee of safety before.

Q. Were you present when they asked for the troops to be landed?

A. I was.

Q. The troops were ordered here on Monday and this mass meeting was on Tuesday?

A. No; the mass meeting was on Monday; the troops came on shore Monday evening just about dark. I might say that it was a surprise to us to hear that the troops were coming on shore.

Q. You expected them to come ashore later?

A. No; I didn't know when they were coming ashore.

Q. But you expected them to come ashore?

A. Yes; I expected they would come.

Q. By reason of any communication with the American minister?

A. No; I think it was by request of the committee of safety.

Q. I have a copy of the communication from the committee of safety of January 16, 1893—Monday.

A. Yes; Monday afternoon.

Q. What time Monday afternoon?

A. After the mass meeting.

Q. How long after?

A. I think about 5.

Q. It was after the adjournment of the mass meeting you say the request to land troops was made?

A. I think it was about 4 o'clock.

Q. What time did the mass meeting adjourn?

A. A little after 3.

Q. And then the committee of safety met?

A. We met immediately; walked down from the meeting to Smith's office.

Q. And then you took up the subject of calling on the American minister to land troops?

A. Yes.

Q. Who took that communication to him?

A. I think it was Charlie Carter. I can not be positive.

Q. Is he one of the present commissioners?

A. Yes.

Q. How long was he gone?

A. Not long.

Q. What did he say when he came back?

A. He said the marines would be landed.

Q. Did he say whether they would support the Provisional Government movement if they took the public buildings?

A. He came back and said the troops were coming ashore. That was as far as I could remember now.

Q. He brought no response in writing?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Did the committee of safety want the troops brought on shore?

A. They felt that it would be for the welfare of the town to have them ashore. We felt as a committee of safety that we had this matter in our hands and would be held responsible.

Q. Did you expect that the presence of the troops on shore would have a quieting effect on the natives and prevent any demonstration?

A. It was thought so.

Q. That was your idea?

A. Yes.

Q. You expected that when they got on shore that any hostile movement would be brought to a standstill by their presence?

- A. Yes, sir.
- Q. Suppose they had not come on shore, would you have been able to have protected yourselves?
- A. I think so; but I think there would have been a great deal of bloodshed.
- Q. Did not you always expect that American troops would be landed in case of conflict or threatened conflict?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And therefore you did not much expect a conflict after they landed?
- A. No; I thought that naturally Wilson would try to do something. I expected there would be bloodshed before we got through.
- Q. Unless American troops were landed?
- A. Yes, sir. Of course I didn't know whether they would attempt it then.
- Q. You had a meeting you say on Monday night at your house. Who was present?
- A. There were the committee of safety.
- Q. Who were they?
- A. Cooper was there. I think Wilder was not there. There was Brown, Smith, and Lansing. I do not think Suhr was there. Dole was there. We sent for Dole. Carter and Loper were there.
- Q. What was the object in sending for Mr. Dole?
- A. To ask him if he would accept the position he now holds.
- Q. What did he say?
- A. He debated in his mind. He wanted to think over it until morning.
- Q. What was Loper doing there?
- A. Loper was invited there. He was to take charge of the forces.
- Q. Was that agreed upon that night?
- A. That was agreed upon.
- Q. Did you and Mr. Loper and Mr. Carter go to the American minister that night?
- A. I didn't.
- Q. Did anybody go from your meeting?
- A. Nobody that I know of. If anyone went I know nothing about it.
- Q. Was there any hesitation on the part of Loper to take command that night?
- A. Yes; he did hesitate.
- Q. What reason did he give?
- A. That he would rather be with the marshal.
- Q. Was there anything said as to the probability of a conflict the next day?
- A. We talked over the matter with Loper; discussed what could be done. He started out to get the men together.
- Q. After he left the committee of safety?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Where were they to be placed?
- A. They were to meet at the old armory here, and from there go right down to the Government house.
- Q. Didn't you think the impression that these marines would have on the natives would be that they would not be in sympathy with them, and that they would be in sympathy with the white people?
- A. That is what I think.
- Q. You were amongst the committee of safety that went up to take charge of the Government house?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How many of you were there?
- A. I think there was fourteen, but we did not all go up.
- Q. Where did you start from?
- A. We started from W. O. Smith's office, on Fort street.
- Q. Which street did you go up going to the Government building?
- A. We went up Queen street and up to the Government house—Mr. Wilder and myself.
- Q. What street did the others go on?
- A. They went on Merchant street.
- Q. When you got to the Government building who was the first person you saw?
- A. Hassinger.
- Q. Is he a porter?
- A. He is first clerk of the interior department.
- Q. When you got there was the proclamation read immediately?
- A. The proclamation was read by Mr. Cooper.
- Q. Were there any troops there during the reading of the proclamation?
- A. I could see one or two coming in.
- Q. By the time it was concluded how many men did you have?
- A. It would be impossible for me to say how many. I was so excited at the time.
- Q. Do you remember the bringing of a paper to the Provisional Government, dated

January 17, 1893, signed by Liliuokalani and her several ministers, and printed in this document (Senate Ex. Doc. No. 56, Fifty-second Congress, second session)?

A. I do.

Q. You were then in possession of the Government building?

A. We were.

Q. Any other buildings at that time?

A. Only the Government building at that time.

Q. How long after that before you got Mr. Stevens's letter of recognition?

A. It was shortly after the station house was given over.

Q. Are you not mistaken about that?

A. No; I believe I am not. I do not think I am.

Q. What about the barracks; had they been given up?

A. They had.

Q. Who were at the barracks?

A. Nowlein.

Q. Where was Wilson?

A. He was at the station house.

Q. And he gave that up before you had notice of the recognition?

A. According to my best knowledge and belief.

Q. Was there any communication, by writing or by word, from any member of the committee of safety, or any other person by their authority, to Mr. Stevens that you planned taking the Government building?

A. Not as far as I know. It is from hearsay.

Q. Who did you hear say it?

A. It would be impossible for me to answer that.

Q. Was it understood in the committee of safety on Monday night, by anybody, that he knew you intended to take the Government building?

A. Not unless somebody left the meeting afterwards and told him.

Q. Was there anything said by any person at the meeting at your house the night before the building was taken indicating that Mr. Stevens knew of the move to take the Government building the next day?

A. I do not remember.

Q. What was your impression—did you think that he knew of your movement?

A. I did; I was in hopes that he did.

Q. Why did you think he knew of your movement?

A. It was common talk.

Q. Common talk Monday, as well as Tuesday?

A. Yes.

Q. It was common talk before the troops were landed on Monday?

A. It was common talk that we were going to make a move—that the committee of safety were urged upon to make a move.

Q. Did you all understand that Mr. Stevens's sympathies were with you?

A. Yes.

Q. How did you get the idea that his sympathies were with you?

A. From remarks made by different persons in regard to certain matters that had come up; and we felt that we had been wronged.

Q. What matters do you refer to?

A. All during the last few days and also during the session of the Legislature.

Q. He would manifest his approval and disapproval of acts of the Queen and her adherents in matters of legislation?

A. Whenever it was against the interests of the American people. Of course, a few days before that, up to Saturday, he was not here. We had a great deal of talking during that time. He lost all that.

Q. He participated freely in political discussions without exciting comment?

A. I do not know that he discussed it. People would naturally come and talk to him and open their hearts to him.

Q. And in that way they got to feel that he was in sympathy with them?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there ever any suggestion on his part to the committee of safety to desist from their movement against the Queen?

A. I have never heard of any.

Q. Was there any expectation when the troops landed that they were to enforce the authority of the Queen in bringing order in the city on the part of the committee of safety?

A. I did not hear any rumor that led me to think that. The way I understood it was that they were here to preserve order.

Q. Now, in the matter of preserving order, if the Queen's forces and the Provisional Government forces got to fighting, would that mean that he was to interfere and stop the fighting?

A. I thought he was only to protect American interests here

Q. How would he go about it?

A. I suppose that most of the Americans would naturally go for protection on American ground, and I suppose that would be up at his place or around the consulate.

Q. You expected he would protect them in those places?

A. Yes; I might say, after the meeting on Monday, there was a falling off in the ranks of the Queen's party and they felt that the stronger elements were against them. The mass meeting brought things to an issue.

Q. You anticipated that the American troops expected to protect at the consulate and American legation American citizens who resorted there for protection?

A. That is what I expected they would do, but I did not know how far they would have gone in case there was bloodshed.

Q. Did you expect them to confine themselves to operations around the legation and consulate?

A. No; I would have expected if the Queen's people overpowered us that they would, of course, have to protect her. If we came out on the top and asked for protection we would get the protection, and we felt we would be strong enough.

Q. You expected him to land his troops and protect American people at the legation and consulate until you whipped the Queen or the Queen whipped you?

A. I do not know that.

Q. Did you expect him to do more than protect American citizens who resorted to the consulate or legation for protection?

A. That in case there was any bloodshed that they would, if called upon, protect the party in power, and I expected we were going to be in power forthwith.

Q. How did you expect to get into power without a little bloodshed?

A. We knew the feeling of those who were in power then—that they were cowards; that by going up with a bold front, and they supposing that the American troops would assist us, that would help us out.

Q. Assist whom?

A. The committee of safety.

Q. That was the general calculation?

A. Yes.

Q. In the conference?

A. Yes. They felt that their being there would be a great help to them. Even their presence ashore would have done that.

Q. When did you first determine to take the building?

A. Monday.

Q. Did you talk over it at Monday afternoon session?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you then determine to do it?

A. That afternoon. We were on the point of going up that afternoon, but things were not ready and it would take until dark and we thought we had better wait until the next day.

Q. Was that the purpose you had, to get the influence of the troops for the purpose of preventing resistance on the part of the Queen's Government?

A. That was not in my mind at all.

Q. What did you want troops for? What was in your mind?

A. In my mind it was going to stop bloodshed. The very presence of them here.

Q. You expected, then, if you got them on shore that you could go on with the plan of taking possession of the Government building and other properties without bloodshed? That was your idea?

A. That was my idea.

Q. Was that the impression of the committee of safety?

A. I think that they felt just the same as I did in regard to it.

(Before leaving Mr. Waterhouse was shown the letter of January 16, from the committee of safety to Mr. Stevens, and identified it.) The letter is as follows:

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, HONOLULU, *January 16, 1893.*

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
American Minister Resident:

SIR: We, the undersigned, citizens and residents of Honolulu, respectfully represent that, in view of recent public events in this Kingdom, culminating in the revolutionary acts of Queen Liliuokalani on Saturday last, the public safety is menaced and lives and property are in peril, and we appeal to you and the United States forces at your command for assistance.

The Queen, with the aid of armed force, and accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed from those with whom she was acting, attempted to proclaim a new constitution; and while prevented for the time from accomplishing her object declared publicly that she would only defer her action.

This conduct and action was upon an occasion and under circumstances which have created general alarm and terror.

We are unable to protect ourselves without aid and, therefore, pray for the protection of the United States forces.

HENRY E. COOPER,
F. W. MCCHESNEY,
W. C. WILDER,
C. BOLTE,
A. BROWN,
WILLIAM O. SMITH,
HENRY WATERHOUSE,
THEO. F. LANSING,
ED. SUHR,
L. A. THURSTON,
JOHN EMMELUTH,
WM. R. CASTLE,
J. A. MCCANDLESS,
Citizens' Committee of Safety.

I have read the foregoing carefully, and pronounce it a correct report of my interview with Mr. Blount.

HENRY WATERHOUSE.

[Inclosure 5 in No. 4.]

Mr. Carter to Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *May 3, 1893.*

HON. JAMES H. BLOUNT,

Commissioner of the United States of America:

SIR: At your request the following statement is made of incidents of the 17th day of January last, as they came under my observation:

After dining that day (dinner hour being 5:30 o'clock, say between 6:30 and 6:40 o'clock) Officer Mehrten, of the police force, drove up to my residence in a hack, and said to me that my presence was required at the Government building, and that he would give me a seat in his carriage if I was ready. I was at once driven to the building and taken to the room of the minister of finance, where I met quite a concourse of men, among which I now recall Judge S. B. Dole, Charles L. Carter, Capt. James King, Rev. S. G. Beckwith, Hon. S. M. Damon, and some twenty or thirty other leading members of our community.

There was a deal of excitement and earnest discussion going on among groups of persons, and while standing among them I overheard among other things that Minister Stevens had recognized the new government and that a steamer was to be made ready at once to carry to San Francisco, en route to Washington, commissioners of the new government. I asked what was required of me, and was told that a committee was to be sent to the palace to inform Her Majesty the Queen that she was deposed, and to assist her in making any protest she desired to make, and that I was to be of the committee. I joined the party headed by Mr. Damon, and proceeded to the palace, where, in the blue room, was Her Majesty, one or both of the young princes, the Hon. H. A. Wideman, and Paul Neumann, Her Majesty's ministers, E. C. Macfarlane, and others. Mr. Damon informed Her Majesty of the establishment of a provisional government, and of her being deposed, and that she might prepare a protest if she wished to. An awkward pause followed, which I broke by addressing Her Majesty, expressing sympathy, and advised her that any demonstration on the part of her forces would precipitate a conflict with the forces of the United States; that it was desirable that such a conflict be avoided; that her case would be considered at Washington, and a peaceful submission to force on her part would greatly help her case; that the persons in command of her forces at the barracks and police station should be ordered to surrender. The Hon. H. A. Wideman then addressed Her Majesty, fully indorsing my advice, and adding that he believed that the result would be a repetition of the scenes of 1843, when the sovereign and flag were restored to Hawaii by Great Britain.

I was moved to advise Her Majesty as I did because it was reported on the street that Minister Stevens had said if the revolutionists obtained possession of a government building that he would recognize them as a government. I saw that the building was in possession of armed men, and knew that the forces of the U. S. S. *Boston* were near at hand, and heard that recognition was a fact.

The Hon. Paul Neumann was requested to prepare the protest for Her Majesty's signature, and I was also requested to assist in preparing the document. While the protest was in course of preparation word was sent to Marshal Wilson to disband the force at the station house and surrender the building, arms, and ammunition.

After the protest had been signed by Her Majesty and the ministers word was brought that Marshal Wilson refused to give up the station house except upon the written command of Her Majesty. The order was prepared, signed by the Queen, and sent to the marshal. The protest of the Queen was placed in the hands of President Dole, and I saw that he indorsed the document as received in due form.

Very respectfully, yours,

J. O. CARTER.

[Inclosure 6 in No. 4.]

Mr. Swinburne to Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, May 3, 1893.

Hon. J. H. BLOUNT,

Special Commissioner of United States;

SIR: In response to your verbal request for a written communication from me regarding certain facts connected with the recognition of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands by the United States minister to that country on the afternoon of January 17, 1893, I have to state as follows:

On the afternoon in question I was present at an interview between Capt. Wiltse, commanding the *Boston*, who was at that time present in his official capacity with the battalion then landed in Honolulu, and Mr. Dole and other gentlemen representing the present Provisional Government, in the executive chamber of the Government building. During the interview we were informed that the party represented by the men there present was in complete possession of the Government building, the archives, and the treasury, and that a Provisional Government had been established by them.

In answer Capt. Wiltse asked if their Government had possession of the police station and barracks. To this the reply was made that they had not possession then, but expected to hear of it in a few minutes, or very soon. To this Capt. Wiltse replied, "Very well, gentlemen, I can not recognize you as a *de facto* Government until you have possession of the police station and are prepared to guarantee protection to life and property," or words to that effect. Here our interview was interrupted by other visitors, and we withdrew and returned to the camp at Arion Hall. As far as I can recollect, this must have been about 5 o'clock p. m. About half-past 6 Capt. Wiltse left the camp, and as he did so he informed me that the United States minister to the Hawaiian Islands had recognized the Provisional Government established by the party in charge of the Government building as the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands. About half-past 7 p. m. I was informed by telephone by Lieut. Draper, who was then in charge of a squad of marines at the United States consulate, that the citizen troops had taken possession of the police station, and that everything was quiet.

Very respectfully,

WM. SWINBURNE,
Lieutenant-Commander, U. S. Navy.

[Inclosure 7 in No. 4.]

Affidavit of Mr. Hopkins.

HONOLULU OAHU, *Hawaiian Islands*, ss:

And now comes Charles L. Hopkins, of Honolulu, aforesaid, and upon oath deposes and says:

That on the 17th day of January, A.D. 1893, he arrived at the police station in Honolulu aforesaid about 2:30 p. m. o'clock and saw Mr. Antone Rosa writing a letter addressed to John L. Stevens, United States minister, and said letter was afterwards signed by Her Majesty's ministers and handed to your affiant to be delivered to the said American minister with instructions to wait for an answer. Your affiant left said police station at about 2:40 p. m. of said day in a carriage, arriving at the legation about 2:45 p. m. He saw on the verandah Miss Stevens, to whom the letter

of Her Majesty's ministers was handed. She asked if an answer was required; your affiant said "Yes."

Miss Stevens then went into the house and about ten minutes afterwards returned saying, "My father is too unwell to write an answer now, but if you will go and return in about an hour's time he will have the answer ready." Your affiant replied that his instructions were to wait for an answer, upon which she went in the house again and then came out and said, "My father will try and answer the letter." She disappeared again, and in about ten minutes came out and handed me a letter addressed to Samuel Parker, minister of foreign affairs. Your affiant then left the legation, arriving at the police station about 3:10 p. m., and handed Mr. Stevens's letter to Mr. Samuel Parker, who went into the deputy marshal's office with it. Later in the afternoon your affiant read the letter of Minister Stevens in which he stated that he recognized the Provisional Government as the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

CHARLES L. HOPKINS.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3d day of May, A. D. 1893.

[SEAL.]

F. J. TESTA,

Notary Public, First Judicial District.

[Inclosure 8 in No. 4.]

Affidavit of Peterson and Colburn.

HONOLULU OAHU, ss:

We, John F. Colburn and A. P. Peterson, being duly sworn, on oath depose and say that on the afternoon of Tuesday, January 17, 1893, we held portfolios in the cabinet of Queen Liliuokalani and were at the station house in Honolulu; that at 2:30 o'clock the Queen's cabinet addressed a letter to his excellency J. L. Stevens, asking if the report then current that he had recognized the Provisional Government was true. This letter was sent to Mr. Stevens through Hon. C. L. Hopkins. Shortly after 3 o'clock Mr. Hopkins returned with an answer from Mr. Stevens to the Queen's cabinet, stating that he, Mr. Stevens, had recognized the Provisional Government as the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands. Shortly after, Mr. S. M. Damon and Mr. C. Bolte, members of the advisory council, came to the station house to consult with the Queen's cabinet as to the situation. Mr. Damon stated that Mr. Stevens had recognized the Provisional Government and that the United States forces would assist them and that it was useless for us to resist, but asked us in the interest of peace and to save bloodshed not to do so. Mr. Damon handed us a copy of the proclamation of the committee of safety, which was read aloud by A. P. Peterson.

Shortly after 4 o'clock, nothing definite having been arrived at, the Queen's cabinet, at the request of the Provisional Government, went with Mr. Damon and Mr. Bolte to the Government building to consult with the executive council. We were in the Government building fifteen or twenty minutes, during which time Mr. S. B. Dole, President of the Provisional Government, said that he desired us to give up the station house and other Government property under our control, in the interests of law and order. We answered that it would be necessary for us to consult first with Queen Liliuokalani. We then left the Government building and together with Mr. S. M. Damon went direct to the palace. At the palace, after some consultation the Queen's cabinet came to the conclusion that it was not advisable to oppose the United States forces, Mr. Stevens having already recognized the Provisional Government, and so advised the Queen to surrender to the superior force of the United States, because of the course of Mr. Stevens, American minister, and of such recognition. At this time, 5:30 o'clock, the Queen's Government had Possession of the station house, barracks, and palace, nine-tenths of the arms and ammunition on the island except that in the possession of foreign governments, and a large body of men under arms. The Queen accepted the advice and her protest was immediately drawn up and signed, and she instructed her cabinet to attend to all necessary matters, which was then done.

The reply of Mr. Stevens, stating that he had recognized the Provisional Government, was placed in the hands of Hon. Paul Neumann, who carried it with his other documents on his mission to Washington, and although we have made every effort to procure the same have been unable to do so and do not know its whereabouts at the present time.

JOHN F. COLBURN.

A. P. PETERSON.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3d day of May, 1893.

[SEAL.]

J. H. THOMPSON,

Notary Public, Island of Oahu.

[Inclosure 9 in No. 4.]

Interview between Hawaiian Patriotic League and Mr. Blount.

MAY 2, 1893.

[Committee of delegates of all the branch associations of the Hawaiian Patriotic League: John Richardson, chairman; J. A. Akins, Ben. Naukana, J. K. Kaihiopulani, S. H. K. Ne.]

Q. Mr. Richardson, are you chairman of this delegation?

A. Yes.

Q. How are delegates from these Islands selected?

A. They are selected by meetings in different districts held by people who have become members of local clubs.

Q. Organized for what purpose?

A. Organized for the purpose of beseeching the maintenance of their independence, and also the perpetuation of a monarchical form of government and against annexation.

Q. How many persons are in these several clubs.

A. The number varies in each club, but the approximate total of the various clubs represented here is to the tune of about 7,000 voters.

Q. How do you get at that number?

A. We have had rolls from the different clubs, and as the Central Club wishes to get time to have the names recorded in the register of the Central Club in Honolulu we have been unable to bring with us the original document holding the list of the names.

Q. How do you get the figures 7,000?

A. By taking the total from each club.

Q. Have you had the totals from each club?

A. Yes.

Q. And putting them together makes an aggregate of 7,000?

A. Yes.

Q. Are they all voters?

A. They are all voters.

MR. BLOUNT. I will accept it as I have all memorials as a matter of information. I can not enter into a discussion of it with you. I am glad to meet you, gentlemen.

[Inclosure 10 in No. 4.]

*Affidavit of Mr. Wilson.*HONOLULU, OAHU, *Hawaiian Islands*, ss:

And now comes Charles B. Wilson, of Honolulu aforesaid, and upon oath deposes and says:

That on the 17th day of January, A. D. 1893, between 3:30 and 4 p. m., of that day, while he was in charge of the police station as marshal of the Kingdom, he saw and read a letter from the American Minister Stevens addressed to Her Majesty's ministers, wherein Minister Stevens stated that he had recognized the Provisional Government as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

CHAS. B. WILSON.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of May, A. D. 1893.

[SEAL.]

F. J. TESTA,

Notary Public, First Judicial Circuit.

No. 8.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 5.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,

May 6, 1893.

SIR: Since my last dispatch I examined Mr. Bolte, a member of the advisory council. He and Mr. Waterhouse, whose evidence I forwarded to you, stated positively that the station house and barracks were

delivered up before Mr. Stevens recognized the Provisional Government. The manner of their testimony caused me to suspect their truthfulness. I had learned from members of the cabinet of the ex-Queen of correspondence with Mr. Stevens which contradicted these assertions. Some weeks ago I had called upon him for the legation records, and was furnished with a book containing correspondence with the State Department. This threw no light on the question of fact I was seeking to settle.

On the 5th instant I went to the legation, feeling that such papers must be there in some form.

In the conversation he spoke of a paper from the Queen which was in his files; said that these files were put in a volume when there were enough to make up one. I said I would like to have the volume for January. He said it had not been made up. I then asked him if he had a paper which the ministry had addressed to him inquiring if he had recognized the Provisional Government. He went out to look for it and returned with a book entitled "Correspondence with Hawaiian Government." In this he showed me a memorandum he had made of a reply to a communication from the ministers, a copy of which I send (Inclosure No. 1).

Believing that he must have the communication itself, this morning I sent my secretary, Mr. Mills, to ask for it. He returned with the paper saying that before giving it to him Mr. Stevens seemed to be at a loss as to whether he had such a paper. This same difficulty occurred when I called upon him for the communication from the committee of safety asking for the landing of the troops of the *Boston*.

I inclose herewith a copy of the letter in question (Inclosure No. 2).

You will see that in the memorandum referred to he says the letter was received about 4 or 5 p. m. on January 17 and that he informed them that he had already recognized the Provisional Government.

In the conversation I had with him when he turned over the record of the correspondence with the Hawaiian Government he said he had recognized the Provisional Government before the barracks and station house had been surrendered; that he did not consider their surrender of any importance.

In my last dispatch Lieut. Swinburne fixes the surrender of the station house at about half-past 7 o'clock. This morning he called and informed me that Lieut. Draper had said to him yesterday that the station house was not surrendered until after dark. I sent for Lieut. Draper and obtained from him a statement, which I inclose (Inclosure No. 3).

I consider that it is now established beyond controversy that Mr. Stevens recognized the Provisional Government before the barracks and station house had been surrendered or agreed to be surrendered.

Before the committee of thirteen went up to proclaim the Provisional Government they sent a gentleman to see if there were any troops in the Government building. On learning the fact that there were none, the committee quietly went up in two or more squads and, uniting at the Government building, read their proclamation.

Without making any demand for the surrender of the palace, in which were the Queen and her friends, with some 50 soldiers; the barracks, a little beyond the palace, with about 80 men, well equipped with small arms and artillery, and with the station house, some 600 yards off, occupied by some 200 men, well armed and equipped, they asked and obtained from the American minister recognition as a Government *de facto*. On this basis the minds of the cabinet and Queen were operated upon to give up the barracks and station house

and to have her surrender to the Provisional Government. In this way the revolution reached its solution.

I invite your attention to a letter, dated on the 16th of January, 1893, from Mr. Stevens to Mr. W. M. Giffard, as follows:

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 16, 1893.

MR. W. M. GIFFARD:

SIR: Please allow Capt. Wiltse and his men the use of the opera house hall for a fair compensation for the same.

Yours, truly,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

This letter was obtained from Mr. Giffard, who had charge of the building as agent for Spreckels & Co. He declined to let Mr. Stevens have it, because, he said, if any damage occurred while the American troops occupied it it would affect the insurance, as the building was liable to be damaged; that in the insurrection of 1889, when Wilcox and his followers had obtained possession of the palace, the Government forces had used the upper portion of this building to fire on the insurrectionists and that more than \$1,000 worth of damage was then done to it by the cannon used by Wilcox and his followers.

This building, Lieut. Swinburne informs me, was agreed upon on board the *Boston* before the troops were landed as the best place for the location of the *Boston's* men. He suggested on shipboard that the troops be quartered near the wharf, so as to be near to their base of supply, the same having been so done when Admiral Skerrett landed troops in 1874. Capt. Wiltse and Mr. Stevens thought it was better that they should be located in the opera house. Failing to get this building, Arion hall, which is on a line with it and adjoins it, and is across the street from the Government building, was obtained for the location of the troops. The men were placed in the rear of Arion hall, but in full view of the palace. A street intervened between the Government building and the palace. It was about 350 yards from one of these buildings to the other.

The American troops were on the same side of the latter street with the Provisional Government troops, which did not probably number 100 men. You will see from the map prepared by Mr. Loevenstein, which I have previously forwarded to you, the location of Arion hall, the Government building, the palace, the barracks, the station house, and the armory. If the Queen's troops should have attacked the Provisional Government troops our men were in danger of being injured, which might have brought them into collision with the Queen's troops. The same is true if the Provisional Government troops had advanced on the palace. If the American troops were landed to protect American property and the persons of American citizens, their location at this place, unfortunately, signified a different purpose.

The Queen, her cabinet, and her followers undoubtedly believed, from the location of the American troops and the quick recognition of the Provisional Government by Mr. Stevens, that the United States forces would aid the Provisional Government forces in the event of a conflict.

The request of the committee of safety, on which the landing of the troops was made, did not ask for the protection of the property and persons of American citizens. This paper you have already in your possession. It was signed by Germans, Americans, and natives. Mr. W. O. Smith and Mr. L. A. Thurston, the leading men signing this paper, are natives of these islands, and seemed to be concerned to have

the troops protect themselves and all others in the islands from the operation of the Queen's forces.

In one of the local papers, yesterday morning, there appeared an alleged interview with Mr. Loud, a member of Congress from California, in which he is reported as criticising the authorities for not having arrested and sent Liliuokalani out of the island. In view of your telegraphic instruction of the 25th ultimo (which was received by me on the 4th instant) and the possibility that Mr. Loud's alleged advice might be pursued and that hostile collision between the friends of the Queen and the Provisional Government might grow out of it, I had an interview this morning with the attorney-general, Mr. W. O. Smith, in which I invited his attention to the reported interview with Mr. Loud. I asked him if he felt free to say to me whether or not the arrest of the Queen was contemplated; that I desired the information because such action on the part of the Provisional Government might produce a condition of affairs which required action on my part. He said that this action was not contemplated by the Provisional Government, but that they were prepared, in the event of hostilities, to take care of certain prominent persons amongst the Royalists. I asked him if those included the Queen. He answered, "confidentially, Yes."

The feeling of the annexationists is very intense, and doubtless the Provisional Government is very much pressed to take action against the person of the Queen by confinement or deportation. Should this occur I believe that it will produce a bloody conflict.

It is my purpose soon to announce to American citizens that if they participate in any conflict in behalf of either party I shall direct that the American troops shall not be used for their protection. This, I think, to be in line with your views. I believe that it will tend to prevent extreme action on the part of the Provisional Government.

I have not and shall not intimate any desire to the Provisional Government as to what they should do with the Queen or with any other person connected with the royal cause.

I do not see any occasion for my remaining longer here for the purpose of making further inquiry as to the condition of affairs in the islands. I believe, however, that my departure prior to your sending out a successor to Mr. Stevens would result in serious trouble. The attorney-general said to me this morning there would be no trouble while I remained here, but he had some apprehensions if I should leave.

The native population seem to have great respect for me, growing out of the idea that I represent the President of the United States in an effort to get at the causes of the revolution and a hope that out of that investigation they will regain the political power they have lost.

I have been careful every moment to avoid making an impression on either party that I was here to interfere in their domestic affairs or for any purpose other than that of inquiry, or to indicate what disposition you or the President might make of any information I should report.

Do not infer from these observations that I have any desire to remain here any longer.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

P. S.—Since closing the foregoing dispatch the affidavits marked 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 have been handed to me.

(Filed with other affidavits.)*

[Inclosure 1 in No. 5.]

Extract from records of the United States legation.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH HAWAIIAN GOVERNMENT.

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

About 4 to 5 p.m. of this date—am not certain of the precise time—the note on file from the four ministers of the deposed Queen, inquiring if I had recognized the Provisional Government came to my hands, while I was lying sick on the couch. Not far from 5 p. m.—I did not think to look at the watch—I addressed a short note to Hon. Samuel Parker, Hon. Wm. H. Cornwell, Hon. John F. Colburn, and Hon. A. P. Peterson—no longer regarding them ministers—informing them that I had recognized the Provisional Government.

JOHN L. STEVENS,
United States Minister.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 5.]

*Queen's ministers to Mr. Stevens.*DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
*Honolulu, January 17, 1893.*His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary:

SIR: Her Hawaiian Majesty's Government having been informed that certain persons to them unknown have issued proclamation declaring a Provisional Government to exist in opposition to Her Majesty's Government, and having pretended to depose the Queen, her cabinet and marshal, and that certain treasonable persons at present occupy the Government building in Honolulu with an armed force, and pretending that your excellency, in behalf of the United States of America, has recognized such Provisional Government, Her Majesty's cabinet asks respectfully: Has your excellency recognized said Provisional Government? and if not, Her Majesty's Government, under the above existing circumstances, respectfully requests the assistance of your Government in preserving the peace of the country.

We have the honor to be your excellency's obedient servants,

SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
WM. H. CORNWELL,
Minister of Finance.
JOHN F. COLBURN,
Minister of the Interior.
A. P. PETERSON,
Attorney-General.

[Inclosure 3 in No. 5.]

Statement of Lieut. Draper.

May 5, 1893. Herbert L. Draper, Lieutenant Marine Corps, attached to Boston: I was at the United States consulate-general at the time the Provisional Government troops went to the station house and it was turned over to them by Marshal Wilson. It was about half past 7 o'clock. The station house is near the consulate-general on the same street. As soon as it happened I telephoned it to the ship. I wanted my commanding officer to know, as I regarded it as an especially important thing.

I was the commanding officer at the consulate-general. There was no other United States officer there at the time excepting myself.

The above is a correct statement.

HERBERT L. DRAPER,
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps.

No. 9.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 6.]

HONOLULU, H. I., May 9, 1893.

SIR: There has appeared in annexation papers on several occasions innuendoes of an offensive character relating to myself. It has been my custom to give no attention to them, because of the greatness of our own Government and the weakness of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

On my arrival here—the opinion obtaining through the newspapers, especially of American origin, that I was to investigate, amongst other things, the disposition of the people of the Islands towards annexation—a campaign in the form of signatures to petitions for and against annexation commenced, and has been continuing until this hour.

Manifestation of the native element soon became very pronounced against annexation, whereupon the papers of the annexationists began to charge the ex-Queen with treason and to insist upon her arrest and trial for treason or her deportation. With this I had nothing to do.

This state of opinion of a majority of the people against annexation has become so well defined as to renew the cry for her arrest in more ardent temper.

Yesterday afternoon the Hawaiian Star, the organ of the annexation club, contained an article, a copy of which is inclosed herewith. (Inclosure No. 1.)

I felt aggrieved at the dishonorable implication as to my own conduct with the Queen contained therein. I immediately addressed a letter to President Dole, a copy of which is inclosed. (Inclosure No. 2.)

Four hours afterward I received a reply from Mr. Dole, a copy of which I send. (Inclosure No. 3.)

The language used is not only objectionable in its offensive reference to myself, but was designed to intimidate antiannexationists in communicating their views to me, and so prevent any successful acquisition of the true state of the public mind in these Islands in its relation to the Provisional Government.

This latter criticism I did not communicate to the Provisional Government, regarding it as inconsistent with my instructions not to interfere in domestic controversies here.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 6.]

Extract from the Hawaiian Star, Monday, May 8, 1893.

WHAT OF THE QUEEN?

The ex-Queen professed to have yielded her throne to the "superior force of the United States," and has kept up that pretense since. Her present attitude is one of waiting. Before doing anything further she desires to know whether or not the United States means to take the islands. From such an attitude it follows that if President Cleveland and Congress should decide to keep their hands off Hawaii, then Liliuokalani will deem herself absolved from her obligation to stay quiet. It must be noted that she has never yet surrendered directly to the Government, or even entered into an armistice with it. She calls herself Queen, and rarely signs her name to a letter without the royal R. It is her hope, that if annexation is defeated, to be

restored, and she is now the center and nucleus of all the royal politics in the islands which look to that end.

So long as things remain in their present shape the ex-Queen is not particularly dangerous; but if the Hawaiian question should be left to stew in its own juice, then she might become an unpleasant quantity to deal with. The United States would have formally refused to accept her surrender. She would have yielded to no one else, and would be at liberty to negotiate with, say, the Japanese for a protectorate. Certainly, her right to treat with a foreign envoy has not been denied, as witness her unhindered interviews with Commissioner Blount. Out of such a conjunction of affairs as this might come a vast amount of political trouble and expense. Even if Liliuokalani did not seek foreign help—as she was quick to do at the beginning of her troubles in a letter to Queen Victoria—her presence here would continually breed mischief, provoke unrest, alarm capital, excite the emotions of her old party, harass the existing Government, require a large military force to be sustained, and cause an impression to go out that if the new régime should at any time be caught napping the old order of things might be restored.

It is pretty generally admitted now that it was a mistake not to have shipped the ex-Queen abroad when she was deprived of her throne. That was one of the errors of a hurried time which, if it had been avoided, would have left the annexationist cause in much better shape than it is. But what is past can not be mended. Only that which is to come may be kept from the need of mending.

The Star believes it to be the duty of the Government to protect itself and the people from the danger that Liliuokalani's presence here might breed by sending her out of the country under the act—which may be enlarged if necessary—that deals with “undesirable residents.” This course might, it is true, work a certain hardship, but compared with the hardship that the ex-Queen's continuance on this soil would visit upon property and business interests, it would hardly be worth noting. Its severity might, of course, be modified by some provision for the expenses of travel abroad, but this is a matter of detail. The main thing is to have the disturbing influence of the royal pretender out of the way when the time comes to tranquilize the country and get it ready for the responsibilities of its future. No better preliminary to that status could be had than the deportation of the woman at once. This would afford ample time, before the American decision could be had, to get the country perfectly in hand and to meet anything that might happen.

There need be no fear that such an act would make a bad impression in the United States or elsewhere, as it is one of the unwritten laws of popular uprisings that when the people overthrow the throne, the occupant of it must leave the country. So far as Hawaii is concerned every sensible politician in America would justify deportation under the existing circumstances.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 6.]

Mr. Blount to Mr. Dole.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *May 9, 1893.*

HIS EXCELLENCY SANFORD B. DOLE,
*President of the executive and advisory councils
 of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.*

SIR: In the Hawaiian Star of May 8, an editorial headed “What of the Queen?” to which I invite your attention, uses this language:

“Certainly her right to treat with a foreign envoy has not been denied, as witness her unhindered interviews with Commissioner Blount.”

It has been my purpose to studiously avoid any word or act calculated to produce on the mind of any individual an impression of a disposition on my part to interfere with the political affairs of these islands. In this article I am made to hold unhindered interviews with the ex-Queen Liliuokalani. These alleged interviews with me are treated as treasonable on her part. This can not be true without an implication of dishonorable conduct on my part. As such, it is insulting to the Government of the United States.

I have held one interview with the ex-Queen, of which you had knowledge before and afterwards. This is the only one. I can not believe that the editorial, in so far as it relates to myself, can be approved by the Provisional Government. I respectfully request a reply.

With assurances of the highest consideration, I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

[Inclosure 3 in No. 6.]

*Mr. Dole to Mr. Blount.*DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, May 9, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of even date calling my attention to an editorial in last evening's issue of the Hawaiian Star touching on your interviews with the ex-Queen.

The Government sincerely regrets the publication referred to in your communication, and I hasten to assure you that it is in no way responsible for the expressions of that or any other paper, and thoroughly disapproves of anything that may be published that can be taken as implying any action on your part that is not entirely consistent with your mission.

The management of the Star have promised to make the *amende honorable* in this evening's issue.

With the sincere hope that nothing may arise that will in any way disturb the cordial and amicable relations that exist between the authorities of the Provisional Government and yourself as the honored representative of a nation that is our nearest and greatest friend, I have the honor to be with the highest respect and consideration,

Your most, etc.,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Hon. JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States, Honolulu.

No. 10.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 7.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *May 24, 1893.*

SIR: Recurring to the correspondence between President Dole and myself in relation to the article in the Hawaiian Star, I inclose herewith a copy of an additional letter which I wrote to him. (Inclosure No. 1.)

Subsequently Vice-President Damon called to see me in relation to the matter, and I said I should not ask the attention of the Government hereafter to any articles of an offensive character in that paper; that I would forward any offensive matter contained therein to the State Department, with the statement that it was the organ of the annexation club, and that the Government was unable to control its conduct. A similar statement was made by me to the Attorney-General, Mr. Smith. In the conversation with me he deplored the article and added that the editor had told the cabinet some days before that he had positive proof of two long interviews between myself and the Queen.

Since this correspondence with President Dole this paper has changed its tone into one of frequent compliment to myself. I presume the Annexation Club found that my reporting their offensive articles was not likely to advance their cause, and changed what had been the uniform course of the paper theretofore. The demeanor of this paper was doubtless intended to impress the native population with the idea that they could not only dominate them, but could insult the representative of the United States with impunity. I shall probably have no more trouble in this direction.

More than 8,000 names have been signed to memorials by the Women's Hawaiian Patriotic League, asking for the restoration of Queen Liliuokalani.

Memorials have been signed against annexation by 7,500 native voters. The delegates of the latter organization report that the request for the restoration of the Queen was omitted because they feared that if inserted in their memorial they would be arrested for treason.

The Annexation Club inform me that they have on their books 5,180 names for annexation. This is signed generally by American citizens whether they have registered here as voters or not. Some natives have signed this last document, who are on the police force and occupy other government positions—doubtless in order to hold their places. Other natives who have signed are the hired laborers of sugar planters, having been systematically worked upon to do so, and, feeling largely dependent upon the planters for employment, fear discharge.

I have put this question to several leading annexationists, whose statements have been taken in writing and certified to by them: "If the question of annexation were submitted to the people of these Islands, who were qualified to vote for representatives under the Constitution of 1887, under the Australian ballot system, which has been adopted by your legislature, what would be the result?" They have almost without exception declared that annexation would certainly be defeated.

Threats to arrest the Queen and deport leading natives have been repeatedly urged in the annexation organs, and have caused the native people uneasiness and alarm. It has restrained outward manifestations of interest on their part. These threats were founded on charges that the Queen and these natives were engaged in treasonable conduct in urging the natives to vote against annexation.

There is not an annexationist in the islands, so far as I have been able to observe, who would be willing to submit the question of annexation to a popular vote. They have men at work in all of the islands urging the natives to sign petitions for annexation. They seek to impress them with the opinion that if annexed they will be allowed the right to vote. Quite a number of petitions have been signed by natives asking for annexation, provided they were allowed the right to vote. In other instances delegations made up of white men and natives have brought in small petitions signed by natives, and on being asked if the natives were in favor of annexation without the right to vote have always answered that they were not. While this is done I have never yet found an annexationist who did not insist that stable government could not be had without so large a restriction of the native vote as would leave political power in the hands of the whites.

I have had ample opportunity to observe the feeling of the native population on the question of annexation. There is no doubt that the whole race—men and women—are deeply concerned about the independence of their native land. Their mind is not turning to England or to any other country for protection. Their devotion to the United States is continually asserted. If the question of annexation by the United States should be made to depend upon the popular will in these islands the proposition had as well be abandoned at once. There are a great many whites here in addition to the natives who are opposed to annexation, and who are now preparing to sign memorials of this character to the President of the United States.

While I have presented these observations I wish here to assert that I have abstained from expressing any wish for or against annexation

to any person in these islands. I have by no act of mine sought to influence opinion on this subject, either one way or the other.

Hereafter I shall discuss this matter from official data, and from the evidence of persons who have filed certified statements with me.

There frequently occurs in Mr. Stevens' correspondence with the State Department the allegation that the Queen has for a paramour ex-Marshall Wilson. Ordinarily such scandalous statements would be unworthy of attention. Its use to prejudice the minds of the American people against her in connection with the question of annexation has caused me to make some inquiry into the subject. A number of reputable gentlemen have stated in writing their utter disbelief in this allegation. She has been received with apparent admiration through all the years of her reign in the most refined circles in this city. The white population have resorted eagerly to the palace to participate in its social enjoyments without any reserve on account of the Queen's character.

On April 19, 1892, the American minister gave her a breakfast, to which a number of prominent persons were invited.

Wilson is ten years the junior of the ex-Queen. He married a girl who was reared by her and lived with her at the time of his marriage.

He has never lived in the palace. He lived in the palace grounds with his wife, in a building 75 yards from the palace, where the Queen resided. They were moved into this building after the death of the Queen's husband at the instance of the Queen. Wilson is universally recognized as a brave man and loyal to the Queen. The frequent revolutions here on the part of the whites doubtless caused her to make him marshal, and put him at the head of the police force, which was the real military force of the Kingdom. Because of his marriage with a native woman, and her connection with the Queen, and her confidence in his courage and fidelity, she trusted him rather than any of the whites in this position.

I forbear any further statement on this subject at this time. Evidently this charge against the Queen has for its foundation the looseness which comes from passionate and vindictive partisan struggles in Honolulu.

On the 16th instant I published my instructions in full, accompanied by the following statement:

While I shall abstain from interference between conflicting forces of whatever nationality for supremacy, I will protect American citizens not participating in such conflict.

I send you newspaper comments on the instructions and the foregoing declaration, in the nature of an interpretation of my instructions. (Inclosure No. 2).

From what I can learn many American citizens intensely active in the late revolution in these islands, and promoters of the cause of annexation, and supporters of the Provisional Government, took offense at the latter language. It seems very difficult for that class of persons to understand why they can not be permitted to participate in political and military movements on these islands with a guarantee of protection from opposing forces by the troops of the United States.

On the 19th instant I published your dispatch of May 9 in relation to my appointment as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States. I believed it calculated to produce an impression on the minds of the people claiming to be American citizens that under no false pretense of preserving order or protecting American

citizens could they be allowed to command the services of American troops to promote political schemes here.

I invite your attention to a communication and plat from Admiral Skerrett, which I inclose herewith. (Inclosure No. 3.)

The plat should have shown Music Hall immediately on the corner of the block, and the side of Arion Hall next to the Music Hall nearly on a line with the front line of the Government building.

It is easy to see that any attack on the Government building by the Queen's troops from the east would have exposed our men to their fire. Any attempt to occupy Music Hall and Arion Hall by the Queen's troops for the purpose of taking the Government building would have encountered the American troops. Any attempt by the Queen's troops from the direction of the palace would have exposed our troops to their fire.

In the insurrection of 1889, Music Hall was occupied by sharpshooters of the Government, who contributed more to the suppression of the insurrection than any other forces. This place Mr. Stevens sought to obtain for the United States troops on the 16th of January last, and failing in this, selected Arion Hall.

Admiral Skerrett well says that the place was well chosen if the design of Mr. Stevens and Capt. Wiltse was the support of the Provisional Government troops. It was certainly suggestive of this design to the Queen and her adherents.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 7.]

Mr. Blount to Mr. Dole.

HONOLULU, H. I., May 10, 1893.

Hon. SANFORD B. DOLE,

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Honolulu, H. I.

SIR: Your communication of the 9th instant, in reply to my letter of the same date, concerning a reflection upon myself as Commissioner of the United States, is acknowledged.

It gives me pleasure to be assured, of what I had previously believed, that a most cordial feeling on the part of your Government existed toward myself as the representative of the Government of the United States, and that the article referred to would not be approved of by your Government.

The disavowal in the *Star* of yesterday did not at all meet the situation. I shall not ask any further action in relation thereto, preferring to content myself with your communication rather than to expose my Government to the charge of ungenerous action in the present condition of affairs in these Islands, by insisting on further and fuller apology on the part of the managers of the *Star*.

With assurances of the highest consideration,

I am, etc.

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 7.—*Hawaiian Star*, May 16, 1893.]

Blount's instructions.

Three mooted points were settled as follows by the text of the instructions given Commissioner Blount by Secretary Gresham:

I. The Commissioner brought with him no authority to restore the ex-Queen, nor to interfere in any way with the domestic policy of the Provisional Government.

II. The power of the United States will be exercised against foreign aggrandizement upon these islands.

III. The settlement of annexation does not fall within the scope of the Commissioner's duty, but is especially reserved to the President and Congress.

As to the announcement made by Commissioner Blount that he will not interfere in any struggle that may arise locally for the possession of this Government, except to protect American citizens not participating in the conflict, and to keep foreign powers from taking a hand in it, we do not see why it should excite either surprise or indignation. It is not the business of the United States, except where the Monroe doctrine is threatened, to concern itself in the internal quarrels of any foreign country. Neither is it considered the right or privilege of any nation to shield its citizens who may be in the military or civil service or in the political activities of a foreign state from the legal consequences of their acts. America gave no protection to Americans who aided the Cuban revolutionists; and during the civil war Great Britain never raised a protest if an English-built blockade runner, commanded by a subject of the Queen, manned by British sailors, and loaded with Birmingham consignments, was shelled and sunk by the United States blockading fleets. By these examples it is easy to see that Mr. Blount merely expresses a principle of international law in the appendix to his instructions; and that the statement of his exact position, far from being a superfluous hint to the "abhorrent and forbidden forces" in Hawaiian politics to do their worst, was a proper recognition of his duty to his own Government and countrymen, serving a useful purpose here, in that it showed the annexation party its exact bearings and forewarned it that it might be forearmed.

By way of side comment, it may be well enough to say that in the remote event of a political *émeute* on these Islands, there will be no necessity for Commissioner Blount to land forces to protect any American's property. No citizen of the United States worthy of the name will need to appeal to him for such assistance here. The Government is in American hands, and so long as the United States is pledged by its "consistent and established policy" to keep foreign powers from interfering with it, the existing administration may be relied upon to maintain its place against any and all comers, and to see that the homes and families of its citizens are held inviolate.

[Extract Hawaiian Daily Bulletin, May 16, 1893.]

Mr. Blount's instructions.

"Hon. James H. Blount's instructions from the Secretary of State of the United States, which the Bulletin had the honor of presenting for the first time to the public, contain nothing contrary to the opinions held, from the first until now, by the opponents of the revolutionary scheme of annexation regarding the Special Commissioner's mission to these Islands. It was from the opposition side that the intimation came, in advance of any mention in the United States press, that a commission of investigation was to be sent here by President Cleveland. This news was contemptuously denied by the press of the party of violence, but next mail steamer brought its definite confirmation. Among other things to be investigated the instructions denominate "the causes of the revolution by which the Queen's Government was overthrown." This certainly includes the question of whether or not the United States diplomatic representative and the naval commander acting with him contributed aid to that revolution. An answer in the affirmative to this question returned by the Commissioner as a result of his investigation would lead inevitably to possibilities of the nature of those that the revolutionary press is in unwise haste to declare are beyond the scope of the Commissioner's power.

"The instructions published are only the original ones, and they inform the Commissioner that he is expected to correspond with the Secretary of State, "communicating information or soliciting special instruction on such points as" he "may deem necessary." As there will by to-morrow's expected mail have been ample time for a reply to voluminous information communicated to Washington, doubtless coupled with the solicitation of special instructions based on the facts as reported, it is only the usual rashness of the revolutionary press from the beginning which seeks to impress its readers with the view that this, that, or the other thing is absurd and impossible. The fact stands out, more prominent than almost anything else, that the United States Government, contrary to the desires and in spite of the strenuous efforts of the Provisional Government and its agents, has with all respect received the protest of the deposed Queen, and will adjudicate thereupon strictly on the merits as well as in accordance with the traditional policy of fairness and friendliness toward weak and friendly neighbors which has hitherto been among the glories of the great Republic.

"Mr. Blount's instructions bring out in high relief the policy of his Government in regard to the occasions when the landing of troops on Hawaiian territory is justifi-

nable. There is small comfort in them for those who have been laboring to justify the fact and the manner of the investment of Honolulu by United States naval troops on the 16th of January. Until the facts on this point, as ascertained by the impartial investigation of Mr. Blount, see the light, however, assertion and comment, beyond what has been given already, would only be in the line of the example set by the Government organs, which have tiresomely asserted from the first that the Commissioner could find out nothing which had not been reported at Washington by the Provisional Government's commissioners, supplemented by the prejudiced and well-stuffed communications of newspaper correspondents. More interesting, if not more important, than the contents of his instructions from the Secretary of State is the terse prescription given by the Commissioner himself, in his communication to the Hawaiian people, of the status of American citizens participating in any conflict between parties for supremacy on these Islands. This is in conformity with the law of nations in similar cases provided, with which citizens and subjects of different powers, who desire to know, were made acquainted at the crisis of 1887.

"To what extent American citizens who took up arms for overthrowing the Government of this country, friendly to their own, were encouraged to rely on the support of their nation's strong arm, and by whom any such encouragement might have been proffered, are other questions that may as well be left to Mr. Blount's inquiry for solution. In this, as in other respects, the opposition can afford to maintain its unvarying coolness and patience, joined with confidence that the United States will not uphold wrong committed in her name, and the subsidized and mercenary press might, with advantage to its feelings at a later stage, try to imitate the same condition of equanimity. Americans who are opposed to filibustering and violence will be prouder of their great nation than ever as they read the words in which President Cleveland's representative assures the law-abiding and peace-loving of his fellow-citizens on this foreign strand that they will be protected in any emergency.

"While I shall refrain from interference between conflicting forces, of whatever nationality, for supremacy, I will protect American citizens not participating in such conflict."

[Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser, Tuesday, May 16, 1893.]

Political developments.

"At present it would be useless to speculate as to the causes which have determined Commissioner Blount to publish his instructions from the State Department at Washington under which he is acting. That he has reached a point in his investigations which justifies his action none will doubt. That there is more or less significance in the publication at the present state of affairs must be admitted by all accustomed to studying the course of international diplomacy. In any event the publication will serve to throw light upon many points doubtful heretofore and will dash some of the baseless hopes and wilder theories regarding Commissioner Blount's intentions and alleged instructions which have passed current in royalist circles from the moment the United States steamer *Rush* entered the harbor.

"It is not our purpose to attempt an analysis of Commissioner Blount's instructions. They are certainly plain enough to need no commentary, as they are full enough to exclude all doubts as to his future action. The fullest inquiry here and report to the United States Government will be made. In the meantime the existing treaty of annexation will be held in abeyance; but the United States will, pending investigation and settlement, give adequate protection to the life and property of citizens of the United States, and, if necessary, will repress any lawless and tumultuous acts threatening them.

"Commissioner Blount's note at the end of his instructions corresponds fully with what he stated on his arrival to the Provisional Government, and seems to us the act of a wise and cautious diplomat, such as he is reported to be.

"There is one point deserving of notice in the document, and that is while the inquiry into Hawaiian affairs in detail is left to the wisdom and sound discretion of Commissioner Blount, final decision on the merits of the case is tacitly if not directly reserved. The instructions, in fact, throw no special light upon the subject of annexation. Pending the settlement of the question, however, the document is decisive and outspoken. The United States will adhere to its consistent and established policy and will not acquiesce in domestic interference by foreign powers.

As to the effect which will be produced by the publication of the instructions there can be little or no doubt. Both the Provisional Government and Americans generally have fully and freely trusted the annexation cause to Mr. Blount, subject to any investigations he might see fit to make under his instructions. At no time

have they attempted to anticipate his action or lead him to prejudge the case. They have at all times rigidly adhered to the argument of facts and figures, coupled with evident national conditions and tendencies backed by the moral and political forces of the community, which they believe to be irresistible for the establishment of stable government and the future welfare of the Islands. They hopefully retain this stand, and the text of Commissioner Blount's instructions now gives them surer hope in doing so.

The publication of Commissioner Blount's instructions is a severe blow to the political tactics of the ex-Queen's following. For some time it has been known that the royalist cause has been bolstered principally by allegations made upon the Commissioner's power and instructions to restore the monarchy. The whole mainstay of the royalist cause consequently falls to the ground with the publication of the document itself. Within the last fortnight the ex-Queen actually told a prominent native citizen of Maui to go home and continue to support her cause, as she would be restored to the throne by the middle of July. Just so long as the contents of the Commissioner's instructions remained unknown the royalists were enabled to hold the natives to their cause with hopes and promises which they knew had no foundation in fact.

An incident of the raising of the American flag in California, similar to the raising of the flag in Honolulu, has been recalled by the early settlers there. In 1842 Commodore Jones of the U. S. Navy, under the impression that the United States were at war with Mexico, took forcible possession of Monterey, hoisted the Stars and Stripes, and proclaimed California a Territory of the United States. Discerning his mistake the following day he hauled down the flag and made such apology as the circumstances would admit. A few years later, however, the flag was raised again and remained up."

[Inclosure 3 in No. 7.]

Admiral Skerrett to Mr. Blount.

No. 167.]

U. S. S. BOSTON, FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, May 20, 1893.

SIR: I have examined with a view of inspection the premises first occupied by the force landed from the U. S. S. *Boston*, and known as Arion Hall, situated on the west side of the Government building. The position of this location is in the rear of a large brick building known as Music Hall. The street it faces is comparatively a narrow one, the building itself facing the Government building. In my opinion it was unadvisable to locate the troops there, if they were landed for the protection of the United States citizens, being distantly removed from the business portion of the town, and generally far away from the United States legation and consulate-general, as well as being distant from the houses and residences of United States citizens. It will be seen from the accompanying sketch that had the Provisional Government troops been attacked from the east, such attack would have placed them in the line of fire.

Had Music Hall been seized by the Queen's troops, they would have been under their fire, had such been their desire. It is for these reasons that I consider the position occupied as illy selected. Naturally, if they were landed with a view to support the Provisional Government troops, then occupying the Government building, it was a wise choice, as they could enfilade any troops attacking them from the palace grounds in front. There is nothing further for me to state with reference to this matter, and as has been called by you to my attention—all of which is submitted for your consideration.


Very respectfully,

J. S. SKERRETT,

Rear Admiral U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

Col. J. H. BLOUNT,

*U. S. Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.*



No. 11.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 8.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *June 1, 1893.*

SIR: The population of the Hawaiian Islands can but be studied by one unfamiliar with the native tongue from its several census reports. A census is taken every six years. The last report is for the year 1890. From this it appears that the whole population numbers 89,990. This number includes natives, or, to use another designation, Kanakas, half-castes (persons containing an admixture of other than native blood in any proportion with it), Hawaiian-born foreigners of all races or nationalities other than natives, Americans, British, Germans, French, Portuguese, Norwegians, Chinese, Polynesians, and other nationalities.

Americans number 1,928, natives and half-castes, 40,612; Chinese,

15,301; Japanese, 12,360; Portuguese, 8,602; British, 1,344; Germans, 1,034; French, 70; Norwegians, 227; Polynesians, 588; and other foreigners 419.

It is well at this point to say that of the 7,495 Hawaiian-born foreigners 4,117 are Portuguese, 1,701 Chinese and Japanese, 1,617 other white foreigners, and 60 of other nationalities.

There are 58,714 males. Of these 18,364 are pure natives, and 3,085 are half-castes, making together 21,449. Fourteen thousand five hundred and twenty-two are Chinese. The Japanese number 10,079. The Portuguese contribute 4,770. These four nationalities furnish 50,820 of the male population.

	Males.
The Americans furnish.....	1,298
The British.....	982
The Germans.....	729
The French.....	46
The Norwegians.....	135

These five nationalities combined furnish 3,170 of the total male population.

The first four nationalities, when compared with the last five in male population, are nearly sixteenfold the largest in number.

The Americans are to those of the four aforementioned group of nationalities as 39 to 1—nearly as 40 to 1.

It is as convenient here as at any other place to give some facts in relation to the Portuguese. They have been brought here from time to time from the Madeira and Cape Verde Islands by the Hawaiian Government as laborers on plantations, just as has been done in relation to Chinese, Japanese, Polynesians, etc. They are the most ignorant of all imported laborers and reported to be very thievish. They are not pure Europeans, but a commingling of many races, especially the negro. They intermarry with the natives and belong to the laboring classes. Very few of them can read and write. Their children are being taught in the public schools, as all races are. It is wrong to class them as Europeans.

The character of the people of these islands is and must be overwhelmingly Asiatic. Let it not be imagined that the Chinese, Japanese, and Portuguese disappear at the end of their contract term. From the report of the inspector in chief of Japanese immigrants on March 31, 1892, it appears that twenty "lots" of Japanese immigrants have been brought here by the Hawaiian Government, numbering 21,110. Of these 2,517 have returned to Japan; 8,592, having worked out their contract term, remain, and 9,626 are still working out their contract term. More than 75 per cent may be said to locate here permanently.

There are 13,067 Chinamen engaged in various occupations, to wit: 8,763 laborers, 1,479 farmers, 133 fishermen, 74 drivers and teamsters, 564 mechanics, 42 planters and ranchers, 776 merchants and traders, 164 clerks and salesmen, 12 professional men and teachers, and 1,056 in various other occupations.

The number of merchants and traders in the entire country is 1,238. Of this number 776 are Chinamen and 81 are Americans.

The largest part of the retail trade seems to be conducted by Chinamen.

Of 20,536 laborers on sugar plantations only 2,617 are Chinese. Of this latter number only 396 are contract laborers.

The Portuguese population in 1884 amounted to 9,377 and in 1890 to 8,602—a loss of 775. These have been leaving in considerable numbers for the past eighteen months, making their way generally to the United

States. In 1890 the males were classified as to occupation thus: Laborers, 2,653, farmers, 136, fishermen, 3, mariners, 10, drivers and teamsters, 63, mechanics, 167, planters and ranchers, 17, merchants and traders, 56, clerks and salesmen, 13, professional men and teachers, 11, other occupations, 123; total, 3,266. On the cane plantations there are of male Portuguese, 277 under contract and 1,651 day laborers.

Of the population in 1892, 20,536 were laborers on sugar-cane plantations, 16,723 being Portuguese, Japanese, and Chinese. Of the whole number 10,991 are contract laborers. The remainder are designated as day laborers. The total number of laborers in the islands by the census of 1890 was 25,466.

In 1890 there were 23,863 male laborers. Of this number 18,728 were Chinese and Japanese. At this period there were 41,073 persons of all occupations. Of this number 24,432 were Chinese and Japanese.

Of the total number of persons in the various avocations, of European and American origin, it appears that 1,106 were Americans, 819 British, 518 Germans, 45 French, and 200 Norwegians, making a total of 2,688 persons.

The natives furnished 8,871 persons and the half-castes 884.

The Hawaiians, therefore, may be said to have furnished 9,755.

There are 196 persons designated as planters and ranchers. Of this number 18 are Americans, 30 are British, and 6 are Germans. The remainder are principally Japanese, Portuguese, Chinese, and Hawaiian.

There are 5,181 persons designated as farmers. Of these, 3,392 are natives and half-castes, and 1,500 are Chinese. These two furnish 4,779, leaving a residue of 402 taken from all other nationalities. Of these, 26 are Americans.

For a more minute examination of the avocation of the people, I append a tabular statement from the last census year, 1890. (Inclosure No. 1.)

It will be interesting, if not pleasing, to examine the number of the various sexes by nationalities.

The grand total of the population is 89,990. The male population is 58,714; the females are 31,276.

The natives and half-castes furnish 21,449 males and 19,174 females.

The Chinese furnish 14,522 males and 779 females.

The Japanese furnish 10,079 males and 2,281 females.

The Portuguese furnish 4,770 males and 3,832 females.

The American males are 1,298, females 630.

The British males are 982, females 362.

The German males are 729, females 305.

This disparity of the sexes applies to all nationalities, save the native race.

The most striking feature is that the Chinese men outnumber the women by more than 18 to 1.

The Japanese men outnumber their women by nearly 5 to 1. In all foreign nationalities the males largely exceed the females in numbers.

The natives and half-castes furnish nearly two-thirds of the women.

For a moment let us see how far this disparity of sexes in 1884 compares with that of 1890:

In 1884 there were 51,539 males, 29,039 females, and a total population of 80,578.

In 1890 the males numbered 58,714, the females 31,276, and the total number was 89,990.

The males increased from 1884 to 1890, 7,175. The females increased from 1884 to 1890, 2,237.

During this period there appears to have been the following gains and losses by nationalities:

Gains: Half-castes, 1,968; Hawaiian-born foreigners (mostly Portuguese), 5,455; British, 62; Japanese, 12, 244.

Losses: Natives, 5,578; Americans, 138; Germans, 566; French, 122; Portuguese, 775; Norwegians, 135; Chinese, 2,638; Polynesians, 368.

The net gain is 9,412. Had it not been for the large importation of Japanese for plantation laborers there would have been a net loss of 2,832.

There was a net loss of Europeans and Americans combined numbering 899.

While the population is increasing in numbers the per cent of females is largely decreasing.

In 1866 the percentage of females was 45.25 per cent; in 1872 it was 44.37; in 1878 41.19; in 1884 36.04; in 1890 34.75.

This condition has been reached by the importation of contract labor by the Hawaiian Government for the sugar plantations.

In 1890 there was in the island of Oahu a population of 31,194. Of this number 1,239 were Americans.

There was in the island of Hawaii a population of 26,754. Of this number 289 were Americans.

In the islands of Molokai and Lanai there was a population of 2,826. Of this number 23 were Americans.

In the island of Maui there was a population of 17,357. Of this number 211 were Americans.

In the islands of Kanai and Niihau there was a population of 11,859. Of this number 112 were Americans.

The total population was 89,990. Of this number 1,928 were Americans.

It appears that in 1890, the period of the last census, that in a population of 89,990 persons 51,610 were unable to read and write. The natives and half-castes, numbering 40,622, had 27,901 able to read and write.

The Chinese, with a population of 15,301 persons, had 13,277 unable to read and write.

The Japanese, with a population of 12,360, had 12,053 persons unable to read and write.

The Portuguese, with a population of 8,602, had 6,276 unable to read and write. These are mostly children.

For more minute examination reference is made to the table inclosed herewith, from the census report of 1890. (Inclosure No. 2.)

The total number of registered voters at this period was 13,593.

Of these 9,554 were natives and half-castes; 146 Hawaiian-born foreigners, 637 Americans, 505 British, 382 Germans, 22 French, 2,091 Portuguese, 78 Norwegians, 42 Polynesians, and other nationalities 136.

From this it appears that the Hawaiians exceeded all other nationalities of voters 4,039.

The Portuguese of an age to vote generally can not read and write. The natives alone had this restriction. Place this upon the Portuguese and other nationalities and the natives would have nine-tenths of the votes.

The minister of finance informs me that the taxes paid by Americans and Europeans amount to \$274,516.74; those by natives, \$71,386.82; half-castes, \$26,868.68; Chinese, \$87,266.10; Japanese, \$67,326.07; other nationalities, \$729.82.

A very large proportion of the Americans and Europeans paying these taxes are antiannexationists.

He also informs me that the acreage on which taxes are paid by various nationalities is: Europeans and Americans, 1,052,492 acres; natives, 257,457 acres; half-castes, 531,545 acres; Chinese, 12,324 acres; Japanese, 200 acres; other nationalities, none.

The surveyor-general reports the crown lands for 1893 as containing 915,288 acres. Of these he reports 94,116 acres available for lease. Of this latter number only 47,000 acres are reported to be good, arable land. He likewise reports the Government land as containing 828,370 acres. He reports these, estimated in 1890, to be worth \$2,128,850. The annual income from them is \$67,636. Of this income \$19,500 is from wharfage and \$7,800 from rent of land with buildings thereon.

The cane and arable land is estimated at 35,150 acres.

It is important here to recall his statement made to the Legislature in 1891 in the following language: "Most Government lands at the present time consist of mere remnants left here and there and of the worthless and unsaleable portions remaining after the rest had been sold." And in the same communication he declares that between the years 1850 and 1860 nearly all of the desirable Government land was sold, generally to natives.

In 1890 the census report discloses that only 4,695 persons owned real estate in these Islands. With a population estimated at this time at 95,000 the vast number of landless people here is discouraging to the idea of immigrants from the United States being able to find encouragement in the matter of obtaining homes in these Islands.

I shall in a future report endeavor to inform you of the legislation in relation to the lands—the distribution of them and such other matters as would be interesting in connection therewith in the event they should figure in the consideration of future political relations with the United States.

It may be proper here to say that the landless condition of the native population grows out of the original distribution thereof by the laws of the country and does not come from its shiftlessness.

On the 30th ultimo the attorney-general and marshal called to see me. They informed me that the order of the community was threatened, according to the reports of their detectives, with a movement on the part of the antiannexation whites to take possession of the Government and restore the Queen. After some considerable presentation of details I was informed that part of the scheme was to drug me.

It so happened that during the afternoon of the preceding day a white man called to ask my opinion as to the propriety of a contemplated meeting on that evening to protest against a movement believed to be on foot by the Provisional Government to propose a new form of treaty with the United States. He said that certain white men were movers in it and he was debating whether he should advise the natives to attend; that he could see no reason for it; that they were awaiting the action of the Government of the United States on the various questions connected with the formation of the present Government, and believed that was the attitude for them to occupy. Of course I declined to express any opinion. He left me saying that he would see the natives did not attend. There was no meeting.

I said to the attorney-general that I was satisfied from communications made by the natives that they would not coöperate in any disorderly action, preferring, as they say, to submit their cause to the decision of the Government of the United States.

A meeting of half-castes, which seemed to be a part of the cause of alarm to the attorney-general and marshal, I said to them was, I believed, nothing more than an effort to prevent the aforesaid meeting.

This they accepted as the probable solution of it, and finally assented to the idea that there was no ground for a belief that there would be any disturbance such as was indicated.

On the 31st ultimo President Dole called on me and informed me that there was a petition signed by fifty persons—British subjects—requesting the British minister to prevent the sailing of the English war vessel *Hyacinth*, which has orders to leave here to-morrow. This seemed to occasion him some uneasiness. He finally said that the petition was being carried around by a man who had been in the military service of the Provisional Government, and had left it on account of inability to get an office which he desired.

I informed him that two nights ago the British minister had expressed to me his gratification that the vessel was going to leave; that its presence here simply furnished the opportunity for some persons to avow some unfriendly intention of his Government.

I further said that I was assured by the British minister on his own motion, in a desire to manifest his friendly disposition, that in no event would the British troops be used to advance the interests of any political movement here. He seemed to accept this as a relief from any apprehension.

The Provisional Government officials are excited by many groundless rumors, and communicate them very freely to me. I have not indicated any line of conduct which I should pursue in the event of a conflict other than that I have communicated to you.

A great deal of testimony in relation to the causes of the revolution and the circumstances attending it has been taken.

The physical inability of the stenographer up to the present time to transcribe the whole of the mass of notes which has accumulated has prevented me from fully considering them and presenting my opinions thereon.

I hope to be able to furnish you with much of interest as soon as this difficulty has been overcome.

I think the condition of the public mind here is just as formerly reported.

The universal feeling towards me so far as I can gather is one of kindness and respect. This is due in largest measure to my abstention from expressing my views on political questions.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

P. S.—Since closing the foregoing communication the inclosure (marked No. 3) has been handed to me by Mr. Samuel Parker, the genuineness of which I do not question.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 5.]

TABLE 6.—Classification of each nationality and sex by occupation.

	Laborers.	Farmers.	Fishermen.	Mariners.	Drivers and teamsters.	Mechanics.	Planters and ranchers.	Merchants and traders.	Clerks and salesmen.	Professional men and teachers.	Other occupations.	Total returning occupations.
Native males	2,213	3,211	656	332	237	663	51	129	58	173	831	8,554
Native females	40	68	12	103	2	3	1	12	76	317
Total	2,253	3,279	668	332	237	766	53	132	59	185	907	8,871
Half-caste males	115	108	25	14	32	230	14	32	78	26	170	844
Half-caste females	1	5	1	25	8	40
Total	116	113	25	14	32	230	14	32	79	51	178	844
Hawaiian-born foreign males	20	16	2	7	39	9	19	70	26	33	241
Hawaiian-born foreign females	1	3	23	1	28
Total	21	16	2	7	39	9	19	73	49	34	269
American males	36	26	2	36	59	369	17	81	127	114	161	1,028
American females	1	5	57	15	78
Total	36	26	2	36	59	369	18	81	132	171	176	1,106
British males	24	15	28	34	328	30	42	85	60	139	785
British females	3	6	3	14	8	34
Total	27	15	28	34	334	30	42	88	74	147	819
German males	52	11	2	10	26	176	6	47	54	20	100	504
German females	1	5	8	14
Total	52	11	2	10	26	177	6	47	54	25	108	518
French males	2	2	2	8	1	1	9	5	30
French females	15	15
Total	2	2	2	8	1	1	24	5	45
Portuguese males	2,653	136	3	10	63	165	17	56	35	10	118	3,266
Portuguese females	3	2	1	5	11
Total	2,656	136	3	10	63	167	17	56	35	11	123	3,277
Norwegian males	79	25	7	9	31	2	8	2	37	200
Norwegian females
Total	79	25	7	9	31	2	8	2	37	200
Chinese males	8,763	1,476	133	74	564	42	776	164	16	1,056	13,067
Chinese females	64	21	1	2	10	98
Total	8,827	1,500	133	74	564	42	777	164	18	1,066	13,165
Japanese males	9,565	36	3	2	4	42	27	20	23	115	9,837
Japanese females	1,404	14	1,418
Total	10,969	36	3	2	4	42	27	20	23	129	11,255
Polynesian males	269	5	2	3	2	9	1	9	300
Polynesian females	85	1	86
Total	354	5	2	3	2	9	1	10	386
Other nationalities:												
Males	72	17	3	18	8	66	5	14	9	6	56	274
Females	2	1	1	4
Total	74	17	3	18	8	66	5	15	9	7	56	278
Total males	23,863	5,087	829	464	555	2,690	193	1,233	703	483	2,830	38,930
Total females	1,603	94	12	112	3	5	13	155	146	2,143
Grand total	25,466	5,181	841	464	555	2,802	196	1,238	716	638	2,976	41,073

[Inclosure No. 2 in No. 8.]

TABLE 7.—*Classification of each nationality and sex by social condition, education, school attendance, possession of electoral franchise, and ownership of real estate.*

	Married.	Unmarried.	Widows.	Widowers.	Divorced.	Total.	Attending school.	Able to read and write.	Owning real estate.	Registered voters.
Native males	6,836	9,578	1,829	121	18,364	2,980	13,756	2,504	8,777
Native females	7,556	6,806	1,616	94	16,072	2,322	10,311	767
Total	14,392	16,384	1,616	1,829	215	34,436	5,302	24,067	3,271	8,777
Half-caste male	669	2,341	66	9	3,085	883	1,914	240	777
Half-caste females	754	2,219	105	23	3,101	875	1,920	155
Total	1,423	4,560	105	66	32	6,186	1,758	3,834	395	777
Hawaiian-born males	219	3,689	1	3,909	605	692	67	146
Hawaiian-born foreign females	157	3,416	11	2	3,586	489	599	38
Total	376	7,105	11	1	2	7,495	1,094	1,291	105	146
American males	528	699	64	7	1,298	62	1,197	147	637
American females	324	251	55	630	59	527	30
Total	852	950	55	64	7	1,928	121	1,724	177	637
British males	433	498	44	7	982	30	897	143	505
British females	193	116	53	362	33	308	26
Total	626	614	53	44	7	1,344	63	1,205	169	505
German males	304	398	22	5	729	74	655	53	382
German females	184	113	8	305	44	260	4
Total	488	511	8	22	5	1,034	118	915	57	382
French males	17	18	10	1	46	38	8	22
French females	5	17	2	24	24
Total	22	35	2	10	1	70	62	8	22
Portuguese males	2,455	2,238	76	1	4,770	720	1,513	224	2,091
Portuguese females	2,443	1,322	65	2	3,832	550	913	10
Total	4,898	3,560	65	76	3	8,602	1,270	2,426	234	2,091
Norwegian males	69	80	4	2	155	19	132	10	78
Norwegian females	55	16	1	72	6	60
Total	124	96	1	4	2	227	25	192	10	78
Chinese males	2,369	12,049	96	8	14,522	51	1,971	224
Chinese females	559	201	19	779	20	51	2
Total	2,928	12,250	19	96	8	15,301	71	2,022	226
Japanese, males	2,964	7,059	50	6	10,079	21	270	4
Japanese, females	2,101	148	29	3	2,281	12	37
Total	5,065	7,207	29	50	9	12,360	33	307	4
Polynesian, males	150	235	19	404	9	61	6	42
Polynesian, females	133	45	6	184	5	24
Total	283	280	6	19	588	14	85	6	42
Other nationalities:										
Males	162	181	26	2	371	2	217	28	136
Females	33	11	4	48	1	33	5
Total	195	192	4	26	2	419	3	250	33	136
Total males	17,175	39,063	2,307	169	58,715	5,456	23,313	3,658	13,593
Total females	14,497	14,681	1,974	124	31,276	4,416	15,067	1,037
Grand total	31,672	53,744	1,974	2,307	293	89,990	9,872	38,380	4,695	13,593

[Inclosure 3 in No. 8.]

Queen's ministers to Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, May 31, 1893.

Hon. J. H. BLOUNT,

Special Commissioner of the United States to Hawaii:

SIR: On Friday afternoon, January 13, about 2 o'clock, we, Samuel Parker, W. H. Cornwell, J. F. Colburn, and A. P. Peterson were called by Her Majesty to the palace and asked to accept positions in a new cabinet, the Wilcox cabinet having tendered their resignations the day previous. We accepted and were handed our commissions, and took the oath of office before Chief Justice Judd in the blue room. It was then thought advisable that the announcement be made to the Legislature, which was accordingly done, after which the cabinet went again to the palace to consult with Her Majesty as to what bills, having passed the Legislature, should be signed by her. Her Majesty asked the advice of the cabinet as to whether she should sign the lottery bill, the opium bill, and the registration act, which laws were then before her. At the same time she expressed a desire to satisfy her lady friends by vetoing the opium bill, and also expressed doubts as to the advisability of signing the registration act. The cabinet advised that as a majority of the Legislature and the mass of the people were in favor of the lottery and opium bills it was the duty of the Sovereign to sign them, and also that as the registration act was deemed important to the planting interests, although opposed very strenuously by a large number of people, it would be advisable to sign that also, as no bill of importance had been vetoed during the session and it was not advisable to do so.

The next day, Saturday, the Legislature met at the usual hour and transacted the business which remained, and adjourned until 12 o'clock the same day for prorogation. Both at the morning session and at the ceremonies attending the prorogation the members of the Reform party in the Legislature, to a man, were conspicuous by their absence, although occasionally one of their number would show himself and then report proceedings down town. Immediately after the ceremonies the cabinet were notified that the foreign representatives desired to meet them, and accordingly a meeting was held in the foreign office, all of the foreign representatives being present. Mr. Wodehouse, the English commissioner, stated that they were informed that Her Majesty intended to promulgate a new constitution upon that day, and asked what the cabinet intended to do about the matter, if this proved correct. Mr. Parker replied for the cabinet, and stated that he had heard of the matter and that the cabinet had decided to advise Her Majesty against such a course.

This reply was satisfactory to all the representatives except to Mr. Stevens, the American minister, who became excited, and dropping the subject under discussion, pounded his cane upon the floor and stated in a loud voice that the United States had been insulted, and that the passage of the lottery bill was a direct attack upon his Government. The other representatives tried to change the subject, and, finally succeeding, the meeting broke up after several of them had disclaimed any approbation of Mr. Stevens's remarks. The cabinet then went to the palace and met the Queen in the blue room, where she stated that at the desire of a large number of her subjects she wished to promulgate a new constitution. The cabinet then spoke of the meeting just held with the foreign representatives and advised Her Majesty not to do it, as they considered the time inopportune and the action inadvisable. The Queen, after considerable hesitation, finally yielded to the advice of her ministers, and so notified the people who were assembled in the palace and throughout the grounds. Early Sunday morning the cabinet met at Mr. Cornwell's residence to consider the situation. Mr. W. M. Giffard, manager of W. G. Irwin & Co., and of Mr. Spreckels's business in Honolulu at that time, notified them that it had been agreed between their bank and the bank of Bishop & Co. that they would render such financial assistance as the Government might need.

It was also reported by Mr. Colburn and Mr. Peterson that an organization known as the "Committee of Safety" had been formed the night before at the house of Mr. L. A. Thurston, and had made overtures to them as members of the cabinet to assist them in dethroning the Queen. That they intended to go ahead and that Mr. Stevens assistance, together with that of his Government, had been guaranteed them. This statement was from Mr. Thurston himself. It was finally decided to ask a number of the most influential merchants and citizens to meet the cabinet and discuss the situation. The meeting was set for 1 o'clock in the afternoon, and in the meantime the cabinet repaired to the station house to consult with the marshal as to the best means of keeping the peace. Everything was found to be in readiness for any disturbance that might arise. At the appointed time the cabinet met in the foreign office with Mr. W. M. Giffard, representing Claus Spreckels; Mr. S. M. Damon representing Bishop & Co.; Mr. J. O. Carter, representing C. Brewer & Co.; Mr. S. C. Allen, representing Allen & Robinson and the Robinson estate; Mr. F. A. Schaefer,

of F. A. Schaefer & Co., and E. C. Macfarlane. The situation was then discussed by all present and methods proposed which would relieve it.

During this discussion Mr. S. M. Damon remarked, the subject having been brought up by the information as to the intentions of the committee of safety, that the *Boston's* troops would land whether the Government liked it or not. It was finally decided that the best course to allay public feeling, and one which must be satisfactory to the people at large and the business interests generally, was for the cabinet to procure from Her Majesty a statement that no further attempt would be made to promulgate a new constitution. This was accordingly done, and the next day, Monday, such statement was sent to the different members of the diplomatic corps, as well as printed and circulated throughout the town. Sunday evening Mr. Parker and Mr. Peterson reported to the cabinet the result of an interview between Mr. Stevens and themselves in which Mr. Stevens had stated that he would not assist the Government as long as Mr. C. B. Wilson remained marshal, and a number of other statements made by him showing his hostility toward the Government and bearing out the information which had previously been received as to his friendly attitude toward the committee of safety. On Monday morning, after the assurance of Her Majesty that no new attempt would be made to promulgate a new constitution was made public, a feeling of satisfaction was generally manifested and an attempt was made by a number of leading citizens to postpone the mass meeting, which had been called for that afternoon, as being unnecessary; but Mr. Thurston protested and thought the meeting should go ahead and at least express their disapprobation of the course pursued by the Queen.

After the people attending the two mass meetings had quietly dispersed to their homes, and the city was as quiet as Sunday, the cabinet were informed, late Monday afternoon, that troops, armed with rifles and bringing Gatling guns, were being landed from the U. S. S. *Boston*. They immediately asked Mr. Stevens what this landing of troops meant, he not having asked the usual permission from the Government, and he, although sending a written reply, did not answer the question, but evaded it. The *Boston* troops took up a position commanding the Government building and the palace, and a position which commanded no American property. Monday evening was exceedingly quiet, the only disquietness being caused by the landing of foreign troops, which was generally disapproved of. On Tuesday information was received that the committee of safety were recruiting troops for the purpose of forming a provisional government, and were inducing men to enlist with them on the promise that the *Boston's* troops would interfere and assist them without it being necessary for them to fire a shot or incur any risk. Shortly after noon Mr. Parker and Mr. Peterson returned from an interview with Mr. Stevens, and reported that he (Mr. Stevens) had said that if any number of what he called responsible citizens should take possession of any building in town and form a provisional government he should recognize them and assist them to the extent of his power, and that he should refuse any assistance to the Queen's Government. The cabinet then made the station house their headquarters, as has always been the custom in any troublous times, the Government building always having been considered untenable. They then sent for a number of prominent citizens to consult with them.

Although being satisfied as to Mr. Stevens's position it was deemed best by the cabinet to get something from him in writing, and accordingly they sent a letter to him between 2 and 3 o'clock, asking whether the report was true that he had recognized the Provisional Government. In a little over half an hour his reply was received which stated that he had done so. Shortly after this Mr. S. M. Damon and Mr. C. Bolte came to the station house as messengers from the Provisional Government to consult with the Queen's cabinet as to an amicable settlement of the difficulty without resort to arms. Mr. Damon during the interview said it would merely be a waste of blood to resist, as the *Boston* and the *Boston's* troops stood ready to assist the Provisional Government. The cabinet gave them no reply but agreed to go with them and consult with the executive council of the Provisional Government at the Government building, which they accordingly did. At this meeting President Dole stated that it was their desire to have the matter settled without any resort to arms, and asked the Queen's cabinet to deliver up to them what Government property was in their possession. The cabinet replied that before any answer could be given it would be necessary to consult with Her Majesty. This was agreed upon, and the cabinet, accompanied by Mr. S. M. Damon, proceeded to the palace and met the Queen. There were present at that time, besides Her Majesty and her ministers, H. A. Widemann, Paul Neumann, E. C. Macfarlane, J. O. Carter, and S. M. Damon.

The question as to the surrender of the Queen was discussed by nearly all present, and Mr. Stevens's attitude and letter recognizing the Provisional Government were also spoken of, and the unanimous opinion of those present was, that although the Queen's Government had possession of the station house, the barracks, and the palace, together with the greater part of the arms and ammunition in the Kingdom,

and all the Gatling guns and field pieces except those under the control of foreign nations, and men enough, both foreign and native, to make them absolutely impregnable so far as any force which could be brought against them from people resident within the Kingdom was concerned, and with force enough to put down any disturbance and to keep the peace of the country, unless such disturbance was assisted by foreign troops. Considering the position taken by the representative of the United States it was useless to make war against that country, which any resistance on the part of the Queen's Government plainly meant, and that the wiser course to pursue was to surrender the Government property under a protest to the United States, the superior force of that country having brought about the situation. The protest was immediately drawn and signed by Her Majesty and her ministers and taken to President Dole, who indorsed the receipt of it. At a little after 7 o'clock that evening the Provisional Government took possession of the station house and other Government buildings and of the arms and ammunition then in possession of the Queen's Government.

SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
WM. H. CORNWELL,
Minister of Finance.
JOHN F. COLBURN,
Minister of Interior.
A. P. PETERSON,
Attorney-General.

In view of the facts stated above, which can not be controverted, and in view of the fact that your investigations concerning the matter are shortly likely to terminate, we, Liliuokalani and her cabinet, who formed the Government of the Hawaiian Islands on the 17th of January last, having surrendered that Government to the superior force of the United States of America, now most respectfully ask that you use your good offices in undoing the acts of a representative of your great country and place the Government of the Hawaiian Islands as Mr. Stevens found them. Believing that the principle of justice which has ever dominated American action will prevail in this instance, we remain,

Yours, respectfully,

LILIUOKALANI, R.
SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
WM. H. CORNWELL,
Minister of Finance.
JOHN F. COLBURN,
Minister of Interior.
A. P. PETERSON,
Attorney-General.

No. 12.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 9.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, June 6, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the political conditions of the Islands do not import any conflict of arms. The Government is very alert in watching every movement which threatens it. Almost any trifling assemblage of natives at night is the occasion of alarm.

The natives are favoring public order, and looking for some action on my part favorable to them. Notwithstanding the publication of my instructions, and my previous declaration that I had no power to restore the Queen, there remains in the native mind a strong faith that, owing to the interference of the American minister and the American marines, resulting in the surrender to the Provisional Government by the Queen of her forces, the United States will ultimately restore her to power.

The action of Admiral Thomas, in 1843, in restoring the Hawaiian flag is written deeply in the minds of the native people. A public

square has been set apart and beautified in honor of his memory and action. This, and the friendly relations between our Government and that of these Islands, seems to be the inspiration of buoyant hope in their final independence.

Should this fail them, and they be left free from interference by foreign powers, the peace of to-day may change into warlike action against the existing order of things.

It can not be truthfully stated that the present peace is the result of the power of the Provisional Government.

I deem it proper at this time to indulge in some observations in relation to landed property here.

To understand the present distribution it is necessary to understand the ancient system of land tenure as well as the modern.

And now as to the first:

Each island was divided into several districts. The next subdivision is the Ahupuaa. Typically this is a long narrow strip extending from the sea to the mountain, so that its chief may have his share of all the various products of the mountain region, the cultivated land, and the sea. It was generally, though not always, subdivided into ilis, each with its own name and carefully defined boundary.

There were two kinds of ilis. The first was a mere subdivision of the Ahupuaa for the convenience of the chief holding the same, who received its revenues from his agent. The other class did not pay tribute to a chief.

The ilis were again subdivided, and many of the larger patches had individual names.

The patches cultivated exclusively for the chief were called *koele* or *hakuone*. The tenants were obliged to work for him on Fridays. In the "principles adopted by the land commission to quiet land titles," approved by the legislative council October 26, 1846, it is stated that—

When the islands were conquered by Kamehameha I, he followed the example of his predecessors, and divided out the lands among his principal warrior chiefs, retaining, however, a portion in his own hands to be cultivated or managed by his own immediate servants or attendants. Each principal chief divided his lands anew and gave them out to an inferior order of chiefs, by whom they were subdivided again and again, often passing through the hands of four, five, or six persons from the King down to the lowest class of tenants. All these persons were considered to have rights in these lands, or the productions of them, the proportions of which rights were not clearly defined, although universally acknowledged. All persons possessing landed property, whether superior landlords, tenants, or subtenants, owed and paid to the King not only a land tax, which he assessed at pleasure, but also service, which was called for at discretion, on all the grades, from the highest down. They also owed and paid some portion of the productions of the land, in addition to the yearly taxes. A failure to render any of these was always considered a just cause for which to forfeit the lands. The same rights which the King possessed over the superior landlords and all under them, the various grades of landlords possessed over their inferiors, so that there was a joint ownership of the land, the King really owning the *alodium*, and the persons in whose hands he placed the land, holding it *in trust*.

The land taxes were really rents and went to the King as his private income. The idea of a nation or government as distinguished from the person of the King first began to be recognized in the Constitution of 1840. When the labor tax first began to be regulated by law, every tenant was required to work one day in every week (Tuesday) for the King, and one day (Friday) for the landlord.

The long reign of Kamehameha evolved greater permanency and security in the possession of the lands.

On the accession of his son Liholiho no general redistribution of lands took place.

The common people were merely tenants at will, liable to be disposed at any time, and even to be stripped of their personal property at the will of their chiefs.

Laws were passed in 1839 and 1840 to prevent evictions without cause and the wanton seizure of the property of tenants.

The King and chiefs resolved to divide and define the shares which each held in undivided shares of the lands of the Kingdom. The following rules were noted by the privy council December 18, 1847:

Whereas it has become necessary to the prosperity of our Kingdom and the proper physical, mental, and moral improvement of our people that the undivided rights at present existing in the lands of our Kingdom shall be separated and distinctly defined; Therefore, We, Kamehameha III, King of the Hawaiian Islands, and his chiefs, in privy council assembled, do solemnly resolve that we will be guided in such division by the following rules:

1. His Majesty, our most Gracious Lord and King, shall, in accordance with the constitution and laws of the land, retain all his private lands as his own individual property, subject only to the rights of the tenants, to have and hold to him, his heirs and successors forever.

2. One-third of the remaining lands of the Kingdom shall be set aside as the property of the Hawaiian Government, subject to the direction and control of His Majesty as pointed out by the constitution and laws, one-third to the chiefs and konohikis in proportion to their possessions to have and to hold, to them, their heirs and successors forever, and the remaining third to the tenants, the actual possessors and cultivators of the soil, to have and to hold, to them, their heirs and successors forever.

3. The division between the chiefs or the konohikis and their tenants, prescribed by rule 2d, shall take place whenever any chief, konohiki, or tenant shall desire such division, subject only to confirmation by the King in privy council.

4. The tenants of His Majesty's private lands shall be entitled to a fee-simple title to one-third of the lands possessed and cultivated by them; which shall be set off to the said tenants in fee simple whenever His Majesty or any of said tenants shall desire such division.

5. The division prescribed in the foregoing rules shall in no wise interfere with any lands that may have been granted by His Majesty or his predecessors in fee simple to any Hawaiian subject or foreigner, nor in any way operate to the injury of the holders of the unexpired leases.

6. It shall be optional with any chief or konohiki, holding lands in which the Government has a share, in the place of setting aside one-third of the said lands as Government property, to pay into the treasury one-third of the unimproved value of said lands, which payment shall operate as a total extinguishment of the Government right in said lands.

7. All the lands of His Majesty shall be recorded in a book entitled "Register of the lands belonging to Kamehameha III, King of the Hawaiian Islands," and deposited with the registry of land titles in the office of the minister of the interior; and all lands set aside as the lands of the Hawaiian Government shall be recorded in a book entitled "Register of the lands belonging to the Hawaiian Government," and fee-simple titles shall be granted to all other allottees upon the award of the board of commissioners to quiet land titles.

The division between the King and his chiefs was settled by a committee March 7, 1848. The book containing a record of this division also contains releases signed by the several chiefs to the King, of the lands they surrendered, and releases by the King to the several chiefs of his feudal rights in the land remaining to them as their shares.

These formal awards were made, after evidence of title, which could be converted into allodial title by payment of the consideration provided for in rules 6 and 7, above cited.

On the 8th of March, 1848, the King set apart for the use of the Government the larger part of his royal domain, specified by name, and reserved the residue for himself, his heirs, and successors. On June 7, 1848, the legislative council passed an act confirming and ratifying what had been done by the King.

In 1850 most of the chiefs ceded a third part of their lands to the Government to obtain an allodial title. This was accepted by the privy council the same year.

The Crown lands received their designation from the cession by the King of his share, founded on rule 1, above cited, to the Government.

The Government lands were derived under rule 2 and from cession from the chiefs in 1850.

In all awards of ahupuaas and ilis the rights of tenants are reserved. The acts of August 6, 1850, and July 11, 1851, protect the common people in the right to take wood, thatch, kileaf, etc. They were also guaranteed the right to water and the right of way, but not the right of pasturage on the land of the konohiki, or chief. The right of fishing in the sea appurtenant to the land and to sell the fish caught by him was secured to every bona fide resident on land. The fee-simple title, free of all commutation, to all native tenants was secured finally by the act of August 6, 1850. The right of lords over tenants was thus ended.

Mr. W. D. Alexander, superintendent of Government surveys, defines Government lands in this language:

The great mass of the Government lands consists of those lands which were surrendered and made over to the Government by the King, Kamehameha III, and which are enumerated by name in the act of June 7, 1848. To these must be added the lands ceded by the several chiefs in lieu of commutation, those lands purchased by the Government at different times, and also all lands forfeited to the Government by the neglect of their claimants to present their claims within the period fixed by law. By virtue of various statutes, from time to time sales of these lands have taken place.

The same authority says that between the years 1850 and 1860 nearly all the desirable Government lands was sold, generally to natives. The total number of grants issued before April 1, 1890, was 3,475.

In 1850 one-twentieth part of all the lands belonging to the Government was set apart for the purposes of education. Most of these have been sold.

Mr. Alexander says: "The term 'Crown lands' is applied to those lands reserved by Kamehameha III, March 8, 1848, for himself, his heirs, and successors forever, as his private property."

Kamehameha III and his successors dealt with these as with their private property, selling, leasing, and mortgaging the same, and conveying good titles.

The supreme court held that the inheritance to the Crown lands was limited to the successors to the throne, and at the same time that the possessor might regulate and dispose of the same as his private property. Subsequently an act of the legislature made them inalienable and declared that they should not be leased for a period to exceed thirty years.

When the division of lands was determined upon the chiefs and tenants alike were required to make proofs of the lands they occupied. Failing in this, their rights were barred.

In view of the principles laid down for a division of the land, the inference is that the common people received their share of one-third. Now, what are the facts? Before this division many natives lived with chiefs and occupied no land. Others occupied small parcels for taro patches, and took fish from the waters, and thus obtained their food. These patches did not generally exceed 1 acre, and were designated as kuleanas in the native tongue. Proof of this occupation of land had to be made before the land commission, involving such forms and proofs that the ignorant native failed in many instances to comply with the regulations, and so lost his property. These little holdings were all that they ever obtained.

The historian of land titles (quoted here as the highest authority) omits this great fact. In examining his work with him, he admits what

I have asserted in relation to the lands assigned to the common people. This is also confirmed to me by the present minister of finance, Mr. Damon (formerly vice-president of the advisory council).

Much is said here of the natives being wasteful, and in consequence becoming landless. To my mind, when Japanese, Chinese, and Portuguese cheap labor was substituted for his own and he sought employment in other avocations more remunerative and turned from these insignificant possessions, he followed only the suggestions which would have come to any person of any race.

Subsequently natives purchased Government land under a law providing for the sale of portions of them to residents in lots from 1 to 50 acres. To this I shall recur hereafter.

The lands here are designated as Crown lands, Government lands, the Bishop lands, and those owned by private parties.

The Government lands contain 828,370 acres; the Crown lands, 915,288 acres; the Bishop lands (a gift from a native, Mrs. C. R. Bishop) are devoted to educational purposes and contain 406,829 acres. The private lands amount to 1,854,018 acres. Of these Europeans and Americans now own 1,052,492; natives, 257,457; half-castes, 531,545; Chinese, 12,324 acres; Japanese 200 acres; other nationalities, none.

The Bishop lands mentioned above are included in the 531,545 acres taxed as belonging to half-castes.

Mr. Albert Loebenstien, of Hilo, Hawaii, in a conversation with me, written out and certified by him, says:

The Crown lands generally are leased to corporations for cane culture and grazing, at a very low price for a long term of years. Most of the Government lands are in the hands of sugar-planters.

He estimates the award of kuleanas to natives at about 11,000 acres. He estimates that the Government has sold 290,000 acres of land to residents, and that two-thirds of this was sold to natives, and is now owned by corporations for cane culture. He thinks the natives sold on account of their improvidence in encumbering themselves with debt.

It appears to me that, with small holdings and no right of pasturage, they could find but little opportunity for a good living on them. They are certainly engaged in labor in various employments offering a life of more comfort.

If American laborers can not compete with Chinese and Japanese contract labor it is not a sign of indolence that the Kanaka should fly from its crushing competition. It is still less so when he sees his own Government seeking cheap labor for cane-growers and enforcing its efficiency by laws intended to compel them to fulfill their contracts.

Mr. C. R. Bishop tells in his statement the simple story of the land division on which the real property of the country rests. He says a land commission was created for the purpose of giving title to all the people who had claim to lands. The King and chiefs made this division in 1847. It was agreed that the people should have their small holdings, which they occupied and cultivated since 1839. That year was fixed because it was the year in which the first draft of the constitution defining the rights of the people was made.

The principle upon which the lands were divided he states thus:

The chiefs had been given lands by former kings, by Kamehameha I, especially. They could not sell or lease them without the consent of the King and premier. There were other lands supposed to be the King's private lands. When the division was made these lands, which he claimed were his own, were set apart and called crown lands. That was his private estate really, and the others belonged to the Government, the chiefs, and the people. The people got theirs out of the Government land,

the King's land, and the chiefs' land. These were called kuleanas. The King's lands were called Crown lands, from which he derived his support. The Government lands were for the support of the Government. The King had a right to and did sell Crown lands at his pleasure until 1864.

In the division of lands the Crown lands were large in amount, the Government received a large share, and the largest part of the remainder went to the chiefs. The Government lands are nearly sold out. The kuleanas would not average more than 2 or 3 acres. A great many natives were seamen, mechanics, fishermen, teachers, and followers of chiefs, who received no land. The children of these awardees of kuleanas generally have no land. The sugar planters derive their titles from the Government and the chiefs.

The King and the chiefs were extravagant; got into debt, and then had to pay. When they got the title to their lands these debts were paid by many of the chiefs with lands. During their lifetime they got rid of a great deal of land. The plantations have come nearly altogether from the Government and the chiefs, and considerable of the land is leased from Crown lands.

Mr. Bishop's statement, which will be duly reported, though freed from the technicalities and formalities of a trained lawyer, brings out all that is practical and vital in the origin and progress of the land system of the Hawaiian Islands.

Attention is here invited to the character of the early surveys and surveys of grants from a report made by the Surveyor-General to the legislature in 1891:

CHARACTER OF THE EARLY SURVEYS.

First in order are the old surveys made under the direction of the land commission, and commonly known as "kuleana" surveys. These had the same defects as the first surveys in most new countries. These defects were, in great part, owing to the want of any proper supervision. There was no bureau of surveying, and the president of the land commission was so overwhelmed with work that he had no time to spare for the superintendence of the surveying. As has been truly said, there was little money to pay out and little time to wait for the work. Political reasons also added to the haste with which the work was pushed through, and barely completed before the death of Kamehameha III.

No uniform rules or instructions were given to the surveyors employed, who were practically irresponsible. Few of them could be regarded as thoroughly competent surveyors, while some were not only incompetent, but careless and unscrupulous. The result was that almost every possible method of measurement was adopted. Some used 50-foot chains, and others the 4-pole chain divided into links; some attempted to survey by the true meridian, others by the average magnetic meridian, while most made no allowance for local variations of the needle. There are some surveys recorded which were made with a ship's compass, or even a pocket compass. Few of them took much pains to mark corners or to note the topographical features of the country. Rarely was one section or district assigned to one man. It is said that over a dozen were employed in surveying Waikiki, for instance, not one of whom knew what the other surveyors had done or tried to make his surveys agree with theirs where they adjoined one another. As might be expected, overlaps and gaps are the rule rather than the exception, so that it is generally impossible to put these old surveys together correctly on paper without ascertaining their true relative positions by actual measurements on the ground.

The board of commissioners to quiet land titles were empowered by the law of August 6, 1850, not only to "define and separate the portions of land belonging to different individuals," but "to provide for an equitable exchange of such different portions where it can be done, so that each man's land may be by itself." This, however, was rarely done, and the kuleanas very often consist of several sections or "apanas" apiece, scattered here and there in the most irregular manner imaginable. No general rules were laid down in regard to the size of kuleanas, though mere *house lots* were limited to one-quarter of an acre by the act just cited, section 5. The consequence was that the responsibility was mainly thrown upon the surveyors, and there was the greatest variety of practice among them in different districts. The act above mentioned provided that fee-simple titles should "be granted to native tenants for the lands they occupy and improve." This was differently interpreted by different surveyors, so that in fact the "kuleanas" vary from 1 to 40 acres in extent. General maps of whole districts, or even ahupuaas, exhibiting the exact location of all the different claims contained within them, were scarcely thought of, and hardly could have been made with the inferior instruments and defective methods used by most of the kuleana surveyors of that time.

Surveys of grants were of a similar character to those of kuleanas. Formerly it was not the policy of the Government to have Government lands surveyed as wholes, or to have their boundaries settled. Portions of Government land sold to private persons were surveyed at the expense of the purchaser. It was seldom the case that an entire "ahupuaa" was sold at once. The pieces sold were of all sizes and shapes, sometimes cutting across half a dozen ahupuaas, and were generally surveyed without reference to the surveys of adjoining land sales or awards. Hence most Government lands at the present time consist of mere remnants left here and there, and of the worthless and unsalable portions remaining after the rest had been sold. It follows that, even supposing all the outside boundaries of a Government land to have been surveyed and duly settled by the commissioner of boundaries, it would still be necessary to locate on the ground all the grants and awards contained within the land in question in order to ascertain how much of it is left. Nothing short of a general survey of the country will bring to light all these facts, will exhibit the Government lands in their true position in relation to other lands, and enable the minister of the interior as well as applicants for land to judge of their actual value. It was considerations like these which induced the then minister of the interior, Dr. Hutchinson, to institute the Government survey in 1871. An account of that survey, its objects, methods, and results, was published in pamphlet form in 1889.

W. D. ALEXANDER,
Superintendent of Government Survey.

In view of the foregoing observations it appears to me that if a humane feeling towards the native population of these islands is to have place in American thought there will arise a conviction that instead of inviting immigrants from the United States or other countries to these islands in the hope of obtaining homes, whatever of lands may be used in this way are more than needed by the native population. They seem moreover, to suggest that if the native has not advanced in mental and moral culture up to the highest standard it can not be denied that the policy of the Hawaiian Government in the distribution of its lands has been a great hindrance to him.

His advancement in the future under the conditions now surrounding him are by no means encouraging. If his advancement should reach the most desirable stage there will in all probability arise a discontent well calculated to unsettle any social fabric which sought to give it permanency.

It has been made to appear in official reports of the Hawaiian Government, and in magazine and newspaper articles, that the native population was dying out and would in a few years become extinct. The best opinion I can obtain here is that the death rate no longer exceeds the birth rate, but that there is a gradual increase in the native population. The extinction of the native, therefore, can no longer afford any excuse for any distribution of the land of the country on that account.

Out of a population of 40,622 natives and half-casts, 23,473 are officially reported as able to read and write. They are generally allied in their religious affiliations with the Protestant and Catholic churches.

Mr. Sereno E. Bishop, an ardent annexationist, and with an eye quick to discern all their faults, in 1888 uses the following language:

The Hawaiian race is one that is well worth saving. With all their sad frailties, they are a noble race of men, physically and morally. They are manly, courageous, enterprising, cordial, generous, unselfish. They are highly receptive of good. They love to look forward and upward, though very facile to temptations to slide backward and downward. In an unusual degree they possess a capacity for fine and ardent enthusiasm for noble ends.

Can a Christian civilization doom such a people to annihilation by any policy of legislation?

I see in the letters from here to the New York World and Sun statements that I had expressed my own opinions in reference to political

questions in these islands, and declaring the opinion of the President on the subject of annexation.

I send you herewith the statement of Mr. Fred. Wundenberg. He is a gentleman of excellent sense and character. It touches upon several questions with so much aptness that I have thought it perhaps might interest you.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 9.]

Interview of Mr. Wundenberg.

MAY 15, 1893.

Q. Where were you born?

A. On the island of Kauai.

Q. How long have you lived in the Islands?

A. I was born in 1850 and have lived here ever since.

Q. What are you engaged in?

A. At present I am deputy clerk of the supreme court.

Q. Have you been recently offered the position of collector-general of customs?

A. I have.

Q. Did you decline it?

A. I did.

Q. I see in the correspondence between the American minister at this point and the State Department the allegation that Mr. Wilson is the paramour of the Queen. What knowledge have you of the relations between these parties?

A. Queen Liliuokalani, before she was Queen was in the habit of providing for a number of Hawaiian girls—in some cases educating them at her own expense; bringing them into society, and teaching them manners, dancing and all that sort of business and providing them with suitable husbands. Miss Townsend, the present wife of Wilson, is one of her beneficiaries, and her marriage with Wilson was brought about in the same way. Mrs. Wilson was Emmeline Townsend. She was a particular personal friend of Liliuokalani—always attended her—acted as a sort of maid of honor, and that relation has existed right up to the present time.

Wilson, in that way became the intimate acquaintance and friend of Liliuokalani, and he also was the personal friend of Dominis. Wilson was fond of horse racing and fond of shooting and rowing—and the old governor was a great sportsman. He was fond of boats; he had the best boats. He tried to have the best horses; prided himself on the best guns. Wilson was an admirer of all that sort of thing, and they naturally drifted together in that way. That was prior to Liliuokalani being Queen. After she became Queen, Dominis was in ill health, and the revolution of 1887 had taken place; the Wilcox riot had taken place, and the woman was in constant dread of something of the kind, and Wilson, being near to her person, and a reliable friend of hers, and a man of known courage, it was the most natural thing in the world that she would want him to be marshal. She insisted upon it. Loper at that time was marshal. Loper, as well as most of us, had taken a hand in the affair of 1887. She wanted things in shape that she could feel she had control of things. The station house was an arsenal. They kept arms there, and ordnance; cannon, Gatling guns, etc., had been removed in 1887 down there and placed under the charge of Marshal Loper, who was in sympathy and connection with the 1887 party. So when she came in power it was one of the first demands she made, that some of her friends should be placed in charge of that institution. I was postmaster then, and one of the demands made was that I should be removed, and I was removed on account of my affiliation with the 1887 party.

Q. The change from Loper to Wilson gave offense to the other side—the Reform party?

A. There was a little interregnum in which another man named Hopkins, was put in temporary charge before Wilson formally took office, but practically Wilson followed Loper. This little administration of Hopkins did not amount to anything.

Q. Wilson going in there gave offence to the Reform party?

A. No; nothing seemed to be said about it. After they began to find things were going against them, and the results of the elections of 1890—the National Reform party swept the field—then they began their old games of attacking through the press. They attacked everybody and everything—not only Wilson, but everybody.

If a chicken thief was caught, Wilson was held up for ridicule. For every drunk, robbery, etc., Wilson was blamed. They attacked him broadcast through the press.

Q. Any efforts made to impeach him?

A. I do not think so; not to my knowledge.

Q. Where was he born?

A. Wilson is the son of the English consul at Tahiti, by a Tahitian chieftess.

Q. Did he come here as a boy?

A. Yes. He is about the same age I am. I am rather better informed than anybody else regarding Wilson. My mother, the daughter of missionaries, was born in Tahiti and was well acquainted with the Wilson family.

Q. How old was he when he came here?

A. His father was interested in shipping ventures, and among other places of trade, I think either owned totally, or in connection with other parties, Fannings Island. He had interests there, and it was in one of these trading voyages that he was lost. Old Capt. English, who is here now, took the two boys—the brothers—and carried them to Fannings Island. They lived there, and when they were old enough, the old man brought them here and put them to school. That was in the early fifties. I think they went to school with Captain Smith.

Q. How old would that make him.

A. About 43 years old. As was usually the case with half-whites of that class, they did not have the best opportunities for education. After they got the ordinary rudiments they would be put to a trade. He was put to a trade. He learned the blacksmith's trade. He was a man of strong character and ability. He dropped that and went into Government employ. He was made superintendent of waterworks and made a good one.

Q. What sort of marshal did he make?

A. An exceptionally good one.

Q. Was that generally the opinion?

A. I do not think they have ever had a marshal here at any time who could equal him, and I think it would be a hard matter to get anyone—with this one exception—like most of the natives Wilson was careless in money matters. I have to admit that Wilson was careless.

Q. Behind in his accounts?

A. In his business arrangements he has been careless. When he was superintendent of waterworks he got behind considerably. I saw his difficulties. There was a shortage of something like nine or ten thousand dollars. We advanced the money for him, myself and the present Queen. That transaction was open to explanation. I think Wilson was made the residuary legatee of a long series of old fossils. It had been considered a place of no importance. They kept accounts very badly. They kept a system of receipt books with stubs. The investigation was held by Gulick. These stubs were added up and Wilson was made to account for it. I can not say whether he was responsible for it.

Q. Did he ever live in the palace with the Queen?

A. I do not think Wilson ever lived in the palace. Wilson and his wife occupied the bungalow.

Q. How far is that from the palace?

A. It is located in the corner of Richard and Palace Walk, in the palace yard. I know that Wilson and his wife occupied some of the apartments. The other apartments were occupied by others of her household, servants and retainers. She occupied the palace herself, or lived in her own place, at Washington Place.

Q. How far is the bungalow from the palace?

A. Sixty or 100 yards. I used to visit him at times. The palace stands in the middle of the square.

Q. Have you ever heard it stated from any reliable source that Mr. Wilson was lodged in the palace?

A. Never.

Q. How was the Queen received here in society?

A. She was always received with the greatest respect.

Q. Please illustrate what you mean by that?

A. No entertainment of any importance—reception, ball—was considered complete without the presence of the Queen. The chief justice on one occasion gave a ball or entertainment of some kind; I think it was a reception to Armstrong. I was present. The Queen was there. The chief justice was very attentive to the Queen. W. R. Castle gave an entertainment not a great while ago at his residence to some children, which the Queen attended. Castle was extremely attentive to her. In fact, whenever the so-called missionary party gave any entertainment they were always desirous of having the Queen. She received the most marked attention from them.

Q. Were these ladies active in social life about the palace?

A. Yes; whenever the Queen would give entertainments these people always attended.

Q. With as much freedom as other classes of people?

A. I think so.

Q. You spoke of the Queen educating Hawaiian girls. At what school?

A. At a number of schools. The school I am most acquainted with is Kawaiahae Seminary.

Q. Who were the teachers there?

A. Miss Bingham was the principal. Latterly they have been compelled to send abroad to get assistance. The management was always in the hands of the missionaries. It is a missionary institution.

Q. Did she generally prefer that institution for these girls?

A. I think most of the girls have been educated there. I think she has had several educated at Maui, at Makawaco Seminary, another institution.

Q. Are you a man of family?

A. No, sir; I am not a married man. We are a very large family. I have a number of sisters living here.

Q. Did they associate with the Queen without reserve, as other people here?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you feel like they were with a reputable person?

A. Yes; I never felt anything out of the way. In fact, I know that a great many people at times would feel slighted if they did not receive invitations to attend entertainments there.

Q. Were you one of the active participants in the revolution of 1887?

A. I was an active participator in the events of 1887. I was not a leader.

Q. Please tell me the cause of that revolution.

A. I want to say that the reasons and causes that actuated different participants were no doubt numerous. The mainspring was this same Missionary party. They were smarting under defeats they had sustained repeatedly from Gibson. They had used large amounts of money in attempting to control the elections, but Gibson seemed to have a strong influence on the King and defeated them and held his power, I think, over a period of six years, and the King, under his direction, was allowed to go into all kinds of follies. This "Kaimiloa" escapade was one. The King had the idea in his head for some time previous of causing a confederation of the Pacific Islands. I have never heard him say he was ambitious of becoming Emperor of the Pacific, as has been attributed to him. Gibson, who was too astute and far-seeing to believe in anything of the kind, still felt it was necessary to humor him in a number of these projects, of which this was one. That escapade is familiar with everybody. They sent Bush down there and it resulted in disaster. That was made one of the ostensible reasons. Also the opium scandal. There had always been a great deal said regarding the opium business; some thought it should be entirely prohibited others thought it was impossible to do so. They favored licensing the business. A bill passed the Legislature authorizing licenses. Then the Chinese began to bid for these licenses and that resulted in what is known as the Ah Ki scandal, in which it is claimed that the King received sixty or seventy thousand dollars to let a certain Chinese firm have the license. That was another cause put forward.

Q. Did they make him pay that back?

A. Yes; his estate paid that back, eventually.

Q. Was it generally believed that he acted corruptly in that matter?

A. Yes; those are the ostensible reasons put forward, and general extravagance and mismanagement of finances. That led up to this business.

Q. What do you mean by ostensible reasons; were there any other reasons behind these?

A. I do not know that I would have any right to put forward convictions and beliefs which lead from way back. I do not think that these reasons, though they were powerful agents at the time, were the only cause. I think it was the persistent determination of a clique here to get the power again which Gibson had wrested from it.

Q. They had been directing public affairs up to Gibson's time?

A. Yes.

Q. And during that time lost control?

A. Yes. To go back a little farther: The same party had held power in various forms and degrees up to about 1853. I think then that the decline of Dr. Judd's power began. He held despotic sway under Kamehameha III. In 1853 a committee of thirteen, representing people who had become tired of this arbitrary rule of Dr. Judd, waited on the King and demanded his removal from power. From that time, over a period of twenty years, is where the country received the very best administration it ever got, from men like Robert C. Wiley, Judge Lee, and, in later days, Harris and Hutchinson—men of that style. That carried through the reigns of Kamehameha IV and V. The missionaries were out of power. These men would not tolerate them at all.

Q. Was there extravagance then?

A. That was the very best period of Hawaiian history. That was the foundation of the Hawaiian Islands being received into the family of nations. She took her standing under the guidance of Wiley and Harris. At the death of Kamehameha V, Lunalilo came in and the missionaries regained their power through him. He was the highest chief living, but an intemperate fellow. He was as good a fellow as ever lived. He was a drunkard. Missionaries went into power under him. He lived a year, then came Kalakaua. They continued their hold on affairs during the early part of Kalakaua's reign, until Gibson came in. He overthrew them, I think, in 1880. Gibson reigned supreme in 1880. He was returned to the Legislature in 1880 and held power to 1887. Kalakaua was extravagant, and Gibson, in order to hold his power, had to yield to a good many of the King's foibles in that way. If Gibson had received generous support from outside he would have been able to hold the King in check, but in order to hold his power he had to yield to the King in order to hold his position against opposition. The chamber of commerce, the Planters' Labor and Supply Company—everything combined against him. It is a marvel how he managed to hold his own against the tremendous odds that were used against him.

While the natives had, as a rule, generally yielded the Government into the hands of the whites, still they always felt that they should have some sort of representation in the Government, and a native Hawaiian usually occupied one of the cabinet positions. In addition to the native Hawaiian there was a new element coming on the field, which consisted of native born of foreign parents, and somewhere around about 1884 we began to feel that we should have representation as well as the foreigners, and placed the proposition before Kalakaua. He recognized the justice of this, and C. T. Gulick was made minister of the interior in compliance with the wishes of this element. This cabinet was overthrown in 1886 by Mr. Spreckels' influence. Mr. Spreckels had advanced large sums of money to the Government, and demanded the deeding over of the wharfage, the city front from the Pacific Mail to the Oceanic docks, the Honolulu waterworks, and other governmental property in town. This proposition was acceded to by Gibson, but resisted by Gulick, who succeeded in frustrating the whole scheme, but which resulted in the overthrow of the cabinet finally through Spreckels' influence. Spreckels was instrumental in forming a new cabinet composed of Gibson, John T. Dare (a lawyer he brought from San Francisco), and, I think, Robert Creighton, and they put one Hawaiian in—some old dummy, I forget now who he was. This was naturally offensive to the Hawaiian element previously alluded to, and we reproached Gibson for his action in the matter, and when the events of 1887 turned up, a large majority of the element alluded to joined the movement to overthrow Gibson, and of course the other party were only too glad to have additions to the strength of their party. I think that answers the question why I joined the movement of 1887.

Q. What was the demand made upon Kalakaua as far as a new constitution went?

A. They made a demand that he should grant them a new constitution, which he agreed to immediately.

Q. And that is the present constitution?

A. Yes; that is the present constitution.

Q. What sort of cabinet did he appoint then?

A. He appointed a cabinet to their dictation: L. A. Thurston, W. L. Green, C. W. Ashford, and Jonathan Austin.

Q. Is Mr. Thurston native-born?

A. Yes.

Q. Educated here?

A. Yes; most of his education. He went abroad to study law.

Q. His life has been spent here?

A. Yes; he is identified with this community.

Q. Has he been an active member of the Planters' Labor and Supply Company?

A. He has always been invited to their meetings. He never was a planter.

Q. Might he not have owned stock?

A. He may have owned some little stock.

Q. He is not an American citizen?

A. No, sir; he is a Hawaiian.

Q. Where is Mr. Green from?

A. He is an Englishman. He came here in early days. He is head of the firm of Janior, Green & Company.

Q. Where is Mr. Ashford from?

A. Ashford is a Canadian. He arrived here in the early part of 1880.

Q. Was he especially active then in military movements?

A. Yes; very active in 1887.

Q. He commanded troops?

A. His brother, Volney V. Ashford; he was the man who put it through.

Q. What do you mean when you say that he was the man who put it through?

A. V. V. Ashford was the organizer and guide of the whole of the movement, which was expected to have operated in the event of any open resistance having occurred. Of course, the Missionary party—Thurston, Smith, Dole, and others—were organizers of the movement, but when it came down to actual working V. V. Ashford was one. He was colonel of the existing forces—four or five companies of Hawaiian rifles, and this riffraff that you find around the Provisional Government to-day—that was the crowd that flocked in around them. They were the ones that would have been used. Whenever danger was in the way they were scarce, but when it came to asking positions, they were there.

Q. Who was Jonathan Austin?

A. He was an American—a New Yorker, I think. He was a brother of H. L. Austin, of Hawaii. He was a comparatively newcomer.

Q. None of these were of native blood?

A. None of them.

Q. They continued in power how long?

A. From immediately after the 30th of June, 1887, up to the Legislature of 1890. The elections were in February. The house met in April or May, 1890. Shortly after the house went into session they passed a vote of want of confidence.

Q. The reform element had been beaten in elections?

A. Yes.

Q. And that brought about an antireform cabinet?

A. Yes.

Q. Now in the Legislature of 1892 there was a continual turning out of cabinets; was that a struggle for power?

A. It was a struggle for power. This same reform or missionary element was fighting to regain the reins of government. They united with a faction known as Liberals. These two elements put together could vote out the other crowd, and they voted them out until the G. N. Wilcox cabinet was formed.

Q. With this cabinet the Reform party was content?

A. Yes.

Q. How did the Liberals take it—did they get offended?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they make a combination with the National Reform party?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the Wilcox cabinet voted out as a result of that combination?

A. Yes.

Q. The Wilcox cabinet was voted out on the 13th of January, 1893?

A. Yes.

Q. The Legislature was prorogued on the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. If this cabinet had not been voted out before the prorogation of the Legislature the Reform element through this cabinet would have had control of the Government for two years?

A. Yes.

Q. How did they receive the voting out of the Wilcox cabinet?

A. It was not liked.

Q. Did they feel like they had lost power?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you at Mr. W. O. Smith's office at the meeting on Saturday, January 14, 1893?

A. Yes; I was there in the afternoon.

Q. Was the subject of the dethronement of the Queen discussed?

A. No.

Q. Was the subject of annexation discussed?

A. No.

Q. What was in the mind of that meeting; anything definite?

A. No; nothing definite. The idea was that this attempted proclaiming of a new constitution was the cause of unsettling affairs, and that there was danger for the public safety. This committee of public safety was organized for that purpose.

Q. Anything said about landing troops?

A. No.

Q. There were subsequent meetings of the committee of safety. Did you attend any of them? Were you invited?

A. I attended one that was held at Henry Waterhouse's on Monday evening, the 16th.

Q. Did you attend any of any earlier date?

A. I attended one at Thurston's house on Saturday evening.

Q. Was the subject of the dethronement of the Queen discussed there?

A. I would not like to give any information regarding anything that took place

at Thurston's house that night, as I considered it as confidential. Thurston reposed confidence in me, and I should not like to betray it.

Q. Where was the other meeting?

A. The only other meeting I attended was the meeting at Waterhouse's.

Q. Who was present? Any members of the present Provisional Government?

A. Most of the members of the committee of safety were there.

Q. Please give the names of such as you can remember.

A. H. E. Cooper, I think, was there; Andrew Brown was there; J. A. McCandless was there; T. F. Lansing was there; I think John Emmeluth was there; C. Bolte was there; Henry Waterhouse was there; F. W. McChesney was there; W. O. Smith was there; C. L. Carter was also present.

Q. Any others connected with the Government?

A. Mr. Dole was sent for and invited to be present and he attended.

Q. Was there anything said at that meeting on the subject of aid by the troops of the United States and the American minister?

A. Yes; the general impression and the general talk all through the business was the fact that they would obtain or receive both moral and material assistance from the United States minister and from the troops from the *Boston*.

Q. Did they expect to fight?

A. No; I do not think they did.

Q. Their idea was that the sympathy of the American minister and troops was with them?

A. Yes; the people knew if the United States minister, or any vessel in port, moved in the matter that would be the end of the matter. If they sent one marine ashore it would end the matter.

Q. Was that the drift of the meeting?

A. Yes; everybody knew that and felt that.

Q. Was there any portion of that meeting that went to see the American minister?

A. Yes. Mr. Loper was offered the position of commander in chief of what forces they might get together. He did not see his way clear; he did not want to assume any position which was not tangible, and the arguments put to him were about this support we would receive.

Q. What sort of support?

A. The support from the United States minister and from the *Boston*. Loper still hesitated. He did not feel satisfied with the assurances. It was suggested that he go over and see the minister himself, which he did in company with some of the others. I think C. L. Carter was one—I do not know for certain.

Q. Henry Waterhouse was one?

A. I think so, but I do not know. I have an impression that Waterhouse and Carter went there.

Q. Did they come back?

A. Yes.

Q. What did they report?

A. I understood them to say that Mr. Stevens had told them that if they would take possession of the Government building and read their proclamation he would immediately recognize them and support them, or, failing to get the Government building, any building in Honolulu. They deny that, but I understood *any building in Honolulu*. Anyway, from what Mr. Loper heard he was satisfied and accepted the office.

Q. Was the city quiet when the troops came in?

A. Yes; quiet as Sunday.

Q. Women and children on the streets?

A. Yes; the public at large did not know what was going on. The band played at the hotel. I do not think anyone knew what was going on except the politicians and those who were behind the scenes, as you might say.

Q. How long after the proclamation was read before Mr. Stevens recognized the Provisional Government?

A. That I do not know. The current report around there was that it was between 3 and 4 o'clock. I understood the United States minister had recognized the Government.

Q. Who said that?

A. It is impossible for me to say. It was common talk.

Q. How long after that before the station house and barracks were surrendered?

A. Somewhere, I should judge, between 6 and 7 o'clock. The lamps were lighted. Loper said Wilson had agreed to turn over the station house. He said: "Will you go down and take possession?" I said: "No; I have nothing to do with this concern." He said: "We must have someone to go down there." I said: "Take some of your own folks; take McCandless down." He did. He had not been gone long before he telephoned up, "I want you; you must come down; McCandless won't stop." I think before I started I met McCandless. He said: "Loper wants you

down there." I don't want to stop there. I considered the matter. A number of friends of mine wanted me to go. They said: "It is a critical moment. We want a Hawaiian who can talk to the natives and prevent any friction between the natives and foreigners." I said: "In the interest of law and order I will go down." I went down. Most of the force that Wilson had was retiring. This guard of 20 men that Loper had taken down of this "German 500," had marched in. I went in and was placed in charge. The street lamps were lighted.

Q. What was the occasion of your separating from the people who were at the meeting at Mr. Waterhouse's?

A. The first proposition was made by Thurston himself. He asked me if I was willing to stay in the movement for maintaining law and order, and try to preserve the fundamental law of the land? I told him I would. We went over to the attorney-general's office and met the cabinet, who had come over from the polls. I heard the statements of Parker, Peterson, and Colburn. It was then proposed by Thurston and others that we should support the cabinet against the overt acts of the Queen, and that meeting at Smith's office was for that purpose. Peterson went there.

Q. You separated from them, then, when it was developed that they meant to overthrow the Queen?

A. Yes. I stopped on Wednesday, when I found it began to develop. I began to be suspicious. I simply went to this meeting at Waterhouse's and was a listener. I was interested in affairs of the country.

Q. You took no part in the organization of the Provisional Government?

A. None whatever.

Q. How many troops did they have there at the time the proclamation was read?

A. When the proclamation was read there were two policemen taken off an ammunition wagon and put at the front door.

Q. How many troops did they have at the close of the reading of the proclamation?

A. None, excepting those two.

Q. How long after that before other troops arrived?

A. Just about 3 o'clock. This Capt. Zeigler, with about 30 men, marched in the back way, indifferently armed.

Q. Then other troops came in afterwards?

A. After that another body of similar number—25 to 30—made up of young fellows from around various offices, marched in. That was all there were. It was not until it was generally known that the United States minister had recognized the Government that the crowd came flocking in—mostly men discharged from the station house by Wilson. They jumped in there with a view of being paid. They enlisted after being discharged by Wilson.

Q. Are those fellows in the service now?

A. Yes.

Q. Making part of the Provisional forces at this time?

A. Yes; and a great many of the citizens, those who compose the Annexation Club, when they saw the thing was sure, the United States forces within pistol shot, and that Wilson had given up the station house, and that the barracks would be surrendered, then they wanted to be on the top side. They came in.

Q. Before that they had been quiet?

A. Yes; then they rushed in.

Q. Were you at the mass meeting on Monday?

A. Yes.

Q. How many people were there?

A. I should judge about 700 or 800, possibly 900.

Q. What nationalities?

A. Heterogeneous.

Q. Many Portuguese?

A. A great many.

Q. How is the white population in this city on the subject of annexation?

A. It is very hard to arrive at an exact statement. You can only get it by making your own views known. You will find out that men who are pretending to be in with a party are really at heart opposed to it.

Q. How many people are not pretending to be with the party in power and are opposed to annexation?

A. I should judge about half and half.

Q. People who are frank about their views?

A. Yes. You take the independent Americans who are not under the influence of the Missionary faction, they are as a rule opposed to it, as are most of the English people and some Germans, and almost all foreigners outside of the particular American class who are under the influence of the missionaries and planters.

Q. What part of the United States is this American element who favor annexation from?

- A. The New England States, generally.
- Q. Are they in point of numbers in a majority of the Americans here?
- A. I do not know. I do not think that they are, but their influence is the largest in account of wealth.
- Q. And intelligence?
- A. I won't add intelligence; I beg to be excused from that.
- Q. Do you know whether or not the committee that went up and organized the Provisional Government sent anybody to the Government building to see if there were any soldiers there or not?
- A. I can not say that. I remained in my office until I felt something was going on, and then I walked out on the street. What they did after leaving Waterhouse's I don't know.
- Q. Was everything quiet at the Government building at the time the proclamation was read?
- A. Oh, yes. All the offices were running right along very quietly; nobody knew anything.

- Q. None of the officers knew of the movement?
- A. I do not think they did. Everything was going on just the same as usual. They knew there were rumors, but I do not think much attention was paid to it. The presence of the United States troops was a matter of curiosity and comment.
- Q. Well, then, so far as the reading of that proclamation dethroning the Queen was concerned it was known to very few people that it was to be done?
- A. I do not think it was known to anybody except themselves. The whole thing was a surprise to everyone. Wilson might have had some inkling of it. He was trying his best to keep posted, but of course his actions would have been guided entirely by what information he got regarding the attitude of the United States troops.

JUNE 5, 1893.

Mr. BLOUNT. Mr. Wundenberg, I omitted to ask you as to the feeling of the natives on the subject of annexation at the former interview. Please tell me now.

A. To the best of my knowledge and belief—and I am well acquainted with the natives—I do not think there is a native in favor of annexation. Many may have declared themselves so, but it is my belief that they have done so under pressure—that is, their interests were controlled by those who desire annexation; they are afraid of offending them and of being deprived of privileges they now possess.

Q. What sort of privileges?

A. In a number of cases they have stock running on lands of large landowners who would make them remove them, and that would deprive them of their means of livelihood. Some of them hold positions under planters and others.

Q. Any of them in Government employ?

A. A good many of them are in Government employ. There is only one that I know of who openly comes out and advocates annexation—a young man by the name of Notley, who is employed in the waterworks. Others do it in a subdued manner. If they advocate the matter at all they do it as a matter of policy. The natives have the same love of country as you will find anywhere. The term they use is *Aloha aina*.

Q. Are there any whites in the islands against annexation?

A. A great many.

Q. What proportion of them—I mean Americans and Europeans?

A. I think if a fair canvass was made that you would find fully one-half opposed to it.

Q. Suppose the question of annexation was submitted to the people of these islands, or such of them as were qualified to vote for representatives under the constitution just abrogated, and with the Australian ballot system which you had adopted, what would be the result of the vote?

A. It would be overwhelmingly defeated—almost to a man by the native Hawaiians, and I think a great many of the foreigners who now are supposed to be in favor of annexation would vote against it.

Q. What would be the proportion of annexationists to anti-annexationists?

A. All the native voters, with very few exceptions, would vote against it. I think most of the native-born of Hawaiian parents would vote against it, with the exception possibly of those few that are mixed up in the annexation movement here. I think most of the foreign element that are independent and outside of what is known as the Missionary party would vote against it, and I think a great many of those who are now on the rolls of the Annexation Club would vote against it. Their names appear there simply for policy.

I have carefully read the foregoing and find it to be an accurate report of my interviews with Mr. Blount.

F. WUNDENBERG.

No. 13.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 10.] HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, June 17, 1893.

SIR: To-morrow, June 18, the *China* leaves here for San Francisco. Your letter of the 26th ultimo, informing me of a desire for my final report, was received. Up to this time I have devoted myself to the study of various questions here and the taking of testimony. The latter has been necessarily slow, because Mr. Mills had no aid in transcribing notes, which occupied a great deal of time.

I had supposed it was your wish that I should not undertake to prepare a report until the lapse of two or three months, in order that I might assure myself of a correct comprehension of the situation here. So little had been said in your correspondence with me that I feared to commence too early lest you should suppose I was acting hastily.

Some recent information has made it well that this delay has taken place. I will immediately commence my report and devote myself to it continuously until it is completed.

There is nothing of special importance occurring here now. There is no indication of any movement against the Provisional Government. There seems to be a universal acquiescence on the part of all parties in the idea of awaiting the action of the Government of the United States.

It may be of interest to you to know that in an examination this afternoon of Col. Soper, commanding the military forces of the Provisional Government since the 17th of January last, he stated that at a meeting at the house of Henry Waterhouse, on the night of the 16th of January, composed of members of the committee of safety, and some persons called in, he was offered the command of the military forces; that he declined to accept it until the next day; that in this meeting it was accepted by all as true that Mr. Stevens had agreed that if the persons seeking to dethrone the Queen got possession of the Government building and proclaimed a new government he would recognize it as a *de facto* government, that he (Soper) never accepted the command until after he had knowledge of this fact; that he is a citizen of the United States and claims allegiance thereto.

I send you a copy of the oath Col. Soper and other foreigners take in order to participate in public affairs in these islands.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

No. —.

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *Island of* —, *District of* —, ss:

I, —, aged —, a native of —, residing at —, in said district, do solemnly swear, in the presence of Almighty God, that I will support the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, promulgated and proclaimed on the 7th day of July, 1887, and the laws of said Kingdom, not hereby renouncing but expressly reserving all allegiance and citizenship now owing or held by me.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this — day of —, A. D. 18—.

_____,
Inspector of Election.

No. —.

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *Island of*——, *District of*——, ss:

I, the undersigned, inspector of election, duly appointed and commissioned, do hereby certify that ———, aged ———, a native of ———, residing at ———, in said district, has this day taken, before me, the oath to support the Constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, promulgated and proclaimed on the 7th day of July, 1887, and the laws of said Kingdom.

—————, *Inspector of Election.*

—————, 18—.

No. 14.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 11.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,

June 28, 1893.

SIR: On yesterday I found amongst the unfiled papers of the legation a document, of which the inclosure sent herewith is a true copy.

My final report will be completed within the next ten days, probably much earlier. It will be forwarded by the first opportunity.

In my dispatch to the Department of April 26 I said: "Mr. Paul Neumann is generally regarded here as a bright, plausible, unscrupulous person." I desire now to say that so far as the expression "unscrupulous" is concerned a better knowledge of public opinion satisfies me that I was not justified in its use. I deem it my duty to place this on the records of the Department.

Three persons have been arrested for conspiracy to overthrow the Government. They are whites of the laboring class.

I see no reason to think that there is likely to be any movement against the Provisional Government or the peace of society at this time.

On the 18th of this month 1,757 Japanese contract laborers were landed here for the sugar plantations. Of this number 1,410 were men and 347 women.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

[Inclosure in No. 11.]

Mr. Dole to Mr. Stevens.

GOVERNMENT BUILDING,
Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
United States Minister Resident:

SIR: I acknowledge the receipt of your valued communication of this day, recognizing the Hawaiian Provisional Government, and express deep appreciation of the same.

We have conferred with the ministers of the late government and have made demand upon the marshal to surrender the station house. We are not actually yet in possession of the station house, but as night is approaching and our forces may be insufficient to maintain order, we request the immediate support of the United States forces, and would request that the commander of the United States forces take command of our military forces so that they may act together for the protection of the city.

Respectfully, etc.,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Chairman Executive Council.

(Note of Mr. Stevens at the end of the above communication: "The above request not complied with.—Stevens.")

No. 15.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

No. 12.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,

*July 7, 1893.*SIR: The steamer *Peru* leaves Honolulu for San Francisco to-morrow.

It will take me three or four days longer to complete my report, which will be forwarded to you by the first steamer leaving here after that time.

Recalling to your mind the letter from Mr. Dole to Mr. Stevens (a copy of which was sent with my last dispatch) I ask you to examine a statement made by the commissioners of the Hawaiian Provisional Government on page 41 of Senate Executive Document, No. 76, Fifty-second Congress, second session, designated as the "sixth" in the statement of facts by them.

I wrote President Dole a communication asking for a copy of Mr. Stevens's reply to this letter, omitting therefrom its reference to his recognition.

Verbally he says he does not recollect writing the letter and has not been able to find the reply. I have asked him for his reply in writing, which he has promised to give me after making a more thorough search.

The annexation element have endeavored to utilize the celebration of the Fourth of July in the advancement of their cause.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

No. 16.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,

July 17, 1893.

No. 13.]

SIR: The report which is forwarded herewith has been delayed by the slowness of movements of persons interested in either party; by the difficulty of communication with the several islands, and by a desire to assure myself of the true import of the facts testified to from time to time by a great number of persons.

Public documents had to be examined, as well as the testimony of a great number of witnesses, which was delayed in being transcribed from the stenographic notes from lack of clerical aid. This testimony will be promptly forwarded.

Few quotations have been indulged in lest this paper should attain inconvenient length.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

No. 17.

*Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.*HONOLULU, H. I., *July 17, 1893.*

SIR: On the 11th of March, 1893, I was appointed by the President of the United States as special commissioner to the Hawaiian Islands. At the same time the following instructions were given to me by you:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 11, 1893.

SIR: The situation created in the Hawaiian Islands by the recent deposition of Queen Liliuokalani and the erection of a Provisional Government demands the fullest consideration of the President, and in order to obtain trustworthy information on the subject, as well as for the discharge of other duties herein specified, he has decided to dispatch you to the Hawaiian Islands as his special commissioner, in which capacity you will herewith receive a commission and also a letter whereby the President accredits you to the president of the executive and advisory councils of the Hawaiian Islands.

The comprehensive, delicate, and confidential character of your mission can now only be briefly outlined, the details of its execution being necessarily left, in great measure, to your good judgment and wise discretion.

You will investigate and fully report to the President all the facts you can learn respecting the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, the causes of the revolution by which the Queen's Government was overthrown, the sentiment of the people towards existing authority, and, in general, all that can fully enlighten the President touching the subjects of your mission.

To enable you to fulfill this charge, your authority in all matters touching the relations of this Government to the existing or other government of the islands, and the protection of our citizens therein, is paramount, and in you alone, acting in coöperation with the commander of the naval forces, is vested full discretion and power to determine when such forces should be landed or withdrawn.

You are, however, authorized to avail yourself of such aid and information as you may desire from the present minister of the United States at Honolulu, Mr. John L. Stevens, who will continue until further notice to perform the usual functions attaching to his office not inconsistent with the powers entrusted to you. An instruction will be sent to Mr. Stevens directing him to facilitate your presentation to the head of the Government upon your arrival, and to render you all needed assistance.

The withdrawal from the Senate of the recently signed treaty of annexation for reëxamination by the President leaves its subject-matter in abeyance, and you are not charged with any duty in respect thereto. It may be well, however, for you to dispel any possible misapprehension which its withdrawal may have excited touching the entire friendliness of the President and the Government of the United States towards the people of the Hawaiian Islands, or the earnest solicitude here felt for their welfare, tranquility, and progress.

Historical precedents, and the general course of the United States, authorize the employment of its armed force in foreign territory for the security of the lives and property of American citizens and for the repression of lawless and tumultuous acts threatening them; and the powers conferred to that end upon the representatives of the United States are both necessary and proper, subject always to the exercise of a sound discretion in their application.

In the judgment of the President, your authority as well as that of the commander of the naval forces in Hawaiian waters should be and is limited in the use of physical force to such measures as are necessary to protect the persons and property of our citizens, and while abstaining from any manner of interference with the domestic concerns of the islands, you should indicate your willingness to intervene with your friendly offices in the interests of a peaceful settlement of troubles within the limits of sound discretion.

Should it be necessary to land an armed force upon Hawaiian territory on occasions of popular disturbance, when the local authority may be unable to give adequate protection to the life and property of citizens of the United States, the assent of such authority should first be obtained if it can be done without prejudice to the interests involved.

Your power in this regard should not, however, be claimed to the exclusion of similar measures by the representatives of other powers for the protection of the lives and property of their citizens or subjects residing in the islands.

While the United States claim no right to interfere in the political or domestic affairs or in the internal conflicts of the Hawaiian Islands otherwise than as herein stated, or for the purpose of maintaining any treaty or other rights which they possess, this Government will adhere to its consistent and established policy in relation to them, and it will not acquiesce in domestic interference by other powers.

The foregoing general exposition of the President's views will indicate the safe courses within which your action should be shaped and mark the limits of your discretion in calling upon the naval commander for coöperation.

The United States revenue cutter *Rush* is under orders to await you at San Francisco and convey you to Honolulu.

A stenographic clerk will be detailed to accompany you and remain subject to your orders.

It is expected that you will use all convenient dispatch for the fulfillment of your mission, as it is the President's desire to have the results before him at the earliest possible day. Besides the connected report you are expected to furnish, you will from time to time, as occasion may offer, correspond with the Secretary of State, communicating information or soliciting special instruction on such points as you may deem necessary. In case of urgency you may telegraph either in plain text or in the cipher of the Navy Department through the kind offices of the admiral commanding, which may be sent to Mr. W. A. Cooper, United States dispatch agent at San Francisco, to be transmitted thence.

Reposing the amplest confidence in your ability and zeal for the realization of the trust confided to you,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Hon. JAMES H. BLOUNT, etc.

On the 29th of the same month I reached the city of Honolulu. The American minister, Hon. John L. Stevens, accompanied by a committee from the Annexation Club, came on board the vessel which had brought me. He informed me that this club had rented an elegant house, well furnished, and provided servants and a carriage and horses for my use; that I could pay for this accommodation just what I chose, from nothing up. He urged me very earnestly to accept the offer. I declined it, and informed him that I should go to a hotel.

The committee soon after this renewed the offer, which I again declined.

Soon afterwards the ex-Queen, through her chamberlain, tendered her carriage to convey me to my hotel. This I courteously declined.

I located myself at the Hawaiian Hotel. For several days I was engaged receiving calls from persons of all classes and of various political views. I soon became conscious of the fact that all minds were quietly and anxiously looking to see what action the Government of the United States would take.

The troops from the *Boston* were doing military duty for the Provisional Government. The American flag was floating over the government building. Within it the Provisional Government conducted its business under an American protectorate, to be continued, according to the avowed purpose of the American minister, during negotiations with the United States for annexation.

My instructions directed me to make inquiries which in the interest of candor and truth could not be done when the minds of thousands of Hawaiian citizens were full of uncertainty as to what the presence of American troops, the American flag, and the American protectorate implied. It seemed necessary that all these influences must be withdrawn before those inquiries could be prosecuted in a manner befitting the dignity and power of the United States.

Inspired with such feelings and confident no disorder would ensue, I directed the removal of the flag of the United States from the government building and the return of the American troops to their ves-

sels. This was accomplished without any demonstration of joy or grief on the part of the populace.

The afternoon before, in an interview with President Dole, in response to my inquiry, he said that the Provisional Government was now able to preserve order, although it could not have done so for several weeks after the proclamation establishing it.

In the evening of this same day the American minister called on me with a Mr. Walter G. Smith, who, he said, desired to make an important communication to me, and whom he knew to be very intelligent and reliable. Thereupon Mr. Smith, with intense gravity, informed me that he knew beyond doubt that it had been arranged between the Queen and the Japanese commissioner that if the American flag and troops were removed the troops from the Japanese man of war *Naniwa* would land and reinstate the Queen.

Mr. Smith was the editor of the Hawaiian Star, established by the Annexation Club for the purpose of advocating annexation.

The American minister expressed his belief in the statement of Mr. Smith and urged the importance of the American troops remaining on shore until I could communicate with you and you could have the opportunity to communicate with the Japanese Government and obtain from it assurances that Japanese troops would not be landed to enforce any policy on the Government or people of the Hawaiian Islands.

I was not impressed much with these statements.

When the Japanese commissioner learned that the presence of the Japanese man of war was giving currency to suggestions that his Government intended to interfere with domestic affairs here, he wrote to his Government asking that the vessel be ordered away, which was done. He expressed to me his deep regret that any one should charge that the Empire of Japan, having so many reasons to value the friendship of the Government of the United States, would consent to offend that Government by interfering in the political conflicts in these islands, to which it was averse.

In the light of subsequent events, I trust the correctness of my action will be the more fully justified.

The Provisional Government left to its own preservation, the people freed from any fear of free intercourse with me in so far as my action could accomplish it, the disposition of the minds of all people to peace pending the consideration by the Government of the United States as to what should be its action in connection with affairs here, cleared the way for me to commence the investigation with which I was charged.

The causes of the revolution culminating in the dethronement of the Queen and the establishment of the Provisional Government, January 17, 1893, are remote and proximate. A brief presentation of the former will aid in a fuller apprehension of the latter.

On June 14, 1852, a constitution was granted by Kamehameha III, by and with the advice and consent of the nobles and representatives in legislative council. This instrument provided for a house of nobles, holding their seats for life, and that the number should not exceed thirty, and a house of representatives composed of not less than twenty-four nor more than forty members. Every male subject, whether native or naturalized, and every denizen of the Kingdom who had paid his taxes, attained the age of twenty-one years, and had resided in the Kingdom for one year immediately preceding the time of election was entitled to vote for the representative or representatives of the district in which he may have resided three months next preceding the day of election.

For convenience the following extracts from that instrument are inserted here:

ART. 32. He has the power, by and with the advice of his cabinet, and the approval of his privy council, to appoint and remove at his pleasure any of the several heads of the executive departments, and he may require information in writing from any of the officers in the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices.

ART. 35. The person of the King is inviolable and sacred; his ministers are responsible; to the King belongs the executive power; all laws that have passed both houses of the legislature, for their validity, shall be signed by His Majesty and the Kuhina Nui; all his other official acts shall be approved by the privy council, countersigned by the Kuhina Nui, and by the minister to whose department such act may belong.

ART. 51. The ministers of the King are appointed and commissioned by him, and hold their offices during His Majesty's pleasure, subject to impeachment.

ART. 72. The King appoints the members of the house of nobles, who hold their seats during life, subject to the provision of article 67; but their number shall not exceed thirty.

ART. 75. The house of representatives shall be composed of not less than twenty-four nor more than forty members, who shall be elected annually.

ART. 78. Every male subject of His Majesty, whether native or naturalized, and every denizen of the Kingdom who shall have paid his taxes who shall have attained the full age of 20 years, and who shall have resided in the Kingdom for one year immediately preceding the time of election, shall be entitled to one vote for the representative or representatives of the district in which he may have resided three months next preceding the day of election; provided that no insane person, nor any person who shall at any time have been convicted of any infamous crime within the Kingdom, unless he shall have been pardoned by the King, and by the terms of such pardon been restored to all the rights of a subject, shall be allowed to vote.

ART. 105. Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in either branch of the legislature, and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members of each house such proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on their journals, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to the next legislature; which proposed amendment or amendments shall be published for three months previous to the election of the next house of representatives. And if, in the next legislature, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members of each house, and be approved by the King, such amendment or amendments shall become part of the Constitution of this Kingdom.

In November, 1863, Kamehameha V was proclaimed King, on the death of Kamehameha IV. He issued a proclamation for the election of delegates to a constitutional convention to be held June 13, 1864. The convention was composed of sixteen nobles and twenty-seven elected delegates, presided over by the King in person. That body decided it had a right to proceed to make a new constitution. Not being in accord with the King on the question of a property qualification for voters, on the 13th day of August, 1864, he declared the constitution of 1852 abrogated and prorogued the convention. On the 20th of August following he proclaimed a new constitution upon his own authority, which continued in force twenty-three years.

From this the following extracts are made:

ART. 45. The legislative power of the three estates of this Kingdom is vested in the King and the legislative assembly, which assembly shall consist of the nobles appointed by the King and of the representatives of the people, sitting together.

ART. 57. The King appoints the nobles, who shall hold their appointments during life, subject to the provisions of article 53; but their number shall not exceed twenty.

ART. 61. No person shall be eligible for a representative of the people who is insane or an idiot; nor unless he be a male subject of the Kingdom, who shall have arrived at the full age of twenty-one years, who shall know how to read and write, who shall understand accounts, and shall have been domiciled in the Kingdom for at least three years, the last of which shall be the year immediately preceding his election, and who shall own real estate within the Kingdom of a clear value, over and above all incumbrances, of at least five hundred dollars, or who shall have an annual income of at least two hundred and fifty dollars derived from any property or some lawful employment.

ART. 62. Every male subject of the Kingdom, who shall have paid his taxes, who shall have attained the age of twenty years, and shall have been domiciled in the Kingdom for one year immediately preceding the election, and shall be possessed of real property in this Kingdom to the value over and above all incumbrances of one hundred and fifty dollars*—or of a leasehold property on which the rent is twenty-five dollars per year—or of an income of not less than seventy-five dollars per year, derived from any property or some lawful employment and shall know how to read and write, if born since the year 1840 and shall have caused his name to be entered on the list of voters of his district as may be provided by law, shall be entitled to one vote for the representative or representatives of that district; provided, however, that no insane or idiotic person, nor any person who shall have been convicted of any infamous crime within this Kingdom, unless he shall have been pardoned by the King, and by the terms of such pardon have been restored to all the rights of a subject, shall be allowed to vote.

ART. 80. Any amendment or amendments to this constitution may be proposed in the legislative assembly, and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members thereof, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on its journal, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to the next legislature; which proposed amendment or amendments shall be published for three months previous to the next election of representatives; and if in the next legislature such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members of the legislative assembly, and be approved by the King, such amendment or amendments shall become part of the constitution of this country.

On the 18th of February, 1874, David Kalakaua was proclaimed King. In 1875 a treaty of commercial reciprocity between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands was ratified, and the laws necessary to carry it into operation were enacted in 1876. It provided, as you are aware, for the free importation into the United States of several articles, amongst which was muscavado, brown, and all other unrefined sugars, sirups of sugar cane, melada, and molasses, produced in the Hawaiian Islands.

From it there came to the islands an intoxicating increase of wealth, a new labor system, an Asiatic population, an alienation between the native and white races, an impoverishment of the former, an enrichment of the latter, and the many so-called revolutions, which are the foundation for the opinion that stable government can not be maintained.

(The deaths in all these revolutions were seven. There were also seven wounded.)

The sugar export in 1876 was 26,072,429 pounds; in 1887 it was 212,763,647. The total value of all domestic exports was in 1876, \$1,994,833.55, and in 1887, \$9,435,204. The bounty paid on sugar by the United States to the sugar planters in the remission of customs on sugar before the McKinley bill was passed, is estimated by competent persons as reaching \$5,000,000 annually.

The government and crown lands were bought and leased and operated by whites of American, English, and German origin, and the sugar industry went into the hands of corporations.

From 1852 to 1876 there had been imported 2,625 Chinese, 148 Japanese, and 7 South Sea Islanders, making a total of 2,780. From 1876 to 1887 there were imported 23,268 Chinese, 2,777 Japanese, 10,216 Portuguese, 615 Norwegians, 1,052 Germans, 1,998 South Sea Islanders, making a total for this one decade of 39,926 immigrants. The Government expended from 1876 to 1887 \$1,026,212.30 in aid of the importation of labor for the planters, who for the same period expended \$565,547.74. It negotiated with various governments treaties under which labor was imported for a term of years to work at a very low figure, and under which the laborer was to be compelled by fines

* The property qualification was removed by an amendment.

and imprisonment to labor faithfully and to remain with his employer to the end of the contract term.

Of 14,439 laborers on plantations in 1885, 2,136 were natives and the remainder imported labor. Generally, the rule has obtained of bringing twenty-five women for every one hundred men. The immigrants were of the poor and ignorant classes. The Portuguese especially, as a rule, could not read or write and were remarkably thievish. The women of Japanese and Chinese origin were grossly unchaste.

The price of all property advanced. The price of labor was depressed by enormous importations and by the efficiency accruing from compulsory performance of the contract by the Government.

In the year 1845, under the influence of white residents, the lands were so distributed between the crown, the Government, the chiefs, and the people as to leave the latter with an insignificant interest in lands—27,830 acres.

The story of this division is discreditable to King, chiefs, and white residents, but would be tedious here. The chiefs became largely indebted to the whites, and thus the foundation for the large holdings of the latter was laid.

Prior to 1876 the kings were controlled largely by such men as Dr. Judd, Mr. Wyllie, and other leading white citizens holding positions in their cabinets.

A king rarely changed his cabinet. The important offices were held by white men. A feeling of amity existed between the native and foreign races unmarred by hostile conflict. It should be noted that at this period the native generally knew how to read and write his native tongue, into which the Bible and a few English works were translated. To this, native newspapers of extensive circulation contributed to the awakening of his intellect. He also generally read and wrote English.

From 1820 to 1866 missionaries of various nationalities, especially American, with unselfishness, toil, patience, and piety, had devoted themselves to the improvement of the native. They gave them a language, a religion, and an immense movement on the lines of civilization. In process of time the descendants of these good men grew up in secular pursuits. Superior by nature, education, and other opportunities, they acquired wealth. They sought to succeed to the political control exercised by their fathers. The revered missionary disappeared. In his stead there came the Anglo-Saxon in the person of his son, ambitious to acquire wealth and to continue that political control reverently conceded to his pious ancestor. Hence, in satire, the native designated him a "missionary," which has become a campaign phrase of wonderful potency. Other white foreigners came into the country, especially Americans, English, and Germans. These, as a rule, did not become naturalized and participate in the voting franchise. Business and race affiliation occasioned sympathy and coöperation between these two classes of persons of foreign extraction.

Does this narration of facts portray a situation in a government in whole or in part representative favorable to the ambition of a leader who will espouse the native cause? Would it be strange for him to stir the native heart by picturing a system of political control under which the foreigner had wickedly become possessed of the soil, degraded free labor by an uncivilized system of coolie labor, prostituted society by injecting into it a people hostile to Christianity and the civilization of the nineteenth century, exposed their own daughters to the evil influences of an overwhelming male population of a degraded type, implanted Japanese and Chinese women almost insensible to feelings of chastity, and then loudly boasted of their Christianity?

On the other hand, was it not natural for the white race to vaunt their wealth and intelligence, their Christian success in rescuing the native from barbarism, their gift of a Government regal in name but containing many of the principles of freedom; to find in the natives defective intelligence, tendencies to idolatry, to race prejudice, and a disposition under the influence of white and half-white leaders to exercise political domination; to speak of their thriftlessness in private life and susceptibility to bribes in legislative action; to proclaim the unchasteness of native women, and to take at all hazards the direction of public affairs from the native?

With such a powerful tendency to divergence and political strife, with its attendant bitterness and exaggerations, we must enter upon the field of inquiry pointed out in your instructions.

It is not my purpose to take up this racial controversy at its birth, but when it had reached striking proportions and powerfully acted in the evolution of grave political events culminating in the present status. Nor shall I relate all the minute details of political controversy at any given period, but only such and to such extent as may illustrate the purpose just indicated.

It has already appeared that under the constitution of 1852 the legislature consisted of two bodies—one elected by the people and the other chosen by the King—and that no property qualifications hindered the right of suffrage. The King and people through the two bodies held a check on each other. It has also been shown that in 1864 by a royal proclamation a new constitution, sanctioned by a cabinet of prominent white men, was established, restricting the right of suffrage and combining the representative and nobles into one body. This latter provision was designed to strengthen the power of the Crown by removing a body distinctly representative. This instrument remained in force twenty-three years. The Crown appointed the nobles generally from white men of property and intelligence. In like manner the King selected his cabinet. These remained in office for a long series of years and directed the general conduct of public affairs.

Chief Justice Judd, of the supreme court of the Hawaiian Islands, in a formal statement uses this language:

Under every constitution prior to 1887 the ministers were appointed by the King and removed by him; but until Kalakaua's reign it was a very rare thing that any King changed his ministry. They had a pretty long lease of political life. My father was minister for seven or ten years and Mr. Wyllie for a longer period. It was a very rare political occurrence and made a great sensation when a change was made. Under Kalakaua things were different. I think we had twenty-six different cabinets during his reign.

The record discloses thirteen cabinets. Two of these were directly forced on him by the reformers. Of the others, six were in sympathy with the reformers and eminent in their confidence. The great stir in cabinet changes commenced with the Gibson cabinet in 1882. He was a man of large information, free from all suspicion of bribery, politically ambitious, and led the natives and some whites.

It may not be amiss to present some of the criticisms against Kalakaua and his party formally filed with me by Prof. W. D. Alexander, a representative reformer.

On the 12th of February, 1874, Kalakaua was elected King by the legislature. The popular choice lay between him and the Queen Dowager.

In regard to this, Mr. Alexander says that "the cabinet and the American party used all their influence in favor of the former, while the English favored Queen Emma, who was devoted to their interest."

Notwithstanding there were objections to Kalakaua's character, he says: "It was believed, however, that if Queen Emma should be elected there would be no hope of our obtaining a reciprocity treaty with the United States."

He gives an account of various obnoxious measures advocated by the King which were defeated.

In 1882 he says the race issue was raised by Mr. Gibson, and only two white men were elected to the legislature on the islands.

A bill prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors to natives was repealed at this session.

A \$10,000,000 loan bill was again introduced, but was shelved in committee. The appropriation bill was swelled to double the estimated receipts of the Government, including \$30,000 for coronation expenses, besides large sums for military expenses, foreign embassies, etc.

A bill was reported giving the King power to appoint district justices, which had formerly been done by the justices of the supreme court.

A million of dollars of silver was coined by the King, worth 84 cents to the dollar, which was intended to be exchanged for gold bonds at par, under the loan act of 1882. This proceeding was enjoined by the court. The privy council declared the coin to be of the legal value expressed on their face, subject to the legal-tender act, and they were gradually put into circulation. A profit of \$150,000 is said to have been made on this transaction.

In 1884 a reform legislature was elected. A lottery bill, an opium license bill, and an \$8,000,000 loan bill were defeated.

In the election for the legislature of 1886 it is alleged that by the use of gin, chiefly furnished by the King, and by the use of his patronage, it was carried against the reform party; that out of twenty-eight candidates, twenty-six were office-holders—one a tax assessor and one the Queen's secretary. There was only one white man on the Government ticket—Gibson's son-in-law. Only ten reform candidates were elected. In this legislature an opium bill was passed providing for a license for four years, to be granted by the minister of the interior with the consent of the King, for \$30,000 per annum.

Another act was passed to create a Hawaiian board of health, consisting of five native doctors, appointed by the King, with power to issue certificates to native *kahunas* (doctors) to practice medicine.

A \$2,000,000 loan bill was passed, which was used largely in taking up bonds on a former loan.

It is claimed that in granting the lottery franchise the King fraudulently obtained \$75,000 for the franchise and then sold it to another person, and that subsequently the King was compelled to refund the same.

These are the principal allegations on which the revolution of 1887 is justified.

None of the legislation complained of would have been considered a cause for revolution in any one of the United States, but would have been used in the elections to expel the authors from power. The alleged corrupt action of the King could have been avoided by more careful legislation and would have been a complete remedy for the future.

The rate of taxation on real or personal property never exceeded 1 per cent.

To all this the answer comes from the reformers: "The native is unfit for government and his power must be curtailed."

The general belief that the King had accepted what is termed the

opium bribe and the failure of his efforts to unite the Samoan Islands with his own Kingdom had a depressing influence on his friends, and his opponents used it with all the effect they could.

The last cabinet prior to the revolution of 1887 was anti-reform. Three of its members were half castes; two of them were and are recognized as lawyers of ability by all.

At this point I invite attention to the following extract from a formal colloquy between Chief Justice Judd and myself touching the means adopted to extort the constitution of 1887, and the fundamental changes wrought through that instrument:

Q. Will you be kind enough to state how this new constitution was established?

A. The two events which brought this matter to a culminating point were (1) the opium steal of \$71,000 by which a Chinaman named Aki was made by the King to pay him a bribe of \$71,000 of hard coin in order to obtain the exclusive franchise for selling opium, and (2) the expense of the expedition to Samoa in the "Kaimilea." A secret league was formed all over the islands, the result of which was the King was asked to promulgate a new constitution containing those provisions that I have before alluded to. It was very adroitly managed by the Ashfords, and more especially by V. V. Ashford, who obtained the confidence of the King and Mr. Gibson. He was the colonel of the Rifles, and he assured them that if he was paid a certain sum of money and made minister to Canada that he would arrange it so that the movement would be futile.

Q. How was he to do that?

A. By preventing the use of the military, I suppose; and he arranged with the military authorities and Capt. Haley that they should be called out to preserve public order, although it was this large and well-drilled force which made the King fear that if he didn't yield things would be very critical for him.

Q. Was that a Government force?

A. It was organized under the laws.

Q. A volunteer organization?

A. Yes.

Q. So that the men in sympathy with the movement of this secret league went into it and constituted it under form of law.

A. Of course I do not know what was told the King privately, but I knew that he felt it would be very dangerous to refuse to promulgate the new constitution. I have no doubt that a great many things were circulated which came to his ears in the way of threats that was unfounded.

Q. What was the outside manifestation?

A. One great feature of it was its secrecy. The King was frightened at this secrecy. It was very well managed. The judges of the supreme court were not told of it until just before the event took place. I think it was the 2d or 3d of July, 1887.

Q. Was there then a mass meeting?

A. There was a large mass meeting held and a set of resolutions was presented to the King requiring that a new ministry be formed by Mr. W. L. Green and one other person, whose name I have forgotten.

Q. Was there any display of force?

A. The Honolulu Rifles were in detachments marched about in different portions of the town, having been called out by the legal military authorities.

Q. Who were the legal military authorities?

A. The governor of the island, Dominis, and Capt. H. Burrill Haley, the adjutant-general.

Q. Were they in sympathy with the movement?

A. No, sir; the officers of the corps were in sympathy with the movement.

Q. Who were they?

A. Ashford and Hebbard. I do not remember all.

Q. Did the governor order them out, not knowing of this state of things?

A. I think he did. I think he knew it, but it was to prevent, as I believe, something worse happening. As I said, there were threats made.

Q. Of what sort?

A. I understood that at one time there was a very strong feeling that the King should be forced to abdicate altogether, and it was only the more conservative men born here who said that the King and the Hawaiians should have another opportunity.

Q. Were there not two elements in that movement, one for a republic and the other for restraining the power of the King?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there not two forces in this movement coöperating together up to a certain point, to wit, those who were in favor of restraining the King by virtue of the provisions of the constitution of 1887 and those who were in favor of dethroning the King and establishing a republic?

A. I understand that there were, and that the more conservative view prevailed.

Q. And the men who were in favor of a republic were discontented at the outcome?

A. They were, and they didn't want the Hawaiians to vote at all; and the reason that the Portuguese were allowed to vote was to balance the native vote.

Q. Whose idea was that—was that the idea of the men who made the new constitution?

A. Of the men who made the new constitution.

Q. It was to balance the native vote with the Portuguese vote?

A. That was the idea.

Q. And that would throw the political power into the hands of the intelligence and wealth of the country?

A. That was the aim.

Q. How was this military used?

A. It was put about in squads over the city.

Q. The officers of the corps were really in favor of the movement for the new constitution and were called out by Governor Dominis to preserve order?

A. Yes. After the affair was over he was thanked by a military order from headquarters.

Q. Do you suppose that he was gratified with thanks under the circumstances?

A. Haley said to me when he showed me the order: "It is a little funny to thank a man who kicked you out, but I suppose I've got to do it."

Q. The King acceded to the demand for a new constitution and of a cabinet of given character?

A. In the first place he acceded to the proposition to make a new cabinet named by Mr. Green. The former cabinet, consisting of Mr. Gibson and three Hawaiians, had just resigned a day or two before. In three or four days the cabinet waited upon him with the constitution.

Q. What cabinet?

A. The cabinet consisting of Mr. Green, minister of foreign affairs; Mr. Thurston, minister of the interior; Mr. C. W. Ashford, attorney-general; and Mr. Godfrey Brown, minister of finance. I was sent for in the afternoon of July 5 to swear the King to the constitution. When I reached the palace they were all there, and the King asked me in Hawaiian whether he had better sign it or not. I said, "You must follow the advice of your responsible ministers." He signed it.

Q. This ministry had been appointed as the result of the demand of the mass meeting?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And then having been appointed, they presented him with the constitution of 1887?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And he signed it?

A. He did.

Q. Was that constitution ever submitted to a popular vote for ratification?

A. No; it was not. There was no direct vote ratifying the constitution, but its provisions requiring that no one should vote unless he had taken an oath to support it, and a large number voted at that first election, was considered a virtual ratification of the constitution.

Q. If they voted at all they were considered as accepting it?

A. Yes, sir. I do not think any large number refused to take the oath to it.

Q. It was not contemplated by the mass meeting, nor the cabinet, nor anybody in power to submit the matter of ratification at all?

A. No, it was not. It was considered a revolution. It was a successful revolutionary act.

Q. And, therefore, was not submitted to a popular vote for ratification?

A. Yes, sir. It had mischievous effects in encouraging the Wilcox revolution of 1889, which was unsuccessful. I think it was a bad precedent, only the exigencies of the occasion seemed to demand it.

Without adding other testimony on the mode of extorting the new constitution or accepting this statement as full and unbiased, it is enough that it brings me to a point at which I may present important changes in the Hawaiian constitution and their application to the social and political conditions of the time. Your attention is now invited to the following amendments in the constitution of 1887:

ARR. 41. The cabinet shall consist of the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of the interior, the minister of finance, and the attorney-general, and they shall

be His Majesty's special advisers in the executive affairs of the Kingdom; and they shall be *ex officio* members of His Majesty's privy council of state. They shall be appointed and commissioned by the King, and shall be removed by him only upon a vote of want of confidence passed by a majority of all the elective members of the legislature, or upon conviction of felony, and shall be subject to impeachment. No act of the King shall have any effect unless it be countersigned by a member of the cabinet, who, by that signature, makes himself responsible.

ART. 42. Each member of the cabinet shall keep an office at the seat of Government, and shall be accountable for the conduct of his deputies and clerks. The cabinet hold seats *ex officio* in the legislature, with the right to vote, except on a question of want of confidence in them.

ART. 47. The legislature has full power and authority to amend the constitution as hereinafter provided, and from time to time to make all manner of wholesome laws, not repugnant to the constitution.

ART. 56. A noble shall be a subject of the Kingdom, who shall have attained the age of twenty-five years, and resided in the Kingdom three years, and shall be the owner of taxable property in this Kingdom of the value of three thousand dollars over and above all encumbrances, or in receipt of an income of not less than \$600 per annum.

ART. 58. Twenty-four nobles shall be elected as follows: Six from the Island of Hawaii; six from the Islands of Maui, Molokai, and Lanai; nine from the Island of Oahu; and three from the islands of Kauai and Niihau. At the first election held under this Constitution, the nobles shall be elected to serve until the general election to the legislature for the year of our Lord 1890, at which election, and thereafter, the nobles shall be elected at the same time and places as the representatives. At the election for the year of our Lord 1890, one-third of the nobles from each of the divisions aforesaid shall be elected for two years, and one-third for four years, and one-third for six years, and the electors shall ballot for them for such terms, respectively; and at all subsequent general elections they shall be elected for six years. The nobles shall serve without pay.

ART. 59. Every male resident of the Hawaiian Islands, of Hawaiian, American, or European birth or descent, who shall have attained the age of twenty years, and shall have paid his taxes, and shall have caused his name to be entered on the list of voters for nobles of his district, shall be an elector of nobles, and shall be entitled to vote at any election of nobles, provided:

First. That he shall have resided in the country not less than three years, and in the district in which he offers to vote not less than three months immediately preceding the election at which he offers to vote;

Second. That he shall own and be possessed, in his own right, of taxable property in this country of the value of not less than \$3,000 over and above all incumbrances, or shall have actually received an income of not less than \$600 during the year next preceding his registration for such election;

Third. That he shall be able to read and comprehend an ordinary newspaper printed in either the Hawaiian, English, or some European language;

Fourth. That he shall have taken an oath to support the constitution and laws, such oath to be administered by any person authorized to administer oaths, or by any inspector of elections;

Provided, however, That the requirements of a three years' residence and of ability to read and comprehend an ordinary newspaper, printed either in the Hawaiian, English, or some European language, shall not apply to persons residing in the Kingdom at the time of the promulgation of this constitution, if they shall register and vote at the first election which shall be held under this constitution.

ART. 60. There shall be twenty-four representatives of the people elected biennially, except those first elected under this constitution, who shall serve until the general election for the year of our Lord 1890. The representation shall be based upon the principles of equality and shall be regulated and apportioned by the legislature according to the population to be ascertained from time to time by the official census. But until such apportionment by the legislature, the apportionment now established by law shall remain in force, with the following exceptions, namely: There shall be but two representatives for the districts of Hilo and Puna on the island of Hawaii, but one for the districts of Lahaina and Kaanapali on the island of Maui, and but one for the districts of Koolauloa and Waialua on the island of Oahu.

ART. 61. No person shall be eligible as a representative of the people unless he be a male subject of the Kingdom, who shall have arrived at the full age of twenty-one years; who shall know how to read and write either the Hawaiian, English, or some European language; who shall understand accounts; who shall have been domiciled in the Kingdom for at least three years, the last of which shall be the year immediately preceding his election; and who shall own real estate within the Kingdom of a clear value, over and above all encumbrances, of at least \$500; or who shall have an annual income of at least \$250, derived from any property or some lawful employment.

ART. 62. Every male resident of the Kingdom, of Hawaiian, American, or European birth or descent, who shall have taken an oath to support the constitution and laws in the manner provided for electors of nobles; who shall have paid his taxes; who shall have attained the age of twenty years; and shall have been domiciled in the Kingdom for one year immediately preceding the election, and shall know how to read and write either the Hawaiian, English, or some European language (if born since the year 1840), and shall have caused his name to be entered on the list of voters of his district as may be provided by law, shall be entitled to one vote for the representative or representatives of that district, provided, however, that the requirements of being domiciled in the Kingdom for one year immediately preceding the election, and of knowing how to read and write either the Hawaiian, English, or some European language, shall not apply to persons residing in this Kingdom at the time of the promulgation of this constitution, if they shall register and vote at the first election which shall be held under this constitution.

ART. 63. No person shall sit as a noble or representative in the legislature unless elected under and in conformity with the provisions of this constitution. The property of income qualification of representatives, of nobles, and of electors of nobles may be increased by law, and a property or income qualification of electors of representatives may be created and altered by law.

ART. 80. The cabinet shall have power to make and publish all necessary rules and regulations for the holding of any election or elections under this constitution prior to the passage by the legislature of appropriate laws for such purpose, and to provide for administering to officials, subjects, and residents the oath to support this constitution. The first election hereunder shall be held within ninety days after the promulgation of this constitution, and the legislature then elected may be convened at Honolulu, upon the call of the cabinet council in extraordinary session at such time as the cabinet council may deem necessary, thirty days' notice thereof being previously given.

ART. 82. Any amendment or amendments to this constitution may be proposed in the legislature, and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members thereof, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on its journal, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to the next legislature; which proposed amendment or amendments shall be published for three months previous to the next election of representatives and nobles; and if in the next legislature such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members of the legislature, such amendment or amendments shall become part of the constitution of this Kingdom.

These sections disclose:

First. A purpose to take from the King the power to appoint nobles and to vest it in persons having \$3,000 worth of unincumbered property or an annual income above the expense of living of \$600. This gave to the whites three-fourths of the vote for nobles and one-fourth to the natives.

The provisos to the fourth section of article 59 and article 62 have this significant application. Between the years 1878 and 1886 the Hawaiian Government imported from Madeira and the Azores Islands 10,216 contract laborers, men, women, and children. Assume, for convenience of argument, that 2,000 of these were males of twenty years and upward. Very few of them could read and write. Only three of them were naturalized up to 1888, and since then only five more have become so. The remainder are subjects of Portugal. These were admitted to vote on taking the following oath and receiving the accompanying certificate:

No. —.

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,

Island of —, district of —, ss.

I, —, aged —, a native of —, residing at —, in said district, do solemnly swear, in the presence of Almighty God, that I will support the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom promulgated and proclaimed on the 7th day of July, 1887, and the laws of said Kingdom. Not hereby renouncing, but expressly reserving, all allegiance and citizenship now owing or held by me

Subscribed and sworn to before me this — day of —, A. D. 18—.

Inspector of Election.

No.—.

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,

Island of ———, District of ———, ss.

I, the undersigned, inspector of election, duly appointed and commissioned, do hereby certify that ———, aged ———, a native of ———, residing at ———, in said district, has this day taken before me the oath to support the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom promulgated and proclaimed on the 7th day of July, and the laws of said Kingdom.

Inspector of Election.

____ ——— 18—.

These ignorant laborers were taken before the election from the cane fields in large numbers by the overseer before the proper officer to administer the oath and then carried to the polls and voted according to the will of the plantation manager. Why was this done? In the language of the Chief Justice Judd, "to balance the native vote with the Portuguese vote." This same purpose is admitted by all persons here. Again, large numbers of Americans, Germans, English, and other foreigners unnaturalized were permitted to vote under the foregoing form.

Two-thirds of this number were never naturalized, but voted under the above form of oath and certificate. They were citizens of the United States, Germany, and Great Britain, invited to vote under this constitution to neutralize further the native voting strength. This same action was taken in connection with other European populations.

For the first time in the history of the country the number of nobles is made equal to the number of representatives. This furnished a veto power over the representatives of the popular vote to the nobles, who were selected by persons mostly holding foreign allegiance, and not subjects of the Kingdom. The election of a single representative by the foreign element gave to it the legislature.

The power of appointing a cabinet was left with the King. His power to remove one was taken away. The removal could only be accomplished by a vote of want of confidence by a majority of all the elective members of the legislature. The tenure of office of a cabinet minister henceforth depends on the pleasure of the legislature, or, to speak practically, on the favor of certain foreigners, Americans and Europeans.

Then it is declared that no act of the King shall have any effect unless it be countersigned by a member of the cabinet, who by that signature makes himself responsible. Power is taken from the King in the selection of nobles, not to be given to the masses but to the wealthy classes, a large majority of whom are not subjects of the Kingdom. Power to remove a cabinet is taken away from him, not to be conferred on a popular body but on one designed to be ruled by foreign subjects. Power to do any act was taken from the King unless countersigned by a member of the cabinet. This instrument was never submitted to the people for approval or rejection, nor was it ever contemplated by its friends and promoters, and of this no man will make issue.

Prior to this revolution large quantities of arms had been brought by a secret league from San Francisco and placed amongst its members. The first election under this constitution took place with the foreign population well armed and the troops hostile to the crown and people. The result was the election of what was termed a reform legislature. The mind of an observer of these events notes henceforth a division of the people by the terms native and foreigner. It does not import race hostility simply. It is founded rather upon the attempted control of the country by a population of foreign origin and zealously holding alle-

giance to foreign powers. It had an alliance with natives of foreign parentage, some of whom were the descendants of missionary ancestors. Hence the terms "foreigner" and "missionary" in Hawaiian politics have their peculiar significance.

Foreign ships of great powers lying in the port of Honolulu to protect the persons and property of their citizens, and these same citizens left by their Governments without reproof for participation in such events as I have related, must have restrained the native mind or indeed any mind from a resort to physical force. Its means of resistance was naturally what was left of political power.

In 1890 a legislature was elected in favor of a new constitution. The calculation of the reformers to elect all the nobles failed, owing to a defection of whites, especially amongst the intelligent laboring classes in the city of Honolulu, who were qualified to vote for nobles under the income clause. The cabinet installed by the revolution was voted out. A new cabinet, in harmony with the popular will, was appointed and remained in power until the death of the King in 1891.

In 1892 another legislature was elected. Thrum's Handbook of Information for 1893, whose author, a reformer and annexationist, is intelligent and in the employ of the Provisional Government, and whose work is highly valued by all persons, says, concerning this election:

The result brought to the legislature three rather evenly balanced parties. This, with an admixture of self-interest in certain quarters, has been the means of much delay in the progress of the session, during which there have been no less than three new cabinets on "want of confidence" resolutions.

Judge Widemann, of the national reform party, divides the legislature up thus: "Three parties and some independents. The national reform, reform, and liberal." There were nine members of the national reform party, fourteen members of the reform, twenty-one liberals, and four independents."

The liberals favored the old mode of selecting nobles; the national reform party was in favor of a new constitution reducing the qualification of voters for nobles, and the reform party was in opposition to both these ideas.

There were a number of members of all these factions aspiring to be cabinet officers. This made certain individuals ignore party lines and form combinations to advance personal interests. The reform party seized upon the situation and made such combinations as voted out cabinet after cabinet until finally what was termed the Wilcox cabinet was appointed. This was made up entirely of reformers. Those members of the national reform and liberal parties who had been acting with the reform party to this point, and expecting representation in the cabinet, being disappointed, set to work to vote out this cabinet, which was finally accomplished.

There was never a time when the reform party had any approach to a majority of members of the legislature.

Let it be borne in mind that the time now was near at hand when the legislature would probably be prorogued. Whatever cabinet was in power at the time of the prorogation had control of public affairs until a new legislature should assemble two years afterwards and longer unless expelled by a vote of want of confidence.

An anti-reform cabinet was appointed by the Queen. Some faint struggle was made towards organizing to vote out this cabinet, but it was abandoned. The legislature was prorogued. The reform mem-

bers absented themselves from the session of that day in manifestation of their disappointment in the loss of power through the cabinet for the ensuing two years.

The letters of the American minister and naval officers stationed at Honolulu in 1892 indicate that any failure to appoint a ministry of the reform party would produce a political crisis. The voting out of the Wilcox cabinet produced a discontent amongst the reformers verging very closely towards one, and had more to do with the revolution than the Queen's proclamation. The first was the foundation—the latter the opportunity.

In the legislatures of 1890 and 1892 many petitions were filed asking for a new constitution. Many were presented to the King and Queen. The discontent with the constitution of 1887 and eagerness to escape from it, controlled the elections against the party which had established it. Divisions on the mode of changing the constitution, whether by legislative action or by constitutional convention, and the necessity for a two-thirds vote of the legislature to effect amendments, prevented relief by either method. Such was the situation at the prorogation of the legislature of 1892.

This was followed by the usual ceremonies at the palace on the day of prorogation—the presence of the cabinet, supreme court judges, diplomatic corps, and troops.

The Queen informed her cabinet of her purpose to proclaim a new constitution, and requested them to sign it.

From the best information I can obtain the changes to the constitution of 1887 were as follows:

ART. 20. By adding to exceptions: Members of the privy council, notary public, agents to take acknowledgments.

ART. 22. By adding Princes Kawanakoa and Kalaniana'ole as heirs to the throne.

ART. 46. Changing the session of the legislature to the month of April.

ART. 49. That the Queen shall sign and approve all bills and resolutions, even to those that are voted when passed over her veto.

ART. 56. Pay of representatives raised to \$500 instead of \$250 for biennial term.

ART. 57. The Queen shall appoint the nobles, not to exceed twenty-four.

ART. 60. The representatives may be increased from twenty-four, as at present, to forty-eight.

ART. 62. Only subjects shall vote.

ART. 65. The term of appointment of the supreme court judges, not for life, as before, but for six years.

ART. 75. The appointment of governors of each island for four-years term.

Her ministers declined to sign, and two of them communicated to leading reformers (Mr. L. A. Thurston, Mr. W. O. Smith, and others) the Queen's purpose and the position of the cabinet. Finding herself thwarted by the position of the cabinet, she declared to the crowd around the palace that she could not give them a new constitution at that time on account of the action of her ministers, and that she would do so at some future time. This was construed by some to mean that she would do so at an early day when some undefined, favorable opportunity should occur, and by others when a new legislature should assemble and a new cabinet might favor her policy, or some other than an extreme and revolutionary course could be resorted to.

It seems that the members of the Queen's cabinet, after much urging, prevailed upon her to abandon the idea of proclaiming a new constitution. The coöperation of the cabinet appears to have been in the mind of the Queen, necessary to give effect to her proclamation. This method had been adopted by Kamehameha V in proclaiming the constitution of 1864. The constitution of 1887 preserved this same

form, in having the King proclaim that constitution on the recommendation of the cabinet, which he had been prevailed upon by a committee from the mass meeting to appoint.

The leaders of the movement urged the members of the Queen's cabinet not to resign, feeling assured that until they had done so the Queen would not feel that the power rested in her alone to proclaim a new constitution. In order to give further evidence of her purpose to abandon the design of proclaiming it, a proclamation was published on the morning of the 16th of January, signed by herself and her ministers, pledging her not to do so, and was communicated to Minister Stevens that morning.

The following papers were among the files of the legation when turned over to me:

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, H. I., January 16, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose to your excellency a copy of a "By Authority" Notice issued this morning by Her Majesty's ministers under Her Majesty's sanction and approval.

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your excellency's obedient servant,
SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

To His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
United States Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Honolulu.

BY AUTHORITY.

Her Majesty's ministers desire to express their appreciation for the quiet and order which have prevailed in this community since the events of Saturday, and are authorized to say that the position taken by Her Majesty in regard to the promulgation of a new constitution was under stress of her native subjects.

Authority is given for the assurance that any changes desired in the fundamental law of the land will be sought only by methods provided in the constitution itself.

Her Majesty's ministers request all citizens to accept the assurance of Her Majesty in the same spirit in which it is given.

LILI'UOKALANI.
SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
W. H. CORNWELL,
Minister of Finance.
JOHN F. COLBURN,
Minister of the Interior.
A. P. PETERSON,
Attorney-General.

On the same day a mass meeting of between fifteen hundred and two thousand people assembled, attended by the leading men in the liberal and national reform parties, and adopted resolutions as follows:

Resolved, That the assurance of Her Majesty the Queen contained in this day's proclamation is accepted by the people as a satisfactory guaranty that the Government does not and will not seek any modification of the constitution by any other means than those provided in the organic law.

Resolved, That accepting this assurance, the citizens here assembled will give their cordial support to the administration, and indorse them in sustaining that policy.

To the communication inclosing the Queen's proclamation just cited, there appears to have been no response. On the next day, as if to give further assurance, the following paper was sent to Mr. Stevens:

SIR: The assurances conveyed by a royal proclamation by myself and ministers yesterday having been received by my native subjects, and by them ratified at a mass meeting, was received in a different spirit by the meeting representing the foreign population and interests in my Kingdom. It is now my desire to give to your excellency, as the diplomatic representative of the United States of America at my court, the solemn assurance that the present constitution will be upheld and maintained by me and my ministers, and no changes will be made except by the methods therein provided.

I desire to express to your excellency this assurance in the spirit of that friendship which has ever existed between my Kingdom and that of the Government of the United States of America, and which I trust will long continue.

LILIUOKALANI R.

By the Queen:

SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
WM. H. CORNWELL,
Minister of Finance.
JOHN F. COLBURN,
Minister of the Interior.
A. P. PETERSON,
Attorney-General.

IOLANI PALACE,

Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,

United States Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Honolulu.

On the back of the first page of this communication written in pencil is the word "Declined." Immediately under the signature of the attorney-general, also in pencil, is written "1.30 to 1.45," and at the end of the second and last page this sentence, written in ink, appears: "Received at the U. S. Legation about 2 p. m."

The cabinet itself could not be removed for two years, and the views of its members were well known to be against establishing a new constitution by proclamation of the Queen and cabinet.

Nearly all of the arms on the island of Oahu, in which Honolulu is situated, were in the possession of the Queen's government. A military force, organized and drilled, occupied the station house, the barracks, and the palace—the only points of any strategic significance in the event of a conflict.

The great body of the people moved in their usual course. Women and children passed to and fro through the streets, seemingly unconscious of any impending danger, and yet there were secret conferences held by a small body of men, some of whom were Germans, some Americans, and some native-born subjects of foreign origin.

On Saturday evening, the 14th of January, they took up the subject of dethroning the Queen and proclaiming a new Government with a view of annexation to the United States.

The first and most momentous question with them was to devise some plan to have the United States troops landed. Mr. Thurston, who appears to have been the leading spirit, on Sunday sought two members of the Queen's cabinet and urged them to head a movement against the Queen, and to ask Minister Stevens to land the troops, assuring them that in such an event Mr. Stevens would do so. Failing to enlist any of the Queen's cabinet in the cause, it was necessary to devise some other mode to accomplish this purpose. A committee of safety, consisting of thirteen members, had been formed from a little body of men assembled in W. O. Smith's office. A deputation of these, informing Mr. Stevens of their plans, arranged with him to land the troops if they would ask it "for the purpose of protecting life and property." It was further agreed between him and them that in the event they should occupy the government building and proclaim a new government he would recognize it. The two leading members of the committee, Messrs. Thurston and Smith, growing uneasy as to the safety of their persons, went to him to know if he would protect them in the event of their arrest by the authorities, to which he gave his assent.

At the mass meeting, called by the committee of safety on the 16th of January, there was no communication to the crowd of any purpose to dethrone the Queen or to change the form of government, but only

to authorize the committee to take steps to prevent a consummation of the Queen's purposes and to have guarantees of public safety. The committee on public safety had kept their purposes from the public view at this mass meeting and at their small gatherings for fear of proceedings against them by the government of the Queen.

After the mass meeting had closed a call on the American minister for troops was made in the following terms, and signed indiscriminately by Germans, by Americans, and by Hawaiian subjects of foreign extraction:

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
Honolulu, January 16, 1893.

To His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
American Minister Resident:

SIR: We, the undersigned, citizens and residents of Honolulu, respectfully represent that, in view of recent public events in this Kingdom, culminating in the revolutionary acts of Queen Liliuokalani on Saturday last, the public safety is menaced and lives and property are in peril, and we appeal to you and the United States forces at your command for assistance.

The Queen, with the aid of armed force and accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed from those with whom she was acting, attempted to proclaim a new constitution; and while prevented for the time from accomplishing her object, declared publicly that she would only defer her action.

This conduct and action was upon an occasion and under circumstances which have created general alarm and terror.

We are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and, therefore, pray for the protection of the United States forces.

HENRY E. COOPER,
F. W. MCCHESENEY,
W. C. WILDER,
C. BOLTE,
A. BROWN,
WILLIAM O. SMITH,
HENRY WATERHOUSE,
THEO. F. LANSING,
ED. SUHR,
L. A. THURSTON,
JOHN EMMELUTH,
WM. R. CASTLE,
J. A. MCCANDLESS,
Citizen's Committee of Safety.

The response to that call does not appear in the files or on the records of the American legation. It, therefore, can not speak for itself. The request of the committee of safety was, however, consented to by the American minister. The troops were landed.

On that very night the committee assembled at the house of Henry Waterhouse, one of its members, living the next door to Mr. Stevens, and finally determined on the dethronement of the Queen; selected its officers, civil and military, and adjourned to meet the next morning.

Col. J. H. Soper, an American citizen, was selected to command the military forces. At this Waterhouse meeting it was assented to by all that Mr. Stevens had agreed with the committee of safety that in the event it occupied the Government building and proclaimed a Provisional Government he would recognize it as a *de facto* government.

When the troops were landed on Monday evening, January 16, about 5 o'clock, and began their march through the streets with their small arms, artillery, etc., a great surprise burst upon the community. Though but few was it understood. Not much time elapsed before it was given out by members of the committee of safety that they were designed to support them. At the palace, with the cabinet, amongst the leaders of the Queen's military forces, and the great body of the people who were loyal to the Queen, the apprehension came that it was a move-

ment hostile to the existing Government. Protests were filed by the minister of foreign affairs and by the governor of the island against the landing of the troops.

Messrs. Parker and Peterson testify that on Tuesday at 1 o'clock they called on Mr. Stevens, and by him were informed that in the event the Queen's forces assailed the insurrectionary forces he would intervene.

At 2:30 o'clock of the same day the members of the Provisional Government proceeded to the Government building in squads and read their proclamation. They had separated in their march to the Government building for fear of observation and arrest. There was no sign of an insurrectionary soldier on the street. The committee of safety sent to the Government building a Mr. A. S. Wilcox to see who was there, and, on being informed that there were no Government forces on the grounds, proceeded in the manner I have related and read their proclamation. Just before concluding the reading of this instrument fifteen volunteer troops appeared. Within a half hour afterward some thirty or forty made their appearance.

A part of the Queen's forces, numbering 224, were located at the station house, about one-third of a mile from the Government building. The Queen, with a body of 50 troops, was located at the palace, north of the Government building about 400 yards. A little northeast of the palace and some 200 yards from it, at the barracks, was another body of 272 troops. These forces had 14 pieces of artillery, 386 rifles, and 16 revolvers. West of the Government building and across a narrow street were posted Capt. Wiltse and his troops, these likewise having artillery and small-arms.

The Government building is in a quadrangular-shaped piece of ground surrounded by streets. The American troops were so posted as to be in front of any movement of troops which should approach the Government building on three sides, the fourth being occupied by themselves. Any attack on the Government building from the east side would expose the American troops to the direct fire of the attacking force. Any movement of troops from the palace toward the Government building in the event of a conflict between the military forces would have exposed them to the fire of the Queen's troops. In fact, it would have been impossible for a struggle between the Queen's forces and the forces of the committee of safety to have taken place without exposing them to the shots of the Queen's forces. To use the language of Admiral Skerrett, the American troops were well located if designed to promote the movement for the Provisional Government and very improperly located if only intended to protect American citizens in person and property.

They were doubtless so located to suggest to the Queen and her counsellors that they were in coöperation with the insurrectionary movement, and would when the emergency arose manifest it by active support.

It did doubtless suggest to the men who read the proclamation that they were having the support of the American minister and naval commander and were safe from personal harm.

Why had the American minister located the troops in such a situation and then assured the members of the committee of safety that on their occupation of the Government building he would recognize it as a government *de facto*, and as such give it support? Why was the Government building designated to them as the place which, when their proclamation was announced therefrom, would be followed by his

recognition. It was not a point of any strategic consequence. It did not involve the employment of a single soldier.

A building was chosen where there were no troops stationed, where there was no struggle to be made to obtain access, with an American force immediately contiguous, with the mass of the population impressed with its unfriendly attitude. Aye, more than this—before any demand for surrender had even been made on the Queen or on the commander or any officer of any of her military forces at any of the points where her troops were located, the American minister had recognized the Provisional Government and was ready to give it the support of the United States troops!

Mr. Damon, the vice-president of the Provisional Government and a member of the advisory council, first went to the station house, which was in command of Marshal Wilson. The cabinet was there located. The vice-president importuned the cabinet and the military commander to yield up the military forces on the ground that the American minister had recognized the Provisional Government and that there ought to be no blood shed.

After considerable conference between Mr. Damon and the ministers he and they went to the government building.

The cabinet then and there was prevailed upon to go with the vice-president and some other friends to the Queen and urge her to acquiesce in the situation. It was pressed upon her by the ministers and other persons at that conference that it was useless for her to make any contest, because it was one with the United States; that she could file her protest against what had taken place and would be entitled to a hearing in the city of Washington. After consideration of more than an hour she finally concluded, under the advice of her cabinet and friends, to order the delivery up of her military forces to the Provisional Government under protest. That paper is in the following form:

I, Liliuokalani, by the grace of God and under the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against any and all acts done against myself and the constitutional Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming to have established a provisional government of and for this Kingdom.

That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America, whose minister plenipotentiary, His Excellency John L. Stevens, has caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the said provisional government.

Now, to avoid any collision of armed forces and perhaps the loss of life, I do, under this protest, and impelled by said force, yield my authority until such time as the Government of the United States shall, upon the facts being presented to it, undo the action of its representatives and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

Done at Honolulu this 17th day of January, A. D. 1893.

LILIUOKALANI, R.
SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
WM. H. CORNWELL,
Minister of Finance.
JNO. F. COLBURN,
Minister of the Interior.
A. P. PETERSON,
Attorney-General.

All this was accomplished without the firing of a gun, without a demand for surrender on the part of the insurrectionary forces until they had been converted into a *de facto* government by the recognition of the American minister with American troops, then ready to interfere in the event of an attack.

In pursuance of a prearranged plan, the Government thus established hastened off commissioners to Washington to make a treaty for the purpose of annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States.

During the progress of the movement the committee of safety, alarmed at the fact that the insurrectionists had no troops and no organization, despatched to Mr. Stevens three persons, to wit, Messrs. L. A. Thurston, W. C. Wilder, and H. F. Glade, "to inform him of the situation and ascertain from him what if any protection or assistance could be afforded by the United States forces for the protection of life and property, the unanimous sentiment and feeling being that life and property were in danger." Mr. Thurston is a native-born subject; Mr. Wilder is of American origin, but has absolved his allegiance to the United States and is a naturalized subject; Mr. Glade is a German subject.

The declaration as to the purposes of the Queen contained in the formal request for the appointment of a committee of safety in view of the facts which have been recited, to wit, the action of the Queen and her cabinet, the action of the Royalist mass meeting, and the peaceful movement of her followers, indicating assurances of their abandonment, seem strained in so far as any situation then requiring the landing of troops might exact.

The request was made, too, by men avowedly intending to overthrow the existing government and substitute a provisional government therefor, and who, with such purpose in progress of being effected, could not proceed therewith, but fearing arrest and imprisonment and without any thought of abandoning that purpose, sought the aid of the American troops in this situation to prevent any harm to their persons and property. To consent to an application for such a purpose without any suggestion dissuading the applicants from it on the part of the American minister, with naval forces under his command, could not otherwise be construed than as complicity with their plans.

The committee, to use their own language, say: "We are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and, therefore, pray for the protection of the United States forces."

In less than thirty hours the petitioners have overturned the throne, established a new government, and obtained the recognition of foreign powers.

Let us see whether any of these petitioners are American citizens, and if so whether they were entitled to protection, and if entitled to protection at this point whether or not subsequently thereto their conduct was such as could be sanctioned as proper on the part of American citizens in a foreign country.

Mr. Henry E. Cooper is an American citizen; was a member of the committee of safety; was a participant from the beginning in their schemes to overthrow the Queen, establish a Provisional Government, and visited Capt. Wiltse's vessel, with a view of securing the aid of American troops, and made an encouraging report thereon. He, an American citizen, read the proclamation dethroning the Queen and establishing the Provisional Government.

Mr. F. W. McChesney is an American citizen; was coöperating in the revolutionary movement, and had been a member of the advisory council from its inception.

Mr. W. C. Wilder is a naturalized citizen of the Hawaiian Islands, owing no allegiance to any other country. He was one of the original members of the advisory council, and one of the orators in the mass meeting on the morning of January 16.

Mr. C. Bolte is of German origin, but a regularly naturalized citizen of the Hawaiian Islands.

Mr. A. Brown is a Scotchman and has never been naturalized.

Mr. W. O. Smith is a native of foreign origin and a subject of the Islands.

Mr. Henry Waterhouse, originally from Tasmania, is a naturalized citizen of the islands.

Mr. Theo. F. Lansing is a citizen of the United States, owing and claiming allegiance thereto. He has never been naturalized in this country.

Mr. Ed. Suhr is a German subject.

Mr. L. A. Thurston is a native-born subject of the Hawaiian Islands, of foreign origin.

Mr. John Emmeluth is an American citizen.

Mr. W. R. Castle is a Hawaiian of foreign parentage.

Mr. J. A. McCandless is a citizen of the United States—never having been naturalized here.

Six are Hawaiians subjects; five are American citizens; one English, and one German. A majority are foreign subjects.

It will be observed that they sign as "Citizens' committee of safety."

This is the first time American troops were ever landed on these islands at the instance of a committee of safety without notice to the existing government.

It is to be observed that they claim to be a citizens' committee of safety and that they are not simply applicants for the protection of the property and lives of American citizens.

The chief actors in this movement were Messrs. L. A. Thurston and W. O. Smith.

Alluding to the meeting of the committee of safety held at Mr. W. R. Castle's on Sunday afternoon, January 15, Mr. W. O. Smith says:

After we adjourned Mr. Thurston and I called upon the American minister again and informed him of what was being done. Among other things we talked over with him what had better be done in case of our being arrested, or extreme or violent measures being taken by the monarchy in regard to us. We did not know what steps would be taken, and there was a feeling of great unrest and sense of danger in the community. Mr. Stevens gave assurance of his earnest purpose to afford all the protection that was in his power to protect life and property. He emphasized the fact that while he would call for the United States troops to protect life and property, he could not recognize any government until actually established.

Mr. Damon, the vice-president of the Provisional Government, returning from the country on the evening of the 16th, and seeing the troops in the streets, inquired of Mr. Henry Waterhouse, "Henry, what does all this mean?" To which he says, if he "remembers rightly," Mr. Waterhouse replied, "It is all up!" On being questioned by me as to his understanding of the expression, "It is all up," he said he understood from it that the American troops had taken possession of the island.

Mr. C. L. Carter, at the government house, assured Mr. Damon that the United States troops would protect them. Mr. Damon was astonished when they were not immediately marched over from Arion Hall to the government building and became uneasy. He only saw protection in the bodily presence of the American troops in this building. The committee of safety, with its frequent interviews with Mr. Stevens, saw it in the significance of the position occupied by the United States troops and in the assurance of Mr. Stevens that he would interfere for the purpose of protecting life and property, and that when they should

have occupied the government building and read their proclamation dethroning the Queen and establishing the Provisional Government he would recognize it.

The committee of safety, recognizing the fact that the landing of the troops under existing circumstances could, according to all law and precedent, be done only on the request of the existing Government, having failed in utilizing the Queen's cabinet, resorted to the new device of a committee of safety, made up of Germans, British, Americans, and natives of foreign origin, led and directed by two native subjects of the Hawaiian Islands.

With these leaders, subjects of the Hawaiian Islands, the American minister consulted freely as to the revolutionary movement and gave them assurance of protection from danger at the hands of the royal Government and forces.

On January 17 the following communication, prepared at the station house, which is one-third of a mile from the Government building and two-thirds of a mile from the residence of the American minister, was sent to him:

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, etc. :

SIR: Her Hawaiian Majesty's Government, having been informed that certain persons to them unknown, have issued proclamation declaring a Provisional Government to exist in opposition to Her Majesty's Government, and having pretended to depose the Queen, her cabinet and marshal, and that certain treasonable persons at present occupy the Government building in Honolulu with an armed force, and pretending that your excellency, on behalf of the United States of America, has recognized such Provisional Government, Her Majesty's cabinet asks respectfully, has your excellency recognized said Provisional Government, and, if not, Her Majesty's Government under the above existing circumstances respectfully requests the assistance of your Government in preserving the peace of the country.

We have the honor to be your excellency's obedient servants,

SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister Foreign Affairs.
WM. H. CORNWELL,
Minister of Finance.
JOHN F. COLBURN,
Minister of the Interior.
A. P. PETERSON,
Attorney-General.

In it will be observed the declaration that the Provisional Government is claiming to have had his recognition. The reply of Mr. Stevens is not to be found in the records or files of the legation, but on those records appears the following entry:

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

About 4 to 5 p. m. of this date—am not certain of the precise time—the note on file from the four ministers of the deposed Queen, inquiring if I had recognized the Provisional Government, came to my hands while I was lying sick on the couch. Not far from 5 p. m.—I did not think to look at my watch—I addressed a short note to Hon. Samuel Parker, Hon. Wm. H. Cornwell, Hon. John F. Colburn, and Hon. A. P. Peterson, no longer regarding them as ministers, informing them that I had recognized the Provisional Government.

JOHN L. STEVENS,
United States Minister.

This communication was received at the station house and read by all of the ministers and by a number of other persons.

After this Mr. Samuel M. Damon, the vice-president of the Provisional Government, and Mr. Bolte, a member of the advisory council, came to the station house and gave information of the proclamation

and asked for the delivery up of the station house, the former urging that the government had been recognized by the American minister, and that any struggle would cause useless bloodshed.

The marshal declared that he was able to cope with the forces of the Provisional Government and those of the United States successfully, if the latter interfered, and that he would not surrender except by the written order of the Queen.

After considerable conference, the cabinet went with Messrs. Damon and Bolte to the Government building and met the Provisional Government, and there indicated a disposition to yield, but said that they must first consult with the Queen.

The members of the Queen's cabinet, accompanied by Mr. Damon, preceded by the police, and met the Queen. There were also present Messrs. H. A. Widemann, Paul Neumann, E. C. Macfarlane, J. O. Carter, and others.

As to what occurred there I invite your attention to the following statement, made by the vice-president of the Provisional Government, and certified by him to be correct:

Q. In that conversation you asked for a surrender of the forces and the ministers advised it?

A. The different ones spoke and they all recommended it. Each one spoke. At first Judge Widemann was opposed to it, but he finally changed his mind on the advice of Mr. Neumann. Mr. Neumann advised yielding. Each one advised it.

Q. Was the advice of Neumann and the cabinet based on the idea that the Queen would have to contend with the United States forces as well as the forces of the Provisional Government?

A. It was the Queen's idea that she could surrender pending a settlement at Washington, and it was on that condition that she gave up. If I remember right I spoke to her also. I said she could surrender or abdicate under protest.

Q. And that the protest would be considered at a later period at Washington?

A. At a later period.

I knew it was the Queen's idea that Mr. Stevens was in sympathy with this movement.

Q. But I am asking now as to what reasons the ministers gave for her acquiescence?

A. It was their idea that it was useless to carry on; that it would be provocative of bloodshed and trouble if she persisted in the matter longer; that it was wiser for her to abdicate under protest and have a hearing at a later time; that the forces against her were too strong.

Q. Did they indicate the United States forces in any way?

A. I do not remember their doing so.

Q. Do you know whether or not at that time they were under the impression that the United States forces were in sympathy with the revolution?

A. Beyond an impression I know nothing definite.

Q. What was the result of this conference with the Queen? What was agreed on?

A. She signed a document surrendering her rights to the Provisional Government under protest.

She was reluctant to agree to this, but was advised that the whole subject would come up for final consideration at Washington.

I did tell her that she would have a perfect right to be heard at a later period.

Q. By the United States Government?

A. Yes.

All the persons present except Mr. Damon formally state and certify that in this discussion it was conceded by all that Mr. Stevens had recognized the Provisional Government. This Mr. Damon says he does not clearly recollect, but that he is under the impression that at that time the Provisional Government had been recognized. Save Mr. Damon, these witnesses testify to the impression made on their minds and on that of the Queen that the American minister and the American naval commander were cooperating in the insurrectionary movement.

As a result of the conference, there was then and there prepared the protest which has been cited.

The time occupied in this conference is indicated in the following language by Mr. Damon:

We went over (to the Palace) between 4 and 5 and remained until 6 discussing the situation.

Mr. Damon and the cabinet returned to the Provisional Government, presented the protest, and President Dole indorsed on the same:

Received by the hands of the late cabinet this 17th day of January, A. D. 1893.

SANFORD B. DOLE,

Chairman of the Executive Council of Provisional Government.

After this protest the Queen ordered the delivery up of the station house, where was an important portion of the military forces, and the barracks, where was another force.

The statements of many witnesses at the station house and at the conference with the Queen, that the reply of Mr. Stevens to the cabinet on the subject of recognition had been received when Mr. Damon and Mr. Bolte called there, and also the statements at the conference with the Queen that the recognition had taken place, are not contradicted by Mr. Damon; but when inquired of touching these matters, he uses such expressions as "I can not remember. It might have been so."

Mr. Damon says that he is under the impression that he knew when he went to this conference with the Queen that the recognition had taken place.

Mr. Bolte, another member of the Provisional Government, in a formal statement made and certified to by him, shows very much confusion of memory, but says: "I can not say what time in the day Mr. Stevens sent his recognition." He thinks it was after sunset.

Mr. Henry Waterhouse, another member of the Provisional Government, says: "We had taken possession of the barracks and station house before the recognition took place."

It will be observed that I have taken the communication of the Queen's ministers and the memorandum of Mr. Stevens as to his reply and the time thereof, to wit: "Not far from 5 p. m. I did not think to look at my watch."

This information was then transmitted to the station house, a distance of two-thirds of a mile, and before the arrival of Messrs. Damon and Bolte. This fact is supported by nine persons present at the interview with Mr. Damon and Mr. Bolte. Then another period of time intervenes between the departure of Mr. Damon and the cabinet, passing over a distance of one-third of a mile to the Government building. Then some further time is consumed in a conference with the Provisional Government before the departure of Mr. Damon and the cabinet to the palace, where was the Queen. The testimony of all persons present proves that the recognition by Mr. Stevens had then taken place. Subsequent to the signing of the protest occurred the turning over of the military to the Provisional Government.

Inquiry as to the credibility of all these witnesses satisfies me as to their character for veracity, save one person, Mr. Colburn. He is a merchant, and it is said he makes misstatements in business transactions. No man can reasonably doubt the truth of the statements of the witnesses that Mr. Stevens had recognized the Provisional Government before Messrs. Damon and Bolte went to the station house.

Recurring to Mr. Stevens's statement as to the time of his reply to the

letter of the cabinet, it does not appear how long before this reply he had recognized the Provisional Government. Some witnesses fix it at three and some at half-past three. According to Mr. Damon he went over with the cabinet to meet the Queen between four and five, and, taking into account the periods of time as indicated by the several events antecedent to this visit to the palace, it is quite probable that the recognition took place in the neighborhood of 3 o'clock. This would be within one-half hour from the time that Mr. Cooper commenced to read the proclamation establishing that Government, and, allowing twenty minutes for its reading, in ten minutes thereafter the recognition must have taken place.

Assuming that the recognition took place at half-past 3, there was not at the Government building with the Provisional Government exceeding 60 raw soldiers.

In conversation with me Mr. Stevens said that he knew the barracks and station-house had not been delivered up when he recognized the Provisional Government; that he did not care anything about that, for 25 men, well armed, could have run the whole crowd.

There appears on the files of the legation this communication:

GOVERNMENT BUILDING,
Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

HIS EXCELLENCY JOHN L. STEVENS,
United States Minister Resident:

SIR: I acknowledge receipt of your valued communication of this day, recognizing the Hawaiian Provisional Government, and express deep appreciation of the same.

We have conferred with the ministers of the late government, and have made demand upon the marshal to surrender the station-house. We are not actually yet in possession of the station-house; but as night is approaching and our forces may be insufficient to maintain order, we request the immediate support of the United States forces, and would request that the commander of the U. S. forces take command of our military forces, so that they may act together for the protection of the city.

Respectfully yours,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Chairman Executive Council.

After the recognition by Mr. Stevens, Mr. Dole thus informs him of his having seen the Queen's Cabinet and demanded the surrender of the forces at the station-house. This paper contains the evidence that before Mr. Dole had ever had any conference with the Queen's ministers, or made any demand for the surrender of her military forces, the Provisional Government had been recognized by Mr. Stevens.

On this paper is written the following:

The above request not complied with.—STEVENS.

This is the only reference to it to be found on the records or among the files of the legation.

This memorandum is not dated.

With the Provisional Government and its forces in a two-acre lot, and the Queen's forces undisturbed by their presence, this formal, dignified declaration on the part of the President of the Provisional Government to the American minister, after first thanking him for his recognition, informing him of his meeting with the Queen's cabinet and admitting that the station-house had not been surrendered, and stating that his forces may not be sufficient to maintain order, and asking that the American commander unite the forces of the United States with those of the Provisional Government to protect the city, is in ludicrous contrast with the declaration of the American minister in his

previous letter of recognition that the Provisional Government was in full possession of the Government buildings, the archives, the treasury, and in control of the Hawaiian capital.

In Mr. Stevens's dispatch to Mr. Foster, No. 79, January 18, 1893, is this paragraph:

As soon as practicable a Provisional Government was constituted, composed of four highly respectable men, with Judge Dole at the head, he having resigned his place on the supreme bench to assume this responsibility. He was born in Honolulu, of American parentage, educated here and in the United States, and is of the highest reputation among all citizens, both natives and whites. P. C. Jones is a native of Boston, Mass., wealthy, possessing property interests in the island, and a resident here for many years. The other two members are of the highest respectability. The committee of public safety forthwith took possession of the Government buildings, archives, and treasury, and installed the Provisional Government at the heads of the respective departments. *This being an accomplished fact, I promptly recognized the Provisional Government as the DE FACTO government of the Hawaiian Islands.* The English minister, the Portuguese chargé d'affaires, the French and the Japanese commissioners promptly did the same; these, with myself, being the only members of the diplomatic corps residing here.

Read in the light of what has immediately preceded, it is clear that he recognized the Provisional Government very soon after the proclamation of it was made. This proclamation announced the organization of the Government, its form and officials. The quick recognition was the performance of his pledge to the committee of safety. The recognition by foreign powers, as herein stated, is incorrect. They are dated on the 18th, the day following that of Mr. Stevens.

On the day of the revolution neither the Portuguese chargé d'affaires nor the French commissioner had any communication, written or oral, with the Provisional Government until after dark, when they went to the Government building to understand the situation of affairs. They did not then announce their recognition.

The British minister, several hours after Mr. Stevens's recognition, believing that the Provisional Government was sustained by the American minister and naval forces, and that the Queen's troops could not and ought not to enter into a struggle with the United States forces, and having so previously informed the Queen's cabinet, did go to the Provisional Government and indicate his purpose to recognize it.

I can not assure myself about the action of the Japanese commissioner. Mr. Stevens was at his home sick, and some one evidently misinformed him as to the three first.

In a letter of the Hawaiian commissioners to Mr. Foster, dated February 11, is this paragraph:

Sixth. At the time the Provisional Government took possession of the Government buildings no American troops or officers were present or took part in such proceedings in any manner whatever. No public recognition was accorded the Provisional Government by the American minister until they were in possession of the Government buildings, the archives, and the treasury, *supported by several hundred armed men and after the abdication by the Queen and the surrender to the Provisional Government of her forces.*

Mark the words, "and after the abdication by the Queen and the surrender to the Provisional Government of her forces." It is signed L. A. Thurston, W. C. Wilder, William R. Castle, J. Marsden, and Charles L. Carter.

Did the spirit of annexation mislead these gentlemen. If not, what malign influence tempted President Dole to a contrary statement in his cited letter to the American minister?

The Government building is a tasteful structure, with ample space for the wants of a city government of 20,000 people. It is near the

center of a 2-acre lot. In it the legislature and supreme court hold their sessions and the cabinet ministers have their offices.

In one corner of this lot in the rear is an ordinary two-story structure containing eight rooms. This building was used by the tax assessor, the superintendent of waterworks, and the Government survey office. In another corner is a small wooden structure containing two rooms used by the board of health.

These constitute what is termed in the correspondence between the Provisional Government and the American minister and the Government of the United States "government departmental buildings."

Whatever lack of harmony of statement as to time may appear in the evidence, the statements in documents and the consecutive order of events in which the witnesses agree, all do force us to but one conclusion—that the American minister recognized the Provisional Government on the simple fact that it had entered a house designated sometimes as the Government building and sometimes as Aliiolani Hale(*sic*), which had never been regarded as tenable in military operations and was not so regarded by the Queen's officers in the disposition of their military forces, these being at the station house, at the palace, and at the barracks.

Mr. Stevens consulted freely with the leaders of the revolutionary movement from the evening of the 14th. These disclosed to him all their plans. They feared arrest and punishment. He promised them protection. They needed the troops on shore to overawe the Queen's supporters and Government. This he agreed to and did furnish. They had few arms and no trained soldiers. They did not mean to fight. It was arranged between them and the American minister that the proclamation dethroning the Queen and organizing a provisional government should be read from the Government building and he would follow it with a speedy recognition. All this was to be done with American troops provided with small-arms and artillery across a narrow street within a stone's throw. This was done.

Then commenced arguments and importunities to the military commander and the Queen that the United States had recognized the Provisional Government and would support it; that for them to persist involved useless bloodshed.

No soldier of the Provisional Government ever left the 2-acre lot.

The Queen finally surrendered, not to these soldiers and their leaders but to the Provisional Government on the conviction that the American minister and the American troops were promoters and supporters of the revolution, and that she could only appeal to the Government of the United States to render justice to her.

The leaders of the revolutionary movement would not have undertaken it but for Mr. Stevens's promise to protect them against any danger from the Government. But for this their mass meeting would not have been held. But for this no request to land the troops would have been made. Had the troops not been landed no measures for the organization of a new Government would have been taken.

The American minister and the revolutionary leaders had determined on annexation to the United States, and had agreed on the part each was to act to the very end.

Prior to 1887 two-thirds of the foreigners did not become naturalized. The Americans, British, and Germans especially would not give up the protection of those strong governments and rely upon that of the Hawaiian Islands. To such persons the constitution of 1887

declared: "We need your vote to overcome that of our own native subjects. Take the oath to support the Hawaiian Government, with a distinct reservation of allegiance to your own." Two-thirds of the Europeans and Americans now voting were thus induced to vote in a strange country with the pledge that such act did not affect their citizenship to their native country. The purport and form of this affidavit appear in the citations from the constitution of 1887 and the form of oath of a foreign voter. See page 12.

The list of registered voters of American and European origin, including Portuguese, discloses 3,715; 2,091 of this number are Portuguese. Only eight of these imported Portuguese have ever been naturalized in these islands. To this should be added 106 persons, mostly negroes, from the Cape Verde Islands, who came here voluntarily several years prior to the period of state importation of laborers.

The commander of the military forces of the Provisional Government on the day of the dethroning of the Queen and up to this hour has never given up his American citizenship, but expressly reserved the same in the form of oath already disclosed and by a continuous assertion of the same.

The advisory council of the Provisional Government, as established by the proclamation, consisted of John Emmeluth, an American, not naturalized; Andrew Brown, a Scotchman, not naturalized; C. Bolte, naturalized; James F. Morgan, naturalized; Henry Waterhouse, naturalized; S. M. Damon, native; W. G. Ashley, an American, not naturalized; E. D. Tenney, an American, not naturalized; F. W. McChesney, an American, not naturalized; W. C. Wilder, naturalized; J. A. McCandless, an American, not naturalized; W. R. Castle, a native; Lorrina A. Thurston, a native; F. J. Wilhelm, an American, not naturalized,

One-half of this body, then, was made up of persons owing allegiance to the United States and Great Britain.

The annexation mass meeting of the 16th of January was made up in this same manner.

On the 25th of February, 1843, under pressure of British naval forces, the King ceded the country to Lord George Paulet, "subject to the decision of the British Government *after full information*." That Government restored their independence. It made a deep impression on the native mind.

This national experience was recalled by Judge Widemann, a German of character and wealth, to the Queen to satisfy her that the establishment of the Provisional Government, through the action of Capt. Wiltse and Mr. Stevens, would be repudiated by the United States Government, and that she could appeal to it. Mr. Damon urged upon her that she would be entitled to such a hearing. He was the representative of the Provisional Government, and accepted her protest and turned it over to President Dole. This was followed by large expenditures from her private purse to present her cause and to invoke her restoration.

That a deep wrong has been done the Queen and the native race by American officials pervades the native mind and that of the Queen, as well as a hope for redress from the United States, there can be no doubt.

In this connection it is important to note the inability of the Hawaiian people to cope with any great powers, and their recognition of it by never offering resistance to their encroachments.

The suddenness of the landing of the United States troops, the reading of the proclamation of the Provisional Government almost in their

presence, and the quick recognition by Mr. Stevens, easily prepared her for the suggestion that the President of the United States had no knowledge of these occurrences and must know of and approve or disapprove of what had occurred at a future time. This, too, must have contributed to her disposition to accept the suggestions of Judge Widemann and Mr. Damon. Indeed, who could have supposed that the circumstances surrounding her could have been foreseen and sanctioned deliberately by the President of the United States.

Her uniform conduct and the prevailing sentiment amongst the natives point to her belief as well as theirs that the spirit of justice on the part of the President would restore her crown.

Attention is now invited to the following table, showing the census of the Hawaiian Islands by districts and islands in 1890:

Latest official census of the Hawaiian Islands, taken December 28, 1890, by districts and islands.

HAWAII.

Hilo	9, 935
Puna	834
Kau	2, 577
North Kona	1, 753
South Kona	1, 812
North Kohala	4, 303
South Kohala	538
Hamakua	5, 002
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	26, 754
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MAUI.

Lahaina	2, 113
Wailuku	6, 708
Hana	3, 270
Makawoo	5, 266
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	17, 357
Molokai	2, 632
Lanai	174
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OAHU.

Honolulu	22, 907
Ewa	2, 155
Waiānā	903
Waiālua	1, 286
Koolāuloa	1, 444
Koolāupoko	2, 499
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	31, 194
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KAUAI.

Waimea	2, 523
Noihau	216
Koloa	1, 755
Kawaihau	2, 101
Hanalei	2, 472
Lihue	2, 792
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	11, 859

Total population, 1890, 89,990. Total population, 1884, 80,578.

The island of Oahu, on which Honolulu is situated, appears, then, to have had a population of 31,194. The total population was 89,970. This total has been increased since by adding several thousand Japanese contract laborers. Fifty-eight thousand seven hundred and ninety-six, a majority of the people, lived on the other islands.

Nothing was known of the revolutionary movement at Honolulu in the other islands until several days after its accomplishment, and no opportunity to consider and approve or reject it has been permitted.

Lieut. Fox, of Admiral Skerrett's staff, furnishes me the following information, in the shape of a memorandum, showing the movements of American troops to and from American vessels in Honolulu:

Account of the forces landed from the U. S. S. *Boston* at Honolulu, January 16, 1893, together with those landed from and returned to the ship at different times:

Landed at 4:30 or 5 p. m., January 16—	
Three companies of blue jackets, 36 each.....	108
One company marines and two musicians.....	32
Musicians for battalion.....	12
Officers—9 naval, 1 marine.....	10

162

Extra men landed—

January 24 for Camp Boston.....	2
February 16 for Camp Boston.....	1
March 15 for marine guard.....	1
March 17 for Camp Boston.....	14

18

Total number of men and officers landed for service..... 180

Returned on board:

January 27, men.....	2
January 30, men.....	1
February 3, Lieut. Young's company.....	35
February 3, officers.....	2
February 23, men.....	2
February 27, men.....	2
February 28, one marine and one blue jacket.....	2
March 1, men.....	1
March 13, men.....	1
March 15, men.....	2
March 18, men.....	1
March 20, Lieut. Coffin's company.....	36
March 20, officers.....	1
March 22, men.....	1

89

Total number of men and officers returned before April 1..... 89

Total number of men and officers landed before April 1..... 180

Total number left on shore March 20, 1893..... 91

On February 15 Lieut. Young's company landed for the admiral's review and returned after the review the same day. There were 36 men in the company and 2 officers.

The total number of men at Camp Boston.—

April 1, men.....	52
April 1, officers.....	6
April 1, marines at Government building.....	33
April 1, officers.....	1

Total force withdrawn from shore April 1, 1893..... 92

The United States troops, it thus appears, were doing military duty for the Provisional Government before the protectorate was assumed, just as afterwards. The condition of the community at the time of the assumption of the protectorate was one of quiet and acquiescence,

pending negotiations with the United States, so far as I have been able to learn.

A few days before my arrival here news of the withdrawal by the President from the Senate of the treaty of annexation and his purpose to send a commissioner to inquire into the revolution was received.

An organization known as the Annexation Club commenced to obtain signatures to a petition in favor of annexation. This work has been continued ever since.

The result is reported on July 9, 1893, thus:

HEADQUARTERS ANNEXATION CLUB,
Honolulu, H. I., July 9, 1893.

Hon. J. H. BLOUNT,
U. S. E. E. & M. P.

In answer to your communication of May I would say that the names on our great register to date are 5,500 and that we are advised of 190 odd on rolls not yet entered on the other islands.

Of those which are entered I would estimate that 1,218 are Americans, being 90 odd per cent of the total number of Americans on the islands and 20 odd per cent of those on the club rolls.

English 251, being 26 per cent of those on the islands and 4 per cent of club rolls. One thousand and twenty-two Hawaiians, being 11 per cent of those on islands and 18 per cent of club rolls.

Two thousand two hundred and sixty-one Portuguese, being 73 per cent of Portuguese on islands and 41 per cent of club rolls.

Sixty-nine Norwegians, being 50 per cent of those on islands and 1 per cent of club rolls.

Three hundred and fifty-one Germans, being 53 per cent of those on islands and 6 per cent on club rolls.

Others, 328, unclassified.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

J. W. JONES,
Secretary Annexation Club.

Compare this with the exhibit in the following table:

The census of 1890, by age and nationality, showing number of registered voters.

Nationality.	Under 15 years.	15 to 30 years.	30 to 45 years.	Over 45 years.	Total.	Registered voters.
Natives.....	10,240	9,329	6,716	8,151	34,436	8,777
Half castes.....	3,427	1,744	742	273	6,186	777
Hawaiian-born foreigners.....	6,797	471	143	84	7,495	146
Americans.....	225	554	662	487	1,928	637
British.....	76	375	515	378	1,344	505
Germans.....	115	293	392	204	1,004	382
French.....	12	22	36	70	22
Portuguese.....	2,233	2,862	2,426	1,031	8,602	2,091
Norwegians.....	27	68	102	30	227	78
Chinese.....	261	5,951	6,919	2,170	15,301
Japanese.....	63	7,009	5,073	125	12,360
Polynesians.....	25	244	233	86	588	42
Other nationalities.....	9	116	192	102	419	136
Total.....	23,518	29,118	24,137	13,217	89,990	13,593

Denominations, as shown by the census of 1884, were: Protestants, 29,685; Roman Catholics, 20,072; and unreported, 30,821. Of this latter 17,639 were Chinese and 116 were Japanese. At the recent census this feature of the work was omitted.

This shows the number of registered voters and the looseness of the method of the Annexation Club.

After my arrival the adherents of the Queen commenced to obtain signatures amongst the natives against annexation, under attacks from the press and annexationists of treasonable purposes. They report 7,000 signatures. In addition to this, petition against annexation by whites, little circulated, contains 249 signatures.

The Portuguese have generally signed the annexation rolls. These, as I have already stated, are nearly all Portuguese subjects. A majority of the whites of American and European birth who have signed the same roll are not Hawaiian subjects and are not entitled to vote under any laws of the Kingdom.

The testimony of leading annexationists is that if the question of annexation was submitted to a popular vote, excluding all persons who could not read and write except foreigners (under the Australian-ballot system, which is the law of the land), that annexation would be defeated.

From a careful inquiry I am satisfied that it would be defeated by a vote of at least two to one. If the votes of persons claiming allegiance to foreign countries were excluded, it would be defeated by more than five to one.

The undoubted sentiment of the people is for the Queen, against the Provisional Government and against annexation. A majority of the whites, especially Americans, are for annexation.

The native registered vote in 1890 was 9,700; the foreign vote was 3,893. This native vote is generally aligned against the annexation whites. No relief is hoped for from admitting to the right of suffrage the overwhelming Asiatic population. In this situation the annexation whites declare that good government is unattainable.

The controlling element in the white population is connected with the sugar industry. In its interests the Government here has negotiated treaties from time to time for the purpose of securing contract laborers for terms of years for the plantations, and paid out large sums for their transportation and for building plantation wharves, etc.

These contracts provide for compelling the laborer to work faithfully by fines and damage suits brought by the planters against them, with the right on the part of the planter to deduct the damages and cost of suit out of the laborer's wages. They also provide for compelling the laborer to remain with the planter during the contract term. They are sanctioned by law and enforced by civil remedies and penal laws. The general belief amongst the planters at the so-called revolution was that, notwithstanding the laws against importing labor into the United States in the event of their annexation to that Government, these laws would not be made operative in the Hawaiian Islands on account of their peculiar conditions. Their faith in the building of a cable between Honolulu and San Francisco, and large expenditures at Pearl Harbor in the event of annexation have also as much to do with the desire for it.

In addition to these was the hope of escape from duties on rice and fruits and receiving the sugar-bounty, either by general or special law.

The repeal of the duty on sugar in the McKinley act was regarded a severe blow to their interests, and the great idea of statesmanship has been to do something in the shape of treaties with the United States, reducing their duties on agricultural products of the Hawaiian Islands, out of which profit might be derived. Annexation has for its charm the complete abolition of all duties on their exports to the United States.

The annexationists expect the United States to govern the islands by so abridging the right of suffrage as to place them in control of the whites.

The Americans, of what is sometimes termed the better class, in point of intelligence, refinement, and good morals, are fully up to the best standard in American social life. Their homes are tasteful and distin-

guished for a generous hospitality. Education and religion receive at their hands zealous support. The remainder of them contain good people of the laboring class and the vicious characters of a seaport city. These general observations can be applied to the English and German population.

The native population, numbering in 1890 40,622 persons, contained 27,901 able to read and write. No country in Europe, except perhaps Germany and England, can make such a showing. While the native generally reads and writes in native and English, he usually speaks the Kanaka language. Foreigners generally acquire it. The Chinese and Japanese learn to use it and know very little English.

Among the natives there is not a superior class, indicated by great wealth, enterprise, and culture, directing the race, as with the whites. This comes from several causes.

In the distribution of lands most of it was assigned to the King, chiefs, some whites, and to the Government for its support. Of the masses 11,132 persons received 27,830 acres—about two and a half acres to an individual—called Kuleanas. The majority received nothing. The foreigners soon traded the chiefs out of a large portion of their shares, and later purchased from the Government government lands and obtained long leases on the crown lands. Avoiding details it must be said that the native never held much of the land. It is well known that it has been about seventy years since he commenced to emerge from idolatry and the simplicity of thought and habits and immoralities belonging to it. National tradition has done little for him, and before the whites led him to education its influence was not operative. Until within the last twenty years white leaders were generally accepted and preferred by the King in his selections of cabinets, nobles, and judges, and native leadership was not wanted.

Their religious affiliations are with the Protestant and Catholic churches. They are over-generous, hospitable, almost free from revenge, very courteous—especially to females. Their talent for oratory and the higher branches of mathematics is unusually marked. In person they have large physique, good features, and the complexion of the brown races. They have been greatly advanced by civilization, but have done little towards its advancement. The small amount of thieving and absence of beggary are more marked than amongst the best races of the world. What they are capable of under fair conditions is an unsolved problem.

Idols and idol worship have long since disappeared.

The following observations in relation to population are presented, though some repetition will be observed:

The population of the Hawaiian Islands can best be studied, by one unfamiliar with the native tongue, from its several census reports. A census is taken every six years. The last report is for the year 1890. From this it appears that the whole population numbers 89,990. This number includes natives or, to use another designation, Kanakas, half-castes (persons containing an admixture of other than native blood in any proportion with it), Hawaiian-born foreigners of all races or nationalities other than natives, Americans, British, Germans, French, Portuguese, Norwegians, Chinese, Polynesians, and other nationalities.

(In all the official documents of the Hawaiian Islands, whether in relation to population, ownership of property, taxation, or any other question, the designation "American," "Briton," "German," or other foreign nationality does not discriminate between the naturalized citi-

zens of the Hawaiian Islands and those owing allegiance to foreign countries.)

Americans number 1,928; natives and half-castes, 40,612; Chinese, 15,301; Japanese, 12,360; Portuguese, 8,602; British, 1,344; Germans, 1,034; French, 70; Norwegians, 227; Polynesians, 588, and other foreigners, 419.

It is well at this point to say that of the 7,495 Hawaiian-born foreigners 4,117 are Portuguese, 1,701 Chinese and Japanese, 1,617 other white foreigners, and 60 of other nationalities.

There are 58,714 males. Of these 18,364 are pure natives and 3,085 are half-castes, making together 21,449. Fourteen thousand five hundred and twenty-two (14,522) are Chinese. The Japanese number 10,079. The Portuguese contribute 4,770. These four nationalities furnish 50,820 of the male population.

	Males.
The Americans	1,298
The British	982
The Germans	729
The French	46
The Norwegians	135

These five nationalities combined furnish 3,170 of the total male population.

The first four nationalities when compared with the last five in male population are nearly sixteenfold the largest in number.

The Americans are to those of the four aforementioned group of nationalities as 1 to 39—nearly as 1 to 40.

Portuguese have been brought here from time to time from the Madeira and Azores islands by the Hawaiian Government as laborers, on plantations, just as has been done in relation to Chinese, Japanese, Polynesians, etc. They are the most ignorant of all imported laborers, and reported to be very thievish. They are not pure Europeans, but a commingling of many races, especially the negro. They intermarry with the natives and belong to the laboring classes. Very few of them can read and write. Their children are being taught in the public schools, as all races are. It is wrong to class them as Europeans.

The character of the people of these islands is and must be overwhelmingly Asiatic. Let it not be imagined that the Chinese, Japanese, and Portuguese disappear at the end of their contract term. From the report of the inspector-in-chief of Japanese immigrants on March 31, 1892, it appears that twenty "lots" of Japanese immigrants have been brought here by the Hawaiian Government, numbering 21,110. Of these, 2,517 have returned to Japan; 8,592, having worked out their contract term, remain, and 9,626 are still working out their contract term. More than 75 per cent may be said to locate here permanently.

There are 13,067 Chinamen engaged in various occupations, to wit: 8,763 laborers, 1,479 farmers, 133 fishermen, 74 drivers and teamsters, 564 mechanics, 42 planters and ranchers, 776 merchants and traders, 164 clerks and salesmen, 12 professional men and teachers, and 1,056 in various other occupations.

The number of merchants and traders in the entire country is 1,238. Of this number 776 are Chinamen and 81 are Americans.

The largest part of the retail trade seems to be conducted by Chinamen.

Of 20,536 laborers on sugar plantations only 2,617 are Chinese. Of this latter number only 396 are contract laborers.

The Portuguese population in 1884 amounted to 9,377 and in 1890 to 8,602, a loss of 775. These have been leaving in considerable numbers

for the past eighteen months, making their way generally to the United States. In 1890 the males were classified as to occupation thus: Laborers, 2,653; farmers, 136; fishermen, 3; mariners, 10; drivers and teamsters, 63; mechanics, 167; planters and ranchers, 17; merchants and traders, 56; clerks and salesmen, 13; professional men and teachers, 11; other occupations, 123; total, 3,266. On the cane plantations there are of male Portuguese 277 under contract and 1,651 day laborers.

Of the population in 1892, 20,536 were laborers on sugar-cane plantations, 16,723 being Portuguese, Japanese, and Chinese. Of the whole number, 10,991 are contract laborers. The remainder are designated as day laborers. The total number of laborers in the islands by the census of 1890 was 25,466.

In 1890 there were 23,863 male laborers. Of this number, 18,728 were Chinese and Japanese. At this period there were 41,073 persons of all occupations. Of this number, 24,432 were Chinese and Japanese.

Of the total number of persons of European and American origin in the various avocations, it appears that 1,106 were Americans, 819 British, 518 Germans, 45 French, and 200 Norwegians, making a total of 2,688 persons.

The natives furnished 8,871 persons and the half-castes 884.

The Hawaiians, therefore, may be said to have furnished 9,755.

There are 196 persons designated as planters and ranchers. Of this number, 18 are Americans, 30 are British, and 6 are Germans. The remainder are principally Japanese, Portuguese, Chinese, and Hawaiians.

There are 5,181 persons designated as farmers. Of these 3,392 are natives and half-castes and 1,500 are Chinese. These two furnish 4,779, leaving a residue of 402 taken from all other nationalities. Of these, 26 are Americans.

It will be interesting if not pleasing to examine the number of the sexes by nationalities.

The grand total of the population is 89,990. The male population is 56,714, the females are 31,276.

The natives and half-castes furnish 21,449 males and 19,174 females.

The Chinese furnish 14,522 males and 779 females.

The Japanese furnish 10,079 males and 2,281 females.

The Portuguese furnish 4,770 males and 3,832 females.

The American males are 1,298, females 630.

The British males are 982, females 362.

The German males are 729, females 305.

This disparity of the sexes applies to all nationalities save the native race.

The most striking feature is that the Chinese men outnumber their women by more than 18 to 1.

The Japanese men outnumber their women by nearly five to one.

In all foreign nationalities the males largely exceed the females in numbers.

The natives and half-castes furnish nearly two-thirds of the women.

For a moment let us see how far this disparity of sexes in 1884 compares with that of 1890:

In 1884 there were 51,539 males, 29,039 females, and a total population of 80,578.

In 1890 the males numbered 58,714, the females 31,276, and the total number was 89,990.

The males increased from 1884 to 1890, 7,175; the females increased from 1884 to 1890, 2,237.

During this period there appears to have been the following gains and losses by nationalities:

Gains: Half-castes 1,968; Hawaiian-born foreigners (mostly Portuguese), 5,455; British, 62; Japanese, 12,244.

Losses: Natives, 5,578; Americans, 138; Germans, 566; French, 122; Portuguese, 775; Norwegians, 135; Chinese, 2,638; Polynesians, 368.

The net gain is 9,412. Had it not been for the large importation of Japanese for plantation laborers there would have been a net loss of 2,832.

There was a net loss of Europeans and Americans combined numbering 899.

While the population is increasing in numbers the per cent of females is largely decreasing.

In 1866 the percentage of females was 45.25; in 1872 it was 44.37; in 1878, 41.19; in 1884, 36.04; in 1890, 34.75.

This condition has been reached by the importation of contract labor by the Hawaiian Government for the sugar plantations.

In 1890 there was in the island of Oahu a population of 31,194. Of this number 1,239 were Americans.

There was in the island of Hawaii a population of 26,754. Of this number 289 were Americans.

In the islands of Molokai and Lanai there was a population of 2,826. Of this number 23 were Americans.

In the island of Maui there was a population of 17,357. Of this number 211 were Americans.

In the islands of Kauai and Niihau there was a population of 11,859. Of this number 112 were Americans.

The total population was 89,990. Of this number 1,928 were Americans.

It appears that in 1890, the period of the last census, in a population of 89,990 persons 51,610 were unable to read and write. The natives and half-castes, numbering 40,622, had 27,901 able to read and write.

The Chinese, with a population of 15,301 persons, had 13,277 unable to read and write.

The Japanese, with a population of 12,360, had 12,053 persons unable to read and write.

The Portuguese, with a population of 8,602, had 6,276 unable to read and write.

The minister of finance informs me that the taxes paid by Americans and Europeans amount to \$274,516.74; those by natives, \$71,386.82; half-castes, \$26,868.68; Chinese, \$87,266.10; Japanese, \$67,326.07; other nationalities, \$729.82.

He also informs me that the acreage on which taxes are paid by various nationalities is:

Europeans and Americans, 1,052,492 acres; natives, 257,457 acres; half-castes, 531,545 acres; Chinese, 12,324 acres; Japanese, 200 acres; other nationalities, none.

The surveyor-general reports the Crown lands for 1893 as containing 915,288 acres. Of these he reports 94,116 acres available for lease. Of this latter number only 47,000 acres are reported to be good arable land. He likewise reports the Government land as containing 828,370 acres. He reports these estimated in 1890 to be worth \$2,128,850. The annual income from them is \$67,636. Of this income, \$19,500 is from wharfage and \$7,800 from rent of land with buildings thereon.

The cane and arable land is estimated at 35,150 acres.

It is important here to recall his statement made to the legislature in 1891, in the following language:

Most Government lands at the present time consist of mere remnants left here and there, and of the worthless and unsalable portions remaining after the rest had been sold.

And in the same communication he declares that between the years 1850 and 1860 nearly all the desirable Government land was sold, generally to natives.

In 1890 the census report discloses that only 4,695 persons owned real estate in these islands. With a population estimated at this time at 95,000, the vast number of landless people here is discouraging to the idea of immigrants from the United States being able to find encouragement in the matter of obtaining homes in these islands.

The landless condition of the native population grows out of the original distribution and not from shiftlessness. To them homesteads should be offered rather than to strangers.

The census reports of the Hawaiian Islands pretend to give the native population from the period when Capt. Cook was here until 1890. These show a rapid diminution in numbers, which, it is claimed, indicate the final extinction of the race. Very many of these reports are entirely conjectural and others are carelessly prepared. That of 1884 is believed by many intelligent persons here to overstate the native strength and, of course, to discredit any comparison with that of 1890.

All deductions from such comparisons are discredited by an omission to consider loss from emigration. Jarvis, in his history of the Hawaiian Islands, published in 1847, says:

Great numbers of healthy Hawaiian youth have left in whale ships and other vessels and never returned.

The number annually afloat is computed at 3,000. At one time 400 were counted at Tahiti, 500 in Oregon, 50 at Païta, Peru, besides unknown numbers in Europe and the United States.

In 1850 a law was passed to prohibit natives from leaving the islands. The reason for it is stated in the following preamble:

Whereas, by the census of the islands taken in 1849, the population decreased at the rate of 8 per cent in 1848, and by the census taken in 1850 the population decreased at the rate of 5½ per cent in 1849; whereas the want of labor is severely felt by planters and other agriculturists, whereby the price of provisions and other produce has been unprecedentedly enhanced, to the great prejudice of the islands; whereas, many natives have emigrated to California and there died in great misery; and, whereas, it is desirable to prevent such loss to the nation and such wretchedness to individuals, etc.

This act remained in force until 1887. How effective it was when it existed there is no means of ascertaining. How much emigration of the native race has taken place since its repeal does not appear to have been inquired into by the Hawaiian Government. Assuming that there has been none and that the census tables are correct, except that of 1884, the best opinion is that the decrease in the native population is slight now and constantly less. Its final extinction, except by amalgamation with Americans, Europeans, and Asiatics, may be dispensed with in all future calculations.

My opinion, derived from official data and the judgment of intelligent persons, is that it is not decreasing now and will soon increase.

The foregoing pages are respectfully submitted as the connected report indicated in your instructions. It is based upon the statements

of individuals and the examination of public documents. Most of these are hereto annexed.

The partisan feeling naturally attaching to witnesses made it necessary for me to take time for forming a correct judgment as to their character. All this had to be done without the counsel of any other person.

Mindful of my liability to error in some matters of detail, but believing in the general correctness of the information reported and conclusions reached, I can only await the judgment of others.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

No. 18.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,

No. 14.]

July 19, 1893.

SIR: On the 28th ultimo I sent through Mr. Mills a communication to President Dole, a copy of which is inclosed herewith.

Mr. Mills reported that President Dole said he did not remember the letter to Mr. Stevens; that he would examine his papers and see if a reply to such communication could be found. He asked if such a paper was in the legation.

A copy of the letter in question was sent to you with my No. 11 of the 28th ultimo.

The omission of a reference to the admission of Mr. Stevens's recognition was done to avoid informing him of my knowledge of this fact.

A great effort has been continuously made to suppress such information. Absolute falsehoods have in some instances been resorted to by men of whom better conduct would have been expected.

Since Mr. Mills's conversation with President Dole I called on him in person and asked him if he would not give me a reply to my letter. He said he desired to talk with Mr. Damon, who had charge of some of their private papers, which he had locked up in his bank, before he answered me.

This was several days ago and I presume I shall hear nothing further from him on the subject.

Mr. W. O. Smith said to me on one occasion that he thought Mr. Stevens had given to President Dole the letter of recognition of the Provisional Government to be used on the happening of some event. He represented that the matter was in his mind vaguely. This was repeated on another occasion. It is quite possible that this reply may in some way bring out other facts, and for that reason it is not desired to furnish it.

There is a habit of mind amongst all people here, no matter how careful of their conduct in other respects, to exaggerate and mislead in political questions, and especially in relation to the present condition of affairs.

Some of the papers from the United States arriving here contain a letter of ex-Queen Liliuokalani to Mr. Stevens, dated January 17,

1893, published as part of his speech in Augusta, Me., on the 29th ultimo.

It was a legation paper, and I can not understand by what means he acquired permission to make it public, and so have deemed it my duty to call your attention to it.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

[Inclosure in No. 14.]

Mr. Blount to Mr. Dole.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, June 28, 1893.

SIR: Please be kind enough to send me a copy of Mr. Stevens's reply to a letter addressed to him by you as chairman of the executive council on the 17th of January last, in which you request the immediate support of the United States forces, and that the commander of those forces take command of your military forces so that they may act together for the protection of the city.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.
His Excellency SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

No. 19.

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
July 26, 1893.

No. 15.]

SIR: On the 28th ultimo I forwarded to you a copy of a letter from President Dole to Mr. Stevens. On it was the entry, "The above request not complied with. Stevens."

On the same day I addressed a communication to Mr. Dole, asking for Mr. Stevens's reply to this letter.

On the 20th instant Mr. Dole inclosed me the communication annexed hereto, (Inclosure No. 1).

This reply of Mr. Stevens is nowhere to be found in the legation records or files.

I inclose also a communication (Inclosure No. 2) containing information from the archives of the Hawaiian Islands, sent me by Mr. W. D. Alexander, at my request, thinking it might be of some historical value.

The public in the United States has been led to believe that Mr. Marcy had shown great individuality and sagacity as secretary of state in his well-nigh consummated treaty of annexation of these islands.

These Hawaiian papers disclose that the project originated with the King of the Hawaiian Islands from fears of the loss of their independence through various causes.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT,
Special Commissioner of the United States.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 15.]

*Mr. Dole to Mr. Blount.*DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, July 20, 1893.

SIR: Your communication of June 28, requesting a copy of Mr. Stevens's reply to a letter addressed to him by me, as chairman of the executive council, on the 17th of January last, in which I request the immediate support of the United States forces and that the commander of these forces take command of our forces, so that they may act together for the protection of the city has been received. My delay in replying has been in consequence of my failure to find the letter mentioned and my hope of eventually procuring it. To-day I have succeeded in finding this letter and herewith forward you a copy thereof.

I have, etc.,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
*Minister of Foreign Affairs.*His Excellency JAMES H. BLOUNT,
United States Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Honolulu.

[Inclosure in inclosure 1 in No. 15.]

*Mr. Stevens to Mr. Dole.*UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

Think Capt. Wiltse will endeavor to maintain order and protect life and property, but do not think he would take command of the men of the Provisional Government.

Will have him come to the legation soon as possible and take his opinion and inform you as soon as possible.

Yours, truly,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

[Inclosure 2 to No. 15.]

W. D. Alexander to Mr. Blount.

SIR: I have the honor to submit to you the following account of the circumstances attending the uncompleted treaty of annexation, negotiated in 1854 between Hon. D. L. Gregg, representing the United States, and his excellency, R. C. Wyllie, representing the King of the Hawaiian Islands.

I will first briefly mention some of the causes which led to the application made by Kamehameha III and his cabinet in 1854 for annexation to the United States.

THE APPLICATION FOR A PROTECTORATE IN 1851.

The subject of annexation to the United States was first seriously considered in the islands in 1851. M. Em. Perrin had been sent to Honolulu as commissioner of France, in the corvette *Sérieuse*, which arrived at Honolulu December 13, 1850, and remained in port three months without exchanging salutes with the fort.

He persisted in pressing again the famous ten demands, presented by Admiral De Tromelin in 1849, and his attitude was so menacing that the King and privy council were finally driven to seek protection from the United States.

As is stated in my "Brief History of the Hawaiian People," p. 270, they passed a proclamation, March 10, 1851, placing the islands provisionally under the protection of the United States.

On the next day a conditional deed of cession of the Kingdom to the United States was drawn up, signed, and delivered in a sealed envelope to Hon. L. Severance, the commissioner of the United States, by two of the King's ministers. This was to be opened and acted upon only in case of an emergency, the signal of which was to be the raising of the flag of the United States above that of Hawaii over the fort. In that case the sovereignty of the islands was to be ceded to the United States, to be held in trust until a settlement of their relations with France, "compatible with the King's rights as an independent sovereign," could be made, and if this should be found to be impracticable the said protectorate was to be declared perpetual.

The U. S. S. *Vandalia*, Capt. Gardner, was in port at the time. The deed of cession was accepted by Mr. Severance provisionally, and referred to his Government. Mr. W. C. Park, the marshal, was directed to have the Hawaiian and American flags sewed together, and kept in readiness to be hoisted at a moment's notice. He remained in the fort night and day, on the watch, during the 15th and 16th of March. By some means, the British consul-general learned of what had been done, and informed M. Perrin, who thereupon withdrew the most obnoxious of his demands; and a joint declaration, comprising four articles, was signed by both parties March 25.

It appears, however, that M. Perrin used language in his later dispatches which threatened to reopen questions that had been supposed to be closed. An appeal to the President of the United States was therefore drawn up and presented to Mr. Severance, which was taken to Washington by Hon. E. H. Allen, then United States consul, who sailed on this mission April 4. M. Perrin left for Paris May 24 to obtain fresh instructions, and did not return until January 8, 1853. Nothing more was ever heard of the rest of the ten demands. Mr. Webster, the United States Secretary of State, made strong representations to the French Government on the subject, but directed Mr. Severance to return to the Hawaiian Government the deed of cession, which had been placed in his keeping.

A joint resolution was passed by both houses of the Hawaiian Legislature June 21, 1851, confirming the action of the privy council, and empowering the King and privy council to place the Kingdom under the protection of some friendly power, if necessary, "to shield it from insult and oppression."

In the following year, in framing the new constitution, a clause was inserted in Article 39, which empowered the King, by and with the approval of his cabinet and privy council, to even alienate his Kingdom "if indispensable to free it from the insult and oppression of any foreign power." This shows that the apprehension of some impending danger was still present to the minds of the King and his advisers.

FILIBUSTERS.

The discovery of gold in California in 1848, which led to the speedy settlement of that State and to the opening of new routes across the American continent, ushered in a new era in the history of the Hawaiian Islands. It opened a new market for their productions, and brought them into closer commercial relations with the United States. Communication became frequent between them and California, and American capital began to be largely invested here.

At that time California was resorted to by numerous lawless adventurers, who planned a number of raids or filibustering expeditions into the neighboring countries. The notorious Gen. Walker headed a raid of this kind into Lower California in 1853, and others into Nicaragua in 1855 and in 1861, in the last of which he was taken prisoner and shot.

The Hawaiian Government received many warnings in the fall of 1851 that a band of filibusters was being organized to invade this Kingdom. At the request of the cabinet the U. S. S. *Vandalia*, Capt. Gardner, was kept at Honolulu ready to seize any suspicious vessel, and a body of 100 native troops was drilled for several months by Lieut. Read of the *Vandalia*.

About 25 suspicious characters, headed by Sam Brannan, came down from San Francisco in November 1851, in the ship *Game Cock*. During the voyage the mail bag was rifled by members of the party and the letters thrown overboard. They were under the false impression that this country was ripe for revolution, and that the King was ready to sell his Kingdom and to retire from the cares of state. But they soon found that they had been deceived in regard to the feeling of the natives, and that the officers and men of the whaling fleet were also hostile to them. They were closely watched; the King declined to see them, and the expedition ended in a fiasco.

During the years 1853-'54 the country was disquieted by frequent rumors of filibustering expeditions being fitted out, and British and American ships of war were kept in port much of the time as a safeguard. Mr. Wyllie strongly advocated the plan of organizing a force of 5,000 militia, to consist of natives armed with pikes, and a small contingent of cavalry, together with 100 regular troops, for defense against filibusters, but it was rejected by the privy council.

THE POLITICAL AGITATION OF 1853.

During the years 1851-'54 a considerable immigration from California took place. It embraced many restless, ambitious spirits, some of whom came for the purpose of exciting revolution. They found the foreign community already split into factions, between which bitter feuds existed of long standing. Many of the newcomers naturally joined the opposition party, which claimed to be the liberal and progressive element in the country.

The plan of the leaders of the new movement seems to have been to reconstruct the Government, and then to turn it over to the United States. A secret committee of thirteen was appointed to carry out their designs. Their first object was to bring about the removal of two of the ministers, viz: Messrs. Armstrong and Judd. The unsuccessful attempt to make political capital out of the smallpox epidemic of 1853 was disgraceful to all engaged in it. At the same time an active agitation was commenced in favor of annexation, and the two obnoxious ministers were accused of being an obstacle in the way of it.

Threats were freely used to intimidate the King and chiefs into dismissing them.

In August a memorial in favor of annexation was presented to the King, which was signed by seventeen respectable residents, who were supporters of the cabinet. This called out a card, published September 10, signed by Revs. E. W. Clark and P. J. Gulick, declaring that "the Protestant missionaries at the islands have never engaged in any scheme of annexation. It has been their cherished wish that the Government may remain independent under the present constitution and rulers. Whatever may have been done by merchants, planters, and others, the Protestant clergymen at the islands have neither advised nor signed any memorial to the King touching annexation." In a letter published in August, 1864, Mr. Clark stated that at the annual convocation in May, 1853, he had frequent conversations with other missionaries on this engrossing subject. "Not one of them expressed an opinion in its favor, but on the contrary, they did express doubts as to its expediency, and grave apprehensions of disaster to the natives from the influx of lawless and unprincipled foreigners." With this agreed the known views of the French Catholic priests.

The memorial created no little excitement among the British and French residents. The representatives of Great Britain and France solicited an audience with the King and privy council, which was granted September 1, when they presented a joint address to the King, protesting against any attempt to annex the islands to any foreign power as in contravention of existing treaties, as well as unconstitutional. This was replied to in an able dispatch addressed to the minister of foreign affairs by the United States commissioner, September 3.

A few days later the whole Cabinet resigned, but were all reappointed, with the exception of Dr. Judd, who was succeeded by Hon. E. H. Allen, whose appointment gave general satisfaction, and caused no change in the policy of the cabinet. The result was a virtual defeat of the schemes of the "thirteen."

GROWTH OF ANNEXATION SENTIMENT, 1854.

Hon. L. Severance, the United States commissioner, returned to the United States in December, 1853, and was succeeded by Hon. D. L. Gregg, of Illinois, who arrived in Honolulu January 6, 1854.

Meanwhile the sentiment in favor of annexation seems to have been growing in strength. There were strong commercial reasons in its favor. Three-fourths of the business was in the hands of Americans, and the chief market of the islands was then, as now, the Pacific coast of the United States. The hope of it stimulated speculation, and led to new enterprises, some of which were afterwards abandoned.

The fearful decrease of the native population (several thousands of whom had been carried off by the fatal epidemic of 1853), the rapid extinction of the order of chiefs, who were the natural leaders of their race, the relapse of the King into habits of gross intemperance, and the perils from without overhanging the feeble Government disheartened many true friends of the nation and led them to favor the preliminary steps then taken towards annexation. The objections of the missionaries to that measure have already been stated. They feared that the rights of the natives might be trampled upon and their interests sacrificed. A new and liberal constitution had just been adopted (in 1852) and they fondly hoped that the natives would soon learn how to use their newly-granted lands and political rights.

The ministry, as a whole, favored annexation, but Mr. Wyllie acquiesced in it unwillingly and only as a last resort in the case of an emergency. During the two following reigns he developed a decided antipathy to American influence and American ideas.

The King, however, strongly favored annexation. He had long been harassed by the threats of foreign powers; he had once been dethroned by a British naval force; he had repeatedly been compelled to make humiliating concessions at the cannon's mouth; he had recently seen his fort dismantled and his beautiful yacht carried off, and his difficulties with France still remained unsettled. At the same time he was kept in a state of alarm by rumors of filibusters from abroad and threats of conspirators at home to overturn his Government. He was deeply grateful for the constant and generous friendship of the United States and for the benefits which his people had received from American citizens. Besides, he had reason to expect for himself and his chiefs a sum equal to the revenue of his Kingdom and for his people all the rights of a free State in the Union. As far as is known, most of the high chiefs agreed with him.

The heir apparent, Prince Alexander Liholiho, however, was at heart opposed to the treaty, and interposed every possible delay to its completion. It is said that he and his brother, Lot Kamehameha, never forgave some incivility which they had experienced on account of their color when traveling in America. He was also moved by a laudable pride of country, a natural desire to reign, and a partiality to England and her institutions.

The mass of the native population was never consulted, and was indifferent on the subject. Race antagonism had not yet been developed to any extent. A newspaper in the Hawaiian language, called the *Nuhou*, edited by a Mr. Marsh, was started in February, 1854, to prepare the native mind for annexation, and was continued for six months. Another memorial on the subject, numerously signed, was presented to the King in January, 1854. It is singular that hardly an allusion to the subject can be found in the Honolulu papers of the time, and none in any of the official reports of the minister of foreign affairs.

NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY.

In February, 1854, the matter took a more definite shape. On the 6th of that month, in view of danger from filibusters and conspirators, the King commanded Mr. Wyllie to ascertain on what terms a treaty of annexation could be negotiated to be used as a safeguard to meet any sudden danger that might arise. Every proposition was to be considered by the cabinet and Prince Liholiho, and the treaty as a whole was to be submitted to His Majesty for his approval, modification, or rejection.

The negotiations were carried on between Mr. Wyllie and Mr. Gregg with the utmost secrecy. At the second meeting, February 11, Mr. Gregg agreed to proceed with a negotiation *ad referendum*, and wrote to the United States Secretary of State for instructions.

A basis for negotiations, framed by Judge Lee and approved by the King and his ministers, was afterwards presented to Mr. Gregg, guarantying to Hawaiian subjects all the rights of American citizens, providing for the admission of the Hawaiian Islands as a State into the Union, for a due compensation to the King and chiefs, and a liberal sum for the support of schools. The amount of compensation to be asked for had been referred to a committee, who recommended that a lump sum, viz, \$300,000, be distributed in the form of annuities by the King and his council. At their sixth meeting, June 1, Mr. Gregg stated that he had received full powers and instructions from his own Government. At Mr. Wyllie's request he then proceeded to draft an outline of the treaty. He was furnished with detailed statements of the property owned by the Hawaiian Government and of the salaries paid by it. An interval of two months followed, during which the treaty made very little progress.

In a private letter from Mr. Wyllie to Judge Lee, dated June 23, he says: "The treaty is now before Prince Liholiho, with all the amendments suggested by you. To be able to save the King and chiefs and people at a moment's warning it is desirable that the treaty should be concluded diplomatically—I mean signed by the plenipotentiaries, but subject to future ratification." Again, July 11, Mr. Wyllie writes to Judge Lee as follows: "Liholiho keeps out of the way, and he has not returned the treaties, though I have often asked him for them. Of my draft I have no copy."

The Fourth of July was celebrated at Honolulu this year with unusual enthusiasm, and in Mr. Gregg's oration allusion was made to the prospect that a new star would soon be added to the constellation of States.

On the 17th of July a combined British and French fleet of eight vessels arrived from Callao, on their way to attack the Russian fortress of Petropaulovski. The two admirals and their officers had a reception at the palace, at which the French admiral said, at M. Perrin's suggestion, that he hoped there was no thought of alienating the sovereignty of the Kingdom, as that would lead to difficulties with France and England, which it would be wise to avoid. The King made no reply.

In a letter from Mr. Gregg to the United States Secretary of State, dated July 26, he states that "a meeting was held on the 17th, at which Prince Alexander was present, when it was agreed that the minister of foreign affairs should immediately proceed, if possible, to arrange and sign a treaty to be submitted to the King for ratification. Mr. Wyllie called on me the next day and we had several conferences, but without as yet arriving at any definite result. Prince Alexander is responsible for all past delay and he will not hesitate to incur the responsibility of still more, unless his mind is brought to the conviction that it is impossible for him ever to wear a crown. * * * If a treaty is once signed he will not oppose its ratification directly and openly, but strive to postpone it to the last moment compatible with safety."

The two principal difficulties were, first, the objection of the Hawaiian authorities to a territorial form of government, and, secondly, the question as to the amount of the annuities to be paid, the Hawaiian Government insisting on \$300,000 as a sine

qua non. One article provided for the payment of \$75,000 *per annum* for ten years for educational purposes, one-third of which was to be capitalized for the support of a college or university.

Judge Lee expressed his views in regard to the treaty in a letter to Mr. Wyllie, dated August 29, in which he stated that it was "the wish of the King and chiefs to be admitted as a *State*, and they must not be deceived by any ambiguity in the phraseology of the treaty. They wish by this article to shield the nation from slavery, and it would be dishonorable to leave so vital a question involved in any doubt." At that time the repeal of the Missouri compromise had begun to be agitated in Congress and party feeling was intense. It is said that Senator Sumner wrote to an influential missionary in the islands warning the King and natives against annexation on the ground that it would lead to the introduction of slavery into their country. An article to this effect appeared in the New York Tribune of July 20, 1854, and caused much excitement at the islands.

Mr. Gregg conceded the two disputed points, "*ad referendum*," and a copy of the treaty as completed was laid before the King in cabinet council September 4 and fully explained to him in all its details. He fully approved of it, but wished to consult a few of his chiefs before taking final action. Near the close of the legislative session of 1854, August 4, Mr. Kaholeku offered a resolution in the house of representatives requesting the minister of foreign affairs to inform the house whether the King had applied for annexation to the United States on account of trouble with France and England, as reported in the New York Herald. The subject was referred to the committee on foreign relations, who never reported on it.

On the 26th of August Prince Liholiho, in the house of nobles, asked the minister of foreign affairs whether it was true that England and France were making trouble, so as to force the King to annex his Kingdom to the United States.

In reply, Mr. Wyllie denied the statement, asserting that those powers were anxious to maintain the independence of the islands, but he said that in the internal condition of the Kingdom there was danger, and there was no saying what changes that danger might lead the King to submit to.

PROCRASTINATION AND FAILURE OF THE TREATY.

On the 18th of September Gen. Miller, the consul-general of Great Britain, had an audience of the King, when he delivered a tirade of more than an hour in length against annexation and in denunciation of the Government and people of the United States.

He read in full the article in the New York Tribune of July 20, to show that the designs of the United States were unfriendly to Hawaiian interests. The King in his reply said that he much preferred that such communications should be made in writing, in order to prevent misunderstandings.

Meanwhile the Crown Prince Alexander remained at Hawaii to avoid signing the treaty. Weary of the delay, Mr. Gregg wrote, September 12, complaining of the procrastination and threatening to withdraw from further negotiations and to declare those which had already taken place to be at an end. The prince was sent for, but did not come.

Mr. Gregg wrote again November 1, remonstrating against further delay in the conclusion of the treaty. He used the following language: "The strong arm of the United States has been solicited for your protection. It has been kindly extended and held out until at length self-respect must soon dictate its withdrawal." This was regarded as a menace and gave much offense.

The U. S. S. *Portsmouth*, Capt. Dornin, and the *St. Mary's*, Capt. Bailey, were in fact detained in port during the fall of 1854, awaiting the result of the negotiations. The United States frigates *Susquehanna* and *Mississippi* also called on their way home from Japan, in the latter part of October, 1854, and remained a week off the port of Honolulu.

It would seem that an attempt was now made to intimidate the King into signing the treaty at once. Mr. Wyllie afterwards stated that on the 12th of November he was informed that there was imminent danger of a revolution; "that there were dangerous men from California, well armed, who insisted on the King's immediate sanction of annexation to the United States, without waiting for the arrival of the Crown Prince or the consent of the Legislature; that they would be joined by 300 or more of the American residents here; that, if unsuccessful then, they would be joined by 300 men of the same dangerous character, who were to arrive from California by the *America*, and 50 who would arrive by the *Ianthe*; that if we attempted to resist a force so determined, the King's Government would be upset, private and public property plundered, and perhaps the town set on fire." "That three individuals should have a private conference with the King instantly, so as to convince His Majesty of the truth of these dangers, and that he could only avoid them by annexation to the United States." A cabinet council was then called, at which Mr.

Wyllie was ordered to make these threats known to the representatives of the three great maritime powers. Mr. Gregg had already written to Mr. Wyllie to assure him that the forces of the United States were ready to cooperate "in repressing any unlawful attempts of reckless adventurers, claiming to be American citizens, against the peace and dignity of His Majesty's Government." Mr. Wyllie immediately applied to the representatives of France, Great Britain, and the United States, and was promised the aid of 200 men from the United States ships *Portsmouth* and *St. Mary's*, of 100 men from Her Britannic Majesty's ship *Trincomalee*, and of 500 men from the French frigate *Artemise*.

He further improved the opportunity to declare that "negotiations should be suspended until they could be honorably resumed after every trace of coercion had been removed." (See his letter of November 26, to Judge Lee.) On the 13th of December he issued a proclamation in the King's name, declaring that His Majesty had accepted the assistance of the three powers named above, and that his "independence was more firmly established than ever before." This called out from Mr. Gregg a dispatch denying that the United States had any intention of entering into any tripartite protectorate of the King's Government, or that his and Capt. Dornin's offers should be taken as equivalent to a permanent guaranty of its independence.

The expected filibusters never appeared. The Crown Prince Alexander Liholiho arrived at last from Hawaii December 1, and it is stated on good authority that he agreed to sign the treaty and that a day was set for the ceremony.

The King is said by Mrs. Judd to have been "more eager than ever" to complete the business, when he was suddenly taken ill, and expired in five or six days, on the 15th of December, 1854, in the forty-second year of his age. His untimely death was undoubtedly hastened by excessive intemperance towards the last. Aside from this unfortunate failing he had many noble traits.

As Mr. Severance truly said, "his partiality to Americans has always been strong, and it will be universally conceded that by his death they have lost a faithful and honorable friend."

His adopted son and heir, Alexander Liholiho, was immediately proclaimed King, under the title of Kamehameha IV. Soon afterwards he expressed his wish that the negotiations that had been begun with Mr. Gregg should be broken off, which was done.

As Mr. Marcy afterwards stated, in his letter to Mr. Gregg of January 31, 1855, the President would never have approved of a treaty admitting the islands into the Union as a *State*, to say nothing of other objections of minor importance. In fact, the whole movement, as we now look back upon it, seems to have been premature and unnecessary. But, as I have elsewhere said of Kamehameha III, "his purpose, though it happily fell through, yet insured to his successor a more secure possession of their inheritance."

W. D. ALEXANDER.

HONOLULU, *July 18, 1893.*

APPENDIX.

PROTECTORATE PROCLAMATION.

HONOLULU, *March 10, 1851.*

We, Kamehameha III, by the grace of God, of the Hawaiian Islands King:

By and with the advice and consent of our Kuhina Nui and council of native chiefs, finding our relations with France so oppressive to our Kingdom, so inconsistent with its rights as an independent state, and so obstructive of all our endeavors to administer the government of our islands with equal justice to all nations and equal independence of all foreign control, and despairing of equity and justice from France:

Hereby proclaim as our royal will and pleasure that all our islands, and all our rights as a sovereign over them, are from the date hereof placed under the protection and safeguard of the United States of America until some arrangements can be made to place our said relations with France upon a footing compatible with our rights as an independent sovereign under the law of nations and compatible with our treaty engagements with other foreign nations; or, if such arrangements should be found impracticable, then it is our wish and pleasure that the protection aforesaid under the United States of America be perpetual.

And we further proclaim as aforesaid, that from the date of the publication hereof the flag of the United States of America shall be hoisted above the national ensign on all our forts and places and vessels navigating with Hawaiian registers.

(Signed by the King and Kuhina Nui.)

MARCH 10, 1851.

B.

Resolution about the joint declaration March 20, 1851.

Whereas in view of the declaration of the commissioner of France in his memorandum of Feb. 1st, and in his dispatch No. 12 of Feb. 27th, that the difficulties with France are reduced to two, viz, the liberty of Catholic worship and the trade in spirits; and

Whereas the joint declaration sanctioned comprises a settlement of these two questions in the view of the King and council:

Resolved, That the minister of foreign relations is authorized and instructed to sign the four articles of the said declaration, and to refer to the sole decision of the President of the French Republic the question of indemnity to the King, as transmitted to Mr. Perrin in Mr. Wyllie's despatch No. 21, on the understanding that this reference is to be acted upon only after the President shall have admitted that all pending difficulties are thus settled.

C.

Joint declaration.

The President of the French Republic and the King of the Hawaiian Islands, animated by an equal desire to terminate the adjustment of pending difficulties between the two countries, and to prevent their return for the future by assuring the just and complete execution of the convention of the 26th of March, 1846, in regard to the points in controversy, through a new official act, destined to interpret it, have chosen for this purpose the undersigned commissioner of the French Republic and the minister of foreign affairs of the Hawaiian Kingdom, the signers of the treaty above mentioned, who, after having exchanged their full powers, found in good form, have agreed to the terms of the following declaration:

1. The treaty of the 26th of March, 1846, will be faithfully adopted and interpreted in the two texts, French and Hawaiian, the only ones officially signed. It remains agreed in all the cases where the foreign judges not understanding French have to decide the text of the English treaty, officially declared identical, under reserve of the III article, shall be considered as an exact translation.

2. Without admitting that by the establishment of a custom-house duty of \$5 per gallon upon spirits the Hawaiian Government have gone beyond the exclusive power which France herself has granted to them, through the means of the wording of the VI article of the treaty above mentioned (an assertion in regard to which the undersigned French commissioner makes all reserves), and after having proved that the effects of that duty have been profitable to France and hurtful to the English and American trade in spirits, the King of the Sandwich Islands declares himself disposed to submit the question of the reduction of duty to \$2.50 per gallon, as a *maximum* to the legislature, which is to assemble next month, as a measure of political economy, which the chamber of commerce of Honolulu have recommended on strong grounds.

3. The Government of the King can not recognize, on the part of any foreign nation, the right of dictating or prescribing laws to them on matters which affect only the religious belief or secular education of the native subjects of the King. Nevertheless, disposed to admit the third of the demands presented by M. Perrin, on the 1st of February last, as a friendly suggestion, destined for the examination of the Legislature which is to assemble this year, the Hawaiian Government will place these assemblies in a position to decide whether the equality between the Protestants and the Catholics, under the protection of the constitution and the laws, of which numerous proofs have been furnished, does not yet require something for its perfect application.

4. Documents presented by French citizens, in their own language, will be received in all the cases in which documents in the English language are received; but in the cases where the employees whose duty it is to make use of these documents do not understand French it shall be incumbent, provisionally, on the party interested to furnish a translation of the document produced, which, to prevent all error and discussion, shall be certified by him as true.

Honolulu, 25th March, 1851.

R. C. WYLLIE,
Minister of Foreign Relations.

La Commissaire de la République Française, EM. PERRIN.

D.

Appeal to the President of the United States.

The undersigned, minister of foreign relations of His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands (having), unavoidably produced to the undersigned, commissioner of the United States, an imperative order, under the great seal of the Hawaiian Kingdom, in Hawaiian and English, signed both by His Majesty and sealed by the royal signet and countersigned by His Highness Keoni Ana, the "Kuhina Nui," and both dated the 28th of this month, proceeded to make the following statement to the undersigned commissioner:

That the King and chiefs, remembering the events of 1839 and 1849, distrust France and fear her.

That they consider that France has not kept her engagement with Great Britain of the 28th November, 1843, and does not mean to treat this Kingdom as under the protection of international law.

That their fears had been abated, but were again revived by Monsieur Perrin's despatch No. 18, of the 22d inst., and his "verbal note" of the 15th, to the undersigned minister, which were laid before His Majesty and his cabinet on the 28th.

That the King from a conversation with Her Britannic Majesty's consul-general, believes that Great Britain is so fettered with France that she can afford him no certain hope of present relief.

That the King, therefore, unable to protect the large American and other national interests in this Kingdom, appealed in his helplessness to the Commissioner of the United States, and now solemnly appeals to the President.

The King would prefer the following alternatives in the order in which they are placed:

1. To secure those large interests equally against all possible danger from foreign powers, under the safeguard of the Republic of the United States, and (if it can be arranged by the President of the United States without unsafe delay), under the safeguard of Great Britain, also, and of France.

2. Unless the last conform with the other two, then under the protection of the United States and England only.

3. If England do not consent, then of the United States only.

4. The King would prefer that this Kingdom be received as an independent state, under protection merely from foreign aggression.

If that can not be done, rather than continue to be the victim of foreign aggression, the mere shadow of a King without the power, but with responsibilities measured out by the arbitrary rule of the strong, we will resign the sovereignty of these islands into the hands of the United States, under their guaranty of his private rights and hereditaments, a due provision for himself, his Queen, the heir apparent, his chiefs, his high officers, all private property and rights, and of all engagements of whatsoever kind lawfully incumbent upon him to fulfill and discharge.

6. The King desires that a secret arrangement be made with the authority and consent of the United States on the basis of one or other of these alternatives, to be instantly acted upon on the emergency of any sudden danger, and not to be acted upon or even mentioned, if through the good offices of the President of the United States, France and other maritime powers will engage to let him alone, with power to govern and seek the protection of his people in his own way, and to protect foreign residents and their interests, without persisting in exacting of him greater responsibilities than can be required of any sovereign under the laws of nations.

7. The King, with the full experience of Capt. Laplace in 1839 and of Admiral de Tromelin in 1849, acknowledges his utter want of power to protect the citizens of the United States and their large interests in his islands under a repetition of such lawless invasions; and as he has no confidence that they will not be repeated on the most trifling complaint against his Government, His Majesty would be glad to see such a provisional occupation of his islands by the armed forces of the United States, as may in the judgment of the President be adequate to the protection of all citizens of the United States and their interests, until time be afforded to mature some permanent arrangement in one or other of the ways hereinbefore mentioned.

The undersigned, Commissioner of the United States, having heard and considered these solemn proposals made in the name and by imperative order of His Majesty King Kamehameha III, agrees to transmit a copy thereof immediately to the Government of the United States, asking for full power and authority how to act, and that in the meanwhile the utmost possible secrecy shall be observed, and that he will continue to do all in his power for the protection of American interests and to uphold the King's dignity and rights as an independent sovereign in friendly relations with the United States and appealing to them for protection.

Done in duplicate in the city of Honolulu this 31st day of March, 1851.

[His official seal.]

[Seal of foreign office.]

LUTHER SEVERANCE.

R. C. WYLLIE,

Minister of Foreign Relations.

E.

Joint resolution.

Be it resolved by the Nobles and Representatives of the Hawaiian Islands in legislative council assembled, That in the sense of this House the demands of France are so clearly unjust and contrary to the laws of nations and to treaty, and the course pursued by her so incompatible with the existence of a regular independent government in these islands, if France should persist in such a course it will be the duty of the King to shield himself and his Kingdom from insult and oppression by placing this Kingdom under the protection of some friendly state; and that should such emergency be so urgent as not to admit of the legislative council being convened, it shall be left to His Majesty by and with the advice of his privy council, under such emergency, to consult the honor and safety of his Kingdom according to his Majesty's best judgment; and that whatever he may do will be binding upon the nation.

Passed both houses of the Legislature June 21, 1851.

W. L. LEE,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
KEONI ANA,
President of the House of Nobles.

Approved by the King August 4, 1851.

KAMEHAMEHA.
KEONI ANA.

F.

Order of the King to Mr. Wyllie, February 6, 1854.

Whereas it has come to our knowledge through the communications made to us by divers discreet men, who we have reason to believe are true friends to the Hawaiian nation, and through various other sources, that plans are on foot inimical to the peace of our Kingdom and the welfare of our people, and such as if carried out would be wholly subversive of our sovereignty, and would reduce us to the most deplorable of all states, a state of anarchy; and

Whereas exigencies may arise of such a nature as to render it imperative upon us for the security of the just rights of our chiefs and people that we should seek the alliance of the United States of America:

We do hereby command you, our minister of foreign relations, to take such immediate steps as may be necessary and proper, by negotiation or otherwise, to ascertain the views of the United States in relation to the annexation thereto of these islands, and also the terms and conditions upon which the same can be effected, with the object of being fully prepared to meet any sudden danger that may arise threatening the existence or independence of our Kingdom.

(Signed)

KAMEHAMEHA III.
JOHN YOUNG.

Liholiho consents to the above royal command.

Approved by Wm. L. Lee.

G.

Extract from instructions of February 21, 1854.

You will immediately enter upon a negotiation *ad referendum* with the Commissioners of the United States, the object of which is the annexation of our Kingdom to the United States of America, in case of necessity, and which shall fully secure our rights and the rights of our chiefs and people, being assured by the protocol No. 2, submitted to us, of the willingness of the Commissioner of the United States to enter upon such negotiation. The constitution of our Kingdom has made our ministers special advisers in the executive affairs of the Kingdom, and therefore you will submit to their consideration every proposal and every proposition that may be interchanged between you and the Commissioner of the United States, and your conduct will be governed by their decision.

Prince Liholiho will join in the deliberations of the cabinet council, vote therein, and make his views known to us. When the treaty *ad referendum*, as aforesaid, is

completed, you will submit the same to us, which will be subject to our approval, modification, or rejection, and, in case we shall deem it wise and necessary, to submit it to the representatives of our people, subject also to their approval.

(Signed)

KAMEHAMEHA III.

I hereby approve of the above instructions.

LIHOLIHO.

Signed by KEONE ANA,
and all the ministers.

H.

PROTOCOLS.

Protocol No. 1.

WEDNESDAY, February 8th, 1854.

The undersigned met this day at 12 noon in the house of the commissioner of the United States. Mr. Wyllie submitted the written commands of the King to him of the 6th instant, also the letter of same date from the Hon. Wm. L. Lee, chancellor of the Kingdom, and invited Mr. Gregg to exchange powers with him, with a view to the objects expressed in the King's command aforesaid.

Mr. Wyllie further submitted to Mr. Gregg the appeal to the President of the United States of March 31st, 1851, signed by him and the late commissioner, Mr. Severance.

Mr. Gregg stated to Mr. Wyllie that he was in possession of no formal powers to negotiate or declare the views of the Government of the United States upon the matter submitted for his consideration; that from the peculiar circumstances of the case it was impossible for the Government of the United States to anticipate the necessity of special replies to such questions, or the existence of a state of affairs making it desirable on the part of the King to bring up for discussion with him (Gregg) a subject of such magnitude and interest to both nations, without an opportunity of referring to the authorities at Washington, which he trusted could readily be done without prejudice. But if the exigencies of the present or future should demand it, he was willing to negotiate *ad referendum* on the subject embraced in the commands of the King, but not otherwise.

Mr. Gregg further stated, that having been verbally informed yesterday by Mr. Wyllie of this matter, he had written to the State Department at Washington relative thereto, with the expectation of obtaining the views and instructions of his Government as early as might be practicable. Mr. Wyllie begged Mr. Gregg to send a duplicate of his letter and to enclose copy of the commands of the King, that the President might understand exactly what His Majesty desired, for which purpose he left a certified copy with Mr. Gregg. Mr. Wyllie also left with Mr. Gregg the appeal of 31st March, 1851, before alluded to, for Mr. Gregg's fuller information.

The undersigned, on behalf of their respective Governments, agreed to consider the protocol as the initiation of a negotiation with the Government of the United States for the purpose expressed in the King's command to his minister of foreign affairs.

The undersigned agreed to adjourn till they should have occasion to meet again.

D. L. GREGG, etc., etc.

R. C. WYLLIE, etc., etc.

Protocol No. 2.

SATURDAY, February 11, 1854—1½ p. m.

The undersigned met in the house of the Commissioner of the United States. Mr. Wyllie stated that he had, by the advice of Prince Liholiho and the cabinet, to add to the King's orders of the 6th instant the signatures of His Majesty's chief justice and of his ministers approving thereof.

Mr. Gregg, with reference to what he said in protocol No. 1, stated that in view of his declaration therein contained, and the matters contained in the preamble to the King's commands to Mr. Wyllie, bearing date on the 6th instant, he felt himself justified in declaring explicitly that if it was the wish of His Majesty's Government to negotiate *ad referendum* he was willing to enter upon such negotiation at any time that might be agreed on for that purpose.

He also said that although he had no formal powers to that effect, yet from his knowledge of the views and policy of his Government, derived from the highest sources, he considered himself warranted, under the state of facts expressed in said preamble and by the exigency of the case, to discuss for reference, the terms of an

arrangement between the two powers of the character indicated in such commands. Mr. Gregg further remarked to Mr. Wyllie that after careful consideration he had deemed it advisable to make this specific declaration in order that no wrong impression might exist as to the nature of the authority with which he regarded himself invested on the part of his Government, to act *ad referendum*, in regard to the exigencies contemplated in His Majesty's commands to Mr. Wyllie.

R. C. WYLLIE.
D. L. GREGG.

Additional instructions.

HONOLULU, *February 21st, 1854.*

SIR: We have examined the protocols, numbers 1 and 2, executed by our minister of foreign affairs and the Commissioner of the United States initiated by our minister, in pursuance of our commands of the 6th of February; and more fully to carry out the purposes and intentions thereof, we hereby give you the following instructions additional. You will immediately enter upon a negotiation with the Commissioner of the United States of a treaty *ad referendum*, the object of which is the annexation of our Kingdom to the United States of America, in case of necessity, and which fully secure our rights and the rights of our chiefs and people, being assured, by the protocol No. 2, submitted to us, of the willingness of the Commissioner of the United States to enter upon such negotiation.

The constitution of our Kingdom has made our ministers special advisers in the executive affairs of the Kingdom, and therefore you will submit to their consideration every proposal and every proposition which may be interchanged between you and the Commissioner of the United States, and your conduct will be governed by their decision.

Prince Liholiho will join in the deliberations of the cabinet council, vote therein, and make its views known to me.

When the treaty *ad referendum*, as aforesaid, is completed, you will submit the same to us, which will be subject to our approval, modification, or rejection, and in case we shall deem it wise and necessary to submit it to the representatives of our people, subject also to their approval.

(Signed)

KAMEHAMEHA.

Approved by Liholiho, W. L. Lee, and the cabinet.

Protocol No. 3.

THURSDAY, *March 23rd, 1854—2 P. M.*

The undersigned met at the house of the Commissioner of the United States, and after comparing the two originals of Protocol No. 2 of the date of February 11th, 1854, which since that time had been in the hands of His Majesty the King for consideration and approval, respectively, signed and exchanged the same.

Mr. Wyllie at the same time communicated to Mr. Gregg the further orders of the King to him (Mr. Wyllie), bearing date on the 21st day of February last, but signed by His Majesty yesterday, and countersigned by His Royal Highness the Crown Prince, His Highness the Kuhina Nui, the chief justice, and by His Majesty's minister of state.

Mr. Gregg having heard the same, expressed a wish to have a copy thereof for transmission to his Government on account of the close relation of such instructions to the royal commands of the 6th of February last, a copy of which he had already transmitted.

The undersigned then adjourned to meet again as occasion might require.

(Signed)

R. C. WYLLIE.
D. L. GREGG.

Protocol No. 4.

SATURDAY, *March 25th, 1854—10 a. m.*

The undersigned met at the house of the Commissioner of the United States, and after comparing the originals of protocol No. 3, respectively signed and exchanged the same.

Mr. Wyllie, in accordance with Mr. Gregg's request as expressed in protocol No. 3 produced the King's additional orders of the 22nd of February last, of which a copy was taken for Mr. Gregg's use, and duly verified by comparison with the original.

Mr. Wyllie then read the following brief memorandum, submitted to him yesterday by Mr. Gregg, for consideration, viz:

"1. The cession of the sovereignty of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States.
 "2. The most ample guarantee of all the personal and private rights of the King, the chiefs, and people, securing to them the footing of citizens of the United States, on terms of perfect equality with all other American citizens.

"3. As a consideration in part for such cession, a suitable provision for the King, the Queen, the Crown Prince, those declared next in succession, the chiefs, etc.

"4. A provision for the support of schools and education.

"5. A provision for the fulfilment of all engagements lawfully incumbent upon the King's Government to fulfil or discharge. Mr. Gregg said he had submitted the preceding brief memorandum for Mr. Wyllie's consideration in order to elicit his views on the subject and as a very general basis of the discussions between them, which must necessarily arise in providing for the objects expressed in the King's commands of the 6th and 21st of February last.

"Mr. Wyllie then presented and read a memorandum, which he proposed as a basis for negotiation in the following terms:

"1. The admission of the Hawaiian Islands as a sovereign State into the American Union, subject to the Federal Government, the same as the State of Massachusetts, and extending to the King and chiefs, and all his subjects, the same rights, civil, political, and religious, as are enjoyed by that State.

"2. A due provision to be made for the King, the Queen, the proclaimed heir to the throne, those declared next in succession by the King's will, the high chiefs enjoying salaries, all the salaried officers of the King, with some regard to the length of service, and for the exercise of the King's bounty in those cases where he may wish to exercise it.

"3. All rights of possession, inheritance, or expectancy to be respected and provided for.

"4. All engagements, of whatever kind, lawfully incumbent upon the King or the nation to discharge, to be religiously fulfilled.

"5. The existing constitution to be maintained, subject only to those alterations without which the islands could not be admitted as a sovereign State into the Union."

(Signed)

R. C. WYLLIE.

D. L. GREGG.

Protocol No. 5.

FRIDAY, April 21st, 1854—9 a. m.

The undersigned met in the house of the commissioner of the United States, and signed protocol No. 4.

Mr. Wyllie submitted the following bases of arrangement which had been framed by the King's chief justice and had been approved of by the Princes of the blood, the Kuhina Nui, and the members of the King's cabinet, viz:

"1. The admission of the Hawaiian Islands into the American Union as a sovereign State, subject to the Federal Government, the same as any other State of the Union.

"2. The most ample guarantee of all the rights of the King, the chiefs, and the people, whether civil, political, or religious, and securing to them all the privileges of citizens of the United States, on terms of perfect equality with other American citizens.

"3. A suitable provision to be made for the King, the Queen, the proclaimed heir to the throne, those declared next in succession by the King's will, the chiefs, and all other persons for whom provision should be made.

"4. A provision for the faithful fulfillment of all engagements of whatsoever kind lawfully incumbent upon the King's government or the Hawaiian nation to discharge.

"5. A provision for the support of schools and education."

Mr. Wyllie stated that the members of the King's cabinet on the 29th of March had agreed to refer the amount of compensation to be determined by a select committee composed of the two Princes of the blood, the Kuhina Nui, and the King's chancellor and chief justice, the Hon. W. L. Lee, who had reported yesterday as follows:

"The undersigned, a committee appointed to fix upon the amounts to be asked for compensation to the King and chiefs, under the new treaty contemplated with the United States, beg to report: That they have found great difficulty in every attempt they have made to fix a just compensation for the several chiefs, who, including the second class, number upwards of thirty persons; and therefore they would respectfully recommend that a gross sum, say three hundred thousand dollars, be asked for, to be distributed among the King and chiefs, in the form of annuities, as they may determine, it being expressly understood that from the above sum of three hundred

thousand dollars no deduction whatever shall be made on the plea of any claim or claims alleged against the Hawaiian Government or authorities by any American citizen, or on any other pretense whatever.

"Signed by Liholiho, Lot Kamehameha, Keoni Ana, and W. L. Lee."

Mr. Gregg remarked to Mr. Wyllie that, so far as the basis of arrangements just submitted was concerned, he had then no objection to interpose, unless it might be to the first clause, which he thought was capable of a construction inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States (act 4, section 3). But if, as he supposed probable, its intention was simply to provide for the admission of the Hawaiian Islands into the American Union as a State, as soon as might be consistent with the principles of the American Constitution, it was free from the difficulty suggested. For the purpose, however, of removing all cause of doubt, he would propose as a substitute for such clause the following:

"The incorporation of the Hawaiian Islands into the American Union, and their admission, as soon as may be consistent with the principles of the Federal Constitution, to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of a sovereign State, the same as any other State of the Union."

Mr. Gregg further remarked that, although the amount fixed by the committee as a compensation was considerably higher than he had anticipated, and more, he feared, than would be regarded reasonable by his Government, yet he would for the present assent to it as the basis for the formation of a treaty *ad referendum*, reserving to himself the right, however, of submitting a counter proposition, if he should deem it incumbent upon him so to do, at any time before the final arrangement of the terms of such treaty.

For the purpose of enabling him to form a satisfactory opinion on this subject of compensation, he begged Mr. Wyllie to cause him to be informed as to the names and ages of the parties to whom annuities were proposed to be paid, the quantity and character of the public land and other public property, the resources and capacities of the islands, &c., &c. The undersigned adjourned to meet as occasion might require.

(Signed)

R. C. WYLLIE.
D. L. GREGG.

Protocol No. 6.

The undersigned met at the house of the Commissioner of the United States at 2 p. m. on the 1st of June. The undersigned compared the two originals of Protocol No. 5, but agreed not to sign it till the King's pleasure thereon be made known to them. Mr. Gregg stated that since the date of Protocol No. 5 he had been advised of the views of his Government in regard to the King's orders of the 6th of February last, and had received full powers, which he now produced in exchange for those previously presented by Mr. Wyllie. The undersigned proceeded to verify and compare their respective powers and exchange the same. Mr. Gregg stated to Mr. Wyllie that, under the powers now conferred upon him, he was ready to proceed immediately to the discussion of the measure contemplated alike in the powers held by him and in the powers held by Mr. Wyllie, and to conclude the same in conformity with the wish of the two high contracting parties.

Mr. Wyllie replied that so soon as he could obtain the *data* requested by Mr. Gregg in protocol No. 5, he would be prepared to enter upon the negotiation, and with a view to save time suggested that Mr. Gregg should draft the outline of a treaty, leaving blanks for the details which were wanting, so as that Mr. Wyllie, knowing Mr. Gregg's views, might carefully consider them with the assistance of his colleagues, of the princes of the blood, and of the King's chief justice, for submission to His Majesty the King, along with protocol No. 5, to which his sanction was still to be obtained.

(Signed)

R. C. WYLLIE.
DAVID L. GREGG.

Protocol No. 7.

The undersigned met in the house of the Commissioner of the United States on Wednesday, the 7th of June, at 1 p. m.

The undersigned compared and executed protocol No. 6, leaving it and protocol No. 5 still unsigned, until after the approval of the King shall have been obtained.

Mr. Wyllie stated that the King's chief justice and the other ministers of the King, on the 2nd of June, had concurred in the view that the powers of Mr. Gregg and Mr. Wyllie, which they had exchanged on the 1st of June, were equal and sufficient

for the formation of a treaty *ad referendum* for the annexation of the Hawaiian Kingdom to the United States of America, agreeable to the King's instructions to Mr. Wyllie of the 21st of February, 1854, approved by the Crown Prince, by the Kuhina Nui, by the King's chancellor and chief justice, and by all of His Majesty's ministers on the 22nd of March, 1854.

With a view to enable Mr. Gregg to proceed in the preparation of the draft of such a treaty, so as that the transfer of sovereignty may be beneficial to the King and all his subjects, and if possible, not prejudice the interests of any of such subjects, Mr. Wyllie with the full approval of the Kuhina Nui and of his colleagues, delivered to Mr. Gregg the following, viz:

No. 1. Civil list.....	\$32, 900. 00
2. List district justices.....	9, 550. 00
3. List circuit judges.....	4, 800. 00
4. List clerks of governors.....	1, 200. 00
5. List tax collectors.....	7, 000. 00
Total.....	55, 450. 00

Also No. 6, a statement of Government houses, forts, lands, bonds, &c., transferable to the sovereignty of the islands, amounting to \$1,522,379.

No. 7. Claims on France.....	\$462, 372. 73
8. Claims on Great Britain.....	32, 101. 61
Total of Nos. 6, 7, and 8.....	2, 016, 853. 34

Mr. Wyllie begged Mr. Gregg to understand distinctly that he could neither make himself nor the Hawaiian Government responsible for the *correctness* of the items forming the above sum of \$2,016,853.34.

Mr. Wyllie further delivered to Mr. Gregg No. 9, being a list of annuities payable by this Government, amounting to \$2,040.00 per annum; and stated that he had still to receive and deliver to Mr. Gregg a list of natives employed in the department of public instruction, who would lose the amounts of their respective salaries under a surrender of the native sovereignty. To save time Mr. Wyllie delivered all these documents in the original requesting Mr. Gregg to return them after making the use of them intended in protocol No. 6.

(Signed)

R. C. WYLLIE.
DAVID L. GREGG.

Protocol No. 8.

The undersigned met at the house of the Commissioner of the United States on Thursday, the 17th day of August, 1854.

Mr. Wyllie begged to make known to Mr. Gregg the following *agenda* founded on instructions from his colleagues and the Crown Prince, viz:

1st. That a treaty should be forthwith concluded according to diplomatic usage, and submitted to the King.

2. That the second article of Mr. Wyllie's draft of a treaty should be adopted with the addition of the following words, viz: "But the King of the Hawaiian Islands reserves to himself the power to ratify it, in any moment of danger." Such article also to express in clear and specific terms, the admission of said islands, as a sovereign State in the usual sense of State sovereignty.

3. The payment of seventy-five thousand dollars per annum, for a period of *ten years*, for the benefit of schools, one-third of which to be capitalized, and the interest annually applied to the support of a college or university, and fifty thousand dollars appropriated to the use of common schools, in the discretion of the legislative authority of the Hawaiian Islands, when admitted into the Union as a State.

The substitution in Article VIII of the words "and all others whom the King may wish to compensate or reward," in place of the words "and other persons now in the service of the Hawaiian Government or formerly in such service."

Mr. Gregg thereupon stated that he would take into consideration the different points contained in such *agenda*, and submit his remarks and conclusions thereon with the least possible delay. The undersigned then adjourned, to meet as occasion might require.

(Signed)

R. C. WYLLIE,
D. L. GREGG.

Protocol No. 9.

The undersigned met at the house of the Commissioner of the United States on the 18th of August, 1854, at 9 a. m. Mr. Gregg read a memorandum on Mr. Wyllie's *agenda*, which he had submitted to Mr. Wyllie yesterday afternoon, as follows viz:

"Mr. Gregg has carefully considered the *agenda* submitted to him by Mr. Wyllie this day as expressing the views of the Hawaiian cabinet and of the Crown Prince upon the drafts of a treaty of annexation under consideration. From conversations with Mr. Wyllie and other members of the cabinet he fully understands and appreciates the object proposed to be accomplished by the addition of the following words, viz: "But the King of the Hawaiian Islands reserves to himself the power to ratify it in any moment of danger." There are grave and serious objections, as he believes, not only to the article as originally drawn up, but to the vagueness and indefiniteness of the additional clause. In regard to the former he has already taken occasion to indicate to Mr. Wyllie his views.

He is convinced that the President and Senate of the United States would regard it as so objectionable that any treaty containing it would be rejected on that account, and he can not, therefore, assent to it. He suggests that the object pointed at in the *clause proposed to be added* could be better reached by the protocols of the negotiation, or by a separate and perhaps secret article, and he submits to Mr. Wyllie a proposition to that effect, and also a modification of said article No. II, as follows, viz:

"The Kingdom of the Hawaiian Islands shall be incorporated into the American Union as soon as, in the judgment of Congress, it can be done in consistency with the principles and requirements of the Federal Constitution, with all the rights, privileges, and *sovereignty* of a State, the same as, and on terms of perfect equality with, the other States of the United States." To this part of Mr. Gregg's memorandum Mr. Wyllie replied that no disrespect or distrust whatever was intended to apply to the United States in the words which the colleagues and the Crown Prince had agreed should be added to the second article of his draft of the treaty. The intention was to provide instantly and effectually for the sudden danger contemplated in the preamble. He admitted that that great object could be as well or better effected by a separate and secret article; but he added that his instructions having been precise as to the addition of these *ipsissimis verba*, he could not take upon himself to make any change without a further reference to his colleagues and to the Crown Prince. Mr. Gregg then continued his memorandum as follows, viz:

Mr. Gregg has no hesitation in assenting to the substitution in Article VIII of the words "and all others whom the King may wish to compensate or reward," in place of the words "and other persons now in the service of the Hawaiian Government, or formerly in such service." In order to approach more nearly to the views of Mr. Wyllie, the cabinet, and the Crown Prince he (Mr. Gregg) is willing to modify the latter part of said article so as to make it read as follows:

As a further consideration for the session herein made, and in order to place within the reach of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands the means of education, present and future, so as to enable them the more perfectly to enjoy and discharge the rights and duties consequent upon a change from monarchical to republican institutions, the United States agree to set apart and pay over the sum of \$75,000 *per annum*, one-third of which shall be applied to constitute the principal of a fund for the benefit of a college or university, or colleges and universities, as the case may be, and the balance for the support of common schools to be invested, secured, or applied as may be determined by the legislative authority of the Hawaiian Islands, when admitted into the Union as aforesaid."

Mr. Gregg thinks the term of *five years* ample to secure an adequate provision for schools, especially in connection with the appropriation of lands to a similar object. But few states are as well provided for in this respect. He can not recognize the propriety of limiting the proceeds of this college or university fund to a single institution, but he is willing to leave their appropriation open to legislative discretion. So far as other questions were concerned, Mr. Wyllie was in possession of his views already, and he did not deem it necessary to enter upon their discussion at present. Aug. 17, 1854.

The undersigned then adjourned to meet again when Mr. Wyllie had consulted his colleagues and the Crown Prince in regard to the foregoing views of Mr. Gregg.

Protocol No. 10.

The undersigned resumed their meeting at the house of the commissioner of the United States on the 18th of August 1854, at 4 p. m. Mr. Wyllie stated that, having conferred with his colleagues on the subject of Mr. Gregg's observations in Protocol No. 9, he had to make known their views as follows, viz:

1. That the amount of seventy-five thousand dollars (\$75,000) for schools must be for ten instead of five years.

2. That his colleagues and the Crown Prince decline to admit Mr. Gregg's proposed substitute for Mr. Wyllie's recent article, and propose the following amendment to stand in its place, viz:

"The Kingdom of the Hawaiian Islands shall be incorporated into the American Union as a sovereign State and admitted as such as soon as it can be done in consistency with the principles and requirements of the Federal Constitution to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of a State, as aforesaid, and perfect equality with the other States of the Confederation."

Mr. Gregg expressed dissatisfaction with the phraseology of the proposed amendment, but promised to take the subject into early consideration and to advise Mr. Wyllie fully of his views thereon. Mr. Wyllie then stated that Protocols 5, 6, and 7 had been submitted to the King, and they were therefore signed in accordance with Protocol No. 6. The undersigned thereafter adjourned to meet again as soon as Mr. Gregg has maturely considered the amendment proposed to the second article.

Honolulu, 27th September, 1854.

(Signed)

R. C. WYLLIE.

D. L. GREGG.

Protocol No. 11.

The undersigned met at the office of the minister of foreign affairs at 10 a. m., on August 19th, 1854, and proceeded to settle the terms of the treaty of annexation referred to and discussed at the preceding conferences.

Mr. Gregg expressed himself still dissatisfied with the terms of the amendment submitted to him yesterday as the agreement of the cabinet and Crown Prince for the second article of the treaty. He did not object to the omission of the words "*in the judgment of Congress*," as contained in his original draft and the one Mr. Wyllie had proposed, as it was well understood and agreed by all the parties to the negotiation that the power of admitting new States into the Union is vested by the Constitution solely in the Congress, and it was not intended to attach to the article any other sense.

He thought the expression "sovereign State" inaccurate and exceptional. The states were, it is true, sovereign in a limited sense; they had full jurisdiction and control over their own local and domestic affairs. But the *national sovereignty* was vested in the General Government alone, and he thought it improper to designate a State, in a public treaty, by terms not strictly applicable in the sense of the Federal Constitution. He also objected to the word "confederation," as being at least of doubtful propriety, and proposed "union" as a substitute. The following was finally agreed upon and adopted, as being within the meaning of and subordinate to section III of Article IV of the Constitution of the United States, viz:

"The kingdom of the Hawaiian Islands shall be incorporated into the American Union as a State, enjoying the same degree of sovereignty as other States; and admitted as such, as soon as it can be done, in consistency with the principles and requirements of the Federal Constitution, to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of a State, as aforesaid, with the other States of the Union."

When Article VIII came up for consideration, Mr. Gregg renewed the proposal heretofore made by him to insert \$100,000 instead of \$300,000 as a suitable amount to be paid in annuities. Mr. Wyllie stated in reply that the revenue of the Kingdom was in rapid augmentation; from \$48,842 in 1843, it had increased in only 8 years to \$315,735 in 1851; that in 1853, notwithstanding the fearful ravages of the smallpox, it was \$326,620; that this increase had taken place without any development of the agricultural resources of the country worthy of the name; that only capital and labor were wanted to develop them to a great extent whereby the revenue would be proportionately increased, and that he (Mr. Wyllie) saw no reason to doubt that in ten years from this date the revenue of the islands would exceed \$1,000,000 annually.

Mr. Wyllie added that for this reason he did not consider \$300,000 an extravagant demand for compensation, considering the present and prospective value of the islands *intrinsically*, and much less in view of their political value to any great naval and commercial power, since the treaty effected with Japan. Mr. Wyllie added his belief that this value was fully understood, and that a higher compensation for thirty years might be procured by a surrender of the sovereignty to another great nation. Besides the \$300,000 had been fully agreed upon by the King's cabinet and the crown prince, and further \$75,000 for the purpose of education, to be continued for 10 years, and he (Mr. Wyllie) did not think they would recede from these terms.

Mr. Gregg said that, as the negotiation was *ad referendum*, he felt himself, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, authorized to assent, although he did

it with reluctance, to the insertion of the sums proposed by Mr. Wyllie, leaving his Government to consider and determine whether they were responsible and proper or not. The same consideration would lead him to agree to the time fixed by the cabinet and Crown Prince for the continuance of the payment for the benefit of schools, etc.

But he objected to the phraseology of the the first paragraph of this Article VIII, which he thought did not express clearly and definitely enough the idea which was in the mind of all parties, viz, that the aggregate amount of annuities should be apportioned once for all by the King and privy council and to remain apportioned forever—each annuity falling off on the death of the party entitled to it and the aggregate sum being diminished to the extent of such annuity or as each life falls in. Any other construction would be different from that intended and lead to misunderstanding and difficulties, which should be clearly provided against.

Mr. Wyllie stated that it undoubtedly was the understanding that the annuities were to be strictly life annuities, terminable with the life of each annuitant, although he himself would have preferred that the annuities should have been for a given period of time, so as that in the probable case of the early death of any annuitant, the benefit of his or her annuity might go to his or her children or other heirs for the years or period of time that the annuity might still have to run. But as his colleagues and the Crown Prince had waived the point, Mr. Wyllie had yielded to the general sense that the annuities were to be life annuities only, with the sole exception of that of the immediate heir to the throne which is specially provided for.

The article was finally, after some amendments, assented to by Mr. Gregg.

The draft of a treaty having been completed to the mutual satisfaction of the undersigned, it was agreed that three copies should be made in English and three in Hawaiian, and that the same should be signed and sealed as soon as convenient in the presence of the Crown Prince and members of the cabinet, and if possible, with the approval of the chief justice. The said treaty having been negotiated and drawn up in the English language, it was understood and agreed that all disputes arising under it, should be decided by the English text.

The undersigned further agreed that a separate and secret article should be framed and added to the treaty, providing effectually for the prevention of anarchy and the preservation of peace and order, in case the emergency contemplated in the preamble should suddenly occur, without which the treaty itself would fail in one of its main objects.

Honolulu, 27th of September, 1854.

(Signed) R. C. WYLLIE,
D. L. GREGG.

Protocol No. 12.

The undersigned met in the office of the minister of foreign affairs at 2 p. m. on Monday, September 4th. The undersigned compared their respective copies of the treaty, which they had agreed to, subject to the King's approval on the 19th of August.

Immediately afterwards they discussed and agreed to the *separate and secret article* provided for in Protocol No. 11, and added the same to the said copies of the treaty.

Whereupon the undersigned agreed that the treaty was completed for submission to the King, in conformity with His Majesty's instructions to Mr. Wyllie of the 21st of February, 1854, and they adjourned to meet again as occasion may require.

(Signed)

HONOLULU, September 27, 1854.

From appendix to Protocol 7, containing civil list, as follows:

The King.....	\$10,000
The Queen.....	1,000
H. R. H. Liholiho.....	2,000
Prince Lot Kamehameha.....	800
C. Kanaina.....	800
K. Kopaakea.....	800
B. Namakeha.....	800
I. Kaeo.....	800
A. Paki (chamberlain).....	1,000
John Young (minister of interior).....	4,000
M. Kekuanaoa (governor of Oahu).....	2,500
P. Nahaolelua (governor of Maui).....	1,500

G. L. Kapeau (governor of Hawaii).....	\$1, 200
P. Kanoa (governor of Kauai).....	1, 200
John Li (second associate justice supreme court).....	2, 000
J. Kekaulahao (second associate justice supreme court).....	1, 500
J. Piikoi (clerk Honolulu Market).....	1, 000
	<hr/>

32, 900

CORRESPONDENCE.

Letter from Wyllie to Lee of March 8, 1854.

[Extract.]

At the last privy council on the 6th I announced the fact that the consul-general Miller and Mr. Perrin had received by last mail dispatches from their respective Governments fully approving of their joint address of the 1st of September, stating that each Government had written to the United States Government on the subject, inviting the latter to join Great Britain and France in a tripartite treaty to support the independence and neutrality of this Kingdom, and ordering the consul-general and Mr. Perrin to act in concert.

Mr. Wyllie then speaks of an alleged conspiracy of Government clerks in the legislature to oust him from office, of which C. C. Harris was said to be the leader. He adds: "I think a feeling is being industriously propagated that I am the only bar to annexation. Upon that point, I believe, my opinion and sense of duty agree fully with your own, and, as far as I can judge, Prince Liholiho and all my colleagues agree with us."

Wyllie to Lee, June 23, 1854.

The treaty is now before Liholiho, with all the amendments suggested by you. To be able to save the King and chiefs and people at a moment's warning, it is desirable that the treaty should be concluded diplomatically, I mean signed by the plenipotentiaries, but subject to future ratification. Armstrong's zeal presses the letter with indiscreet haste, and I fear makes everything known to J. and B. Armstrong's grand idea is that you and I should go to Washington with the treaty ratified here, to have it ratified there.

It would, no doubt, be very convenient to some people to get rid both of you, me, and of Allen, too; but the question is, would the King's honor and the rights of the natives be as safe in other hands, or when a treaty is made as a safeguard against sudden treason or rebellion, is there any place so proper for the King's ratification as his own court, where the danger would first be felt, or any form more proper or decorous than that the act of ratification should be witnessed and signed by all who have signed the powers and protocols from the first by the King's own desire. To my mind the treaty admits of no dispute whatever, but I should like to know yours.

Lee to Wyllie, July 5, 1854.

[Private.]

The treaty should be concluded at once, so that we may be prepared for emergencies, but I agree with you about the final ratification.

Wyllie to Lee, July 11, 1854.

[Extract.]

Liholiho keeps out of the way and has not returned the treaties, though I have often asked for them. Of my draft I have no copy. Unless I perform the duty which on the 6th of February was imposed on me imperatively, if any sudden emergency were to occur, I would be subject to blame. Therefore one of two things;

either I must perform that duty or the royal order must be withdrawn. The final ratification is quite another matter. That I would be as unwilling to press on the King, except in the presence of an immediate emergency, as you would be.

Under such a *clear necessity* colonial subjection to any European power would not be so favorable to the interests of the islands as their admission as a sovereign State of the United States. There are no markets in Europe likely to afford such a consumption of island produce at high prices as those of California and Oregon.

Besides, *contiguity* and the superior magnitude of present interests in the islands are considerations not to be overlooked. This view of mine I made known to the consul-general fully and frankly in 1851 or 1852. In judging of such abstract questions I know of no nationality whatever. Under a *pressing necessity* I would advise the King to annex himself and his Kingdom to *Japan* if I thought that it would be best for him, the prince, the chiefs, the Hawaiians generally, and the future interests of the islands as an agricultural and mercantile state.

But to the *treasonable creation* of a necessity for the extinction of the native sovereignty I never will be a party. As the house of representatives is going on it appears to me that they will bring on the *necessity* soon enough, although all we ministers remain faithful to our oaths up to the very moment of its supervention.

Such are my views, and from what I can recollect of our confidential conference at Rosebank, in January last, I think you will not be far different. Hoping soon to hear that you are better or to see you here, I remain, my dear Lee,

Yours, truly,

R. C. WYLLIE.

P. S.—Before the 6th of February last my idea of saving the King from sudden treason and rebellion was always to hoist the united flags of the United States, Great Britain, and France. But our dangers are internal, and a tripartite treaty would fail to keep the King permanently on his throne unless each of the powers were to consent to keep up a permanent garrison of, say, 100 men, in all 300.

Wyllie to Lee, August 23, 1854.

MY DEAR LEE: * * * I am anxious to have your approval before I sign. Reflecting upon the matter, it is a most deplorable thing that we should be driven to *give up* at the time when our means of governing independently, and that well, too, are so much greater than they were in 1843, our revenue being increased from \$18,842 yearly to \$326,620.

Our constitution, our laws, and our land tenure are vastly improved since you have been the King's chief justice. The administration of justice compares favorably with that of California or any of the Southwestern States. Education is more generally diffused than it is in many old nations of great civilization, and the King's rights of sovereignty and neutrality are fully acknowledged by the great powers of the earth.

Yet all these advantages and ameliorations go for nothing against the secret machinations and agitation of wretches whose loyalty, whose conscience, and whose religion are at the bottom of their pockets, instigated by some half dozen traitors that one month of a strong, energetic government would clear the country of forever. Yet, looking to the King's safety, and the absence of all physical force to *insure* it, we have yet to take things *as they are*, not as they *ought to be*.

Mem.—Letter about annexation in the New York Tribune July 20, 1854. Gen. Miller and Mr. Perrin much excited by it.

From the King to Wyllie, August 29, 1854.

SIR: Referring you to my orders and instructions relating to the treaty with Mr. Gregg, hearing that it is nearly completed, I order you to send me a copy in native, and a copy of all the protocols in native, that I may consider what amendments and suggestions I may have to make before you sign the treaty.

(Signed)

KAMEHAMEHA III.

Lee to Wyllie, August 29, 1854. Torbertville. (Ulupalakua, Mani.)

MY DEAR WYLLIE: Mr. Ii has just touched here on his way to Hilo, leaving me your notes of August 20 and 23, with a copy of the treaty. You wish, before signing, to have my views of the treaty, and I will give them to you, though I have very little time for reflection. They are briefly as follows: I see no objection to the treaty, except the second article, which strikes me as being indefinite, ambiguous, and, to a certain extent, contradictory. This article is intended to secure a very important point, the most important, in my opinion, involved in the whole treaty, and, as it is now framed, it seems to me to dodge the question, or at least to leave room for future controversy.

It is the wish of the King and chiefs, so far as they have spoken on the subject, to be admitted as a *State* and not as a *Territory*, and they must not be deceived by any uncertainty of expression in the treaty. They wish by this article to shield the nation from slavery, and it would be as dishonorable to us as unjust to them to leave so vital a question involved in doubt.

I may not rightly understand this article, but, as I read it, it is left to the American Congress to say when we may be admitted as a State, and that may be one, ten, or twenty years hence. Much as I am in favor of a treaty of this kind, yet knowing as I do the views of the King, chiefs, and people on this subject, it would be treacherous and criminal in me to let this point pass unnoticed. In my opinion the article should read that the Hawaiian Islands shall be incorporated into the American Union, not as a *Territory*, but as a *State*, etc., and omitting the clause "and admitted as such as soon," etc.

The conditions and requirements precedent to our admission as a State, if any, should be *distinctly specified*. In my opinion, as the article now stands, it leaves room for any amount of delay and double dealing, and does not meet the wishes of the King and chiefs.

In what I have said I mean no reflection whatever on Mr. Gregg, who doubtless intended and understands this article in a sense fair and just to the Hawaiian nation, but it may be left to others, perhaps less honorable than himself, to give it a construction. I can not tell you how much I should regret throwing the slightest obstacle in the way of the conclusion of this treaty, but I should be false to my own conscience and to the nation I serve, to keep silence.

The treaty has been greatly modified since I saw it, and perhaps for the better in all respects, except the article above mentioned. I am sorry you did not send me a copy of it at an earlier date. I shall write to Liholiho, giving him authority to act as my proxy, and referring him to this letter for my views. I shall return to Honolulu in two or three weeks, and if there is no pressing emergency, why not postpone the matter until I can make my views more fully known? Of course I write you this in confidence, but I wish you to show it to Mr. Allen, Mr. Armstrong, Liholiho, and Mr. Young. I should not say "in confidence," if I had not heard from several sources that the doings of the cabinet and Mr. Gregg in this matter were town talk.

Wyllie to Lee, November 14, 1854.

[Extract.]

We seek from the United States some other remedy than revolvers at our ears and bowie knives at our breasts. If the United States authorities can not protect us from such comforters *before annexation*, what hope we reasonably *after annexation*? This is the common-sense view of the case, and I wonder that Gregg and Dornin don't see it.

Wyllie to Lee, November 15, 1854.

MY DEAR LEE: While in the middle of my preceding note of this same date Mr. Young brought down a fresh order from the King dated yesterday, suggesting certain amendments in the treaty. We had a meeting of the cabinet upon the order, and have requested Armstrong to prepare a careful translation of it, to be considered to-morrow at 10 a. m.

The effect will be to justify Mr. Gregg in assuming that if the amendments suggested by the King be adopted he virtually pledges himself to ratify the treaty.

Now, are we prepared for this, after the new phase given to things by Mr. Gregg and Capt. Dornin themselves, well known to you—commented on in my accompanying note, especially after the alternative, put to us by Mr. Gregg himself in the

separate dispatch of the 22d September (which you saw), to be either *off* or *on* with the treaty?

How otherwise can we understand the following :

"I am authorized to insist upon the conclusion of such negotiations according to diplomatic usage. The alternative seems to me plain and imperative. This result must be consummated or I shall feel myself obliged to withdraw from any further negotiations, and to declare those which have already taken place at an end."

And still more objectionable is the following, *because* it seems to imply a threat and license for the filibusters to overthrow us: "The strong arm of the United States has been solicited for your protection. It has been kindly extended and held out, until at length self-respect must soon dictate its withdrawal." What think you of that? I must confess that I regret that the King has sent me the order (which, however, with the consent of my colleagues, I will respectfully obey) before we had all in presence of the King, Liholiho, and yourself, considered whether "self-respect" after undisguised intimidation attempted, does not require us to do something very different to what they would drive us to by intimidation.

We never in this world will have such an opportunity to take dignified ground. We can take it *now* with absolute safety to the King and national sovereignty. But good has arisen out of intended evil. Are we to miss the opportunity or turn it to the King's advantage? I have no time to write to Liholiho, but you will inform him of everything. Let me know as soon as possible what you think. Mr. Young and I unite in begging you not to attempt so much labor in one day. Calculate carefully your strength, and measure your work accordingly.

Yours, truly,

R. C. WYLLIE.

P. S.—Yesterday Consul-General Miller and Perrin promised to send instantly, when required, all the disposable force of the *Trincomalee* and *Artemise*, and to-day Mr. Gregg handed to me a note from Capt. Dornin, promising to land 200 men, fully armed.

Wyllie to Lee, November 26, 1854.

The effect of the application authorized by the cabinet and by the King for assistance, when the danger threatened, has been to elicit from the commissioners of France and the United States and the consul-general of Great Britain such assurances as to amount *virtually* to a tripartite military protectorate of the King, if His Majesty should be pleased so to understand the official offers severally made.

Would it not be well for the King to take that ground, to proclaim the fact, to make the treaty public (which Mr. Gregg, it appears, has already submitted, to the cognizance of the United States officers here, of American residents here, and even of filibusters from California), and to advise as to his present and future policy with the Governments of the three great naval powers of the world? If we take this ground we sacrifice no right of the King, we do not necessarily lose the treaty, we free ourselves effectually from all violence and threatenings of violence, and we obtain another and, I think, a very good chance of preserving the King and the native dynasty in the enjoyment of their natural rights as the sovereign rulers of this land.

After the *threats* made and the *ridicule* thrown upon our means of resistance, we have agreed to make something of a military demonstration on the anniversary of the 28th.

There is not one of us who doubts our present perfect safety, and the promises officially made to us. We now stand on strong ground; we can breathe freely; we can efficiently put down all filibusters, rebels, and traitors. Are we to show ourselves equal to the emergency or not? This is for you and the privy council to consider, and for us all to consider. * * *

If the negotiation is to go on with Mr. Gregg one thing I must insist upon, which is, that *pending the negotiation* he, as Commissioner of the United States, must bind himself to keep American citizens quiet. No treaty can be made under *duress*. If made so it is not valid.

R. C. WYLLIE.

Letter from Mr. Gregg of September 12.

[Memoranda.]

Complaining of procrastination in regard to the treaty which he said was completed August 19 satisfactorily.

Remonstrates again November 1 as above.

Wyllie to Capt. Dornin, November 27, 1854.

MY DEAR SIR: It was only this day that I heard that you were to leave us so soon. I am sorry that your departure has become necessary, and having the utmost regard for you personally I am anxious that you should not retire under a wrong impression of my feeling in consequence of the communications made to me on the 11th and 12th instant.

The one hundred and fifty-seventh section of Vattel, chapter 12, book 2, is as follows:

"A treaty is valid if there be no defect in the manner in which it has been concluded; and for this purpose nothing more can be required than a sufficient power in the contracting parties, and their mutual consent sufficiently declared."

Therefore, by international law the highly confidential and delicate negotiation between Mr. Gregg and me, in progress since the 6th of February, became suspended under the coercion made known on the 11th and 12th instant.

Who is it who has seen the proclamation of the President against filibustering to Cuba, his proclamation of the 18th of January, 1854, against unlawful expeditions in the Pacific, his inaugural message, and the official declarations of preceding administrations relating to these islands in particular, that could doubt for one moment that if the President, had he heard what I heard on the 11th and 12th, he would not instantly have ordered that all negotiations should be suspended until they could be honorably resumed after every trace of coercion had been removed and the King's liberty to consent or not to consent fully and unquestionably re-established.

The only course that I could pursue under circumstances, the parallel of which, as far as I know, is not to be found in the history of any other nation, and certainly never in the past experience of this humble Kingdom, is unmistakably designated in the above quotation of Vattel, and in Chapter XVIII, sections 200, 201, 202.

Respect to the United States Government, duty to the King and to my colleagues, and, I may add, to myself, all alike required, in the most imperative manner, that the unlawful threats of foreign intruders should be instantly met by the most determined resistance.

In less than forty-eight hours we were prepared *effectually and certainly* to put down the insurrectionary attempt that was threatened, even had it come upon us in the formidable shape in which it was represented. With the assistance kindly promised by yourself, through the Hon. David Gregg, and that which was promptly promised by others, the result of a struggle could not have been doubtful, the rights of the King would have been vindicated, and from all I have seen of the generous and merciful character of His Majesty I would venture to say that the prisoners would have experienced at his hands a clemency so much beyond what the law and usage of nations allow in such cases as would have filled them with remorse for having ever attempted and conspired to overturn his throne.

I speak in the supposition that such men can be susceptible of generous and ennobling sentiments, which, considering the designs imputed to them *where they neither had suffered nor could have suffered any wrong whatever*, may be very doubtful. Ever since I have been on these islands I have welcomed the ingress of American citizens; I have made it a rule, even in political debate, never to be wanting in personal respect to those who held diplomatic or consular commissions from the President; but I have no such feeling of respect or consideration for filibusters; and if for that I am to be blamed, then let the censure commence with the President himself, for my sentiments correspond with his proclamations, and so, I hope, will ever my acts.

In a private note like this I am forced to speak of myself only; I have no right to put words in the mouths of my colleagues, but I know them to be *at heart gentlemen* and men of honor, and if you believed them to be such in every point of their official duty to the King, you can foretell precisely what course they will pursue. I am quite sure that you, whose prompt and energetic conduct in the Peninsula of "Bassa California" will be recorded in history as one of the brightest pages, in a moral sense, of the annals of the brave American navy, can never blame those gentlemen born in your own country, who act with me as the joint depositaries of the confidence of King Kamehameha III, for uniting their efforts with mine, with the protection of God and of all the friends whom the Almighty had given to us to repel with *loathing, disgust, and indignation* all filibusters who may come among us with the insolent pretension of throwing the weight of their revolvers into the balance of our honorable deliberations.

Since the 12th you have several times remarked that I was too much excited. I beg to assure you that neither then nor since have I known any excitement whatever, beyond that of a strong indignation. As for fear, I never had one particle of it; but I can assure you that, had I yielded to such an unworthy impulse and debased myself to the degree of surrendering the King's rights under the threats of filibusters, and in accordance with the advice of those residents, seemingly act-

ing in connivance with them, my own dearest relations in Scotland would have shunned me as a *filthy thing*, and if my American-born colleagues had permitted me to make that ignominious surrender, more plainly to perpetrate the treason, the stigma of Arnold would have clung to them and to me in every part of the United States during life.

I hope negotiations will soon be resumed on the honorable basis on which they were commenced, and free from the influence or control of parties who never ought to have known anything about them. It was to you only that I approved of cognizance being given.

I remain, my dear sir, yours ever truly,

R. C. WYLLIE.

Gregg to Wyllie, January 26, 1856.

SIR: It is my duty to inclose to you a copy of a letter addressed to me yesterday by Commander Bailey, of U. S. S. *St. Mary's*, relative to the proclamation of the late King, issued on the 8th of December last. I can not suppose that there is any misunderstanding on the part of the Hawaiian Government as to the precise extent and meaning of Capt. Dornin's offer of aid. It had reference to the special emergency apprehended about the middle of November, and, of course, fell to the ground with the dangers which it was designed to ward off. Neither he nor I had any authority to enter into an arrangement looking beyond the crisis then supposed to be immediately impending.

Our action was strictly *pro hac vice* and to that extent alone. Popular construction gives to the proclamation a sense which could never have been officially intended. It bears date long after the apprehensions of violence had ceased to exist, and when the independence of the Islands was supposed to be "more firmly established than ever before." The formal acceptance of offers of assistance made three weeks previously could only have been designed as an act of courtesy and acknowledgment to the powers whose friendly intentions had been manifested on an occasion when they were peculiarly acceptable.

Such was my view of it, founded, as I supposed, upon a just appreciation of facts. Had I thought that the existence of a permanent tripartite protection was designed to be intimated, my protest against such an inference would have been prompt, imperative, and unqualified. Such a thing was never thought of on my part, and could not have been understood from any circumstance which transpired, officially or otherwise. As the proclamation is still kept standing in the columns of the "Polynesian" newspaper, I must beg to inquire how far it is to be understood as assuming an existing guaranty of protection by the United States of America. I am anxious to remove all occasion of misapprehension and to preserve unimpaired not only the substance but the semblance of entire good faith and perfect concord, etc.

(Signed.)

DAVID L. GREGG.

Capt. Bailey wrote as follows:

"It would appear from the proclamation that England, France, and the United States had agreed to a joint protectorate of the late King. Such an agreement would have been directly opposed to the policy that has ever been maintained by the United States, and would be in direct violation of the course adopted in refusing to unite with England and France in securing the possession of Cuba to Spain.
* * *"

Proclamation.

Whereas it has come to my knowledge from the highest official sources that my Government has been recently threatened with overthrow by lawless violence, and whereas the representatives at my court of the United States, Great Britain, and France, being cognizant of these threats, have offered me the prompt assistance of the naval forces of their respective countries, I hereby proclaim my acceptance of the aid thus proffered in support of my sovereignty. My independence is more firmly established than ever before.

KEONI ANA.

PALACE, December 8, 1854.

KAMEHAMEHA III.

E. C. WYLLIE.

Extract from an address delivered by Judge Lee before the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society in August, 1850.

Until within the last year the Hawaiian held his land as a mere tenant at sufferance subject to be dispossessed at any time it might suit the will or caprice of his chief or that of his oppressive *luna*. Of what avail was it to the common people to raise more than enough to supply the immediate wants of their subsistence? Would the surplus belong to them, or furnish the means of future independence? Far from it.

It would go to add to the stores of their despotic lords, who claimed an absolute right in all their property, and who periodically sent forth their hordes of *lunas* to scour the country and plunder the people, without the shadow of right or mercy. Often did these ravagers, these *land-pirates*, leave the poor *makaainana* (peasant) with little else than his *maro* (breecloth), his digger, and his calabash. I thank God that these things are now at an end, and that the poor Kanaka may now stand on the border of his little taro patch, and, holding his fee-simple title in his hand, bid defiance to the world. Yes, I thank God that He has moved the hearts of the King and chiefs of these islands to let the oppressed go free.

[Personal.]

Mr. Blount to Mr. Gresham.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *July 31, 1893.*

DEAR SIR: The condition of parties in the islands is one of quiescence. The action of the United States is awaited by all as a matter of necessity. This condition, it can be assumed, will remain until the proposition to annex is accepted or rejected. In the latter contingency no sudden movement is likely to occur. The present Government can only rest on the use of military force, possessed of most of the arms in the islands, with a small white population to draw from to strengthen it. Ultimately it will fall without fail. It may preserve its existence for a year or two, but not longer.

My own private affairs make it necessary for me to return home. The distance between us, and consequent difficulty of communication, is too great for me to wait for any further correspondence. It is not pleasant to reveal one's private affairs, nor do I intend to do so now. I assume that neither you nor the President under existing circumstances could urge my further continuance here.

I have discharged my duty the best I could considering I was surrounded by persons interested in misleading me, and in my inability to compel answers from witnesses.

I am, etc.,

JAMES H. BLOUNT.

LIST OF AFFIDAVITS.

1. John F. Colburn and A. P. Peterson.
 2. John F. Calburn and A. P. Peterson, May 3, 1893, printed with Mr. Blount's No. 4, dated May 4, 1893.
 3. William H. Cornwell.
 4. John A. Cummins and W. T. Seward.
 5. Charles L. Hopkins.
 6. Charles L. Hopkins, May 3, 1893, printed with Mr. Blount's No. 4, dated May 4, 1893.
 7. John Lota Kaulukou.
 8. E. C. Macfarlane.
 9. Paul Neumann.
 10. Samuel Nowlien.
 11. P. M. Rooney.
 12. John Ross.
 13. Charles B. Wilson, May 4, 1893, printed with Mr. Blount's No. 4, dated May 4, 1893.
 14. C. B. Wilson, 6th May, 1893, 6th May, 1893.
 15. C. B. Wilson, 6th May, 1893, May 9, 1893.
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PART II—AFFIDAVITS.

No. 1.

Affidavits of J. F. Colburn and A. P. Peterson.

HONOLULU, OAHU, *Hawaiian Islands*, ss:

J. F. Colburn and A. P. Peterson, being duly sworn, on oath depose and say, that on Sunday, January 15, 1893, they were members of Her Majesty's cabinet, and that on that Sunday morning at 6:30 o'clock Mr. L. A. Thurston came to the house of Mr. Peterson and stated in the presence of Mr. Peterson and Mr. Colburn that he wished to have a talk with them. He said that the committee of safety had had a meeting the night before and had come to the conclusion that things could not go on as at present, and that the committee had decided that the Queen should be dethroned and a Provisional Government established. He said that Mr. Stevens, the American minister would land his troops and support the movement, if a proclamation to that effect was issued from any building in town.

He then asked Mr. Peterson and Mr. Colburn if they would, without consulting with their colleagues, as he said they were not to be trusted, take control of the situation and in their own names ask the American minister to assist in carrying out their programme and stated that the document already drawn up by him, a copy of which is annexed, could be changed to suit this proposition.

JOHN F. COLBURN,
A. P. PETERSON.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day of June, 1893.

[SEAL.]

F. J. TESTA,
Notary Public First Judicial Circuit.

To His Excellency JNO. L. STEVENS, *American Minister Resident, and*
Captain — WILTSE, *Commander U. S. S. Boston:*

GENTLEMEN: On behalf of the Hawaiian cabinet, you are hereby informed that certain persons, without authority of law, have prepared and caused to be promulgated a document purporting to be a new constitution subversive of the rights of the people and contrary to the law and constitution of the land.

That such illegal action is taken in the name of Her Majesty Lihoukalani, and is proposed to be supported by force. That the cabinet maintain that such action is revolutionary and treasonable, and they hereby request the assistance of the United States troops to maintain order and support the Government.

No. 2.

Affidavit of John F. Colburn and A. P. Peterson, May 3, 1893, printed with Mr. Blount's No. 4, dated May 4, 1893.

No. 3.

Affidavit of William H. Cornwell.

His Excellency J. H. BLOUNT,

United States Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary:

SIR: In supplementing the statements which I have already had the honor to present to your excellency, I beg to represent the following facts as they came within my personal observation during the late disturbances here:

On Monday, the 16th of January, the cabinet met at 10 o'clock a. m. and made the necessary arrangements providing for the Queen's proclamation, in which she gave her assurance, guaranteed by us, her constitutional advisers, that no further attempts would be made in regard to obtaining a new constitution except by the way provided in the constitution itself.

The proclamation as presented to your excellency was issued, and the two political meetings took place. About 5 p. m. the cabinet received information that American forces were being landed from the U. S. S. *Boston*, and after a short consultation among the members of the cabinet, Messrs. Parker and Colburn, with Hon. A. S. Cleghorn, the governor and commander in chief of Oahu, departed to interview Minister Stevens to ask for an explanation of this remarkable and uncalled-for step of the American representative, and to protest against the landing of the troops as being contrary to international law, courtesy, and custom. Mr. Parker returned shortly afterwards and told us that he and the other gentlemen mentioned had performed their mission and that Mr. Stevens had answered them that he knew "what he was doing," and that the troops had been landed at the request of an alleged committee of safety and that he would file the protest of the ministers. Mr. Parker immediately went to his office and issued a protest in writing to the above effect. Later, a meeting of the "law and order" committee supporting Her Majesty's Government was held at the Government building, at which the cabinet were present. After some discussion, it was

decided to encourage the Hawaiians to keep quiet and await further developments.

On Tuesday, the 17th, the cabinet met in the morning and arrangements were made for calling a meeting of the diplomatic corps to take place at noon. The different foreign representatives, except Minister Stevens, who sent his excuses, met together at the time appointed. Shortly after I saw Marshal Wilson, who emphatically told me that from a military standpoint he was perfectly able to cope with the situation, and that he and his followers were ready to stop any insurrection, and, if necessary, prepared to resist and successfully fight (as he expected to have to do) the United States forces then ashore. Having the fullest confidence in the good judgment of Marshal Wilson, I concurred with his ideas, and from that moment advised my colleagues to resist by force any attempt that might be made to overthrow the Government. About 2:45 p. m. we were informed that a proclamation had been issued to the effect that the Queen had been deposed and that her ministers and the marshal had been dismissed.

The cabinet immediately proceeded to the American legation. Messrs. Parker and Peterson went into Minister Stevens's office while Mr. Colburn and myself remained in his sitting room. Our colleagues soon returned and told us that Minister Stevens could grant us no assistance, as the committee of thirteen representing, as he said, the respectability and wealth of the community, had requested his support. Upon a straight question of the attorney general he answered that if called upon for assistance by the alleged newly-established Government he would respond to such call with the forces at his command. A little after 3 p. m. Mr. Charles Hopkins was sent to Minister Stevens from the station house (where the cabinet had taken up their headquarters) with a letter in which the cabinet wished to know in black and white how Minister Stevens proposed to act in the matter.

Mr. Hopkins returned about half an hour later and brought Minister Stevens's answer, in which he informed us that he had already recognized the Provisional Government because they were in possession of the departmental buildings, the archives, and the treasury, and that he would stand ready to support them as the *de facto* government. Messrs. E. C. Macfarlane and Neumann were then in consultation with the cabinet in regard to what action should be taken. About this time Messrs. Samuel M. Damon and C. Bolte came to the station house and asked the cabinet to go with them to the Government house, that the officers of the Provisional Government wished to talk over the situation with us.

Mr. Parker and I went there and found Messrs. Dole, Damon, W. O. Smith, and others, and we were told that the Provisional Government had been recognized by Mr. Stevens, and we were asked as true Hawaiians to do the best for our country and surrender, to avoid bloodshed. We told them that we could give them no answer before seeing Her Majesty the Queen, and were then requested to go to the palace and do our best to induce the Queen to surrender. Shortly after 5:30 p. m. we went to the palace and found the Queen in the blue room, and soon after Messrs. J. O. Carter, H. A. Widemann, Paul Neumann, and E. C. Macfarlane arrived. There were also present my colleagues, Messrs. Colburn and Peterson, and the two princes.

Mr. Damon was likewise present representing the Provisional Government. The Queen told us that she had sent for the gentlemen present to consult with them in this crisis, and requested them all to remain with her until everything was settled. Mr. Damon stated that he was

sent by the Provisional Government to inform the Queen that she had been deposed, that her ministers and marshal had been dismissed, and that the Provisional Government had been recognized formally by Mr. J. L. Stevens, the U. S. Minister. As a friend and also as a privy councillor, he urged her to surrender peaceably, and expressed the opinion that it would perhaps be well to surrender under protest to the United States. Mr. J. O. Carter then expressed his views at some length. He saw no other course for the Queen to pursue after the recognition of the new government by Mr. Stevens and the landing of the United States troops.

In his opinion, any resistance under the circumstances would be equivalent to a declaration of war against the United States. He advised making the protest and leaving the matter in the hands of the United States. After a short consultation, in which all present took part and all concurred in the remarks of Mr. Carter the Queen agreed to surrender under a protest, and the necessary document was drawn up by Messrs. Neumann and Carter. Mr. Carter and I thereupon proceeded to the Government building, where we presented the protest to Mr. Dole, who indorsed it as having been received, noting the date and time it was received. We then requested the attorney-general to go to the Station House and inform the marshal, who was there, of what had taken place at the Palace, and to notify him to surrender the forces under his command. We were informed shortly after that Marshal Wilson refused to act upon such instructions, demanding a written order from the Queen and Cabinet before he would surrender. He reiterated that he was fully prepared to cope with the situation, and was ready to fight the insurgents and the forces of the United States, then ashore, and would do so, unless he should first receive such written order for his surrender.

The whole cabinet then proceeded to the station house and in the presence of Mr. Neumann and others handed the written orders to the marshal and explained the situation to him. He thereupon dismissed his forces with a short address. The large crowd of Hawaiians gathered outside of the station house were dispersed quietly, after a short address in Hawaiian by one of the police captains, by order of the marshal, after which we left the station house, but up to the time of leaving no officer of the Provisional Government had taken charge.

WM. H. CORNWELL.

Subscribed and sworn to this 27th day of June, A. D. 1893, before me,
[SEAL.] F. J. TESTA,

Notary Public, First Judicial Circuit.

No 4.

Affidavits of John A. Cummins and W. T. Seward.

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *Island of Oahu, City of Honolulu, ss:*

On this 19th day of June, A. D. 1893, personally appeared before me John A. Cummins and Major W. T. Seward, who being by me duly sworn, deposed and said, that on Saturday, the 14th day of January, A. D. 1893, the city of Honolulu was perfectly quiet, there being nothing unusual and no signs of disturbance; that on Monday, the 16th day of

said month of January, a small faction of foreign residents called a meeting in the Rifles Armory, on Beretania street, at 2 o'clock p. m., which was attended by from six to seven hundred persons, a large proportion of whom were neither voters nor taxpayers; that at the same hour a mass meeting attended by about twenty-five hundred persons (mostly Hawaiians) was held in Palace square, at which resolutions were unanimously passed and ordered to be presented to Her Majesty the Queen assuring her of the loyalty and cordial support and sympathy of her people; that both of said meetings were orderly, and no sign or threat of disorder was seen or heard anywhere throughout the city; that, at about five o'clock on the same afternoon, a strong force was landed from the U. S. S. *Boston* and quartered on property belonging to an Englishman; that no portion of the force landed was assigned to the protection of either American lives or property; that said forces were camped in virtual possession of the Government building, within less than one hundred yards of the front entrance of said building; that the landing of the American forces was a matter of great surprise to the public generally; that a band concert was held at the Hawaiian Hotel at eight o'clock in the evening which was very largely attended by the general public, men, women, and children turning out in large numbers to enjoy the music, as it was a beautiful moonlight evening; that no disturbance or breach of the peace occurred at any time now under consideration, except the shooting of a policeman while in the discharge of his duty at Hall's corner by a man in the employ of the conspirators; that said policeman was endeavoring, in accordance with orders, to prevent the transportation of arms from Hall & Son's store to the armory on Beretania street, and was unarmed; that the Provisional Government did not issue their proclamation till after they had consulted with both Minister Stevens and Captain Wiltse.

J. A. CUMMINS,
W. T. SEWARD,

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 19th day of June, A. D. 1893.
[SEAL.]

CHARLES T. GULICK,
Notary Public, Island of Oahu.

No. 5.

Affidavit of Ch. L. Hopkins.

HONOLULU, OAHU, *Hawaiian Islands*, ss:

And now comes Charles L. Hopkins, a subject of the Hawaiian Kingdom, and upon oath deposes and says:

That after the delivery of Minister Stevens's answer to Her Majesty's cabinet's letter, your affiant remained at the police station until Mr. J. H. Soper, at the head of the Provisional troops, numbering about 30 men, arrived at the police station, which was about 7:40 p. m. of the 17th day of January, 1893. Marshal Wilson and J. H. Soper made addresses to the police in the yard, and on the return of J. H. Soper in the marshal's office your affiant shook hands with him and then took the 8 p. m. street car for home.

CHARLES L. HOPKINS.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6th day of May, A. D. 1893.

A. ROSA,
Notary Public, First Jud. Circuit.

No. 6

(Affidavit of Charles L. Hopkins, May 3, 1893, printed with Mr. Blount's No. 4, dated May 4, 1893.)

No. 7.

Affidavit of John Lota Kaulukou.

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *Honolulu, Island of Oahu, ss:*

And now comes John Lota Kaulukou, and on his oath deposes and says: That he is a native Hawaiian by birth and is a resident of Honolulu for a long time last past; that he is a lawyer by occupation and at present practicing law in Honolulu aforesaid; that on or about 2:30 p. m. of the 17th day of January last, it had been declared in front of the Government building a new form of government for Hawaii nei known as the "Provisional Government;" that at the said time the troops of the *Boston* were lined between the Government building and the Arion Hall, and well supplied with ammunition and Gatling guns, which were faced to the palace, where Her Majesty the Queen, was then residing; that the Provisional Government at the aforesaid time had only 50 armed men, more or less, and it could have been suppressed by the guards of the Queen's Government in a short time; that at the aforesaid time Her Majesty Queen Liliuokalani was residing in the palace and had charge of that building, the barracks, the guards, and the ammunition, and also the police station, where Marshal Chas. B. Wilson, the constables, and those who lent their assistance to Her Majesty the Queen's Government, who have been well armed.

That at the aforesaid time the said buildings, the police force, and the other public buildings were not under the charge of the Provisional Government, and that in or about 2:45 p. m. of said date, one Chas. L. Hopkins took a communication from the Queen's cabinet from the police station, where they were then, to J. L. Stevens, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States of America, residing at the court of the Hawaiian Islands; and that on or about 3:15 p. m. of said date the said Chas. L. Hopkins returned to the said police station with a letter from said J. L. Stevens; and that after that it had been announced to the public, who were there then, that said United States minister, J. L. Stevens, had recognized the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, and will back and help the said Provisional Government, and not to Her Majesty the Queen's Government.

That at the recognition of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands by the said J. L. Stevens, United States minister in Hawaii nei, the palace was in the possession of Her Majesty Queen Liliuokalani, and she was living in there; and under the charge and authority of the Queen's Government were the barracks, the guards, and the ammunition; under the care of Capt. S. Nowlien, the police station; under the charge of Marshal Chas. B. Wilson, as aforementioned, the custom-house, the Oahu prison, and other public buildings, and also the protection of the lives and property of the people without trouble.

JOHN LOTA KAULUKOU.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 18th day of May, A. D. 1893.
GEO. LUCAS, *Deputy Clerk, Supreme Court.*

No. 8.

Affidavit of E. C. Macfarlane.

I hereby depose that on Tuesday, the 17th day of January, 1893, at about 4 p. m. of that day, I was present in the station-house at Honolulu, when Mr. S. M. Damon came to me and asked me to use my influence with Mr. C. B. Wilson (the marshal of the Kingdom) to surrender the station-house, which was the stronghold of Her Majesty's Government, urging that any attempt to resist the Provisional Government, which had already been proclaimed, would result in bloodshed and considerable loss of life. I agreed with Mr. Damon that that was the only course to pursue, inasmuch as the United States minister, Mr. Stevens, in a letter to the Queen's cabinet, which letter had been shown to me by Mr. A. P. Peterson, the attorney-general, had already recognized the Provisional Government, and I felt sure that the U. S. forces from the *Boston* would undoubtedly resist any attempt made to dislodge the Provisional Government, who were already in possession of the Government building.

I was convinced that it would be useless for the marshal to offer any resistance, for such an attempt would most certainly bring about a conflict with the United States forces, and accordingly I urged Mr. Wilson to give up the station house. He stoutly refused, saying that he was prepared for any conflict which might arise, and that under no circumstances would he surrender unless by written instructions of the Queen and her ministers.

Toward sundown I was summoned to the palace and there met the ministers and other gentlemen whom Her Majesty was consulting about the situation.

Beside the ministers and the two princes there were present Mr. Damon, H. A. Widemann, J. O. Carter, and Paul Neumann. In a few words Her Majesty said she had sent for them to advise with her upon the situation—that the Provisional Government, which had been recognized by the United States minister—had made a demand to surrender the station house and the barracks and asked their advice in the matter.

Mr. Damon said that he was sent as a committee from the Provisional Government to inform Her Majesty that she had been deposed, her ministers dismissed, and likewise the marshal, Mr. Wilson; that the Provisional Government was established and recognized by the United States minister and a demand made by the Provisional Government that the station house and barracks be surrendered.

For himself he would advise her to that course, suggesting that she could make a protest if she desired to do so.

Mr. Carter stated that, in his opinion, there was only one course to pursue, and that was for Her Majesty to comply to the demands, stating that the Provisional Government having been recognized by the United States minister, any attempt to resist would undoubtedly bring about complications with the United States Government. He favored peaceful submission and advised that she make a protest and leave the matter in the hands of the United States Government.

Mr. Widemann advised to the same effect, and referring to the restoration of the islands by Admiral Thomas in 1843, expressed the opinion that the United States, upon a proper representation of all the facts leading up to the present situation, would in the end repeat the action of the British Government and restore the independence of Hawaii.

The protest was prepared by Mr. Neumann and Mr. Carter.

Written instructions were then addressed to the marshal, Mr. Wilson, signed by the Queen and her four ministers, notifying Mr. Wilson that he must surrender the station house to the Provisional Government.

This letter was taken to Mr. Wilson by Mr. Peterson. I accompanied him to the station house. The letter was handed to Mr. Wilson with a verbal message from the Queen that he should make a brief statement to those with him that the Queen had yielded under protest, relying upon the justice of the United States Government to restore her authority, and that she wished her supporters to disperse peaceably and keep quiet. Mr. Wilson spoke a few words to that effect. I remained in the building for some time afterwards and left about 7 o'clock, up to which time no agent of the Provisional Government had arrived to take possession of the station house.

I have the honor to remain, etc.,

E. C. MACFARLANE.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6th day of May, 1893.

F. J. TESTA.

Notary Public, First Judicial Circuit.

No. 9.

Affidavit of Paul Neumann.

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *Island of Oahu*, ss:

Paul Neumann, being duly sworn, on his oath deposes and says: That he is a citizen of the United States of America, residing at Honolulu, on the Island of Oahu, and that he has resided there during the last nine years prior to this date.

Affiant says that he was in Honolulu on the 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th of January, 1893. That on the 14th day of January, about 2 o'clock p. m., Hon. W. O. Smith, the present attorney-general of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, invited this affiant to come to his (Smith's) law office, where a number of other citizens called shortly after affiant's arrival, and the persons assembled were then informed that the Queen had requested her cabinet to join her in proclaiming a new constitution, which the cabinet refused to do, and wished to know whether the community would sustain the ministers in their refusal. A unanimous expression of those present followed that they would sustain the ministers in their course.

Some one then suggested that Mr. Stevens be requested to land troops from the Boston to assist the people in resisting the desire of the Queen. A few of the persons present opposed this movement, and affiant can not state what steps, if any, were taken by those who sought the armed intervention of the United States forces.

The persons assembled as aforesaid prepared a list of those who decided to sustain the Queen's cabinet in their course, and said list was signed by a number of persons, including affiant, at that time and place.

On Monday, the 16th of January, in the afternoon, troops of the U. S. S. *Boston* were landed, and after one squad had been left at the U. S. consulate and another at the U. S. legation, the main body, including the battery, were stationed between the government building and

the palace, at the instance, as we were informed, of Mr. John L. Stevens, then U. S. minister plenipotentiary, etc.

On the preceding Saturday and Sunday, and on the Monday when the troops were landed, as well as at all times thereafter, the town and country was in profound peace and tranquillity, and the sudden and unexpected landing of a large body of troops and the battery created great surprise, and was ascribed generally to the intention of Mr. Stevens and Captain Wiltse to assist in the establishment of a Provisional Government, a movement which had been hinted by Wiltse and Stevens at various times, according to the information which a number of people had at that time.

The pretext that the troops were landed to protect American lives and property was spurious and false; both lives and property were as safe here and as unlikely to be threatened or disturbed as in Kennebec, Maine, and the sole object of Mr. Stevens and Captain Wiltse was to abet and assist, not alone by intimidation, but by actual violence the revolutionary movement headed by Mr. L. A. Thurston and other persons belonging to his party.

In making this statement affiant refers to the replies of Mr. Stevens to the protest of the cabinet and of the governor of Oahu, copies of which affiant believes are in the possession of the U. S. Government.

Mass meetings of foreigners and natives were respectively held on Monday afternoon, which in themselves showed that no outbreak of any kind was impending, and both meetings had peaceably and quietly adjourned before the Boston forces were landed.

On Tuesday, the 17th of January, Mr. Peterson and Mr. Parker, members of Queen Liliuokalani's cabinet, about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, informed affiant that Mr. Stevens had told them categorically that he would support with the United States forces a Provisional Government if such were proclaimed, and Mr. Peterson, when asked by affiant what reply Mr. Stevens had made to their protest against the landing of the *Boston* forces, showed to affiant the letter from Mr. Stevens recognizing the new government.

The following is a copy of Mr. Stevens' reply to Mr. Cleghorn:

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, Jan. 17th, 1893.

SIR: Yours of yesterday, the 16th, regarding the landing of the United States naval force at Honolulu, is received. I have carefully read its terms and import. My responsibility as the United States minister plenipotentiary at this critical time in Hawaiian affairs it is impossible for me to ignore. I assure you that, in whatever responsibility the American diplomatic and naval representatives have assumed or may assume, we shall do our utmost to regard the welfare of all persons and interests concerned.

Yours sincerely with kindest consideration,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Hon. A. S. CLEGHORN,
Governor of Oahu.

Affiant suggested to Peterson and Parker to obtain from Stevens a written declaration of his intention to support the revolutionary movement by the U. S. troops, but affiant can not state if such a declaration was delivered to them. About two hours after affiant had been made aware of Mr. Stevens's attitude toward the lawful Hawaiian Government, and of his instantaneous recognition of the revolutionary government, if in fact that recognition was not made and delivered to the leaders of the revolution before any Provisional Government was at all proclaimed, affiant was requested to call at the Palace, when he met the Queen

and her Cabinet and a number of citizens, including Mr. J. O. Carter, Mr. Macfarlane, Judge Widemann, and Mr. S. M. Damon, who discussed the situation, and after the statement was repeated that Mr. Stevens had unqualifiedly stated that he would by force of arms sustain the Provisional Government, and had in fact given it official recognition before it had a lawful existence, and the further fact was stated to affiant that the U. S. legation had been at various times the meeting place of the persons who conspired to overthrow the Hawaiian Government, affiant among others advised the Queen to accede under protest to the request of Mr. Dole to surrender the station house and barracks, and advised to disband the persons who had been sworn in and armed to preserve law and order.

Affiant drafted the protest, and after Mr. Dole, the President of the revolutionary faction, had acknowledged in writing the receipt of the Queen's protest, the order was given to the marshal, who thereupon, between 7 and 9 o'clock p. m., disbanded the men and subsequently, but whether that night or the next day affiant does not know, delivered the possession of the station house and its contents to some representative of the Provisional Government. Affiant can not state when the barracks were delivered to the revolutionary party but believes that it was done on Wednesday the 18th of January.

PAUL NEUMANN.

Subscribed and sworn to this 27th day of January, A. D. 1893, before me.

CHAS. T. GULICK,

Notary Public, Island of Oahu.

No. 10.

Affidavit of Samuel Nowlien.

HONOLULU, OAHU, *Hawaiian Islands*, ss:

And now comes Samuel Nowlien, a subject of the Hawaiian Kingdom, and upon oath deposes and says:

That he was captain commanding the Household Guards and was stationed at the Government Barracks and was also in control of the royal palace on the 16th and 17th days of January, A. D. 1893, with a total armed force of 272 men of all ranks, of which 72 men were regulars of the Household Guards and 200 men were native Hawaiian volunteers, fully armed and equipped with 12 breech-loading rifled cannons (Austrian make) and one Gatling, 111 Springfield rifles (U. S. A.), and 165 Winchester repeating army rifles, with 21,580 rounds of ammunition. That your affiant was in possession and in charge of said barracks and the palace yard up to and between 4 and 5 o'clock p. m. of the 18th of said January, when said premises were turned over to J. H. Soper and the regulars were then and there disbanded.

SAMUEL NOWLIEN.

Subscribed and sworn to this 8th day of May, A. D. 1893, before me,
[SEAL.]

F. J. TESTA,

Notary Public, First Judicial Circuit.

No. 11.

*Affidavit of P. M. Rooney.*HONOLULU, OAHU, *Hawaiian Islands*, ss:

And now comes P. M. Rooney, an American citizen, and a resident of Honolulu aforesaid, and upon oath deposes and says that he was a special police on the 16th and 17th days of January, A. D. 1893, having been engaged by Marshal Wilson as such; that your affiant was at the police station up to 7 o'clock p. m. of the 17th day aforesaid, and up to that time Marshal Wilson was in possession and in charge of the police station aforesaid with all of his men. The Provisional troops had not at that time taken charge of the place.

P. M. ROONEY,

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6th day of May, A. D. 1893.

A. ROSA,

Notary Public, First Judicial Circuit.

No. 12.

*Affidavit of John Ross.*HONOLULU, *June 20, 1893.*

His Excellency JAMES H. BLOUNT,
U. S. Minister, etc., etc.

SIR: I am again enabled to present to you, on behalf of truth and justice, an affidavit from a Captain John Ross, for four years, and latterly an executive officer, in the four years' war of American Revolution. Believing it to be useful he has placed the affidavit at my disposal, which I have given him to understand shall be sent to you immediately. He is in communication with me, and can be seen any time you should so desire further acquaintance of the gentleman. I have the honor to be

Your obedient, humble servant,

JNO. E. BUSH.

From an experience of twenty years' residence in the Hawaiian Islands I hereby state, without bias or prejudice, that there was no demonstration or disturbance or threats made that there would be disturbance on the sixteenth day of January, 1893, that would call for the landing of troops either to protect life or property; in fact the landing of men from the U. S. S. "Boston" was so unlooked for that when the report came to the Hawaiian Hotel, where I was at the time of their landing, about 5:30 p. m., that it was received as a canard until the battalion was seen marching past on King street and came to a halt on the sidewalk east of the main entrance to the Royal Palace and facing the south. About 7 p. m. the battalion formed and marched eastward about three-quarters of a mile to the suburbs and broke ranks on the premises of J. B. Atherton, where it appeared they were to bivouack for the night. Next morning they occupied Harmony Hall, a small wooden building about eighty feet west of the Government building. The Hawaiian Government band played as usual its Monday evening concert to the populace and the usual assembly of men, women, and children were there as well as on the streets.

The circumstance of the landing of the marines was generally accepted as part of the schemes of the Revolutionists or Missionary party as understood to be arranged between them and Mr. Stevens and Captain Wiltse of the U. S. S. "Boston," as shortly before the battalion landed Messrs. Thurston, W. R. Castle and Henry Waterhouse were seen going to the U. S. legation, and returning from there, and to the office of L. A. Thurston and W. O. Smith's office, the headquarters of the Revolutionists. But at no time before, on, or after the 16th of January was life or property in danger more than ordinary. Such is my belief and statement.

JOHN ROSS.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 19th day of June, 1893.

[SEAL.]

CHAS. T. GULICK,
Notary Public, Island of Oahu.

No. 13.

(Affidavit of Charles B. Wilson, May 4, 1893, printed with Mr. Blount's No. 4, dated May 4, 1893.)

No. 14.

Affidavit of Charles B. Wilson.

HONOLULU, OAHU,
Hawaiian Islands, ss.

And now comes Chas. B. Wilson of Honolulu, aforesaid, and upon oath deposes and says:

That on the 17th day of January, A. D. 1893, between the hours of 7 and 8 p. m. of that day, he surrendered, by order of the Queen and Cabinet to Jno. J. Soper, as commander-in-chief of the forces of the Provisional Government, and representing that Government, the police station with all the arms and munitions of war, the control of the police force and Oahu jail, together with all Government property under his control as marshal of the Kingdom.

CHAS. B. WILSON.

Sworn and subscribed before me this 6th day of May, A. D. 1893.

F. J. TESTA,
Notary Public, First Judicial Circuit.

No. 15.

Affidavit of Charles B. Wilson.

HONOLULU, OAHU, *Hawaiian Islands, ss.*

And now comes Chas. B. Wilson, of Honolulu, aforesaid, and upon oath deposes and says:

That he was at the police station and had full charge and control of the station, Oahu jail, and the police force throughout the kingdom on

the 17th day of January, A. D., 1893, as marshal of the Kingdom of Hawaii; that on the date aforesaid at about 2 p. m. he had at the police station under his control a total of two hundred and twenty-four (224) men fully armed and equipped for active service, one hundred and ten (110) of said number having been instructed in military tactics and drilled in the use of firearms for nearly two years last past, who also had practice at target shooting and have contested in team shooting with the household troops, and were victorious, winning the team trophy and all prizes competed for during the contest.

That on the aforesaid day were armed with Springfield rifles (of late U. S. A. pattern) and one Gatling gun with twenty thousand and five hundred (20,500) rounds U. M. Co.'s fixed ammunition. That one hundred and fourteen (114) of the 224 were volunteers armed with repeating rifles, 74 of which were of army pattern, 20 army carbines and 20 sporting, all of the Winchester make, with (9,000) nine thousand rounds of fixed ammunition, also two thousand (2,000) rounds of fixed ammunition loaded with buckshot for 10 and 12 gauge breech-loading shotguns for the use of extra men.

The make-up of the force under his control is as follows: From the regular patrol, 74; special reserve force, 36; volunteers, 114. Total armed force at police station on the aforesaid date (224) two hundred and twenty-four.

CHAS. B. WILSON.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of May, A. D. 1893.
[SEAL.]

F. J. TESTA,
Notary Public, First Judicial Circuit.

LIST OF STATEMENTS AND INTERVIEWS.

1. W. D. Alexander.
2. Same.
3. Same.
4. W. D. Alexander, July 18, 1893, (printed with Mr. Blount's No. 15, dated July 26, 1893, *ante*).
5. Volney V. Ashford.
6. Same.
7. H. P. Baldwin.
8. C. R. Bishop.
9. S. E. Bishop.
10. William Blaisdell.
11. Same.
12. C. Bolte.
13. W. P. Boyd.
14. J. O. Carter, May 3, 1893 (printed with Mr. Blount's No. 4, dated May 4, 1893, *ante*).
15. J. O. Carter.
16. H. Center.
17. D. W. Coffman.
18. John F. Colburn.
19. W. H. Cornwell.
20. S. M. Damon.
21. Lieut. Herbert L. Draper (printed with Mr. Blount's No. 5, dated May 6, 1893, *ante*).
22. C. T. Gulick.
23. Same.
24. Same.
25. F. H. Hayselden.
26. C. M. Hyde.
27. C. P. Jankea.
28. A. F. Judd.

29. Hui Kalaiaina.
30. J. W. Kalua.
31. J. Kanoho.
32. John Lot Kaulukou.
33. *Queen* Liliuokalani.
34. A. B. Loebenstein.
35. Curtis J. Lyons.
36. Same.
37. E. C. Macfarlane.
38. George Mundon.
39. Samuel Parker.
40. Hawaiian Patriotic League.
41. Same.
42. Hawaiian Patriotic League, May 2, 1893 (printed with Mr. Blount's No. 4, dated May 4, 1893, *ante*).
43. A. P. Peterson.
44. Wm. Hyde Rice.
45. Antone Rosa.
46. M. M. Scott.
47. Admiral Skerrett, April 8, 1893 (printed with Mr. Blount's No. 2, dated April 8, 1893, *ante*).
48. W. O. Smith.
49. J. H. Soper.
50. Claus Spreckels.
51. Same.
52. Lieut. Commander William Swinburne, May 3, 1893 (printed with Mr. Blount's No. 4, dated May 4, 1893, *ante*).
53. L. A. Thurston, March 16, 1893 (printed with Mr. Blount's No. 2, dated April 8, 1893, *ante*).
54. Dr. Trousseau.
55. Henry Waterhouse, May 2, 1893 (printed with Mr. Blount's No. 4, dated May 4, 1893, *ante*).
56. C. B. Wells.
57. H. A. Widemann.
58. Same.
59. Robert W. Wilcox.
60. C. B. Wilson.
61. F. Wundenberg.
62. F. Wundenberg (printed with Mr. Blount's No. 3, dated April 26, 1893, *ante*).
63. F. Wundenberg, May 15, 1893 (printed with Mr. Blount's No. 9, dated June 6, 1893, *ante*).

PART III INTERVIEWS AND STATEMENTS.

No. 1.

Statement of W. D. Alexander.

A STATEMENT OF FACTS RELATING TO POLITICS DURING KALAKAUA'S REIGN.

It is true that the germs of many of the evils of Kalakaua's reign may be traced to the reign of Kamehameha V. The reactionary policy of that monarch is well known. Under him the "recrudescence" of heathenism commenced, as evinced by the Pagan orgies at the funeral of his sister, Victoria Kamamalu, in June, 1866, and by his encouragement of the lascivious hulahula dances and of the pernicious class of kahunas or sorcerers. Closely connected with this reaction was a growing jealousy and hatred of foreigners.

INTRIGUES DURING LUNALILO'S REIGN.

During Lunalilo's brief reign, 1873-'74, this feeling was fanned into a flame by several causes, viz, the execution of the law for the segregation of lepers, the agitation caused by the proposal to cede the use of Pearl Harbor to the United States, and the famous mutiny at the barracks. This disaffection was made the most of by Kalakaua, who was smarting under his defeat in the election of January 8, 1873. Indeed, his manifesto previous to that election appealed to this race prejudice. Thus he promised, if elected, "to repeal the poll tax," "to put native Hawaiians into the Government offices," to "amend the constitution of 1864," etc. "Beware," he said, "of the constitution of 1852, and the false teaching of the foreigners, who are now seeking to obtain the direction of the Government, if Lunalilo ascends the throne." Walter Murray Gibson, formerly Mormon apostle and shepherd of Lanai, then professional politician and editor of the scurrilous paper, Nuhou, was bitterly disappointed that he had been ignored in the formation of Lunalilo's cabinet. Accordingly he took the role of an agitator and attached himself to Kalakaua's party. They were both disappointed at the result of the barracks mutiny, which had undoubtedly been fomented by Kalakaua.

THE ELECTION OF KALAKAUA.

Upon Lunalilo's untimely death, February 3, 1874, as no successor to the throne had been appointed, the Legislature was summoned to meet on the 12th, only nine days after his death. The popular choice lay between Kalakaua and the Queen-Dowager Emma. The cabinet and the American party used all their influence in favor of the former, while the English favored Queen Emma, who was devoted to their

interest. At the same time Kalakaua's true character was not generally understood. The natives knew that his family had always been an idolatrous one. His reputed grandfather, Kamanawa, had been hanged, October 20, 1840, for poisoning his wife, Kamokuiki.

Under Kamehameha V he had always been an advocate of absolutism and also of the removal of the prohibition of furnishing alcoholic liquors to natives. While he was postmaster a defalcation occurred, which, was covered up, while his friends made good the loss to the Government. Like Wilkins Micawber, he was impecunious all his life, whatever the amount of his income might be. He was characterized by a fondness for decorations and military show long before he was thought of as a possible candidate for the throne.

It was believed, however, that if Queen Emma should be elected there would be no hope of our obtaining a reciprocity treaty with the United States. The movement in favor of Queen Emma carried the day with the natives on Oahu, but had not time to spread to the other islands. It was charged, and generally believed, that bribery was used by Kalakaua's friends to secure his election. Be that as it may, the Legislature was convened in the old court-house (now occupied by Hackfeld & Co.) and elected Kalakaua King by 39 votes to 6.

THE COURT-HOUSE RIOT.

A howling mob, composed of Queen Emma's partisans, had surrounded the court-house during the election, after which they battered down the back doors, sacked the building, and assaulted the representatives with clubs. Messrs. C. C. Harris and S. B. Dole held the main door against them for considerable time. The mob, with one exception, refrained from violence to foreigners, from fear of intervention by the men-of-war in port.

The cabinet and the marshal had been warned of the danger, but had made light of it. The police appeared to be in sympathy with the populace, and the volunteers, for the same reason, would not turn out. Mr. H. A. Pierce, the American minister, however, had anticipated the riot, and had agreed with Commodore Belknap, of the U. S. S. *Tuscarora*, and Commodore Skerrett, of the *Portsmouth*, upon a signal for landing the troops under their command. At last Mr. C. R. Bishop, minister of foreign affairs, formally applied to him and to Maj. Wodehouse, H. B. M.'s commissioner, for assistance in putting down the riot.

A body of 150 marines immediately landed from the two American men of war, and in a few minutes was joined by one of 70 men from H. B. M.'s corvette *Tenedos*, Capt. Ray. They quickly dispersed the mob, and arrested a number of them without any bloodshed. The British troops first occupied Queen Emma's grounds, arresting several of the ringleaders there, and afterwards guarded the palace and barracks. The other Government buildings, the prison, etc., were guarded by American troops until the 20th.

INAUGURATION OF KALAKAUA.

The next day at noon Kalakaua was sworn in as King, under the protection of the United States troops. By an irony of fate the late leader of the anti-American agitation owed his life and his throne to American intervention, and for several years he depended upon the support of the foreign community. In these circumstances he did not venture to proclaim a new constitution (as in his inaugural speech he had said he intended to do), nor to disregard public opinion in

his appointments. His first minister of foreign affairs was the late Hon. W. L. Green, an Englishman, universally respected for his integrity and ability, who held this office for nearly three years, and carried through the treaty of reciprocity in the teeth of bitter opposition.

THE RECIPROCITY TREATY.

The following October Messrs. E. H. Allen and H. A. P. Carter were sent to Washington to negotiate a treaty of reciprocity.

The Government of the United States having extended an invitation to the King, and placed the U. S. S. *Benicia* at his disposal, he embarked November 17, 1874, accompanied by Mr. H. A. Pierce and several other gentlemen. They were most cordially received and treated as guests of the nation. After a tour through the Northern States, the royal party returned to Honolulu February 15, 1875, in the U. S. S. *Pensacola*. The treaty of reciprocity was concluded January 30, 1875, and the ratifications were exchanged at Washington June 3, 1875.

The act necessary to carry it into effect was not, however, passed by the Hawaiian Legislature till July 18, 1876, after the most stubborn opposition, chiefly from the English members of the house and the partisans of Queen Emma, who denounced it as a step toward annexation. It finally went into effect September 9, 1876.

THE ADVENT OF SPRECKELS.

The first effect of the reciprocity treaty was to cause a "boom" in sugar, which turned the heads of some of our shrewdest men and nearly caused a financial crash. Among other enterprises the Haiku irrigation ditch, 20 miles in length, which taps certain streams flowing down the northern slopes of East Maui and waters three plantations, were planned and carried out by Mr. S. T. Alexander, in 1877. About that time he pointed out to Col. Claus Spreckels the fertile plain of Central Maui, then lying waste, which only needed irrigation to produce immense crops. Accordingly, in 1878, Mr. Spreckels applied to the cabinet for a lease of the surplus waters of the streams on the northeast side of Maui as far as Honomanu. They flow through a rugged district at present almost uninhabited. The then attorney-general, Judge Hartwell, and the minister of the interior, J. Mott Smith, refused to grant him a perpetual monopoly of this water, as they state it. Up to this time the changes in the cabinet had been caused by disagreement between its members, and had no political significance.

In the meantime, Mr. Gibson, after many months of preparation, had brought in before the Legislature a motion of want of confidence in the ministry, which was defeated June 24 by a vote of 26 to 19. On the night of July 1 Messrs. Claus Spreckels and G. W. Macfarlane had a long conference with Kalakaua at the Hawaiian Hotel on the subject of the water privilege, and adjourned to the palace about midnight. It is not necessary to give the details here, but the result was that letters were drawn up and signed by the King, addressed to each member of the cabinet, requesting his resignation, without stating any reason for his dismissal. These letters were delivered by a messenger between 1 and 2 o'clock in the morning. Such an arbitrary and despotic act was without precedent in Hawaiian history.

The next day a new cabinet was appointed, consisting of S. G. Wilder, Minister of the Interior, E. Preston, Attorney-general, Simon Kaai, Minister of Finance, and John Kapena, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The last two positions were sinecures, but Kaai as a speaker and politician had great influence with his countrymen. The new cabinet granted Mr. Spreckels the desired water privilege for thirty years at \$500 per annum. The opium-license and free-liquor bills were killed. The actual premier, Mr. Wilder, was probably the ablest administrator that this country has ever had. He infused new vigor into every department of the Government, promoted immigration, carried out extensive public improvements, and at the legislative session of 1880 was able to show cash in the treasury sufficient to pay off the existing national debt. But his determination to administer his own department in accordance with business methods did not suit the King.

Meanwhile Gibson spared no pains to make himself conspicuous as the *soi-disant* champion of the aboriginal race. He even tried to capture the "missionaries," "experienced religion," held forth at Sunday prayer meetings, and spoke in favor of temperance.

CELSE CESAR MORENO.

The professional lobbyist, Celso Cesar Moreno, well known at Sacramento and Washington, arrived in Honolulu November 14, 1879, on the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company's steamer *Ho-chung*, with the view of establishing a line of steamers between Honolulu and China. Soon afterwards he presented a memorial to the Hawaiian Government asking for a subsidy to the proposed line. He remained in Honolulu about ten months, during which time he gained unbounded influence over the King by servile flattery and by encouraging all his pet hobbies. He told him that he ought to be his own prime minister, and to fill all Government offices with native Hawaiians. He encouraged his craze for a 10-million loan, to be spent chiefly for military purposes, and told him that China was the "treasure house of the world," where he could borrow all the money he wanted. The King was always an active politician, and he left no stone unturned to carry the election of 1880. His candidates advocated a 10-million loan and unlimited Chinese immigration. With Moreno's assistance he produced a pamphlet in support of these views, entitled "A reply to ministerial utterances."

THE SESSION OF 1880.

In the Legislature of 1880 was seen the strange spectacle of the King working with a pair of unscrupulous adventurers to oust his own constitutional advisers, and introducing through his creatures a series of bills, which were generally defeated by the ministry.

Gibson had now thrown off the mask, and voted for everyone of the King and Moreno's measures. Among their bills which failed were the 10-million loan bill, the opium-license bill, the free-liquor bill, and especially the bill guaranteeing a bonus of \$1,000,000 in gold to Moreno's Trans-Pacific Cable Company.

The subsidy to the China line of steamers was carried by the lavish use of money; but it was never paid. Appropriations were passed for the education of Hawaiian youths abroad, and for the coronation of the King and Queen.

At last on the 4th of August, Gibson brought in a motion of "want of confidence" which after a lengthy debate was defeated by the decisive vote of 32 to 10. On the 14th, the King prorogued the Legislature at noon, and about an hour later dismissed his ministers without a word of explanation, and appointed Moreno premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs; J. E. Bush, Minister of the Interior; W. C. Jones, Attorney-general, and Rev. M. Kueea, Minister of Finance.

FALL OF THE MORENO MINISTRY.

Moreno was generally detested by the foreign community, and the announcement of his appointment created intense excitement.

For the first time the discordant elements of this community were united, and they were supported by a large proportion of the natives. The three highest and most influential chiefs—Queen Dowager Emma, Ruth Keelikolani, and Bernice Pauahi Bishop—joined in condemning the King's course. Two mass meetings were held at the Kaumakapili Church, and a smaller one of foreigners at the old Bethel Church, to protest against the *coup d'état*. The diplomatic representatives of the United States, England, and France—Gen. Comly, Maj. Wodehouse, and M. Ratard—raised their respective flags over their legations, and declared that they would hold no further official intercourse with the Hawaiian Government as long as Moreno should be premier. On the side of the King, R. W. Wilcox, Nawahi, and others harangued the natives, appealing to their jealousy of foreigners. The following manifesto is a sample:

WAY-UP CELSO MORENO.

To all true-born citizens of the country, greeting: We have with us one Celso Cesar Moreno, a naturalized and true Hawaiian. His great desire is the advancement of this country in wealth, and the salvation of this people, by placing the leading positions of Government in the hands of the Hawaiians for administration. The great desire of Moreno is to cast down foreigners from official positions and to put true Hawaiians in their places, because to them belongs the country. They should hold the Government and not strangers. This has been the cause of the decrease of the people. Positions have been taken from Hawaiians and given to strangers. C. C. Moreno desires to throw down these foreigners and to elevate to high positions the people to whom belongs the land, *i. e.*, the red-skins. This is the real cause of jealousy on the part of foreigners, *viz.*, that Hawaiians shall be placed above them in all things in this well-beloved country. C. C. Moreno is the heart from whence will issue life to the real Hawaiians.

After four days of intense excitement, the King yielded to the storm. Moreno's resignation was announced on the 19th, and his place filled *ad interim* by J. E. Bush. On the 30th Moreno left for Europe, with three Hawaiian "youths" under his charge, *viz.*, R. W. Wilcox, a member of the late legislature, 26 years of age, Robert Boyd, and James K. Booth. It was afterwards ascertained that he bore a secret commission as minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary to all the great powers, as well as letters addressed to the governments of the United States, England, and France demanding the recall of their representatives. A violent quarrel had broken out between him and his disappointed rival, Gibson, who purchased the P. C. Advertiser printing office with Government money September 1, and conducted that paper thenceforth as the King's organ.

Mr. W. L. Green was persuaded to accept the vacant place of minister of foreign affairs September 22. In a few days he discovered what had been done, and immediately notified the representatives of the three powers concerned of the insult that had been offered them.

A meeting was held at his office between the foreign representatives on the one side and himself and J. E. Bush on the other, at which the letters in question were read. The result was that Mr. Green resigned and compelled the resignation of his colleagues.

THE GREEN-CARTER MINISTRY.

Mr. Claus Spreckles, who arrived September 5, took an active part in these events and in the formation of the new ministry, which con-

sisted of W. L. Green, Minister of Foreign Affairs; H. A. P. Carter, Minister of the Interior; J. S. Walker, Minister of Finance, and W. N. Armstrong, Attorney general.

The first act was to annul Moreno's commission, and to send dispatches, which were telegraphed from San Francisco to Washington, London, and Paris, disavowing the demands which he had sent. Moreno, however, proceeded on his journey and finally placed the Hawaiian youths, one in a military and two in a naval school in Italy.

THE KING'S TOUR AROUND THE WORLD.

The King immediately began to agitate his project of a trip around the world. As it was known he was corresponding with Moreno, it was arranged that Mr. C. H. Judd should accompany him as Chamberlain, and Mr. W. N. Armstrong as Commissioner of Immigration. He was received with royal honors in Japan, Siam, and Johore. On the King's arrival in Naples, Moreno made an audacious attempt to take possession of His Majesty and dispense with his companions, but he met with more than his match in Mr. Armstrong. The royal party visited nearly all the capitals of Europe, where the King added a large number of decorations to his collection, and took particular note of military matters and court etiquette. An Austrian field battery which took his eye afterwards cost this country nearly \$20,000. During the King's absence his sister, Mrs. Dominis, styled Liliuokalani, acted as regent. He returned to Honolulu October 29, 1881, where he had a magnificent reception, triumphal arches, torches blazing at noonday, and extravagant adulation of every description.

TRIUMPH OF GIBSON.

During the King's absence he had kept up a correspondence with his political workers at home, and after his return he produced another pamphlet in Hawaiian, advocating a ten-million loan. Gibson's paper had been filled with gross flattery of the King and of the natives, and had made the most of the smallpox epidemic of 1881 to excite the populace against the ministry.

Just before the election of 1882 a pamphlet appeared, containing a scathing exposure of his past career (especially in connection with the Mormon Church), backed by a mass of documentary evidence. Gibson's only reply was to point to his subsequent election by a large majority of the native voters of Honolulu. Only two other white men were elected on the islands that year. It was the first time that the race issue had superseded all other considerations with the native electorate.

SESSION OF 1882.

The Legislature of 1882 was one of the weakest and most corrupt that ever sat in Honolulu. At the opening of the session Minister Carter was absent in Portugal, negotiating a treaty with the Government of that country. It was soon evident that the ministry did not control a majority of the House, but that the King did. After an ineffectual attempt to quiet Gibson by offering him the Presidency of the Board of Health with a salary of \$4,000, they resigned, May 19, and Gibson became Premier.

His colleagues were J. E. Bush, lately of Moreno's cabinet; Simon Kaai, who drank himself to death, and Edward Preston, attorney-general, who was really the mainstay of the Cabinet.

One of their first measures was an act to convey to Claus Spreckels the crown lands of Wailuku, containing some 24,000 acres, in order to compromise a claim which he held to an undivided share of the crown lands. He had purchased from Ruth Keelikolani, for the sum of \$10,000, all the interest which she might have had in the crown lands as being the half sister of Kamehameha IV, who died intestate. Her claim had been ignored in the decision of the Supreme Court and the Act of 1865, which constituted the crown lands. Instead of testing her right by a suit before the Supreme Court, the Ministry thought it best to accept the above compromise and carried it through the Legislature.

The prohibition against furnishing intoxicating liquor to natives was repealed at this session, and the consequences to the race have been disastrous. The ten-million loan bill was again introduced, but was shelved in committee and a two-million loan act substituted for it. The appropriation bill was swelled to double the estimated receipts of the Government, including \$30,000 for coronation expenses, \$30,000 for Hawaiian youths in foreign countries, \$10,000 for a Board of Genealogy, besides large sums for the military, foreign embassies, the palace, etc.

At the last moment a bill was rushed through giving the King sole power to appoint district justices, through his creatures, the governors, which had formerly been done only "by and with the advice of the Justices of the Supreme Court." This was another step toward absolutism. Meanwhile Gibson defended the King's right to be an active politician, and called him "the first Hawaiian King with the brains and heart of a statesman."

At the same time it was understood that Claus Spreckels backed the Gibson ministry and made them advances under the Loan Act.

THE CORONATION.

Kalakaua had always felt dissatisfied with the manner in which he had been sworn in as King. He was also tired of being reminded that he was not a king by birth, but only by election. To remedy this defect he determined to have the ceremony performed over again in as imposing a manner as possible. Three years were spent in preparations for the great event, and invitations were sent to all rulers and potentates on earth to be present in person or by proxy on the occasion. Japan sent a commissioner, while England, France, and the United States were represented by ships of war. The ceremony took place February 12, 1883, nine years after Kalakaua's inauguration. Most of the regalia had been ordered from London, viz, two crowns, a scepter, ring, and sword, while the royal feather mantle, tabu stick, and kahili or plumed staff, were native insignia of rank.

A pavilion was built for the occasion, as well as a temporary amphitheatre for the spectators. The Chief Justice administered the oath of office and invested the King with the various insignia. This ceremony was boycotted by the high chiefs, Queen Emma, Ruth Keelikolani, and Mrs. Bernice Pauahi Bishop, and by a large part of the foreign community, as an expensive and useless pageant intended to aid the King's political schemes to make himself an absolute monarch. The coronation was followed by feasts, a regatta, and races, and by a series of nightly hulahulas, *i. e.*, heathen dances, accompanied by appropriate songs. The printer of the Coronation Hula programme, which contained the subjects and first lines of these songs, was prosecuted and fined by the court on account of their gross and incredible obscenity.

During this year Mr. J. M. Kapena was sent as Envoy Extraordinary to Japan, while Mr. C. P. Iaukea, with H. Poor as secretary, was sent to attend the coronation of the Czar Alexander III at Moscow, and afterwards on a mission to Paris, Rome, Belgrade, Calcutta, and Japan, on his way around the world.

Kalakaua was no longer satisfied with being merely King of Hawaii, but aspired to what Gibson termed the "Primacy of the Pacific." Capt. Tripp and F. L. Clarke were sent as royal commissioners to the Gilbert Islands and New Hebrides, to prepare the way for a Hawaiian protectorate; a parody on the "Monroe doctrine" was put forth in a grandiloquent protest addressed to all the great powers by Mr. Gibson, warning them against any further annexation of islands in the Pacific Ocean, and claiming for Hawaii the exclusive right "to assist them in improving their political and social condition," *i. e.*, a virtual protectorate of the other groups.

THE HAWAIIAN COINAGE.

The King was now impatient to have his "image and superscription" on the coinage of the realm, to add to his dignity as an independent monarch. As no appropriation had been made for this purpose, recourse was had to the recognized "power behind the throne." Mr. Claus Spreckels purchased the bullion, and arrangements were made with the San Francisco mint for the coinage of silver dollars and fractions of a dollar, to the amount of one million dollars' worth, to be of identical weight and fineness with the like coins of the United States. The intrinsic value of the silver dollar at that time was about 84 cents. It was intended, however, to exchange this silver for gold bonds at par under the loan act of 1882. On the arrival of the first installment of the coin the matter was brought before the Supreme Court by Messrs. Dole, Castle, and W. O. Smith. After a full hearing of the case, the court decided that these bonds could not legally be placed except for par value in gold coin of the United States, and issued an injunction to that effect on the Minister of Finance, December 14, 1883. The Privy Council was then convened, and declared these coins to be of the legal value expressed on their face, subject to the legal-tender act, and they were gradually put into circulation. A profit of \$150,000 is said to have been made on this transaction.

THE FIRST RECONSTRUCTION OF THE GIBSON CABINET, 1883.

Mr. Gibson's first cabinet went to pieces in a little over a year. Simon Kaai was compelled to resign in February, 1883, from "chronic inebriety," and was succeeded by J. M. Kapena. Mr. Preston resigned the following May from disgust at the King's personal intermeddling with the administration, and in July Mr. Bush resigned in consequence of a falling out with Mr. Gibson. For some time "the secretary stood alone," being at once Minister of Foreign Affairs, Attorney-General, and Minister of the Interior ad interim; besides being President of the Board of Health, President of the Board of Education, and member of the Board of Immigration, with nearly the whole foreign community opposed to him. The price of government bonds had fallen to 75 per cent with no takers, and the treasury was nearly empty. At this juncture (August 6), when a change of ministry was looked for, Mr. C. T. Gulick was persuaded to take the portfolio of the Interior, and a small

loan was obtained from his friends. Then to the surprise of the public, Col. Claus Spreckels decided to support the Gibson cabinet, which was soon after completed by the accession of Paul Neumann.

THE LEGISLATURE OF 1884.

Since 1882 a considerable reaction had taken place among the natives, who resented the cession of Wailuku to Spreckels, and felt a profound distrust of Gibson. In spite of the war cry "Hawaii for Hawaiians," and the lavish use of Government patronage, the Palace party was defeated in the elections generally, although it held Honolulu, its stronghold. Among the Reform members that session were Messrs. Dole, Rowell, Smith, Hitchcock, the three brothers, Godfrey, Cecil, and Frank Brown, Kauhane, Kalua, Nawahi, and the late Pilipo, of honored memory.

At the opening of the session the Reform party elected the speaker of the house, and controlled the organization of the committees.

The report of the finance committee was the most damaging exposure ever made to a Hawaiian Legislature. A resolution of "want of confidence" was barely defeated (June 28) by the four Ministers themselves voting on it.

THE SPRECKELS BANK CHARTER.

An act to establish a national bank had been drawn up for Col. Spreckels by a well-known law firm in San Francisco, and brought down to Honolulu by ex-Governor Lowe. After "seeing" the King, and using the usual methods in vogue at Sacramento, the ex-Governor returned to San Francisco, boasting that "he had the Hawaiian Legislature in his pocket." But as soon as the bill had been printed and carefully examined, a storm of opposition broke out. It provided for the issue of a million dollars' worth of paper money, backed by an equal amount of Government bonds deposited as security. The notes might be redeemed in either silver or gold. There was no clause requiring quarterly or semiannual reports of the state of the bank. Nor was a minimum fixed to the amount of cash reserved in the bank. In fact, most of the safeguards of the American national banking system were omitted. Its notes were to be legal tender except for customs dues. It was empowered to own steamship lines and railroads, and carry on mercantile business, without paying license fees. It was no doubt intended to monopolize or control all transportation within the Kingdom, as well as the importing business from the United States.

The charter was riddled both in the house and in the chamber of commerce, and indignation meetings of citizens were held until the King was alarmed, and finally it was killed on the second reading by an overwhelming majority. On hearing of the result the sugar king took the first steamer for Honolulu, and on his arrival "the air was blue—full of strange oaths, and many fresh and new." On second thought, however, and after friendly discussion he accepted the situation and a fair general banking law was passed providing for banks of deposit and exchange, but not of issue.

THE LOTTERY BILL, ETC.

At the same session a lottery bill was introduced by certain agents of the Louisiana company. It offered to pay all the expenses of the leper settlement for a license to carry on its nefarious business, besides

offering private inducements to venal legislators. In defiance of the public indignation, shown by mass meetings, petitions, etc., the bill was forced through its second reading, but was stopped at that stage and withdrawn, as is claimed, by Col. Speckels' personal influence with the King.

Kalakaua's famous "Report of the Board of Genealogy" was published at this session. An opium license bill was also killed, as well as an eight million dollar loan bill, while a number of excellent laws were passed. Among these were the currency act and Dole's homestead law. The true friends of the native race had reason to rejoice that so much evil had been prevented.

PRACTICAL POLITICS UNDER GIBSON.

During the next few years the country suffered from a peculiarly degrading kind of despotism. I do not refer to the King's personal immorality, nor to his systematic efforts to debauch and heathenize the natives to further his political ends.

The coalition in power defied public opinion and persistently endeavored to crush out, buy out, or disarm all opposition, and to turn the Government into a political machine for the perpetuation of their power. For the first time in Hawaiian history faithful officers who held commissions from the Kamehamehas were summarily removed on suspicion of "not being in accord" with the cabinet, and their places generally filled by pliant tools. A marked preference was given to unknown adventurers and defaulters over natives and old residents. Even contracts (for building bridges, for instance) were given to firms in foreign countries.

The various branches of the civil service were made political machines, and even the Board of Education and Government Survey came near being sacrificed to "practical politics." All who would not bow the knee received the honorable sobriquet of "missionaries." The demoralizing effects of this régime, the sycophancy, hypocrisy, and venality produced by it, have been a curse to the country ever since. The Legislature of 1884 was half composed of officeholders, and wires were skillfully laid to carry the next election. Grogshops were now licensed in the country districts, to serve as rallying points for the "National party." The Gibsonian papers constantly labored to foment race hatred among the natives and class jealousy among the whites.

Fortunately, one branch of the Government, the Supreme Court, still remained independent and outlived the Gibson régime.

THE ELECTION OF 1886.

The election of 1886 was the most corrupt one ever held in this Kingdom, and the last one held under the old régime. During the canvass the country districts were flooded with cheap gin, chiefly furnished by the King, who paid for it by franking other liquor through the custom-house free of duty, and thereby defrauding the Government of revenue amounting to \$4,749.35. (See report of attorney-general for 1888, and the case of the King *vs.* G. W. Macfarlane, 1888.) Out of 28 Government candidates 26 were officeholders, one a last year's tax assessor, and one the Queen's secretary. A list of them is appended herewith. There was only one white man on the Government ticket, viz, the premier's son-in-law.

List of Government candidates for the election of 1886 for representatives.

Island.	District.	Name.	Office.
Hawaii.....	North Kona.....	J. K. Nahale.....	Tax collector.
	South Kona.....	D. H. Nahinu.....	Deputy sheriff and tax collector.
	Kau.....	Kaacamoku.....	
	Puna.....	A. Kekoa.....	Tax collector.
	Hilo.....	Kaulukou.....	Sheriff.
	Hilo.....	A. Pahia.....	Tax collector.
	Hamakua.....	Kaunamano.....	Do.
Maui.....	Kohala.....	Z. Kalai.....	District judge.
	Lahaina.....	L. Aholo.....	Police judge.
	Lahaina.....	Kai Nahaolelua.....	Tax collector.
	Hana.....	S. W. Kaai.....	District judge.
	Makawao.....	J. Kamakele.....	Tax collector.
	Wailuku.....	G. Richardson.....	Road supervisor and tax collector.
	Kaanapali.....	J. Kaukau.....	Deputy sheriff and tax collector.
Molokai and Lanai ..		Nakaleka.....	Tax collector.
		Kupihea.....	District judge.
Oahu.....	Honolulu.....	F. H. Hayselden.....	Secretary of the board of health and tax assessor.
	Honolulu.....	James Keau.....	Poi contractor.
	Honolulu.....	Lilikalani.....	Queen's secretary.
	Honolulu.....	J. T. Baker.....	Captain of King's guards.
	Ewa and Waianae.....	J. P. Kama.....	District judge.
	Koolanloa.....	Kaauhikana.....	Tax collector.
	Koolaupoko.....	F. Kaulia.....	District judge.
Kauai.....	Waialua.....	J. Amara.....	Deputy sheriff and tax collector.
	Hanalei.....	Palohau.....	Do.
	Koloa.....	T. Kalaeone.....	
	Waimea.....	E. Kauai.....	District judge.

In order to prevent Pilipo's election, the King proceeded to his district of North Kona, taking with him a number of soldiers and attendants (who voted at the election), besides numerous cases of liquor. He took an active part in the canvass, and succeeded in defeating Pilipo by a small majority. The King's interference with the election nearly provoked a riot, which was averted by Pilipo's strenuous exertions. The matter was investigated by a Legislative committee, whose report is on file. Mr. E. Kekoa, the member elected from Puna, was afterwards tried and convicted of gross violations of the election laws, but the house refused to declare his seat vacant.

Only ten Reform candidates were elected, viz: Messrs. Cecil Brown, W. R. Castle, C. H. Dickey, S. B. Dole, J. Kauhane, A. Kauahi, J. Kalua, A. Paehaole, L. A. Thurston, and J. Wight.

THE SESSION OF 1886.

The session of 1886 was a long one, and a vacation of two weeks was taken, from July 26 until August 9, to allow the tax assessors in the Legislature to go home and nominally perform the duties of their office. About this time certain creditors of the Government in San Francisco brought pressure to bear upon the ministry to cede or hypothecate the Honolulu waterworks and part of the wharves to a California company. The pressure became so great that the ministers opposed to the project were requested by the King to resign, and a new cabinet was formed June 30, 1886, consisting of W. M. Gibson, Minister of the Interior; R. J. Creighton, a journalist, lately arrived from California, Minister of Foreign Affairs; J. T. Dare, another recent arrival, Attorney-General; and P. P. Kanoa, Minister of Finance, in place of J. Kapena, who had succumbed to the same failing that had destroyed Simon Kaai.

The two new members of the cabinet were respectable gentlemen, but soon found themselves in a false position.

THE OPIUM BILL.

An opium-license bill was introduced towards the end of the session by Kaunamano, one of the King's tools, and after a long debate carried over the votes of the ministry by a bare majority. It provided that a license for four years should be granted to "some one applying therefor" by the Minister of the Interior, with the consent of the King, for \$30,000 per annum. The object of this provision was plainly seen at the time, and its after consequences were destined to be disastrous to its author. Mr. Dole proposed an amendment that the license be sold at public auction at an upset price of \$30,000, which, however, was defeated by a majority of one, only one white man, F. H. Hayselden, voting with the majority.

Another act was passed to create a so-called "Hawaiian Board of Health," consisting of five kahunas, appointed by the King, with power to issue certificates to native kahunas to practice "native medicine."

THE LONDON LOAN.

The King had been convinced that, for the present, he must forego his pet scheme of a ten-million loan. A two-million loan bill, however, was brought in early in the session, with the view of obtaining the money in San Francisco. The subject was dropped for a time, then revived again, and the bill finally passed September 1.

Meanwhile, the idea of obtaining a loan in London was suggested to the King by Mr. A. Hoffnung, of that city, whose firm had carried on the Portuguese immigration. The proposal pleased the King, who considered that creditors at so great a distance would not be likely to trouble themselves much about the internal politics of his little Kingdom. Mr. H. R. Armstrong, of the firm of Skinner & Co., London, visited Honolulu to further the project, which was engineered by Mr. G. W. Macfarlane in the Legislature.

Two parties were now developed in that body, viz, the Spreckels party, led by the Ministry, and the King's party, which favored the London loan. The small knot of independent members held the balance of power.

The two contending parties brought in two sets of conflicting amendments to the loan act, of which it is not necessary to give the details. As Kaulukou put it, "the amendment of the Attorney-General provides that if they want to borrow any money they must pay up Mr. Spreckels first. He understood that the Government owed Mr. Spreckels \$600,000 or \$700,000. He has lent them money in the past, and were they prepared to say to him, 'We have found new friends in England?'—to give him a slap in the face?"

On the other side, Mr. J. T. Baker "was tired of hearing a certain gentleman spoken of as a second king. As this amendment was in the interest of that gentleman he voted against it." Allusions were also made to the reports that the waterworks were going to be pledged to him. When the decisive moment arrived the independents cast their votes with the King's party, defeating the ministry by 23 votes to 14. The result was that the cabinet resigned that night, after which Gibson went on his knees to the King and begged to be reappointed.

The next morning, October 14, to the surprise of everyone and to the disgust of his late allies, Gibson reappeared in the house as premier, with three native colleagues, viz, Aholo, Kanoa, and Kaulukou. But from this time he had no real power, as he had neither moral nor financial backing. The helm of state had slipped from his

hands. Mr. Spreckels called on the King, returned all his decorations, and shook off the dust from his feet. The Legislature appropriated \$100,000 for a gunboat and \$15,000 to celebrate the King's fiftieth birthday.

In this brief sketch it is impossible to give any idea of the utter want of honor and decency that characterized the proceedings of the Legislature of 1886.

The appropriation bill footed up \$3,856,755. 50, while the estimated receipts were \$2,336,870.42.

W. D. ALEXANDER.

[Second part.]

SKETCH OF POLITICS IN KALAKAUA'S REIGN—continued.

THE SEQUEL OF THE LONDON LOAN.

From the report of the Minister of Finance for 1888 we learn that Mr. H. R. Armstrong, who had come to Honolulu as the agent of a London syndicate, was appointed agent of the Hawaiian Government to float the loan. He was also appointed Hawaiian Consul-General for Great Britain, while Mr. A. Hoffnung, previously referred to, was made *Chargé d'affaires*.

In the same report we find that the amount borrowed under the loan act of 1886 in Honolulu was \$771,800 and in London \$980,000. Of the former amount \$630,000 was used to extinguish the debt owed to Col. Spreckels. By the terms of the loan act the London syndicate was entitled to 5 per cent of the proceeds of the bonds which they disposed of as their commission for guaranteeing them at 98 per cent. But it appears that in addition to this amount £15,000, or about \$75,000, was illegally detained by them and has never been accounted for. The Legislature of 1888 appropriated the sum of \$5,000 to defray the expenses of a lawsuit against their financial agents to recover the \$75,000 thus fraudulently retained. The matter was placed in the hands of Col. J. T. Griffin, who advised the Government that it was not expedient to prosecute the case. The \$75,000 has therefore been entered on the books of the treasury department as a dead loss. Since then Mr. Armstrong's name has ceased to appear in the Government directory among those of the Consuls-General.

ROYAL MISRULE.

As before stated, the King now acted as his own prime minister, employing Gibson to execute his schemes and defend his follies. For the next eight months he rapidly went from bad to worse. After remaining one month in the cabinet Mr. Kaulukou was transferred to the Marshal's office, while Mr. Antone Rosa was appointed Attorney-General in his place and J. M. Kapena made Collector-General. The limits of this brief sketch forbid any attempt to recount the political grievances of this period. Among the lesser scandals were the sale of offices, the defrauding of the customs revenue by abuse of the royal privilege, the illegal leasing of lands in Kona and Kau to the King without putting them up to auction, the sale of exemptions to lepers, the gross neglect of the roads, and misapplication of the road money, particularly of the Queen street appropriation.

Efforts to revive heathenism were now redoubled under the pretense of cultivating "national" feeling. Kaluunas were assembled from the other islands as the King's birthday approached, and "night was made hideous" with the sound of the hula drum and the blowing of conchs in the palace yard. A foreign fortune teller by the name of Rosenberg acquired great influence with the King.

THE HALE NAUA ALIAS TEMPLE OF SCIENCE, ALIAS BALL OF TWINE SOCIETY.

This was founded September 24, 1886. A charter for it was obtained by the King from the Privy Council, not without difficulty, on account of the suspicion that was felt in regard to its character and objects. According to its constitution it was founded forty quadrillions of years after the foundation of the world and twenty-four thousand seven hundred and fifty years from Lailai, the first woman.

Its by-laws are a travesty of Masonry, mingled with pagan rites. The Sovereign is styled Iku Hai; the secretary, Iku Lani; the treasurer, Iku Nuu. Besides these were the keeper of the sacred fire, the anointer with oil, the almoner, etc. Every candidate had to provide an "oracle," a kauwila wand, a ball of olona twine, a dried fish, a taro root, etc. Every member or "mamo" was invested with a yellow malo or pau (apron) and a feather cape. The furniture of the hall comprised three drums, two kahilis or feathered staffs, and two puloulous or tabu sticks.

So far as the secret proceedings and objects of the society have transpired it appears to have been intended partly as an agency for the revival of heathenism, partly to pander to vice, and indirectly to serve as a political machine. Enough leaked out to intensify the general disgust that was felt at the debasing influence of the palace.

KALAKAUA'S JUBILEE.

The sum of \$15,000 had been appropriated by the Legislature of 1886 towards the expenses of the celebration of His Majesty's fiftieth birthday, which occurred November 16, 1886.

Extensive preparations were made to celebrate this memorable occasion, and all officeholders were given to understand that every one of them was expected to "hookupu" or make a present corresponding to his station. At midnight preceding the auspicious day a salute was fired and bonfires were lighted on Punchbowl hill, rockets were sent up, and all the bells in the city set ringing.

The reception began at 6 a. m. Premier Gibson had already presented the King with a pair of elephant tusks mounted on a koa stand with the inscription: "The horns of the righteous shall be exalted." The Honolulu police marched in and presented the King with a book on a velvet cushion containing a bank check for \$570. The Government physicians, headed by F. H. Hayselden, Secretary of the Board of Health, presented a silver box containing \$1,000 in twenty dollar gold pieces. The Custom-House clerks offered a costly gold-headed cane. All officials paid tribute in some shape. Several native benevolent societies marched in procession, for the most part bearing koa calabashes. The school children, the fishermen, and many other natives marched through the throne room, dropping their contributions into a box. It is estimated that the presents amounted in value to \$8,000 or \$10,000.

In consequence of the Hale Naua scandal scarcely any white ladies were seen at this reception. In the evening the palace was illumi-

nated with electric lights, and a torchlight parade of the Fire Department took place, followed by fireworks at the Palace.

On the 20th the public were amused by a so-called historical procession, consisting chiefly of canoes and boats carried on drays, containing natives in ancient costume, personating warriors and fishermen, mermaids draped with sea moss, hula dancers, etc., which passed through the streets to the Palace. Here the notorious Hale Naua or "Kilokilo" society had mustered, wearing yellow malos and paus or aprons over their clothes, and marched around the Palace, over which the yellow flag of their order was flying.

On the 23d a luau or native feast was served in an extensive lanai or shed in the palace grounds, where 1,500 people are said to have been entertained. This was followed by a jubilee ball in the Palace on the 25th. The series of entertainments was closed by the exhibition of a set of "historical tableaux" of the olden time at the opera house, concluding with a hulahula dance, which gave offense to most of the audience. No programme was published this time of the nightly hulahulas performed at the Palace.

THE SAMOAN EMBASSY.

In pursuance of the policy announced in Gibson's famous protest to the other great powers, and in order to advance Hawaii's claim to the "primacy of the Pacific," Hon. J. E. Bush was commissioned on the 23d of December, 1886, as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the King of Samoa and the King of Tonga, and High Commissioner to the other independent chiefs and peoples of Polynesia. He was accompanied by Mr. H. Poor, as Secretary of Legation, and J. D. Strong, as artist and collector for the Government museum. They arrived at Apia January 3, 1887, and were cordially received by King Malietoa on the 7th, when they drank kava with him and presented him with the Grand Cross of the Order of Oceania. Afterwards, at a more private interview, Bush intimated to Malietoa that he might expect a salary of \$5,000 or \$6,000 under a Hawaiian Protectorate. A house was built for the Legation at the expense of the Hawaiian Government.

A convention was concluded February 17 between King Malietoa and the Hawaiian Envoy, by which both parties bound themselves "to enter into a political confederation," which was duly ratified by Kalakaua and Gibson, "subject to the existing treaty obligations of Samoa," March 20, 1887.

"The signature was celebrated," says Robert Louis Stevenson, "in the new house of the Hawaiian Embassy with some original ceremonies. Malietoa came attended by his ministers, several hundred chiefs (Bush says 60), 2 guards and 6 policemen. Laupepa (Malietoa), always decent, withdrew at an early hour; by those that remained all decency appears to have been forgotten, and day found the house carpeted with slumbering grandees, who had to be roused, doctored with coffee, and sent home. * * * Laupepa remarked to one of the Embassy, "If you have come here to teach my people to drink, I wish you had stayed away." The rebuke was without effect, for still worse stories are told of the drunken orgies that afterwards disgraced the Hawaiian embassy.

THE KAIMILOA

About this time Mr. J. T. Arundel, an Englishman, engaged in the copra trade, visited Honolulu in his steamer, the *Explorer*, a vessel of

170 tons, which had been employed in plying between his trading stations. The King, who was impatient to start his new Navy, to maintain "Hawaiian primacy," had put the reformatory school under the charge of Capt. G. E. Jackson, a retired navigating lieutenant in the British navy, with the view of turning that institution into a naval training school. The old *Explorer* was purchased for \$20,000, and renamed the *Kaimiloa*. She was then altered and fitted out as a man-of-war at an expense of about \$50,000, put into commission March 28, and placed under the command of Capt. Jackson. The crew was mainly composed of boys from the reformatory school, whose conduct as well as that of their officers was disgraceful in the extreme.

The *Kaimiloa* sailed for Samoa May 18, 1887. On the preceding evening a drunken row had taken place on board, for which three of the officers were summarily dismissed. The after history of the expedition was in keeping with its beginning. As Stevenson relates: "The *Kaimiloa* was from the first a scene of disaster and dilapidation; the stores were sold; the crew revolted; for a great part of a night she was in the hands of mutineers, and the Secretary lay bound upon the deck."

On one occasion the *Kaimiloa* was employed to carry the Hawaiian embassy to Atua, for a conference with Mataafa, who had remained neutral, but she was followed and watched by the German corvette, *Adler*. "Mataafa was no sooner set down with the embassy than he was summoned and ordered on board by two German officers."

Another well-laid plan to detach the rebel leader, Tamasese, from his German "protectors," was foiled by the vigilance of Capt. Brandeis. At length, Bismarck himself was incensed and caused a warning to be sent from Washington to Gibson, in consequence of which Minister Bush was recalled July 7, 1887. Mr. Poor was instructed to dispose of the legation property as soon as possible, and to send home the attachés, the Government curios, etc., by the *Kaimiloa*, which arrived in Honolulu September 23. She was promptly dismantled, and afterwards sold at auction, bringing the paltry sum of \$2,800. Her new owners found her a failure as an interisland steamer, and she is now laid up in the "naval row."

THE OPIUM BRIBE.

The facts of this case were stated in the affidavit of Aki, published May 31, 1887, and those of Wong Leong, J. S. Walker, and Nahora Hipa, published June 28, 1887, as well as in the decision of Judge Preston in the case of Loo Ngawk *et al.*, executors of the will of T. Aki, *vs.* A. J. Cartwright *et al.*, trustees of the King (Haw. Rep., Vol. vii, p. 401).

I have already spoken of the opium license law, which was carried by the Royalist party in the Legislature of 1886, and signed by the King in spite of the most vigorous protests from all classes of the community. As this law had been saddled with amendments, which rendered it nearly unworkable, a set of regulations was published October 15, 1886, providing for the issue of permits to purchase or use opium by the Marshal, who was to retain half the fee and the Government the other half.

The main facts of the case, as proved before the court, are as follows: Early in November, 1886, one Junius Kaae, a palace parasite, informed a Chinese rice-planter named Tong Kee, alias Aki, that he could have the opium license granted to him if he would pay the sum of \$60,000 to the King's private purse, but that he must be in haste because other parties were bidding for the privilege. With some dif-

fculty Aki raised the money, and secretly paid it to Kaae and the King in three installments between December 3 and December 8, 1886. Soon afterwards Kaae called on Aki and informed him that one Kwong Sam Kee had offered the King \$75,000 for the license, and would certainly get it, unless Aki paid \$15,000 more. Accordingly Aki borrowed the amount and gave it to the King personally on the 11th.

Shortly after this another Chinese syndicate, headed by Chung Lung, paid the King \$80,000 for the same object, but took the precaution to secure the license before handing over the money. Thereupon Aki, finding that he had lost both his money and his license, divulged the whole affair, which was published in the Honolulu papers. He stopped the payment of a note at the bank for \$4,000, making his loss \$71,000. Meanwhile Junius Kaae was appointed to the responsible office of registrar of conveyances, which had become vacant by the death of the lamented Thomas Brown.

As was afterwards ascertained, the King ordered a \$100,000 gunboat from England, through Mr. G. W. Macfarlane, but the negotiations for it were broken off by the revolution.

On the 12th of April, 1887, Queen Kapiolani and the Princess Liliuokalani, accompanied by Messrs C. P. Iaukea, J. H. Boyd, and J. O. Dominis, left for England to attend the celebration of the jubilee held upon the fiftieth anniversary of the accession of Her Majesty Queen Victoria. They returned on the 26th of July, 1887.

THE REFORM LEAGUE.

The exposure of the two opium bribes and the appointment of the King's accomplice in the crime as registrar of conveyances helped to bring matters to a crisis, and united nearly all taxpayers not merely against the King, but against the system of government under which such iniquities could be perpetrated.

In the spring of 1887 a secret league had been formed in Honolulu, with branches on the other islands, for the purpose of putting an end to the prevailing misrule and extravagance, and of establishing a civilized government, responsible to the people through their representatives. Arms were imported, and rifle clubs sprang up all over the islands. In Honolulu a volunteer organization known as the "Rifles" was increased in numbers, and brought to a high state of efficiency under the command of Col. V. V. Ashford. It is supposed that the league now numbered from 800 to 1,000 men, while its objects had the sympathy of the great majority of the community. It was at first expected that monarchy would then be abolished, and a republican constitution was drawn up.

As the time for action approached, the resident citizens of the United States, Great Britain, and Germany addressed memorials to their respective governments, through their representatives, declaring the conditions of affairs to be intolerable. As is the case in all such movements, the league was composed of average men, actuated by a variety of motives, but all agreed in their main object. Fortunately, the "spoils wing" of the party failed eventually to capture either branch of the Government, upon which a number of them joined the old Gibsonian party and became bitter enemies of reform.

THE GREAT REFORM MEETING.

Some members of the league, including Col. Ashford, were in favor of a sudden attack upon the Palace, but this advice was overruled, and it was decided to first hold a public mass meeting to state their griev-

ances and to present specific demands to the King. Accordingly, on the afternoon of the 30th of June, 1887, all business in Honolulu was suspended, and an immense meeting was held in the armory, on Bere-tania street, composed of all classes, creeds, and nationalities, but united in sentiment as never before or since. The meeting was guarded by a battalion of the Rifles fully armed. A set of resolutions was passed unanimously declaring that the Government had "ceased through incompetency and corruption to perform the functions and to afford the protection to personal and property rights for which all governments exist," and demanding of the King the dismissal of his cabinet, the restitution of the \$71,000 received as a bribe from Aki, the dismissal of Junius Kaae from the land office, and a pledge that the King would no longer interfere in politics.

A committee of thirteen was sent to wait on His Majesty with these demands. His troops had mostly deserted him, and the native populace seemed quite indifferent to his fate. He called in the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Portugal, to whom he offered to transfer his powers as King. This they refused, but advised him to lose no time in forming a new cabinet and signing a new constitution. Accordingly he sent a written reply the next day, which virtually conceded every point demanded. The new cabinet, consisting of Godfrey Brown, Minister of Foreign Affairs ; L. A. Thurston, Minister of the Interior ; W. L. Green, Minister of Finance, and C. W. Ashford, Attorney-General, was sworn in on the same day, July 1.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1887.

As the King had yielded the republican constitution was dropped, and the constitution of 1864 revised in such a way as to secure two principal objects, viz, to put an end to autocratic rule by making the Ministers responsible only to the people through the Legislature and to widen the suffrage by extending it to foreigners, who till then had been practically debarred from naturalization. I have given the details in another paper.

Mr. Gibson was arrested July 1, but was allowed to leave on the 5th by a sailing vessel for San Francisco. Threats of lynching had been made by some young hot heads, but fortunately no acts of violence or revenge tarnished the revolution of 1887.

An election for members of the Legislature was ordered to be held September 12, and regulations were issued by the new ministry, which did away with many abuses, and secured the fairest election that had been held in the Islands for twenty years. The result was an overwhelming victory for the Reform party, which was a virtual ratification of the new constitution. During the next three years, in spite of the bitter hostility and intrigues of the King, the continual agitation by demagogues, and repeated conspiracies, the country prospered under the most efficient administration that it has ever known.

W. D. ALEXANDER.

APPENDIX.

FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE AKI CASE.

It has been seen that on the 30th of June, 1887, Kalakaua promised in writing that he would "cause restitution to be made" of the \$71,000 which he had obtained from Aki, under a promise that he (Aki) should receive the license to sell opium as provided by the act of 1886.

The Reform cabinet urged the King to settle this claim before the meeting of the Legislature, and it was arranged that the revenues from the Crown lands should be appropriated to that object. When, however, they ascertained that his debts amounted to more than \$250,000 they advised the King to make an assignment in trust for the payment of all claims pro rata. Accordingly, a trust deed was executed November 21, 1887, assigning all the Crown land revenues and most of the King's private estate to three trustees for the said purpose, on condition that the complainant would bring no petition or bills before the Legislature, then in session.

Some three months later these trustees refused to approve or pay the Aki claim, on which Aki's executors brought suit against them before the Supreme Court.

After a full hearing of the evidence, Judge Preston decided that the plea of the defendants that the transaction between Aki and the King was illegal could not be entertained, as by the constitution the King "could do no wrong," and "can not be sued or held to account in any court of the Kingdom." Furthermore, as the claimants had agreed to forbear presenting their claim before the Legislature in consideration of the execution of the trust deed, the full court ordered their claim to be paid pro rata with other approved claims.

W. D. A.

No. 2.

Statement of W. D. Alexander.

A BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE CAUSES WHICH LED TO THE LATE
REVOLUTION IN HAWAII NEL.

The writer of the following statement, a citizen of the islands by birth, is a conservative both in principle and by natural inclination.

It is generally admitted that revolutions are not justifiable except as a last resort when all constitutional methods of redress have been thoroughly tried and failed and when the most vital and necessary rights of citizens are at stake. Hence, we condemned the *coup d'état* of Kamehameha V in 1864 because it was unnecessary, and because it unsettled the foundations of the Government.

The experiment of carrying on constitutional government of the Anglo-Saxon type in a country with a mixed population like that of these islands was a difficult and doubtful one, but it was entered upon by men of rare ability and unselfish patriotism, and for thirty years it was fairly successful.

It was then well understood that in order to maintain an independent government it was necessary to combine the foreign and native elements in one common organization for the good of all classes.

The Kings of the Kamehameha dynasty were sincere patriots and had some conception of their position as constitutional sovereigns and of their true policy towards foreigners.

It seemed for awhile as if these islands would give the world a lesson in the art of combining widely different races on equal terms in one government. The Government in those days has been called an oligarchy, but if so, it was a just and beneficent oligarchy.

It was simply the legitimate influence exercised by superior intelligence and character, without which the experiment would have failed

in the outset. Undoubtedly Kamehameha V was right in saying that privileges and duties had been bestowed upon the common people for which they were wholly unprepared.

During his reign from various causes a retrograde tendency began to show itself among the native population and the former good understanding between the races began to be impaired.

One cause was the partial withdrawal of the American board from its mission to these islands, the evil effects of which have been felt morally, socially, and politically. There has passed away a class of white residents devoted to the interests of the natives and possessing their confidence, who acted as mediators between them and that portion of the white population which had less regard for the rights and the welfare of the aborigines.

Another cause was the premature extinction of the order of chiefs, who were the natural leaders of their race, and whose part could not be filled by plebians or foreigners.

The scourge of leprosy, which compelled the enactment of severe segregation laws, helped to widen the breach between the races.

The consequences were first seen in the lawlessness and race hatred which broke out during Lunalilo's brief reign, 1873-'74.

The next reign was signalized by an extraordinary development of the resources of the country, produced by foreign enterprise and capital and by a large increase of the foreign element in the population.

King Kalakaua, however, seemed to be blind to the course of events and to the true interests of his people. His chief object appears to have been to change the system of government into an Asiatic despotism on the pattern of Johore, in which the white "invaders," as they were called, should have no voice in its administration.

In pursuance of this policy systematic efforts were made, with too much success, to demoralize the native population by the revival of heathen superstitions and the encouragement of vice, and to foment race jealousy and hatred under the guise of "national" feeling. The patronage of the Government was abused without stint, and the corrupt arts of Tammany were employed to carry elections and to pack legislatures with subservient officeholders.

A number of patriotic "sons of the soil" of both races labored with small success to stem the tide of corruption and to avert the impending ruin of their native land.

At last affairs reached such a crisis that on the 30th of June, 1887, an uprising of nearly the whole foreign population, supported by the better class of natives, took place, which compelled the King to sign a constitution that was intended to put an end to personal rule. By this instrument the administration of public affairs was placed in the hands of a Cabinet, responsible only to the Legislature, while officeholders were made ineligible to seats in that body.

The remaining three and a half years of his reign teemed with intrigues and conspiracies to restore autocratic government. One of these ended in the deplorable insurrection and bloodshed of July 31, 1889, which did much to aggravate the ill-feeling existing between the two races, and was made the most of by reactionary politicians to fire the native mind.

In spite of Kalakaua's faults as a ruler he was kind-hearted and courteous in private life, and there was mourning in Honolulu at the news of his death, received January 29, 1891.

Grave apprehensions were then felt at the accession of his sister, Liliuokalani, which, however, were partially relieved by her promptly

taking the oath to maintain the constitution of 1887. Notwithstanding her past record it was hoped by many that she had sufficient good sense to understand her position and to abide by the spirit as well as the letter of the constitution. This hope has been disappointed. Her ideal of government is the same as that of Kalakaua, and her determination to realize it has cost her the Throne.

I have not the heart to recapitulate the shameful story (with which the newspapers are filled), of the protracted struggle in the late Legislature, culminating in the triumph of the lottery and opium rings, allied with the Crown, and in the attempted *coup d'état* of the 14th instant.

The experiment spoken of in the beginning of this article, seems to have broken down at last.

The utmost efforts of able and patriotic men have only prolonged its life a few years.

Considering the character of our mixed population, the intensity of race jealousy, the concentration of one-fourth of the population, comprising its most turbulent elements in the capital city, it seems vain to expect a stable, self-governing, independent state under such conditions. It is time one of the great Powers should intervene, and it is needless to ask which power has its hands unfettered by conventions, and already holds paramount interests and responsibilities in this archipelago.

W. D. ALEXANDER.

JANUARY 28, 1893.

No. 3.

Statement of W. D. Alexander.

HAWAIIAN GOVERNMENT SURVEY,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, April 12, 1893.

DEAR SIR: By the permission of the attorney-general, I take the liberty of inclosing a brief statement on the title of the Crown lands of this country.

If you desire further information on this or other subjects, I am entirely at your service.

I remain yours faithfully,

W. D. ALEXANDER.

Hon. J. H. BLOUNT.

HONOLULU, March 31, 1893.

His Excellency W. O. SMITH,
Attorney-General:

DEAR SIR: In regard to the status of the crown lands, I beg leave to report as follows:

The term crown lands is applied in this country to certain lands reserved by Kamehameha III in the great division of lands March 8, 1848, "for himself, his heirs, and successors forever."

The circumstances were briefly as follows:

Under the ancient feudal system the *allodium* of all lands belonged to the King, not however, as an individual, but "as the head of the nation, or in his corporate right," to quote the language of the land commission. The constitution of 1846 declared that the land of the Kingdom was not the private property of Kamehameha I. "It belonged to the chiefs and people in common, of whom Kamehameha I was the head, and had the management of the landed property."

Thus all lands forfeited for nonpayment of taxes reverted to him. His consent was necessary for any transfer of real estate in the Kingdom, and for real mortgages also, and for the seizure of land for debt. (Old laws, p. 179.)

When the labor tax first began to be regulated by law every tenant was required to work one day in every week (Tuesday) for the King and one day (Friday) for his landlord. But this was afterwards reduced to thirty-six days in the year for the King and an equal number for the landlord. (Old laws, p. 27.)

The idea of a government as distinct from the person of the King first began to be clearly recognized in the constitution of 1840.

From that time it was seen more and more clearly that the King held a two-fold character—first, as an individual chief, and, secondly, in his official capacity as head of the Government.

It was in virtue of both titles that the land commission decided that one-third of the lands in the Kingdom belonged to the King. It is hardly necessary for our present purpose to give the history of the land commission and of the great division of 1848. Suffice it to say, that in 1848 a committee was appointed to effect the division between the King as feudal suzerain and the chiefs, his feudatories, which completed its work in forty days. Partition deeds were signed and sealed by the King on one side and the several chiefs on the other side, who were then entitled to receive awards from the land commission for the lands thus partitioned off to them.

At the close of this division the King held in his possession about half of all the lands in the Kingdom.

But it was evident, to quote from the decision of the Supreme Court (in the matter of the estate of His Majesty Kamehameha IV) in 1864, that the lands held by the King at the close of the Mahele were not regarded as his private property, strictly speaking. Even before his division with the landlords a second division between himself and the Government was clearly contemplated, and he appears to have admitted that the lands he then held might have been subjected to a commutation in favor of the Government, in like manner with the lands of the chiefs. Accordingly, on the very day after the Mahele, or division with his chiefs, was closed, viz, the 8th day of March, 1848, he proceeded "to set apart for the use of the Government the larger part of his royal domain, reserving to himself what he deemed a reasonable amount of land as his own estate."

This latter class of lands "he reserved for himself and his heirs forever" as his own private estate, and they are now known as Crown Lands.

On the 7th day of the following June, 1848, the legislative council passed the "act relating to the lands of His Majesty the King and of the Government," which confirms and ratifies the division which had already been made by the King, thus making it an act of the nation through its representatives. In this act the said lands are designated by name, and declared "to be the private lands of His Majesty Kamehameha III, to have and to hold to himself, his heirs, and successors forever; and said lands shall be regulated and disposed of according to his royal will and pleasure, subject only to the rights of tenants."

It is well known that both Kamehameha III, and his immediate successor, Kamehameha IV, dealt with these lands as their private property, selling, leasing, or mortgaging them at pleasure. These royal deeds of sale constitute titles equally valid with Royal Patents.

At the death of Kamehameha IV, it was decided by the Supreme Court, in April, 1864, that the lands reserved to the Sovereign by the act of June 7, 1848, "descend in fee, the inheritance being limited, however, to the successors to the throne, and that each successive possessor may regulate and dispose of the same according to his will and pleasure as private property, in like manner as was done by Kamehameha III."

At the same time the Court decided that Queen Emma was lawfully entitled to dower in the said lands, there being nothing in said act, taking away her right to dower in the lands therein named.

Afterwards an act was passed January 3, 1865, "to relieve the royal domain from encumbrances and to render the same inalienable." This act provided for the redemption of the mortgages on the estate by the issue of exchequer bonds not to exceed \$30,000, and enacted that so many of the lands reserved by the act of June 7, 1848, as remained at that time unalienated, should be thenceforth "*inalienable*, and descend to the heirs and successors of the Hawaiian Crown forever;" and that "it shall not be lawful hereafter to execute any lease or leases of said lands for any term of years to exceed thirty." A board of commissioners of crown lands was then created, "to consist of three persons, to be appointed by the King, two of whom should be appointed from among the members of his cabinet council, and serve without any remuneration, while the other should act as land agent, and be paid out of the revenues of said lands such sum as may be agreed to by His Majesty the King."

The foregoing acts were approved and signed by Kamehameha V, who was the heir to the estate as well as successor to the throne.

He thereby renounced for himself and his successors the power to alienate any of the crown lands, in consideration of the payment by the Legislature of the debts with which the estate had become encumbered, and of the settlement of a permanent annuity upon Queen Emma in lieu of her claim of dower in the royal domain.

By the same act he concurred, with the Legislature and the court in constituting them a class of national lands, set apart for the *successors* to the throne, instead of being governed by the general laws of inheritance.

The correctness of the foregoing settlement has been contested by some of our best lawyers. They have denied that it carried out the intention of Kamehameha III, and have even held it to have been unconstitutional, and that an action in equity might be brought in behalf of the heirs of the estate of Kamehameha III.

On the death of Kamehameha V his half-sister, Ruth Keelikolani, inherited his private lands, but the Crown Lands were held by the commissioners for the benefit of his successors.

Col. Claus Spreckels, being desirous of obtaining a fee-simple title for the Hawaiian Commercial Company to the lands of Wailuku, Maui, and having taken legal advice, purchased from Ruth Keelikolani, the sister and heir of Kamehameha V, all her interest or claim in and to the Crown Lands for the sum of \$10,000.

The conveyance is dated September 13, 1880, and is recorded in Vol. 64.

After due investigation, the Gibson cabinet agreed to compromise this claim without taking it before the Courts, and an act was carried through the Legislature of 1882, and approved July 21, 1882, by which the commissioners of crown lands were authorized to convey to Claus Spreckels "the Ahupuaa of Wailuku, Maui, with the Hils therein or thereunto belonging, which were estimated to contain 24,000 acres, or thereabouts."

Accordingly, on the 11th of August, 1882, Mr. Spreckels executed a deed, releasing to the Commissioners of Crown Lands all of the undivided interest claimed by him in said lands by virtue of the conveyance made to himself by Ruth Keelikolani.

At the same time a royal patent, viz, No. 3343, for the Ahupuaa of Wailuku, was signed by the King and delivered to Claus Spreckels.

This transaction satisfied any claim on the crown lands that could be raised by any heirs of Kamehameha III, and no further claim on them has been raised since that time.

They have remained, as was settled in 1865, National Lands, to be administered for the benefit of the occupant of the throne, who is entitled to receive the revenues of said lands only by virtue of his or her *official* position as chief magistrate.

The Kalakaua dynasty had no claim on them whatever by the general law of inheritance. In fact no claim of that kind exists at present.

In the Legislative Session of 1890 it was suggested that the vested rights of the reigning Sovereign in the crown lands should be provided for by issuing bonds, the interest upon which should be equal to his annual receipts from said land, and which should expire at his death.

The object of this proposal was to enable the Government to open these valuable lands, embracing about 876,000 acres, to settlement by industrious farmers of small means.

In view of the above facts it would seem that, upon the abolition of the office for which the revenues of the Crown Lands were appropriated, the lands would escheat to the Government, and it would then be in order for the Legislature to repeal the act of January 3, 1865, and to use the said lands thenceforth for the purpose of building up a class of industrious and thrifty farmers, owning their lands in fee simple. Such a class is the mainstay of every free country.

I remain, yours, respectfully,

W. D. ALEXANDER,
Surveyor-General.

No. 4.

(Statement of W. D. Alexander, July 18, 1893, printed with Mr. Blount's No. 15, dated July 26, 1893.)

*Statement of Volney V. Ashford.*HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *March 8, 1893.*

Hon. JAMES H. BLOUNT,

United States Ambassador to Hawaii:

SIR: You ask me to put in writing the substance of my information to you *in re* Hawaiian affairs on the 3d instant. In order to fully understand the situation, it seems necessary to refer to political developments which led to the conditions existing on January 14 last past.

Since the time of King Kamehameha V, in 1864, the political status of the Hawaiian Islands was that of a constitutional monarchy with succession to legitimate heirs, failing which, the sovereign nominated his own successor, such nomination to be ratified by the majority of the nobles. Failing both these alternatives, it rested with the entire Legislature (nobles and representatives) to elect a new sovereign. This latter was the case upon the death of Lunalilo, known as the last of the Kamehamehas, in 1874. The candidates were Kalakaua and the Queen Dowager Emma, widow of Kamehameha IV. The latter was the favorite of the natives, while Kalakaua was selected by the foreign element—then chiefly American—who feared the islands would drift to England if under the rule of Queen Emma, who had spent much time in visiting that country, and was anti-American in all her sentiments.

Kalakaua was not selected for his virtues, but simply because he could be controlled. The Legislature, which was chiefly composed of natives, was bribed to vote for Kalakaua, whose election was thereby secured, but the native population created a riot which resulted in several fatal casualties and was only quelled by the intervention of British and American men-of-war's men in port. Thus the late King began his reign, under conditions accomplished by fraud and sustained by foreign force, with the bitter hostility of the great majority of his countrymen. His extravagances and corruptions, as subsequently developed, helped him but little with the natives, who looked on him as a usurper and outside the real chiefhood, while the foreign population became gradually more estranged, until the ante-revolutionary condition of 1887 stared the country in the face. But with all the King's recklessness he was careful to keep within the letter of the law, though continually violating its spirit. He was enabled to do this from the peculiar privileges and prerogatives allowed by the then constitution.

The legislative body consisted of two so-called "houses" (though they sat together in one). Half the Legislature consisted of the "nobles," appointed for life by the sovereign. This process, abused to favor royal lickspittles regardless of their merits, gradually changed the general character of the house of nobles, so that the great majority of them were absolutely the creatures of the King, whose powerful influence over the majority of the representatives also, through his manipulating and distributing offices, and all kinds of public favors among them, gave him the literal ownership of the entire Legislature in pushing all his corrupt measures through Parliament, so that revolution became the only possible remedy. All government patronage was in the King's hands, through his power of appointing and dismissing his ministers at will. Such a thing as independence of Parliament was utterly unknown; while laws were passed at the King's nod, appropriating vast sums for such revels and indecencies as his lewd and extravagant tastes suggested; while orgies, debauchery, hulas,

and "sounds of revelry by night," made the neighborhood of the royal palace offensive to all but the royal debauchees.

The plan of the movement of 1887, into which the distracted populace were thus driven, embraced the establishment of an independent republic, with the view to ultimate annexation to the United States. All foreigners, even the British, were practically unanimous in this, while the natives stood by, and said to us: "This is not our king; he is yours. You forced him upon us against our protest. Do with him as you will." Had it not been for this passive attitude of the Hawaiians, it is doubtful if the movement of 1887 would have succeeded.

Even as it was, the movement came well nigh a dismal failure by reason of the desertion of several of the "missionary" wing of the revolutionary league, when the time for action arrived. The term "Missionary" party is now used in the islands in a political sense. It consists of the early white inhabitants and their immediate descendants, who have become a family compact in religious, social, commercial, professional, and political matters, in which they are opposed to the larger part of the white population, and almost all the natives.

The missionary deserters, and the influence the deserters forced upon the balance of the league, resulted in a compromise in shape of a demand for certain political rights from the King, preliminary to actual revolt (June 30, 1887). He promised to grant the concessions demanded; and thereupon in pursuance of such promise, so wrested from him, he promulgated a new constitution (July 7, 1887), which deprived the sovereign of many prerogatives, chief of which were (1) the right to appoint nobles; (2) the power to dismiss ministers without consent of the legislature; (3) the absolute right of veto. The general franchise for representatives (composed of twenty-four members from an equal number of electoral districts), was extended to all residents, aliens included (except Asiatics), who registered within certain dates, etc., regardless of property qualifications. Twenty-four nobles were also to be elected in sets, or series, by those of the general or representative electors, who owned \$3,000 worth of real estate unincumbered, or received \$600 of income. Thus, the election of one-half the Legislature was put in the power of a small minority of aliens, most of whom had been enfranchised by the new constitution; for the conditions were such that very few natives had the required amount of property left, and few Hawaiians received from personal services the amount of \$600 per annum. Practically all aliens, however (except Asiatics) received much more. Thus, the control of the Legislature passed to aliens, most of them without any property interests, but servants in different lines of the planting and commercial element, who all belong to the Missionary party, and were hostile to the native Hawaiians.

The nobles and representatives sat and voted together; and, though the Native party were to the revolutionary or Reform party, as four or five to one, yet the latter succeeded, by the differential franchise, in controlling, by a large majority, the Legislature returned next after the revolution. This condition naturally exasperated the Hawaiian people, while many white men took up the native cause, some from sentiments of pure justice, others as a matter of political expediency, to restore domestic contentment, yet the tremendous advantage given by conditions which enabled a small minority to elect half the Legislature clear, and gave them even chances in the election of the balance, has kept political power in the hands of the few, and the country has continued in a constant and growing state of ferment.

When the revolution of 1887 took place the ex-Queen Kalakaua's sis-

ter was absent in England at the Victorian jubilee. On and after her return she evinced, on every opportunity, her disgust at the turn of affairs, and her determination to reëstablish the royal prerogatives at the first opportunity. She did not await her own succession. She eagerly accepted a proposition from friends of the then cabinet to enter into a conspiracy to force the King to abdicate. The intention of the cabinet of the day was to intimidate the King by a division in the royal family, he being then unmanageable, and continually violating the conditions of the new constitution respecting the veto, during the legislative session of December, 1887.

The object being accomplished by the submission and promised loyalty of the King, Mrs. Dominis continued the conspiracy to a point where some 300 armed conspirators, all natives, had assembled in the barracks of the royal guards (the guardsmen having already been won over) and sent a committee to the King to demand his abdication. This was in January, 1888. The King induced this committee to give him forty-eight hours to deliberate. During the intervening time the conspiracy was discovered by a Government official by the purest accident. The leaders were quietly brought one by one before notaries and sworn confessions taken which are now among the Government archives. On account of personal relations between Mr. Thurston (then minister of the interior) and some of the half-white leaders in this affair, the Government did not prosecute anyone, or even divulge the facts to the public, only insisting that Wilcox, one of the leaders, should leave the country. This was done, but events showed that the then princess immediately reëmbarked in a further conspiracy in the same direction, and which resulted in the Wilcox insurrection of July 30, 1889. Besides Wilcox, the committee who, on the occasion above mentioned, were sent by the conspirators to force the King's abdication, were Maj. Nowlein and C. B. Wilson. The latter had been for many years notoriously one of Liliuokalani's paramours. The former was commanding officer of the Second Battalion, Hawaiian volunteers, an organization of native Hawaiians, which was subsequently disbanded by the Government for disloyalty, disobedience, and insubordination in refusing to turn out to suppress the insurrection of 1889; and later on (until the abrogation of the monarchy) was commander of the royal guard.

Ever since the year 1887 the political record of R. W. Wilcox has been so closely interwoven with Hawaiian events that it is proper to make a passing reference to him at this point. A native of the island of Maui, of mixed Hawaiian and American parentage, his father came from the State of Connecticut, and still follows the occupation of a rancher on Maui. The young man taught school in his youth, and at 20 years of age (which is legal age in Hawaii) represented his native district in the Legislature. He was subsequently selected by the Government as one of the young Hawaiians to be sent abroad to be scientifically educated at the public expense, according to the line of policy then in vogue, and had been seven years in the best military and engineering schools of the Italian Government, and was serving in the Italian artillery as a subaltern when the revolution occurred. Thereupon our Government issued an order of recall to a number of their students abroad, and with others Wilcox returned to Honolulu in November, 1887. Being refused employment by the Government and boycotted by the "Missionary" party, he readily fell in with the ideas of the Princess Liliuokalani, as above stated.

After going to California, on the failure of the first or "Dominis" conspiracy, he sought employment as engineer in the Spring Valley

waterworks till April, 1889, when Liliuokalani called him back to again assist her to "restore the rights of the native chiefs." He at once responded and, arriving at Honolulu in April, 1889, took up his abode at the princess Palama residence where she herself then lived apart from her husband. Here he organized the movement, held revolutionary meetings, gathered arms and munitions, collected men for the expedition, and moved out in regular military order on the early morning of July 30, 1889, with about 100 armed men to the Government headquarters. After taking possession of the parliament buildings and palace grounds, recruits were collected by messengers hastily sent out, and by daylight (which was the first the authorities knew of the movement) he had possession of everything, with an armed force of 400 to 500 men.

In addition to this, the royal guard were all on his side, although their captain held immediate possession of the palace itself with 30 men, and with orders from the King to allow none to enter till further instructed. Kalakaua was in the conspiracy. He had joined issues with his sister (the princess), the plan being to restore, by force, the constitution of 1864. His suspicions as to his sister's *bona fides* had been strongly aroused, however, and on the preceding evening they had been confirmed by some native friends, who persuaded him that Liliuokalani's real object was to compel his abdication as soon as the act of promulgating the proposed constitution should be carried out. He thereupon, at midnight, moved from the palace to Honuakaka, his Queen's private residence, taking 12 of the most trustworthy men of the guard, leaving 30 men at the palace, as above stated, and when the report came that Wilcox was on the move, he took refuge in his boathouse in the harbor, but a stone's throw from the U. S. S. *Adams*. In this position he could avoid all chances of capture, as the only access to the boathouse was over wooden causeways of considerable length, giving him time to escape to the *Adams* on the least alarm. There he remained till the battle was over and the insurgents dispersed or captured.

Two days previously the King himself had taken Wilcox through the palace and barracks, and showed him the position of the cannon, reserve small arms, ammunition, etc., and on the afternoon of the 29th of July he sent word to Wilcox to move at once, as, for certain reasons connected with a quarrel which happened the day previous between the King and cabinet, in regard to the transfer of Gatling gun carriages from the royal guard to the police authorities, and which the King refused, he considered immediate action necessary. When, therefore, the expedition arrived at the palace, and Wilcox found the King had gone, leaving instructions for the guard to hold the palace subject to his further orders, he was paralyzed. However, he seized every point of vantage, posted cannon, and sent a message to the King thus: "Your Majesty: We are here, at the palace, according to the plans agreed upon;" to which Kalakaua replied: "Remain there and complete your part of the undertaking. I will be there when the proper moment arrives." The above was developed at the subsequent trial of Loomens, a Belgian ex-artilleryman, for treason for participation in the insurrection. He was convicted, sentenced to death, had his sentence commuted to life imprisonment, and was subsequently turned loose on condition he should leave the Kingdom. At the same trial the letter mentioned above, from Liliuokalani to Wilcox calling him home to "restore the chiefs, etc.," came to light. It was discovered in a pocket of his clothing, in Liliuokalani's house, upon search being made on the

night of the 30th July, after the defeat of the movement and Wilcox's capture.

After this, the princess deserted Wilcox, denied all knowledge of his plans and of the conspiracy, and showed her entire willingness that the men who had taken their lives in their hands at her solicitation should now hang. This treacherous conduct of the woman was the beginning of Wilcox's conversion from "chief" rule to the rule of the people. His disgust for her was also heightened by her treachery to her brother, whose place she was ready at any moment to occupy by any means necessary to replace him. In fact, her conduct succeeding the failure of the Wilcox insurrection alienated many of her old-time friends, and was the beginning of her downfall in the affections of the natives. Naturally Wilcox has ever since been an advocate of annexation to the United States, although his idea was to accomplish this end by first establishing an independent republic, and proceeding as in the case of Texas.

It should be here mentioned that some 10 Hawaiians were killed in the action, or died of wounds, and as many more wounded; the above-named Loomens was the only man convicted by the courts, most of the others having been either acquitted or discharged, while a few pleaded guilty to minor charges and received light sentences. Wilcox himself, after his acquittal, became the acknowledged leader, both in and out of parliament, of the Hawaiian people, who composed the great bulk of the new Liberal party, whose shibboleth was equal civil rights. Under this as a first principle, the Liberals rolled up an immense majority of the entire vote at the general election of February, 1890, and actually secured a handsome majority of the legislature, with which they succeeded in ousting the so-called Thurston cabinet, in June of the same year. But a number of those foreigners whom the natives had elected on the Liberal ticket deserted to the "Missionary" party, and, forming a coalition cabinet, carried on the Government in a way which increased the discontent of the people, till the death of the King, in San Francisco, on January 20, 1891.

The magnificent manner in which the King—alive and dead—had been treated in America by the governments of the Republic and of the State of California, by the city of San Francisco, and by the people at large, mollified in very great measure the hereditary aversion of the Hawaiians towards American political affiliation—a feeling growing out of their dislike for the mercenary land-grabbing qualities of the "missionaries" on whom they mistakenly looked as specimens of Americanism. For although their *aloha* for the King was not the *aloha* they formerly bore to their real chiefs, yet each Hawaiian seemed to look upon the courtesies of Americans to the sovereign as a personal compliment to himself. It was long well known that large numbers of both whites and natives had determined that Kalakaua should be the last Hawaiian monarch. But the surprise accompanying his almost tragic return completely balked any organization till his successor was nailed won, as it were. It was also well known that Liliuokalani was determined that the constitution of 1887 should be abolished, at latest, on the moment of her accession. But the same surprise had a similarly opposite effect (if the term be allowable) upon her.

The cabinet of the day, realizing that delay would cause a movement for the abolition of monarchy on the one hand or the reëstablishment of the royal prerogatives on the other, promptly went in a body to the then Princess Regent and compelled her to take the oath to the existing constitution. She has since repeatedly said that she was so taken

by surprise that she was cowed into obedience, especially as some of the ministers threatened her that in case of refusal a republic would be at once established and she would become a political prisoner. She has further stated to friends that she would have refused and at once proclaimed a new constitution, containing all the old (and added) prerogatives, had she but received sufficient warning to prepare herself; but, even as it was, that she swore with a mental reservation. This, then, was the status of monarchy in Hawaii when Liliuokalani became Queen—a reigning sovereign who had at least twice striven to supplant her brother even at the expense, if necessary, of walking over his strangled corpse to the throne; a woman notoriously loaded with the grossest social vices, such as had contributed so largely to the late King's downfall in 1887, but still strongly upheld by the majority of the native people, who believed her professions and promises to restore them to an equal franchise; possessed, as her friends claimed, of qualities of justice, firmness, and courage, which events proved to be but selfishness, mulishness, and savage ignorance; a hater of whites and a promoter of race prejudices; an idolatress, a kahuna worshiper, and an advocate of the most abominable methods which distinguished the ante-Christian epoch. The natives soon turned from her in disgust.

The so-called "Reform" party, consisting chiefly of the "Missionaries," could do nothing with her. Foreigners, generally, feared and hated her. She gradually began to interfere in official appointments and Parliamentary elections, and to usurp autocratic authority in all directions. Her dismissal of Government officials and appointment of known thieves, vagabonds, and vicious ignoramuses from among her personal favorites and paramours to the most lucrative and responsible positions exasperated everyone outside her personal following. Her tour in state about the islands (as is the custom of Hawaiian monarchs upon their succession) was marked by the studied absence or the open insults of the great body of the Hawaiian people. Her retainers could not procure a supply of food from the natives and had to rely on the whites, while the hookuou, or giving of presents (an ancient Hawaiian custom), was a pitiable failure, only participated in by officials, or those otherwise dependent on royal favor. Secret leagues were formed, both among the whites and the Hawaiians, to remedy the existing conditions. Of these the Hui Hawaii Alohaaina (Hawaiian Patriotic League) was the most prominent, from the arrest of nearly one hundred of its members and their trial for treason.

I was myself a member and one of the organizers of this league, as also of a white league (under the same name), among the latter of whose members were most of those who actually "carried guns" in the overthrow of the monarchy last January. The mass of Hawaiians had by this time become possessed of a bitter hatred to the ruling dynasty. Of the most stable class of natives, the following sentiment, related to me by one who, under Kalakaua, had held in succession all the most distinguished positions in public and political life, is a sample of the then prevailing thought: "I have been trained from childhood to love and obey my alii (chiefs); no one would more gladly give his very life for them. But the days of the alii are past; they are no more; their successors are unworthy the name; my aloha for them has withered. I weep for Hawaii. The Kingdom must come to an end; and who can say what will be the best for our country—annexation or a republic?" And amid such sentiments the "Hui Hawaii Alohaaina" came into existence the 1st day of March, 1892.

But before entering into the details of this league, reference may be made to some of the Queen's official acts which had a strong bearing upon its origin and development. Though she took the oath to the constitution as above, the event proved it to be with a mental reservation, as she had claimed to her friends, and she at once laid plans to overturn it. She first refused to recognize the ministers, on the ground that they were the King's cabinet and "died with the King", thus voiding the constitutional provision rendering it necessary to precede dismissal by a vote of want of confidence of the legislature. Then followed several weeks of practical anarchy, political unrest, and severe business stagnation, during which the opposing parties literally slept on their arms. Finally, at the importunities of the mercantile class, who were most anxious to avoid such troubles as would ruin commerce, the cabinet were induced to refer the matter to the supreme court, under a constitutional provision which permits such reference by either the sovereign or cabinet, although the opinions promulgated in such instances are not conclusive, but merely advisory. The decision went against the cabinet, on the ground that as the constitution made no provision for the contingency the cabinet died with the King and the prerogative of appointment lay with the sovereign.

The Queen's obstinacy was caused by her determination to appoint C. B. Wilson to the portfolio of interior, where the great bulk of the public moneys are controlled and expended. This scheme was so grossly objectionable to the people, however, that, fearing a revolution if she carried it out, she selected men who were either personal friends of Wilson, or from whom she obtained a promise in advance that they would appoint Wilson to the marshalship of the Kingdom. This official had, by law, absolute command of the entire police force of the Kingdom, complete and unrestrained power in all appointments in that department, and practically controlled the administration of justice. Both his appointment and dismissal must be by the attorney-general, "by and with the advice and consent of the cabinet," according to law passed by the revolutionary (or "reform") legislature of 1887-'88. It was openly stated at the time that she compelled the incoming attorney-general to sign a commission for Wilson in advance, before receiving from her his own commission as a minister, though the attorney-general subsequently denied this charge on the floor of Parliament.

Wilson's "pull" on the Queen consisted in the fact that for many years he has been her favorite paramour (she has several). He openly and in the most shameless manner assumed family relations with her years before the death of her husband; and, although himself a man with a family, he moved into the dead man's own house and occupied his bed almost before his corpse was cold. The Queen had a private gateway cut through the palace wall immediately contiguous to her apartments in the "bungalow," that he might alone enter by a near and more convenient way—a scandal at which even the most obtuse of the native people drew the line. The pair openly lived together in the Queen's cottage at Waikiki (a suburb of Honolulu) during and succeeding the "sandbag" episode at the palace, just preceding the descent upon the league. This place was formerly an assignation house, built by the Queen, and openly used for that purpose, under the personal charge of her business manager, formerly her native coachman. All these and many other equally scandalous acts are matter of public notoriety at the capital, and have been aired and commented upon in scathing terms by the native press of Honolulu; but the English press

were either gagged by the palace party or kept silent to avoid the effects of the scandal abroad.

Through the Queen's influence over her brother (during his absolute power of official patronage) Wilson was given the superintendency of the Honolulu waterworks, though he was utterly ignorant of all theory regulating hydraulics, and the real work was necessarily done by another highly paid official. Wilson collected the water rates, however, and an investigation being demanded by a member of the Legislature of 1886, a parliamentary committee found he had stolen in the neighborhood of \$16,000 from the receipts. Then through the same influence the cabinet of the day entered into a stipulation whereby the matter was compromised, Wilson repaying into the treasury \$10,000. The princess paid over \$5,000 of this amount in cash, and by her further influence, exerted in the same direction, prevailed on the Legislature to pass an "act of indemnity" restoring to her the \$5,000 out of the public funds. To save further scandal, friends of the ministry indorsed Wilson's notes for another \$5,000 on the Government's pledge to retain one-half of his salary till the amount was recouped, while he himself of course retained the office, although members of the Legislature, from their place on the floor of the house, expressed the opinion that he should be breaking stones on the street with a ball chained to him.

At the revolution of 1887 the fellow was a spy on both sides. Whether he gave truthful information to either is hard to say; but the King subsequently informed friends that he at least betrayed him into the enemy's hands as soon as the revolutionary cause began to promise success. He was in the "Dominis conspiracy," so-called, in 1888, already described, and was the man to run over his coconspirators to first reach the Government officials and betray his comrades when he suspected the plot was discovered. Unless the official documents were stolen while he and his tools were in power, there are still confessions of his own, under oath, in the Government archives, "which would hang him"—to use the words of the then minister of the interior. The particulars of this conspiracy were suppressed by the Government of the day to prevent a lowering of Hawaiian bonds then selling in London on a two-million dollar loan, and for other reasons already stated. He was in the Wilcox insurrection of 1889, but kept out of harm's way; and it was developed at the trial of Loomens that it was he who introduced Loomens to the King, and sent him, by the King's order, to join the conspirators.

During the Queen's reign and his incumbency of the marshalship he was the absolute dictator in Hawaii. It is known that no act of importance in governmental functions transpired without either emanating from him or receiving his approval. He over and over again insulted the people, the Legislature, and the cabinet by openly commanding the Queen to disregard the premier, on behalf of the cabinet, when that minister was urging upon her the adoption, modification, or rejection of contemplated public acts. (By the way, the law recognizes no "premier," but the Queen insisted on so calling that minister who officially communicated with her outside her meetings with the entire cabinet.) Boodle, thievery, blackmailing, bribe taking, and general disregard of the laws were alarmingly common, and gambling houses, dives, illicit liquor dens, opium joints, and the wholesale importation of that deadly drug have been positively traced to his acquiescence for monetary considerations. He kept a body guard about him, composed in part of fugitives from justice from other countries, accused of all degrees of crime. He is a half-breed Tahi

tian, who, as a waif, was brought to Honolulu by an old Hawaiian sea captain. He grew up here, learned the blacksmith trade, and followed it till his physical development attracted the attention of Mrs. Dominis, who at once procured a Government office for him and advanced him as occasion offered. Though physically large, active, and well-proportioned, he is morally and intellectually of a low order—a circumstance which is true of all the ex-Queen's favorites, and illustrates her savage tastes.

The feeling of disgust resulting from the palace scandals, as well as the general repugnance to having the laws maladministered by such notorious corruptionists and worthless paramours, combined to originate the league "to promote justice and equal rights in the political government of Hawaii" (as the oath expressed it)—the exact means being left to the development of events and the personal directions of the league leaders, to whom all swore obedience, but to include in any event the suppression of the monarchy, with close political connection with the United States as the ultimate object. Among the wrongs to be remedied was of course the differential franchise; and it was this belief of the Hawaiian leaguers that annexation would mean equal civil rights, which most strongly tended to bring the annexation view into prominence among them as the true solution of the question. At first the palace party encouraged the league. They thought to use them in the promulgation of a new constitution by throwing to them the sop of "equal rights" in exchange for their actual coöperation in the Queen's intended coup; or at least relied on their non-interference, or perhaps upon their preventing the reform party from interfering, while the Queen's party, supported by the royal guard and the Honolulu police (both under direct command of tools of the Queen, Nowlein and Wilson), would proclaim the instrument and set matters running thereunder.

The constitution was prepared, being identical with that which Her Majesty attempted to promulgate on January 14, so far as evidence of the latter's contents can now be furnished. It was practically the constitution of Kamehameha V, with the added prerogative of dismissal and appointment of the supreme court at will—a project dear to Liliuokalani since long before her accession—as that body had always been regarded, both by sovereigns and people, as the bulwark against unconstitutional encroachment upon the liberties of the masses by Hawaiian monarchs. The league preferred to take chances of getting equal rights by their own methods, especially as one of their greatest complaints had been as to certain unconstitutional acts already exercised by the Queen, through her hated paramours, with the connivance of a servile cabinet—acts involving interference in official appointments and with the administration of justice. The league, however, did not at once openly quarrel with the Queen's representatives, but "negotiated" at arm's length, with the object of being left unmolested by the authorities, or, rather, by Wilson, who was directing the "new constitution" conspiracy, from the Queen's side, and giving only such information to the ministers of the Government as the Queen's party chose they should know.

The league rapidly increased in numbers, and included many of the best natives and half-whites in the country. By May 1st there were over 300 sworn members. There was a quasi-military organization, controlled mostly by ex-officers or non-commissioned officers of late native volunteer companies, or of the guard; spies reported that the leaders of the league had arranged for a large supply of arms, to be landed

by smuggling from small craft at out-of-the-way points; the Legislature was about to meet, and it was the Queen's plan that the new order of things must be inaugurated in time to prevent its meeting. Evidently something must be done, and done quickly. The introduction, also, of a large number of "Queen Emma" men into the league—men who were known to be hostile to the house of Kalakaua—increased the suspicions of the palace party, and Wilson instructed his spies to report the "arms" story, to compel the Government to move, as soon as he became satisfied that the league was against the monarchy. The members of the Government were strongly opposed to it at first, but succumbed to the personal pressure of Wilson and the Queen. Certain of the ministers told me this themselves, and others sent their personal friends to me to assure me of the fact. They said, in effect, "Wilson is the Queen; the Queen is absolute; we cannot control Wilson." One member of the cabinet used those very words.

On the morning of May 19th two confidential friends of the Queen, Kanui and Kekipi, both defeated parliamentary candidates on the Queen's side at the elections in the previous February, came to Wilcox (representing the league), and the three had a long interview. These emissaries represented that they had been authorized and instructed by Her Majesty to request his immediate presence at the palace to consult with Her Majesty in regard to the new constitution which she had prepared, and which she now held for his perusal and advice before its promulgation; further, that the time had arrived when the league must commit itself positively and irrevocably to this plan, or be considered enemies of the Crown. It is now positively known that Kanui and Kekipi came directly from the Queen's presence when they visited Wilcox, who was taken by surprise by this ultimatum, and tried to edge by further "negotiating," there being special reasons why he should not at that time give a positive refusal. The Queen's men, however, forced the game, and finally the natives and Wilcox quarreled and a definite answer being insisted upon under a threat; and, Wilcox thereupon sent to Her Majesty a positive refusal, accompanied by a defiance, upon which, being reported at the palace, warrants were immediately made out for every member of the league whom the spies had "located"—some 87 in number.

Plans were laid to attack and shoot down in cold blood the executive council of the league, who were (according to information from spies) to hold a meeting at my rooms that night. This was to be done under cover of an alleged but bogus resistance to arrest in face of warrants; and to make the thing complete, martial law was to be at once declared, and the "disturbing element," who were not already assassinated, to be disposed of by court-martial, composed of officers of Her Majesty's personal staff and the royal guard. But the league had friends in the palace and at the headquarters of most of the Government departments, and were from time to time informed as to what was there transpiring; so the meeting did not take place; but, instead, Wilcox and other league leaders attended a public meeting of the liberal party on that evening and denounced the Government, the Queen, and royalty in the bitterest terms. If there was basis for the "arms" story no evidence was found in the searches by the police of residences of all known to belong to the league. But the details of the first move having failed, it was still contemplated by the Queen to remove at all hazards those she considered her enemies. It is positively known that a proclamation of martial law was drafted by one of the advisers of the Queen, and passed for revision through the attorney-general's office, and was

carried for some days in the pocket of one of the Queen's staff, while the authorities were busily engaged in hunting up more evidence.

The palace party calculated to stifle all necessity for such evidence as would convict in a court of justice by establishing a "military" court composed of ignorant kanaka partisans and body servants of the Queen. In this search for evidence (after the arrests) the authorities threw parties into prison without warrant or form of law, kept some without food for days, plied prisoners with promises of reward and offices if they would perjure themselves in such way as to make a "case" against the liberal leaders, and with threats of death in case of refusal, and used means to extort "evidence" of the kind they wanted in a manner which would disgrace brigands. These facts were proven at the trial by witnesses for the prosecution. But the failure of the Queen to destroy all opposition to her abominable course is due chiefly, after all, to the interference of Maj. Wodehouse, British commissioner (now minister), on my behalf, as a Canadian, by compelling the Government to try the conspirators in one of the courts of law instead of by a so-called military tribunal.

Passing over the trying period of danger and uncertainty of the legislative session, and the bitter fight of the Queen against the constitutional party, we come to the 14th of January and succeeding events, so near in time (and therefore in memory), coming down to the status in quo. The existing facts imply a Provisional Government treating with the Government of the United States for "annexation." Now, what is annexation? It has been years discussed in this country as a possible outcome of the near future, but always on the basis that it would necessarily include equal civil rights in the management of all affairs not in their nature under Federal control—as, for instance, in Texas, or in the Territory of Arizona. There is in this country a bitter objection on the part of the majority against any unusual system such as proposed in the treaty laid before the United States Senate. This I firmly believe—and such, I feel sure, is the belief of the great majority—that a governing commissioner (say) from Washington would, nay, must, be influenced by the missionary party here, and that it would result in a plutocratic rule of a half dozen or dozen men of a political family compact, who came here poor to serve the cause of religion on starvation salaries, and have developed by their superior thrift into a moneyed aristocracy, owning all the valuable lands and industries of the country.

This class has always been considered the enemies of not only the native race, but of all classes denizenized in the islands who are not of themselves. Their attempted monopoly of politics; their alternative subservience and hostility to the monarchy, according to their hold on office for the day; their changing to the cause of "Americanism," or their "Hawaiian patriotism," according to whether they are begging for differential duties, or fixing "a deal" with royalty; their contemptible airs of superiority over those not so rich as themselves; and their continually repeated efforts to grind the natives to inferior political position have alienated all classes against them. But having stolen in, like jackals, on the executive offices under the present régime, a great number of annexationists fear to openly object to their methods, lest it place the whole plan of annexation on the basis of swapping horses while crossing the stream. The commissioners arrived at San Francisco with the war cry, "Down with the Hawaiians." This has turned nearly all Hawaiians against annexation, many hundreds of whom were formerly open and active in its advocacy. If even now assured

that annexation would make them American citizens, as such is the case in say Texas or Arizona, they would forever abandon the thought of royalty and hail annexation with delight as the ultimate destiny of Hawaii.

Will the people of the United States, as represented in Congress or either branch thereof, permit the vast majority of the Hawaiian people to be driven by armed force into a distasteful political condition by a handful of political jackals of the missionary party, simply because the Hawaiians are poor and the other own the property? And this is practically the reason advanced by the commissioners. Does the action of the United States Government on the Samoan question indicate that America will use her armed forces to permit a minority of foreigners to coerce a majority of the native people; and would such a course be creditable to the American people? Would it be an exponent of the American principle of justice to the weak? But the entire question could be settled by forming a treaty which would remove the objections referred to, by interfering with no vested rights, and by giving political privileges to the rich and the poor alike. And while this might not altogether please the monopolists, an accommodation which would give equal civil rights to the Hawaiians in the management of local Hawaiian affairs is the one only which is just, beneficial, or practical from the standpoint of the future, from either the American or Hawaiian point of view.

It is not necessary to refute the arguments of that portion of the American press which opposes annexation on sentimental or economical grounds. That issue I assume to be already settled. It will be a sorry day for both America and Hawaii if annexation should now be deferred. Nevertheless, it will be a source of great grief to Hawaii and of future disgrace to the proclaimed political righteousness of the American people if the latter refuse us conditions which represent a fullness of political rights. The only hope of a condition of affairs which will make Hawaii a country in which a white man of self-respect and loving liberty can live and prosper is annexation, accompanied by an equal franchise to Hawaiians in matters of local administration.

Referring to the idea of an American protectorate, this would be bitterly repulsive to the great majority of the Hawaiian people, native and foreign, as many degrees worse, if possible, than "annexation" under the Thurston-Harrison treaty, with carpetbag government controlled by the family-compact oligarchy. It would, to our minds, mean the presence of a foreign armed force to bayonet into submission any resistance to tyranny, however great, if only perpetrated in the name of law and by the authority of the Government for the time being. It would mean the engrafting of a moneyed aristocracy into place and power, who, representing only the Missionary party, could, by their unlimited wealth, drown the cries of the people of this country from consideration of any man or body of men holding the power of review. Our appeals would not likely reach the Congress. This is the view which caused the unanimous uprising of the people against what is generally known as the "Blaine treaty" in 1889-'90.

This was a treaty drafted, as was said, by Mr. Blaine, then Harrison's Secretary of State, and brought from Washington by H. A. P. Carter, then Hawaiian minister to the United States. A majority of the cabinet were in favor of it, and tried to force the King to sign it; but C. W. Ashford, who was attorney-general, resisted it on the ground that it contained a "troops" clause, permitting the United States to land forces to "preserve law and order," which, he contended,

would place in absolute power, backed by a foreign military force, any cabinet for the time being in office. The provisions of the proposed treaty having leaked out mass meetings were held, at which the entire plan was denounced by all classes, and in order to save forcible ejection by the populace the majority of the cabinet were obliged to repudiate the entire undertaking. Later development proved the whole scheme to be one for the establishment of all power in the hands of an oligarchy of the Missionary party, with practical disfranchisement to all other classes of Hawaiians, whether native or foreign. This experience satisfied everybody, including the Missionary party, that any "protectorate," from whatever source, must be imposed upon the Hawaiian people by superior force.

Regarding the protectorate proclaimed by Minister Stevens truth compels the statement that under no rule of international law or military or other necessity was there any cause for such action. On many statements of facts not materially differing the Provisional Government was stronger on February 1st than April 1st, for at the former date all annexationists were united (if the Government's claim is true), while at the last-named day disintegration was fast creeping in as a result of the methods pursued in relation to the annexation question—the opinion being very strong now in Honolulu that the Provisional Government have thus far thrown serious impediments in the way thereof by their treatment of the native side of the question and their mugwumpery, if not, indeed, their treachery, in official appointments. The threatening aspect of the Japanese question had not entered into the calculations, because no knowledge or suspicions existed on February 1st of the pending arrival of the *Naniwa* from Yokohama.

It is not the intention to herein discuss the arguments in favor of annexation from an American standpoint; but in this connection some reference should be made to the attitude of Japan. The possibilities from that quarter, as well as the chances of an English occupation (in case annexation falls through), have no doubt been given due weight from the American side. But observation of developments on the spot has convinced most people here that the invasion from Yokohama, which commenced some seven or eight years since, was designed as a means of turning Hawaii into a Japanese colony. As long as four years ago I had written articles, which appeared in Eastern and European newspapers, pointing out the approaching danger from Japan, and outlining a trend of events which has been fully justified by developments to date.

I notice the American press has not apparently considered that any importance attaches to this question; but nothing seems more certain than this, that these islands must, upon any refusal of the United States to take advantage of the supreme moment now at hand, at once become an advance post of the empire of the rising sun and a hostile sentinel over the American Pacific coast. This is on the supposition that England would not interfere. But supposing she does interfere; what is the difference, in case the United States let go, whether Hawaii falls to a rival (and perhaps hostile) power of the old civilization or the new, when the power which dominates Hawaii will dominate the Pacific, the future home of the world's commerce?

To revert, in conclusion, to the purely Hawaiian side of the case, monarchy is now dead, and Hawaii knocks for admission to America's door. Give us not an oligarchy. Give us democratic government. Give us a government of the people, for the people, and by the people.

I remain, yours truly,

VOLNEY V. ASHFORD.

No. 6.

Statement of Volney V. Ashford.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,

April 8, 1893.

Hon. JAMES H. BLOUNT,

United States Ambassador to Hawaii :

DEAR SIR: I inclose herewith a review of the political situation here, from the formation of the constitution of 1887 to its attempted abrogation by Liliuokalani on January 14 last. I can scarcely say that this covers all the points discussed, or upon which you requested information, though it probably includes most of them.

There is, however, a strange circumstance which I now see I omitted, to wit, that the men, as individuals and as a class, into whose hands fell the executive offices and entire control of this movement, are those who (aside from the thick-and-thin apologists of monarchy at all hazards) have always heretofore been the bitterest enemies of those who were suspected of favoring annexation. Dole himself, though a member of the revolutionary league of 1887 and a member of the "Council of Thirteen" therein, tried his best to "throw" the whole scheme just as the supreme moment arrived. Failing in this, he resigned his place on the council and deserted the league, and tried his best to pull others out. He did manage to pull out P. C. Jones, who was also a member of the "Thirteen," which position he resigned and deserted the league the same as Dole had done.

About the same time W. O. Smith, who, through his great personal intimacy with Dole, Jones, and others of the league, was acquainted with the general plan, and had given his adhesion to it and arranged to swear in before the council, but had deferred it several times, did come before that body. After hearing a part of the oath repeated, he drew his hand from the bible, made a contemptible, cowardly speech in favor of the continuance of monarchy, and withdrew, and never became a member of the league. Other prominent members of the Missionary party worked with all their energy against the cause. It was subsequently learned that just about the time of the withdrawal of Dole and Jones, the King, suspecting the dangerous strength of the league, made overtures, through prominent members of the Missionary Colony, to recede from certain objectionable positions he had assumed, to dismiss the Gibson cabinet, and form one from the Missionary party. The above desertions, the consequent narrow escape of the league from ruin, and the resulting enforced modification of the entire plan (as referred to in my statement) only saved the leading non-Missionary leaguers from the gallows, as we then, and always since, believed.

It is needless to say that this perfidy of that political element, at the supreme moment, convinced the non-Missionaries that treachery was the moving cause. When the demands for reform were made, under the compromise agreement, only the abject cowardice of the King and his chief advisers saved us from a bloody battle, in which, on account of delay resulting from the Missionary defection above, the King would have had an overwhelming advantage, having thereby time to fortify and strengthen his position. When the new constitution came into effect, the cabinet soon became a Missionary body, by pressure brought upon the King in making appointments to fill the vacancies of Godfrey Brown and W. L. Green, who resigned, and their whole line of official conduct to the time of their resignation, in June,

1890, was a series of insults and abuses to all the non-Missionary members of the league, and the filling of all the important offices of the kingdom between their brothers, the uncles and the cousins, etc., on the one hand, and the most vicious favorites of royalty on the other.

One of these latter was C. B. Wilson, whom Thurston, as minister of interior, kept in the office of superintendent of waterworks—though he had already been proven guilty of serious embezzlements (as related in “statement”); and although Thurston, then an opponent of Gibson, had said from his place in the legislature that Gibson, by retaining Wilson in that very office, was harboring a criminal who should be breaking stones, with a ball chained to him, Thurston continued to make this vagabond his chief favorite, and it was to save him, as a member of the “Dominis conspiracy,” that he refused to prosecute the conspirators, as heretore stated. Of course, this was with a view to control Mrs. Dominis, when she should come to the throne. Such conduct as the above helped to alienate the non-missionary whites, who had belonged to the revolutionary or “Reform” party.

So long as the Missionary party could hold all the political offices, Kalakaua, and after him Lilioukalani, were good enough, and it was only when that faction lost all hope of a prevailing influence over royalty that royalty became unbearable. During the organization of the Hawaiian Patriotic League, a year ago, one of the leading missionary politicians said to me: “Your charges against Lilioukalani are, no doubt, true; but what does it matter so long as we have the prevailing influence over her. A republic or annexation would lead to the dominance of the natives.”

This party, almost without exception, tried to hunt down all participants in the attempt against the monarchy last year. I have heard from several sources, though not able to prove it juridically, that Dole, then justice of the supreme court, was in conference with Wilson many times, advising him what course to pursue, and what line to work up against us. Finally, he was the one who issued the warrants, a thing unheard of in the Hawaiian criminal practice, our criminal cases then all originating in the police or district courts. Mr. Justice Dole not only violated this precedent, but issued the warrants, (and then tried the cases) without consultation with any of the other judges, and against the advice (to Wilson—and known to Dole, as is said) of almost every attorney in town, and on the same statement of facts as were laid before himself. During the examination which lasted (with intermissions) for three weeks, he overruled every ruling of the common law courts of the United States and England—both on points of admission and rejection of evidence, as well as of construction—against the defense, and invoked the rulings of the courts of Bloody Mary and her times, in construing the law of treason, especially as to what constituted an overt act. His hatred to any and all who favored a change from monarchy was so marked as to excite general comment. And a chain of known facts points most strongly to the conclusion, at that time very generally believed, that the discharge of most of the defendants (including myself) was in accordance with a secret understanding that Wilcox and I should not expose at the trial the complicity of the Queen and her negotiations with the league in regard to their assisting her in promulgating a revolutionary and retrogressive constitution.

Of the “Councils” who now “rule” the country under the Star Chamber process, there are only three men, at most—possibly not a single one—who are independent of the sugar ring. In fact, fifteen of

sixteen, in addition to all the commissioners, are either entirely or in very great measure dependent upon sugar for their very existence, commercially speaking. This class has always been bitterly opposed to any ideas tending to an abolition of monarchy. The cause of their change may be correctly judged from an American point of view, but this I can not help saying, that my personal knowledge of these people refuses to admit that "Americanism" has anything to do with it; and I have the word of many of them to the effect that they would prefer England to the United States, unless the latter give them terms which will exclude the Hawaiians from the franchise, and any apparent tendency they or any of them have recently exhibited towards admission of Hawaiians to vote has been caused by the lesson they have learned as to the sentiments of people in the United States.

The natives distrust the whole missionary element, and it is very doubtful if those now at the helm can "deliver the goods," except under some process of compulsion.

In expressing this want of confidence in the governing faction, I desire to say that it is fear for annexation, through the mismanagement of the present régime, which induces me to speak on this subject. I am, and always since my advent here, have been an annexationist, from both a Hawaiian and American standpoint. I openly spoke, wrote, and acted in favor of annexation, when annexation meant treason, and when Dole, the present President, judicially construed a discussion of the possible future necessity for the same as an "overt act."

I hope these additional points may be of some service or interest to you as bearing on the whole case under review.

And I remain, yours truly,

VOLNEY V. ASHFORD.

INTERVIEWS ARRANGED ALPHABETICALLY.

No. 7.

Interview with H. P. Baldwin, Maui, April 26, 1893.

Mr. BLOUNT. Please give me your name and residence.

Answer. H. P. Baldwin. I live really on Maui, where I am interested in two plantations, and also one in Makaweli.

Q. Suppose you were cut off from the power to make contracts to bring labor into this country; what would be the effect on your plantations?

A. Some of the planters consider it absolutely essential for us to have contracts, but I think that in order to bring about annexation most of them would be ready to yield that point.

Q. How would they get labor?

A. That is one of the most difficult questions to the planters here. The people have the same prejudice against the Chinese that you have in the United States. We imported a large number of Portuguese and a great many have left. I think if we were allowed Japanese and Portuguese we might get along. We got Norwegians here. They stood it fairly well for awhile, but they got ill working in our hot cane fields. The Portuguese have been very good labor for us.

Q. With the property qualification, such as now obtains, and add thereto a qualification requiring that the voter shall read and write, what sort of a local government would you have here? Could you have a satisfactory government?

A. I do not think we would have a satisfactory government—as I said in my letter to you. I am convinced that it would be a very difficult thing to form a local government to stand.

Q. Suppose you were admitted as a State into the Union, what sort of Government would you expect?

A. I think a State government would be undesirable for us.

Q. Well, what would you think, in the event of annexation, the form of government should be?

A. My choice would be for a Territorial government. I mean the governor and secretary of state to be appointed by the Federal Government, the legislature elected by electors with a limited franchise.

Q. Giving the controlling vote to the intelligent classes?

A. As far as possible.

I have read the foregoing and pronounce it a correct report of my interview with Mr. Blount.

H. P. BALDWIN.

HONOLULU, H. I., June 13, 1893,

No. 8.

Interview with C. R. Bishop, of Honolulu, April 27, 1893.

Mr. BLOUNT. How long have you lived in these islands?

Mr. BISHOP. Since October 12, 1846.

Q. You have spent your life here since then?

A. Mostly. A year and four months is the longest time I have been away. I was here twenty years before I went away at all. I was married in 1850.

Q. To whom?

A. Bernice Pauahi. She was a high chief's daughter. Her mother was a descendant of Kamehameha I.

Q. You have large landed interests here?

A. Yes; I owned considerable land at times. I had control of large land interests.

Q. And your wife had large interests?

A. Yes; you might call it large interests. Quite large interests by inheritance not very long before she died.

Q. You have had occasion then to give more than ordinary attention to lands in the kingdom?

A. Yes; I think so. I was intimately associated with Judge Lee, who was president of the land commission. We came here together. We roomed together.

Q. You spoke of the land commission; for what purpose was it created?

A. It was created for the purpose of giving title to all the people who had claims to land—the chiefs and the people.

Q. On what principle did they act in giving title?

A. The King and chiefs made this division in 1847. It was then agreed that the people should have the small holdings which they had occupied and cultivated since 1839. That was conceded by the King and chiefs on the advice of the foreigners in the Government and the friends of the natives outside.

Q. Why do you say it was occupied since 1839?

A. That date was fixed upon because it was the year in which the first draft of the constitution defining the rights of the people was made at Lahina. That is the reason why they took this date as a starting point. That was only the draft made there as I understand it. The land commission was for the purpose of giving titles to the chiefs and to the people for the lands which belonged to the chiefs, and which came to the natives under this concession.

Q. What was the principle upon which the lands were divided?

A. The chiefs had been given lands by former kings—by Kamehameha I, especially. They could not sell or lease them without the consent of the King and premier. There were other lands supposed to be the King's private lands. When the division was made these lands which he claimed were his own were set apart and called crown lands. That was his private estate really, and the others belonged to the chiefs and the people—the Government, the chiefs and the people. The people got their's out of the Government land and out of the King's land and out of the chiefs' land. These Kuleanas—it did not matter whether in the King's land, the chiefs' land or the Government land—they got them all the same by putting in a claim and having them surveyed. There were days set for them to come to prove claim. The

land commissioner took down evidence and made awards according to evidence.

Q. What do you designate lands which belonged to the King as his private estate?

A. They were called crown lands.

Q. Well, Government lands were intended to support the King in his administration of public affairs?

A. No; he was expected to support himself mostly out of crown land. The appropriations made for the King were comparatively small. The expenses of Government would be paid out of sales of land, rents, taxes, and duties. The Kings down to 1864 had the right and did sell more or less of these lands. They were really their private property.

Q. Well, in this division you speak of made by this land commission, the lands went to what class of persons?

A. They confirmed only the rights of the people to whom mostly the lands belonged. The crown lands was a large amount; the Government got a large share, and the largest part of the remainder belonged to the chiefs.

Q. You make a distinction between Government lands and crown lands?

A. The crown lands belonged to the sovereign. The Government lands belonged to the Government for the support of the Government.

Q. Were the Government lands leased out?

A. Yes, they were leased and they were sold. You might say they are nearly sold out. The Government appointed land agents in nearly every district of the islands, with authority to sell small pieces of land to the natives. It was intended to give land to the natives who were not entitled to lands under the law giving them lands occupied since 1839. It was intended to give them an opportunity to purchase lands. They cut up a large number of the large lands into small holdings, and sold them to natives at very low prices. A large part of them were sold at half a dollar an acre.

Q. Where one had already a holding did they sell to him, too?

A. Yes; I think so. I do not think it was confined strictly to those who did not own lands.

Q. Now, you spoke of the small holdings of land occupied by the natives from 1839 onwards being confirmed by this commission. Did the native occupiers of these Kuleanas generally take steps to have their lands set apart, or did many of them lose their lands by failure to comply with the mode of asserting and fixing their titles?

A. Most of them put in their claims, and had the lands surveyed and got their awards.

Q. You said a moment ago that the government sold land to natives at low prices on account of the fact that they had not gotten the lands assigned to them under the distribution authorized in 1839?

A. No; not lands assigned to them, because in most cases they had not shown any right to take lands.

Q. You mean to say that they were not occupiers of land?

A. They had not been occupiers and cultivators—that is, all the time since 1839, if at all.

Q. Then the natives, under that arrangement, who had not been occupiers of land were homeless?

A. Let me say this: Before this division and before this concession to the natives, allowing them to put in claims which would give them the title to land, they had certain understood rights in the places where they lived, for which they were to do a certain amount of work

for the chief, and so long as they did that they had the right to stay where they were, and that has always been recognized. It is even now. There were three days a month of labor. He had no land that he could dispose of.

Q. Was not that true as to all the common class of natives?

A. Yes, that was the title they all had. There would be a family—a number living together. The head of the family would put in a claim for the land which he had occupied and cultivated. Then he had grown-up sons who would want land, and this sale of land to natives gave them an opportunity to become land owners—and gave an opportunity to those who had not been constant occupiers and cultivators of land to buy land for themselves.

Q. Up to that time they had no land?

A. They had no land.

Q. Can you give me some idea of what proportion of the people were not occupiers of land at the time of this sale of lands—1839?

A. That would be difficult; I don't know that I can.

Q. I do not expect a definite, mathematical answer.

A. But I can not do it. The natives never would have put in these claims and followed them up, if they had not been advised and urged to it mainly by American missionaries and other friends. They were pretty well satisfied to live on in that old-fashioned way. They were slow in sending in these claims and time was extended more than once to give them opportunity to make their claims. I should say that a very large proportion of the heads of families got land either by putting in their claims, or by purchasing small holdings.

Q. Please let me invite your attention to this question. You have alluded to a class of persons who were occupiers of land and those who were not occupiers of land. What was the mode of life of the persons who were not occupiers of land? Were they migratory?

A. More or less so. A good many of them were a sort of servants—attachés of some chief, and there were a considerable number of them sailors. Some were mechanics and fishermen. Some were educated and employed as teachers.

Q. What per cent would you say were not located on lands?

A. There were a good many people who lived about with one another. The natives were very free with each other's calabashes. A good many lived together—one man having the land and the others living with him. They were exceedingly liberal with each other. One man had plenty of food and the other hadn't any. The man who had any shared with the man who had none. It was as with the Indians—so long as there was food in camp they all had some. There was a class who spent a large part of their time in fishing, and I do not think that these were cultivators of land, not many of them. The people in the early times before my time became cultivators and fishermen. Those who were fishermen did not do much cultivating.

Q. What was the theory upon which these lands were divided between the King, chiefs, and people—in what proportion?

A. I do not know as to proportion.

Q. About what amount of land was there in a kuleana?

A. All the way from half an acre to ten acres. Some of them perhaps more than ten acres.

Q. What would you say the average was?

A. I should say the average would be between two and three acres.

Q. Was this division in which the native got his first title brought

about through the influence of the missionaries with the Crown or Government?

A. Largely by the missionaries and by other foreigners in the Government or out of the Government. It was a foreign idea. They were given in addition half an acre on which to build a house. They could not build on taro land. They had in addition to the land which they cultivated the right to go to the mountains for timber for house and fence building and for the *tī* leaf and for thatch grass. The *tī* leaf is used in cooking and in packing food and carrying it. They also had the right to fish in the sea belonging to the land of the chief, within certain limits and to certain kinds of fish.

Q. You mean that they got this under this 1839 settlement?

A. Yes; they had all that defined in the law.

Q. He lived principally upon his taro patch and fish?

A. Yes, principally; but in some districts they had some lands on which they cultivated sweet potatoes and bananas. Taro, fish, and sweet potatoes were the principal thing. They raised hogs.

Q. What was their clothing made of?

A. The clothing was formerly made of tapa. At the time I speak of, 1839, they used mostly foreign material—cotton and woolen goods.

Q. Were they generally clothed, or were most of them in a comparatively nude state?

A. In towns they were pretty generally clothed. In the country, except on Sunday, they were partially clothed. They wore very little clothing. You would see a well-educated native in the morning with his malo (a strip of tapa or cloth worn around the loins). After he had gotten through with his work he would wash himself and put on something of clothing. If he was a teacher he went to his school completely clothed, but very likely barefooted—most likely barefooted. The clothing in the country was a good deal a matter of ornament and show. On Sunday they dressed up and went to church and came home and threw off their clothing.

Q. Do the natives own much land?

A. There are a good many natives who do.

Q. I do not refer to the descendants of chiefs—I mean the common people.

A. There are a large number of the common people who own lands.

Q. What per cent of them, would you say?

A. That is very difficult to say. These small holdings that were acquired at the time I speak of were too small to be divided—generally were not divided. The young men who have come on since that time do not own land. Many of them have not tried to get any land. These small holdings have descended to heirs, and in many cases are still in possession of the heirs of the original holders.

Q. You do not know the percentage of the land owned by the natives?

A. I do not. The tax collector or assessor could give you a pretty good estimate by taking a little time.

Q. These lands were divided originally so that the Crown got a portion, the chiefs a portion, and the common people a portion.

A. Yes.

Q. These great sugar-planters—from whom do they derive their title? Who were the original patentees of these lands?

A. Mostly the Government and the chiefs; and those chiefs are nearly all of them dead. Scarcely one of them from whom these lands have come is living.

Q. Do you mean that they have died without making a will or leaving heirs?

A. In very few instances have they any heirs remaining. Some of them made wills and some didn't. The high chiefs who received these titles and their heirs are mostly dead.

Q. And the lands themselves have gone where?

A. Many of them were sold by those chiefs themselves.

Q. To whom?

A. To different foreigners; to graziers. Some natives bought land.

Q. Much?

A. Not so very much.

Q. The bulk of them were sold or given to foreigners?

A. They were not given; they were sold, to a large extent.

Q. I saw some statements in some of your publications that the chiefs generously gave away large areas to foreigners.

A. I do not remember any such case. Kamehameha I gave land to Young and Davis and to other chiefs. He gave them lands, but I do not think Kamehameha III or other Kings or the chiefs ever gave very much land to foreigners. The chiefs were an extravagant people. They had very little idea of economy, and lands to them had but little value. Large tracts of land had but small value. They were not used for anything. They were covered, many of them with grass or ferns, or shrubbery of some sort, and the first use to which these large tracts of land were put was for grazing. The horses increased rapidly; the cattle increased, and a good many lands were occupied for grazing.

The chiefs from the first were careless about property. They had no idea about saving. They got into very extravagant habits during the sale of sandalwood. There was a large sandalwood trade from 1810 to 1825. Traders came here and tempted them with all sorts of handsome goods—sold them vessels and sold them goods. The kings and chiefs got very much into debt, and then had to pay. The only thing they could pay with was sandalwood. I believe the trade here one year amounted to something like \$400,000 in sandalwood. They bought broadcloths and satins and vessels and all manner of things—and a good deal of liquor. They got into extravagant habits. They kept on with that kind of habit. They kept getting into debt, and when they got the titles to the land so that they could dispose of them many paid their debts by selling land. They would sell large tracts of land without surveying—sell them by name. The chiefs took titles to their lands by name.

The land commission awarded them by name. The chiefs themselves, during their lifetime got rid of a great deal of land. Some of them left, when they died, debts to be paid. I had the settling of my wife's father's estate. He did not own as much land as many of the chiefs. He built a house where the *Boston's* sailors have been staying on King street. He built many houses for his people. He was a popular chief and very kind to his people, who were attached to him. He supported a company of soldiers. He had quite a large company—perhaps fifty to one hundred men. So in building and in fine clothing, horses, furniture, etc., they got into debt. I had to sell off in settling his estate quite a quantity of land—fish ponds, and so forth, to get the estate clear. The plantation lands have come nearly altogether from the Government and the chiefs, and considerable of the land is leased.

Q. Who owns what is called the Bishop estate lands?

A. It is in the hands of five trustees for the purpose of establishing and maintaining two schools; one for boys and the other for girls.

Q. How many acres are there in these lands?

A. About 430,000 acres, a good deal of which is of no value.

Q. What is the income derived from them?

A. About \$50,000.

Q. They were lands left by your wife?

A. Yes.

Q. You have been out of the country for some time?

A. Yes; six months.

Q. You were not here during the period of the revolution?

A. No.

Q. What is the feeling of the masses of the people towards the Provisional Government and annexation—those two ideas seem to run together—or have you been here enough to be able to answer?

A. Do you mean natives or people generally?

Q. You can answer it as to people generally.

A. Well, I should think that a large majority of the natives would be against annexation if left to them. Of course the Chinese and Japanese don't think much about it one way or the other. The Portuguese seem to be in favor of it. As near as I can get at it a large proportion of Americans, a considerable number of Germans, and some English are in favor of it.

Q. If it was left to the people to pass on under your Australian-ballot system, with the present qualification of a voter for the house of representatives, that would likely be the result?

A. They would vote against annexation, I think. They would vote against annexation unless they could see some immediate personal advantage in some way. I do not think they would consider very much what the advantage or disadvantage would be to them. It is a sentiment against any change.

Q. Is there anything of a race feeling in it; that they would rather the Government be under native princes?

A. Yes, I think so. Their preference would be to be ruled by their own people even if everything went to the bad. Things might go to the dogs, they would adhere to that.

Q. Well, your political contests which you have had since 1886—have they been largely on the lines of a struggle for power between the native and the white races?

A. That has been growing. For a long time back there has been something of that disposition on the increase. That feeling has been growing. It has been used more or less through native newspapers and in the elections.

Q. Prior to the constitution of 1887 the Crown appointed nobles?

A. Yes.

Q. Then it was quite easy, with the native vote outnumbering the white, for the Crown and native people to control the legislative body, was it not?

A. Yes; if they had so determined.

Q. Well, in 1886 was not the legislature in control of the crown and native people?

A. I do not remember now how they stood. We have always had a considerable number of foreigners as nobles, and a number always have been elected to the house of representatives. Some years the number of foreigners has been pretty large, and then again not so large. Kala

kaua was inclined more to appoint natives. I was made a noble in 1860. I sat in the house when there were two houses for several sessions.

Q. Well, the complaint in the revolution of 1887—one of the complaints—was against his exercise of that power of appointing nobles, was it not?

A. I do not remember.

Q. The constitution of 1887 took it away?

A. Yes. That is, the power which he got partly through the appointment of nobles. They felt he was abusing the power which he had. They complained of him for interfering in the elections and for getting people who he thought would favor any schemes of his, and also in interfering in the appointment of all the minor officers—like tax assessors, tax collectors, and district justices—getting everything as much as possible into his own hands, and of his extravagance. Through such a legislature he could get appropriations made to suit him.

Q. The revolution of 1887 was to change that?

A. Yes; it was to change that. Now, a man can not be elected who is holding any office at all. Giving men these minor offices was one way of paying them.

Q. Has there been discontent with the constitution of 1887 on the part of the Crown and native population more or less since then?

A. Yes; but I do not think the people generally were discontented if they had been let alone. The Crown was discontented all the time from the time of the revolution. It wanted to get power back again.

The shorthand notes of the foregoing have been read to me by Mr. Mills, and it is a correct report of my interview with Mr. Blount.

CHAS. R. BISHOP.

(Mr. Bishop was on the point of leaving Honolulu for the United States.)

No. 9.

Interview with Sereno E. Bishop, Honolulu, Tuesday, April 11.

MR. BLOUNT. Mr. Bishop, will you be kind enough to tell me—because I know you are a thoughtful man—the causes immediate and remote which led to the recent revolution?

MR. BISHOP. The immediate cause was a succession of aggressions upon liberty and good government by the Queen, and the final act of attempting to overthrow the existing constitution by violence.

Q. Will you be kind enough to refer to these acts specifically?

A. The first definite act was the refusal of the Queen to appoint a cabinet in accordance with the choice of the legislature.

Q. What day was that?

A. I can not give you the precise date. There was a series of these proceedings from, I think, August to November, during which time the legislature rejected, successively, three Cabinets which she had appointed by vote of want of confidence, she persisting in sending in again and again men that the legislature considered unfit for the office.

Q. You mean by that that the individual members of a cabinet were repeatedly rechosen and rejected?

A. In some cases the same individuals were rechosen, but generally not more than one at a time. Other men equally objectionable were substituted in their places. They were men in whom the business

community had no confidence. The next act of distinct importance was the manifest collusion of the Queen with the lottery ring. It finally appeared that the passage of the lottery bill was a definite part of her policy by which to render herself independent of the business people by means of a subsidy of \$500,000, which that lottery paid to the government.

Q. How would that render her independent?

A. It would furnish a means of revenue of such an amount that she hoped to be able to dispense with the support of the banks.

Q. Get along without taxation of other property?

A. No; not get along without taxation, but to get along without the support of the business men, which was necessary to supply money in case of stringency, which has often arisen here.

Q. Well, please proceed on that line.

A. The matter culminated during the absence of the American Minister and the ship-of-war *Boston* by the passage of the lottery bill, driven through the House in the absence of several of the best members, and especially by the removal of the excellent Cabinet, in which all had great confidence, and which had restored financial confidence in the government and business prosperity. They were removed by a vote of confidence, the vote of the same men who passed the lottery bill. The Queen proceeded immediately to appoint another cabinet composed of the worst elements of previous cabinets which had been successively rejected by the House.

Q. Can I interrupt you here? Who were the members of that objectionable cabinet?

A. They were four men—Parker, Colburn, Cornwell, and Peterson; every one of which men, I am compelled to say this—

Q. I want to know the truth.

A. Not one of these men possessed any confidence of the public. They were men of notorious character in some respects, especially as to their business reliability. Not one of them could by any means at his command have raised \$10,000 for his own use, owing to his personal deterioration of character and failure in business. That was the general character of them.

Q. Were they truthful men in their ordinary relations?

A. I should speak differently about different ones. I should say that Mr. Parker might be regarded, for anything I know, as an honorable man in his ordinary relations, but a prodigal man. Mr. Colburn, the minister of the interior, was notably a falsifier in business matters, so that he would not be trusted in any business matter.

Q. What do you mean by falsifier?

A. He would give false weights and measures.

Q. What was his business?

A. He was a feed dealer. The next man was Cornwell, minister of finance; I should say that he was a wreck financially and morally in every way. As to his character for truthfulness, I do not know.

Q. What do you mean by a wreck morally?

A. I mean that he was so far degraded in his personal character as to licentiousness and gambling that he had lost the ordinary shame which men possess. I am sorry to speak in that way, but you wish to be answered truthfully.

Q. I do. I want to see the situation. I don't care what it is. I want to see it.

A. He was in possession of large property which he has wasted. He has to my knowledge—not to my personal observation, but to my

knowledge—displayed himself in public matters in a very gross way personally—particularly in connection with Hula dances.

Q. You mean going to see Hula dances?

A. No; but in cheering and publicly commending the vilest portions of it before the people present. Licentiousness is a common practice in a country where most of the women are weak, but he carried it to an excess of grossness. He has run through his property, so that he has hardly anything left.

Q. And the next man?

A. The fourth man, Peterson, is of very old family—a native of the island, I believe. He was one of our promising lads, but when he came back here from the United States he fell into association with the lottery and opium rings, and he lost character and lost ground.

Q. On that account?

A. On that account mainly. I do not know of any individual transactions of his. I never heard of any that indicated dishonesty, but he was associated with them in their proceedings and he was supposed to have dealings with them in opium smuggling. I do not know what the facts are about that. He was intimately associated with them, especially with Paul Neumann, who was the reputed chief of that company and has been for a long time. Paul Neumann was for many years the chief adviser of the King. He was a back-stair adviser—a private counsellor of King Kalakaua in all his arbitrary proceedings toward the establishment of arbitrary power. It is unpleasant for me to speak evil of men. I said before, the culminating act was one which took the public by surprise. It was the drawing up of the household troops in line in front of the palace, which I personally witnessed, and the attempt to promulgate an entirely new constitution by arbitrary means.

Q. What do you mean by attempt to promulgate a constitution by unlawful means?

A. I mean that she presented such a constitution to her ministers and they demurred. She used violent language toward them. They fled, and after several hours of contest with them she finally yielded so far as to give an announcement to the natives that she would not promulgate it—to her intense regret. She added it was her intention to promulgate that constitution in a short time. She gave the people hopes that she would do it. That act of the Queen put her in a position which practically wrecked her Government; that is, no further confidence or reliance could in any way be placed in her or her administration from that time on. It was felt by the whole intelligent community to have gone to pieces. There was an absolute necessity for substituting some other government in its place. I became informed of an element in the Queen's proceedings which awakened an apprehension in my mind of some fanatical excitement. I heard that she was under the influence of Kahunas; that she had been for two weeks in consultation with Kahunas before her endeavor to submit the constitution, and that on that very day she was conducting sacrificial worship.

Q. How did you get that?

A. I do not remember how the information came to me now. There was a good deal of excitement about the idolatrous doings in the palace. I was going on to say that my alarm was excited, that I handed in a note to Mr. Stevens on Sunday expressing my sense of the probable need of protection from the American forces for fear of some kind of a fanatical uprising among the natives. I never heard from Mr. Stevens on the subject. I do not know what he thought of it or what influence it had upon him. I was only speaking of my own apprehensions. I

would say that it had been the custom on previous occasions to have the American forces landed for protection and public safety. On two previous instances, in 1887 and 1889, American forces were landed by the American Minister.

There was a determined resistance of every effort to remove the marshal (who has the reputation of being her present favorite), Marshal Wilson, and this opposition was led more by John E. Bush than any other person in the legislature. A majority of the legislature was insisting upon it. It was one of their grounds for voting out ministers—because she would not agree to remove Wilson.

Q. What was their objection to Wilson?

A. It was not so much that he was her personal favorite, but that he was obnoxious to them, especially to Wilcox. He had been active in the arrest of Wilcox for conspiracy. I do not know whether the grounds of opposition were sound or not. I know Mr. Thurston was not very ardent in the matter of having him removed. It was John E. Bush and Wilcox. John E. Bush was in the habit of calling her all kinds of foul names.

Q. What is your opinion of the credibility of Bush?

A. He has no character for veracity or morality of any kind. It is as bad as it can be. I have known his record for a long period. He has about as bad a record as anybody in these islands in every respect. I will say about Bush that his earlier progress in public life was owing to the fact that his wife was at the King's service entirely. That was the secret of his success. It was a notorious fact.

Q. What country was she from?

A. She was a native.

Q. Dead?

A. Yes. When she died his influence with the King somewhat declined. In reference to this matter of the marshal it should be added that the Queen declared publicly to a committee sent to ask her to keep Wilson in office that he should be kept in office. It was an unconstitutional declaration. I give this as one of her unconstitutional acts.

Q. The Provisional Government was established on the 17th?

A. The 17th.

Q. Three days, then, afterwards it was the avowed purpose to seek annexation with the United States?

A. Yes; that is a matter of record.

Q. Out of what did that declaration in favor of annexation come? Did it come out of the moment, or had there been a progress of opinion for years on the line of connecting this country with the Government of the United States?

A. There had been a progress of opinion growing for a good many years in favor of annexation to the United States, and looking to it as a certain event of the future. I would say that the royalist paper "Bulletin" distinctly avowed that as a certainty in a year—either last year or the year before.

Q. Now, was there a feeling in the mind of the people in that meeting reaching back through a period of months, looking forward to some opportunity of connection with the Government of the United States?

A. There was nothing said about annexation in that meeting.

Q. I do not know that I gave you my idea.

A. As to what feeling existed among individuals or among leaders in that meeting—I suppose that is what you wish to know—it would be a matter of opinion with me. I should say that at that meeting there was no definite thought about annexation among the people; that that

was an afterthought which grew up perhaps during the next day—that is, of actually proposing annexation as an immediate thing. I know that it was not in my own mind. I was not thinking about that. I was thinking about what kind of a government would be put up. It was quite evident there was going to be a change. Annexation might or might not come. People had to act and think rapidly. We had had some training in the revolution of 1887. That had been an education to our leading men.

Q. What do you mean by education? In what particular?

A. An education in planning for a form of government. An education in prompt action of the right kind.

Q. What do you mean by prompt action of the right kind?

A. I mean such action as was actually taken. Experience had taught the people that no confidence was to be placed in any royal promise; that there was only one thing to be done—to make clean work and sweep the monarchy away. The people here had a very distinct education in what may be termed the strategy of a revolution.

Q. Do you mean that the white element here had learned what they could accomplish by courage and organization?

A. Yes; exactly. I would add to that also that the native population got an education in the impossibility of resistance to a determined action on the part of the whites.

Q. Now, Mr. Bishop, was this change of Government brought about by any action from the other islands—or was it done entirely on this island?

A. Entirely. There was no time to communicate with the other islands. The white population of the other islands were as thoroughly in sympathy as the white population of Honolulu.

Q. Did they have any knowledge of it?

A. None.

Q. Did the native population on the other islands know anything of the movement?

A. I think they knew of the movement to proclaim a new constitution.

Q. That is not what I mean—

A. Well, they could not. The whole thing was done so rapidly. There was no vessel going up to the other islands during those days. I think no vessel went up during that period.

Q. In the education you say the whites received here and the natives received in connection with revolutions, was there in the minds of the whites to enable them to succeed, and in the minds of the natives to induce them to submit, any calculation as to the aid of the forces of any foreign government?

A. I should say there was none whatever. I was myself fairly intimate with the public sentiment in that matter, and I am certain that there was no calculation of any such aid. There was a calculation on the maintenance of the usual practice of landing troops to maintain order against mob violence, and to protect the property of citizens. There was an expectation of that.

Q. How was that force to be applied? The Queen's Government was in existence up to the time of your recognition?

A. It may be said to have had no manner of existence. It had no real existence. It was wrecked by the panic produced by the unconstitutional acts of the Queen. All persons had ceased to look to it; at least, all owners of property and intelligent people.

Q. Then you did not expect the use of troops to enforce or sustain any action on the part of the Queen?

A. We did not expect they would. We did not regard the Queen's Government as a source of order. The attitude of the Queen herself, as shown on the morning of that Monday, the 16th, in this terrified proclamation, showed that they themselves were in a state of panic.

Q. The people then did not expect that in the use of foreign troops that the Queen's Government would derive any support from that quarter.

A. No; they did not. Mr. Stevens' sympathies were well known by various manifestations. They were known to be in favor of the progress of constitutional government. He had so declared himself on public occasions like the 4th of July.

Q. What do you mean by that. Please be more specific.

A. I mean that on at least two public occasions—one of which was the 4th of July—Mr. Stevens had made addresses in which he spoke of the necessity of the Hawaiian monarchy conforming itself to constitutional progress.

Q. How did that apply to any condition of things here?

A. It applied because Kalakaua's Government and the Queen's Government were manifestly seeking to establish absolutism.

Q. And the condition of things here induced the interpretation of these two speeches to mean that—

A. He was heartily in sympathy with the movement of constitutional government. He was going to show himself as a good American. It was kindness in him to exercise his influence as the American representative.

Q. You did not think the forces were going to be used when they came on shore in the interest of protecting the property and persons of American citizens in connection with the Queen's government, or in support of it.

A. I was well satisfied they would not be used to support that government.

Q. Did you think that the new government was likely to be recognized and that in the protection of person and property the troops would likely act on a line in harmony with the new government?

A. I did not suppose—I had some indications that led me to believe that the troops would not be used in any way to assist in establishing the Provisional Government. They would be left entirely to their prowess or strength to accomplish the end.

Q. Were the troops landed before that government was recognized?

A. They were landed before the government was formed. They were landed on the evening of the 16th. The government was not formed until the morning of the 17th.

Q. Now, suppose disorders had broken out, in that condition of things—in executing the power—the purpose of protecting persons and property here—what was expected as to the tendency of the action of these troops—that it would be with the white population or with the native element—with the new political movement or with the Queen's Government?

A. Well, it was expected that they would repress any mob violence whatever—that they would assist in preventing any incendiarism in town, or attacks upon private property.

Q. Suppose there had been a conflict on the streets—a battle on the streets—what side do you suppose the United States would have taken?

A. My belief was at that time that the United States would have remained entirely neutral. I have no doubt of that. I had no doubt then,

Q. Did you look for any trouble at the time these troops were put on shore?

A. We were apprehensive at that time of secret disturbance—attempts to create insurrection and disturbances. We were apprehensive about incendiarism.

Q. Insurrection against what?

A. Attempt on the part of the natives to injure the whites.

Q. You mean race conflict rather than insurrection?

A. Well, I do not mean any organized insurrection—we were afraid of local disturbances in town. We were in a state of uncertainty and apprehension. We felt we needed protection. We had not organized Government forces.

Q. You wanted these forces here to preserve order until you had organized?

A. And after that if they chose. We were accustomed to have such forces landed—Mr. Merrill had had such forces.

Q. I am not questioning the propriety of it, but I am trying to find out the public mind in this situation.

A. I understand. Now I am expressing what my own view is as an intelligent person, knowing what the customs and proprieties of things would be internationally. I am only giving you my opinion.

Q. I am only asking your opinion. I am inquiring from you because you have the reputation of being an intelligent man, a man of character. These troops were landed at the instance of whom?

A. I understand that they were landed at the request of the committee of public safety—organized before the Provisional Government was organized. It was felt that the community was in great danger, and it was necessary to take immediate steps.

Q. The protectorate was established to continue during the progress of negotiations, was it not?

A. So far as it was a protectorate. I do not know how far it was entitled to be called a protectorate. I think the proclamation of Mr. Stevens settles that matter. I do not know anything outside of that. I think it was pending orders from the United States Government.

Q. Was there a fear here that were the troops aboard, the government would not be able to protect property—the Provisional Government?

A. The troops had been on shore all the time to assist in maintaining order. They took no active part then and were always confined to their barracks.

Q. Do you think that during all that period and up to the establishment of the protectorate that these troops were necessary on shore in order that order might be preserved?

A. Well, it is hard to say. I cannot judge. I will say this: I know from my personal knowledge of volunteers of the force that they considered themselves very hard worked in controlling the town, and while they encountered hardly any signs or disposition to make disturbance they had a sense of insecurity. They were called off from their business to a degree that was a great trial to them, and the putting up of the American flag enabled martial law to be dispensed with and gave a feeling of general confidence and security which was agreeable to us all.

Q. Martial law and the United States troops you felt necessary to give adequate protection and restore confidence here. Is that true or not?

A. I should not say that the presence of the United States troops

was a necessity. It was very desirable. I think that the Provisional Government could have maintained our security without them.

Q. Mr. Bishop, there has been a controversy (if I am not correct you can correct me) for a good many years on the part of the people of the white race here and the native race in the matter of governing the country. Is that true or not?

A. It is true.

Q. Have the political alignments here been as a general rule racial—white race against other races?

A. Not until recently.

Q. How recently?

A. My first recollections of any indications of such an alignment I should say were early in the reign of Kalakaua, about eighteen or twenty years ago.

Q. And did it take shape in the form of questions of taxation, or what form did it take?

A. In the shape of appointments to public office. They claimed that natives should hold a larger proportion of public office than they had been accustomed to.

Q. And the other side did not like it?

A. The other side did not feel that the natives were fit for office. They were notoriously incompetent. The first indication I remember of such a feeling was one day seeing Samuel Parker—then a young man—landing at Lahaina from a vessel from Honolulu and proclaiming loudly that Kalakaua was going to do the right thing by the Hawaiians—give them a proper share in the Government.

Q. What had been the share before this announcement of Parker?

A. It had been customary to have one or two natives or half whites in the King's cabinet of four.

Q. How about the court?

A. The supreme court?

Q. Yes.

A. It has always been customary to have three white judges.

Q. Because they were learned in the law?

A. Yes; the natives were incapable of being learned in law.

Q. That had for some time been accepted as proper?

A. It has ever since it has been the rule. It has never been changed.

Q. How are your judges selected?

A. Appointed by the Sovereign with the advice of the cabinet. There has been a very satisfactory administration of law and justice.

Q. How about your foreign ministers—any rule obtained?

A. They were always white men.

Q. And appointed by the Crown?

A. Yes.

Q. On confirmation by anybody else?

A. The cabinet, I think.

Q. Not confirmed by the legislative body?

A. No; a large part of the offices sought to be occupied by natives were subordinate civil offices.

Q. Was that what Parker had in mind, or did he want to enlarge it?

A. He wanted to enlarge it, to have more natives in the cabinet.

Q. In the constitution of 1887 did the qualifications of electors leave the whites in the majority in the election of nobles, or the natives?

A. The whites in the majority; that is, a majority of nobles.

Q. The constitution allowed citizens of other countries who were liv

ing here at that time to vote, not thereby forfeiting their citizenship in other countries. Was that intended to strengthen the white vote?

A. It was intended to strengthen the white vote by enabling them to vote, as they were not willing to renounce their citizenship.

Q. With a view of giving the white element strength in political controversies?

A. Yes; to give them adequate representation in the legislature, so that they should not be entirely overridden by the native representatives.

Q. This constitution was extorted from Kalakaua by a mass meeting?

A. Yes; by force of public sentiment manifested through a mass meeting. That demonstration of the determination and unity of the white citizens so terrified him that he was ready to do what he was wanted to do.

Q. Now, is it to be inferred from transactions like that that the intelligent people here are of the opinion that the native population as a mass are qualified for government, capable of carrying on a government?

A. I should say quite the contrary.

Q. Referring to the mass meeting which extorted the constitution from Kalakaua and to the recent mass meeting which brought about the change here—are we to believe from these that the intelligent classes in this community—the whites—do not believe that the mass of the native population are capable of self-government?

A. Not without assistance.

Q. What is your view about that? I do not know these people at all. I am trying to get at the inside facts of the case.

A. My view is that, while the native people here are lacking in adequate intelligence and force of purpose to conduct self-government long, they are so well disposed that with a sufficient power of white guidance—white coöperation—and the removal of racial contention, which has been sedulously cultivated by the late dynasty, they will usefully coöperate in republican government. They possess sufficient intelligence and good disposition so to do.

Q. On that point of being led by the white element, and easily in the absence of attempts to excite racial feelings, could you trust to universal suffrage?

A. Without limitations we could not.

Q. What limitations could you trust to in the matter of suffrage?

A. I think the limitations would have to be quite high, as to education and property qualifications.

Q. What would you put them at?

A. As to education, I should require a good knowledge of the English language—sufficient to enable the voter to read and understand the Constitution of the United States.

Q. In regard to property qualifications?

A. I think it should be made so high as to exclude unskilled laborers.

Q. You have about 9,000 voters among the native population—how many would that exclude?

A. The educational qualification would exclude two-thirds—the number qualified would rapidly increase.

Q. What property qualification?

A. The same property qualification as now required of voters for nobles—\$600 income. That would exclude unskilled laborers.

Q. How many skilled laborers do you think would vote?

A. I do not know. There has been very great carelessness in admit-

ting such voters. I think the number of such voters having that property qualification would be about one-fifth.

Q. That is your opinion?

A. Yes; my private opinion.

Q. What would you think would be the opinion of the intelligent people here on this question?

A. I think they would generally agree with it, except as they are governed by a strong American prejudice of universal suffrage.

Q. A majority of the whites, would they adopt your opinion or the manhood suffrage idea?

A. I think the great majority of the whites would adopt my idea as a matter of necessity, although contrary to their theoretical principles. They would sacrifice their theory for obvious necessity.

Q. Mr. Bishop, what would be the effect on values here if you were to go into the United States—property values?

A. I think there would be an appreciation of most property values within two years of at least 50 per cent.

Q. Why do you think that?

A. On account of the immediate restoration of financial confidence. It would put into operation at once a great variety of new enterprises, such as the proposed railroad around Oahu, which is now waiting for the result of the present negotiations.

Q. Anything else?

A. Yes; there are other causes. The rapid immigration here of energetic whites from America, from the United States, which would follow annexation.

Q. What would bring them?

A. The sense that they were going to be in the United States, that they were coming to their own country—the protection of the American flag.

Q. They have that already there. I mean what would bring them here?

A. Attractions of land. Opening to enterprise. They are deterred from doing so now by the political uncertainty of the country.

Q. Any other causes?

A. I think those are the main causes.

Q. The sugar bounty—has it had any influence at all in the matter?

A. In promoting annexation?

Q. Yes.

A. Ever since the bounty has been put on it has increased, I think, the desire for annexation, but at the same time there was an apprehension that the bounty would soon be removed, so that it was not a very powerful influence.

Q. What would be the effect on your labor here?

A. Very unfavorable to sugar-planters. It is apprehended it would be. I think it would be. I think the planters would suffer a good deal in reference to their contract labor.

Q. Suppose they had no contract labor, could not they bring Japanese here and Portuguese in sufficient quantities to supply plantations?

A. Their passage would have to be paid by the planters.

Q. You think they would not do that unless there was a contract?

A. No; they could not get their money back unless they were bound.

Q. That would seem so to me. I saw a statement from Mr. Paul Neumann, in which he took a different view, but did not give his reasons for it.

A. Paul Neumann would say anything that would suit the occasion.

Q. You think the contract labor system would be done away with if there was annexation?

A. It is so understood.

Q. When these contracts are out do the laborers leave the country?

A. Not necessarily.

Q. Some of them—the Chinese—would have to go back, would not they, under your last legislation?

A. I am not very familiar with the last legislation. My attention has been taken up with other political aspects.

Q. Do you think the Chinese would remain here?

A. They have remained here in very large numbers. There has been a very large decline in Chinese population.

Q. Would you expect the United States Government to permit the Chinese population to remain here in the event of annexation?

A. Just as they permit the Chinese population to remain in the United States. I suppose on the same terms.

Q. The Japanese population—would you expect them to remain mostly when their term of service was out?

A. I believe the Japanese are under some obligation to their own Government in the matter, which may constrain them.

Q. Do you think if that is not true that they would like to remain—most of them?

A. I think they would.

Q. Well, the Portuguese element—is that permanent here?

A. I think it is—unless they are compelled to leave here for want of employment.

Q. Now, taking your native population—the Portuguese population and the Japanese population that remain here—it would be overwhelming in point of numbers against the white element?

A. The Portuguese we count as whites. They are whites. They are whites in intelligence when they receive education.

Q. I do not care whether you call them whites or not.

A. I am disposed to insist that they are whites. They have the European Christian ethics. They belong to Christian civilization by inheritance.

Q. With the Japanese population living here, and the Portuguese population here, and the white population here, what would you do with the question of suffrage? Would you be inclined to the lines you have already indicated in that condition of things?

A. Well, it would establish English as an absolute condition of suffrage.

Q. And the property qualification?

A. Yes; but the English would exclude the ignorant Portuguese, and exclude the Japanese and Chinese almost entirely.

Q. You mean the qualifications for reading English would exclude most of the Portuguese and most of the Japanese?

A. Yes; it would exclude Portuguese who were not educated. I was going to say that it is my opinion that there should be an exception made from the educational qualification in reference to all persons who had voted hitherto for a considerable number of years—say fifteen. It would be an injustice to a large class of intelligent and excellent natives not to let them exercise suffrage.

Q. You desired to express some views a while ago on some subject?

A. On the question of the expectation of intelligent people here in respect to the action of the troops of the *Boston*. On the Sunday following the establishment of the Provisional Government Mr. P. C.

Jones, the minister of finance, and myself held a conversation on the steps of the Stone church, where we were about to conduct Bible classes. Mr. Jones expressed himself confidentially to me about his feelings on the occasion of assuming office. He stated to me that he thought he had never had such a sense in his life of personal peril he felt at the time when he and the other members of the Provisional Government left Fort street to proceed to the Government house for the purpose of seizing the Government. From that I am convinced that the members of the Provisional Government expected no assistance whatever from the United States forces.

Q. What day was this?

A. It was the Sunday following the day they took the Government—was Tuesday, the 17th. It was the 22d of January.

Q. The American flag was then up?

A. No; the American flag was not put up for two weeks afterwards.

Q. Were the troops on shore all the while.

A. Yes; they were on shore all the time. They were out of sight mostly on the premises which they occupied. My son-in-law, Jonathan Shaw, was active as a volunteer from the moment of the assumption of power by the Provisional Government. He has always spoken to me of experiencing a great sense of danger at the time that he took up arms to assist the Provisional Government in occupying the government house. He had no expectation of support at that time from the United States troops. He is a bookkeeper and general business man of intelligence. I would urge the point that the proclamation made by the Queen and her cabinet on Monday morning, the 16th, demonstrated a condition of panic on the part of the Queen's Government. It was a most humiliating proclamation for her to make. It proves that the Government had practically gone to pieces—and this supports the theory that the reason why not the slightest opposition was offered by the large force assembled and armed on the Queen's side to the Provisional Government. It was due entirely to a state of panic on the part of the natives.

Q. The natives here in the city of Honolulu?

A. The organized native forces. They could not possibly have been brought up to face the whites. This feeling was enhanced by actual experience they had had of being shot down by the whites in the insurrection of 1889, in which no white man was wounded. Twelve natives were shot down.

Q. Was that the Wilcox insurrection?

A. Yes.

Q. Now let me ask you there, was that an insurrection against Kalakaua?

A. It is hard to say what the inside intention of the revolution was, but my opinion is that Kalakaua was privy to it. It was purely an attempt to restore the old constitution in the interests of absolutism.

Q. Where was he at the time; was he at the palace?

A. No; he was not at the palace; he was at his house on the beach, and at an early hour he went on board the American ship-of-war, which was in port.

Q. For what purpose?

A. For safety.

Q. From whom?

A. I do not know. His royal guard in the palace was instructed to keep Wilcox and his men out of the palace so as to save the palace from injury. Wilcox made no attempt to gain possession of the palace,

although he went to the barracks, in the rear of the palace, and obtained all the rifles and cannon he could use. They were freely given to him by the King's forces in the barracks.

Q. Now, did the whites suppress the insurrection?

A. Yes; it was done entirely by the whites. It was done by authority of the Thurston cabinet. The King's own cabinet suppressed the insurrection as being an insurrection against the King. They understood it very well that the King was conniving at it. It was also stated that Liliuokalani aimed to destroy the King and put herself on the throne.

Q. How much was that believed here among the white people?

A. I think the general consensus of opinion was in favor of the former theory that the King was privy to the whole thing.

Q. Now, you say that the shooting down of the natives on the part of the whites in the Wilcox insurrection was probably the cause of the panic in the royal troops in the late movement?

A. I think it contributed to it. No native would face a combination of white volunteers. The men who shot down the natives were volunteers—not organized, but riflemen gathered for the moment.

Q. Mr. Bishop, I notice in correspondence between the minister here and the State Department a letter in which he speaks of arms being landed here from San Francisco for the whites in connection with the movement of 1887?

A. Yes; there was. That was an organized movement.

Q. What became of those arms? I do not want you to answer it unless you feel perfectly free about it. Were they retained by private citizens?

A. My impression is that they were retained by private citizens. I think they were owned by private citizens.

Q. Is it true or not that the white people here with a view to their own security keep themselves supplied with arms in their houses? I mean as a general rule?

A. I think it is quite extensive, but I do not think it is universal.

Q. That would indicate a feeling on the part of the whites that it was necessary for them to be in a condition always to protect themselves by force, although they might never have it to do?

A. That is the feeling undoubtedly.

Q. I was led to ask you that question by a man named Lillie. He spoke of keeping arms in his house.

A. I would say that apprehension is felt solely in regard to the adherents of royalty. There is no fear from other sources.

I have carefully read the foregoing and pronounce it an accurate report of my interview with Mr. Blount.

SERENO E. BISHOP.

HONOLULU, May 12, 1893.

No. 10.

Interview with William Blaisdell of Kealia and Kapaa Kauai, Wednesday, April 19, 1893.

Mr. BLOUNT. Mr. Blaisdell, please tell me your occupation?

Mr. BLAISDELL. I am a plantation manager.

Q. What plantation?

A. The McKee Sugar Company.

Q. What is the amount of capital involved?

A. About \$1,000,000.

Q. How many hands employed?

A. An average of 700.

Q. Where are they from—what race?

A. Principally Japanese, Chinese, Portuguese, Hawaiians, and a few South Sea Islanders.

Q. How many Japanese?

A. About 400.

Q. About how many Chinese?

A. About 100.

Q. About how many Portuguese?

A. Something like 120.

Q. How many natives?

A. Not more than about 75 or 80 at present.

Q. You are here representing an annexation organization?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. As a delegate?

A. Yes.

Q. Who were the gentlemen who came up with you representing the annexation organization on the island?

A. H. P. Baldwin, George N. Wilcox, George Mundon, and J. Konoho.

Q. What is the occupation of Mr. Baldwin?

A. He is a sugar planter.

Q. Do you know anything of the capital he represents?

A. He represents from that island a capital stock of something like \$2,000,000.

Q. Does he represent any interest on any other island?

A. Yes; he is the principal owner of several plantations on Maui.

Q. Is he from the State of Maine?

A. I do not know. His father was one of the original missionaries.

Q. Well, Mr. Wilcox, is he interested in sugar?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What is his business?

A. He is a planter,

Q. How much capital does he represent?

A. Well, in the sugar business he is estimated at being worth something like \$1,000,000, and his plantation business I should think is something like half a million.

Q. Do you mean in addition to his sugar interest?

A. No, sir; his sugar interest would amount to about half a million dollars. He has other interests besides. He is a principal shareholder in the Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company. In fact, he has interests all over the islands. He has a great deal of sugar stock outside of his own plantation.

Q. You are speaking of Mr. Wilcox?

A. Yes.

Q. He is the principal owner of the steamship line also?

A. I don't know that he is the principal owner. I know he owns considerable stock.

Q. Is he the Wilcox known in connection with the phrase, "Wilcox Cabinet?"

A. Yes. His father was one of the early missionaries.

Q. What is the business of those two natives who came with you?

A. George Mundon does a little business in the way of hauling wood, cutting wood, and supplying wood to the plantations.

Q. What plantations?

A. Ours principally.

Q. Is he in your employ?

A. Not directly—well, I suppose he is.

Q. The other native. His business?

A. He is a minister of the Gospel.

Q. You all came in together yesterday evening. Did you represent the same organization?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you represent the same locality?

A. No, sir; we represent about the whole of the island.

Q. Will you tell me the causes which led to the dethronement of the Queen?

A. Well, poor government.

Q. Could you not be more specific? Poor government is a very loose phrase, and won't carry much information with it.

A. Of course it was something that has been coming for some time, but what decided the question was the Queen's wishing to put a new constitution on the people—force a new constitution on the people.

Q. What do you mean by the phrase, "has been coming for some time?"

A. Things had been drifting into disorder and corruptness in government matters.

Q. What sort of disorder?

A. Mismanagement.

Q. Well, was life and property safe?

A. No, sir; well, I won't say that altogether, but things were drifting that way. We felt that property at least was not safe.

Q. Was there a looking forward to a change of government on account of the discontent with the political condition in the islands?

A. Well, I do not think so. Of course we are not as well posted on the other islands, away from the capital here.

Q. You were not here during the scenes immediately preceding and during the dethronement of the Queen?

A. No, sir.

Q. Then, on that question you can not answer?

A. No, sir.

Q. You have already said you are representing annexionists?

A. Yes.

Q. What is your opinion as to the feeling in favor of the existing Government with a view towards annexation?

A. When the Queen was first overthrown there were very few in favor of annexation, very few of the planters especially. I was one that did not see that we could be improved, especially in view of the contract-labor system which is our mainstay.

Q. You mean mainstay for sugar interests or for the islands?

A. Well for the islands, because it is the main industry of the islands; but as things developed, and after looking over the matter carefully and talking over the matter with other interested parties—that is, planters principally—we came to the conclusion that we would rather take our chances on the labor question than to take the chances of an independent government. We were in hopes that if annexation was secured that the United States would take our labor question into consideration and allow us some privileges in that way.

Q. In what way?

A. In bringing in Asiatic labor or not interfering with our present system of labor. We feel, of course, that good government is the

foundation of prosperity, and that without good government we have no use for labor. I think if we could have been assured of a good independent government we should have preferred it.

Q. What sort of an independent government?

A. A thoroughly reliable home government.

Q. Without annexation?

A. Yes, sir; because the benefits we might get are very obscure. We didn't feel that we could depend on that at all.

Q. What would be a reliable government here do you think?

A. I do not think it is possible to have good government and free suffrage.

Q. Just there I would be glad if you would give me your views with precision.

A. Knowing the native race as well as I do—have worked them for years, was raised among them and had them in responsible positions—I know their character and know they can not be relied upon. They are not educated to it.

Q. They are not educated to what?

A. To manage themselves—to govern themselves.

Q. You mean for participation in governmental affairs?

A. Yes; a native can never conduct any business for himself. In no instance that I know of has a native attempted to go into business for himself and made a success of it—that is, any business of any extent. He has always been associated with some foreigner and the foreigner at the head always. It is very hard for them to understand business. They have not got the knack of acquiring, and what they do acquire they can not hold on to. They are very weak in this matter.

Q. Well, now, when it comes to voting, how are they?

A. Very easily led, one way or the other. Up to within the last three or four sessions of the legislature they were very indifferent about it, but since then there has been a little race prejudice.

Q. For ten or twelve years?

A. I won't go back as far as that. I will say six years. Of course it was anything to beat the *Howle* (the white man). Very often now in elections, especially outside of Honolulu, you ask them how they expect to vote, they say, "Oh, it makes no difference to us. As long as the plantations are running of course we can always expect employment, and we look to the plantations for support."

Q. How long is it since the Australian ballot law was enacted?

A. Only the last election.

Q. In your legislature you have nobles and representatives. Now I want to speak as to representatives. Were a majority of the representatives elected to the last legislature in sympathy with the reform party or against them?

A. Against them.

Q. What was the effect of the Australian ballot system on the native? Was he more or less easily influenced under this system as compared with the former?

A. I think that if the candidate was a Hawaiian; that is, if there were two candidates, a white man and a Hawaiian, he would, of course, vote for the Hawaiian.

Q. Under the secret ballot system?

A. Yes, sir; that is, speaking of the majority.

Q. Suppose the question was left to the native population to determine by ballot under the Australian system whether they desired to return to royalty or annexation, what do you think that vote would show?

A. I think it would show a return to royalty—that is at the present time. In talking with natives I found a great many were in favor of annexation, but they are afraid that they would lose their civil rights, that is, they think they would have to forfeit that.

Q. Let me ask you if this is the situation. That when they are approached by their employers, desiring to be in accord with them, they declare themselves willing for annexation subject to an expression of fear that they will lose the right of suffrage?

A. I do not quite get your question.

(Question repeated.)

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In other words you think you can influence a considerable native vote by reason of the relations existing between you, but for the fear that they would lose the right of suffrage under annexation?

A. I can hardly answer that. Of course there is their regard for their Queen on the one hand. They feel that annexation is inevitable—a good many of them—and they would express themselves as in favor of annexation provided they were allowed their free suffrage. But I think under any circumstances if it was put to a vote and no financial interests involved, if they were not dependent upon others for support, they would vote against annexation.

Q. Do you think they are in favor of the restoration of the Queen?

A. A majority of them? No, sir. You cannot depend upon the Hawaiians. They say one thing to-day and another to-morrow.

Q. Now, the class of men they elect to the legislature—are they intelligent, reliable people?

A. Not always; no, sir.

Q. Your constitution provides that a voter for nobles shall have unincumbered property of the value of \$3,000 or an income of \$600?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If the nobles were elected by persons having the same qualifications as those who elect representatives, would that place the control of the nobles in the hands of the native voters?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You have said that they elect a majority of the representatives?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The same thing then would obtain as to the nobles?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Then that body would likely sustain a ministry in accord with native ideas?

A. Yes, sir, decidedly.

Q. And that would leave the property of the Kingdom and the rights of foreigners to the disposition of native voters?

A. Yes, sir, entirely. Property would not be secure.

Q. Property would not be secure?

A. No, sir.

Q. Please tell me why?

A. I would have to answer that in a general way—that no property can be secured under bad government.

Q. You think a body elected in the way last indicated would be a corrupt body of men?

A. I do.

Q. You think it would be an ignorant body of men?

A. Yes, sir; as regards the science of government.

Q. You think the business conditions of the islands would be disregarded in legislation?

A. Yes, sir; I think the natives would be controlled by unscrupulous people. The natives are very easily influenced, one way or another.

Q. Do you think the animosity towards the white people would continue?

A. I have no doubt of it.

Q. Please tell me this—do you think that it is necessary to the preservation of order and the making and enforcement of good laws that the foreign element should give direction to political affairs on these islands?

A. Yes, sir; I do. Of course, in speaking of the Hawaiians, I speak of the majority. There are exceptions, of course. There are some very good Hawaiians that I have a great deal of respect for, but their not being interested to any extent financially—having nothing to lose in that way and being dependent upon others for support—they are not careful, they are easily influenced.

Q. Are they easily influenced with liquor in elections?

A. Since the Australian ballot system was adopted, not so much so. Previous to that and previous to the formation of the Reform Party, it was a custom for the candidates outside of the polling places to have feasts—laaus—and the native would get a free feed and a free glass of gin provided he would vote for a certain representative. His ballot would be handed to him and he would go to the polls and put it in. There was a great deal of that. I think that was one of the main reasons for the formation of the Reform Party.

Q. Were there a majority of them subject to this influence you have just spoken of?

A. Yes, sir. I have seen it open and aboveboard.

Q. That thing, then, often determined the election of a representative?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was that generally the case in elections for representatives prior to the Australian ballot law?

A. I think it was a good deal so.

Q. Well, is there anything else you want to add?

A. We have been charged as sugar men with being at the bottom of this movement. I want to contradict that emphatically.

Q. Was it not really a Honolulu movement?

A. Yes, sir. Although of course we felt that something of the kind might happen. In talking over matters with our president, Colonel Spaulding, I told him I thought something might be done to oust the Wilcox cabinet. He said he didn't think the Queen would dare to do it.

Q. Well, if she did oust them did you expect any trouble to come out of it?

A. I did. Things had gone so far and we had had so much of it, that I felt sure something would come of it. At the same time I was surprised that she did do it.

Q. That she did remove the Cabinet?

A. Yes, sir; and that she signed the lottery bill and the opium bill.

Q. You think the peace of the islands depends on the power of the white element to direct this government?

A. Yes, sir; I think so, I feel so—decidedly so. Of course, we are at a little disadvantage, as property holders with large interests away from Honolulu. We feel at a disadvantage compared with the Honolulu people. There we are pretty much at the mercy of the people at large, that is, the natives, and our property being scattered over thousands of acres, and being very easily destroyed by fire, of course we

feel concerned. We can not call for protection from any force—naval force or anything of that kind. A few natives with a match could destroy thousands and thousands of dollars' worth of property in a short time. Fire in the sugar cane is very hard to fight. A great deal of property would be destroyed in a short time. Therefore, of course, we feel justified in asking for annexation or for protection against civil disorder.

Q. Is there anything else you want to add?

A. I want to deny again the charges made, that the planters are at the bottom of this movement. You can easily see how annexation would affect us. It would undoubtedly do away with our contract system of labor.

Q. What would be the effect on you of laws prohibiting contract labor?

A. It would require 25 per cent more labor to keep up the supply.

Q. Suppose the United States should prohibit contracts being made by corporations with people in Asiatic countries, what would be the effect of that?

A. It would raise the price of labor.

Q. What would the effect be on crop products?

A. It would increase the cost of a ton of sugar.

Q. Can you get any European labor of any amount here; could you look to Europe as a source for labor?

A. No, sir. We have tried that. It was a failure. We got some German families, but we had to give it up. They did not seem suitable. They could not stand working in the sugar cane.

I have carefully read through the foregoing and pronounce it a correct report.

W. BLAISDELL.

HONOLULU, April 20, 1893.

No. 11.

Statement of William Blaisdell.

KEALIA, KAUAI, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,

May 9, 1893.

DEAR SIR: I hereby take advantage of the privilege granted me by you to communicate by letter anything of interest in addition to my statement made to you a fortnight or so ago.

If I remember rightly, I forgot to reply, in answer to a question asked me, "Whether the planters had introduced any other nationalities than Asiatics in this country as laborers," that for several years during the time we received 2 cents a pound for our sugar several thousands of Portuguese families were induced to come to the Islands from Azores under contract to this Government, and then transferred to the planters.

They proved to be the best and most reliable class of laborers brought to this country; no other class of labor has given as good satisfaction. But when the price took such a tumble and we were obliged to make sugar for \$40 a ton less, we were compelled to look elsewhere for less expensive laborers, or go to the wall.

The first cost of importing Portuguese was a considerable expense as the distance is so great between the two countries; that expense had to be borne by the planters. They also received higher rates of wages than any other class of labor in the country, and, in addition, were fur-

nished free house room, fuel, medical attendance for the whole family. Notwithstanding their greater expense to the Planters as laborers than the Japanese or Chinese, they were, on the whole, a more desirable class of employés than any other class of labor, and I hope that, if we are annexed to the United States of America, our circumstances will be so much better, financially, that we can again encourage the immigration of that class of labor to this country. There may be some trouble in getting them here, if the contract-labor system is abolished, for they have not the funds wherewith to defray the expense of bringing their families out here, let alone themselves. The Planters, therefore, would have to advance them that much, and the binding of the laborer to serve for a certain time is the only security the employer can obtain for the refunding the amount of the advance, which is deducted from his wages in monthly installments, and as the new settler can spare but a very small portion of his earnings each month, he is as a rule two years working out the debt.

Much has been said against the contract-labor system by people who do not understand it; much more can be said in its favor by those who do. As a rule the contract laborer is better off in every respect than the noncontract man. A contract man is free to do as he pleases when his ten hours of work are over. It is true he is compelled to work when physically able, and if a man claims to the contrary, he reports to the physician, and if, after an examination, the physician finds the least thing ails the laborer, he is excused from work, and if, on the contrary, he is sound in health, is lazy, and feigns illness for an excuse to get a day or two to idle or gamble, he is ordered to work, which order should he disregard, he is taken before a magistrate, and, if he fails to prove that he is physically unable to work, he is ordered by the court to go to work, and, should he still refuse, he is sent to jail, there to remain until he agrees to do as ordered.

It is a common rule on all plantations to occasionally grant a leave of absence for several days to a man who has proved himself worthy of it. A good man is seldom, if ever, denied that privilege.

The fact of the laborer being compelled to work when able, enables him to earn more wages than the noncontract men. He, therefore, always has money laid by for a rainy day; whereas the day laborer or noncontract man does not work more than 80 per cent of his time, and spends that time, when not at work, in idleness and gambling, and in running from one part of the country to another.

I maintain that where there is a large number of the lower class, as there is in this country, and also where the rate paid to the laborer is so far in excess of what it costs them to live, that some such system is necessary in order to discourage idleness and its consequent evils. In fact, it is as necessary as compulsory education is in this country. Every Government school has a truant officer and he is kept busy bringing in truants and recruits. That will explain my reason for the statement made you that "if the contract-labor system is abolished we will require 25 per cent more laborers in the country to supply the demand as well as it is supplied at present."

Since my return from Honolulu I have been from one end of this district to the other (50 miles) to ascertain as near as possible what the sentiment is among the natives in regard to Annexation. The Royalist politicians have sent several agents down here from Honolulu to influence the natives against it by every means possible. A certain Capt. Ross, a noted character, of whom, no doubt, you have heard much, was one of them. The misleading statements that he has made to these

simple-minded people regarding America, its people, and form of government, and saying everything possible that a base-hearted person can say to encourage race prejudice, is enough to disgrace him in the eyes of every American, or anyone else that can boast of having an enlightened mind.

He has told them that America can not take care of her poor people, of which there are many thousands in every city in the Union, and that they are dying off by the hundreds for the want of something to eat. It is that class of people, he has told them, that the United States will send here among you, and as they have nothing, they will kill off you natives in order to get your lands, etc. You will be treated like slaves, and run over by the white people. The above is only a sample of what he told the natives, and although the better class do not place much confidence in all that he told them, yet they are somewhat alarmed at what he said, and do not know which way to turn.

As they are not directly interested in any of the industries and enterprises of the Islands, and are only small landowners, they therefore feel that they can not be materially affected by bad government, and that it would be better for them to take their chances in that, rather than Annexation and its doubtful benefits. And, again, the exciting of race prejudice, which has been intensified by the Royalists, has been an important factor in influencing them against desiring to annex their country with that of a white man. They are a timid and simple-minded lot of people as a rule, and are therefore easily influenced against anything foreign that they imagine may do them harm.

Almost all of the better educated natives are officeholders, such as district judges and policemen, and they, for fear of losing their positions under a new form of government, do all they can to encourage their less fortunate countrymen against annexation, and this is not a difficult task when you understand that they have never read the Constitution of the United States, and all they know of America is that there is such a place some 2,000 miles away from the Islands, where all manner of crime is committed, and that there is a possible chance of such criminals coming to the Islands to flee from justice, consequently the islands will be overrun with all sorts of bad characters; this, in fact, has been told them by the Royalists.

I have worked hard to explain away such delusions and stories, and am also having the Constitution of the United States translated into the Hawaiian language, and will distribute copies of same to all natives on the Island, and will have it explained thoroughly to them. I feel sure that this course will do much to dispel many points of doubt that they now adhere to. I also feel sanguine that, after a few years of Annexation, and they enjoy all the benefits and privileges thereof, few, if any, will be willing to give it up.

But to ask them to decide in favor of it under the present circumstances would be very similar to asking the Indians of America a hundred years ago whether all the white people should be allowed to remain in that country or not, and if they had had an idea that their decision would result in expelling the whites, every one of them would have had to emigrate from whence they came. The result would undoubtedly be the same in the present case here on the Islands if the question of Annexation were put to a popular vote, as the natives and dependents upon Royalty are in the majority.

But it must be acknowledged by the whole world that the foreigners or white people have done all in their power to educate the Hawaiian race to rule and govern their own country; made all efforts

to guide them on to prosperity and develop their resources; acted as their advisors and only took part of managing the affairs and occupying such positions themselves as the natives were incapable to conduct. A number of attempts have been made in the course of the last fifty years by the white people to place well-educated Hawaiians in those positions, but for the lack of strength of character (a natural failing of the whole Hawaiian race) the experiments have proved utter failures, and the positions filled again by *honest* and *reliable* white men.

All positions that natives were competent to fill have been given them; even then they would have disgraced themselves were they not held in check by the white men at the head of the several departments in which they were employed. But a short time ago, not over a month, it was proved beyond a doubt that the deputy sheriff of this district and subordinates (all Hawaiians) were paid a regular salary by keepers of Chinese dens to wink at their operations, and to permit the carrying on of same, free from molestation. One of the gambling dens was in the house owned by the deputy sheriff and rented to Chinese for that express purpose by him.

A proprietor of one of the dens refused to pay the sum of money won by one of his countrymen at one of their games; the cheated party threatened to expose the place if he did not get the money due him, but the threat did not alarm the offender, inasmuch as he thought the matter would be reported to the deputy sheriff, the landlord, with whom he felt secure. But the injured party knew of the local police being bribed and reported the whole matter to Mr. Wilcox, the sheriff of the Island. He sent a constable from another district to make a haul on the den. They succeeded in doing so and exposed the whole matter. The foregoing is an illustration of the character of a native, even when placed in a responsible position.

Is it a matter of wonderment that the white people, and especially those who have so much at stake in this country, and whose patience has been so sorely tried and confidence abused, have at last taken matters into their own hands and ask for protection from those whom we are sure can give it.

Any independent form of government will not stand very long under existing circumstances; we can not see any way out of the predicament than annexation with the United States. Those who have extensive investments in this country can not depend upon the future security against corrupt legislation until the United States has the management of public affairs and the handling of the revenues of the Islands; and I claim that we have the *right* and are *justified* to ask the United States to protect us, and to accept the trust, for patience has ceased to be a virtue.

As an example to illustrate how far the native will allow his feelings to be influenced by race prejudice, I will mention a circumstance that occurred here in this district, and, as I am familiar with every detail connected therewith, I have no hesitancy in giving it to you as a fact. During the last election for representatives for election in this district two candidates were in the field, one a Hawaiian-born white man, Mr. A. S. Wilcox, brother to G. N. Wilcox, of the "Wilcox cabinet," and in opposition a native by the name of Kahilina. A. S. Wilcox was nominated by the foreigners and those natives of the better class. Kahilina was asked to run by the Queen.

A. S. Wilcox is a man with an irreproachable character and his conduct as a man throughout his life is an honor to human nature. He

was born and raised in this district, where he has always lived, and has been a sugar-planter for the past twenty-five years, employing natives in preference to any other class of labor, and his conduct toward them has won their love and respect. He has never let an opportunity go by to do the native a favor.

A few years ago a number of natives in the neighborhood of his home, Hanalei, desirous of replacing their grass huts with wooden houses, and not having funds to carry their plans into effect, went to Mr. Wilcox for aid, as has always been their custom in such cases.

He gave them the necessary funds and as security for the payment of same they gave him mortgages on all their lands and other property. They built their houses and, native-like, the time for the redeeming of their mortgages came around and found them unprepared to do so. Mr. Wilcox allowed the matter to go on for years and finally, tiring of carrying it along on his books, he canceled all the mortgages, on which he had never received a cent of interest let alone the principal. Likewise in many other instances, too numerous to mention, he has befriended the native and does so to this day.

The other candidate, Kahilina, is a full-blooded Hawaiian, well educated. For a while he held a position as district judge in Hanalei, Kauai. But that position was taken from him before many months had elapsed, as it was proved that he accepted bribes and appropriated court funds for personal use and lived in open adultery. This is the character of the man that the Queen and her party put up as their representative to run against Mr. Wilcox. I may here state that Mr. Wilcox refused the nomination, but when he learned that Kahilina was to run for election, and rather than to have such a man go to the Legislature to represent a district where the foreigners had invested so many millions and had so much at stake, he consented to contest the election against Kahilina. The first thing Kahilina did when he found that Mr. Wilcox was in the field against him was to run down the white man, and did all in his power to excite race prejudice, as he could find nothing in the character or past life of Mr. Wilcox with which to weaken his chances with the natives.

Prior to the day of election Kahilina went into the precinct where Wilcox was born, and among the natives he had befriended, as mentioned above, knowing that there Wilcox was a favorite, and there he told the natives not to vote for a white man. "Wilcox may be all right, and a good man himself, but he represented the white people, and they would treat the natives as the white people treated the Indians in America; they were overrunning the country and would soon gobble up all their land." This had the desired effect. When the election was over and the count made of the votes cast in each precinct of the district it was found that very few natives voted for Mr. Wilcox, and none of those whom he had befriended. Mr. Wilcox was elected, but by only the foreigners, Americans, English, Germans, and Portuguese. When the natives were upbraided for voting against Mr. Wilcox, after all his kindness toward them, they acknowledged their indebtedness to him for all past favors, but they did it "because he was a *haole* (white man) and represented the white people."

Only in political matters is that sentiment expressed; outside of that the natives acknowledge their dependence upon the foreigner, and will go to them first to ask a favor in preference to one of their own nationality. There is not a foreigner on this Island, and I will go as far to state on any of the Islands, but what feels that the native is a special charge and do all in their power to administer to their comfort

and welfare. A visit through the Islands would convince you of that fact at every step. Leave the race to themselves and they would drift right back to where they were fifty years ago. They would do so now were it not for the fact that the foreign element is continually tugging at the other end. They have no conception of the great watchword of the enlightened world, "progress;" they have no objection, however, to be carried along with it so long as they are pampered like a lot of children.

To a person who thoroughly understands the character of a Kanaka it is no surprise that matters have taken the turn that they have in the past two months. According to all rules of progression, it had to come some time, and now that it has arrived, we who have the welfare of the country at heart, and for the good of all concerned, feel that there is no hope for domestic tranquillity in the future unless the United States will accede to the prayers of the respectable people of this country. Left to ourselves domestic strife is inevitable, and will ruin the whole country in a very short time. This must not be permitted. It is the unquestionable duty of the United States to ward off that danger and consequent destruction of homes and interests of thousands of her citizens, and if she should not do it she would be shrinking from a duty that she would always regret. She will have to do it sometime and probably not at a time so favorable to all concerned. "A stitch in time will save nine."

This country's resources can be increased tenfold if the large tracts of Government and crown land were taken out of the hands of large leaseholders and divided up among enterprising citizens as homesteads. There are thousands of acres of the richest land to be found on the face of the globe in the hands of a few, and only a small portion of which is under cultivation, whereas if settled upon by enterprising people with small means, they can be made to produce millions of dollars annually, as sugar and rice are the only products that are admitted into the United States free of duty. Those industries alone have received attention, consequently on an extensive sugar estate there are thousands of acres of land that could be made to produce almost anything else under the sun, but are given up to cattle grazing, because they are not altogether suitable for either cane or rice.

Upon such lands thousands of families could build beautiful homes live in a climate second to none on the face of this globe, where flowers bloom and all kinds of vegetables grow all the year round. This will surely come about with good government and an available market for all products of the Islands.

I would give much if you could visit this, the garden Island of the Group; you would then learn from your own observations the truth of the above statements. You could see from your carriages some of the grandest scenery to be found on the Islands—a beautiful country covered with verdure from the tops of the mountains to the water's edge, and an abundance of water everywhere, and yet there are miles and miles of this beautiful country unsettled, with the exception of the rich valley bottoms.

I shall regret very much if you leave this country without honoring us with a visit; you could do it and be absent from Honolulu only three or four days. I therefore on the part of all the people on Kauai cordially invite yourself and party to pay us a visit. Everything possible in a quiet way will be done for your comfort, etc. I fear that I have already imposed too much upon your patience and valuable time, and will therefore close, trusting that you will do all in your power to gain

for us the protection that we feel so much the need of and is our only hope for future prosperity.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
W. BLAISDELL.

Col. JAMES H. BLOUNT,
United States Commissioner, Honolulu.

No. 12.

Interview with Crister Bolte, of Honolulu, May 5, 1893.

Mr. BLOUNT. What is your occupation, Mr. Bolte?

Mr. BOLTE. I am a merchant in the corporation of Grinbaum & Co.

Q. Are you connected with the Planters' Labor and Supply Association?

A. I am.

Q. Are you a stockholder in sugar plantations?

A. I am.

Q. Is the Planters' Labor and Supply Association made up of persons interested in planting, either directly or by owning stock?

A. Yes; it is made up of persons owning stock in plantations and plantations themselves. There is hardly any person of property in this country who is not an owner of some sugar stocks.

Q. Are the members of this Planters' Labor and Supply Company all owners of sugar stocks?

A. I believe so.

Q. Were you here on the 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th of January, 1893?

A. Yes.

Q. Please tell me what you know about the occurrences during that time?

A. Previous to the 14th of January we had a cabinet consisting of Wilcox, P. C. Jones, Cecil Brown, and Mark Robinson. These were all people of intelligence, integrity, and property. They commanded the confidence of the whole community. Various attempts had been made by the legislature to get rid of them. Finally, on the 13th of January, they did oust them.

The cabinet, consisting of Sam Parker, Billy Cornwell, John Colburn, and Peterson, was appointed by the Queen, and on the 14th of January the legislature was prorogued. These people did not command the confidence of the business community. Sam Parker has squandered away all his money. He is considered a big boy; no stability in him. Billy Cornwell is of the same character also; has no property. John Colburn is a man of property, but of very doubtful character—not considered honest and straightforward. Peterson is an able lawyer. He has had the best of chances here to be a respectable man, but he seems naturally inclined towards associating with a class of people who have no respectability to them.

Q. What do you mean by the word "respectability?"

A. A man who leads a pure family life, pays his bills, keeps his word, and various other ways.

Q. What is his business?

A. He is a lawyer. He goes off on carousals. Does not go home at night. There is trouble in his family. Now to proceed: The legislature was prorogued on the 14th at 12 o'clock, and before that time news

came down town that the Queen was going to proclaim a new constitution and abrogate the old one. The business men down town came together and talked matters over.

Q. At what place?

A. W. O. Smith's office. They came to the conclusion that if the Queen can alter the constitution to suit herself she might as well alter any other law to suit herself. Anyway through altering the constitution alone she would get perfect control of the affairs of the country, because, in this constitution it says—as Minister Colburn told us at this meeting—that she intended to appoint the nobles, which is one-half of the legislative body. We decided to let things go on for a while to see how it would end up. At 4 o'clock we had another meeting, which was largely attended.

Q. At the same place?

A. At the same place. It was then stated by Minister Colburn and Minister Peterson that she had not proclaimed a new constitution; had told the people to go home, abide their time, be of good cheer, and she would give them a new constitution anyhow. At the first meeting Paul Neumann was present and said the Queen was going to proclaim a new constitution. At this last meeting it was decided that the people who were there could not be satisfied with the Queen just withdrawing from this as if nothing had happened, and they came to the conclusion that the people must have guarantees for the future, and appointed a committee of thirteen people, of which I was a member, to devise ways and means by which such guarantees could be gotten.

This committee met several times at various places, and decided that the only perfect safeguard against future occurrences of this kind would lie in annexation to the United States, or in a protectorate, or in anything of that kind, but that we could not go on with the form of government as it was then. They decided to call a mass meeting of citizens on Monday afternoon at 2 o'clock, and see what people there would say about it. At this meeting were various speakers, some of the committee of thirteen and also others. The people were asked by the speakers if they were satisfied with the promises the Queen had made and let the matter drop—let everything go on as it was before, or if they wanted a change and guarantees for the future. They desired guarantees for the future, and appointed the committee of thirteen—or rather continued the committee—to take such further steps as might be necessary.

Q. Let me ask you what you meant and what people meant by saying they wanted guarantees?

A. I meant a change of government. What the people meant I can not say, but I am fully convinced that they meant the same as it has been very often spoken of during the last few years.

Q. What has been spoken of so often?

A. Annexation to the United States has been advocated publicly in the papers—I meant change of government.

Q. Why didn't you use language that conveyed distinctly the idea—dethronement of the Queen and annexation to the United States?

A. The Hawaiian Government, as it was then, was still in existence, and in stating there publicly we wanted to dethrone the Queen and have a government of our own with an intention of being annexed to the United States, might be going a little too far.

Q. You mean making you liable to interference on the part of the local authorities?

A. Yes.

Q. And that you were trying to avoid at that time?

A. Yes, especially for this reason. We did not know whether the action of the committee would be indorsed by this large majority of the people at the mass meeting. We thought it would.

Q. Was there any expression in that meeting asking for guarantees for the future in a shape of a vote?

A. Yes; the resolution was all prepared.

Q. It was a resolution indorsing the report of the Committee of Safety?

A. Yes. The meeting dispersed, and the committee of safety went back to W. O. Smith's office to talk matters over.

Q. What time in the day was that?

A. About half past 3. After talking matters over and seeing that the Queen had concentrated her forces—meaning thereby that the soldiers were all in the barracks—the palace barricaded with sand bags and the station house barricaded—

Q. How about the Government house?

A. I didn't notice anything going on there. The station house has always been considered the stronghold of the Government. It looked as if there might be trouble. So we came to the conclusion to ask Mr. Stevens if he would protect the life and property of the citizens by sending some soldiers ashore, stating that we considered the situation very grave—even dangerous. After a short while Mr. Stevens sent his answer that he would.

Q. Sent it to the meeting?

A. Yes; sent it to the meeting, and then at 5 o'clock the soldiers came ashore. They were quartered at various places. That same evening, Monday, January 16, the Committee of Safety had another meeting.

Q. Where?

A. At Mr. Henry Waterhouse's house. They called in, besides the Committee of Safety, a few other gentlemen.

Q. Who were they?

A. Mr. Young, Fred Wundenburg, Cecil Brown, and John H. Soper. We talked matters over to see what would be best to do, and came to the conclusion we would form a Provisional Government and ask Mr. Dole if he would be the President, and that this Provisional Government should try to get annexation with the United States, because so far as we could make out at that time that was the only solid basis on which we could safely rely. Mr. Dole was not at the meeting. I had my horse with me. I was detailed to speak to Mr. Dole. I arrived at his house about half past 8, I think.

I told him what decision we had come to, and asked him if he would accept such an office. He was utterly surprised at it. He had had nothing to do with the affair before, only had been at second meeting at W. O. Smith's. He said he could not then quite see that the view we had was quite correct, but still he had not given the matter much consideration. After a lengthy discussion I induced him to go along to the meeting, so that he could hear what they had to say. After everything at the meeting had been thoroughly explained to him and discussed with him he said that he felt it was his duty, as well as the duty of any other citizen of these islands, to do all they could to get pure and stable government, but he was not quite convinced then that it was necessary to take so radical a step as to overthrow the old Government. Later on, at about 12 o'clock that night, he had come to the conclusion we could not go on the way we were, but whether he would

become President or not he would not say until 10 o'clock the next morning.

The next morning at 10 o'clock we met at W. O. Smith's office, and he said he had resigned his position as judge and would do what he was requested to do by us. We then proceeded to form the Government. It took us up to about 12 o'clock. We made all the necessary arrangements and adjourned to meet again at half past 1. At half past 1 we talked all matters over again for a little while and went to the Government house and took possession of it. At the Government house there was nobody, no armed men, supporters of the Queen, except Charles McCarty, who was doing some clerical work for the lately adjourned legislature. He said he was waiting for somebody to come to help him defend the Government house.

Q. To you?

A. No.

Q. You don't know that he said it?

A. Only from friends who told me.

Q. Who did he tell?

A. I think Andrew Brown.

Q. What does he do?

A. He is a coppersmith. He worked in the Honolulu Iron Works. Lately became superintendent of the water works. At 2 o'clock when we arrived at the Government house there came our supporters—brought their rifles and pistols with them.

Q. Do you mean at the same time, or do you mean that they got there a little before or a little after you?

A. There was preconcerted action. We told them we would go to the Government house at 2 o'clock.

Q. Had you commenced to read the proclamation before your troops got on the ground?

A. I do not recollect distinctly. They were there before we finished reading the proclamation. The chief clerks at the different departments were called in to confer with the newly-appointed ministers, among them Mr. Hassenger and Mr. Hastings. They were told to go right on with their work. Letters were written at once to the representatives of foreign countries informing them that the Provisional Government was now the Government of the Hawaiian Islands. After a short time they answered, recognizing this Government.

Q. That same day?

A. Mostly the same day. When we arrived at the Government house the ministers were not there. Mr. Hassenger, chief clerk of the interior department, said he believed they had gone over to the palace. He telephoned for them, but he got no answer, or they answered they were not there. Later on in the afternoon—I should think about 4 o'clock—Deputy Marshal Mherton came to the Government house to ask some question of Mr. Dole. I forget now what the question was. He then said, incidentally, that the ministers were at the station house, and he was handed a copy of the proclamation to give it to the old ministers. They had not been officially informed of anything, because we could not find them. Also a verbal invitation was sent to them to come over to the Government house to talk. Sam Parker came over to the Government house. He said in effect this: "You have possession now. We can not do anything." He was asked to get his colleagues. He said they did not like to come, but would some of us come to the station house and talk there?

Q. Had you then been recognized by the United States minister?

A. No. We had not been recognized by anybody at that time. Sam Damon and I were appointed and we went there to talk with them.

Q. To try to induce them to give up?

A. Yes.

Q. What reason did you give them?

A. That we had possession of the Government house now and that it would be useless shedding of blood if we got into a fight over this thing.

Q. Did you give any other reason?

A. No; only just stuck to facts.

Q. Any mention of United States troops on your part or the part of anybody during that conversation?

A. No; I did not say anything about it.

Q. Did anybody?

A. I can not say whether Sam Damon said anything.

Q. Did they say anything to anybody in your presence?

A. No.

Q. How did they answer you? Did you have no discussion?

A. Not there. We invited them to come to the Government house and talk with Mr. Dole.

Q. Did they make any agreement with you, or did they postpone it and go to the Government house?

A. Peterson said if we would guarantee him his liberty——

Q. Safe-conduct?

A. Yes. We promised him that and all went together to the Government house.

Q. What time of day was this?

A. About 5 o'clock.

Q. What time is it dark at that season of the year?

A. Between 6 and 6:30. At the station house was Ned Macfarlane. He said to me that he thought the old government would give up or the Queen would give up if we would accept a protest of her. He said, "I know such a protest does not amount to anything, but still she wants it and so you had better accept it." I told him that so far as I was concerned in the matter they could put all the protests they wanted.

Q. Was this conversation at the barracks or Government house?

A. At the station house. The four ministers, Sam Damon, and I took two hacks and went to the Government house. All said about the same thing, that they would have to give up, but they wanted to enter a protest. Then Sam Damon went with the ministers to the Queen. He reported after he came back that the Queen had said in substance the same thing.

Q. What time was it when they came back?

A. Fully 6 o'clock.

Q. About quarter of an hour before sunset?

A. Yes. Very soon after Billy Cornwell came over bringing the protest that you know of. Mr. Dole acknowledged the receipt of the protest on the back of it, stating the hour, and he then said the Queen would send orders to the station house that her people should vacate the premises. Very soon after that Captain Zeigler with a number of our men went to the station house and took possession, and the others went away leaving their arms.

Q. Who was in command of the station house?

A. Charles B. Wilson, marshal.

Q. What do you mean by very soon after? What time was the station house given up?

A. About five minutes after Billy Cornwell delivered the protest.

Q. How do you know that? Were you at the station house?

A. No.

Q. You did not know then what time it was given up?

A. We heard immediately. They telephoned from there.

Q. How long after?

A. I can not say. It was all done in a short time. I went home and got dinner. I was home about 7 o'clock.

Q. You said that same day Mr. Stevens and all the foreign governments recognized your Government. At what time in the day did they recognize you?

A. First came Mr. Woodhouse and Mr. Fuji.

Q. What time was that?

A. Four o'clock.

Q. What time in the day did Mr. Stevens send his recognition?

A. I can not say.

Q. Won't you try to approximate?

A. I can not.

Q. Had the sun set or not?

A. If Mr. Pringle brought the letter then the sun had set, and I think he was the one to bring the letter.

Q. When did you learn of the recognition? How long before you went home?

A. Just before I went home. That was what I was waiting for.

Q. How did you learn that?

A. By letter being read aloud.

Q. Who had the letter?

A. Mr. Dole.

Q. Do you know how long he had that letter?

A. He did not have it until—I think—Mr. Pringle brought it in.

Q. Are you sure about that?

A. I am not positive about that.

Q. You do not know that Pringle brought that letter at all?

A. No; but I am under that impression. I believe he delivered the letter, but I did not see him hand it over.

Q. Now will you say how long before you went home before you heard of that letter?

A. I was waiting for that letter to go home.

Q. You do not know who brought the letter?

A. I think Mr. Pringle.

Q. You do not know but what that letter was there half an hour before that?

A. I did not see the letter unless it was Pringle who brought it.

Q. You do not know but what that recognition was delivered to Mr. Dole sometime before you knew of it?

A. No; but I have reason to believe not, because some way or other I know that they said we can not be recognized as fully in possession of the Government until we had the station house and barracks in our possession. We were among ourselves wondering why Mr. Stevens did not send his recognition. This was what my friends said.

Q. What friends? Mr. Dole didn't say that—Mr. W. O. Smith didn't?

A. He may; I don't know who.

Q. Did Mr. Thurston tell you anything of that sort?

A. It is impossible to tell you what individuals said. There were so many there; it was not like a regular well conducted quiet meeting.

Q. How many attempts were made to oust the Wilcox cabinet before it was voted out?

A. Only one definite attempt.

Q. You were speaking of the character of members of the last cabinet of Liliuokalani. What do you say as to Mr. Parker's character for truth and veracity?

A. I do not know. I have never had dealings with him.

Q. What is his reputation?

A. I do not know. Nobody expects very much out of him. They look upon him as an overgrown boy.

Q. What do you say as to Mr. Peterson's reputation for truthfulness?

A. I would say myself that I do not believe he is a truthful man.

Q. What is his general reputation in that way?

A. That question I do not like to answer. I would rather state from personal knowledge.

Q. What about Mr. Colburn? What is his reputation for truth?

A. His truthfulness and honesty is very poor, I know.

Q. What is Cornwell's reputation for truth and veracity?

A. The same as Sam Parker's. He is considered a boy. With regard to truthfulness I can not say.

Q. How many persons were present in Mr. Smith's office at Saturday's first meeting?

A. Perhaps thirty.

Q. How many at the second meeting?

A. More than one hundred. People standing out in the street. Could not get in there.

Q. You talked of annexation to the United States in there, did you or did you not, on Saturday?

A. Yes.

Q. Why did you think of annexation to the United States; was there a disposition of that sort in the country?

A. Yes; it has been discussed openly in newspapers over the signature or name of various people, among them, Hartwell, Sereno Bishop, and others.

Q. Was that the general disposition amongst the whites in this country?

A. It is.

Q. Was it at that time?

A. It was.

Q. So you felt sure of that on that day—Saturday?

A. We knew that was the feeling of all who were at the two meetings on Saturday, as well as the large meeting in the skating rink.

Q. Before that, was it the general inclination of the whites in the Hawaiian Islands?

A. Yes; I should consider it so.

Q. You had a meeting on Monday about 3 o'clock of the committee of safety, after the mass meeting?

A. Yes; about half-past three.

Q. You were present?

A. Yes.

Q. At that time how many arms did you have?

A. They were not collected, but they were all over town. I had seen some of my friends on Saturday, and at one house they told me that they had between 50 and 60 men armed.

Q. Of course you made some estimate of your arms. How many men do you think you had and how many guns do you think you had?

A. I can say what I thought myself. My own opinion was that we could have three or four hundred easily.

Q. You appointed a committee to wait on Mr. Stevens and ask that troops be brought on shore?

A. Yes.

Q. Who carried that communication to Mr. Stevens?

A. I am not sure. I think Thurston and Waterhouse. I am not sure. It may have been somebody entirely different.

Q. Did you see Mr. Stevens that day?

A. No.

Q. Who reported Mr. Stevens' reply about troops?

A. The same committee.

Q. What did they say?

A. They said that Mr. Stevens had heard their request and conversed with them about matters, and he considered that the situation was sufficiently dangerous to send troops ashore.

Q. Was he informed of the purposes of the mass meeting?

A. He did know about it. Everybody in town knew.

Q. And knew of the purposes of the movement?

A. I can not say.

Q. You say everybody in town knew?

A. That we desired annexation had not been said by us at the mass meeting. We said we wanted stable government. The committee was to devise ways and means to get stable government.

Q. Was it known that one of the methods of getting it was to get rid of the Queen? Was that the impression of the meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. That meeting was composed of a large class of whites, and it is a fair inference that the white people here knew what it meant?

A. Yes; I think so.

Q. The meeting that called for troops—they determined then and there to dethrone the Queen—the meeting after the mass meeting?

A. After the mass meeting we said we have to decide what to do about this, and the first thing we have to do is to get things into safety, and it was only in the evening on Monday, the 16th of January, at Henry Waterhouse's house, that we definitely made up our minds which course to pursue.

Q. What course?

A. The course we have pursued—dethroning the Queen and forming the Provisional Government.

Q. Your committee that met after the mass meeting were all in favor individually of dethroning the Queen?

A. Yes, individually.

Q. Why did not you determine to do it then instead of postponing it until night?

A. Because we wanted to go home to get our dinner and come back after dinner.

Q. Then, the night meeting was a continuation of the discussion which began after the mass meeting, and concluded with the determination to dethrone the Queen and establish the Provisional Government?

A. The night meeting was an adjourned meeting of the 3 o'clock meeting.

Q. What did you do at the 3 o'clock meeting?

A. We said we are a committee of safety. We must get things safe

first. We will appoint a committee to wait upon Mr. Stevens and ask him to send soldiers ashore.

Q. And having done that you adjourned?

A. We waited until the committee came back. The committee said Mr. Stevens was willing—the soldiers would come ashore at 5 o'clock. Then we adjourned to meet in the evening.

Q. Was there any communication between any of the gentlemen who met at Mr. Waterhouse's house that night and Mr. Stevens?

A. None to my knowledge.

Q. No committee went to see him?

A. No.

Q. Why did you want the troops to come on shore? What was the idea of the committee?

A. The idea of the committee was this: The natives were armed—at least the soldiers and friends of the Queen were all armed—that evening. We didn't have any armed forces in readiness. Each individual had his own arms, but we had no organized forces; so in case of a row we would not be able to resist anything.

Q. Suppose they had made an attack on the committee of safety, what would you have done?

A. We could not have done anything. They would simply have caught us. We had our men out watching. We were afraid of an attack.

Q. By the government troops?

A. No, by the natives, because there were some among the natives who had been preaching for them to set houses on fire.

Q. You wanted troops to keep them from setting houses on fire?

A. Yes; as soon as the natives in this country know that there is a strong force anywhere which they can not subdue or will show real fight it is then their character to be very quiet and keep still.

Q. If the troops had not been landed you would not have been safe?

A. We would not have considered ourselves safe.

Q. If you had not gotten a favorable answer from Mr. Stevens about the landing of the troops, what would you have done then?

A. That is impossible to answer, because we had not made any plans.

Q. You were not willing to do anything until you got the answer.

A. That is a question I can not give an answer to. We did not decide about it.

Q. You said you met to do one thing—to ask for troops and to stay there until you got Mr. Stevens's answer, and then you adjourned. Is that correct.

A. Yes.

Q. Having gotten that answer and the troops on shore you assembled at night, and at that night session you determined to dethrone the Queen and establish the Provisional Government?

A. Yes.

Q. You never took up that subject until you got the troops on shore?

A. At previous meetings. Saturday afternoon we were appointed. Sunday we had a meeting. At this meeting we talked over matters. The general feeling was that annexation to the United States would be the best solution of the whole question, and this, of course, would necessitate the overthrow of the Queen's Government.

Q. That was known at Saturday's meeting and at Sunday's meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you have any meeting before the mass meeting on Monday?

A. We had another meeting on Monday morning.

Q. And still the same feeling?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there anything said in this meeting with reference to the use of troops?

A. No; although I can not state so positively.

Q. Was anything said on Sunday about the use of troops?

A. Only that we expressed the wish that we could get the troops to make things safe.

Q. Then on Monday before the meeting, was there anything mentioned about the troops?

A. It was still said if we could get annexation to the United States and have United States troops on shore there would be no trouble.

Q. You thought if you got troops on shore everything would be quiet?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you think it at the mass meeting?

A. Yes; still thought the same thing.

Q. And you thought at night when you assembled and determined on dethroning the Queen that you would have no trouble, the troops being on shore?

A. Exactly so.

Q. You thought the presence of United States troops—an organized armed body of men—would prevent any hostile movement on the part of the government forces?

A. Not of the forces, but of an excited mob.

Q. You went up to the government building—the troops were near by. Did you still feel that the presence of those troops would likely restrain hostilities?

A. No; I can hardly say that. I expected that there would be somebody in the Government building—that there might be some formalities.

Q. What sort of formalities?

A. The same formalities as we have had before at the 1887 revolution. They trotted out with their guns and talked.

Q. You expected there would be a talk and they would surrender?

A. Yes.

Q. The opinion you have expressed about the presence of troops—was that the general opinion in the meeting of the committee of safety?

A. The committee of safety thought that as soon as the United States troops were on shore the property of everybody would be safe—no house-firing; no plunder.

Q. When the troops came on shore what did you expect of them in the event of a conflict between the Provisional Government forces and the Queen's Government?

A. We did not expect them to do anything.

Q. Just to stand and see the fight?

A. I do not know. My opinion is that they came on shore to protect life and property. Their presence would avoid any attack upon property or life.

Q. How would they accomplish it? You are proposing to depose the Queen; she has armed forces. Suppose those forces had gotten into battle. What did you expect the United States troops to do in the way of protection of person and property during the battle?

A. This is a peaceable country. We only scare one another. No blood shedding happens here. This is the third revolution since I am here. At the first revolution not a shot was fired. At the second

there were two or three young native men who had had a military training in Europe. They fired a few guns that they had. There were seven or eight native people killed—wounded and killed. As soon as these people had been wounded and killed the rest of the natives ran away. Hid away in the house in the palace yard—the bungalow it is called. During the whole afternoon was kept up a fusillade from both sides. Nobody was hurt. In this instance I personally expected there would be something similar to either the first or second revolution.

Q. What were the deliberations of the committee of safety in that meeting?

A. No further than this: We must get the soldiers on shore. Their very presence on shore without doing the least thing will make life and property safe. We did not expect any resistance, because we had as many men as they, or more. But their being there, there would not be any trouble at all. But even without them we did not expect any trouble.

Q. Then why did you determine to try to get them there before you determined to dethrone the Queen?

A. Because we wanted to protect property.

Q. What need had you of the protection of property if you did not expect the people to fight? Suppose the troops had not been on shore, what danger was there to property? You just expected to march up and take the Government building without fighting?

A. Yes; but we wanted to have the troops.

Q. And you determined to ascertain whether you could get the troops before you went further. Is not that true?

A. Yes; if we could not get them we must make our own arrangements.

Q. Do you mean to say that if Mr. Stevens had said you should not have the troops you had determined to go on anyway?

A. We didn't come as far as that, we were waiting for Mr. Stevens's answer before we decided anything further.

Q. If you did not think the natives would fight, whether the troops were on shore or off shore, why did you need the United States troops to prevent the burning of houses and other riotous acts?

A. We wanted them to stay over night, because things of that nature are generally done at night.

Q. Was it your idea that those troops were just to protect you that night?

A. No; it was our idea to have them on shore and keep them on shore as long as possible, until everything was quiet again.

Q. Now let me ask you, did the committee or not, in their deliberations, consider the presence of those troops on shore as important to your success in the effort to dethrone the Queen and set up a new government?

A. When we asked for them we had not made up our minds to dethrone the Queen. We had not made up our minds to anything definite. A change of government was to come, but we had not decided as to what means should be taken.

Q. They had to be quartered somewhere. You had to have a large house. What did you do?

A. Arion Hall was vacant. It was the handiest place and we chose it.

Q. Did you all think that was the best place?

A. Yes.

Q. To whom does it belong?

A. Arion Hall belongs to Mr. Waller.

Q. And in the meeting after the mass meeting you concluded that was the best place to put them?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you all think that the natives and the Queen and her followers would think that those troops were in sympathy with your movement?

A. I do not know what was in their minds.

Q. You said the meeting of the committee of safety in the afternoon of Monday was assembled to do its first work, to wit, to ask for troops.

A. Yes.

Q. Was it not the idea in the minds of you gentlemen at that time to do away with the royal government?

A. Why certainly. It has been in our minds for many years.

Q. Did it show itself in your discussions?

A. At the very first meeting at W. O. Smith's office they talked about such things.

Q. I invite your attention to the meeting of the committee of safety at half past 3 o'clock on Monday afternoon. In the interchange of views that took place there was there an expression in favor of the landing of the troops, and of taking up in the night session the question of dethroning the Queen?

A. What is our first duty? It is to make things 'safe. For that purpose we must ask Mr. Stevens to let us have his soldiers. The committee came back and said the soldiers would be on shore at 5 o'clock.

Q. Was not anything said in that meeting about taking steps towards dethroning the Queen at the night session?

A. Not by me or to me, nothing definitely said, but it was the prevailing idea since the first meeting.

Q. It was in the minds of the mass meeting and in the minds of the committee of safety at the time that call took place, so that there was no occasion to interchange any opinion on that subject at that time?

A. Yes.

Q. So, understanding each other, your object was first to get the troops on shore. Is that true?

A. Yes; to get things safe. I say that the intention of getting troops on shore that afternoon was only considered from a standpoint of safety.

Q. And that consisted in the fact that you thought the presence of the troops would prevent the burning of houses.

A. Or any disturbances of any kind.

Q. Suppose the Queen's troops should have been ordered to arrest people, what would you expect?

A. We knew most likely they would not be ordered to arrest anybody.

Q. But suppose they had commenced to make arrests of the committee of safety and other persons, or commenced to fight against the followers of the committee of safety, what did you expect the troops to do at such a moment?

A. Nothing. I fully understand the situation. These people did not come to prevent anything by the existing Government, but knowing the character of the Hawaiian people so well there was small risk that we took.

Q. What time did the committee of safety adjourn on Monday afternoon?

A. I think about half-past 4 or quarter to 5, something like that.

Q. What time did it assemble in the evening?

A. Half-past seven, about.

Q. In your evening session after the troops were landed, did you take up the question of dethroning the Queen?

A. We did.

Q. And determined to dethrone her, and determined on a Provisional Government for the purpose of annexation?

A. We did then definitely determine these things, and more especially decide upon the manner in which it should be done, but about annexation was spoken at the first meeting at W. O. Smith's.

Q. At whose house was this meeting?

A. Henry Waterhouse's.

Q. How far is that from the American minister's house?

A. Next door.

Q. What is the distance between the houses?

A. Twenty yards—maybe thirty yards.

Q. Were many Americans in this movement in the mass meeting?

A. People of all nationalities.

Q. Which nationality had the largest number there?

A. I believe Americans.

Q. How many Americans do you think were there?

A. It is impossible to say.

Q. Would you say that the great body of Americans in Honolulu were there—all the men?

A. I believe so—I can not say. It is impossible to recognize each person. I will say that I saw many Americans, many Germans, many English, and some Portuguese.

Q. How many Portuguese.

A. I took a Portuguese friend of mine, Mr. Mendonça. There were not many Portuguese. Some of them do not understand English very good. There was a large crowd of people, which has been estimated by different people at different numbers. I estimated it at 1,200. Others claimed there were more. How they were divided I do not know.

Q. Did you ask any other power to send troops on shore?

A. No.

Q. Anything said about it in the meeting of the committee of safety?

A. Nothing that I know of. There were no other warships anyway.

Q. Well, you had troops on shore on Monday night, and your idea was to prevent the burning and destruction of property that night?

A. For the future. Not only for that night, but until things were settled.

Q. Do you mean until you could organize the affairs of government?

A. Yes.

(Mr. Bolte was at this point shown the letter from the committee of safety to Mr. Stevens—dated January 16, 1893—and asked in regard to the nationality of the signers thereof.)

Q. What nationality is Mr. Cooper?

A. American.

Q. Mr. McChesney?

A. American.

Q. Mr. Wilder.

A. American.

Q. Mr. Bolte?

A. German.

Q. Mr. Brown?

A. American.

Q. Mr. W. O. Smith?

A. Hawaiian.

Q. Mr. Waterhouse?

A. Hawaiian.

Q. Mr. Lansing?

A. American.

Q. Mr. Suhr?

A. German.

Q. Mr. Thurston?

A. Hawaiian.

Q. Mr. Emmeluth?

A. American.

Q. Mr. Castle?

A. Hawaiian.

Q. Mr. McCandless?

A. American.

Q. Do they all vote here?

A. Yes; they all vote here.

Q. This was a call, then, from Germans, Hawaiians, and American citizens for troops, was it not?

A. Yes.

Q. And they were landed to protect all classes?

A. Yes.

Q. Who drew up the application to the American minister?

A. Either Mr. Thurston or Mr. Smith.

Q. In this paper you set out your reasons for your application?

A. Yes.

A. With a requirement that each elector shall be able to read and write could you have stable government on these Islands?

A. What language?

Q. Either Hawaiian or English.

A. We could not.

Q. Tell me why.

A. Because the Hiwaiians are indolent people. They do not want to do any work to earn money. They prefer easy jobs, such as Government offices of any kind—either as clerks in the Government house, as judges, sheriffs, policemen, poundkeepers, or anything of that nature. That gives them a living and also a sort of authority—a sort of power of domineering over others—which they like immensely. They know that they can get this power only by keeping together and getting a government of Hawaiians—whether they be brown-skinned or white-skinned—I mean with Hawaiian sentiment. They want to domineer over people who have some property. They let their horses go into the sugar cane of others, let their cattle run on the pasture of others, and various things of that sort. You cannot get justice when they are brought into court. Hawaiian judges will let them go, or fine them such a small amount that property holders do not care to go into court. You cannot get justice in jury cases with Hawaiian jurymen. They never convict anybody on testimony. They judge by sentiment.

Q. Do you think you could have and maintain an independent government here with the population you have without aid from outside power?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Why?

A. Ever since 1887 there have been attempts at revolution from the native Hawaiian side. One real outbreak occurred in 1889—the Wilcox insurrection. At that time the people who were implicated in this revolution were found not guilty in court by a jury of their own countrymen, and only one man of the revolutionists, who was a Belgian or German, I do not remember now, was found guilty by a white jury and punished. You will see anywhere and on all occasions that the native element runs together like mercury to confront anything that comes from the side of the white people.

Q. You mean in politics?

A. In anything, and it is a very strange thing to see that the half-whites almost invariably go with the natives.

Q. Do you ever have any white men of intelligence and courage and ambition for place—without property—who will go with them and lead them?

A. We have men of ambition, intelligence, courage, and no property. The last point I can not say, but the first three applies to V. V. Ashford. There are others. I could give you a whole string.

Q. I only wanted to know if the native population could get and accept that class of white men as leaders of their race and party?

A. They would, because they have done so already.

Q. Have you been troubled much with this class of men?

A. Very much indeed.

Q. For how long?

A. Ever since I have been in the country—since 1879.

Q. And for these causes you have felt that to have stable government you have to look to some power outside the islands?

A. Yes.

Q. You still feel that way?

A. I do.

Q. Now, without indicating anything by my question as to the disposition of the United States (for I have no right to do so), suppose you should undertake annexation to the United States, what form of government would you think necessary in order to maintain order, security, life, and property in these islands?

A. I should prefer personally an oligarchy—submitting my interests to the judgment of respectable men.

Q. Appointed how?

A. I suppose after we were annexed the President of the United States would appoint a governor, and let this governor or the President of the United States appoint three or four secretaries and let them appoint advisory boards, but I do not think that would satisfy the people.

Q. What property qualification would you consider sufficient for a voter?

A. I think a man ought to earn \$2 or \$2.50 a day.

Q. That would be about how much in the course of a year?

A. Between \$600 and \$750 a year.

Q. Would that disqualify enough of the natives to give you political power?

A. I think if it was about \$2.50 a day that it would, because people who earn \$2.50 day are mechanics, and people who earn less than that are mostly laborers. Mechanics are naturally of a higher class than laborers.

Q. Are there many mechanics among the natives?

A. Very few in proportion to their large number.

Q. What proportion of them would you say are mechanics—one in fifty?

A. No; one in twenty-five.

Q. What would be your idea about the American notion of not allowing anybody to hire labor from abroad?

A. I want stable government first. Annexation to the United States in any way, and I will take my chances as to the rest.

Q. Suppose you were not allowed to send agents abroad and the individual citizen was not allowed to send abroad to bring laborers to the sugar plantations, what would be the result on the value of the product and the value of the property?

A. The United States laws permit a board of immigration to make known in other countries how things are there with reference to laborers, what wages they may expect, and how much work there is. The laws also permit that people may come as free immigrants; also, that personal friends and relatives may assist their friends and relatives to come to this country, and I know a good many people among the laboring classes here who are willing and ready to do so. I think there are a great many among the Japanese as well as the Portuguese, who are most desirable classes, who would assist their friends to come here, but it will be necessary that these people should be entitled to a small piece of land after they have been in the country for a certain number of years; say three or five years. They do not require much.

A Portuguese family would be satisfied with a piece of three acres. We would establish villages all over the country in the neighborhood of plantations. The men and boys would go down to the plantation to work, and the women and children stay at home to look after the garden, etc. The men go home from their work at 5 o'clock, so there are almost two hours of daylight. They can do whatever hard work there is after that time.

I have carefully read the foregoing and pronounce it an accurate report of my interview with Colonel Blount.

HONOLULU, *June 10, 1893.*

C. BOLTE.

(This page was handed in by Mr. Bolte June 21, 1893):

The answers which I have given to Mr. Blount's questions, "When was for the first time anything said about deposing or dethroning the Queen," might lead to misunderstandings in reading this report. I desire, therefore, to hereby declare as follows: Words to the effect that the Queen must be deposed or dethroned were not uttered to my knowledge at any meeting of the committee of safety until Monday evening, January 16, 1893; but at the very first meeting of citizens at W. O. Smith's office, on Saturday, January 14, at about 2 p. m., or even before this meeting had come to order, Paul Neumann informed the arriving people that the Queen was about to promulgate a new constitution. The answer then given him by Mr. W. C. Wilder, by me, and by others was: That is a very good thing and a splendid opportunity to get rid of the whole old rotten Government concern, and now to get annexation to the United States. Paul Neumann thought that that might be going a little too far. At the second meeting at W. O. Smith's, between 3 and 4 p. m. on Saturday afternoon, January 14, 1893, when the committee of safety was appointed, sentiments of the same nature, that this is a splendid opportunity to get rid of the old régime, and strong demands for annexation, or any kind of stable government under the supervision of the United States, were expressed.

Therefore, even if the words that the Queen must be deposed or dethroned were not spoken, surely the sentiment that this must be done prevailed at or even before the very first meeting, on January 14, 1893.

C. BOLTE.

HONOLULU, *June 10, 1893.*

No. 13.

Interview with W. Porter Boyd, consular clerk, Honolulu, Tuesday, June 13, 1893.

Q. Mr. Boyd, what is your occupation?

A. I am in the consular service.

Q. In what position?

A. I am a consular clerk and vice-consul-general at this place.

Q. Were you at your office on the 16th of January, 1893?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you on the streets on that day?

A. Not until the afternoon about the time of the meeting.

Q. Where was the meeting held?

A. At the armory.

Q. Was there any signs of disturbance on the streets?

A. No, sir.

Q. Business going on as usual?

A. Yes, up to the time of the mass meeting, when they closed to go there.

Q. Women and children on the street as usual?

A. I think there were very few women and children about.

Q. Was there any excitement looking like disorder?

A. No; I do not think there was. I didn't see any of that.

Q. Was there any suggestion of disorder except what might come from the movements of the committee of safety?

A. So far as I know there was not.

Q. What I wish to know—was there anything exciting the public mind except those events growing out of the movement of the committee of safety?

A. I should say there was not.

Q. Was there any indication of hostility manifested by the carrying of arms or threats on the part of what may be termed the royalists?

A. To my knowledge there was not.

Q. Did you attend the mass meeting?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. As an observer?

A. Yes.

Q. How many people do you suppose were there?

A. I should say from eleven to twelve hundred.

Q. Many Portuguese there?

A. I can not answer. I do not know.

Q. What did you understand to be the object of that mass meeting from what you saw and heard?

A. It was first to hear the report of that committee of thirteen, and then take other steps for the protection of the persons and property of citizens of the islands.

Q. What did you understand them to mean by the protection of the persons and property of citizens?

A. I understood that it was to prevent the change of the Constitution.

Q. Did you understand that it was to dethrone the Queen and set up another government?

A. That was not my understanding at the time.

Q. Was that the understanding in the community so far as you can gather from contact with people?

A. I should say that of the very pronounced annexationists that was their wish—that was their object—but whether this meeting was for that purpose I do not know.

Q. There was no expression in the crowd, so far as you could gather, containing the idea that this was a movement to dethrone the Queen and set up another government?

A. No, sir.

Q. Had you heard of any meeting of the committee of safety before that meeting?

A. I had heard that they had had meetings, and that they had a report to make.

Q. Did you hear what it was to be?

A. No, sir; and I do not believe any one else did.

Q. After the mass meeting, what did the people do? Did they go to work again that afternoon?

A. I think they did—I think the stores were open.

Q. Don't you know?

A. No; but that is my impression now. On second thought I am sure that they opened their places again.

Q. Do you think that the crowd that came to that meeting and then went away and went back to their business had any impression that the Queen was going to be dethroned the next day?

A. I do not believe that they thought that. Everything was left in the hands of the committee. The mass meeting gave the thirteen power to go ahead and do what they thought best; and only that thirteen knew, so far as I can learn.

Q. But there was no mention that the power to do what they thought best went so far as to dethrone the Queen?

A. Not any further than the way they denounced the action of the Queen on the Saturday before.

Q. But would that indicate that they meant to dethrone her by denouncing her action?

A. Yes; it was my impression that it would be either that or she would remain on the throne under certain restrictions.

Q. Was there any excitement when the troops landed that evening other than that growing out of the fact of seeing troops landed?

A. Yes; of course much more than if troops had been landed as they have been before for drill.

Q. Were many people down at the wharf when they landed?

A. I do not think so. They did not seem to know until the troops were landed. Both central offices rang us up and asked us why the *Boston* troops were landed.

Q. Was it understood that they landed at the request of the committee of safety?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why did the committee of safety want them to land if everything was quiet?

A. They knew what they were going to do, and they feared some trouble or some interference in their plans.

Q. Now, was it understood, so far as you could gather by both annexationists and antiannexationists, that those troops were friendly to the movement of the committee of safety?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was it encouraging to one side and depressing to the other?

A. I should say it was—for the reason that it was at the request of this committee, and the others did not know what it was for.

Q. Did antiannexationists seem to be depressed when they found the troops had been landed?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they apprehensive that they would be favorable to the other side?

A. I should say they were.

Q. Was this a continuing feeling up to the dethronement?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, Mr. Boyd, in view of what you have stated and what you observed that day, would you suppose that this feeling restrained action on the part of the Queen and her friends against the committee of safety?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you see Mr. Stevens on Monday, the 16th of January?

A. Yes.

Q. Had he been aboard the *Boston*?

A. I was told he had been there all afternoon.

Q. By whom?

A. Mr. Severance.

Q. How did Mr. Severance know it?

A. Mr. Stevens, I believe, had told him.

Q. Did he say what he was there for?

A. No, he didn't.

Q. Was Mr. Stevens at the consulate?

A. Yes. He said the *Boston* boys were going to land and would detail a guard for the consulate.

Q. Had Mr. Severance any desire for it?

A. No; it was the first knowledge he had of it.

Q. Had you any uneasiness at the consulate-general?

A. None whatever.

Q. Did you hear anything from the telephone or otherwise in reference to the landing of the troops?

A. Only that they were landing, and asked why they were landed.

Q. Who asked?

A. The central office asked first.

Q. Did the people in the city make any inquiry?

A. Yes; some.

Q. Did it seem to be a surprise generally?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it a surprise to you?

A. It was.

Q. There was nothing in the city to indicate the need of military forces, so far as you could see?

A. Nothing, so far as I could see.

Q. Did you have any conversation with Judge Hartwell January 14, 1893; did you hear any conversation between him and Lieut. Young?

A. Not further than that he said that something would drop about

3 o'clock, and asked if he was going to be aboard. He said all the officers will know.

Q. Are you sure that was on Saturday?

A. That was immediately after the prorogation on Saturday.

Q. Did Mr. Atherton say anything on the day of the proclamation dethroning the Queen? What did he say?

A. Mr. Draper, I think, Mr. Severance, and myself were with some others in the office, as was Capt. McCullough of the *W. G. Irwin*. We were all impatient. Everybody was anxious to know what was going to happen. He said something was going to happen about 3 or 4 [o'clock.]

Q. He didn't say what it was?

A. No. I had no idea what it was. Of course I had some idea.

Q. Were you not thinking about dethronement?

A. Yes; I was.

Q. Is this Mr. Atherton the man in whose yard the *Boston* men stopped when they first landed?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. After they landed they went up by the palace?

A. Yes. The main body went on up to Atherton's yard. They stopped there a few hours. It was after dark before they went back to Arion Hall—back of the opera house.

Q. Did Mr. Atherton seem to be satisfied over what was going to happen?

A. Yes. He seemed to be satisfied that everything was coming out as he wished.

Q. Any excitement on the street before the pistol shot?

A. No; just the ordinary crowds walking about.

Q. Did they seem to know what was going on?

A. No.

Q. Were the stores open?

A. Yes.

Q. Any ladies on the street?

A. Very few.

Q. Any children?

A. I do not know that I noticed any children.

Q. What time did they close the stores?

A. They closed them when the report of the pistol was heard, so far as I remember.

Q. What did they do then?

A. They went out on the street, towards where the shot was fired.

Q. Did they go armed?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. As if they were going to fight, or only as if to see what was going on?

A. Just for curiosity.

Q. No manifestation of any hostile movement?

A. None whatever. A Mr. Paris, connected with the "Advertiser," was our authority. We used to question him, and he used to tell us what was going on. In the afternoon he told us there were three different places where they were enlisting to support any movement the committee wished to make.

Q. Did those men who were enlisted have arms?

A. He didn't say so, or where they were going to get them.

Q. Was that after the proclamation or before?

A. It was before.

Q. Did he say what they were enlisted for?

A. To carry their point. He did not say what it was.

I have read the foregoing and it is a correct report of my interview with Mr. Blount.

W. P. BOYD.

HONOLULU, *June 13, 1893.*

No. 14.

(Statement of J. O. Carter, May 3, 1893, printed with Mr. Blount's No. 4, dated May 4, 1893.)

No. 15.

Interview with J. O. Carter, Honolulu, May 13, 1893.

MR. BLOUNT. Are you a brother of the Mr. Carter who was at one time minister to the United States?

A. I am.

Q. What business are you engaged in?

A. I am a sugar factor and commission merchant.

Q. I see in the correspondence between the American minister at this point and the State Department, during Mr. Harrison's administration, reference to the relations between the ex-Queen and Mr. Wilson, the ex-marshal. Please tell me what you know of the character of the Queen.

A. So far as I know I have always found her to be a gentlewoman, very kindly and generous, and I do not know anything against her, except what parties have circulated in Honolulu.

Q. Do you give any credit to these stories?

A. No; knowing this community as well as I do, I do not credit them.

Q. In what way do you mean?

A. There is more loose talk about men and women in this town than any place I have ever seen in my life. I never knew such a place for loose talk.

Q. Was she invited to private houses to entertainments by Americans and Europeans?

A. She was.

Q. Did the ladies of these nationalities resort freely to the palace and manifest respect for her?

A. They did to my certain knowledge.

Q. To any considerable extent?

A. It was limited only by her.

Q. She was welcome at any house?

A. I never knew anything against her being invited. She was most certainly welcome.

Q. What is the foundation of these rumors against her character?

A. I suppose the fact that Wilson and his wife resided in that bungalow and resided in the cottage at Washington Place when she was there.

Q. Did they live in the house with her?

A. Not to my knowledge. I understand that Wilson and his wife

lived in the bungalow at the palace and in the cottage at Washington Place.

Q. The bungalow was 30 or 40 yards from the palace?

A. Certainly; all of that.

Q. Did Mr. Wilson and his wife live in that bungalow?

A. I understand so. I never called on them.

Q. What were the relations between the Queen and Mrs. Wilson?

A. I think she very largely brought Mrs. Wilson up. Mrs. Wilson was the daughter of an American, John S. Townsend. He deserted his wife and family, and the Queen showed her kindness to the girl. But that was before she was Queen; before she was heir apparent. Natives have a way of bringing up children in that way.

Q. She took this Mrs. Wilson up at about what age?

A. I can not say; but at quite an early age. There are two kinds of children among the natives—Keikehanai and Keikehanau. The latter is a child of the body the former an adopted child.

Q. Has she (Liliuokalani) ever had a child?

A. She never had any children.

Q. What do you know of Mr. Wilson?

A. I know that he is reputed to be half Tahitian; that he was a blacksmith and that he was marshal of the Kingdom.

Q. His father was of what nationality?

A. I do not really know.

Q. Does he seem to be about the same type of person as the half-castes are?

A. Just about.

Q. His associations generally are with those people?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he come here as a child?

A. That I can not tell you.

Q. What reason did the Queen have for appointing this person to the office of marshal and for having him to live in the palace grounds when she was at that place and in the cottage when she was at Washington Place?

A. She believed thoroughly in his loyalty. He has the reputation of being courageous, and she believed that he would protect her against persons who were disposed against her.

Q. Protect her in what sense? Was she apprehensive of any assault?

A. I think she has been from all that I could gather.

Q. Of what?

A. Of this party of revolutionists.

Q. Do you mean that she has not felt sure but what some movement would be made looking to her dethronement?

A. Whether it was that or overturning of the State I can not say.

Q. And you think that was the reason, in connection with Wilson's loyalty to her and his courage, that she persisted in holding him in office?

A. I can not think of any other reason.

Q. What was the reason of the desire on the part of the opposition or Reform party to get Wilson out of that place? What sort of officer did he make?

A. He was in charge of the police. He was a very good marshal, and the proof of that is that when the Reform party came into power they did not put him out.

Q. In 1887?

A. I do not mean that. I mean lately—in the Legislature they did

not put him out. Mr. Neumann invited them to come before him and a committee and make their complaint about Mr. Wilson; said that he would listen to them, and if they gave sufficient reason why he should be deposed they should do it. Neumann told me so himself.

Q. What reason do you suppose they had for the attacks on Wilson?

A. He was in their way.

Q. In their way in what thing? Do you imagine that there was any annexation movement in the minds of the Reform party?

A. Individuals in the party were always pronounced annexationists. Hartwell was; Mr. Gren was; Mr. Thurston—I won't say that of Thurston. The only insight I got as to his feelings was that he remarked to me one day that he believed in bringing things to a smash.

Q. How long ago was that?

A. During the session of the Legislature. It was at a meeting of the company we were in. He said, "I believe in bringing things to a smash and then we will rebuild."

Q. What is your interpretation of all that turning out of cabinets and putting in of cabinets? Did it illustrate that smashing-up policy?

A. Thurston was a ringleader in all that work and I believe it was to that end.

Q. How in point of intelligence did the Wilcox cabinet compare with the Macfarlane cabinet, take them as a whole?

A. In point of intelligence there was not much difference. In the matter of having the confidence of men of wealth the Jones-Wilcox cabinet was undoubtedly the superior.

Q. What is the character of Mr. Samuel Parker as to truthfulness?

A. I have never heard it questioned. He is a frank, open sort of person, and such persons are not liars as a rule.

Q. Does he circulate in the best society in Honolulu, he and his family?

A. Yes, they can circulate wherever they want to.

Q. He and his wife are both half-castes?

A. They are.

Q. What is Mr. Peterson's character as to truthfulness?

A. I would always accept his statements.

Q. Is that generally true here?

A. That I can not tell you.

Q. Do you know his general reputation for truth and veracity?

A. I think I do.

Q. From that character would you believe him on oath?

A. I would.

Q. Do you regard him as a truthful man?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know the general reputation of Cornwell as to truth and veracity?

A. I have never heard it questioned.

Q. From that reputation would you believe him on his oath?

A. Certainly.

Q. How about Mr. Colburn; from your general knowledge of his reputation for truth and veracity, would you believe him on his oath?

A. He has the reputation of being sharp in business practices. I am loath to say I would not take his word under oath.

Q. Has it been the practice of any foreign nation or nations to land troops here in case of disturbance?

A. I never saw it done except on the part of American forces. When

Kalakaua was put on the throne both English and American forces were landed. Admiral Skerrett was the captain of the *Portsmouth*.

Q. What effect was produced on the mind of the native population by the landing of American marines on the 16th of January, 1893?

A. The effect was to intimidate them.

Q. Was that intimidation helpful to the movers in the revolution?

A. Most certainly.

Q. Could they have succeeded without the impression that they were backed by the United States forces?

A. They would not have undertaken it without. I feel sure of that.

Q. What was the condition at that time in the city as to peacefulness?

A. It was the most peaceful, law-abiding community you would see anywhere.

Q. The stores open as usual?

A. Yes. They closed the stores on the 16th so as to let everybody attend the mass meeting.

Q. Were women and children going about on the streets as usual?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the people go back to their stores after the mass meeting?

A. I think not. It was late in the afternoon.

Q. Was it on account of the lateness of the hour that they did not go back to their stores?

A. Yes; that was the only reason. There was no disorder. Women and children on the street.

Q. The next morning, the morning of the 17th, were people going about as usual?

A. I saw no difference. Our place opened up and I think all the rest of the places on Queen street opened up.

Q. Sometime during the day of the 17th were you sent for to go to the Government building?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What time in the day was that?

A. About 6 o'clock, I think. I dine at half past 5, and during dinner I was rung up, and went down to the Government building with Mr. Mehrtens, who came for me.

Q. Were you sent for by the parties in this new movement?

A. I do not know that. I was taken by Mehrtens right to the Government building.

Q. And brought in the presence of whom?

A. The Provisional Government.

Q. Please state what occurred there?

A. There was a deal of excitement. I asked why I had been sent for. I do not know who answered me. I was told a committee was going over to the Queen—that I was to go with the committee. I went with the committee.

Q. They didn't ask you to go, just told you you were to go?

A. I was told that there was a committee to be sent to the Queen and I was wanted to go.

Q. For what purpose?

A. To state to her that the Provisional Government had been formed and that she was deposed, and to assist her in making any protest she might want to make.

Q. Did you go?

A. Yes.

Q. Please state what occurred?

A. We went into the blue room. Her Majesty and one or both of the princes were there. Her ministers were there—Mr. Widemann, Mr. MacFarlane. Mr. Damon I suppose was the committee. I do not know whether there was more than one. I went with him. Mr. Damon made a few remarks, in which he said that the Provisional Government had been formed; that she was deposed, and that she could make a protest if she desired. There was a pause. I spoke up and said it was an unpleasant thing to be present on such an occasion. She had my sympathy; that it was a question of yielding to force; that if she would accept my advice she would yield and counsel her people to be quiet and orderly; that I should advise the surrender of the station house and barracks; that in case she acted in the line I marked out, I believed her case would be a better one for presentation at Washington.

Q. What force did you refer to?

A. The forces of the Provisional Government, backed by the *Boston*.

Q. Was it your impression that the *Boston* forces would coöperate with the Provisional Government forces?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Had the Provisional Government been recognized?

A. That is a matter of hearsay. It was commonly reported so on the street.

Q. You were in the crowd at the Government building when they sent for you?

A. I overheard that Mr. Stevens had recognized the Provisional Government.

Q. Was it the common acceptance in that crowd, so far as you could see or hear?

A. In the afternoon it was the understanding on the street that Mr. Stevens had recognized the Government. I heard a rumor that Stevens had recognized the Government and that a steamer was to be chartered and sent with commissioners to Washington.

Q. That occurred on the streets?

A. Yes; I heard it on the streets before I went to dinner.

Q. In a conversation with me you referred to certain newspaper articles pointing to the character of the Queen. What were they?

A. A sermon in the Commercial Advertiser of February 17, 1893, preached by the Rev. E. G. Beckwith on the accession of the Queen.

Q. Who is he?

A. Pastor of the Central Union Church.

Q. Is he an Englishman?

A. An American.

Q. What denomination is his church.

A. Congregational.

Q. What was the other article?

A. A leading article in the same paper of February 5, 1891, and the Bulletin of June 26, 1891, containing an account of the Oahu College jubilee, naming the persons present, among whom was the Queen.

Q. Did you ever attend a breakfast given by the American minister to the ex-Queen?

A. I did, with my wife.

Q. When was that?

A. April 19, 1892.

Q. Who was present besides the Queen?

A. Hon. Jonathan Austin; Hon. S. M. Damon and wife; Hon. and Mrs. Samuel Parker; Mr. Haines, of San Francisco; Mr. and Mrs. H.

W. Severance; Mr. and Mrs. Mizner, late United States minister to Guatemala; Hon. and Mrs. W. G. Irwin; Lieut. Dyer, U S. Navy; Dr. Clarke, U. S. Navy; Mrs. Henry Waterhouse and others.

Q. These people were invited to meet the Queen, were they?

A. Yes, sir.

I have carefully read the foregoing and pronounce it to be an accurate report of my interview with Mr. Blount.

J. O. CARTER.

HONOLULU, *June 10, 1893.*

No. 16.

Interview with H. Center, Honolulu, June 24, 1893.

Q. Where do you reside?

A. Spreckelsville, Maui.

Q. What is your occupation.

A. Manager of the Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Company.

Q. How long have you been in the Hawaiian Islands?

A. Nearly sixteen years.

Q. When a laborer works carelessly, what remedy have you under the law to compel him to work?

A. We sue him for damages in court. If I can prove what is a proper day's work, and a man does not do it, I can sue him for the amount of work not performed. You can not deduct by law from their pay. We do sometimes deduct and the man stands it because he escapes thereby the cost of court, which is about \$3.50 in addition to the loss of pay. If they were paid 50 cents a day, if he did only half a day's work, we should only sue him for 25 cents, but if he lost his case he would have to pay \$3.50 in addition.

Q. If a laborer leaves his employer during the contract term what remedy does the law furnish to compel him to return to his employer?

A. Upon producing the contract before the district judge and entering a complaint the judge issues a warrant, which is served by the Government police, and the party must be tried forty-eight hours after being put in jail. If convicted and it is his first offense on that contract he will be reprimanded, ordered back to work, and charged costs. On the second offense on the same contract he is fined or imprisoned and charged costs if convicted, and after the expiration of his imprisonment ordered back to work. The third offense he is fined or imprisoned three months, and all further offenses are punished at the discretion of the court.

Q. Can the natives generally read and write?

A. Yes; it is very seldom you find a native who can not read and write very well. Generally the Kanaka language, but very frequently English. They are learning more English now.

Q. What is the disposition of the native population towards the Provisional Government?

A. Hostile, altogether hostile, so far as I have come in contact with them. They dread to lose their ancient customs and rights, and also because there was an attempt made to disfranchise them.

Q. What is their general character for uprightness?

A. They are honest and straightforward. They are remarkably true to any one who is true to them. They would steal nothing.

Q. How do they compare in fitness for the use of the elective franchise with the laboring class of the United States?

A. They compare very well indeed.

Q. If the question of annexation were left to the people of these Islands by a ballot under the Australian system, with the qualification of reading and writing, what, in your opinion, would be the result?

A. There would be an overwhelming majority against annexation. No native who was not influenced would vote for it.

Q. Can you get labor here from European countries to work your plantation successfully?

A. We can not to raise sugar at the world's price. Of course under the protection of the United States it might be a little better for us. We have now no advantage from the United States.

The shorthand notes of this interview have been read to me by Mr. Mills and they are correct.

H. CENTER.

HONOLULU, *June 26, 1893.*

No. 17.

Statement concerning number of troops landed and returned to the Boston.

Guns landed: One 37 m H. R. C.; one Gatling.

I have looked the log over and find the following to be a pretty accurate account of the forces landed from the U. S. S. *Boston* at Honolulu, January 16, 1893, together with those landed from and returned to the ship at different times:

Landed at 4:30 or 5 p. m., January 16:

Three (3) companies of blue jackets, 36 each.....	108
One (1) company of marines and (2) music.....	32
Music for battalion	12
Officers (9 naval, 1 marine).....	10

162

Extra men landed:

January 24, for Camp Boston.....	2
February 16, for Camp Boston	1
March 15, for Marine Guard	1
March 17, for Camp Boston.....	14

18

Total number of men and officers landed for service..... 180

Returned on board:

January 27, men	2
January 30, men	1
February 3, Lieut. Young's company	35
February 3, officers	2
February 23, men	2
February 27, men	2
February 28, men (1), marine (1), blue jacket.....	2
March 1, men	1
March 13, men	1
March 15, men	2
March 18, men	1
March 20, Lieut. Coffman's company	36
March 20, officers	1
March 22, men	1

Total number of men and officers returned before April 1..... 89

Total number of men and officers landed before April 1..... 180

Total number of men and officers left on shore March 20, 1893..... 91

On February 15 Lieut. Young's company landed for the Admiral's review, and returned after the review the same day. There were 36 men in the company and two officers.

The total number of men at Camp Boston April 1:

Men	52
Officers	6
Marines at Government building	33
Marine officer	1

Total force withdrawn from on shore April 1, 1893..... 92

I think this is very near a true state of facts.

Yours, etc.,

D. W. COFFMAN.

No. 18.

(Statement of John F. Colburne, April 15, 1893, printed with Mr. Blount's No. 3, dated April 2, 1893.)

No. 19.

(Statement of William H. Cornwell, April 24, 1893, printed with Mr. Blount's No. 3, dated April 26, 1893.)

No. 20.

(Statement of S. M. Damon, April 29, 1893, printed with Mr. Blount's No. 4, dated May 4, 1893.)

No. 21.

(Statement of Lieut. Hebert L. Draper, May 5, 1893, printed with Mr. Blount's No. 5, dated May 6, 1893.)

No. 22.

Interview with Charles T. Gulick, Honolulu, May 13, 1893.

Q. What is your occupation, Mr. Gulick?

A. Notary public and business agent.

Q. For whom?

A. General; that is carrying on business agency. Agent for Pitt and Scott's express, and for the Burlington railroad. My business is also negotiating loans as well as real estate.

Q. Have you been a minister in any reign?

A. Under Kalakaua, 6th of August, 1883, to 30th of June, 1886.

Q. At any time since then?

A. Under Liliuokalani from September 12, 1892—about two months.

Q. I see in the correspondence between the American minister and

the State Department some statements as to Wilson, the ex-marshal being the paramour of the ex-Queen. I wish to ask you as to your knowledge of her character in point of chastity?

A. I would say to begin with that I know nothing against her character in that line.

Q. Was she received in all of the best families in this city—among the whites?

A. She was; she always has been.

Q. Were they pleased to have her accept invitations to their entertainments?

A. They always have been.

Q. Did they accept invitations to entertainments at the palace?

A. Not only accepted them, but were always anxious to get them.

Q. Did you ever hear of anybody keeping away from there on account of her character?

A. I have not.

Q. Do you know anything of the history of Mrs. Wilson?

A. I do.

Q. Please state it.

A. Mrs. Wilson is a half white woman who, at the early age of 10 or 12 was taken by the present Queen and educated. Was admitted into her household as a member. As she grew to womanhood Charles B. Wilson, her present husband, met her, took a fancy to her, and, with the approval of the Queen, he married her. When the Queen came to the throne Mrs. Wilson became one of her ladies in waiting, which position she held up to the overturn of the Government.

Q. Where did Mr. and Mrs. Wilson live?

A. In the bungalow.

Q. That is a building in the palace yard?

A. Yes.

Q. What distance between the bungalow and the palace?

A. Two hundred and fifty feet I should think.

Q. You have heard some scandal about the Queen and Mr. Wilson?

A. I have.

Q. Did they grow out of the political campaigns here or did they have a firmer basis?

A. I think they grew out of the political campaign entirely.

MONDAY, *June 19, 1893.*

Q. When the American troops were landed here on the 16th of January, 1893, was there any indication of disorder on the part of the population?

A. None whatever.

Q. Were ladies and children on the streets as usual?

A. They were.

Q. When it was known these troops had been landed, what was the impression made on the minds of the royalists by that fact?

A. There was a feeling of bewilderment, as they were unable to account for it. The people in the streets followed along inquiringly and people in their offices went out. I was at my office. I went out to see what it all meant. Nobody seemed to know how to account for it—what the object could be. It inspired all who were royalists with concern and apprehension.

Q. Apprehension of what sort?

A. Apprehension of some impending disaster to the nation or encroachment upon their rights and independence. The feeling at that time was vague.

Q. The next day what was generally the feeling on the part of the Royalists?

A. There was a feeling that it was a high-handed, unjustifiable move, and that there was no call for it.

Q. Was there any opinion that it was in aid of the movement of the committee of safety?

A. I may say that that was the general impression; but matters at that day had not formed themselves, had not crystallized, so that everyone was looking around and asking his neighbor and inquiring as to what would come next.

Q. Was that the condition of mind the day after the troops were landed?

A. I think I may safely say it was.

Q. What was the feeling on the part of the foreign element here?

A. My communication was principally confined to those who were in sympathy with my own feelings and views. All of us who were in sympathy with the Government and country and desired to see its perpetuation as an independent country were, as I said before, impressed with the fact that it was a high-handed move. With regard to the other people, those who might properly be considered revolutionists, there was an activity apparent on the street which would seem to indicate that they were making preparations for some definite move. This was in the forenoon of the 17th, the day following the landing of the American troops.

Q. What was the impression made on your mind when the troops were landed on the 16th as to the object of their being landed?

A. The impression left on my mind was that they were landed in support of a revolutionary measure having in view the overturning of this Government.

Q. What time did that impression obtain generally in the community; did it commence before the Provisional Government was proclaimed?

A. Yes; early in the day.

Q. How long before the proclamation of the Provisional Government dethroning the Queen?

A. To my knowledge six or eight hours. I would qualify that by saying that it is altogether likely a number had that view the night before.

Q. When the American protectorate was proclaimed here, was the condition of the public mind one of quiescence, awaiting the action of the Government of the United States, or otherwise?

A. I should say that the public was quite ready to await the result of deliberations in Washington.

Q. Was there in the minds of the opponents of the Provisional Government any disposition to commence hostilities against it?

A. Not at all.

I have read the foregoing and they are accurate reports of my interviews with Mr. Blount.

(Mr. B. said it was unnecessary for Gulick to certify to this.—E. M.)

No. 23.

Statement of Charles T. Gulick.

Col. J. H. BLOUNT,
United States Commissioner, etc.:

DEAR SIR: I send you by bearer a very hastily prepared sketch of some features of Hawaiian History with our present condition in view.

Time has not permitted of as careful an arrangement and comparison of facts and analysis of motives as I could have wished, but if the sketch assists in the most humble way in arriving at a true understanding of our situation, my object will be fully attained.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

CHAS. T. GULICK.

MAY 8, 1893.

A FOOTNOTE TO HAWAIIAN HISTORY—MAY 8, 1893.

In order to arrive at anything like a true understanding of the present condition of affairs in our little Kingdom and the conflicting influences and interests to which may be attributed the unfortunate order of things now existing, it would seem necessary to take a brief glance at the last seventy years of the nation's history with that object in view.

In the year 1820 a little band of Puritan missionaries, in number four, with their wives, landed on these shores, the ostensible object of their visit being to evangelize the heathen, or, in the words of a quotation frequently made by themselves from their principal text-book, to preach "glad tidings of good things."

They seemed to wish it understood that they were actuated by a self-sacrificing charity and devotion rivaling, if not superior to, that of Paul and his associates and followers when he started out on a similar errand, and this view of the case does not seem so unreasonable when we take into consideration the fact that our Puritan friends were taking their chances in what was to them a veritable *terra incognita*, while the first apostle, instead of pointing for Scythia with his momentous message, preferred to work the most brilliant centers of ancient civilization, where he would be much more likely to find people and conditions congenial to his cultivated tastes.

The worldly goods of the newcomers were few indeed, and their intellectual stock in trade was almost as beggarly, consisting for the most part in a number of trite quotations from the Puritan Bible, worn threadbare with constant and injudicious use. They were welcomed by a race of incomparable physique, open-hearted, generous, and hospitable to a fault, qualities which to the average New Englander (such, for instance, as were sent here with the Redeemer's message seventy years ago), accustomed to the withering narrowness and penury of his native land, were as strange as a quadratic equation to a Hottentot. In fact, the newcomers were so overshadowed by the importance of their "message," as well as themselves, that they had no time to throw away on the amenities of life which are so highly valued under conditions of our more advanced civilization, and not wholly despised by even barbarous people.

They found the Hawaiian in that state of mental evolution, which would have gladdened the heart of the earnest philosophical teacher.

He had already realized that he had outgrown the trammels of his idolatrous religion, and that the mysteries and mummeries of its priesthood were worse than folly, and had just returned from a gleeful dance around the bonfire of the trumpery connected with the superstitions of the past. He received the newcomers with open arms, in the simplicity of his heart, not doubting but that they would give him something better than what he had just thrown away that would satisfy, morally and mentally, the craving of his better nature.

Our Puritan friends were more fortunate than their brethren of the South Seas, where tradition would have us believe that missionary on toast was a favorite delicacy.

They had no war to wage against the Prince of Darkness, no settled evil notions and vices to combat, no idolatrous or pagan religion to overturn, no conquest to make conquering "foot by foot from barbarism," as Gen. Armstrong would have us believe in his letter to the New York Independent, of May 30, 1889.

They found the door wide open. A pleasant expectant face and beckoning hand encouraged them to enter; they did not hesitate a moment, but dropping their manners outside with that exasperating brusqueness which they have taken fine care to hand down to their children's children even to the present day, they bounced right in.

The simple islanders crowded around them, loaded them with presents, gave them lands of their own selection, built them houses and churches, furnished them with food, and besought them for instruction. The immense council houses of the chiefs were not large enough to hold the vast throngs which assembled to hear them relieve themselves from time to time of a portion of the "message;" consequently open air meetings were resorted to, the size of the audiences being limited only by the range of the speaker's voice, and as the stomach and lungs of our friends were the best developed organs of their equipment, they sometimes spoke to immense gatherings.

The mental development which prompted the Hawaiian to destroy his wooden deities and relegate the priests to more useful employment enabled him to discover at a very early stage that something was lacking in the new teachers. To his disgust, he found that the veneering was very thin and that from his standpoint at least, in accepting the new doctrines and forms in place of those just cast aside, he was trading one set of mummeries for another without any perceptible gain or advantage. He found that the new teachers were not only human (which of course he expected, as the day when his grandfather had looked upon Capt. Cook as a deity had long gone by), but he found, also, that they were prompted by motives and guilty of actions which he and his race despised and was endeavoring to rise superior to.

His knowledge of the world, outside of his own people, being limited to the few visitors who had touched on his shores during the twenty or twenty-five years preceding the advent of the newcomers, and the still fewer foreigners who had made their homes with him during that time, did not help him to determine where the difficulty lay, whether in the teachers, the doctrines taught, or in both, and he desired to see something of the outside world for himself.

The King and a strong delegation were accordingly sent to England. While there it was learned that there were other teachers equally capable or possibly better, and other religions more ancient and very likely more satisfying to the hungry soul than those he had so rashly taken to his bosom in 1820. These things could not be known without a trial,

and accordingly an invitation was extended to the Catholics to send teachers, who in due course of time arrived at the islands.

Our Puritan friends had about ten years the start of their Catholic brothers in the race to deliver the "message" to the simple islander, during which time they had made good use of their opportunities. Notwithstanding this great advantage, they did not look with favor on the advent of their Catholic brethren. In the first place there was one quotation from their text-book peculiarly applicable to the present case (and they were nothing, if not strong on quotations), which was, "Thou shalt have no other Gods before me," and then the Catholic brother had a little different version of the "message." The encouragement which our Puritan friends had received at the start had made them aggressive, and they had, by successive steps, directed with more skill than has been shown by any of their descendants, secured the virtual control of the Government, which has, however, been continually denied by them all until the appearance of Armstrong's letter in the Independent of the 30th May, 1889, referred to above. The Government at that time (about 1830) was a monarchy assisted by a council of Chiefs.

During the decade following 1830, the little original band of "message" bearers received very considerable additions to their ranks, all being recruited from the same uncompromising, intolerant stock from which the first were drafted, the recruits, with one or two exceptions, being of the \$200-a-year class of New England Parsons. They were never noted for individual aggressive courage, but numbers, as with (baser mortals), gave them assurance, and a taste of power sharpened their cupidity. The Catholic (or anyone, for that matter, outside their own pale) was an interloper who must be routed at all hazards. This they endeavored to do through the agency of the chiefs, while keeping themselves in the background, so that should odium or failure attend their efforts, they could disclaim any responsibility in the matter. Their machinations resulted in the disastrous occurrences of 1839, 1843, and 1848, the details of which can be gleaned from the newspapers and histories of those times, and are entirely in keeping with the recorded characteristics of the gentle Puritan from the first day that his dirty paw smudged the pages of European history.

They managed in a degree, hardly comprehensible at this date, to retain their hold on not only the chiefs but the common people, and their dictum was supreme in every sphere, social, moral, governmental, and even individual. As a consequence some of the most absurd regulations were promulgated, the ears and claws of a few still showing themselves in the Hawaiian statutes of to-day. The country was dotted all over with unnecessary churches, Kawaiahao among the number, built by the painful labor of the uncomplaining native to satisfy the wishes of his teachers and everything was subordinated to the one idea of religion as they taught it. The advantage of teaching their willing pupils any of the arts of civilization and at the same time instructing them how to avoid the pitfalls of the new order of things never seems to have entered their heads. The consequence was that as far back as 1840 there were graduates of Lahainaluna (the mission high school on Maui) who had passed creditable examinations in Conic sections, who had to don the malo and go into the taro patch if they desired to earn an honest living, not having been taught a single practical idea which would assist them in earning a living in a civilized way.

As a matter of fact such genuine benefactors of the Hawaiian race

as Locke of Waialua, Oahu, Goodrich of Hilo, Whitney of Waimea, Kauai, and Shipman of Kau, Hawaii, who endeavored to teach the people of their respective districts to work as civilized men, with modern tools, and to improve their homes and take a civilized and intelligent care of their families, were frowned upon and denounced by the balance of their devout brethren for neglecting the all-important "message." The unwavering loyalty of the people to their teachers, under the circumstances, speaks volumes for the constancy of the old-time Kanaka.

About the beginning of the decade commencing with 1840, the commercial interests of the country demanded a more formal government and governmental methods conforming in a measure to those of the nations with whom it was in communication. Persons capable of assisting in the work of reorganization were not plentiful and the chiefs naturally looked to their spiritual advisers for assistance, as they had been instructed from the beginning that there was nothing on the earth or in the heavens above or in the waters under the earth beyond their ken.

Again luck favored our Puritan friends. It would never do to have it appear that they sought secular employment and preferment. Equally impossible would it be for them to permit any except the Lord's anointed to embrace such an opportunity. Consequently, under cover of the plea of the necessity of getting the permission of the A. B. C. F. M., which at that time took a whole year, they perfected their plans, and Judd, Richards, Armstrong, and Andrews rather ostentatiously severed their outward connection with the mission and took positions under the Government, or more properly speaking, took the Government. This was just into their hands; nothing could have been finer. And from this time on, through all the various changes and vicissitudes of fortune, they looked upon the little kingdom as the veritable promised land, and taught their descendants to recognize and claim it and all belonging to it, together with the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues, and profits thereof as their rightful heritage for all time.

The development of the whale fisheries of this ocean and the increased commerce resulting therefrom brought to these shores quite a number of visitors of various nationalities during the decade under consideration, some of whom became permanent residents. Many of these people were men of education, knowledge of the world, and more than usual ability.

These were confronted by a singular social condition of things not a little puzzling to the uninitiated. Our Puritan brethren had by this time increased in numbers to such an extent as to form a community of their own, and, as before remarked, were drafted from a stratum of society which was not only destitute of the advantages of social training and polish, but which with genuine loyalty to their creed and their history, affected to despise the manners and courtesies which amongst civilized nations are the evidences of good breeding. With them the sum of all the virtues consisted in the exhibition of those Puritanical characteristics so familiar to the reader of English history, and the moral obliquity which prompted them to haze the Catholic out of the vineyard caused them to surround themselves with a barrier of social exclusiveness as impenetrable as an East Indian caste. An exception, however, was made in favor of those who were sufficiently hypocritical to make a pretense of adopting their creed and outwardly conforming to their ways.

These being the conditions of social recognition, it will be readily

seen that the recruits from what they were pleased to term the "world's people" were, with scarcely an exception, the most unworthy sneaks whom greed of gain had tempted so far from home. And in some cases, family and business alliances the most incongruous were made with persons of more than doubtful morality, if judged by the Puritan standard. It must not be forgotten, however, that deviations from their generally exclusive rule had, in almost all cases, solid material advantages to commend them—considerations which the Puritan has never yet been known to ignore.

The Hawaiian, at this period, presents many interesting and curious features to the student of history. The memories of the great Kamehameha had not lost their influence, and the ruling chiefs, in many cases, proved themselves not unworthy successors to the founder of Hawaiian unity, giving evidence of firmness, moderation, and judgment which challenge the admiration of all who are acquainted with the complicated problems demanding their solution at this stage of their national existence.

Their reception of the white men was altogether unique. History furnishes no parallel. While in all time and in every part of the world the colonization of a superior race has been vigorously resented and repelled by force of arms, usually resulting in the ultimate subjugation or extinction of the aborigines, the Hawaiian welcomed his white visitor, encouraged him to remain, adopted his religion and dress, aped his manners, sought his instruction, and finally asked his assistance in framing a government on a civilized model. A reception so unusual was quite to the taste of our "message" bearing friends, who did not fail to make the most of it, while some of the world's people were more modest, as appeared at the time of the election of representatives to the first Legislature in 1845, when the Hawaiians urged their white friends to accept their suffrages and show them how to carry on the business of legislation, they themselves being desirous of learning the methods of representative government before assuming any responsible part in its management.

All the lands, without exception, belonged to the Crown and to the heads of the powerful chiefly families. Without hesitation the chiefs enfranchised the common natives and divided the lands between the Government, themselves, and the people, giving titles in severalty on terms which have commanded the approval of all acquainted with the conditions.

Up to this time the nation had encountered no serious difficulties excepting those occasioned by following the advice and instructions of the "message" bearers, which were prompted by a selfish jealousy of all others in the field.

In arranging the machinery and perfecting the methods of government it was very soon discovered by everyone outside their own following that the unassisted efforts of the "message" bearers were wholly unequal to the task; consequently the services of such men as Wyllie, Robertson, Record, Lee, and others, professional men, not of the fold however, were secured, and the little nation very soon took its place in the great family of independent states by virtue of treaties negotiated with rare tact and good judgment, chiefly through the efforts of Wyllie,

By 1853 the little ship of state was fairly under way. Representative Government was running smoothly, and the common people were learning their duties as freeholders, and taking such part in public affairs as their intelligence fitted them for. Honolulu had become an important shipping port not unknown in the business centers of the

world. The permanent white population of the city and the Kingdom had rapidly increased, and in cultivation and general intelligence was probably above the average of communities of its size, as people who go to settle so far away from home are usually the most enterprising among their fellows. This class of people was sufficiently numerous in the city itself to form a separate community or society, as it were, who were in the habit of thinking and acting for themselves, and to whom the little country owed most, if not all, the standing it held abroad.

This class lived on the best of terms with the Hawaiian chiefs and people, some of them having formed matrimonial alliances with the native families of the higher grades. Our Puritan friends did not look with any more favor on this class than they did on the Catholics, meeting out to them but scant courtesy, and but little, if any, of that Christian charity of which they were presumed to be the exemplars. In fact, they had no use for anyone whom they could not bully and browbeat into a cringing sycophant or a willing tool. They took the most offensive ways of reminding people of their supreme hold on the King and Government, quite in keeping with their early training, or the lack of it, wholly and contemptuously ignoring such men as Wyllie and Robertson, who had done the work and gave character to the Government under the new conditions.

This state of things could not last long and resulted in the appointment, after several popular meetings, of a committee of 13 citizens (some of them now living), who waited on His Majesty Kamehameha III, demanding the dismissal of Judd and his associates. This was readily acceded to, but not without some expressions of surprise on the part of the King and his native advisers at the existence of such a bitter antagonism between people of a race claiming so great a superiority to the Hawaiians. The common natives were bewildered at the exhibition. They attended the meetings without taking part. As their fathers, shortly after welcoming the first sky pilots, saw reason to repent of their rashness, the sons began to entertain grave doubts with regard to the wisdom of the new tinkers in Governmental affairs, as well as to the results of their tinkering. The effect on our "message" bearers was indescribable. Each one of the 250 odd men, women, and children belonging to their guild looked upon the downfall of the Judd cabinet as a personal calamity. They realized that the heritage was in danger. This was the first genuine setback they had ever experienced.

For the next twenty years the Government, while by no means perfect, was, under the virile rule of the last of the Kamehamehas, administered with evenhanded justice, having regard for the interests of all and endeavoring to secure the greatest good to the greatest number. During this time the most capable men in the realm, regardless of nationality or creed, were called upon to assist the head of the nation with their counsel. This call did not, however, at any time during this period include any member of the Puritan guild, whose interests were not by any means ignored, as some of their members were honored with subordinate appointments, where they could do no harm. During all this time—to the appointed an eternity, to the rest of the nation a respite—there was no publication which would admit their drivel but was loaded with their complaints, and no pulpit into which they could climb but resounded with their wails and maledictions.

Another page of history is completed and the Puritan is again in luck. The last of the Kamehamehas is gathered to his fathers at the close of 1872, and as the Hawaiian saw the last representative of his race

who had strength and genius enough to keep ahead of the wheels of the juggernaut of human progress enter the family mausoleum there is little wonder that his grief was inconsolable and that he gave himself up to despair. Poor Lunalilo, a weak, but in some respects brilliant, offshoot of the old stock, was unanimously elected to the vacant throne, as by law provided. Our "message," bearing friends, all but famished from their long fast, were at his collar in a moment and never let go their hold till they dropped him in the grave, after only one brief year of power. As was their traditional custom, they had again made the most of their opportunities, securing as many as possible of the subordinate offices, positions on the various boards, Privy Council, House of Nobles, etc.

During the reign of Lunalilo the course of events was somewhat modified by an element not altogether unknown, but exceedingly distasteful to our friends, in the person of Walter Murray Gibson.

The throne was again filled by the election of Kalakaua in 1874.

As Prince Lunalilo was, according to the Hawaiian standard, of a chiefly rank superior to that of any one living at the time of his election to the throne, he had no competitors, and his elevation to an heretofore hereditary throne by a popular election seemed in no way to affect the current of events. The position was looked upon as almost his by right of inheritance. and was cheerfully confirmed to him by legal formalities. When, however, it became necessary to fill the throne a second time in the same way the whole situation was quite different.

The oft repeated statement that "Paris is France" might with perfect propriety be paraphrased to apply, during the period under consideration, to the little capital city of Honolulu, which, in almost every sense, was to all intents and purposes the Hawaiian Kingdom. The only safe harbor for deep-water vessels was here, all the business agencies were located here, and all the enterprises throughout the Kingdom centered in and were controlled from the city. During the twenty years since we last noticed the make-up of its society, the conditions had somewhat changed and should claim our attention for a moment.

Social and business methods had, so to speak, crystallized; several commercial houses had been established, which, in all respects, would compare favorably with the best in any large seaport; a bank had been opened, having correspondence with all the principal business centers of the world; newspapers in the Hawaiian and English languages had been established, and had a wide domestic circulation; foreign churches, benevolent societies; Masonic and other lodges were organized and in a flourishing condition; the American, English, and German people had representatives amongst the permanent residents of the city from almost every grade of society in their respective nations; in fact, the city was as fairly a representative cosmopolitan community on a small scale as San Francisco or New York.

The whaling business had declined, and attention of late had been directed to agricultural and grazing ventures which were fairly remunerative, and if the American tariff were not in the way (European markets being beyond our reach) would to all appearances be opulence itself. Serious efforts had therefore been made for several years to, in some way, get over this tariff by annexation, reciprocity, or a remission of duties on Hawaiian products entering American markets. The first method was not popular with the Hawaiian nation at large, the third was impossible from an American standpoint, consequently the inge-

nuity of the best contrivers in the little Kingdom was strained to the utmost to convince American statesmen that 2 and 2 made 5, and that great material advantages would inure to the Republic through a commercial treaty of reciprocity with Hawaii. The native Hawaiian understood little or nothing of the force of the project, and failed to see wherein he would be benefited, but as his white friend and guest so greatly desired its consummation, he, as usual, good-naturedly assented and rendered such assistance as he could to bring about the desired end.

The foregoing in brief was the condition of things, business generally slack, profits uncertain, and the reciprocity treaty hanging fire in Washington, when the 12th of February, 1874, arrived. This was the day appointed by Ministerial proclamation for the Legislature to assemble and fill by ballot the place made vacant by the death of Lunalilo. The Legislature met. There were but two candidates, Queen Emma and David Kalakaua.

Queen Emma was the choice of the native Hawaiian population, almost to a man; but saint and sinner for once met on common ground and decided to, if possible, defeat the wish of the people by securing the election of Kalakaua. The reasons for the union of effort, on the part of people so radically antagonistic, to compass the election of Kalakaua are worthy of attention. As has been heretofore mentioned, a reciprocity treaty with the United States, or something equivalent thereto, had for some time been looked upon by the majority of the business community as being the only salvation. This view had been almost universally adopted by the American Missionaries, their descendants and associates. It may be here remarked as a significant fact that with two exceptions, the children of the missionaries neglected to enter the chosen field of their fathers, they seeming quite content to let the souls of the gentle islanders take their chances, while for themselves they generally preferred lines which gave promise of more tangible rewards for thrift and energy.

The wisdom of their choice being at the present time amply demonstrated by the enormous annual gains of some of their number, which far outrun the wildest dreams of romance, as for instance, Baldwin, with a net gain for the year 1889 of over \$300,000, followed closely by the Wilcoxs, Bailey, Alexander, Castle, Cooke, Rice, and a number of others hardly less fortunate. It may also be remarked at this time that the term "missionary," which to those acquainted with the general relationship of individuals, business enterprises, etc., is quite clear and definite, to the uninitiated is likely to be misleading and requires a word of explanation. The nature of their society and the methods of recruiting from the "outside world" have been before alluded to, and with this in mind it will be readily seen that the missionaries, at the time of which we are treating, included in their fold a large number who could lay no claim to this designation except in so far as they acted with the saints when the balance of the world was to be beaten, and made a pretense of covering their moral nakedness from time to time as suited their convenience with a cloak of religious hypocrisy.

The members of this guild, more especially the original missionaries, considered themselves and taught their children to feel that they occupied a moral and social plane far above not only the native Hawaiian, but all "outsiders" of their own race. In fact, the missionary placed between his own family and the generous-hearted islander whom he came across the sea to pilot the way to everlasting life, a chasm far more difficult to bridge than ever existed between the

"haughty" Southerner and his African slave. Fortune favored the guild with material wealth, and it might with truth be said that the financial resources of the country were practically in their hands. It did not take long for this class to be designated the "Missionary party," by which term it is now generally known. This is, however, periodically resented by members of their guild in the newspapers of the day—sometimes snappishly, and at others with a whine.

The foregoing little digression seems necessary to explain the situation and, to be brief, the Missionary party espoused the cause of Kalakaua with the view of reinstating themselves in the position they enjoyed before the downfall of Judd, not doubting that the new King would prove a willing tool to act their bidding. David's impecuniosity and other social disabilities seemed to them sufficient ground for believing that ordinary gratitude, if no other motive, would induce him to heed their instructions. On the other hand, Queen Emma was surrounded by and under the control of individuals and influences not only inimical to the "Missionary Party," but to a treaty of reciprocity with the United States, or, in fact, any other compact which might, even remotely, threaten the autonomy of the Kingdom.

She was a member of the Anglican Church in Honolulu, and her principal advisers and associates were British people, all of whom were opposed to any American alliance, excepting a certain few whose interests were such as to be favorably affected by a modification of the tariff on Hawaiian products entering American ports, in their case self interest triumphed over patriotism and they either remained silent or sided with the "Missionary Party" which was, by the way, at this time, the only class which deserved the name of a "party", all others were simply "outsiders".

By law, the election was in the hands of the Legislature, consisting of about fifty members, over two-thirds of whom were native Hawaiians. This simplified the manipulation of the business very much, and for the first time in the history of the nation the white man applied to the most important election ever held in the Kingdom the methods so common in the ward politics of New York and other American cities thereby grossly deceiving the people, controverting the popular will and ultimately gaining the desired end by the election of Kalakaua.

For the first time in his experience, more than fifty years after he had first welcomed his white brother to his shores and besought his instruction in the ways of civilization and religion, the Hawaiian found himself face to face with the bugbear of race prejudice. It was a new and strange element to him which he did not understand and for which he was not responsible. The men like Wyllie, Robertson, Harris, and their associates who had formulated for him methods of government, foreseeing the possibility of the intrusion of this prejudice in the affairs of state, had diligently guarded against such a catastrophe and as long as their counsels prevailed the danger was averted.

From this time on the internal relations of the heterogeneous commonwealth rapidly changed, and the aboriginal Hawaiian, who had been so long the subject of prayerful solicitude was forgotten, his interests and rights ignored and despised, and as from time to time he appeared in the Legislature of his native land, he was either cajoled, bullied, or bought into supporting the schemes of his white brother. The basket of loaves and fishes was small, the hungry maws numerous, manners scarce, and consequently the scramble for spoils and plunder was savage. Our Puritan friends and their allies, with the sentiment **strong within them of rightful inheritance to everything in sight, were**

not to be indifferently dealt with. After the usual wire pulling the game was called and the saints showed up with the practical control in almost every branch of the public service, Cabinet, Supreme Court, Board of Education, Bureau of Surveying, etc.

The inchoate American reciprocity treaty was a matter of so much importance, meaning as it did success or failure to almost every enterprise in the Kingdom outside of the capturing of fish and the manufacture of poi, that after the first grab and snarl over the plums, all whose interests were to be affected by the change of tariff, united in as cordial a manner as might, for instance, the fiercer animals of a menagerie when confronted by a common danger in a supreme effort to secure its ratification. The aged Chief-Justice Allen, of the Supreme Court, was relieved of his duties on the bench and dispatched to Washington armed with a high-sounding title to represent the interests of the little country (or rather its moneyed and planting interests), and urge on the treaty to its final ratification. A better choice could not have been made, as Judge Allen was a typical American politician of large experience in his native land before coming to Hawaii, and both training and self-interest united in causing him to put forward his best efforts to ensure the success of the mission entrusted to his care. A trump card in the game was to send the King to Washington and show to the Republicans the anomaly of (as Barnum would have put it) the only King on earth who owed his throne to, and reigned by the will of the people, and not by the grace of God.

Accordingly the King, accompanied by a staff of officers selected for the trip, visited America's capital, also several other principal cities, and for the time being, in physical proportion to say the least, was a "bigger man than Grant."

During the period of waiting for Uncle Sam to make up his mind to grant their request, our little insular community put in the time pulling faces at one another, intriguing for and securing positions for themselves and their favorites. In this contest the Missionary party were generally consistent and loyal to themselves, whilst outsiders had to fight their battles singly, having only the support of their personal friends. The Honolulu newspapers of the years 1875 and 1876 contain some spicy reading of a personal nature, giving evidence of more than usual bitterness, which, in the Legislature of 1876, culminated in an open feud. A majority of the assembly was native Hawaiians, with six or seven British, and the remainder Americans, German, and half-caste.

The native Hawaiian leaders were not all dead, and some of the brightest then living were in the house; amongst them were Aholo and Pilipo. The quarrel was confined to the white members, and took the form of a determined effort to unseat the cabinet. The wrangle was boisterous, filled with bitter personalities, and in every way unseemly. It continued for three days, the native members remaining mute spectators during the whole time. In the afternoon of the third day, all the contestants being blown, question was called. The native members glanced around to Pilipo as one who might say a word for them touching the situation. Pilipo arose with great deliberation, addressed the chair, asked the indulgence of the house for a few moments, and reminded the interpreter that as what he was about to say was intended especially for his "white brethren," he wanted his views made very clear to them.

Pilipo proceeded, and as he warmed to the subject, his few moments extended to an hour and a half, compassing one of the most scathing,

eloquent addresses ever heard in the house, and what proved to be almost the last effort of the kind by a Hawaiian Orator worthy of notice. The interpreter did his duty well, and the word pictures presented for the consideration of Pilipo's "white brethren" were very sharply outlined and anything but flattering to their vanity. The orator briefly reviewed the history of the intercourse of foreigners with his own race, something after the fashion of this sketch, amplifying where it best suited his purpose. He dwelt at length on the errand of the missionary to these shores and his agency in instructing the Hawaiian in the ways of religion and civilization. He painted in vivid colors the picture of the three days' wrangle just past, making sarcastic comparisons and comments on the whole.

The effect of the speech was indescribable. Those of his hearers who had not taken part in the quarrel could scarcely restrain themselves from violating the dignity of the house by giving the orator an ovation. Even at this time the Hawaiian did not realize that his "white brother" and guest had got tired of him, and had been so long the recipient of his hospitality that he looked upon his privileges as vested rights and preferred to enjoy them to the exclusion of the host.

At last the good news came. The treaty was a reality. Then came the rejoicing, firing of guns, display of fireworks, and the like. Those who were to be the most benefited by it and who made the most noise over its consummation never in the wildest flights of fancy dreamed of the success in store for them. Had they been told that they, descendants of shirt sleeves, with no more claim to a pedigree than a Government mule, would, each one of them, be within a decade in the yearly receipt of an annual income equal to many of the noble families of Europe, who trace their lineage through a host of distinguished ancestors for hundreds of years back, they would have been offended as being made game of.

This, however, is the fact, and until "the frost, the killing frost," of the McKinley bill "nipped their root" there was every prospect of a very material increase of their prosperity from year to year as long as the terms of the treaty were in force. Coal Oil Johnny's success has had several counterparts in the Paradise of the Pacific, not followed, however, by Johnny's improvidence, as it is hardly likely that should the descendants of the penurious New Englander suddenly find that the earth beneath his feet had turned to gold he would spurn it on account of its abundance. This phenomenal good fortune was turned into the laps of the few, however, the many having to be content with the crumbs, so that the condition of the little paradise is in many respects somewhat similar to that of Athens under the thirty tyrants.

In the struggle for position and power the churchman forgot his creed and the sinner gave rein to his passions, while both ignored the interests and rights of the Kanaka. These facts were seized upon by Gibson (of whom mention has already been made) and shown up in both Hawaiian and English newspapers with great clearness and skill. The thorough literary Bohemian that he was, he also possessed a much greater knowledge and experience of men and affairs, diplomacy, and statesmanship than people of his class usually have, and, in fact, had forgotten more moves and tricks in the game now on the board than all the rest of the players ever knew. Among the native Hawaiian population he, of course, very soon gained a large following, which was supplemented by a not inconsiderable portion of the foreign residents of various shades of opinion, who supported his views to a greater or less degree. It hardly needs mentioning that the missionary party from

the first looked with aversion and distrust on his appearance in the political arena.

These sentiments in a short time ripened into enmity and hatred, and for the genuine, consistent passion there is hardly a shadow of doubt the Puritan stands ahead, more especially when it is directed against an opponent of greater ability than he possesses himself, or, in other words, who draws too much water for him. Gibson was elected to the assembly in 1878, and, being returned each session till called upon to form a cabinet, he displayed many of those qualities which are so essential to the success of the political worker, and worried the souls of all the saints and quite a number of the sinners without rest or intermission. The prizes were getting larger and the points of vantage more important every day, and the contest waxed fiercer all the time. Lands, contracts, and franchises were increasing in value and must be secured at all hazards—by fair means if possible, by foul if necessary.

Fair means were out of the question, as the arena was so small that no move could be made without the knowledge of all the contestants, and the native officials and legislators soon learned a new lesson (new to them) in politics, to wit, that official position had a money value, conveniently measured by the purses of those requiring their assistance. In a short time the native Hawaiian, from the most obscure voter to the King himself, was so thoroughly debauched by the white man's gold that his standard of right and wrong was almost if not wholly destroyed, and his moral sense of personal rectitude was completely dulled by sophistry, gin, and coin. A truly deplorable condition, for which saint and sinner are about equally responsible.

As an example of the methods adopted by those who would violently resent the charge of anything bordering on dishonorable conduct or unfair means, it may be mentioned that one of the numerous ministries (cabinets) of this period, one that was as fairly representative as any that ever filled the position, and who were earnestly endeavoring to perform their duties, while consulting with and receiving advice from prominent members of the business community were being undermined by the very men with whom they were in communication, and who were fairness itself to the faces of the cabinet. Compensation came, however, in a singular way. The two-faced gentlemen did not feel themselves strong enough to carry out their plot single-handed, so they made overtures to Gibson, making all sorts of fair promises, which no one knew better than Gibson himself were never intended to be fulfilled.

They were not wise in approaching a player so far their superior in a game of this kind. After playing one crowd against the other until he learned what each held, Gibson, with the most bland and easy manner imaginable, dropped both sides, stepped in and took the bun without any trouble whatever, formed a cabinet of his own, much to the amusement of the native Hawaiian, who as heretofore was not a party to the contest. The disappointment and rage of the defeated contestants were truly pathetic. To be beaten was bad enough, but to be caught in one's own trap, sold, and laughed at by even the Kanakas was too much. "Eternal enmity to Rome and fealty to Carthage" was but an empty vow in comparison with the oath by which the schemers bound themselves each to the other to compass the final ruin of the man who had held them up to public ridicule.

Fort Street Church (now Central Union Church) was organized in 1852, the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce a few years later, and the Planters' Labor and Supply Company soon after the ratification of the

treaty, the three together containing the whole of the missionary party, together with a small sprinkling of those who did not wholly sympathize with their views and aspirations. On the accession of Gibson to position and power a general tarpauline muster of all the brains in the crowd was made, committees were appointed, resolutions passed, memorials prepared, appeals and petitions drawn; in fact the maggot bed had a spasm which threatened as serious consequences to the patient (*i. e.*, the maggot bed) as sometimes follows a congestive chill. They appealed to the American Minister resident (Daggett), carried in solemn procession their memorials and petitions to the King, and prayed to the Lord Almighty—all without any apparent result. Gibson compassed the whole in replies and dispatches which were respectful, polished, and diplomatic, and which might have served as forms for them in their future correspondence. He remained unshaken.

It very soon became apparent that he was the rallying point for the native Hawaiians, who, under his guidance and tutelage, were beginning to learn, and in a measure appreciate the relation of matters, and to assert their rights in the land of their birth. No sooner did the Missionary party understand this new feature of the game than without hesitation they unblushingly proclaimed that the Kanaka must go. They conveniently forgot the errand which ostensibly brought their forefathers to these shores, despised the rights of hospitality, and, blinded by cupidity, worked themselves up to the point where they were prepared to override and trample upon any and all rights and interests not in harmony with their own. In short, certain of their number did not hesitate to say that the money and thrift of the white men having made the country what it was, it was high time that it should be made in fact, as well as appearance, a white man's government.

This was the attitude assumed in the face of the fact that ever since the foundation of the Government under its present form, the chief judicial, executive, and diplomatic offices had been voluntarily conferred upon foreigners, the Hawaiian having a laudable desire to be represented by at least one position in the cabinet.

Up to this time no demand on his generosity had been refused. The sugar plantations of his white brother required cheap labor. He, without hesitation, voted from the public treasury large sums to defray the expense of scouring the world to satisfy the demand. China, Japan, the South Seas, Germany, and Norway, were in turn thoroughly tried as sources of supply. The demand far exceeded the supply, and at the urgent request of his white brother, he threw open the flood gates in 1881 and thousands of Chinese swarmed on his shores in a yellow tide that brought with it not only all the vices of the pagan Asiatics, but also an epidemic which laid 300 native Hawaiians corpses forever to rest in the sands of the quarantine station at Honolulu, and cost the public treasury \$110,000 in cash.

The production of sugar by Chinese coolies was not looked upon with favor by our California friends, but labor must be had, and the Hawaiian was again called upon to lend his assistance to the introduction of the less objectionable Japanese. Again he yielded, only to find that he had at last practically voted away the avenues of occupation for his own countrymen, and had, at the crafty solicitation of those whom he had supposed to be his friends, filled his country with a heterogeneous horde of pagans and worse, far outnumbering his own people, with whom they had little or nothing in common, and who,

like his white brother, were beginning to look upon the Hawaiian as an intruder on his own soil.

To the saintly Puritans and their successors all this had no weight and was unworthy of their notice. There was too much in the pot to run the risk of any accidents, and the only sure way to success was to blow out the lights, snatch the pot, and jump the game. But while our friends of the "Missionary party" possessed wealth enough to corrupt the Russian Empire, and were actuated by all the sentiments required to overturn the world, they yet lacked two very essential elements to success, which were intelligent leadership and pluck sufficient to carry the scheme into execution. While they longed for the possession of the coveted prize, they were in no hurry to risk their own precious carcasses in securing it, and consequently cast about for some accommodating cat to reach after the chestnuts for them. The right kind of a cat was not just to hand, and our friends had to content themselves, for a few years longer, with putting up their money lavishly on elections and subsidizing every vagrant Bohemian blackguard within reach to write libelous matter for the local and foreign press, denouncing the Government and every one connected therewith.

By continual hammering, a sentiment of antagonism to the Hawaiian Government and more especially to the native Hawaiians themselves was propagated, chiefly amongst comparatively new comers who knew nothing, and cared less, of the history of the country and who were quite ready to look upon the native much in the same way as the western pioneer does on the Comanche Indian. A suitable cat was at last found in the person of a Canadian adventurer, who possessed the necessary ability to organize and encourage, to execute the plans of usurpation, and who far surpassed his employers in the possession of the common honesty to frankly avow at the start that, while glory might have had some attractions for him in his tender youth, coin was at present his strongest incentive to action, and that his zeal would be measured by the amount in sight. All was satisfactorily arranged with little delay, the cat receiving a handsome subsidy from both side without the knowledge of the other, and the conspiracy was in running order in a short time.

Our missionary conspirators justified their course with the hollow pretense that they were seeking the adoption of governmental reforms which could be secured in no other way than by violence. They raised their hands in holy indignation and horror at such ill-advised schemes as the "kaimiloa" the genealogy board, and royal cemeteries, and words failed them in expressing their detestation of the Aki opium swindle and kindred irregularities. While little or nothing can be said in defense or extenuation of the follies referred to, it would seem not out of place to note the fact that, from a moral and financial standpoint, their injury to the commonwealth was trifling in comparison to the damage done by the eccentricities of the conspirators' favorites, which left their marks on the waterworks of Nuuanu Valley, the reservoir and land damages in Makiki, the quarantine graveyard at Honolulu, the South Sea immigration venture of the barque *Hawaii*, the "Likelike" and bellows opium business, and a score of other outrages of a similar nature which were hushed up, whitewashed, or hidden from the public as far as possible.

During the first half of the year '87 the conspirators were busy perfecting their plans. A league was formed, a large fund subscribed, and members sworn in, at first with some care, but as their numbers grew they gained confidence and relaxed their circumspection. Waifs from

all parts of the world, temporarily stranded on these shores, were attracted by all sorts of impossible promises of official employment as soon as the move became a success. The "Honolulu Rifles," a battalion of four companies, wholly composed of Europeans, armed and equipped at the expense of the Hawaiian treasury, was organized and drilled incessantly. Arms and ammunition in large quantities were imported and distributed. Mention should not be omitted of the fact that during all the excitement of these stirring times the quality of thrift was not for a moment lost sight of by the saints, as they generously imported military equipments, costing \$6.50 per man, which they supplied to the members of the league and such others as they thought could be trusted at \$18 and upwards.

Nor must it be lost sight of that the sentiment of self-preservation was always strong in the breasts of the saints, and on this occasion was developed in a rather quaint and amusing way. When their commander began making assignments to duty he overlooked this quality in a portion of his band and made a pardonable mistake of distributing to some of our friends tasks the fulfillment of which might be attended with a possibility of personal danger. He was quickly reminded that in great enterprises affecting the fate of nations it was not usual to expose the Marlboroughs and Napoleons of the movement to the possibility of being snuffed out; in other words, our friends recognized themselves as the brains of the crowd, and they did not propose to run any personal risk, but would at all times hold themselves in readiness to give chin music in unlimited quantities, seasoned from time to time with small allowances of coin.

The organization of the conspiracy was much more complete perhaps than movements of this kind usually are. It had its military commander; council of thirteen, otherwise known as the committee of "public safety," and which was the fountainhead for all orders; its military force, uniformed, fully equipped, and drilled, ready at a moment's notice to obey without question any orders from the committee of "public safety;" a large body of citizens, fully armed and supplied with ammunition, who had familiarized themselves with the use of their weapons by frequent target practice during several months past—in fact, it was as completely organized as the Hawaiian Government itself, and, as it turned out, much better handled. Of all the foregoing the Government was from time to time fully informed, and the indifference or pretended disbelief of Gibson in the existence of anything out of the usual course, or which would be likely to make trouble, is difficult to reconcile with his habitual astuteness.

However, this was about the condition of things during the latter days of June, 1887. Fully prepared as the organization was for immediate action, the leaders were at a loss just how to begin. The country was apparently at peace with all the world, and more especially with itself. All the functions of the Government were being performed as usual, the courts were disposing of the business brought before them without interruption, and to a stranger just arrived nothing unusual would appear to be in the wind. Consequently, it was not quite clear how to proceed. A committee of public safety was bent double with the weight of an indefinable responsibility, and yet it was not quite apparent just what they were called upon to save, as the public peace and safety did not somehow appear to be in any immediate danger, unless from the committee themselves and their satellites. But something must be done, and that very soon, as it would never do

to allow of even a little time for thought, which would inevitably lead to a reaction, when all would be lost.

In order to make the initiatory movement appear to the outside world as springing from a popular demand for the correction of abuses, it was decided to hold in the Rifles Armory, on the 30th of June, a public meeting to which all were invited without regard to nationality, and in order to guard against any miscarriages in their designs the Rifles in uniform, with arms and ammunition, were on hand, ostensibly to preserve order. Some of the speakers addressed the assembly while in uniform, holding their weapons in one hand, while they frantically sawed the air with the other and ranted about reform. The subject introduced, and on which they intended to justify their course, was a wholesale amending of the faulty constitution of 1864. This, by the way, was the hollowest of all their hollow pretenses, as a constitution had already been prepared by them for a republican form of government, and which, of course, contemplated the deposition of the King and complete remodeling of the governmental machinery.

The meeting was attended pretty generally by the European residents, and a few Hawaiians, attracted by curiosity as their fathers had been on a somewhat similar occasion thirty-four years before. It was quite evident from the very beginning that there was no intention on the part of the conspirators to permit of anything like a free discussion of the subjects of public interest, as a speaker was listened to and permitted to speak only so long as he echoed the sentiments of the league. Any suggestion of a constitutional convention or of a submission of a constitution to a vote of the people was immediately drowned in angry yells. (See "Sketch of Recent Events," p. 15.) The object which the meeting was advertised for, to-wit, discussion, was not allowed. A number of harangues, sounding strangely in these latter matter-of-fact years of the nineteenth century, were followed by the reading and adoption of an already prepared set of demands on the King, which were intended to be so exacting as to ensure their immediate rejection. The meeting adjourned, and the committee presented the demands to the King, who immediately yielded to them all without modification. The "committee of public safety" charged themselves with the care of the town, and the little pretorian guard of the Honolulu Rifles were assigned to various posts.

The ready acquiescence of the King to their demands seriously disconcerted the conspirators, as they had hoped that his refusal would have given them an excuse for deposing him, and a show of resistance a justification for assassinating him. Then everything would have been plain sailing for their little oligarchy, with a sham republican constitution.

Now, the only thing to be done, so far as they could see, was to make without delay a constitution conforming to their demands and submit it for his (the King's) signature. This was no small job for the class of workmen at their command. There seemed to be no help for it, and the maggot bed took another spasm. The little hole in the corner, self-constituted constitution-framers tackled the business off hand and wrestled with their self-imposed task for a whole week. "*Parturient montes*," etc., was distanced, and on the 6th of July, 1887, they presented a constitution which was signed by the King with as little delay as he had shown a week previous—a constitution which, until signed and promulgated, had not been seen even, to say nothing of being studied and discussed, by more than two score of people, and these being exclusively conspirators.

This hardly deserves the qualifying statement that the conspirators' constitution was shown to some of the judges of the Supreme Court before it was signed and promulgated, as it was shown to them in about the spirit that many people seek advice from their friends when they have no intention of following any advice at all at variance with their own views.

A cabinet from the "committee of public safety" took the portfolios. Gibson and his son-in-law lieutenant were arrested and placed under a guard of the Rifles and league, which were now in undisputed possession of the Government and all belonging to it.

The anomalous condition of affairs now for the first time began to dawn on the more thoughtful participants in the conspiracy, a number of whom had gone into the scheme with an honest desire for reform and a general correction of abuses, and to whom the awkwardness of their position now became apparent.

The ease with which the overturn had been effected proved a source of embarrassment to the revolutionists, who found themselves in possession of everything in sight without striking a blow or firing a shot, and the heterogeneous crowd now began to eye each other suspiciously with the view of determining who could be dropped out in the distribution of the spoils.

The instincts of the Puritan marred the success of the scheme almost from its birth. The native Hawaiians had no part in the business, and within a week after the promulgation of the new constitution the saints were devising methods for ridding themselves of the inconvenient partnership of those of their own race who were outside the pale, but whose presence and help had made the undertaking possible.

During the whole period of incubation of the precious conspiracy they (the saints) held meetings to which only the elect were called. These select gatherings were continued after their accession to power, and at one of them, held on the 7th or 8th of July, 1887, Dole (the present chief of the Provisional Government) made the remark, while treating of the unfortunate necessity to which the Lord's anointed had been subjected of accepting the assistance of the unwashed, that in a short time, as soon as they had settled themselves fairly into the saddle, they would be able to get rid of the presence of the Canadian "as one would throw away a dirty dishrag," accompanying the remark with a fitting gesture and suggestive grimace.

The only justification of the revolutionists for seizing the reins of power and overturning the Government was the crying necessity for the correction of abuses and the immediate prevention of continued malfeasance in the administration of the several departments. Consequently they lost no time in employing an expensive staff of experts and proceeding to an exhaustive examination in every direction which would be likely to prove anything irregular against either or both the King and his prime minister, Gibson. In spite of their most strenuous efforts, extending over a period of more than two months, the scheme resulted in a miserable failure, as their ferrets could find nothing on which to base a charge.

But they were not to be foiled in their determination to get revenge on the man who had so long held them at bay. An adventurous strumpet was induced by them to bring a suit for \$10,000 damages for a breach of promise of marriage against Gibson, he being out of the country at the time. A jury was easily found to assist in the fraud, and the amount claimed was awarded in full. A greater outrage on an indi-

vidual, or a more abominable travesty of justice, never before received the sanction of a Hawaiian court.

The new cabinet, backed by the pretorian guard of "Honolulu rifles," decided on making a show to the world and at the same time demonstrating to the native Hawaiians how insignificant a factor they had become in the land of their birth. A general election of members of the Legislature was ordered for the 15th September, 1887, within the lines of the new constitution, and under regulations which the revolutionists were confident would preclude the possibility of any failure in their schemes. The division of the whole country into "districts," "wards," and "precincts," and the organization of political clubs, with the peculiar technical slang of the ward bosses, were new and novel features in the Paradise of the Pacific; but the business was pushed forward with a zeal worthy of a better cause, and a whole crop of McLeans, McLeods, McStockers, O'Raffertys, and the like, bloomed out like magic as managers and instructors in the science of how to beat an overwhelming majority of the honest citizens at the polls.

Nor were any of the minor details overlooked. The swaggering gait, tilted hat, humped shoulder, and leering stare of the ward bosses made the stranger from New York and San Francisco feel quite at home, and gave unmistakable assurances of our being fully abreast of the age. The missionary of the present generation became an apt pupil of the scoundrel, who was an adept in all the black arts by which the will of the people is defeated at the ballot box. In due course the election was held, and the results showed how perfectly the organization of the revolutionists had been carried out. Only two independent native Hawaiians out of forty-eight elected members were returned to the assembly, and these two were practically under the control of the machine. The average standard of intelligence of the Legislature was much lower than that of any Hawaiian Legislature either before or since, and included such men as Notley, Wall, Makee, the two Dowsetts, father and son, the Wilcox brothers, George and Albert Deacon, and the like; men who were selected because they could be depended upon to vote straight without any danger of their giving trouble by having views of their own.

The mental and moral obliquities of the lawgivers were plainly outlined in their physical deformities, as seven-eighths of the whole number were either pigeontoed, knock-kneed, or bow-legged, and served as excellent illustrations of the well-known physiological principle or truth of the general harmony of mental and physical attributes. The history of the session and the character of the work done did not in any way disappoint those at all acquainted with the personnel of the honorable body. The speakers and leaders in the Assembly, without exception, were members of or under control of, the Missionary party, and the whole business of the session was carried through on the "cut-and-dried" principle. The main object in view was to emphasize their contempt for the King, his native subjects, and all others who were not in sympathy with the revolutionists, and at the same time to strengthen, by suitable legislation, their hold of the situation. When they felt they had attained their object they adjourned, "subject to the call of the President of the Legislature," avoiding prorogation, thereby still further showing their determination to arrogate to themselves all the functions of government.

The community, the nation at large, soon realized that instead of being ruled over by one king, who, however injudicious he might be at times, never failed to realize that he was the first gentleman of the

realm, they were being ruthlessly dominated by four kings who were personifications of arrogance and boorish ignorance. Their management of the several departments, distribution of patronage, and haughty indifference to the wishes of those who had helped them to power caused an inevitable revulsion amongst their own adherents, to say nothing of the increased alienation of the native Hawaiians, who now began to understand and feel the indignities heaped upon them.

It was plain to be seen that the coming election, not far distant, would show a decided change very likely disastrous to the saints. In the meantime a few ill-advised natives, with R. W. Wilcox at their head, and secretly supported and encouraged by some disaffected foreigners, made an abortive attempt to emulate the example of the Missionary party by presenting to the King a constitution which would restore the conditions previous to June 30, 1887. The leaders had reckoned without their host. They led a few hundreds of natives to the palace before daylight in the morning, expecting by 7 o'clock they would have several thousands to support them. In this they were disappointed, as the movement was not popular with the Hawaiians generally. And by 8 o'clock those in the palace yard realized their situation and would have gladly surrendered to anyone having authority to demand it.

When the news of the affair spread over town our missionary friends were dismayed, and had no idea of what to do, as there seemed to be little inclination on the part of the public to help them out. However, their old tactics stood them in good service, and by 10 o'clock in the forenoon, by the time-honored trick of promises and coin, they got together a motley body of sharpshooters to attack the comparatively defenseless people in the palace grounds. The attacking party occupied the buildings surrounding the palace yard, and from safe point of vantage began a fusilade fatal to the Kanaka, the missionaries themselves taking the greatest delight in "picking them off," as Dole and others of his ilk who participated in the sport expressed it.

If the Hawaiian needed any further proof of the true sentiments cherished for himself by the descendants of the old missionary teachers, the savage alacrity with which they seized the first opportunity to shoot him like a rat in a hole from safe cover would seem to have been sufficient to dispel any remaining doubt.

The general election of 1890 came off in due time, and, as was anticipated, a cold wave swept over the hopes and plans of the revolutionists and left them without a majority in the house. They plainly saw that all their expenditure of time and pains and (what to them was the most heartsickening of all) money was a total, dismal failure, as, with all their talk about free and representative government, they had no grounds for complaint if they could not control the necessary votes. Consequently they immediately began to scheme on a different line, having in view the extinction of the nation, as such, and accordingly laid their plans for annexation to the United States. Just exactly what advantages the saints expected to secure to themselves by such a move is not quite clear when it is remembered that the very essence of the Government of the great republic is that the voice of the majority shall rule.

It can only be presumed that they had their own selfish ends alone in view, as in this respect they had always been thoroughly consistent, and their past history precludes the possibility of supposing that any consideration for the welfare of the nation had cut any figure in their scheme. It has been suggested that the 2 cents per pound bounty made

their mouths water. To imagine this to have been the prompting motive would be to place them on about the same plane of intelligence with the African ostrich with his beak in the sand, or the Irishman who sawed off the limb on which he was standing, between himself and the trunk of the tree. Whatever the true causes may have been which led to this course, the fact remains that they bent their energies with untiring zeal to the accomplishment of the object, and Col. Spalding, Judge Hartwell, and Thurston, each in turn, made special visits to Washington on this errand, with what success the public, of course, never learned; but from later developments there would seem to be reason for believing that the revolutionists' emissaries found some comforting warmth in the bosom of that statesmanship which conceived, and endeavored to put in force, the peculiar views with regard to the Monroe doctrine a dozen or so years since and the Pan-American scheme of a later date.

As soon as they found that the Queen was not disposed to yield a blind obedience to their bidding the saints transferred to her all the bitter malevolence which they had heaped upon her brother (notwithstanding the fact that she had very lately been so much of a favorite with them that they had seriously contemplated setting her up in his place), and the measure of their vindictiveness knew no bounds. They had cheerfully accepted her always liberal contributions to their church, educational, and charitable objects, and no sacred or social function was complete without her presence, and for years past they had sought her membership of all their benevolent and church societies.

The greatest show of deference and obsequious homage was always made by them all when before her, and no opportunity was lost by any of them to secure invitations to the palace, and they took especial pains to have strangers understand that they were on the best of terms with the head of the nation. But when their emotional tide turned there was nothing too gross for their devilish ingenuity to lay to her charge. Moral depravity and superstition too coarse for description by any except their own filthy scavengers were imputed to her and paraded in their publications in the most offensive and loathsome manner. As an example of what the motherly members of the Central Union Church have been in the habit of retailing to strangers with regard to her, the following choice bit may serve as a type:

For several years passed the Queen has supported at her own expense upwards of 20 destitute native Hawaiians girls at Kawaiaho and other mission schools, and when they graduated, in many cases, she settled them in life, assisting them in securing homes with suitable husbands. When the saints frowned on her they could see nothing but the most contemptible motives back of her philanthropy, and they did not hesitate to say that the girls were merely supported by the Queen for the sole purpose of being distributed amongst her favorites when their charms were sufficiently developed.

Illustrations like the foregoing might be multiplied indefinitely. The feature most difficult to account for in the attitude of the saints is, that while the Queen might naturally come in for a large share of their ill-will as having been a marplot to their schemes, why should they show hatred for the native Hawaiian race. Their local publications, the Friend, Gazette, Daily Advertiser, etc., seldom appeared without containing some heartless libel or ungenerous slur against the Hawaiians either as individuals or as a race or nation. Descendants of the old stock, such as S. E. Bishop, S. C. Armstrong, H. M. Whitney, W. R. Castle, and a number of others, who screened themselves from identi-

fication by writing anonymously-prepared elaborate libels on the Hawaiian people for publication in American periodicals. They worked with the genius of inspiration and the industry of honest men to in every way defame the people for whom one would think they could entertain only the most friendly and generous sentiments to the latest generation.

A notable example of their efforts in this line is the screed prepared by Bishop entitled (See page 3 of pamphlet herewith) "Why are the Hawaiians dying out?" The author endeavored to shield himself from criticism behind the specious pretext of "scientific investigation," and first made public his diatribe by reading it before one of the numerous admiration societies controlled by the saints in Honolulu, known as the "Social Science Association." The document is a model of ingenious combination of truth and falsehood, which are sufficiently well interwoven to give a certain air of severe scientific fairness to the heartless production. Affecting a display of analytical acumen, the author proceeds to divide up and classify the reasons for his belief that the final extinction of the Hawaiians (so devoutly hoped for by him and his friends) is near at hand. First amongst the causes selected is "unchastity"—under which heading he tells us that "the Hawaiian female was aggressive in solicitation," and that this astounding and unseemly peculiarity "was a matter of good form."

The writer hereof can only say, in reply, that a continuous residence of over forty years in this Kingdom and an intimate association with the natives of every grade from the peasant to the head of the nation has discovered to him no such custom or weakness, and it would seem not unreasonable that the author of the libel should be called upon to raise his hand and make affidavit whether at any time during his long experience—from tender infancy (for unfortunately he was born here) to the hoary old age now vouchsafed to him—he ever met an Hawaiian damsel who had so far forgotten the instincts of womanhood as to voluntarily seek his loathsome embraces. It is altogether unlikely that the aged traducer would face the proposition. The charge coming from this source seems all the more gratuitous when it is remembered that a large number of half-castes of both sexes, ranging from infancy to middle age, throughout the Kingdom are living proofs of the moral weaknesses of some of the annointed and their white descendants.

If the saints prove anything they would seem to prove too much by their continued efforts to belittle the Queen and her race. If she and her people are as bad now as they represent them to be what is to be said of all the prayerful work of the good missionary fathers and mothers during the last seventy years? If their picture is a true one then the million and a half of money, made up from 5 and 10 cent American sabbath-school subscription, together with a few death-bed legacies of Puritan fanatics, which has been expended for the evangelization of the Hawaiians would seem to have been worse than wasted.

The impartial observer is not, however, led to this conclusion. He finds that the Hawaiian has made very commendable progress on the road to civilization during the two and a half generations last past; that for a half century he has had a representative government, which, so far as he himself (the Hawaiian) is concerned, would compare favorably with that of any nation on the face of the globe; that the little Kingdom occupies an honored position in the family of nations, having treaty relations with all the commercial nations of the earth and being a member of the Universal Postal Union, with a representative in the congress at Geneva; that the standard of intelligence amongst the

native Hawaiians is higher than that in any other nation in the world, illiteracy being practically unknown; and that, above all, he finds the native Hawaiian a peaceable, law-abiding citizen, not nearly so prone to violence and riot as his white brother. He finds further that, notwithstanding their unfortunate experience with some of the foreign residents in their midst, the people are endowed with a genial friendliness and hospitality, frankness and courtliness of manner, which, in many respects, makes them the peers of any race living, and strikes the stranger with wonder who has become familiar with the libelous charges so industriously circulated against the Hawaiians.

Returning to the political attitude of the saints, we find that the arrival of United States Minister Stevens gave a new impulse to their machinations. On his first presentation to the King, he presumed to give His Majesty a lecture in such an offensive manner as to tempt the King to abruptly terminate the interview and to request his recall. Actual rupture on the occasion was, however, narrowly avoided and from this time on the American legation was the rallying point for the missionary annexation party. During the session of the Hawaiian Legislature of 1892, Hartwell, Smith, Castle, Waterhouse, Thurston, Dole, Judd (the chief justice), and other leaders of the party were in the habit of meeting there from time to time to plan the overthrow of the monarchy without endangering their own precious carcasses. They had secured, at no little expense, the services of a cat in 1887 to get the chestnut for them, which through ignorance and carelessness they subsequently lost. It had been an expensive and sorrowful lesson to them.

Now if they could only induce Stevens to take the part of the cat in the new venture it would be a great improvement on their first effort. In the first place it would be much less expensive (which to the saints was of prime importance), and in the next place, they imagined that the backing of the United States troops would give greater assurance of success than the undisciplined and ungovernable rabble of volunteers, of whom they had had a disagreeable experience in the times subsequent to their first revolution. Stevens was only too glad of the opportunity to act as the cat, and with a powerful war vessel in command of a willing tool, the setting of the game was easily completed.

The attitude of the American minister and his satellite, the Commander of the U. S. S. *Boston*, also the clandestine meetings at the American legation above referred to, were matters of public notoriety and as early as August or September of last year it was at first mysteriously hinted and later more openly asserted that the American minister would recognize without delay any movement for the overthrow of the monarchy and would give it the physical support of the men from the *Boston*, and it was further generally understood and spoken of, that the revolutionary annexationists, with Stevens and Wiltse (the commander of the *Boston*) at their backs, or more properly in the lead, were only waiting for a favorable opportunity to strike. The opportunity, or excuse, came on the 14th of January, A. D. 1893, culminating in the events of the 16th and 17th days of the same month. The revolutionists proclaimed a Provisional Government from the steps of the Government building at 2:40 o'clock in the afternoon of the last named day, which was immediately recognized by Stevens with the assurance that the new Government would receive the support of the *Boston's* men who had been quartered the day before alongside of and in practical possession of the Government building.

The revolutionary annexationists, in justification of their action, have raised the old cry of 1887, of the necessity of stable government, proper

representation, honest administration, prevention of riot and bloodshed, maintenance of law and order, etc., when as a matter of fact there is not now, and never has been, the least danger of disorder or opposition to law except at the hands of revolutionists themselves. The rant in the speeches at their meeting in the Rifles' armory on the 16th of January, and in their "proclamation," and the mock heroic utterances of Wilder (see *Two Weeks of Hawaiian History*, pages 15 and 16) when he assumed the chairmanship of the meeting are amongst the poorest examples imaginable of a stale herring drawn across a trail. There has been no fraud discovered nor malfeasance unearthed, nor great wrong righted; on the contrary thefts and spoliations have been committed under the very noses of the Provisional Government with apparent impunity, the probability being that exposure would be disagreeable, as it would be likely to implicate more or less distinguished members of their own precious crew.

The bald fact stands out in plain view to-day, exactly as it did in 1887, that the sole prompting motive of the missionary revolutionists was in both cases a lust of power coupled with a desire to possess themselves of the property of another without giving compensation therefor, sentiments which they enjoy in common with the vulgar highwayman and his more gentlemanly prototype, the filibuster. As they could not have held together for an hour without the assistance of the United States officials and forces, the singular spectacle is presented of a United States naval commander in Honolulu protecting a band of filibusters with the forces under his command while they overturn and destroy a Government between which and his own country special treaty relations of amity and commerce were in full force and unimpaired, and at the same date, due east about 5,000 miles as the crow flies, another naval commander, under the same flag, blockades a filibustering force in Key West to prevent it from making a descent on a friendly power. The question naturally arises: Why this difference? What had little Hawaii done that she should merit such treatment?

About 5 o'clock in the afternoon of Monday, the 16th day of January, A. D. 1893, a large detachment of marines and sailors from the United States ship *Boston*, lying in the harbor of Honolulu, landed *without permission or request from the Hawaiian Government*, and took position in King street between the Government building and the palace. The United States troops were fully armed and carried double cartridge belts filled with ammunition, also haversacks and canteens, and were accompanied by a Gatling gun battery, also a field hospital corps. Between 7 and 8 o'clock the same evening the force was quartered in the building immediately in rear of the Music Hall, being within half pistol shot, and in practical possession of the Government building.

At the date above mentioned, and for many years immediately preceding the landing of this force, the Hawaiian Kingdom was at peace with all nations. With all the great powers, and with many of the smaller Governments, Hawaii sustained treaty relations which were in full force and effect. This was more especially true in the case of the United States, with whom the most friendly relations of amity and commerce had existed from the date of the first treaty, dated December 23, 1826, to the above-mentioned date, and for whom little Hawaii (rulers and people alike) had always cherished the most friendly feelings. Diplomatic and consular representatives of various countries were accredited to the Hawaiian court and raised the flags of their respective governments in Honolulu. The Hawaiian Government was represented at various capitals and seaports throughout the world by diplo.

matic and consular agents duly recognized and accepted by the several governments to whom they were accredited by the Hawaiian foreign office.

The Hawaiian Kingdom held an honorable position in the family of nations as an independent government. The courts of justice throughout the Kingdom were disposing of the business brought before them without menace, let, or hindrance. Business of all kinds was being carried on as usual without interruption. The banks, newspaper offices, and commercial houses were attending to business in their several lines without unusual incident. *Perfect quiet and good order* existed throughout the city, there being *not even a suggestion of disorder or danger* to the life or property of either *citizen or alien*. A band concert was given at the Hawaiian Hotel at 8 o'clock in the evening, which was largely attended by men, women, and children of all classes, as it was fine weather and near full moon.

At 2:40 o'clock p. m. on the following day, January 17, 1893—nearly twenty-four hours after the American troops landed—*thirteen white men, several of them lately arrived in the country and not entitled to vote*, appeared in front of the Government building, and the leader proceeded to read a proclamation deposing the Queen and establishing a provisional government. The only audience to this function was composed of a few loungers in the corridors of the building. Near the close of the reading some twenty-seven armed men ran in from the back and side entrances of the premises and gathered around the thirteen men above mentioned, apparently as supporters of the movement. This supporting force was composed of *vagrants and ex-convicts* who were at *that moment* under *police surveillance*, *deserters from merchant ships in port*, and the like, only two or three being known as residents of the town. Before the arrival of the thirteen men in front of the Government building the American troops quartered near by (as already described) were under arms; the crews of the Gatlings were handy by their respective places; everything seeming to indicate complete readiness for any emergency.

At the time when the proclamation was being read the Hawaiian Government had 87 regular troops at the barracks, well drilled, officered, and equipped, having a battery of breech-loading field guns and a large supply of extra arms and ammunition for all arms. There was also a very efficient police force, drilled as a military company, and a large supply of arms, equipments, and ammunition, including a Gatling gun, with boiler-plate shield, at the station house in Honolulu.

The commander at the barracks and the marshal were ready and anxious to proceed immediately to take the Government building and arrest the parties in possession. But the presence of the American troops, and certain rumors with regard to the attitude of the American minister, caused the Hawaiian cabinet to confer with that official before taking action. They learned from him in writing that he recognized the Provisional Government and would support it with the United States troops.

As any action on the part of the Hawaiian troops or police meant a *collision* with the *United States troops*, the cabinet decided to surrender to the *United States* and await a settlement of the case on a presentation of the facts to the *authorities in Washington*. The surrender was made about sundown, at which time there had assembled at the barracks over a hundred and fifty members of the old volunteer companies disbanded in 1887 by the Reform cabinet, and between one hundred and fifty and two hundred citizens, accustomed to the use of arms, many of

them old soldiers, assembled at the station house, volunteering their services to the marshal. There was an ample supply of arms and ammunition at both the barracks and station house to supply all comers. At the time of the surrender there were, all told, over *five hundred men* ready and anxious to assist the Hawaiian Government in enforcing law and order.

The foregoing statement of facts can be easily supported by affidavits, if necessary, and would seem to show plainly that the movement can in *no sense* be justly termed a *revolution*, but was simply the action of a *handful of filibusters* made possible only by the active coöperation of the *American minister* and the *American troops*, and that the Hawaiian Government was at the time fully prepared and capable of regulating its domestic affairs, maintaining order, and giving ample protection to life and property within its borders. Consequently, as the defiance of Hawaiian laws, the deposition of the sovereign, and the spoliation of the treasury were effected—in fact *were only possible*—through the active *agency of the American officials and troops*, it seems but just that a *full and complete restoration* of affairs to the statu quo of January 16, 1893, previous to the landing of the United States troops, should be made with as little delay as possible, as each day's delay is adding to the legal and financial complications which will have to be met and composed by the Hawaiian people and their rulers.

CHAS. T. GULICK.

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *Island of Oahu*, ss:

Charles T. Gulick, being duly sworn, on his oath deposes and says, that during the ten years from A. D. 1869 to A. D. 1879 he was chief clerk of the interior department of the Hawaiian Government; that during the period from August 6, 1883, to June 30, 1886, he was minister of the interior of said Hawaiian Government; that during the above-named periods the rolls (or polling lists) of qualified voters for members of the Legislature were returned to said Interior Department; that from the opportunities thus offered for gaining information on the subject, affiant is confident that *less than 20 per cent* of American and European foreigners (*i. e.*, foreigners other than Asiatics) domiciled in the Kingdom prior to the revolution of 1887 became naturalized under the Hawaiian laws.

CHAS. T. GULICK.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of July, A. D. 1893.

[SEAL.]

J. H. THOMPSON,
Notary Public, *Island of Oahu*.

**WHY ARE THE HAWAIIANS DYING OUT OR ELEMENTS OF DISABILITY
FOR SURVIVAL AMONG THE HAWAIIAN PEOPLE?**

BY REV. S. E. BISHOP.

[Read to Honolulu Social Science Association, November, 1893.]

Mr. Darwin supplied an expression which has been much in vogue, "The survival of the fittest." This is scarcely applicable in the present case, since in Hawaii there is no competitive "struggle for existence" between weaker and stronger races of men. The Hawaiian Islands have been far more than sufficiently productive for the ample supply of the needs of all the people living here since the beginning of this century. So far all the different races have lived in plenty, and in amity with

each other. A crowded condition might be conceived as possible in the future, when the thrifty and capable classes would push the inefficient and improvident classes into penury. In such case, one would think the Chinese to be the best fitted for the "struggle for existence," and the Polynesian the least fitted. The former inherits an education of hundreds of generations in living on the minimum of necessities, also an unequaled patience of industry and tactful thriftiness for procuring those necessities. The latter, thriftless and indolent in comparison, would be crowded out of the land.

No such conditions exist. There is no struggle to find subsistence. One race is as fit to survive as another, so far as obtaining a living is concerned, in a country where the wages of one day's unskilled labor will purchase all indispensable food and raiment for a whole week. Neither is the climate of Hawaii less favorable to the health of one race than to that of another. It is comparatively a perfect climate, absolutely devoid of extremes of temperature, free from humidity, swept by the ever purging ocean airs, and seemingly incapable of long harboring malarial or zymotic diseases. Possibly an Esquimaux might not thrive here. For all other races it is an Eden in salubrity.

Yet it is the strange fact—in view of the amiable and attractive qualities of Polynesians, the distressingly sad fact that, simultaneously with the arrival of white men in these islands, the Hawaiian people began rapidly to melt away, and that this waste has continued up to the present with substantial steadiness. At the date of the discovery, Captain Cook estimated the population at 400,000. Later historians have leaned to the more moderate estimate of 250,000. My father who was one of the first party of white men to travel around Hawaii in 1824, then observed such evidences of recent extensive depopulation in all parts of that island that he very decidedly supported the estimate of Cook. There are now less than 40,000 pure Hawaiians surviving. The later counts have been taken with reasonable accuracy.

One is led to suspect that the earlier ones omitted considerable numbers, when one observes the comparative sparseness of native population in every district, as compared with the relatively dense population fifty years ago, when only 125,000 were counted, or little more than three times the present number. With the exception of the towns of Honolulu, Hilo, and Wailuku, every large and populous town in the islands has dwindled to a hamlet since my boyhood, and the then frequent and considerable hamlets scattered everywhere, have almost all disappeared. The recollections of fifty years since are of throngs and swarms of natives everywhere. Yet even then all the talk was of how the islands had become depopulated; even then, in traveling, the deserted sites of villages and hamlets with abandoned plantations were constantly pointed out. Have we now one in six of the ancient numbers of natives, or have we only one in ten. It is immaterial; the fact remains of an enormous depopulation.

And yet, in the total absence of any struggle for existence, all the more or less civilized races migrating here appear to thrive and multiply abundantly, and the children surpass their children in health and stature. At first sight these foreigners do not average as equal to the Hawaiian. The Chinaman is vastly his inferior in strength, in stature, in symmetry, and in apparent soundness. But the Chinaman lives and propagates, while the Hawaiian dies easily, and leaves few or no offsprings. The Caucasian also comes with his family and multiplies amain.

The query then is, under what peculiar disabilities does the Hawaiian labor, as to vitality and power of propagation, from which the foreign races living here are exempt? This inquiry is farther complicated by the fact that these disabilities, whatever they are, seem to have first sprung into efficiency upon contact with the white race. The coming of that race appears to have introduced new deleterious influence, and created new conditions, under which the Polynesian, somewhere weak, succumbs. We are to seek to clearly define what these unfavorable conditions are, and wherein the weakness of the native race to withstand these adverse influences, consists.

I here limit our inquiry to the Hawaiians, because with this people only do we possess any intimate acquaintance. A similar state of things prevails more or less throughout Polynesia, and ultimate extinction appears to threaten the native population of most of the groups of Polynesia. We are to endeavor to define the precise causes of depopulation. We should strive to indicate exactly what adverse influences have been steadily at work for five generations to kill off the Hawaiian people. There has been a great deal of vague generalization—of indefinite talk about a weak race succumbing to the stronger. We want to quit vagueness and generalities, and find the answer to the question, "In what respects, particularly and precisely, are the Hawaiian people weaker than their white, or their Mongoloid guests?" This will prepare us for the further inquiry, by what means can this weak race be so invigorated that it will again multiply? Our first effort—perchance unskilled and misdirected, is to diagnose the deadly malady which is slaying the people.

As the leading and most efficient element of weakness in the Hawaiian race, tending to physical decay, we predicate:

(1) *Unchastity*. *—This has always been general among females as well as males. The Hawaiian female was, like males of other races, aggressive in solicitation. It was matter of good form that all proposals should be expressed by the female. It is still so, except to the extent that foreign ideas have permeated society. The records of Cook's discovery of the group indicate that state of things as originally existing. The account written by Dr. Ellis, Cook's chief surgeon, states how at Kauai, where they first touched, Captain Cook was determined, on account of serious disease among his men, to permit no intercourse with the women, so as not to introduce disease among the Hawaiians. It was, however, impracticable to prevent the women from swarming over the ships. The native account received from participants by the early missionaries, states that it was arranged in public council that the women should take this course, as the easiest way of obtaining iron and other prized articles from the ships.

Proceeding from Niihau to Alaska, and returning nine months later, Cook's ships made the coast of Hamakua, Hawaii. He again sought to keep the women from his crew, but discovered that they were already infected with the malady. So promiscuous were the habits of the people, that from the first center of infection at Waimea, the malady had in nine months, spread like a fire to the other extremity of the group. This, again, is corroborated by the information obtained by the early missionaries as to the spread of the disease. Dr. Ellis describes, in words undesirable to here reproduce, the grossly aggressive and impetuous action of the females.

It was the universal practice of ordinary hospitality to visitors to supply them during their sojourn with the women of the family. Such a matter-of-course tender was a frequent cause of annoyance to the early missionaries in their tours in remoter districts, enjoying the cordial hospitality of the most well-to-do people, in their neat thatched cottages. I am not prepared to say how far this heathen custom has now lapsed into disuse. It is certainly one of the old customs sought to be maintained and revived together with the hulas and idolatrous practices. One of the painful experiences of missionaries in the out districts, was to hear of this practice being carried out in the chief households of his parish when some great man came along with his suite. I speak from repeated personal experience as a missionary pastor.

It may be said in general that chastity had absolutely no recognition. It was simply a thing unknown and unthought of as a virtue in the old domestic life of Hawaii. A woman who withheld herself was counted sour and ungracious. This did not exclude more or less of marital proprietorship, involving an invasion of the husband's right in enjoying his property without his consent. There was no impurity in it any more than among brute animals.

There was, however, a salutary limitation of some importance in a frequent stringent guarding of early virginity. Young maidens were quite commonly put under tabu for first use by the chief, after possession by whom all restriction ceased. No sense of a sacredness in chastity seems to have been involved in this, nor any sense of profanation in the contrary. It was only the thought of a special choiceness in an article that was fresh and unused. In the tremendous disturbances of life ensuing upon the advent of the white man, even this solitary restriction perished.

No severe moral reprobation is due to the primitive Hawaiian for what seems to have been an ignorant innocence of easy, promiscuous living, like the free life of animals, without sense of evil. None the less must we deem this social condition more than any other to have incapacitated the Hawaiians from holding their own after the advent of the white man. During the simplicity of aboriginal life, and in the total absence of sexual diseases, the evils resulting from promiscuous intercourse would be minimized. Procreative force remained largely in excess of mortality, so that the teeming population was kept down by infanticide. But to them a lady which the white man imported, the unguarded social condition was as tow to the flame. The scorching and withering disease ran like wildfire through the nation. Multitudes died at once, while the survivors remained with poisoned bodies and enfeebled constitutions.

A general impairment of constitutional vigor in the people by venereal disease caused them to fall early victims to other maladies, both native and foreign. All diseases ran riot in their shattered constitutions. They became especially incapacitated to resist pulmonary maladies. The greatly increased prevalence of colds and consumption is doubtless due to this syphilitic diathesis rather than to change of habits as to clothing, although the latter may have had some unfavorable effect. Probably the pestilence called *Okun*, whatever its nature, which carried off such a bulk of the population in 1804, owed most of its virulence to the impaired physique of the people.

* See "Foot-note to Hawaiian history," page 35.

Another destructive effect of the syphilitic taint is believed to have been an inflaming of sexual passion. It may have acted as a ferment thrown into the former more quiet pool of promiscuous social living. There can be no doubt that the advent of foreigners in large numbers was attended by an immense increase of debased and bestial living. Ten thousand reckless seamen of the whaling fleet annually frequented these islands and used it as their great brothel. This enormously aggravated and inflamed the normal unchastity of the people. In the presence of the white hordes life became hideously brutalized. To multitudes of young women, gathered into the seaports for profit, from half the households in the country, life became a continuous orgie of beastly excess. All the former slender limitations and restrictions upon an indiscriminate commerce fell to pieces. The stormy and reckless passion of the white man, exulting in his unwonted license, imparted itself to the warm but sluggish Hawaiian nature. Life became a wasteful riot of impurity, propagated from the seaports to the end of the land. There was thus no defense against the new and trying conditions of life through any existing sentiment of the sacredness of chastity. The inevitable consequence was depopulation. The population of brothels and slums has no internal power of multiplying.

In the report on the subject of purity, adopted by the 144 bishops convened in the late Pan-Anglican Conference at Lambeth Palace, are the following words: "We solemnly record our conviction that wherever marriage is dishonored, and sins of the flesh are lightly regarded, the home life will be destroyed, and the nation itself will sooner or later decay and perish." The source of this language will lend it great weight. The Hawaiian nation is a sad witness to their truth.

One of the most destructive consequences of the new physical taint was the enfeeblement of infancy, rendering it difficult for the diseased babes to survive the ignorant and careless dealing of their nurses. The largest increase in the mortality of the Hawaiians was undoubtedly among their infants. The external influences adverse to infant survival among Hawaiians are very great. Chief among these are the practice of feeding with unsuitable nutriment in early infancy, the prevalence of unchecked cutaneous maladies, general lack of watchful care, and evil doses administered by ignorant or superstitious friends. Healthy and vigorous infants, as of the old times, would in good numbers survive all these hostile conditions. Those born into the taint of syphilis, with its inward and outward corrosions, had little prospect of surviving other maltreatments, unless some missionary or other beneficent foreigner came to their aid with his simple regimen and alleviations.

Under this general head of unchastity, as the chief cause of the depletion of the race, a considerable share must be attributed to the extensive loss of procreative power in the males. This loss was probably due in part to syphilitic taint, but is mainly owing to early sexual excess during puberty. In the aboriginal condition there would seem to have been less tendency to very early indulgence among the males. The nervous irritations of the syphilitic taint and the exciting excesses pervading native society may have been causes extending debauching influences even to the children. It is certain that in many districts deplorable excesses have been found to exist among the school children. It seems to be true that a majority of young Hawaiian men never have children. Those placed early under the discipline of foreigners, in boarding schools or otherwise, show exceptions to the common rule. The incapacity seems to be mainly on the part of the males. Young women united to Chinamen or white men are usually quite as fruitful as women of other races. *Per contra*, it is to be noted that such men are apt to select the best-conditioned females, also that they are accustomed to restrain and to protect their wives, as Hawaiians do not, and so keep them in healthier condition.

The common record of Hawaiian families is few or no children born, or perhaps several born, most or all of whom die in infancy. It is exceedingly rare to find a large family surviving to adult age. Nearly all such that I have known were families under the immediate and very parental control of some missionary, with whom the parents had lived from early youth, learning habits of industry, self-control, and civilized domestic living. They were themselves kept in vigor and health, their children were well cared for, and well doctored in sickness. Natives so situated very frequently not only raised large families, but by means of their superior industry, skill, and thrift acquired considerable substance. Being thereby placed in a high social rank among their countrymen, it has too commonly resulted that most of their children became dissolute, like the children of the wealthy elsewhere, and the family failed to be continued.

Among other disastrous effects of the universal syphilitic taint was the frequency of miscarriages. It has been the testimony of missionaries and physicians that a very considerable proportion of native births have been prevented by that cause. In my inquiries in native households this has been assigned as frequently as any other as the cause of the absence of children. To make such inquiries is indeed melancholy. One becomes glad to hear that even one or two children are surviving in a household.

Abortion is often attributed to active horseback exercise during pregnancy. As native females used to be continually galloping about, no doubt this has contributed to the evil since 1850, when the common people began generally to possess horses. With the developement of good roads, wheels are now coming into very common use by all classes.

(2) *Drunkenness*.—This should be assigned to no inconsiderable place among disabling conditions. Before the *haole* arrived the favorite narcotic was *awa* (*piper methysticum*), more commonly known throughout Oceania as *kava*. A beer of some strength was made by fermenting sweet potato. The sirupy *Ki-root* (*Dracæna Tī*) was also macerated and fermented, becoming still more alcoholic than the potato. This was less acceptable, tending to produce irascibility, while the sour-potato swill only inflamed sexuality. No great orgies of drunkenness resulted from the use of any of the foregoing. The vice existed only in mild forms. *Awa* in excess tended to waste and paralyze the system.

With the foreigner came the products of the still. Only then did drunkenness begin to reign. Drunken orgies were an essential part of the beach-comber's paradise on Hawaiian shores. He found the Hawaiian an apt disciple, save that, like all savages, he did not know how to stop. The story of the early missionaries is one of constant impediment in their labors from the inebrity of the King and chiefs and of frequent annoyance and disturbance from the riotous orgies of the common people. While Kamehameha lived he put considerable check upon both his people and himself as to temperance. His youthful successor, Liholiho, plunged, with his people, into a carnival of excess.

The contribution of drunkenness to depopulation was mainly indirect, although powerful. It tended to overturn and destroy whatever remains of wholesome social order and domestic life survived the general wreck consequent upon foreign intercourse. It stimulated the passions; it solved the remaining bonds of self-restraint; it flung prudence to the winds; thus it enhanced the effectiveness of the causes previously described. Intemperance is always a chief ally of impurity. The gin-mill and the brothel are close partners.

(3) *Oppression of the chiefs*.—There was a considerable mortality during the first quarter of this century, when the sandal-wood trade was active, caused by the heavy exactions of the King and chiefs upon the common people to procure this precious commodity wherewith to liquidate their immense debts to the traders, incurred for yachts and costly luxuries. Great numbers of men were driven into the mountains upon this errand, passing many nights in cold and rain with slight protection and little food. The result was great waste of life and the almost entire extirpation of the precious tree. Other severe exactions of labor were common. Great levies of labor and supplies were frequently made at a chief's caprice from the tenants of remote estates, to be brought to the island capital. This was an evil much increased by the temptations of foreign trade. No doubt it materially contributed to the decimation of the people. Oppression by chiefs has ceased to be an operative cause for nearly half a century, or since constitutional government began to exist.

(4) *Infectious and epidemic diseases*.—These have largely added to the destruction of the population. There seems to be good reason for accepting the theory that new diseases attack with more severity and greater fatality races who are unaccustomed to them or to their like. No doubt any race becomes in time somewhat hardened to the diseases which infest it, the weaker and more susceptible individuals being weeded out, and the hardier ones transmitting their resisting power to descendants.

Measles first appeared here in 1849. Great numbers died in all parts of the group. The excess of mortality was attributed to the patients' bathing in order to alleviate the external heat and irritation of the malady.

Smallpox first arrived in 1853. Before vaccination could be efficiently administered to the natives the infection had spread over the island of Oahu, and one-half, or 15,000, of the people on that island, perished in a few weeks. After their manner they rushed to visit their friends when attacked by the disease. Isolation and precaution against infection is foreign to their natures. By the energy of the then "missionary" Government quarantine measures were vigorously enforced on the other islands, and the people thoroughly vaccinated, so that only a few hundred deaths occurred. Foreigners were all promptly vaccinated, and nearly all escaped.

Malarial and other epidemics have been repeatedly introduced, and from time to time have produced extensive mortality among the natives. The admirable climate, with its sea air and the ozone of the mountain land breezes, seemed in each case rapidly to mitigate the virulence with which earlier cases of the new malady would be characterized, later cases assuming milder forms, until the disease seemed to slowly die out. This was very marked in the instance of what was known as the "boo-hoo" fever, which attacked all newly arrived foreigners. It was quite severe at its first appearance in 1851, but by 1857 had become a very trifling malady.

Leprosy has been something of a scourge. Probably 4,000 lepers have died in these islands during the past thirty years. The number at present suffering from the disease can not be more than 1,500, or 4 per cent of the native population. For more than a year, or since the end of 1887, there has been a radical improvement in the work of segregating the lepers. There seems reason to believe that soon nearly every leper will have been removed to the excellent asylum at Molokai. The lepers are nearly all natives. The disease very rarely appears among the white or the Mongolian races living here, owing to their carefully avoiding intercourse with lepers. Hawaiians, on the contrary, mingle freely with lepers in the most intimate daily intercourse. They commonly regard the segregation of their leprous relatives as a cruel and uncalled for severity. This is only one illustration of the habitual indifference of this people to sanitation, whether in physics or in morals.

Indeed, the idea of disease being a product of natural agencies and a thing to be averted by physical preventives, seems to be one quite foreign to the Hawaiian's mind and contrary to his mode of thought. In common with other uncivilized races the world over they were accustomed to attribute all diseases to the immediate agency of some personal demon, who enters the patient and malignantly distresses and destroys him. This brings us to another and one of the most destructive of the agencies contributing to the diminution of the Hawaiian people.

(5) *Kahunas and sorcery*.—The *kahuna* is the *medicine man*. He is properly a sorcerer or wizard, whose chief reliance for the relief of disease is the employment of supernatural agencies although he will also perhaps use drugs and hygienic treatment. From ancient times these men and their arts have been powerful agencies of death, although not seldom effecting a species of "faith cure." When a Hawaiian is ill, his superstitious relatives and friends immediately seek to persuade him that his sickness is owing to the malign presence of some demon, who must either be propitiated or expelled by force. Some *kahuna* is called in to accomplish this object. He is believed to enjoy special power with some patron demon, who may be the one needing to be propitiated, or whose agency may be called in to expel and overcome the perhaps less powerful agent of the disease. If one *kahuna* proves insufficient to the task others must be found who possess the special influence needed. The processes employed are always expensive to the patient, and very commonly quite severe.

There are sacrifices of pigs and fowls; there are complex incantations. There are doubtless various efforts allied to mesmeric or hypnotic phenomena. Violent sweatings and purgings are frequently used to promote the expulsion of the demon, with great physical severities of different kinds, such as often are of themselves fatal to the patient. The tension of anxiety and dread is terrible and very weakening. A great mortality results directly from this violent and terrifying treatment. Furthermore, there is a large mortality caused by pure mental apprehension where no disease originally existed. The sufferer is told that a sorcerer is at work against him; he at once sickens, and is prostrated, and soon dies. Or he is solemnly warned by a learned *kahuna* that he has symptoms of dangerous disease impending. Or he is conscious of having committed some act, such as the violation of a vow, which has offended the family deity, or *aumakua*, and through mental apprehension, the same effect of sickening ensues. All these things play into the hands of the medicine man, bring him dupes and victims, increase his revenue, and multiply the mortality of the people. It is difficult to determine to what extent these superstitious agencies are still at work. There is a painful reason to believe that their activity has been greatly revived of late years. There is much ground for thinking that a large proportion of the more intelligent and educated Hawaiians, when they fall ill, are prone to succumb to the inherited superstition. It is commonly remarked that the Hawaiian, when sick, shows a strange lack of recuperative power. He dies easily. He becomes depressed and surrenders where other men would recover. Probably in most such cases the cause is his superstitious belief in a demon whom he feels working at his vitals and whom it is hopeless to resist.

(6) *Idolatry*.—This is intimately connected with the above-named agency. Its chief importance, however, in this discussion, is in its character as the most efficient of all the agencies that disorder the mental and debase the moral action of the people, and which frustrate and neutralize remedial influences. It resembles drunkenness in this respect, but I think very far exceeds it in its evil ethical efficiency.

All thinkers, of whatever creed or type of skepticism, consider a people's religion to have an immense formative power upon them. The institutions, the customs, and the conduct of a people are certain to be shaped and patterned, in a great degree, after whatever embodiments of moral ideals they believe in, such as deified heroes, and deities of whatever sort whom they fear and worship. If the gods of any nation, like those of early Egypt, are understood to exercise substantial justice, to reward virtue, purity, and temperance, and to punish vice, treachery, and cruelty, such a nation will continue to cherish the higher and to despise the baser qualities. Righteousness has the sanction of religion, and the nation grows and prospers. The Polytheisms of Egypt, of Greece, of Rome, of Chaldea, in their earlier and less cor-

rupted forms, exalted much of the higher elements of character; hence a good degree of civilization became possible under these religions. This was also true of the earlier Brahminism of the Vedas. There is strong evidence that these religions were all corruptions from an original Monotheism, retaining something of that earlier religious recognition of the righteousness and benevolence of the Heaven-Father, the Dyaus-Pitar, Zeus-Pater, or Jupiter of the Aryan races. It is most noticeable how, from debased races, these nations imported successively the worship of evil gods—the Baals, Molochs, Astartes, Kalis, gods of lust, cruelty, falsehood, debauchery. These fastened as parasites upon the earlier and cleaner Polytheisms, and so corroded and poisoned the social and political life of those great nations.

Whether, as Fornander maintains, any traces of an ancient monotheism can be discerned in the Polynesian Pantheon, may be considered doubtful. It is certain, however, that the prevailing characteristics attributed to even the highest gods, such as Fornander's Trinity of Ku, Kane, and Kanaloa, were wretchedly evil and unclean. There are not merely strong tendencies to animalism and cruelty, with frequent lapses into crimes of lust and revenge, such as disfigure Greek mythology. These gods of the Hawaiians become absolute embodiments of bestiality and malignity, like Moloch and other gods of the Canaanites.

The impure and malignant essence of Hawaiian deities is visibly embodied in their images. In contrast to the personal beauty of the Greek gods, the aim and the effort of the carver is to depict an extreme of malignity and sensuality. The lineaments are made as revolting and horrific as the artist can combine them from vicious types of animal savagery, such as the shark or the boar. The first impression is a just one, that a people who worshiped such deities as these images represent could not be otherwise than profoundly perverted in their ethical sentiments.

The various legends of the chief gods abound in attributes of the most excessive bestiality. They are generally incapable of being printed without extensive expurgation. A loathsome filthiness is not mere incident, but forms the groundwork of character, not merely of the great hog-god Kamapuaa, but even of the more human-like Ku and Kane of the chief Trinity.

The moral ideas of the worshippers of such gods could not fail to suffer extreme perversion. Justice and purity were in contempt. Cruelty and lust were exalted into religion. The late Matthew Arnold, eliminating personality from the idea of the God of Christendom, defined Deity as "The stream of tendency in the universe that makes for righteousness." If we could eliminate these horrific personalities from the Hawaiian Pantheon, we might well count the ideal residuum to stand for the stream of tendency that makes for all wickedness. It was an embodied diabolism.

As a shaping force upon character, and a moving force upon conduct, this diabolic religion takes its energy from sorcery. Sorcery brings these evil gods down as living active powers interposing in all circumstances of life. By the arts of the *kahunas* the people were held, and, to a considerable extent, are still held, in habitual fear of these powerful gods and their subordinate demons. Their lives are continually threatened by them. Every internal sense of illness is the deadly touch, sensibly felt, of a god. So the people were held in abject slavery to their gods, and to the priests who could influence them. Slaves to such unclean beings, they tend to be like them; their moral sentiments are overturned; evil becomes good, and good evil. Lewdness, prostitution, indecency, drunkenness, being god-like, are exalted into virtues. Recent practical illustrations of this are not lacking.

One of the foul florescences of the great poison tree of idolatry is the *hula*. This is most intimately connected with the whole system, and forms an essential part of its services, just as sacred music does of Christian worship. The *hula* dances are habitually idolatrous in practice, having their special patron gods, whom the dancers invoke and worship. The chief posturings and movements of the *hulas* are pantomimes of unnameable lewdness, illustrated and varied with elaborate art, and accompanied with chants of unspeakable foulness of diction and description. This is the sacred music of idolatry, its opera and its drama. The multitudes of men, women, and children who throng to these royal *hula* operas there drink in the heathen ethics of social life in unmitigated directness and grossness, made sensational with vivid pantomime of beastliness, and embellished with foul wit and jest in song, extolling and dramatizing impurity. Against such schooling, it must be a powerful civilizing force that can make head and redeem any Hawaiian homes from becoming brothels.

(7) *Wifeless Chinese*.—This is an evil of recent growth, which acts most perniciously upon the social life of Hawaiians. There are some 20,000 Chinamen of the lowest class, without their women, distributed throughout the islands in close contact with the natives, and in many districts outnumbering the Hawaiian males. The effect is necessarily very destructive to the purity of native families, although not more so than the presence of a similar number of unmarried whites would be. There is no doubt but that many native households in all parts of the country are maintained in comparative affluence by the intimacy of Chinese with their females.

Some of the heads of these families are members in good standing in the Protestant churches, whose easy-going native pastors lack the energy and authority to deal with the offenders, while the moral sentiment prevailing both within and outside of the church is too feeble to put them to shame.

The catalogue of destructive elements making for the death of the Hawaiian people, as enumerated above, is an appalling one. It certainly suffices to account for any amount of infertility and mortality. On the other hand there are many sanative and restorative agencies at work which inspire hope for the repression of these evils and afford prospect for the reinforcement and augmentation of healing agencies. I briefly name some of the most efficient:

(1) *Government medical aid.*—Paid physicians are within reach of most of the people, whose services to them are free of charge. Their help should save many more lives than they do, or than they will, so long as the people are taught idolatry and to trust in the *kahunas*. It is not in itself a very easy thing for a skilled physician to gain the confidence of the native people in the degree that he needs for any considerable success. It is nearly impossible for him to do so, when contending as he generally is with active superstition in the minds of his patients and their friends, and with the army of *kahunas* working with all their arts against him. His prescriptions will very commonly be neglected and his injunction disobeyed.

I have not the slightest doubt that a hearty reception by the Hawaiian people of the medical aid now provided, discarding their *kahunas*, would at once cause births to preponderate over deaths.

(2) *Hygienic instruction.*—There has been a great deal of instruction given upon the laws of health and simple remedial treatment in the schools and churches and by means of books. Dr. Judd's translation of Cutter's *Anatomy and Physiology* was printed nearly fifty years ago and used as a text-book in the leading high school. Such instruction has done great service. It has proved insufficient, however, to make head against the inveterate belief in the supernatural cause of disease. It is likely to continue inadequate, so long as the *kahunas* are encouraged to ply their arts.

(3) *School education.*—Book knowledge, and even the much vaunted education in English, have sadly failed to arm Hawaiians against succumbing to superstition and its kindred impurity, either in the ranks of the lowly or the lofty.

Domestic and industrial training in boarding schools has accomplished much more, and is doing excellent work for both sexes by their practical training in the ethics, the conduct, and the industry of Christian civilization. Several hundred youth of each sex are now enjoying the advantages of such schools conducted by Protestants, Anglicans, and Catholics. Adversely, the youth who go out of these schools are at once plunged into a sea of indescribable temptation. Yet much of our best hopes for the future of the race is in the increasing numbers of these well-trained Hawaiians. They tend to form an elevated and civilized social class of their own. This is opposed and disintegrated by a Hawaiian social leadership, whose tendencies are all adverse.

(4) *Christian instruction* will continue to be regarded by earnest believers in Christianity as the chief effective agency in healing the nation's maladies. They hold that faith in Christ has power to emancipate from fear of demon-gods; they believe that the implanting of the high ideal of righteousness, of which Jesus of Nazareth is the source, will in the end erect in all minds a standard of integrity and purity which will be more effectual than anything else in securing moral and healthy living among the people. Probably the most of the many true and earnest friends of right living who do not accept the supernatural element of Christian doctrine would agree that for the Hawaiian, in his present mental stage of development, such a faith would be a more efficient antidote than any scientific or philosophical teaching could be.

If it be asked why sixty-eight years of Christian teaching has not availed to lift the Hawaiian people out of the mire of impure living if it be thus efficacious, its teachers would point to the great increase of adverse influences for the last thirty years and to the direct fostering of sorcery and *hulas* by authority during that time, and latterly to the promotion of hardly concealed worship of the gods. They would also point to the immense growth of foreign elements whose unfavorable influence has been illustrated in the case of the Chinese. They would also call special attention to the fact that during the period of powerful missionary ascendancy, say from 1833 to 1853, while nearly the whole people became nominal adherents of Christianity, only a minority become actual members of the churches, while the great majority, although outwardly assenting, remained wedded to their habitual vice and secretly to their superstitions, and that the more Christian minority gave place by death to another generation far less strongly impressed and less fervid in religious interest.

In accordance with the foregoing statement of facts, as I clearly understand them, and whose substantial correctness I think can not be gainsaid, there seems to be no radical remedy for the two great causes of infertility and mortality, viz, *unchastity*

and sorcery, except a system of vigorously extirpating those two allied agencies in which they generate and are nourished, the *hulas* and the *kahunas*. Both are purely heathen institutions of the most pronounced and detestible type, and are totally incompatible with any true and wholesome civilization. They should both be hunted down and exterminated like the venomous reptiles that they are, poisoning and slaying the people. Until this is done with determined thoroughness I see little prospect of arresting the decrease of the Hawaiian people.

The Hawaiian race is one that is well worth saving. With all their sad frailties, they are a noble race of men physically and morally. They are manly, courageous, enterprising, cordial, generous, unselfish. They are highly receptive of good. They love to look forward and upward, even though very facile to temptations to slide backward and downward. In an unusual degree they possess a capacity for fine and ardent enthusiasm for noble ends. Should the Hawaiian people leave no posterity, a very sweet, generous, interesting race will have been lost to the world. They can be saved. They have deserved too well of mankind—they have been too kindly, too friendly, too trustful and magnanimous not to merit the most devoted efforts to avert their threatening fate and to set them forward in a hopeful course. It seems as if this might most easily be accomplished if there were only a wise and resolute purpose to do it.

TWO WEEKS OF HAWAIIAN HISTORY.

[A brief sketch of the revolution of 1893. Illustrated. Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands. Published by the Hawaiian Gazette Company, 1893.]

A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE HAWAIIAN REVOLUTION OF 1893.

PREFATORY.

The course of Hawaii's political development has in general been peaceful. Under the reign of Kamehameha III the fundamental changes in social organization, in the private rights of individuals, in the tenure of land, and in the constitution of government were effected without disturbance or bloodshed. The reign of the third Kamehameha witnessed the beginning and the completion of the great series of changes which transformed Hawaii from a feudal and savage despotism into a free and civilized state. Without the cordial coöperation of an enlightened monarch these reforms could not have been, as they were, speedily and peacefully effected.

With the failure of the Kamehameha line, a change came over the spirit of the monarchy, and the new dynasty refused to walk in the footsteps of the old. The sound sense which had tempered the despotic spirit of Kamehameha V was wanting to Kalakaua, and his reign brought with it a long series of extravagances and abuses which finally exhausted the patience of the people. The uprising of 1887 resulted in the promulgation of a new and more liberal constitution, but the patience and moderation of the people gave to royalty one last chance, and left the monarchy standing.

Five years of bitter experience under the new régime have proved that the revolution of 1887 had one fatal fault. It did not go far enough. The constitution which it secured was indeed liberal, its guarantees of political and private right appeared sufficient, it seemed to introduce a system of government, for and by the people, responsible to the people. Had the throne been filled by a ruler like Kamehameha III, the expectations founded upon the new instrument would not have been disappointed and Hawaii might perhaps have continued for a generation to enjoy the substantial blessings of prosperity and freedom under a monarchical form of government. The constitution was, however, so drawn that a willful and stiff-necked sovereign might easily obstruct its workings. Immemorial usage had neither defined its intent nor fixed its meaning beyond the reach of quibbling subterfuge and cavil. White men were found to misinterpret its provisions, and pervert its plain meanings in the interest of absolutism. The closing years of Kalakaua were occupied with a stubborn resistance by the King to his cabinet, and while the opening days of Liliuokalani gave birth to fairer hopes, it was soon obvious that the Queen had all the despotic instincts of her brother, with far more than his tenacity of will. She was determined to govern by herself without consulting the will of the people, and had no idea of accepting the rôle of the constitutional head of a free state.

Such is a brief sketch of the events which serve as a prologue to the revolutionary drama which was soon to be enacted. This can not be fully understood, however, without an account of the events, or rather, of the secret intrigues, which led to the downfall of the Wilcox cabinet.

EVENTS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE REVOLUTION.

The Wilcox cabinet was appointed November 8, but it was not until about Christmas time that rumors commenced to circulate in town, that the relations existing between the Queen and her cabinet were not as smooth as they might be. She had attempted to dictate to them, an interference which they resented, and the first rumors were that she wanted to get rid of her cabinet on the pretense that they were under the influence of the American and Annexation party, fearing that if they remained in power after the prorogation of the Legislature she would be sure to lose her throne. These fancies were found to have been instilled into her mind by the opium and spoils ring which had been making such a fight for existence during the term of the legislative session. The leaders of this ring were clever enough to perceive that their influence with the Queen lay in using the marshal as a cloak for their designs, and, making friends with him, they held the key to the situation. But they still lacked strength, and cast about for means to carry out their designs. Some self seekers joined their ranks, and the Queen now commenced to take an active part in affairs, and her minions, notably Captain Nowlein, of her guard, were in constant communication with the native members of the House.

The Queen's legal advisers were in constant consultation with her, and engaged in the preparation of a new constitution. At the same time the lottery bill was revived and used as a lever, and promises of money payments for the passage of the first, second, and third reading of appointments as agents in the several districts and of blocks of stock soon brought a change over the native members. The Queen was now engaged in making personal appeals to these members, cases being reported of her fortifying her entreaties with tears. She sent for prominent white members whom she thought she could influence and asked outright for their support against her ministers. Expostulations were in vain, and she showed her determination to brook no delay; still not much fear as to the stability of the cabinet was felt, as without C. O. Berger's vote she could not secure the necessary 25. It was clearly explained to Mr. Berger what her actions meant, and he was told who would constitute a new cabinet if she succeeded in getting the Wilcox one out, and he promised not to lend his assistance to such schemes. He was advised to consult his father-in-law (Mr. Widemann), and it is a notable fact that after doing so Mr. Berger went to the Palace, and to the consternation of the ministerial supporters, appeared in the House after swearing he would never go near it again during the session. The 25 votes necessary to pass a resolution of want of confidence were thus obtained, and on Thursday, January 12, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the Wilcox ministry was voted out of office.

The downfall of the cabinet was received with universal disgust throughout the community, but when the following day the places of the ministers were supplied by the Parker-Peterson-Colburn-Cornwell cabinet, the disgust was seasoned with indignation of the strongest kind. The universal feeling found, however, only peaceable expression, and none thought of anything but law-abiding acquiescence in the change, fraught with injury to the public interest though it was known to be.

THE FIRST DAY.

Saturday, the 14th of January, 1893, dawned clear and beautiful, and no one dreamed that it was to be one of the eventful days of Hawaiian history. The prorogation of the Legislature was to take place at noon, and the members opposed to the new cabinet, though they absented themselves from the ceremony, had no idea of attempting anything against the ministry. It did not seem possible that the Queen, after having gained everything for which she had been striving, would imperil her gains by violating the constitution. And yet she did.

THE RUMORS.

Saturday afternoon, between 1 and 2 o'clock, the community was startled by the information that a *coup d'état* was in progress, and that the Queen was endeavoring to force her cabinet to sign a new constitution, which she then proposed to promulgate immediately to the people. The information was at first disbelieved by some, but it was speedily confirmed.

The political changes of the past few days, the renewed vote of want of confidence, the secret attempt made by the Queen to secure the overthrow of her ministers, her secret interviews with Noble Dreier and others, the signing of the opium and lottery bills, coupled with the rabid talk of certain native members in the house, had produced a feeling of great unrest in the community. The remarks of Kamaoha in the house were felt by some to give a hint as to what was to be looked for in the future, and many shared these forebodings. On Saturday morning rumor

was busy, and it was freely stated that a new constitution was to be promulgated in the afternoon. At a meeting of business men, held in the room of the chamber of commerce, reference was made to this possibility, but still it was not generally believed until in the afternoon the unexpected happened, and doubt was transformed into certainty.

THE HISTORY.

Three days before the *coup d'état* was attempted, a gentleman who enjoys the confidence of the Queen told one of the members of the newly appointed cabinet (who was then in private station) that the blow was to be struck, and that the persons of the ministers would be secured. In the anticipation that the new cabinet would not make any resistance to the revolutionary blow, the precaution of arresting them was not taken. Saturday morning one of the ministers received positive information that a blow was to be struck that afternoon. He immediately proceeded to consult two prominent citizens on the course to be taken. After a conference, the gentlemen referred to advised the cabinet to refuse to sign a new constitution and to decline to resign if their resignations should be demanded. The prorogation of the legislature was the last chapter in the story of the morning. It went off tamely and quietly enough, but those who were acquainted with the real situation felt that the Government and the nation were sleeping on the crest of a volcano.

THE AFTERNOON.

In the afternoon, immediately after the Legislature had been prorogued, the Hui Kalaiaina (a native Hawaiian political society), marched over to the palace in order to present a new constitution to the Queen, with the petition that the same be promulgated to the people as the fundamental law of the land. The matter of the new constitution and petition had been prearranged, and there was little spontaneity about it. It really originated with the Queen and a few of her adherents. Activity had been noted for several days among some of the native retainers of Her Majesty. Several have since stated that they were ordered to appear before her and ask for a new constitution. One case particularly worthy of note is that of an old native resident of Nuuanu Valley, who was seen going home on the evening of the prorogation in an old working suit of clothes. On being asked where his tall hat, long black coat, and black pants were, he replied, "In the basket," pointing to one which he was carrying on his arm. Proceeding, the native said that he, with others, had been ordered to go and ask for a new constitution, and went prepared to ask, never dreaming of having the request granted, but before the delegation could present the petition the Queen intimated that their prayer would be granted, without giving them time even to read the petition. The old man said he knew that was treason, and he thought he had better get home. So he got his wife to bring him his old clothes again, which he immediately donned, shuffling his finery into the basket. He further stated that he and the rest had no desire for a new constitution.

LIFTING THE HAMMER FOR THE COUP.

In the meantime a large crowd of Hawaiians had gathered around the palace gates and in the grounds near the great flight of steps, and natives were also gathered in large groups in the Government-building yard and elsewhere in the neighborhood. The Queen retired to the blue room and summoned the ministers, who repaired at once to the palace. The Queen was at a table, still dressed in the magnificent costume of the morning, and sparkling in a coronet of diamonds. She at once presented them with the draft of the new constitution, demanded their signatures, and declared her intention to promulgate the same at once. Attorney-general Peterson and Minister of Interior Colburn decidedly refused to do so, and Ministers Cornwell and Parker, though more hesitatingly, joined their colleagues in this refusal. All the cabinet now perceived the expediency of advising Her Majesty not to violate the law, but she was not to be dissuaded from her mad course. Bringing her clenched hand down upon the table Queen Liliuokalani said: "Gentlemen, I do not wish to hear any more advice. I intend to promulgate this constitution, and to do it now." Proceeding, she told the cabinet that unless they abandoned their resistance at once she would go out upon the steps of the palace and tell the excited crowd there assembled that she wished to give them a new constitution, but that her ministers were inside the palace, hindering her from doing it. The ministers remembered the riot at the court house, and the fate of the unlucky representatives who fell into the hands of the mob. They knew what the threat might mean, and before it could be put into execution they retired from the palace.

THE APPEAL TO THE CITIZENS.

From the Government building, the ministers immediately sent word down town asking the citizens what support the cabinet could expect in its resistance to the

revolutionary movement begun by the Queen. Leading citizens of every political complexion hurried together at Hon. W. O. Smith's office, and, while their numbers were every instant augmented by fresh accessions, held a hurried consultation as to the course to be pursued. There was but one mind among all those gathered together. Tradesmen, lawyers, mechanics, merchants, were of one opinion. A unanimity of sentiment reigned such as has not been witnessed here for years, and it was agreed, without a dissenting voice, that it was the duty of every good citizen, without distinction of party, to support the law and the liberties of the people and to resist the revolutionary encroachments of the Queen. A message to this effect was at once dispatched to the cabinet.

A NEW STRUGGLE WITH THE QUEEN.

The ministers now revisited the palace, not without the apprehension that their persons would be taken into custody even if they suffered no bodily harm. Great pressure had been brought upon Her Majesty to induce her to go no farther and to retrace the revolutionary steps she had already taken. While her troops stood drawn up before the palace, waiting for the final word of command, the Queen hesitated and hesitated. The conference in the blue room was a long one. For two hours the result trembled in the balance. She could not be induced to give up her unlawful project, but finally consented with bitter reluctance to a temporary postponement of the premeditated coup.

THE QUEEN'S SPEECH.

The Queen was a very angry woman, when at 4 p. m. Saturday she returned to the throne room, where were assembled the Hui Kalaiaina with most of the native members of the Legislature, the cabinet, the governor of Oahu, the young princes, Chief-Justice Judd and Mr. Justice Bickerton, the staff, ladies of the court, kahili bearers, etc. She ascended the dais and spoke substantially as follows:

"PRINCES, NOBLES, AND REPRESENTATIVES: I have listened to the thousands of voices of my people that have come to me, and I am prepared to grant their request. The present constitution is full of defects, as the chief justice here will testify, as questions regarding it have so often come before him for settlement. It is so faulty that I think a new one should be granted. I have prepared one, in which the rights of all have been regarded—a constitution suited to the wishes of the people. I was ready and expected to proclaim the new constitution to-day, as a suitable occasion for it, and thus satisfy the wishes of my dear people. But, with deep regret, I say that I have met with obstacles that prevent it. Return to your homes peaceably and quietly and continue to look towards me, and I will look towards you. Keep me ever in your love. I am obliged to postpone the granting of the constitution for a few days. I must confer with my cabinet, and when, after you return home, you may see it, receive it graciously. You have my love, and with sorrow I now dismiss you."

Mr. White replied, thanking the Queen and assuring her of the love of the people, and that they would wait patiently until their desires should be fulfilled, to which the Queen responded with thanks, and left the throne room.

Mr. Kaunamano then began in a loud voice an inflammatory harangue which was suppressed. He demanded the lives of the members of the cabinet who had opposed the wishes of Her Majesty, and declared that he thirsted for bloodshed.

A few moments later the Queen went out upon the upper balcony of the palace and addressed the crowd. She told them that on account of the perfidy of her ministers she was unable to give them the constitution which she had promised them, but that she would take the earliest opportunity of procuring it for them. (The crowd then gave three cheers.)

Representative White then proceeded to the steps of the palace and began an address. He told the crowd that the cabinet had betrayed them, and that instead of going home peaceably they should go into the palace and kill and bury them. Attempts were made to stop him, which he resisted, saying that he would never close his mouth until the new constitution was granted. Finally he yielded to the expostulations of Col. Boyd and others, threw up his hands and declared that he was pau, for the present. After this the audience assembled dispersed.

The constitution which the Queen wished to force upon the people deprived them of all voice in the choice of the house of nobles, the appointment of which was vested in the sovereign. The system of cabinet responsibility was abolished, the choice and removal of ministers being vested solely in the Queen. Native Hawaiians were to be exempt from the payment of personal taxes, and all white men were to be deprived of the franchise except those who were married to native wives.

News was brought to the citizens down town that the attempt to carry the revo-

lution through had for the moment failed. The meeting, however, appreciating the fact that the trouble had but just begun, did not break up, but continued the consideration of the emergency. A committee of public safety was formed, to which the further consideration of the situation was delegated, after which the assembly, which had been animated by one heart and soul from the beginning, dispersed.

The committee of public safety did not delay in their performance of the task intrusted to them by the citizens, but proceeded to hold a conference on the spot. At first everything was in the air, there being no definite plan of operations. The committee adjourned at 6 p. m. to meet again on the following (Sunday) morning. On this occasion the situation was discussed in all its bearings, and it was decided to call a mass meeting, to make a report, and then to ask this general gathering of all the citizens to confirm the appointment of the committee of safety, and to authorize it to take whatever steps might seem necessary to further the public welfare and secure the rights of the people from aggression once and for all. It was the unanimous sentiment of the members of the committee that a proclamation should be issued abrogating the monarchy, and a provisional government established, if the tone of feeling developed at the mass meeting should clearly indicate that such a course would be in accord with public sentiment. In case the expectations of the committee as to the state of public feeling were realized, it would be necessary to be prepared to take immediate steps. The committee, therefore, continued its meetings and began the work of organization and preparation. Monday morning it was decided to request the American minister to land troops for the protection of property, and a request to that effect was forwarded to the American minister.

THE QUEEN'S PARTY.

In the meanwhile the Queen's party were not idle. They were frightened at the tone of feeling manifested in the city, and began to cast about for means of averting the catastrophe which seemed to threaten the throne. The Queen patched up a peace with her cabinet and forgave them, for the time being, for their "perfidy." In the morning of Sunday she held a meeting at the palace, and charged the native pastors present to pray for her, as evil-minded foreigners were endeavoring to deprive her of her throne. In the evening a secret meeting was held at the office of the attorney-general, in the government building, at which, besides the cabinet, Paul Neumann, Marshal Wilson, Hon. R. W. Wilcox, E. C. Macfarlane and Antone Rosa were present, besides some others. At this meeting Marshal Wilson proposed the arrest of the committee of thirteen, but Paul Neumann and others opposed the proposition on the ground that it would cause friction. Posters for the mass meeting of citizens being already out, it was decided to call a counter mass meeting of Hawaiians at Palace Square, and the tone to be adopted at this meeting was decided upon. A "by authority" notice was drafted, to be signed by the Queen and cabinet, announcing that her intention to abrogate the constitution by force had been abandoned, and that in future any changes she might desire would be affected by constitutional means only. In accordance with the terms of this announcement, the speaking at Palace Square was to be temperate and peaceable.

Monday morning the Advertiser appeared with a long account of the *coup d'état* attempted by the Queen on Saturday, and with an editorial counseling the people to stand firmly by their rights. Late in the morning the "by authority" notice above referred to was distributed. It was as follows:

BY AUTHORITY.

Her Majesty's ministers desire to express their appreciation for the quiet and order which has prevailed in this community since the events of Saturday, and are authorized to say that the position taken by Her Majesty in regard to the promulgation of a new constitution was under the stress of her native subjects.

Authority is given for the assurance that any changes desired in the fundamental law of the land will be sought only by methods provided in the constitution itself.

Her Majesty's ministers request all citizens to accept the assurance of Her Majesty in the same spirit in which it is given.

LILIUOKALANI.

SAMUEL PARKER

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

W. H. CORNWELL,

Minister of Finance.

JOHN F. COLBURN,

Minister of the Interior.

A. P. PETERSON,

Attorney-General.

IOLANI PALACE, January 16, 1893.

THE CITIZENS MASS MEETING.

At 2 p. m. Monday, January 16, the Honolulu Rifles Armory was the scene of the largest and most enthusiastic mass meeting ever held in Honolulu. It was called by the committee of public safety for the purpose of protesting against the revolutionary aggressions of the Queen. At half-past 1 citizens began to assemble, and before 2 o'clock the large building was crowded to its utmost capacity, 1,260 being present by actual count, while many others came later. Every class in the community was fully represented, mechanics, merchants, professional men, and artisans of every kind being present in full force. The meeting was intensely enthusiastic, being animated by a common purpose and feeling, and most of the speakers were applauded to the echo. Hon. W. C. Wilder, of the committee of safety, was the chairman.

MR. WILDER said: * Fellow-citizens, I have been requested to act as chairman of this meeting. Were it a common occurrence, I should consider it an honor, but to-day we are not here to do honor to anybody. I accept the chairmanship of this meeting as a duty. [Applause.] We meet here to-day as men—not as any party, faction or creed, but as men who are bound to see good government. It is well known to you all what took place at the Palace last Saturday. I need not tell you the object of this meeting, and no such meeting has been held since 1887. There is the same reason now as then. An impromptu meeting of citizens was called Saturday to take measures for the public safety. The report of the committee will be read to you. We do not meet as revolutionists, but as peaceful citizens who have the right to meet and state their grievances. [Loud applause.] We will maintain our rights and have the courage to maintain them. [Universal cheers.]

Noble Thurston, being introduced by the chairman, read the following

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF SAFETY.

To the citizens of Honolulu:

On the morning of last Saturday, the 14th instant, the city was startled by the information that Her Majesty Queen Liliuokalani had announced her intention to arbitrarily promulgate a new constitution, and that three of the newly-appointed cabinet ministers had or were about to resign in consequence thereof.

Immediately after the prorogation of the Legislature, at noon, the Queen accompanied, by her orders, by the cabinet retired to the palace; the entire military force of the Government was drawn up in line in front of the building and remained there until dark, and a crowd of several hundred native sympathizers with the new constitution project gathered in the throne room and about the palace. The Queen then retired with the cabinet, informed them that she intended to promulgate it, and proposed to do so then and there and demanded that they countersign her signature.

She turned a deaf ear to their statements and protests that the proposed action would inevitably cause the streets of Honolulu to run red with blood, and threatened that unless they complied with her demand she would herself immediately go out upon the steps of the palace and announce to the assembled crowd that the reason she did not give them the new constitution was because the ministers would not let her. Three of the ministers, fearing mob violence, immediately withdrew and returned to the Government building. They were immediately summoned back to the palace, but refused to go on the ground that there was no guarantee of their personal safety.

The only forces under the control of the Government are the household guards and the police. The former are nominally under the control of the minister of foreign affairs and actually under the control of their immediate commander, Maj. Nowlein, a personal adherent of the Queen.

The police are under the control of Marshal Wilson, the open and avowed royal favorite. Although the marshal is nominally under the control of the attorney-general, Her Majesty recently announced in a public speech that she would not allow him to be removed. Although the marshal now states that he is opposed to the Queen's proposition, he also states that if the final issue arises between the Queen and the cabinet and people he will support the Queen.

The cabinet was absolutely powerless and appealed to citizens for support.

Later they reluctantly returned to the palace, by request of the Queen, and for nearly two hours she again endeavored to force them to acquiesce in her desire, and upon their final refusal announced in a public speech in the throne room and again from the upper gallery of the palace that she desired to issue the constitution but was prevented from doing so by her ministers and would issue it in a few days.

The citizens responded to the appeal of the cabinet to resist the revolutionary attempt of the Queen by gathering at the office of William O. Smith.

Later in the afternoon it was felt that bloodshed and riot were imminent; that the community could expect no protection from the legal authorities; that on the contrary they would undoubtedly be made the instruments of royal aggression. An impromptu meeting of citizens was held, which was attended by the attorney-general and which was addressed among others by the minister of the interior, J. F. Colburn, who stated to the meeting substantially the foregoing facts.

The meeting unanimously passed a resolution that the public welfare required the appointment of a committee of public safety of thirteen to consider the situation and devise ways and means for the maintenance of the public peace and the protection of life and property.

Such committee was forthwith appointed, and has followed its instructions.

The first step which the committee consider necessary is to secure openly, publicly, and peaceably, through the medium of a mass meeting of citizens, a condemnation of the proceedings of the party of revolution and disorder, and a confirmation from such larger meeting of the authority now vested in the committee.

For such purpose the committee hereby recommends the adoption of the following

RESOLUTION:

1. Whereas Her Majesty, Liliuokalani, acting in conjunction with certain other persons, has illegally and unconstitutionally, and against the advice and consent of the lawful executive officers of the Government, attempted to abrogate the existing constitution and proclaim a new one in subversion of the rights of the people;

2. And whereas such attempt has been accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed and a display of armed force; and such attempt and acts and threats are revolutionary and treasonable in character;

3. And whereas Her Majesty's cabinet have informed her that such contemplated action was unlawful, and would lead to bloodshed and riot, and have implored and demanded of her to desist from and renounce such proposed action;

4. And whereas such advice has been in vain, and Her Majesty has in a public speech announced that she was desirous and ready to promulgate such constitution, the same being now ready for such purpose, and that the only reason why it was not now promulgated was because she had met with unexpected obstacles, and that a fitting opportunity in the future must be awaited for the consummation of such object, which would be within a few days;

5. And whereas at a public meeting of citizens, held in Honolulu on the 14th day of January instant, a committee of thirteen, to be known as the "committee of public safety," was appointed to consider the situation, and to devise ways and means for the maintenance of the public peace and safety, and the preservation of life and property;

6. And whereas such committee has recommended the calling of this mass meeting of citizens to protest against and condemn such action, and has this day presented a report to such meeting, denouncing the action of the Queen and her supporters as being unlawful, unwarranted, in derogation of the rights of the people, endangering the peace of the community, and tending to excite riot, and cause the loss of life and destruction of property;

Now, therefore, we, the citizens of Honolulu, of all nationalities, and regardless of political party affiliations, do hereby condemn and denounce the action of the Queen and her supporters;

And we do hereby ratify the appointment and indorse the action taken and report made by the said committee of safety; and we do hereby further empower such committee to further consider the situation and further devise such ways and means as may be necessary to secure the permanent maintenance of law and order, and the protection of life, liberty, and property in Hawaii.

MR. THURSTON said: Mr. Chairman, Hawaii is a wonderful country. We are divided into parties and nationalities and factions, but there are moments when we are united and move shoulder to shoulder, moved by one common desire for the public good. Three times during the past twelve years this has happened—in 1880, 1887 and to-day. They say it is ended, it is done, there is nothing to consider. Is it so? [Calls of No! No!] I say, gentlemen, that now and here is the time to act. [Loud cheers.] The Queen says she won't do it again. [Cries of humbug!] Fellow citizens, have you any memories? Hasn't she once before promised—sworn solemnly before Almighty God to maintain this constitution? What is her word worth? [Calls of Nothing! Nothing!] It is an old saying that a royal promise is made to be broken. Fellow citizens, remember it. We have not sought this situation. Last Saturday the sun rose on a peaceful and smiling city; to-day it is otherwise. Whose fault is it—Queen Liliuokalani's? It is not her fault that the streets have not run red with blood. She has printed a proclamation expressing her repentance for what she has

done, and at the same time—perhaps sent out by the same carriers—her organ prints an extra with her speech with bitterer language than that quoted in the Advertiser. She wants us to sleep on a slumbering volcano, which will some morning spew out blood and destroy us all. The constitution gives us the right to assemble peacefully and express our grievances. We are here doing that to-day without arms. The man who has not the spirit to rise after the menace to our liberties has no right to keep them. Has the tropic sun cooled and thinned our blood, or have we flowing in our veins the warm, rich blood which makes men love liberty and die for it? I move the adoption of the resolution. [Tumultuous applause.]

Mr. H. F. GLADE: The Queen has done an unlawful thing in ignoring the constitution which she had sworn to uphold. We most decidedly protest against such revolutionary proceedings, and we should do all we possibly can to prevent her from repeating actions which result in disorder and riot. We now have a promise from the Queen that proceedings as we experienced on Saturday shall not occur again. But we should have such assurances and guaranties for this promise as will really satisfy us and convince us of the faith and earnestness of the promise given, of which we now have no assurance. What such guaranties and assurances ought to be I can not at this moment say or recommend. This should be referred to the committee of safety for their careful consideration. I second the motion.

Mr. A. YOUNG, in addressing the meeting, spoke as follows: Mr. Chairman and fellow citizens: In June, 1887, I stood on this same platform and addressed an audience almost as large as the one now before me. At that time we had met to consider a resolution that looked toward a new constitution, which proposed constitution was considered the most effectual method of removing some flagrant abuses in governmental affairs practiced by the King and his cabinets prior to the time that the constitution was promulgated. To-day we have met to consider the action of Her Majesty in attempting to set aside the constitution we all worked so hard to have promulgated, in the best interests of the Sovereign and the people at large, as well as for the redemption of the credit of the kingdom abroad. It has long been reported that at some favorable opportunity the Queen would spring a new constitution upon the people and place matters even more in the hands of the Sovereign than they were before the revolution of 1887. Some did not believe the rumors, but the actions of the Queen in the last few days have convinced the most skeptical that the rumors were well founded, and that she had been pregnant with this unborn constitution for a long time, but it could not be born till under the propitious star. The Queen's Kahunas, together with her would-be advisers, had no doubt told her that the auspicious time for the advent had arrived. In trying to promulgate this long-promised constitution, the Queen has therefore premeditatedly committed a breach of faith with one portion of her subjects, in order to satisfy the clamors of a faction of natives urged by the influence of a mischievous element of foreigners who mean no good to the Queen or the people, but simply for the purpose of providing avenues for carrying out more perfectly the smuggling of opium and diverting the contents of the treasury into their own pockets. A "by authority" circular has now been handed around, setting forth that the Queen and her cabinet had decided not to press the promulgation of a new constitution, but can we depend on this promise of Her Majesty? Is this promise any more binding upon her than the oath she took before the Almighty God to support and maintain the present constitution? Has not the Queen resorted to very questionable methods in an underhanded way to remove what, to the people, was one of the most acceptable cabinets ever commissioned by any sovereign in this Kingdom, in order that four other ministers might be appointed that would carry out her behest, treasonable or otherwise, as might be most conveniently within their scope. I say, have we any reasonable assurance that the Queen and her ministers have abandoned finally the new constitution promulgation scheme? [Roars of No! from the audience.] My fellow-citizens, while the Queen and her cabinet continue to trifle with and play fast and loose with the affairs of state there can be no feeling of security for foreign families residing within these domains. There can be no business prosperity here at home, and our credit abroad must be of the flimsiest and most uncertain nature. And you business men who are toiling honestly for your bread and butter will have to put up with thin bread and much thinner butter if this farcical work is continued. In order that matters may be set to rights again and that honest, stable, and honorable government may be maintained in Hawaii, I support the resolution, and trust that it will be passed unanimously by this meeting.

Mr. C. BOLTE. Since the resolution which was read here has been written things have changed. On Saturday the Queen promised the native people that she would give them a new constitution under all circumstances; she did not say exactly when, but as soon as possible. This morning a proclamation was issued, in which she says that her attempt to promulgate a new constitution last Saturday was made under stress of her native subjects, but that she will not do it again. An attempt to change the fundamental law of the land is a very serious matter, a matter that

requires a good deal of consideration, and I am well convinced that this matter has been weighed and considered for more than a day by the Queen, and that there was no acting on the spur of the moment under the stress of her native subjects about it. It was her well premeditated conclusion that she would change the constitution, so as to suit herself, on the day of prorogation of the Legislature. Many people knew this several days ago, but there have been so many rumors about all sorts of things that not very much attention was paid to it; it was expected that she might change her mind before that day would come. But she did not change her mind as soon as that; she told the native people that she was ready to give them a new constitution right then and there, but that she could not do it because her ministers would not let her. Now she has changed her mind; she makes a sort of excuse for what she did, and says she will never do it again. It seems to me that the question that your committee has to ask now, and which is for you gentlemen here in the meeting to decide, is this: Are you satisfied with the assurance given in to-day's proclamation signed by the Queen and the four ministers, and will you consider this matter ended, or do you desire greater and stronger guarantees for the safety and preservation of your life and liberty and property? I am one of the citizens' committee of public safety; my views on the situation are expressed in the resolutions which have just been read, and I trust that you will show that you are of the same mind as the committee by adopting these resolutions.

Hon. H. P. BALDWIN. I feel with the rest of you that actions of the Queen have put the country in a very critical situation. Before this revolutionary act of Her Majesty we were getting along. A ministry had been appointed which would probably have been able to pull us through. The McKinley bill had put the whole country into a critical situation. We were working up new industries. Mr. Dillingham is trying to build a railroad around this island. The Queen seems to have blinded herself to all these things. She has followed a whim of her own—a whim of an irresponsible body of Hawaiians—and tried to establish a new constitution. We must stop this; but we must not go beyond constitutional means. I favor the resolution, but think the committee should act within the constitution. There is no question that the Queen has done a revolutionary act—there is no doubt about that. The Queen's proclamation has not inspired confidence; but shall we not teach her to act within the constitution? [Loud calls of "No."] Well, gentlemen, I see that you do not agree with me; I am ready to act when the time comes.

J. EMMELUTH wished to say a few words on the situation. He had heard the Queen's speech at the palace, and noted the expression of her face. It was fiendish. When the petitioners filed out he reflected on the fact that thirty men could paralyze the business of the community for twenty-four hours. It was not they that did it, but the schemers behind them, and perhaps a woman, too. It was not the Hawaiians that wanted the new constitution; not those who worked. This was the third time that he had shut his doors, let his men go, and come up to this building. It would be the last time. If we let this time go by we would deserve all we would get. An opportunity came once in every lifetime. It had come to us, and if we finished as we should, a repetition of last Saturday would never occur in this country again. [Applause.] We must stand shoulder to shoulder. There was but one course to pursue, and we would all see it. The manifesto of this morning was bosh. "I won't do it any more; but give me a chance and I'll do it again." That is the real meaning of it. If the Queen had succeeded last Saturday myself and you would have been robbed of the privileges without which no white man can live in this community. "Fear not, be not afraid," was written in my Bible by my mother twenty-five years ago. Gentlemen, I have done. As far as the Hawaiians are concerned I have an aloha for them, and we wish to have laws enabling us to live peaceably together.

R. J. GREENE. Fellow citizens, among the many things I never could do was to make an impromptu speech. I have tried it over and over again and never succeeded but once, and that was after five weeks' preparation. Our patience has been exhausted. We all agree about the case. The question is the remedy. John Greene, of Rhode Island, entered the war of the Revolution and served throughout. His son, my father, served through the war of 1812, until that little matter was settled. In 1862 John Greene, my father, stood before a meeting like this, and said he had four sons in the war, of whom I was the youngest, and would serve himself if he was not too old. This experience has biased my judgment as to some matters of civil government. It is too late to throw obstacles across the path of its progress here. I have adopted this flag and am loyal to it, but I am not willing to go one step back in the matter of civil liberty, and I will give the last drop of Rhode Island blood in my veins to go forward and not back. [Cheers.]

Chairman WILDER read the latter part of the resolution.

It was passed by a unanimous standing vote, without a dissenting voice and amid tremendous cheers, after which the meeting broke up.

AT PALACE SQUARE.

While the mass meeting was in session at the armory a counter demonstration was attempted by the Queen's party at Palace square. The speakers had been carefully coached and advised to express themselves with the utmost caution. The tone was an unnatural one and the enthusiasm correspondingly small. A resolution was adopted accepting the royal assurance that she would no longer seek a new constitution by revolutionary means. The same meeting, however, expressed by cheers its approbation of the attempt by the Queen to carry out her *coup d'état*, and one of the speakers gave vent to the expression of a wild thirst for bloodshed.

MORE COMMITTEE MEETINGS.

Immediately after the mass meeting a session of the committee of public safety was held. All the members felt that their action had been more than indorsed by the citizens, and that the moment a Provisional Government was established the foreign community would rally to its support.

It should have been mentioned that Marshal Wilson had warned all persons from attending the mass meeting. The indications of approaching trouble were serious, and at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, Minister Stevens deemed it proper to comply with the request of the committee of safety, and at the hour named the ship's battalion, under Lieut. Commander William T. Swinburne, landed, and troops were stationed for the protection of the consulate and legation, while a detachment encamped at Arion Hall. The presence of the troops did much to prevent disorder and to tranquilize the fears of the timid.

In the evening the committee of safety again convened, and elected the executive council and officers. In the morning, the members of the executive council consented to serve, and John H. Soper was induced to accept the responsible position of military chief of the new Government. Judge Sanford B. Dole, the new executive head, sent his resignation to the cabinet, and this act was, so to speak, the first shot of the counter revolution. At 1 p. m., the formation of the advisory council was complete, and shortly after the proclamation was signed by the committee of safety. The first act of the Provisional Government was then to sign the commission of J. H. Soper as commander of the forces. Just as the committee had finished considering the question when the coup should take place, and had decided on immediate action, a shot was fired on Fort street, a crowd ran up to the spot, the story flew through the street, "Good has shot a policeman," and the committee hastened to the Government building.

THE SHOT ON FORT STREET.

The shot fired on Fort street precipitated the revolution. In order to understand this event, it is necessary to return a little and pick up a new thread in the narrative. In the morning J. Good had been appointed ordnance officer, and in the discharge of his duty it became necessary for him to gather up the guns and ammunition available at the different stores, and transfer them to the armory. Half-past 2 in the afternoon was the hour set for the removal of the ammunition from E. O. Hall & Sons. Mr. Good selected Mr. Benner, of Castle & Cooke's, to drive the wagon, detailing Edwin Paris and Fritz Rowald as guards. The ammunition had been packed in the morning, the packing having been more or less supervised by some policemen who were hanging around with instructions to watch closely what was going on. At 2:20 Mr. Good proceeded to execute the transfer, and ordered Mr. Benner to drive rapidly out of the rear entrance. As the wagon came out of the gate, a policeman grabbed at the reins and ordered a halt. As the order was disregarded the officer blew his whistle, which was immediately answered by four or five other policemen who came running up and joined in the effort to stop the wagon.

The Fort street car had just crossed King and alongside of it was a dray. This completely barred the progress of the wagon. One of the policemen seized the bit, but was warned off by Mr. Good, revolver in hand. Another endeavored to climb up but received a smart cut with the whip from Mr. Benner. In the meanwhile two policemen in the rear had been kept off by Paris and Rowald. On the rear platform of the street car were J. A. McCandless and Mr. Martin, the tailor. The latter covered one of the officers with his revolver, but did not fire. In the meantime came from McCandless on the street car, from E. O. White at Hall's and others, calls of "Pull, pull." Warned by these, Mr. Good now faced square around. One of the officers was coming up at a run, and when a few feet distant, put his hand behind him as though to draw a revolver. The indications being that some one would be shot, Mr. Good promptly fired and the man fell, with a bullet in the shoulder. This ended the effort to capture the ammunition. The horses started forward and the

wagon proceeded up Fort street, followed by two policemen in a hack who were kept at a respectful distance by Paris, who leveled his rifle at them. The wagon proceeded up Fort to School street, and then down Punchbowl to the armory, where they were glad to see Zeigler's men already in line.

THE NEW GOVERNMENT DECLARED.

In the meantime the committee of public safety with the members of the provisional Government had proceeded to the Government building, Judge Dole and Mr. Cooper leading the way up Merchant street. All the committee were unarmed. When the building was reached, inquiry was made for the ministers but they were not to be found. Mr. Cooper then made demand upon Mr. Hassinger, the chief clerk of the interior office, for possession of the building, and the demand was immediately complied with, there being no force with which any resistance could have been made. The committee now proceeded to the public entrance, and Mr. H. E. Cooper read to the gathering crowd the following proclamation:

PROCLAMATION.

In its earlier history, Hawaii possessed a constitutional government honestly and economically administered in the public interest.

The Crown called to its assistance as advisers able, honest, and conservative men, whose integrity was unquestioned even by their political opponents.

The stability of the Government was assured; armed resistance and revolution unthought of; popular rights were respected and the privileges of the subject from time to time increased and the prerogatives of the Sovereign diminished by the voluntary acts of the successive kings.

With very few exceptions this state of affairs continued until the expiration of the first few years of the reign of His late Majesty Kalakaua. At this time a change was discernible in the spirit animating the chief executive and in the influences surrounding the throne. A steadily increasing disposition was manifested on the part of the King to extend the royal prerogatives; to favor adventurers and persons of no character or standing in the community; to encroach upon the rights and privileges of the people by steadily increasing corruption of electors, and by means of the power and influence of officeholders and other corrupt means to illegitimately influence the elections, resulting in the final absolute control of not only the executive and legislative, but to a certain extent the judicial departments of the Government in the interest of absolutism.

This finally resulted in the revulsion of feeling and popular uprising of 1887, which wrested from the King a large portion of his ill-gotten powers.

The leaders of this movement were not seeking personal aggrandisement, political power, or the suppression of the native Government. If this had been their object it could easily have been accomplished, for they had the absolute control of the situation.

Their object was to secure responsible government through a representative cabinet, supported by and responsible to the people's elected representatives. A clause to this effect was inserted in the constitution and subsequently enacted by law by the Legislature, specifically covering the ground that, in all matters concerning the state the sovereign was to act by and with the advice of the cabinet and only by and with such advice.

The King willingly agreed to such proposition, expressed regret for the past, and volunteered promises for the future.

Almost from the date of such agreement and promises, up to the time of his death, the history of the Government has been a continual struggle between the King on the one hand and the cabinet and the Legislature on the other, the former constantly endeavoring by every available form of influence and evasion to ignore his promises and agreements and regain his lost powers.

This conflict upon several occasions came to a crisis, followed each time by submission on the part of His Majesty by renewed expressions of regret and promises to abide by the constitutional and legal restrictions in the future. In each instance such promise was kept until a further opportunity presented itself, when the conflict was renewed in defiance and regardless of all previous pledges.

Upon the accession of Her Majesty Liliuokalani for a brief period the hope prevailed that a new policy would be adopted. This hope was soon blasted by her immediately entering into conflict with the existing cabinet, who held office with the approval of a large majority of the Legislature, resulting in the triumph of the Queen and the removal of the cabinet. The appointment of a new cabinet subservient to her wishes and their continuance in office until a recent date gave no

opportunity for further indication of the policy which would be pursued by Her Majesty until the opening of the Legislature in May of 1892.

The recent history of that session has shown a stubborn determination on the part of Her Majesty to follow the tactics of her late brother, and in all possible ways to secure an extension of the royal prerogatives and an abridgment of popular rights.

During the latter part of the session the Legislature was replete with corruption; bribery and other illegitimate influences were openly utilized to secure the desired end, resulting in the final complete overthrow of all opposition and the inauguration of a cabinet arbitrarily selected by Her Majesty in complete defiance of constitutional principles and popular representation.

Notwithstanding such result the defeated party peacefully submitted to the situation.

Not content with her victory, Her Majesty proceeded on the last day of the session to arbitrarily arrogate to herself the right to promulgate a new constitution, which proposed among other things to disfranchise over one-fourth of the voters and the owners of nine-tenths of the private property of the Kingdom, to abolish the elected upper house of the Legislature, and to substitute in place thereof an appointive one to be appointed by the sovereign.

The detailed history of this attempt and the succeeding events in connection therewith is given in the report of the committee of public safety to the citizens of Honolulu, and the resolution adopted at the mass meeting held on the 16th instant, the correctness of which report and the propriety of which resolution are hereby specifically affirmed.

The constitutional evolution indicated has slowly and steadily, though reluctantly, and regretfully, convinced an overwhelming majority of the conservative and responsible members of the community that independent, constitutional, representative, and responsible government, able to protect itself from revolutionary uprisings and royal aggression is no longer possible in Hawaii under the existing system of Government.

Five uprisings or conspiracies against the Government have occurred within five years and seven months. It is firmly believed that the culminating revolutionary attempt of last Saturday will, unless radical measures are taken, wreck our already damaged credit abroad and precipitate to final ruin our already overstrained financial condition; and the guarantees of protection to life, liberty, and property will steadily decrease and the political situation rapidly grow worse.

In this belief, and also in the firm belief that the action hereby taken is, and will be for the best personal, political, and property interests of every citizen of the land,

We, citizens and residents of the Hawaiian Islands, organized and acting for the public safety and the common good, hereby proclaim as follows:

1. The Hawaiian monarchical system of Government is hereby abrogated.
2. A Provisional Government for the control and management of public affairs and the protection of the public peace is hereby established, to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon.
3. Such Provisional Government shall consist of an executive council of four members, who are hereby declared to be S. B. Dole, J. A. King, P. C. Jones, W. O. Smith, who shall administer the executive departments of the Government, the first named acting as president and chairman of such council and administering the department of foreign affairs, and the others severally administering the department of interior, finance, and attorney-general, respectively, in the order in which they are above enumerated, according to existing Hawaiian law as far as may be consistent with this proclamation; and also of an advisory council which shall consist of fourteen members who are hereby declared to be S. M. Damon, A. Brown, L. A. Thurston, J. F. Morgan, J. Emmeluth, H. Waterhouse, J. A. McCandless, E. D. Tenney, F. W. McChesney, F. Wilhelm, W. R. Castle, W. G. Ashley, W. C. Wilder, C. Bolte. Such advisory council shall also have general legislative authority.

Such executive and advisory councils shall, acting jointly, have power to remove any member of either council and to fill such or any other vacancy.

4. All officers under the existing Government are hereby requested to continue to exercise their functions and perform the duties of their respective offices, with the exception of the following-named persons:

Queen Liliuokalani.

Charles B. Wilson, marshal,
Samuel Parker, minister of foreign affairs,
W. H. Cornwell, minister of finance,
John F. Colburn, minister of the interior,
Arthur P. Peterson, attorney-general,

who are hereby removed from office.

5. All Hawaiian laws and constitutional principles not inconsistent herewith shall continue in force until further order of the executive and advisory councils.

(Signed) HENRY E. COOPER, *Chairman*.

ANDREW BROWN,
THEODORE F. LANSING,
JOHN EMMELUTH,
C. BOLTE,
ED. SUHR,
HENRY WATERHOUSE,

W. C. WILDER,
F. W. MCCHESENEY,
WM. O. SMITH,
LORRIN A. THURSTON,
WM. R. CASTLE,
J. A. MCCANDLESS,

Committee of Safety.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *January 17, 1893.*

During the reading of the proclamation armed adherents of the Government began to gather, and it is stated that Oscar White was the first man in the grounds with a gun. By the time that the reading was finished Capt. Ziegler reached the spot with his men.

THE VOLUNTEER FORCES.

The armory on Beretania street was the spot selected for the assembling of the volunteers, and here arms and ammunition were furnished to those who required them. The first body of men who were ready for active work was a company composed of German citizens who were under command of Capt. Charles Ziegler.

They were at the spot about 2:30 o'clock, just one-half hour earlier than the appointed time, but they were soon joined by two companies which were rapidly formed until a good-sized detachment was made up. The last-mentioned companies were under the command of George C. Potter and J. H. Fisher. Each man was armed with a rifle and had a cartridge belt around his waist. When they were mustered together, an order came from Commander J. H. Soper to march at once to the Government building to prevent any possible uprising. The companies at once repaired in squads to Aliiolani Hall. Orders were given to clear the yard and sentries were at the gates to prevent outsiders from entering.

As soon as it was generally known about town that a new Government was established, citizens of all classes rallied to its support, and before nightfall, four companies under arms were organized to uphold the new order and carry it through. During the afternoon a temporary military organization was formed, with J. H. Soper at the head. He named as his aids, George F. McLeod, D. B. Smith, John Good, Fred. Wundenberg, and J. H. Fisher. Captains Hugh Gunn, George C. Potter, Charles Ziegler and J. M. Camara jr., were placed in command of the different companies.

Pickets were at once stationed all over the city to carry out the provisions of martial law which had been proclaimed by the new Government.

After the reading of the proclamation, the new Government at once took possession of the treasury and all the departments. The following orders were issued:

HONOLULU, H. I., *Jan. 17, 1893.*

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

[Orders No. 1.]

All persons favorable to the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands are hereby requested to forthwith report to the Government at the Government building to furnish the Government such arms and ammunition as they may have in their possession or control, as soon as possible, in order that efficient and complete protection to life and property and the public peace may immediately and efficiently be put into operation.

(Signed)

SANFORD B. DOLE,
J. A. KING,
P. C. JONES,
W. O. SMITH,

Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

JOHN EMMELUTH,
ANDREW BROWN,
C. BOLTE,
JAMES F. MORGAN,
HENRY WATERHOUSE,
S. M. DAMON,
W. G. ASHLEY,

E. D. TENNEY,
F. W. MCCHESENEY,
W. C. WILDER,
J. A. MCCANDLESS,
W. R. CASTLE,
LORRIN A. THURSTON,
F. J. WILHELM.

Advisory Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

HONOLULU, H. I., Jan. 17, 1893.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

[Order No. 2.]

It is hereby ordered and decreed that until further ordered, the right of the writ of habeas corpus is hereby suspended, and martial law is hereby declared to exist throughout the Island of Oahu.

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
 J. A. KING,
Minister of the Interior.
 P. C. JONES,
Minister of Finance.
 WILLIAM O. SMITH,
Attorney-General.

Executive Council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

THE ROYALIST SURRENDER.

The cabinet were summoned to surrender the palace, police station, and barracks. They endeavored to gain time, but the Provisional Government insisted upon an immediate unconditional surrender. The police station was accordingly given up at once, the Queen retiring from the palace and the barracks being taken into possession the next day. The cabinet noted the following protest:

I, LILIUOKALANI, by the Grace of God, and under the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against any and all acts done against myself and the constitutional Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming to have established a Provisional Government of and for this Kingdom.

That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America, whose minister plenipotentiary, His Excellency John L. Stevens, has caused the United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the said Provisional Government.

Now, to avoid any collision of armed forces, and perhaps the loss of life, I do under this protest, and impelled by said force yield my authority until such time as the Government of the United States shall, upon the facts being presented to it, undo the action of its representative and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

Done at Honolulu this 17th day of January, A. D. 1893.

(Signed)
 (Signed)

(Signed)

(Signed)

(Signed)

LILIUOKALANI, R.
 SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
 WM. H. CORNWELL,
Minister of Finance.
 JNO. F. COLBURN,
Minister of the Interior.
 A. P. PETERSON,
Attorney-General.

To S. B. DOLE, Esq., and others composing the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

[Indorsed.]

Received by the hands of the late cabinet this 17th day of January, 1893.

(Signed)

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Chairman of Executive Council of Provisional Government.

BUSY DAYS.

Wednesday, the 18th, was another busy day about the Government building. Recruits kept constantly pouring in from all quarters until about 500 names were enrolled, which spontaneous action on the part of the citizens proved that the new Government had the sympathy and support of the general community.

In the meantime the taking of the barracks and the police station furnished the Government with a large amount of ammunition and arms, which were immediately distributed among the forces of the Government.

The interior of the Government building was transformed into a barracks through the efforts of W. W. Hall, who had been appointed commissary. Beds and bedding

were supplied for the men, and arrangements were made with the different hotels to provide food for the volunteers. The legislative hall and other rooms in the building were assigned as quarters for the members of the different companies and everything possible was done for their comfort.

For days everything went along with military precision, and on the 23d the executive and advisory councils of the Government decided to organize a national guard of four companies, one company to be a permanent force under pay and to consist of 100 men, while three companies were to be volunteers. On the same day commissions were issued to J. H. Soper as the commander of the forces with the rank of colonel, John Good as captain, and Arthur Coyne as first lieutenant.

On the 24th, the active work of enlisting men for the permanent force commenced in Arion Hall, where Chief-Justice Judd, Associate Justice Bickerton, and Circuit Judges Whiting and Frear were present to administer the oath of allegiance.

On the same day additional appointments were made as follows: J. H. Fisher as lieutenant-colonel; George F. McLeod as major; W. W. Hall as quartermaster; W. P. Tilden as ordnance officer; Ira A. Burgess as second lieutenant of the regular forces.

On the same evening, at the Government building, an important event took place when the three volunteer military companies were organized. Each company will probably consist of 100 men. They will be uniformed and armed with rifles, and as soon as possible meeting places will be provided for the companies.

Following is the list of officers:

Company A.—Captain, C. W. Ziegler; first lieutenant, A. Gartenberg; second lieutenant, Karl Klemme.

Company B.—Captain, Hugh Gunn; first lieutenant, Arthur Brown; second lieutenant, L. T. Kenake.

Company C.—Captain, J. M. Camara, jr.; first lieutenant, J. M. Vivas; second lieutenant, A. G. Silva, jr.

THE BOSTON MEN.

The battalion from the *Boston* was composed as follows:

Marine Guard.—First Lieut. H. L. Draper, commanding, 30 men armed with Springfield rifles.

Artillery Company.—Lieut. Lucien Young, commanding, 34 men, with two gatlings.

First Company Infantry.—Lieut. Charles Laird, commanding, 34 men armed with Lee rifles.

Second Company Infantry.—Lieut. D. W. Coffman, commanding, 34 men armed with Lee rifles.

Adjutant of the battalion, Lieut. W. R. Rush.

When the battalion fell in line it marched up Fort street to the office of Mr. H. W. Severance, consul-general for the United States, when a halt was made. One company was detached and sent to guard the American legation on Nuuanu street. A guard was also left at the consul's office, after which the battalion moved out Merchant street to King, and came to a halt in front of Mr. J. A. Hopper's residence. About sundown another move was made to Mr. J. B. Atherton's residence in the same street, and after a stay of several hours a return march to Arion Hall was made, where the battalion made its headquarters for several days. In the meantime the old Bishop premises on King street had been prepared for the officers and men, and on Thursday, January 19, they were installed, and they have been there ever since.

THE NEW GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZED.

As soon as the Provisional Government was in possession, it sent notifications of the situation to all the representatives of the foreign powers. Recognitions began to pour in as soon as it became clear that the Government was a genuine *de facto* one, until all the powers had accepted the situation. The list includes Sweden, Germany, the United States, Austro-Hungary, Belgium, Russia, Peru, Italy, the Netherlands, France, England, Japan, China, Portugal, Chile, Denmark, Spain, and Mexico.

It was also decided to dispatch the *Claudine* to San Francisco with a commission empowered to negotiate a treaty of union with the United States. She left this port Thursday morning at about half past 9 o'clock for San Francisco with the special commission to Washington on board. The Wilder dock was crowded with people to witness the departure of the vessel, and when she left the dock three hearty cheers were given for Messrs. Thurston, Wilder, W. R. Castle, Marsden, and Carter, the gentlemen who compose the special commission. Many prominent citizens were present on the dock to bid the gentlemen good luck and a successful mission. The vessel had been carefully guarded for a couple of days previously to prevent any stowaways from getting on board, and on her departure a thorough search was made.

The voyage was prosperous. Saturday morning, January 28, the commissioners landed in San Francisco, proceeding on the following day to Washington.

The eleven days immediately following the departure of the *Claudine* were not distinguished by any event of special importance. The Provisional Government was busily occupied in adjusting the administration to the new conditions. A few bills were passed, but no legislation has been attempted except such as was called for by the exigencies of the situation. A strong guard was kept upon the Government building, as well as at the palace, barracks, and police station. The neighborhood of the Government building was also picketed, and a regular street patrol, horse and foot, was maintained during the night. One or two fires, suspected to be of incendiary origin, were started, but they were promptly extinguished, and no damage resulted. Under martial law the streets of the city were quiet as they seldom have been before. The saloons were at first closed, but everything remained so quiet that even this simple measure was found unnecessary. The excitement of the first two or three days passed away, and business resumed its customary course. Recruits flowed in steadily, though no special effort was made to obtain them.

THE PROTECTORATE.

This state of things lasted eleven days, when the Government resolved upon a new move, which had been the subject of deliberation for several days. The incessant agitation on the part of certain whites of the class who have always been the curse of this country, coupled with the efforts of one English and one or two native newspapers to discredit the Government, to block its efforts toward the establishment of order, and in general to bring it into disrepute and contempt, had been the chief agency in spreading through the town a feeling of uneasiness and disquietude. It was thought wise, therefore, to secure the direct assistance of the United States Government in the preservation of property and the maintenance of order, and a request was forwarded by the Government to the American minister to establish a protectorate pending the settlement of the negotiations at Washington.

In accordance with the terms of this request, at 8:30 a. m. February 1, Capt. Wiltse proceeded to the Government building, and a few moments later the battalion of the U. S. S. *Boston*, under Lieut. Commander Swinburne, marched up the street, entered the grounds, and drew up in front of the building.

Detachments from the three volunteer Companies A, B, and C were drawn up in line, under the command of their respective captains, Ziegler, Gunn, and Camara. Just before 9 o'clock Lieut. Rush read in a loud voice the following proclamation, and punctually at 9 o'clock, amid the breathless silence of all present, the flag, saluted by the troops and by the cannon of the *Boston*, was raised above the tower of Aliiolani Hall.

The following is the text of the proclamation:

To the Hawaiian people:

At the request of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, I hereby, in the name of the United States of America, assume protection of the Hawaiian Islands for the protection of life and property and occupation of public buildings and Hawaiian soil, so far as may be necessary for the purpose specified, but not interfering with the administration of public affairs by the Provisional Government.

This action is taken pending, and subject to, negotiations at Washington.

JOHN L. STEVENS,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

UNITED STATES LEGATION, February 1, 1893.

Approved and executed by

G. C. WILTSE, Captain, U. S. N.,

Commanding the United States Ship Boston.

The wisdom of the Government's course in requesting the protectorate was justified by the result. A feeling of general relief spread itself throughout the community. The maintenance of the citizen soldiers, many of whom could ill spare the time and strength which they required for their daily bread, had been somewhat burdensome. While these soldiers were willing to support the Government as long as necessary, most of them were glad to be able to return to the ordinary occupation. The power of the Provisional Government to maintain itself against all comers was never doubted for a moment, but it was naturally felt that the safest course was to be in constant readiness for an attack, even though the probability of any being made might be very small. As a matter of fact, it is not likely that an armed attempt to overthrow the Government would have been made.

On Sunday, the 5th of February, martial law was abrogated and the right of the

writ of habeas corpus restored. No use had been made of its suspension, and no political arrests of any kind were found necessary.

The steamer arrived from San Francisco February 10, bringing the news that the propositions of this Government were very favorably received by the press and people of the United States. The arrival of this intelligence produced a feeling of general satisfaction throughout the community, which was raised to the highest pitch when the *China* came in Monday, February 20, six days from San Francisco, and brought the further news of the arrival of the commissioners in Washington, their favorable reception, and formal recognition by the administration, and the rapid progress of negotiations for an annexation treaty at Washington.

On Washington's birthday the *Australia* arrived, confirming previous dispatches, and adding to them the fact that the treaty had been signed by the President, and that it would be submitted to the Senate for ratification immediately. The resultant state of feeling is one not merely of the keenest personal satisfaction, but of general security. Business confidence is being restored, sugar stocks are recovering, the money market is easier, and there is a well-founded anticipation among all classes that Hawaii, as a part of the American Union, is about to enter upon a career of prosperity without a parallel in her history.

THE MEN WHO DID IT.

The foregoing sketch, brief as it is, would not be complete without a word or two as to the character of the men who have brought the cause to a successful issue. Of Lorrin A. Thurston it is not necessary to speak. His indomitable resolution and energy are recognized by all as prime factors in the movement. The proclamation, which may well be called the new charter of Hawaiian liberty, he dictated from a sick bed, but its ringing words have nothing in them but the health and strength of full manhood. The fact that Sanford B. Dole is the executive head of the Government has furnished from the beginning one of the strongest guarantees of its success. No man in all the Hawaiian commonwealth is the object of more universal respect. He stands for equity, for moderation, for prudence, and for firmness as well, in all the actions of the executive.

The military department possesses a thoroughly reliable head in John H. Soper. The pluck and determination of J. Good, captain of the regulars, who fired the first and last shot of the revolution, have been invaluable to the cause. Capt. Ziegler, with his Germans, has been a host, and the zeal of Captains Gunn and Camara, of the volunteers, who have devoted day and night to the service, as well as the officer's of the commander's staff, is above praise. With the police station in the charge of Fred Wundenberg, during the first doubtful and trying days, everyone felt that stronghold to be safe.

No attempt is made here even to enumerate more than a fraction of those who have served the cause with devotion. Many of those chiefly worthy of mention must pass unnamed. The host of volunteers, though their roll is not called here, should not be forgotten, for their service, though humbler, was not less necessary than the service of the leaders.

A SKETCH OF RECENT EVENTS.

[Being a short account of the events which culminated on June 30, 1887, together with a full report of the great reform meeting, and the two constitutions in parallel columns. Honolulu: Published by A. M. Hewett. Hawaiian Gazette Print, 1887.]

A RETROSPECT.

The origin of the events which had their culmination in the revolution of July 1, 1887, must be sought for in the Moreno episode of 1880. The *teterrima causa*, of course, was the vicious and worthless constitution of 1864; but, as the Hon. C. R. Bishop said in the now historical meeting of June 30, 1887, he had lived under it during the reign of five Kings and had not found out that it was a bad one until the last few years when it had been so thoroughly misused. We may, for the moment, dismiss that, and concentrate our attention on the last eight years, when it became patent to one designing mind how the "worthless rag" of a constitution might be used by an unscrupulous man for private aggrandizement.

C. C. Moreno came here in 1880 with a scheme for a transpacific cable and a plan for a set of Chinese steamers, which were to touch here on their way between San Francisco and the Flowery Kingdom. He soon found his way to the ear of the King, and put before him some dazzling schemes. Moreno was a keen politician, and made use of Mr. W. M. Gibson, who was then leading the opposition in the Legislature, to

further his views in the house, and also learned Gibson's plans, some of them, according to his story, very desperate ones, for acquiring power. The cabinet at that time consisted of Messrs. S. G. Wilder, interior; J. M. Kapena, foreign affairs, Simon Kaai, finance, and Edward Preston, attorney-general. An attempt was made to overthrow this cabinet in the Legislature by a vote of want of confidence, but it was defeated and the session came to a close. Within a few hours after the prorogation the cabinet was summarily dismissed by the King, and commissions were signed (August 14) for John E. Bush, interior, C. C. Moreno, foreign affairs, Kaai, finance, and Claude Jones, attorney-general. The change called forth a perfect storm. A mass meeting was held, the diplomatic corps intervened, and the most objectionable feature in the ministry, C. C. Moreno, was forced to resign August 19, and left for San Francisco in the *Ho Chung*, a steamer belonging to the Chinese Navigation Company. By September 27, 1880, an entirely new ministry was formed with Messrs. W. L. Green, H. A. P. Carter, J. S. Walker, and Mr. W. N. Armstrong joined them later as attorney-general.

This was but an episode, but it showed what could be done. If a stranger could drop, as it were, from the clouds and do what Moreno had done, why should not another, who was a resident here, do likewise? The seed sown by Moreno took rapid hold in the mind of Gibson, and from the moment of Moreno's fall he resolved to work on the lines of the wily Don.

It took some time to organize his scheme, but Gibson kept his aim steadily in view. On May 19, 1882, during the first weeks of the legislative session, the Green-Carter ministry resigned, and Gibson was called to the head of affairs. His colleagues were Messrs. Simon Kaai, interior; J. E. Bush, finance, and Edward Preston, attorney-general. From 1882 to June 30, 1887, a system of gradual extension of royal prerogatives, a using of the public funds for private ends, has steadily gone on. The changes in the cabinet have been so frequent that it acquired the name of kaleidoscopic; but whatever change took place, one central figure always remained, and that was W. M. Gibson. During his career he occupied every place in the cabinet, and on one occasion he filled three positions at the same time, viz, foreign affairs, interior, and the attorney-generalship.

The policy at first adopted was to play upon the King's vanity, and for that purpose a gorgeous coronation pageant was arranged, which took place February 14, 1883. The bills incurred on that occasion were enormous, how large has never yet been learned, but at the session of 1886 the outstanding accounts under this head still amounted to some \$20,000. The coronation, however, was but the thin end of the wedge. In every way that could add to the tinsel and glitter of the Kingdom, money was spent.

It became very clear that to do this it was necessary to "hold" the Legislature. To this end political heads were chopped off in all directions and the places of the former incumbents filled by men devoted to the new régime without reference to their fitness for the positions. Thus Mr. Godfrey Brown was summarily dismissed from the finance office and Col. Allen from the collector-generalship of customs, while the board of education, consisting of Messrs. C. R. Bishop, E. O. Hall, Godfrey Rhodes, and J. Kawainui were turned out in an insulting manner. The name and influence of the King were freely used in the elections, and the Government candidates for election were chosen from among the office-holders. In the Legislature of 1884 an effort was made to meet the evil but the opposition was not united enough; it needed that the governing powers should more plainly show their evil qualities before all men would unite in a solid phalanx against them.

The appropriation bill of 1884 far exceeded any previous one. Money was voted for many useless things; the expenses of the privy purse were swelled; so was the military vote, the vote for foreign missions, and, throughout the whole session and long after it, the Spreckels' influence was supreme. The following two years told the same tale of extravagance only the Government were becoming more bold. Jobs of the most flagrant description were constantly being brought before the public through the press, and the cabinet calmly smiled and asked the complainants what they were going to do about it?

The leprosy question, also, had been growing into a crying evil. Lepers were let free, either on the authority of Mr. Gibson or the King, and these permits were used for political purposes. To quell the feeling in this direction, for it was growing serious, Dr. Arning, a specialist, was sent for from Germany. He came, instituted a set of valuable experiments, and then, proving only a scientific man and not a political tool, was dismissed, under circumstances which are fresh in the minds of all our readers. Debt, too, began to accumulate rapidly, and to bolster their failing finances, loans were obtained from Mr. Spreckels.

For the Legislature of 1886 a gallant fight was made to have a body of men elected who would vote money with some sense of its value, and who should, in some degree, represent the capital and brains of the country. The effort was abortive. Every scandalous means was used to secure a victory for the men in power. Bribery was

employed, liquor was allowed to run in a tide, promises of office were given, intimidation was resorted to, and in one district a number of soldiers were taken up to outvote the opposition candidate, while in another the voting lists were openly tampered with.

With a Legislature composed of such materials, and obtained by such means, it is not surprising that the right of free speech was cut off, and that a reckless disregard for the rights of capital and brains reigned supreme.

The session lasted from April 30 to October 16—a period of 170 days. The results were an appropriation bill of somewhat over four and a half millions of dollars, the income of the country being about two millions. A loan bill was passed authorizing the Government to borrow \$2,000,000, the affair to be managed by a syndicate in London. A free-liquor bill had been passed in the Legislature of 1884, and that of 1886 gave an opium bill, which was so framed that bribery could be freely used to obtain the license. The results of this bill will be seen later on. Then there was an army bill, authorizing the expenditure of a very large sum of money, and creating generals, colonels, intelligence officers, and no end of frippery. The buying and fitting out of a man-of-war was authorized, and the vote for foreign missions was still further increased. One thing was made clear, during the session, and that was the ministerial view of the constitution. In open debate the question was argued: "Where lies, or should lie, the preponderating, the actual ruling power?" One of the independent members maintained "In the legislature;" the ministry held "In the crown;" and the latter theory was acted upon.

Great dissatisfaction was felt at the close of the Legislature; but matters were not so bad yet as to cause all men to unite. What the Government intended to do soon began to be developed. An embassy, under charge of John E. Bush, was sent at great expense to Samoa. A large sum of money was expended over festivities in honor of the King's birthday. The *Explorer* (re-named the *Kaimiloa*)—a vessel totally unsuited for the purpose—was purchased by the Government for \$20,000, and some \$50,000 or \$60,000 were expended in turning her into a man-of-war. The crew was largely made up of boys from the Reformatory School, and their conduct, together with that of some of the officers, created a perfect scandal. On the evening before the day appointed for the sailing of the vessel a mutiny broke out, and several of the officers were summarily dismissed. Meantime, money was very scarce, the loan was bungled, and though the money had been subscribed in England, it was not forthcoming in Hawaii. The roads all over the group were in a terrible condition; the harbor had not been dredged for months, no funds being forthcoming for the purpose; the landings were neglected and Government indebtedness was not liquidated.

So bad had things become that men set seriously to work to right them, and early in the present year a number of gentlemen in Honolulu and on the other islands began to consider the best means for putting an end to the then state of affairs, and placing the Government of the country on a basis which should for the future do away with the system of corruption and fraud which had ruled so long. For this purpose arms were imported, and every preparation made beforehand. The organization took the name of the Hawaiian League, and had enrolled among its members some of the weightiest men in the city.

The agitation was progressing favorably, when a weapon was put into the hands of the patriotic party which served to unite the whole population as one man against the régime under which such iniquities could be perpetrated.

We have spoken above of the opium law which was passed in the Legislature of 1886, and which had received the King's signature in spite of the most vigorous protests from all classes of the community. The bill provided that a license for the sale of opium, at the rate of \$30,000 per annum, should be given to whomsoever the minister of the interior might choose.

The facts in the matter, furnished on undeniable authority, were published in the Hawaiian Gazette of May 17, and from that paper we quote. The paper said:

"Early in November, 1886, one Junius Kaae, heretofore conspicuous for nothing except being a 'palace hanger-on' (since promoted to the office of register of deeds), went to a Chinese rice-planter named Aki and asked him if he did not want the opium license. Aki said he did. Kaae then informed him that he could help him to get it, and that the first step necessary was to pay the King the sum of \$60,000, but that he must hurry up about it, because there were others trying to get the King to give it to them. After some discussion, Aki agreed to act upon Kaae's suggestion. About the 6th of December, in the afternoon, \$20,000 were taken to the palace in a basket. The King, seeing others around, told the bearers to come in the evening. They came in the evening and met the King, who directed them to see Kaae. Kaae, being present, conferred with the King, and then went to the King's private office, and he there received the \$20,000, and put it in the King's private drawer. A few days after, the King stated to the owner that he had received the \$20,000. Shortly after a check on the bank for \$10,000 was handed to the King personally. The same day Kaae returned it, saying that they preferred coin to

checks. The same evening the coin to that amount was delivered to Kaae. A day or two later \$30,000 in gold coin and certificates of deposit, in two baskets, were taken to the palace and delivered, together with a present of a little baked pig, to the King personally. This completed the \$60,000. Finding how easily \$60,000 was made, probably there were some qualms of conscience about letting the license go so cheap. Aki was therefore informed by Kaae that John S. Walker was backing another Chinaman, and that unless \$15,000 more was forthcoming, Walker's Chinaman would get the license. Aki reluctantly raised the amount, and it was paid to the King personally."

Shortly after this, Aki heard that the license had been given to another Chinese syndicate, at the head of which was Chun Lung.

The fact that he had lost his money and his license, made Aki tell, and the whole circumstances were drawn up in a series of affidavits. On May 31 the Gazette published Aki's affidavit, giving the matter more fully in detail, and likewise exposed an illegal land transaction in which the minister of foreign affairs, W. M. Gibson, while acting minister of interior, had been engaged.

It had also transpired that the minister of interior, J. Aholo, had drawn a sum of money out of the treasury, certifying that it was for the work done on the continuation of Queen's street, when it was known, for a fact, that no such work had been done.

These publications created an immense sensation, and the entire press united in denouncing the venality and corruption of the Hawaiian Government. Preparations were made for holding a public meeting on Monday, June 27, but it was deemed advisable to postpone the meeting till Thursday, June 30. Early on Tuesday, June 28, it was rumored that the ministry had resigned. This was found to be a fact. During that day and the next the ex-attorney-general made efforts to get together a coalition ministry, but without success, and on Thursday, June 30, the mass meeting was held. The account of it, which appeared in the Gazette, is reproduced here, corrected by the accounts published in the Commercial Advertiser and Herald. It reads as follows:

THE GREAT MASS MEETING.

The most enthusiastic, largest, and yet most orderly meeting ever held in Honolulu took place on Thursday afternoon, June 30. The meeting had been advertised June 29 by posters in English, Hawaiian, and Portuguese, and long before the appointed hour, 2 p. m., the approaches to the armory of the Honolulu Rifles, corner of Punchbowl and Beretania streets, were thronged with crowds of people of all classes, hurrying to the rendezvous. All the stores in town were closed by 1 p. m., and all work on buildings or in machine shops was brought to a close. Passing the palace a considerable stir was noticed, and as the Gazette reporter passed, a native with half a dozen rifles on his shoulder was proceeding thither from the barracks.

Outside the armory the Honolulu Rifles were drawn up under arms with fixed bayonets, and each man carrying fifty rounds of ammunition. Our citizen soldiers looked a fine body of men, "ready," as one of the speakers afterwards said in the meeting, "to defend their rights or enforce them."

In the armory seats had been arranged, and by 2 o'clock the building was filled in every part, while a large crowd blocked up every opening. The platform was placed on the *mauka* or land side of the building. On the table was the Hawaiian flag, while at the back the flags of the United States and Great Britain were intertwined, fit emblems of the mother and daughter country standing shoulder to shoulder.

Those who were present.—The assemblage was thoroughly representative—mechanics, merchants, day-laborers, planters, professional men, all were there. Of nationalities there were Americans, Britons, Colonials, Germans, Hawaiians, Portuguese, Chinese, and Japanese. In numbers, a good many estimated the crowd as being about 2,500. With but a few exceptions, all were animated by the same feelings, the same determination, to put an end, once and for all, upon the present iniquitous system of misrule and extravagance.

The following list of names was compiled by Mr. Dan Logan, of the Herald, Dr. Emerson, and Mr. Alatau T. Atkinson, of the Gazette, and though necessarily imperfect, will serve to show the material of which the meeting was composed:

Representative names.—Jonathan Austin, Hon. W. F. Allen, Alatau T. Atkinson, J. B. Atherton, L. C. Ables, H. J. Agnew, L. Aseu, F. E. Atwater, W. Alexander, Hon. C. R. Bishop, Maj. Benson, U. S. Army; Hon. Cecil Brown, Godfrey Brown, Frank Brown, W. P. A. Brewer, Rev. Dr. Beckwith, W. R. Buchanan, P. Butler, J. E. Brown, J. Bushee, Rev. S. E. Bishop, Geo. C. Beckley, A. J. Cartwright, sr., H. W. Schmidt, R. J. Creighton, Hon. John A. Cummins, James Campbell, Hon. W. R. Castle, G. P. Castle, Kwong Hang Cheng, Yuen Chong, J. O. Carter, E. S. Cunha,

Lau Chong, Robert Catton, C. K. Cooke, E. C. Damon, M. Dickson, W. E. H. Deverill, J. A. Dower, J. Dowsett, Dr. N. B. Emerson, G. D. Freeth, W. S. Forsyth, Chas. Foster (Maui), W. E. Foster, C. J. Fishel, Hon. W. L. Green, H. F. Glade, Sir A. Gooch (England), Robt. Gay, R. Jay Greene, W. Robinson, R. Grieve, Capt. W. B. Godfrey, Chr. Gertz, Frank Gertz, Walter Hill, A. Hoffnung (England), Julius Hotting, Major Hills, C. Hammer, F. M. Hatch, W. W. Hall, W. L. Holokahiki, C. W. Hart, Thos. Hughes, W. E. Herrick, Maj. A. B. Hayley, Hon. P. Isenberg, A. Jaeger, P. C. Jones, E. W. Jordan, W. A. Kinney, Geo. Kim, A. Kraft, Capt. J. King, Prince Albert Kuniuakea, M. Louisson, R. W. Laine, D. Logan, H. R. Macfarlane, E. C. Marfarlane, Fred W. Macfarlane, M. McInerny, Rev. W. C. Merritt, Alex McKibbin, Capt. Mist, R. N., E. Muller, Rev. Alex Mackintosh, Dr. J. S. McGrew, A. Marques, J. A. McCandless, M. D. Monsarrat, Dr. Robt. McKibbin, Captain Macaulay, John Nott, P. Neumann, Rev. W. B. Oleson, Hon. Sam Parker, R. W. Purvis, John H. Paty, W. C. Peacock, W. H. Rice, Mark P. Robinson, Dr. C. T. Rodgers, H. Riemenschneider, H. Renjes, Capt. Ross, L. F. Stolz, Capt. Harry S. Swinton, J. H. Soper, S. Savidge, F. M. Swanzy, G. M. Stillman, Dr. Tucker, H. S. Tregloan, J. G. Tucker, T. G. Thrum, Fred Turrell, H. S. Townsend, R. von Tempisky, J. M. Vivas, J. T. Waterhouse, E. M. Walsh, William C. Wilder, J. Hay Wodehouse, H. M. Whitney, Henry Waterhouse, C. L. White, J. A. Wilder, T. Rain Walker, G. L. Wilcox, Rev. George Wallace, C. B. Wilson, R. N. Webster, Chief Engineer Whittaker, U. S. Army; A. S. Wilcox, A. Young.

At the reporters' table were Messrs. Daniel Logan, editor of the Daily Herald; Walter Hill, editor of the Bulletin; Alatau T. Atkinson, editor of the Gazette; Messrs. Taylor and Gilbert, of the P. C. Advertiser; Mr. S. Kaaikaula, of the Pae Aina; Mr. Ho Fon, of the Chinese News, and Mr. F. J. Testa, of the Elele.

The meeting.—Shortly after the stroke of 2 Hon. S. B. Dole came on to the platform and calling the meeting to order, nominated Mr. P. C. Jones as chairman. The nomination was accepted unanimously, and amid loud applause the genial gentleman, who has presided over so many a social gathering, took charge of the most important meeting that has ever been known in Hawaiian history.

Mr. Jones, on ascending the platform, said: I feel honored at being nominated chairman of this, the largest and most important meeting that has ever assembled in this city. We have assembled in a constitutional manner, and propose to conduct it in a constitutional manner. We are here for the purpose of asking for good government, a thing we have not had, but which we earnestly desire. We, representatives of all nations, are assembled here and we can afford to conduct ourselves in a firm and dignified manner, because we are firm and determined in what we ask. [Applause.]

A set of resolutions have been prepared which will be read to you by Mr. L. A. Thurston, and also a communication from the King which has just been received by the Hon. C. R. Bishop. Then there will be short speeches. As there are many speakers and the place is warm and we are warmed up, they will be limited to five minutes. We must make the work short, sharp, and decisive. [Loud cheers.]

Hon. Lorrin Thurston apologized for appearing in uniform, but he had been so ordered by his commanding officer, and he obeyed his orders. He then read the following:

RESOLUTIONS.

We, the citizens, residents, and taxpayers of Honolulu, acting, as we firmly believe, in sympathy with and in behalf of all right-minded citizens, residents, and taxpayers of this Kingdom, and being assembled in mass meeting in the city of Honolulu, on the 30th day of June, 1887, do resolve as follows:

1. That the administration of the Hawaiian Government has ceased, through corruption and incompetence, to perform the functions and afford the protection to personal and property rights for which all governments exist.

2. That while some of the evils of which we complain can not be at once adequately redressed and their recurrence prevented, and many others are incurable except by radical changes in the present constitution, yet there are some evils which we feel must be remedied at once, before a permanent reform movement can be inaugurated with any reasonable prospect of success.

3. Holding these views, we request of the King:

First. That he shall at once and unconditionally dismiss his present cabinet from office, and we ask that he shall call one of these persons, viz, William L. Green, Henry Waterhouse, Godfrey Brown, or Mark P. Robinson to assist him in selecting a new cabinet, which shall be committed to the policy of securing a new constitution.

Second. That Walter M. Gibson shall be at once dismissed from each and every office held by him under the Government.

Third. In order, so far as possible, to remove the stain now resting on the Throne, we request of the King that he shall cause immediate restitution to be made of the sum, to wit, seventy-one thousand dollars (\$71,000), recently obtained by him in violation of law and of his oath of office, under promise that the persons from whom

the same was obtained shall receive the license to sell opium, as provided by statute of the year 1886.

Fourth. Whereas one Junius Kaae was implicated in the obtaining of said seventy-one thousand dollars (\$71,000), and has since been, and still is, retained in office as registrar of conveyances, we request, as a safeguard to the property interests of the country, that said Kaae be at once dismissed from said office, and that the records of our land titles be placed in hands of one in whose integrity the people can safely confide.

Fifth. That we request a specific pledge from the King—

(1) That he will not in the future interfere either directly or indirectly with the election of representatives.

(2) That he will not interfere with or attempt to unduly influence legislation or legislators.

(3) That he will not interfere with the constitutional administration of his cabinet.

(4) That he will not use his official position or patronages for private ends.

Resolved, That Paul Isenberg, W. W. Hall, J. A. Kennedy, W. H. Rice, Capt. Jas. A. King, E. B. Thomas, H. C. Reed, John Vivas, W. F. A. Brewer, W. B. Oleson, Cecil Brown, Capt. John Ross, J. B. Atherton, are hereby appointed to present the foregoing resolutions and requests to the King; and said committee is hereby instructed to request of the King that a personal answer to the same be returned within twenty-four hours of the time when the same are presented; and to further inform the King that his neglect so to answer the same within said time will be construed as a refusal of the said requests.

Resolved, That said committee, in case of the King's refusal to grant said requests, or in case of his neglect to reply to the same, is authorized to call another mass meeting at this place on Saturday, July 2, at 2 p. m., to further consider the situation.

When the second request, relative to the summary dismissal of Walter M. Gibson, was read, a perfect storm of cheers swept through the building.

Hon. C. R. Bishop then read the communication he had received from the King, premising that it had reached him at 1 p. m.

THE KING'S LETTER.

Hon. C. R. BISHOP,

Member of the House of Nobles, Privy Councillor of State, etc.:

MY DEAR SIR: Reposing especially confidence in your loyalty and sound judgment as a councillor, and knowing your regard for our people, we are moved to call upon the Hon. W. L. Green to form a cabinet and a ministry which he may select and will be acceptable to the respectable and responsible majority of our people, will be welcome to us; and any guaranties which may be reasonably required of us under the constitution and laws of our Kingdom will be at once conceded to such administration.

Your friend,

KALAKAUA.

The chairman reread the letter for the benefit of those who were far off, Mr. Bishop's voice not being strong enough to reach the whole assemblage.

Mr. W. A. Kinney read a translation of the resolutions in Hawaiian, the reader being frequently interrupted by applause.

Hon. W. L. Green, on being called, was received with great applause. He said a speech from him was impossible. He could not tell, no one could tell, what the course of events would be. He knew no more than any one present about the letter from the King. The meeting had assembled to express themselves as to the past and in regard to the future, and he urged upon the speakers to keep their language firm and decisive. He remembered a meeting held some three years ago, he thought, at the Lyceum. It was a large meeting, though not so large as this, and its object was to protest against the maladministration of the Gibson cabinet. He was not there, not being well, but sent a letter, in which he expressed himself in strong language. He need not go into the details—that could be done better by others; but they were met again to-day, because from that day to this that same administration had been getting worse and worse until at last it had become intolerable. He considered that their united attitude to-day was one which would teach His Majesty that he must turn over a new leaf, and see that this country is governed as a constitutional monarchy. He thought the King's letter precluded his saying anything further on this point. If he should be called upon to head a ministry, it should be one pledged to the common good, and which would carry out the resolutions passed there that day.

Mr. W. A. Kinney, before addressing the meeting in Hawaiian, spoke in English. He said that he had been born here and please God he was going to die here, and

would try to live here under this flag, but he wanted that flag to be clean. It would not be clean unless they went much further than the removal of the Gibson administration. He had been reminded of the words of Lord Chatham, "It is time that the Crown were addressed in the language of truth." It is the height of folly to put four men into a hostile camp, and support the tension to try and keep them there. (Mr. E. M. Walsh—"We will support them!") The speaker had a great deal of confidence in Mr. Walsh, but he preferred a good constitution, a new constitution, every time, and anything less than a new constitution would not suit him.

The miserable rag of a constitution we had did not afford adequate representation nor impose proper restrictions upon the power of the Throne. He believed it was written on the hearts of those before him, "a new constitution, and that speedily." It was the height of folly to suppose that commercial men and others in the community could stand and hold these men in their places. We had tried this kind of things for the last six years. With a good constitution we would have peace—peace flowing like a river. The franchise will be reconstructed and the king will have power as great as the Queen of Great Britain, and that ought to be enough for him. If to his own rights he wants to add the rights of 75,000 subjects he is not going to have them. The revolution of thought would be followed by a revolution of arms, as it always had been, if our reasonable requests were not granted. He pledged his life, every cent that he possessed, and his sacred honor under that flag that sheltered him from his birth. (Cheers.) If the men would not put this thing through the women would. He referred to the mental agony the women had endured these passed years for want of proper protection against disease, many having had to isolate their children in foreign lands. No man can stop or stay this movement now. The sails are set, the ship is in motion; we can not go back. Push her forward into the open sea. (Cheers.)

Mr. Kinney then spoke several minutes in Hawaiian.

Hon. S. B. Dole, being called upon, said: Fellow citizens: There are two thoughts to which I will call your attention in our constitution. First, "The King conducts his Government for the common good." The second is like unto it, "All men are allowed to assemble to consult upon the common good." We have a right to be here, and we have assembled according to law; but we would not be here to-day if the King had conducted the Government for the common good. He has not done so. This meeting has come together to consider the public interests, and is composed of men who are determined to have good government. As I understand the situation, this meeting is called to give the King one chance to fall into line for political reform—just one chance. I do not say he will take the chance. I am not here to talk about the ministers, but about the King (loud cheers), for he is not conducting the Government for the benefit of the people. I need not detail the fact of bad government by the King to you; it relates to all departments of the administration; interference with everything appertaining to government has been his rule, and he has sold his sacred oath of office to the highest bidder. We are here for no unlawful purpose; we are here to demand that the King cleanse the Government, and that he return this money—which every man, woman, and child in the country believes he took unlawfully—not for the sake of the parties to whom it belongs, but to show that the Government is to be conducted henceforth upon clean principles. We remember the last six years, during which the rights of the people have been trampled under foot, the representative principle of government has been practically destroyed, the principle of ministerial responsibility interrupted, and public moneys recklessly squandered. These things cannot go on. This movement means political reform, and it has gone so far that, from the talk I hear as I go along the street, opposition or hostility to it is in the public mind something akin to treason.

Mr. J. A. McCandless, whom the chairman introduced as a gentleman who went down into the bowels of the earth, spoke next. He said he supported these resolutions, and in doing so he believed that he represented some 1,500 people. He was ready to support them with the last drop of his blood. All were united—merchants, mechanics, laborers, and all. He believed that there was a unanimity which had never before been attained. Fifteen hundred persons had been disfranchised for no other reason than they were white men, and they were not going to have this much longer. They had a right to have their franchise granted unconditionally. [A voice, We'll take them.] He was afraid there were some among them who were weak-kneed. One man had got his gun and taken it home, and left a note upon the table with the words "Good-bye; shall be out of town till next Sunday." That there were some who wanted bracing up. There were men among them the grandchildren of those who had fought at Waterloo, and made it what it was, of the noble six hundred at Balaklava. They had among them some of the heroes of Appomattox, and also of the Franco-German war. These were the kind of men this community is made up of. Abraham Lincoln had remarked on the eve of the late war, "it may be necessary to set the foot down hard." And a great newspaper correspondent who was present said that he knew then for the first time that the great North was

ready, and, concluded the speaker, from what I see here to-day I know that we are ready to put our foot down. (Applause.)

Hon. C. R. Bishop said: This is unquestionably an important meeting, the most important ever held in Honolulu. I see before me mechanics, merchants, professional men. They are not here for amusement, but because they feel that the course of affairs calls for prompt and determined action. We should discuss matters in a peaceable manner without any threats; we do not need any threats. The fact that so many men have come here shows that we do not need any threats. I came here in 1846, became naturalized in 1849, and have lived under five kings. We thought we had really a liberal constitution, because those kings did not encroach upon the rights of their subjects. But we have found out within the last few years that our constitution is defective, partly on account of bad advice to the King, but largely on his own account. The King has encroached on our rights. We have had very few mass meetings, but when we have one like this I believe it means either a new constitution or one with material reforms, which I am sure we shall have. I come here as a Hawaiian, not for any class or clique. If it was any class or clique, I would not come here at all. (Applause.)

Mr. Henry Waterhouse spoke in native in substance as follows:

Fellow-citizens of Hawaii nei—Hon. C. R. Bishop says the constitution is full of faults. If so, let us have a new constitution. Therefore, let us stand by the resolutions. We shall see from those who stand by these resolutions who are the friends of the Hawaiian people. My counsel is to stand firm and go before the King without fear, and make our demands fearlessly.

Mr. R. Jay Green said: Gentlemen, fellow-citizens, friends, neighbors, and brothers: I was not aware that I should be asked to speak here or I should have put on my other coat. But the boys left me to come here, and I had to follow them, and all I want to say is that I expect to keep on following the boys. (Applause.)

Hon. L. A. Thurston said: Gentlemen, you and I have been waiting a long time for this day, but it has come. It is a long lane that has no turning, but we have come to the turning of our lane. There are persons here to speak to all of you, but I am here to speak as a Hawaiian. My ancestors came here in the reign of Kamehameha I. I was born and brought up here, and I mean to die here. Hawaii is good enough for me. I speak for Hawaiians, because you foreigners can speak for yourselves and can look out for yourselves, but many of these Hawaiians are ignorant and have been deserted by their leaders. I am the representative of the constituency of Molokai, and spent some weeks there last summer, and I wish to say that the Hawaiians on Molokai are with us to a man. It may be that this letter from His Majesty was meant to head off these resolutions. I remember reading somewhere of a man who was going to shoot a coon, and the coon said, "Don't shoot; I'll come down." The King is the coon and this meeting the gun. [Great applause.] History repeats itself. We all remember the King's message to the Legislature in 1884, recommending economy, and asking that it should begin with His Majesty's privy purse. That message was accepted in good faith, and there was a grand torchlight procession to the palace to thank him—I carried a torch in that procession myself—but it was followed by appropriations enormously in excess of the revenue. And again, in 1886, came another message for retrenchment, but this time it didn't wash. There was a meeting during the Moreno time to protest against bad government, and into the midst of it someone came and said, "It's all right; the King has appointed a new ministry," and there were three cheers for the King, and that was the last of it. Are there any cheers to-day? (Loud cries of No! No!) The King was taken at his word. I noticed that there were no cheers proposed for the King to-day. It is not sufficient to have the King accept these resolutions; we must have a new constitution, and must have it now. A constitution is a contract, and if the King and the people both agree to change it, there is no violation of constitutional rights and no revolution. If we have let things come to this pitch, and take the King at his word, it is to rely on wind. Let a change in the constitution be the first and last and only request, if necessary, but let that be the one to be insisted on till the last moment.

* Hon. Paul Isenberg said that on many points he agreed to these resolutions, but as far as the new constitution was concerned he was somewhat doubtful. Let it be done legally. The subject had been broached the previous day of his entering a new ministry. If so, he would not be a party to pushing a new constitution through in a hurry. It would not be legal unless carried by the Legislature. (Dr. C. T. Rodgers: What assembly gave us our present constitution?) We could have an extra session to pass the constitution, and another extra session to ratify it. (Hisses and applause.) He hoped all would be peaceful and not hasty. (A voice: We have been waiting six years.) If so, we could very well wait another. (Great uproar and cries of "No, no.") Dr. Emerson: "We won't wait another year." A voice: "We mean to have it now." Cries of "Sit down.") The speaker took his seat.

H. L. Swinton said, in Hawaiian: I am not going to speak in the English language, because the haoles all think as I do. It has been said that this meeting is called to incite to kill the Hawaiians. I have always been called a rebel. This is because I am not afraid to speak my mind, and my mind is firm and clear that the Government is false and corrupt. My advice is to stand by the resolution for a new constitution, and let us not be satisfied with promises by the King. Let us not be satisfied when the King tells us he has turned out the cabinet, what more do you want. Let us follow the lead of Thurston, and demand a new constitution.

Mr. Alexander Young, who represented the Honolulu Iron Works, said he was proud to stand upon the platform and look so many honest men in the face. They were men who not only looked what they meant, but meant what they looked. He was no speaker, but a thinker. He came here twenty-three years ago, and at one time, when traveling, he was proud of living here. Lately he had done some traveling, and had to hide his face when he found this flag stinking abroad. He represented a large class of men not only in this country, but all over the world. The class he represented were the horny-handed sons of toil, who earned their honest dollar and could lie down and sleep without it burning them. He was ready to shoulder a musket to defend Kalakaua, and not a knave. Some had counseled them to wait; but he said wait not, strike the iron while it is hot. Kalakaua had had a great many years to let us see whether he was a man or not. The tension about our hearts had long been strained, and to-day the strings had broken, and we must express ourselves. He was not a lawyer, and could not tell whether we could have a constitution in five minutes; but necessity was the mother of invention, and we must get it as soon as possible. There was not a coward in that assembly—not one, though it was not always wise to rush into mischief. If the King would not do what was wanted, he must be made to do it. Let us exercise patience and put the matter in the hands of people able to deal with it. Let us have a new constitution, and if it is not legal, the same power would make another.

Dr. Tucker said that when he came to this country there were mutterings of discontent, and it was all Walter Murray Gibson. We arraign the King. He does not know that this assembly—largely composed of men who think that kings are not of much account anyway—he does not know that if it was not for the wise counsel of men in this movement his head would have been off before this. They could not wait any longer for reform. The King had better be a saint while he is well, as well as when he is sick.

Mr. L. C. Ables, who represented the clerks, said that he had come here to seek his fortune, but had not seen it. He was an American; the stars and stripes was his flag, but the Hawaiian flag would suit him as well, and he was going to stay by it. The class whom he represented wanted a new constitution, and they were going to have it. He was not a lawyer, but he had been told by lawyers that the constitution was promulgated by a king. It could be done again. Some would ask, "Are you going to get it?" In illustration of his determination to have it, he related an anecdote about a certain youth who had evinced an indomitable determination in hunting for a woodchuck wherewith to regale the appetite of a hungry Methodist preacher. The boy chased the woodchuck into his hole. A man came along and asked the boy if he could get him, "Mister," said the boy, "I've got to get him;" and for the constitution, we've got to have it!

Hon. Cecil Brown said, in Hawaiian: "Perhaps you ask, why is this meeting of citizens? Perhaps the thought may enter that it is to propose to do evil to Hawaiians. Not so. I am an Hawaiian, and was born under this flag, and under it my bones shall be buried. Has there been good government in the past few years? No. Has the legislative right been respected? No. We want, then, a new constitution. We want the King to think of the public good, not of personal ends. We have just seen the jubilee of Queen Victoria, and if Kalakaua would follow her example, he might reign as long. But if Queen Victoria were to act as badly as Kalakaua, she would not live an hour. Let us, then, go for a new constitution.

Mr. E. M. Walsh, manager of the Paia plantation, Maui, said that he represented the planters, who, he felt sure, would indorse the sentiments so ably expressed. In 1882 a deputation representing the plantations on the other islands waited on the King to petition His Majesty to give them honest government. The result was they were snubbed. The King afterwards went to North Kona, and with the assistance of his soldiers defeated Pilipo in the election. They did not want to use threats, but to-day they were prepared, and would not be again insulted. He believed it would be wise to change the constitution. He did not know the best way of doing it, but in view of the consummate skill which had brought this movement forward, he was ready to leave it to the thirteen gentlemen to see that it was done right. It seemed to him, however, that this was a time to have the voice of the people. From Maui all were with them. In 1882, as he had said, the King let them go with false promises. They took his word then. Now, let us prepare a constitution and say this is what we want and what we must have. (Applause.)

Mr. J. M. Vivas then read the resolutions in Portuguese, and made a speech which evidently went to the hearts of his countrymen.

Mr. J. G. Tucker said they had heard talk about this flag and that flag, but they had gone into this thing as people of all nationalities merged into Hawaiians. They had come and meant to stay till they got what they wanted.

Mr. W. H. Rice, of Kanai, spoke in the native language, as follows:

Hawaiian citizens, from Hawaii to Nihau; from northwest to southeast; we want to clean up the Government. Has the Government been clean? No! The roads are wasting and groaning from one end to another of the land. Where is the money for the roads? Sent on an exploration with the Kaimiloa. If we go asking for bread, shall we be satisfied with stones? Some one asked me to-day if I had my gun? Well, yes; I am a cattle-drover, and I need one. It has been well said that the ship of this movement has been launched, the anchor is weighed, the sails set, now let us take the helm and steer.

Lieut. C. W. Ashford was the last speaker. He appeared upon the platform in uniform, and armed with a rifle and belt of cartridges. He stated that he was under military orders, and had been commanded by his superior officer not to indulge in a political speech. He had not had the privilege of listening to all the speeches, but from reports which had been carried to the corps outside, he understood that a gentleman representing vast moneyed interests here had counselled the meeting to wait another year for a new constitution.

Here the rifle company marched round the outer edge of the building and took up their position inside to hear the speech of their comrade, and as they did so, three rousing cheers and a tiger were given for the "boys."

Lieut. Ashford, resuming, acknowledged the compliment on behalf of the corps. He had joined it three years ago in anticipation of trouble such as they saw that day. Returning to Mr. Isenberg's remark, he said that gentleman, in view of his position, would naturally have an aversion to anything having a tendency to disturbance. He (the speaker) did not want to fight, but by heaven if we did—. If we set about getting reform under the present constitution we might wait till our grandchildren were gray. He felt sure Mr. Isenberg did not express the sentiments of that meeting, certainly not those of the Honolulu Rifles. At the same time he had the greatest respect for the great nation that gentleman represented. He thought that Germans were pretty well decided not to submit to dictation abroad, however much they might at home.

The German heart is strong and true,
The German arm is strong,
The German foot goes seldom back
Where armed foemen throng.

If armed foemen should throng here, he did not think the German foot would go back. He wished to say a few words on the merits of a new constitution. It has been objected that we could not have it at once, because such a thing would be unconstitutional and illegal. He would show the fallacy of that argument. In 1864, when Kamehameha V convoked his legislature, it was thought that a new constitution was wanted. After some weeks they failed to agree upon one satisfactory to His Majesty. The Legislature was arbitrarily dismissed, and the King, without even saying "By your leave," forced upon them a new constitution. That was the constitution we were living under to-day, and some people had the gall to say we were living under a constitutional government. He held that nothing was constitutional which was forced upon the people without their consent. The present constitution did not adequately protect personal rights, and it gave the King power which no monarch in a civilized country in the present day possessed. Who had ever heard of an absolute veto by the monarch anywhere in recent years? King Kalakaua had a great many very pleasant qualities, and many which were not so pleasant. Personally, he had behaved in a very friendly manner to the speaker when he came here, and perhaps would still if he were to truckle to him as some did. Cries of "Time" being heard, he concluded by urging upon all not to let the matter drop until some sensible and concerted action was taken. (Applause.)

Hon. W. R. Castle moved the adoption of the resolutions, seconded by Dr. Emerson and many others. On being put to the meeting they were carried unanimously, there being a roar of ayes, and dead silence when Mr. Jones put the question: "Contrary minded!"

The chairman stated, as the meeting was dispersing, that he had been requested to say that Mr. Gibson had sent for a squad of the Honolulu Rifles to go down to his house and protect him against the Hawaiians.

The committee immediately waited on the King, who stated that he was willing to give an answer offhand; but the committee informed him that they would leave the documents in his hands, and expect a reply in writing.

The meeting was thoroughly orderly throughout, but it was strong and determined. After the meeting the committee of thirteen proceeded to the palace and presented the resolutions to the King, requesting a reply.

The next day the King called a meeting composed of the American minister, W. H. Merrill; the British commissioner, James Hay Wodehouse; the French commissioner, Henri Feer, and the Portuguese commissioner, A. de Souza Canavarro, to whom he offered to transfer the powers vested in him as King. These gentlemen refused to accept the trust, but advised the King to lose no time in forming a new cabinet and signing a new constitution, which would meet the demands of the people. Accordingly, in the afternoon, the following reply was forwarded to the citizen's committee:

THE KING'S REPLY.

To Honorable Paul Isenberg and the gentlemen composing the committee of a meeting of subjects and citizens.

GENTLEMEN: In acknowledging the receipt of the resolutions adopted at a mass meeting held yesterday and presented to us by you, we are pleased to convey through you to our loyal subjects as well as to the citizens of Honolulu our expression of good will and our gratification that our people have taken the usual constitutional step in presenting their grievances.

To the first proposition contained in the resolutions passed by the meeting, whose action you represent, we reply that it has been substantially complied with by the formal resignation of the ministry, which took place on the 28th day of June, and was accepted on that date, and that we had already requested the Hon. W. L. Green to form a new cabinet on the day succeeding the resignation of the cabinet.

To the second proposition we reply that Mr. Walter M. Gibson has severed all his connections with the Hawaiian Government by resignation.

To the third proposition we reply that we do not admit the truth of the matter stated therein, but will submit the whole subject to our new cabinet, and will gladly act according to their advice, and will cause restitution to be made by the parties found responsible.

To the fourth proposition we reply that at our command Mr. Junius Kaa resigned the office of registrar of conveyance on the 28th day of June, and his successor has been appointed.

To the fifth proposition we reply that the specific pledges required of us are each severally acceded to.

We are pleased to assure the members of the committee and our loyal subjects that we are, and shall at all times be, anxious and ready to cooperate with our councillors and advisers, as well as with our intelligent and patriotic citizens in all matters touching the honor, welfare, and prosperity of our Kingdom.

Given at our palace this first day of July, A. D. 1887, and the fourteenth year of our reign.

KALAKAUA, REX.

The new cabinet, consisting of Messrs. W. L. Green, finance; Godfrey Brown, foreign affairs; Lorrin A. Thurston, interior, and C. W. Ashford, attorney-general, were sworn in the same day, and the revolution was practically over. It only remained to sign the new constitution. This document was prepared with great care, a large number of the members of the Hawaiian league being present and taking part in the debates. The document was ready on Wednesday, July 6, received the King's signature at 6.15 p. m. of that day, and was duly proclaimed on the next, copies being sent forward to the other islands.

Without the organization known as the Hawaiian league, this revolution could never have taken place. The moment that the members were called upon they were ready and well armed. Without the assistance of Major V. V. Ashford, who had command of the Honolulu rifles, order could not have been kept. To the gentlemen who form that corps the citizens of Honolulu owe a deep debt of gratitude. For two days Honolulu was under martial law, and yet the most perfect order was kept, the banks and business places were open, and there was perfect security to both life and property. It was the most peaceful and most complete of revolutions, but it was so because the power was there to sustain it.

A word or two about Mr. Gibson. He was arrested by the military on the morning of July 1, and was handed over to the civil authorities on a charge of embezzlement on the evening of the Saturday. He was permitted to remain in his house under guard, but on July 5 was removed to the prison. When brought before the police court the attorney-general entered a nolle pros., and Mr. Gibson quietly got on board the brigantine *John D. Spreckels*, which was leaving that same day, and sailed for California. Thus bringing one of the most unpleasant episodes in Hawaiian history to a conclusion.

THE TWO CONSTITUTIONS.

Constitution of 1864.

Granted by His Majesty Kamehameha V., by the grace of God, King of the Hawaiian Islands, on the twentieth day of August, A. D. 1864.

ARTICLE 1. God hath endowed all men with certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the right of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.

ARTICLE 2. All men are free to worship God according to the dictates of their own consciences; but this sacred privilege hereby secured shall not be so construed as to justify acts of licentiousness, or practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the Kingdom.

ARTICLE 3. All men may freely speak, write, and publish their sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and no law shall be enacted to restrain the liberty of speech or of the press, except such laws as may be necessary for the protection of His Majesty the King and the royal family.

ARTICLE 4. All men shall have the right, in an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble, without arms, to consult upon the common good, and to petition the King or Legislative assembly for redress of grievances.

ARTICLE 5. The privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* belongs to all men, and shall not be suspended, unless by the King, when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety shall require its suspension.

ARTICLE 6. No person shall be subject to punishment for any offense, except on due and legal conviction thereof in a court having jurisdiction of the case.

ARTICLE 7. No person shall be held to answer for any crime or offense (except in cases of impeachment, or for offenses within the jurisdiction of a police or district justice, or in summary proceedings for contempt), unless upon indictment, fully and plainly describing such crime or offense, and he shall have the right to meet the witnesses who are pro-

Constitution of 1887.

WHEREAS, the constitution of this Kingdom, heretofore in force, contains many provisions subversive of civil rights and incompatible with enlightened constitutional government.

AND WHEREAS, it has become imperative, in order to restore order and tranquility and the confidence necessary to a further maintenance of the present Government, that a new constitution should be at once promulgated:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Kalakaua, King of the Hawaiian Islands, in my capacity as sovereign of this Kingdom, and as the representative of the people hereunto by them duly authorized and empowered, do annul and abrogate the constitution promulgated by Kamehameha the Fifth, on the 20th day of August, A. D. 1864, and do proclaim and promulgate this constitution.

ARTICLE 1. God hath endowed all men with certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the right of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.

ARTICLE 2. All men are free to worship God according to the dictates of their own consciences; but this sacred privilege hereby secured shall not be so construed as to justify acts of licentiousness, or practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the Kingdom.

ARTICLE 3. All men may freely speak, write, and publish their sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and no law shall be enacted to restrain the liberty of speech or of the press.

ARTICLE 4. All men shall have the right, in an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble, without arms, to consult upon the common good, and to petition the King or Legislature for redress of grievances.

ARTICLE 5. The privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* belongs to all men, and shall not be suspended, unless by the King, when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety shall require its suspension.

ARTICLE 6. No person shall be subject to punishment for any offense, except on due and legal conviction thereof, in a court having jurisdiction of the case.

ARTICLE 7. No person shall be held to answer for any crime or offense (except in cases of impeachment, or for offenses within the jurisdiction of a police or district justice, or in summary proceedings for contempt), unless upon indictment, fully and plainly describing such crime or offense, and he shall have the right to meet the witnesses who are produced

duced against him face to face; to produce witnesses and proofs in his own favor; and by himself, or his counsel, at his election, to examine the witnesses produced by himself, and cross-examine those produced against him, and to be fully heard in his defence. In all cases in which the right of trial by jury has been heretofore used, it shall be held inviolable forever, except in actions of debt or assumpsit in which the amount claimed is less than fifty dollars.

ARTICLE 8. No person shall be required to answer again for any offence of which he has been duly convicted, or of which he has been duly acquitted upon a good and sufficient indictment.

ARTICLE 9. No person shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

ARTICLE 10. No person shall sit as a judge or juror, in any case in which his relative is interested, either as plaintiff or defendant, or in the issue of which the said judge or juror may have, either directly or through a relative, any pecuniary interest.

ARTICLE 11. Involuntary servitude, except for crime, is forever prohibited in this Kingdom; whenever a slave shall enter Hawaiian territory he shall be free.

ARTICLE 12. Every person has the right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his house, his papers, and effects; and no warrants shall issue, but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

ARTICLE 13. The King conducts his Government for the common good, and not for the profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class of men among his subjects.

ARTICLE 14. Each member of society has a right to be protected by it, in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, according to law; and, therefore, he shall be obliged to contribute his proportional share to the expense of this protection, and to give his personal services, or an equivalent when necessary; but no part of the property of any individual shall be taken from him or applied to public uses without his own consent or the enactment of the legislative assembly, except the same shall be necessary for the military operations of the Kingdom in time of war or insurrection; and whenever the public exigencies may require that the property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor.

ARTICLE 15. No subsidy, duty, or tax of any description shall be established or levied without the consent of the legis-

against him face to face; to produce witnesses and proof in his own favor; and by himself or his counsel, at his election, to examine the witnesses produced by himself, and cross-examine those produced against him, and to be fully heard in his own defence. In all cases in which the right of trial by jury has been heretofore used, it shall be held inviolable forever, except in actions of debt or assumpsit in which the amount claimed is less than fifty dollars.

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ARTICLE 10. No person shall sit as a judge or juror, in any case in which his relative, by affinity, or by consanguinity within the third degree, is interested, either as plaintiff or defendant, or in the issue of which the said judge or juror may have, either directly or through such relative, any pecuniary interest.

ARTICLE 11. Involuntary servitude, except for crime, is forever prohibited in this Kingdom. Whenever a slave shall enter Hawaiian territory he shall be free.

ARTICLE 12. Every person has the right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his house, his papers, and effects; and no warrants shall issue, except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

ARTICLE 13. The Government is conducted for the common good, and not for the profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class of men.

ARTICLE 14. Each member of society has a right to be protected in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, according to law; and, therefore, he shall be obliged to contribute his proportional share to the expense of this protection, and to give his personal services, or an equivalent, when necessary. Private property may be taken for public use, but only upon due process of law and just compensation.

ARTICLE 15. No subsidy, duty, or tax of any description shall be established or levied without the consent of the Leg-

lative assembly; nor shall any money be drawn from the public treasury without such consent, except when between the sessions of the legislative assembly the emergencies of war, invasion, rebellion, pestilence, or other public disaster shall arise, and then not without the concurrence of all the cabinet and of a majority of the whole privy council; and the minister of finance shall render a detailed account of such expenditure to the legislative assembly.

ARTICLE 16. No retrospective laws shall ever be enacted.

ARTICLE 17. The military shall always be subject to the laws of the land, and no soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by the Legislature.

ARTICLE 18. Every elector shall be privileged from arrest on election days during his attendance at election, and in going to and returning therefrom, except in cases of treason, felony, or breach of the peace.

ARTICLE 19. No elector shall be so obliged to perform military duty, on the day of election, as to prevent his voting, except in time of war or public danger.

ARTICLE 20. The supreme power of the Kingdom in its exercise is divided into the executive, legislative, and judicial; these shall always be preserved distinct, and no judge of a court of record shall ever be a member of the legislative assembly.

ARTICLE 21. The Government of this Kingdom is that of a constitutional monarchy, under His Majesty Kamehameha V, his heirs and successors.

ARTICLE 22. The Crown is hereby permanently confirmed to His Majesty Kamehameha V, and to the heirs of his body lawfully begotten, and to their lawful descendants in a direct line; failing whom, the Crown shall descend to Her Royal Highness the Princess Victoria Kaiulani, and the heirs of her body lawfully begotten, and their descendants in a direct line. The succession shall be to the senior male child, and to the heirs of his body; failing a male child, the succession shall be to the senior female child, and to the heirs of her body. In case there is no heir as above provided, then the successor shall be the person whom the Sovereign shall appoint with the consent of the nobles, and publicly proclaim as such during the King's life,

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ARTICLE 19. No elector shall be so obliged to perform military duty, on the day of election, as to prevent his voting, except in time of war or public danger.

ARTICLE 20. The supreme power of the Kingdom in its exercise is divided into the executive, legislative, and judicial; these shall always be preserved distinct, and no executive or judicial officers, or any contractor or employee of the Government, or any person in the receipt of salary or emolument from the Government, shall be eligible to election to the Legislature of the Hawaiian Kingdom, or to hold the position of an elective member of the same. And no member of the Legislature shall, during the time for which he is elected, be appointed to any civil office under the Government, except that of a member of the Cabinet.

ARTICLE 21. The Government of this Kingdom is that of a constitutional monarchy, under His Majesty Kalakaua, his heirs and successors.

ARTICLE 22. The Crown is hereby permanently confirmed to His Majesty Kalakaua, and to the heirs of his body lawfully begotten, and to their lawful descendants in a direct line; failing whom the Crown shall descend to Her Royal Highness the Princess Liliuokalani, and heirs of her body lawfully begotten, and their lawful descendants in a direct line. The succession shall be to the senior male child, and to the heirs of his body; failing a male child, the succession shall be to the senior female child, and to the heirs of her body. In case there is no heir as above provided, the successor shall be the person whom the Sovereign shall appoint with the consent of the nobles, and publicly proclaim during the Sovereign's life; but should there be no

but should there be no such appointment; and proclamation, and the throne should become vacant, then the Cabinet Council, immediately after the occurring of such vacancy, shall cause a meeting of the legislative assembly, who shall elect by ballot some native Alii of the Kingdom as successor to the throne; and the successor so elected shall become a new *Stirps* for a royal family; and the succession from the Sovereign thus elected, shall be regulated by the same law as the present royal family of Hawaii.

ARTICLE 23. It shall not be lawful for any member of the royal family of Hawaii who may by law succeed to the throne, to contract marriage without the consent of the reigning sovereign. Every marriage so contracted shall be void, and the person so contracting a marriage may, by the proclamation of the reigning Sovereign be declared to have forfeited his or her right to the throne, and after such proclamation, the right of succession shall vest in the next heir as though such offender were dead.

ARTICLE 24. His Majesty Kamehameha V will, and his successors upon coming to the throne shall, take the following oath: I solemnly swear, in the presence of Almighty God, to maintain the constitution of the Kingdom whole and inviolate, and to govern in conformity therewith.

ARTICLE 25. No person shall ever sit upon the throne who has been convicted of any infamous crime, or who is insane or an idiot.

ARTICLE 26. The King is the commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and of all other military forces of the Kingdom, by sea and land; and has full power by himself, or by any officer or officers he may appoint, to train and govern such forces as he may judge best for the defense and safety of the Kingdom. But he shall never proclaim war without the consent of the legislative assembly.

ARTICLE 27. The King, by and with the consent of his privy council, has the power to grant reprieves and pardons, after conviction, for all offences, except in cases of impeachment.

ARTICLE 28. The King, by and with the consent of his privy council, convenes the legislative assembly at the seat of Government, or at a different place, if that should become dangerous from an enemy or any dangerous disorder; and in case of disagreement between His Majesty and the legislative assembly, he adjourns, prorogues, or dissolves it, but not beyond the next ordinary session; under any great emergency, he may convene the legislative assembly to extraordinary sessions.

such appointment and proclamation, and the throne should become vacant, then the Cabinet immediately after the occurring of such vacancy shall cause a meeting of the Legislature, who shall elect by ballot, some native Alii of the Kingdom as successor to the throne; and the successor so elected shall become a new *Stirps* for a royal family; and the succession from the Sovereign thus elected shall be regulated by the same law as the present royal family of Hawaii.

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ARTICLE 26. The King is the commander-in-chief of the army and navy and of all other military forces of the Kingdom, by sea and land. But he shall never proclaim war without the consent of the Legislature; and no military or naval force shall be organized except by the authority of the Legislature.

ARTICLE 27. The King, by and with the advice of his privy council, and with the consent of the Cabinet, has the power to grant reprieves and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses, except in case of impeachment.

ARTICLE 28. The King convenes the Legislature at the seat of Government, or at a different place, if that should become insecure from an enemy or any dangerous disorder, and prorogues the same; and in any great emergency he may, with the advice of the privy council, convene the Legislature in extraordinary session.

ARTICLE 29. The King has the power to make treaties. Treaties involving changes in the tariff or in any law of the Kingdom shall be referred for approval to the legislative assembly. The King appoints public ministers, who shall be commissioned, accredited, and instructed agreeably to the usage and law of nations.

ARTICLE 30. It is the King's prerogative to receive and acknowledge public ministers; to inform the legislative assembly by royal message, from time to time, of the state of the Kingdom, and to recommend to its consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.

ARTICLE 31. The person of the King is inviolable and sacred. His ministers are responsible. To the King belongs the executive power. All laws that have passed the legislative assembly shall require His Majesty's signature, in order to their validity.

ARTICLE 32. Whenever, upon the decease of the reigning sovereign, the heir shall be less than 18 years of age, the royal power shall be exercised by a regent or council of regency, as hereinafter provided.

ARTICLE 33. It shall be lawful for the King at any time when he may be about to absent himself from the Kingdom, to appoint a regent or council of regency, who shall administer the Government in his name; and likewise the King may, by his last will and testament, appoint a regent or council of regency to administer the Government during the minority of any heir to the throne; and should a sovereign decease, leaving a minor heir, and having made no last will and testament, the cabinet council at the time of such decease shall be a council of regency until the legislative assembly, which shall be called immediately, may be assembled, and the legislative assembly immediately that it is assembled shall proceed to choose by ballot a regent or council of regency, who shall administer the Government in the name of the King, and exercise all the powers which are constitutionally vested in the King, until he shall have attained the age of 18 years, which age is declared to be the legal majority of such sovereign.

ARTICLE 34. The King is sovereign of all the chiefs and of all the people; the Kingdom is his.

ARTICLE 35. All titles of honor, orders, and other distinctions emanate from the King.

ARTICLE 36. The King coins money and regulates the currency by law.

ARTICLE 37. The King, in case of invasion or rebellion, can place the whole Kingdom or any part of it under martial law.

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ARTICLE 31. The person of the King is inviolable and sacred. His ministers are responsible. To the King and the cabinet belongs the executive power. All laws that have passed the Legislature shall require His Majesty's signature, in order to their validity, except as provided in article 48.

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ARTICLE 37. The King, in case of invasion or rebellion, can place the whole Kingdom or any part of it under martial law.

ARTICLE 38. The national ensign shall not be changed, except by act of the Legislature.

ARTICLE 39. The King's private lands and other property are inviolable.

ARTICLE 40. The King can not be sued or held to account in any court or tribunal of the realm.

ARTICLE 41. There shall continue to be a council of state for advising the King in all matters for the good of the state, wherein he may require its advice, and for assisting him in administering the executive affairs of the Government in such manner as he may direct, which council shall be called the King's privy council of state, and the members thereof shall be appointed by the King to hold office during His Majesty's pleasure.

ARTICLE 42. The King's cabinet shall consist of the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of the interior, the minister of finance, and the attorney-general of the Kingdom, and these shall be His Majesty's special advisers in the executive affairs of the Kingdom; and they shall be *ex officio* members of His Majesty's privy council of state. They shall be appointed and commissioned by the King, and hold office during His Majesty's pleasure, subject to impeachment. No act of the King shall have any effect unless it be countersigned by a minister, who, by that signature, makes himself responsible.

ARTICLE 43. Each member of the King's cabinet shall keep an office at the seat of Government, and shall be accountable for the conduct of his deputies and clerks. The ministry hold seats *ex officio* as nobles in the legislative assembly.

ARTICLE 44. The minister of finance shall present to the legislative assembly, in the name of the Government, on the first day of the meeting of the Legislature, the financial budget, in the Hawaiian and English languages.

ARTICLE 45. The legislative power of the three estates of this Kingdom is vested in the King, and the legislative assembly, which assembly shall consist of the nobles, appointed by the King, and of the representatives of the people, sitting together.

ARTICLE 38. The national ensign shall not be changed, except by act of the Legislature.

ARTICLE 39. The King can not be sued or held to account in any court or tribunal of the Kingdom.

ARTICLE 40. There shall continue to be a council of state for advising the King in all matters for the good of the state, wherein he may require its advice, which council shall be called the King's privy council of state, and the members thereof shall be appointed by the King to hold office during His Majesty's pleasure, and which council shall have and exercise only such powers as are given to it by the constitution.

ARTICLE 41. The cabinet shall consist of the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of the interior, the minister of finance, and the attorney-general, and they shall be His Majesty's special advisers in the executive affairs of the Kingdom; and they shall be *ex officio* members of His Majesty's privy council of state. They shall be appointed and commissioned by the King, and shall be removed by him only upon a vote of want of confidence passed by a majority of all the elective members of the Legislature, or upon conviction of felony, and shall be subject to impeachment. No act of the King shall have any effect unless it be countersigned by a member of the cabinet, who, by that signature, makes himself responsible.

ARTICLE 42. Each member of the cabinet shall keep an office at the seat of Government, and shall be accountable for the conduct of his deputies and clerks. The cabinet hold seats *ex officio* in the Legislature, with the right to vote, except on a question of want of confidence in them.

ARTICLE 43. The minister of finance shall present to the Legislature, in the name of the Government, on the first day of each biennial session, the financial budget, in the Hawaiian and English languages.

ARTICLE 44. The legislative power of the Kingdom is vested in the King and the Legislature, which shall consist of the nobles and representatives sitting together.

ARTICLE 45. The legislative body shall be styled the Legislature of the Hawaiian Kingdom, and shall assemble, biennially, in the month of May. The first regular session shall be held in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and eighty-eight.

ARTICLE 46. The legislative body shall assemble biennially, in the month of April, and at such other time as the King may judge necessary, for the purpose of seeking the welfare of the nation. This body shall be styled the Legislature of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

ARTICLE 47. Every member of the legislative assembly shall take the following oath: I most solemnly swear, in the presence of Almighty God, that I will faithfully support the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, and conscientiously and impartially discharge my duties as a member of this Assembly.

ARTICLE 48. The Legislature has full power and authority to amend the constitution as hereinafter provided; and from time to time to make all manner of wholesome laws not repugnant to the provisions of the constitution.

ARTICLE 49. The King shall signify his approval of any bill or resolution which shall have passed the legislative assembly, by signing the same previous to the final rising of the Legislature. But if he shall object to the passing of such bill or resolution he will return it to the legislative assembly, who shall enter the fact of such return on its journal, and such bill or resolution shall not be brought forward thereafter during the same session.

ARTICLE 50. The legislative assembly shall be the judge of the qualifications of its own members, and a majority shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner and under such penalties as the assembly may provide.

ARTICLE 51. The legislative assembly shall choose its own officers and determine the rules of its own proceedings.

ARTICLE 46. Every member of the Legislature shall take the following oath: I solemnly swear, in the presence of Almighty God, that I will faithfully support the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, and conscientiously and impartially discharge my duties as a member of the Legislature.

ARTICLE 47. The Legislature has full power and authority to amend the Constitution as hereinafter provided; and from time to time to make all manner of wholesome laws not repugnant to the constitution.

ARTICLE 48. Every bill which shall have passed the Legislature shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the King. If he approve he shall sign it and it shall thereby become a law, but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to the Legislature, which shall enter the objections at large on their journal and proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration it shall be approved by a two-thirds vote of all the elective members of the Legislature it shall become a law. In all such cases the vote shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of the Legislature. If any bill shall not be returned by the King within ten days (Sunday excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Legislature by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.

ARTICLE 49. The Legislature shall be the judge of the qualifications of its own members, except as may hereafter be provided by law, and a majority shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner and under such penalties as the Legislature may provide.

ARTICLE 50. The Legislature shall choose its own officers and determine the rules of its own proceedings.

ARTICLE 51. The Legislature shall have authority to punish by imprisonment, not exceeding thirty days, every person, not a member, who shall be guilty of disrespect to the Legislature by any disorderly or contemptuous behavior in its presence; or who, during the time of its sitting,

ARTICLE 52. The legislative assembly shall have authority to punish by imprisonment, not exceeding thirty days, every person, not a member, who shall be guilty of disrespect to the assembly, by any disorderly or contemptuous behavior in its presence; or who, during the time of its sitting, shall publish any false report of its proceedings, or insulting comments upon the same; or who shall threaten harm to the body or estate of any of its members, for anything said or done in the assembly; or who shall assault any of them therefor, or who shall assault or arrest any witness, or other person ordered to attend the assembly, in his way going or returning; or who shall rescue any person arrested by order of the assembly.

ARTICLE 53. The legislative assembly may punish its own members for disorderly behavior.

ARTICLE 54. The legislative assembly shall keep a journal of its proceedings; and the yeas and nays of the members on any question shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the journal.

ARTICLE 55. The members of the legislative assembly shall, in all cases, except treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Legislature, and in going to and returning from the same; and they shall not be held to answer for any speech or debate made in the assembly, in any court or place whatsoever.

ARTICLE 56. The representatives shall receive for their services a compensation to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the public treasury, but no increase of compensation shall take effect during the year in which it shall have been made; and no law shall be passed increasing the compensation of said representatives beyond the sum of one hundred and fifty dollars for each session.

shall publish any false report of its proceedings, or insulting comments upon the same; or who shall threaten harm to the body or estate of any of its members for anything said or done in the Legislature; or who shall assault any of them therefor; or who shall assault or arrest any witness, or other person ordered to attend the Legislature, on his way going or returning; or who shall rescue any person arrested by order of the Legislature.

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ARTICLE 53. The Legislature shall keep a journal of its proceedings; and the yeas and nays of the members, on any question, shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the journal.

ARTICLE 54. The members of the Legislature shall, in all cases, except treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Legislature, and in going to and returning from the same; provided such privilege as to going and returning shall not cover a period of over twenty days; and they shall not be held to answer for any speech or debate made in the Legislature, in any court or place whatsoever.

ARTICLE 55. The representatives shall receive for their services a compensation to be determined by law, and paid out of the public treasury, but no increase of compensation shall take effect during the biennial term in which it shall have been made; and no law shall be passed increasing the compensation of representatives beyond the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars each for each biennial term.

ARTICLE 56. A noble shall be a subject of the Kingdom, who shall have attained the age of twenty-five years, and resided in the Kingdom three years, and shall be the owner of taxable property in this Kingdom of the value of three thousand dollars over and above all encumbrances, or in receipt of an income of not less than six hundred dollars per annum.

ARTICLE 57. The King appoints the nobles, who shall hold their appointments during life, subject to the provisions of Article 53; but their number shall not exceed twenty.

ARTICLE 58. No person shall be appointed a noble who shall not have attained the age of twenty-one years and resided in the Kingdom five years.

ARTICLE 59. The nobles shall be a court with full and sole authority to hear and determine all impeachments made by the representatives, as the grand inquest of the Kingdom, against any officers of the Kingdom, for misconduct or maladministration in their offices; but previous to the trial of every impeachment the nobles shall respectively be sworn, truly and impartially to try and determine the charge in question, according to evidence and the law. Their judgment, however, shall not extend further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold or enjoy any place of honor, trust, or profit, under this Government; but the party so convicted, shall be, nevertheless, liable to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to the laws of the land. No Minister shall sit as a noble on the trial of any impeachment.

ARTICLE 57. The nobles shall be a court, with full and sole authority to hear and determine all impeachments made by the representatives, as the grand inquest of the Kingdom, against any officers of the Kingdom, for misconduct or maladministration in their offices; but previous to the trial of every impeachment the nobles shall respectively be sworn, truly and impartially to try and determine the charge in question, according to evidence and law. Their judgment, however, shall not extend further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold or enjoy any place of honor, trust, or profit under this Government; but the party so convicted shall be, nevertheless, liable to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment according to the laws of the land.

ARTICLE 58. Twenty-four nobles shall be elected, as follows: Six from the island of Hawaii; six from the islands of Maui, Molokai, and Lanai; nine from the island of Oahu, and three from the islands of Kauai and Niihau. At the first election held under this constitution the nobles shall be elected to serve until the general election to the Legislature for the year of our Lord 1890, at which election, and thereafter, the nobles shall be elected at the same time and places as the representatives. At the election for the year of our Lord 1890 one-third of the nobles from each of the divisions aforesaid shall be elected for two years, and one-third for four years, and one-third for six years, and the electors shall ballot for them for such terms, respectively; and at all subsequent general elections they shall be elected for six years. The nobles shall serve without pay.

ARTICLE 59. Every male resident of the Hawaiian Islands, of Hawaiian, American, or European birth or descent, who shall have attained the age of twenty years, and shall have paid his taxes, and shall have caused his name to be entered on the list of voters for nobles for his district, shall be an elector of nobles, and shall be entitled to vote at any election of nobles; provided,

First. That he shall have resided in the country not less than three years, and in the district in which he offers to vote not less than three months, immediately preceding the election at which he offers to vote.

Second. That he shall own and be possessed, in his own right, of taxable property in this country of the value of not less than three thousand dollars over and above all encumbrances, or shall have actually received an income of not less than six hundred dollars during the year next preceding his registration for such election.

Third. That he shall be able to read and comprehend an ordinary newspaper printed in either the Hawaiian, English, or some European language.

Fourth. That he shall have taken an oath to support the Constitution and laws, such oath to be administered by any person authorized to administer oaths or by any inspector of elections.

Provided, however, that the requirements of a three years' residence and of ability to read and comprehend an ordinary newspaper, printed either in the Hawaiian, English, or some European language, shall not apply to persons residing in the Kingdom at the time of the promulgation of this constitution, if they shall register and vote at the first election which shall be held under this constitution.

ARTICLE 60. The representation of the people shall be based upon the principal of equality, and shall be regulated and apportioned by the legislature according to the population, to be ascertained, from time to time, by the official census. The representatives shall not be less in number than twenty-four, nor more than forty, who shall be elected biennially.

ARTICLE 60. There shall be twenty-four representatives of the people elected biennially, except those first elected under this constitution, who shall serve until the general election for the year of our Lord 1890. The representation shall be based upon the principles of equality, and shall be regulated and apportioned by the Legislature according to the population to be ascertained, from time to time, by the official census. But until such apportionment by the Legislature, the apportionment now established by law shall remain in force, with the following exceptions, namely, there shall be but two representatives for the districts of Hilo and Puna, on the island of Hawaii; but one for the districts of Lahaina and Kaanapali, on the island of Maui; and but one for the districts of Koolauloa and Waialua, on the island of Oahu.

ARTICLE 61. No person shall be eligible for a representative of the people who is insane or an idiot, nor unless he be a male subject of the Kingdom, who shall have arrived at the full age of twenty-one years, who shall know how to read and write, who shall understand accounts and shall have been domiciled in the Kingdom for at least three years—the last of which shall be the year immediately preceding his election—and who shall own real estate within the Kingdom of a clear value, over and above all encumbrances, of at least five hundred dollars, or who shall have an annual income of at least two hundred and fifty dollars, derived from any property or some lawful employment.

ARTICLE 61. No person shall be eligible as a representative of the people unless he be a male subject of the Kingdom who shall have arrived at the full age of twenty-one years, who shall know how to read and write either the Hawaiian, English, or some European language, who shall understand accounts, who shall have been domiciled in the Kingdom for at least three years—the last of which shall be the year immediately preceding his election—and who shall own real estate within the Kingdom of a clear value, over and above all encumbrances, of at least five hundred dollars, or who shall have an annual income of at least two hundred and fifty dollars, derived from any property or some lawful employment.

ARTICLE 62. Every male subject of the Kingdom, who shall have paid his taxes, who shall have attained the age of twenty years, and shall have been domiciled in the Kingdom for one year immediately preceding the election, and shall be possessed of real property in the Kingdom, to the value, over and above all encumbrances, of one hundred and fifty dollars, or of a leasehold property on which the rent is twenty-five dollars per year, or of an income of not less than seventy-five dollars per year, derived from any property or some lawful employment, and shall know how to read and

ARTICLE 62. Every male resident of the Kingdom, of Hawaiian, American, or European birth or descent, who shall have taken an oath to support the constitution and laws in the manner provided for electors of nobles, who shall have paid his taxes, who shall have attained the age of twenty years, and shall have been domiciled in the Kingdom for one year immediately preceding the election, and shall know how to read and write either the Hawaiian, English, or some European language (if born since the year 1840), and shall have caused his name to be entered on the list of voters

write, if born since the year 1840, and shall have caused his name to be entered on the list of voters of his district as may be provided by law, shall be entitled to one vote for the representative or representatives of that district: *Provided, however,* That no insane or idiotic person, nor any person who shall have been convicted of any infamous crime within this Kingdom, unless he shall have been pardoned by the King, and by the terms of such pardon have been restored to all the rights of a subject, shall be allowed to vote.

ARTICLE 63. The property qualification of the representatives of the people, and of the electors, may be increased by law.

ARTICLE 64. The judicial power of the Kingdom shall be vested in one supreme court and in such inferior courts as the Legislature may, from time to time, establish.

ARTICLE 65. The supreme court shall consist of a chief justice and not less than two associate justices, any of whom may hold the court. The justices of the supreme court shall hold their offices during good behavior, subject to removal upon impeachment, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office: *Provided, however,* That any judge of the supreme court or any other court of record may be removed from office, on a resolution passed by two-thirds of the legislative assembly, for good cause shown to the satisfaction of the King. The judge against whom the legislative assembly may be about to proceed shall receive due notice thereof, accompanied by a copy of the causes alleged for his removal, at least ten days before the day on which the legislative assembly shall act thereon. He shall be heard before the legislative assembly,

ARTICLE 66. The judicial power shall be divided among the supreme court and the several inferior courts of the Kingdom in such manner as the legislature may, from time to time, prescribe, and the tenure of office in the inferior courts of the Kingdom shall be such as may be defined by the law creating them.

ARTICLE 67. The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under the constitution and laws of this Kingdom, and treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority, to all cases affecting public ministers and consuls, and to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.

of his district as may be provided by law, shall be entitled to one vote for the representative or representatives of that district: *Provided, however,* That the requirements of being domiciled in the Kingdom for one year immediately preceding the election, and of knowing how to read and write, either the Hawaiian, English, or some European language, shall not apply to persons residing in this Kingdom at the time of the promulgation of this constitution if they shall register and vote at the first election which shall be held under this constitution.

ARTICLE 63. No person shall sit as a noble or representative in the Legislature unless elected under, and in conformity with, the provisions of this constitution. The property or income qualification of representatives, of nobles, and of electors of nobles may be increased by law; and a property or income qualification of electors of representatives may be created and altered by law.

ARTICLE 64. The judiciary power of the Kingdom shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Legislature may, from time to time, establish.

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ARTICLE 68. The chief justice of the supreme court shall be the chancellor of the Kingdom. He shall be *ex officio* president of the nobles in all cases of impeachment, unless when impeached himself, and exercise such jurisdiction in equity or other cases as the law may confer upon him; his decisions being subject, however, to the revision of the supreme court on appeal. Should the chief justice ever be impeached, some person specially commissioned by the King shall be president of the court of impeachment during such trial.

ARTICLE 69. The decisions of the supreme court, when made by a majority of the justices thereof, shall be final and conclusive upon all parties.

ARTICLE 70. The King, his cabinet, and the legislative assembly shall have authority to require the opinions of the justices of the supreme court upon important questions of law and upon solemn occasions.

ARTICLE 71. The King appoints the justices of the supreme court and all other judges of courts of record. Their salaries are fixed by law.

ARTICLE 72. No judge or magistrate can sit alone on an appeal or new trial in any case on which he may have given a previous judgment.

ARTICLE 73. No person shall ever hold any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Government of the Hawaiian Islands who shall, in due course of law, have been convicted of theft, bribery, perjury, forgery, embezzlement, or other high crime or misdemeanor, unless he shall have been pardoned by the King and restored to his civil rights, and by the express terms of his pardon declared to be appointable to offices of trust, honor, and profit.

ARTICLE 74. No officer of this Government shall hold any office or receive any salary from any other government or power whatever.

ARTICLE 75. The Legislature votes the appropriations biennially, after due consideration of the revenue and expenditure for the two preceding years, and the estimates of the revenue and expenditure of the two succeeding years, which shall be submitted to them by the minister of finance.

ARTICLE 76. The enacting style in making and passing all acts and laws shall be: "Be it enacted by the King and the legislative assembly of the Hawaiian Islands, in the Legislature of the Kingdom assembled."

ARTICLE 68. The chief justice of the supreme court shall be the chancellor of the Kingdom. He shall be *ex officio* president of the nobles in all cases of impeachment, unless when impeached himself, and shall exercise such jurisdiction in equity or other cases as the law may confer upon him; his decisions being subject, however, to the revision of the supreme court on appeal. Should the chief justice ever be impeached, some person specially commissioned by the King shall be president of the court of impeachment during such trial.

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ARTICLE 71. The King appoints the justices of the supreme court and all other judges of the courts of record. Their salaries are fixed by law.

ARTICLE 72. No judge or magistrate shall sit all alone on an appeal or new trial in any case on which he may have given a previous judgment.

ARTICLE 73. The following persons shall not be permitted to register for voting, to vote, or to hold office under any department of the Government, or to sit in the Legislature, namely: Any person who is insane or an idiot, or any person who shall have been convicted of any of the following-named offenses, viz: Arson, barratry, bribery, burglary, counterfeiting, embezzlement, felonious branding of cattle, forgery, gross cheat, incest, kidnapping, larceny, malicious burning, manslaughter in the first degree, murder, perjury, rape, robbery, sodomy, treason, subornation of perjury, and malfeasance in office, unless he shall have been pardoned by the King and restored to his civil rights, and by the express terms of his pardon declared to be eligible to offices of trust, honor, and profit.

ARTICLE 74. No officer of this Government shall hold any office or receive any salary from any other government or power whatever.

ARTICLE 75. The Legislature votes the appropriation biennially, after due consideration of the revenue and expenditure for the two preceding years, and the estimates of the revenue and expenditure of the two succeeding years, which shall be submitted to them by the minister of finance.

ARTICLE 76. The enacting style in making and passing all acts and laws shall be: "Be it enacted by the King and the Legislature of the Hawaiian Kingdom."

ARTICLE 77. To avoid improper influences which may result from intermixing in one and the same act such things as have no proper relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in its title.

ARTICLE 78. All laws now in force in this Kingdom shall continue and remain in full effect until altered or repealed by the Legislature, such parts only excepted as are repugnant to this constitution. All laws heretofore enacted, or that may hereafter be enacted, which are contrary to this constitution shall be null and void.

ARTICLE 79. This constitution shall be in force from the twentieth day of August, in the year one thousand eight hundred and sixty-four, but that there may be no failure of justice or inconvenience to the Kingdom from any change, all officers of this Kingdom at the time this constitution shall take effect shall have, hold, and exercise all the power to them granted, until other persons shall be appointed in their stead.

ARTICLE 80. Any amendment or amendments to this constitution may be proposed in the legislative assembly, and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of members thereof such proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on its journal, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to the next Legislature; which proposed amendment or amendments shall be published for three months previous to the next election of representatives; and if in the next Legislature such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members of the legislative assembly, and be approved by the King, such amendment or amendments shall become part of the constitution of this country.

KAMEHAMEHA R.

ARTICLE 77. To avoid improper influences which may result from intermixing in one and the same act such things as have no proper relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in its title.

ARTICLE 78. Wherever by this constitution any act is to be done or performed by the King or the Sovereign, it shall, unless otherwise expressed, mean that such act shall be done and performed by the Sovereign by and with the advice and consent of the cabinet.

ARTICLE 79. All laws now in force in this Kingdom shall continue and remain in full effect until altered or repealed by the Legislature, such parts only excepted as are repugnant to this constitution. All laws heretofore enacted, or that may hereafter be enacted, which are contrary to this constitution shall be null and void.

ARTICLE 80. The cabinet shall have power to make and publish all necessary rules and regulations for the holding of any election or elections under this constitution, prior to the passage by the Legislature of appropriate laws for such purpose, and to provide for administering to officials, subjects, and residents the oath to support this constitution. The first election hereunder shall be held within ninety days after the promulgation of this constitution, and the Legislature then elected may be convened at Honolulu, upon the call of the cabinet council, in extraordinary session at such time as the cabinet council may deem necessary, thirty days' notice thereof being previously given.

ARTICLE 81. This constitution shall be in force from the 7th day of July, A. D. 1887; but that there may be no failure of justice or convenience to the Kingdom from any change, all officers of this Kingdom, at the time this constitution shall take effect, shall have, hold, and exercise all the power to them granted. Such officers shall take an oath to support this constitution within sixty days after the promulgation thereof.

ARTICLE 82. Any amendment or amendments to this constitution may be proposed in the Legislature, and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members thereof, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on its journal, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to next Legislature; which proposed amendment or amendments shall be published for three months previous to the next election of representatives and nobles; and if in the next Legislature such proposed amend-

ment or amendments shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members of the Legislature, such amendment or amendments shall become part of the constitution of this Kingdom.

KALAKAUA REX.

By the King:

W. L. GREEN,
Minister of Finance.

HONOLULU, OAHU, SS.

I, Kalakaua, King of the Hawaiian Islands, in the presence of Almighty God, do solemnly swear to maintain this constitution whole and inviolate, and to govern in conformity therewith.

KALAKAUA REX.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this sixth day of July, A. D. 1887.

A. F. JUDD,
*Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
and Chancellor of the Kingdom.*

No. 24.

Statement of Charles T. Gulick.

AGENCY OF UNITED STATES MINISTER STEVENS AND CAPT. WILTSE, COMMANDING U. S. S. BOSTON, IN THE OVERTHROW OF THE HAWAIIAN GOVERNMENT, WHICH WAS EFFECTED JANUARY 17, 1893.

When Mr. Stevens presented his credentials to His Majesty, Kalakaua, as United States minister resident near the Hawaiian court, he gave the King a lecture on his duties as a sovereign, and at the same time hinted, in an ambiguous way, at the possibilities of the future. The subject matter of the address, and the manner of Mr. Stevens, were so offensive as to very nearly produce disagreeable consequences, as the King was on the point of abruptly terminating the interview and demanding the recall of Mr. Stevens. The unpleasant episode passed, however, without subsequent notice.

Col. G. W. Macfarlane and Dr. G. Trousseau will confirm the foregoing.

On the occasion of the Fourth of July celebration in 1891, Mr. Stevens delivered an oration at the music hall in which he took the opportunity to show his very thinly veiled contempt for the Sovereign and Government to which he was accredited. His sentiments were more distinctly emphasized in his speech on Memorial Day, 1892, leaving no room for doubt with regard to his real meaning. In October, 1892, the *Daily Bulletin*, a newspaper published in Honolulu, contained a criticism on Mr. Stevens' tardiness in causing a search for a missing boat's crew (supposed to be somewhere to windward of the island of Hawaii) belonging to an American vessel which had burned at sea.

Mr. Stevens called in a rage at the foreign office and in his interview with the minister of foreign affairs endeavored to fasten on the cabinet responsibility for the comments in the *Bulletin* and demanded, as he termed it, "full satisfaction." His manner and language were in the highest degree undiplomatic and offensive, and he would accept no explanation. He immediately followed up the insult by demanding an audience with the Queen *without* the usual formality of the presence

of the minister of foreign affairs. The audience was accorded, and, trembling with passion, he reiterated his demand for "satisfaction," leaving it somewhat vague as to the form or kind of "satisfaction" he desired. The impression left by him in both interviews was that it was not so much "satisfaction" that he was after as it was an opportunity to pick a quarrel with, and embarrass, the cabinet who were then under fire in the legislative assembly.

Hon. Samuel Parker, Hon. Paul Neumann, and Maj. J. W. Robertson can give more fully the details of the foregoing.

Very shortly after Mr. Stevens' arrival in the Kingdom he made it generally known that he considered annexation to the United States as not only the ultimate or "manifest" destiny of the little country, but that it would be just as well to hasten the event, and the American legation immediately became the rendezvous or headquarters of the annexation leaders, such as Hartwell, Judd (the chief justice), Thurston, Dole, Castle, Smith, and others, who frequently met there for the purpose of discussing plans for bringing about the desired end.

On one occasion M. d'Anglade, the then French commissioner, and M. Canavarro, the present Portuguese chargé d'affaires, were invited to dinner at the American legation, and much to their surprise found several of the above-named gentlemen present, and as the dinner proceeded were not a little annoyed to find that they had been invited for the express purpose of being sounded with regard to annexation.

Señhor Canavarro and Dr. Trousseau, the latter being an intimate friend of M. d'Anglade, the French commissioner (who is not now in the Kingdom), can throw light on the above if they will submit to an interview.

During August, 1892, the tension became so great in the Legislature that the cabinet was voted out, and a new one was appointed on the 12th day of September. A vote of "want of confidence" in the new cabinet was immediately introduced, and the speeches of Thurston, Smith, Ashford, and their associates on the motion showed that the meetings at the legation were beginning to bear fruit. Mr. Stevens was present during a part of the debate on the motion, also Capt. Wiltse, who just after one of Mr. Thurston's speeches called at the interior office and took occasion to inform the then minister of the interior (C. T. Gulick) that he considered Mr. Thurston a "very able man," and that his "views on the situation, and particularly those on the monarchy, were very sound." It may be observed that Thurston had very plainly shown in his speech supporting the motion that he and his supporters would leave no stone unturned in order to destroy the monarchy and get the reins of power into their own hands.

As Thurston and his party were known to be annexationists, his expressions seemed to please Capt. Wiltse very much. About this time (September, 1892) it was a matter frequently spoken of that any move for the overthrow of the Government would receive the official recognition of Mr. Stevens and the material aid of Capt. Wiltse. Annexation was so freely discussed in public that T. T. Williams, of the San Francisco Examiner, polled the Legislature on the subject, and when they found that their views were likely to be published they denounced annexation to a man.

The meetings at the legation continued, and Stevens and Wiltse (the latter more particularly) called frequently at Hartwell's office during the day. Wiltse told people that he kept himself thoroughly posted with regard to affairs, as he "was constantly in communication

with Hartwell, who was the best informed man in the Kingdom on the situation."

The *Boston's* troops were landed at about 5 o'clock p. m. on Monday, the 16th day of January, A. D. 1893, and were quartered at Arion Hall, a position which practically commanded the Government building and the palace. The Hawaiian Government protested against their presence. The foreign diplomatic representatives called at the legation and entered their protest against the procedure as being wholly unnecessary. The town was perfectly quiet. Mr. Stevens's excuse was that the troops were ashore for the purpose of protecting the lives and property of Americans. They were quartered, however, on property belonging to an Englishman (at that time occupied by an Englishman and the Japanese inspector of immigrants under leases), and was surrounded by property belonging to the Hawaiian Government and native Hawaiians.

During the forenoon of Tuesday, the 17th day of January, 1893, it was freely remarked and frequently repeated on the streets that a move for deposing the Queen and overturning the Government would be made during the day, and that "*it was all right, as Stevens had promised to support the movement.*"

Thirteen men, calling themselves a committee of public safety (*all foreigners* and some of *brief residence* in the country), proceeded from the office of W. O. Smith up Merchant street to the front of the Government building, and Cooper, the leader, at about 2:40 o'clock p. m., read a proclamation deposing the Queen and establishing a "Provisional Government." Just before the arrival of the committee at the building, Charles L. Carter rode up hastily on horseback to Arion Hall and delivered a letter to Capt. Wiltse, who was himself in charge of the American troops. Wiltse was seen to tear open the envelope and read the letter, nodding his satisfaction to Carter, who then withdrew. As the committee turned the corner of the Music Hall on their road up, Mr. Cooper hastened forward to Arion Hall and delivered a letter to an officer (who apparently stood in readiness to receive it) and rejoined the committee.

At this time, *i. e.*, before the proclamation was read, the American troops were under arms, strong picked guards were posted at the corner of the Music Hall on King street and at other points around their quarters; the Gatling guns were placed in commanding positions and the crews were to attention or handy by.

The position of the American troops and their attitude, also the delivery of the letters above mentioned, can be verified by several different people, each one seeing different parts of the procedure. Dr. G. Trousseau, T. A. Lloyd, H. F. Poor, Norie, Pond, de Voll, and others were eyewitnesses of the matter above referred to.

By half past 3 o'clock it was generally reported on the streets that Stevens had recognized the Provisional Government and had assured the Queen's cabinet that he would support their action with the troops of the *Boston*.

The police department in charge of the marshal of the Kingdom was surrendered at dusk—lamps were lighted indoors, but there was still daylight on the streets; it was probably about 7 o'clock in the evening, *i. e.*, some three and a half to four hours after Stevens's action was generally known to the public. The barracks were not surrendered till near night of the following day.

CHAS. T. GULICK.

HONOLULU, *May 12, 1893.*

Interview with Fred. H. Hayselden, Lanai, April 11, 1893.

- Q. What is your occupation?
 A. I am a stock raiser.
- Q. How much land have you?
 A. I control about 100,000 acres.
- Q. What do you mean by that?
 A. It is my wife's property left in trust to my children.
- Q. How many whites on that island?
 A. Only my family and four white men.
- Q. How many natives?
 A. About 250.
- Q. What is the disposition down there towards the revolution—
 towards the new Government?
 A. The natives are entirely opposed to it.
- Q. What is the reason of that opposition?
 A. Simply personal, I believe.
- Q. Don't like the people?
 A. No; because they feel that they are shut out in everything.
- Q. Are you well acquainted in Honolulu?
 A. Yes.
- Q. What is the feeling here towards the present Government?
 A. I should imagine among a majority of the whites it is in favor of
 the Provisional Government, for the sake of business.
- Q. Are there any whites here opposed to the existing Government?
 A. A great many.
- Q. How many would you suppose?
 A. I should suppose there are one-third of the whites.
- Q. Do you include in that estimate Portuguese or Japanese?
 A. No.
- Q. You mean people of American descent?
 A. American, English, German, and French.
- Q. What type of people are they—people of education and means?
 A. Yes; all of them.
- Q. What does their opposition consist in?
 A. They are opposed because they think they are run by a coterie.
 That is one reason.
- Q. Any other?
 A. The other reason is that they want to force annexation on this
 country and to put them down to the position of serfs.
- Q. Do you mean by that that they meant to deprive them of suf-
 frage?
 A. Yes.
- Q. Are there many of the natives here who have signed petitions for
 annexation?
 A. I have heard that there are quite a considerable number of those
 who have been forced to do so by storekeepers and others—for bread
 and butter. I have asked them why they signed. They said: "On
 account of our food." I said: "Do you really mean that?" They said:
 "Heart is here—mouth is there."
- Q. You were not here at the time of the revolution?
 A. No. I was in Lanai; was sheriff there at the time. I had the
 honor of being the first one selected for dismissal.

Q. They dismissed you on account of your political views?

A. Yes. I came down to W. O. Smith's office and asked why I was dismissed. He said: "Simply because you are a friend of the Queen. You and the circuit judge are looked upon as enemies to our arrangement and we do not think it right to have two prominent officials against us." I asked him: "Do you want a republic here?" He said: "No." I said: "Are you quite sure of what you are saying? I have heard it reported on the street that you do." He said: "I give you my word of honor I do not." He said: "We want annexation." I said: "Do you want it pure and simple?" He asked what I meant. I said: "To give the natives franchise." He said: "Oh, no; we could not do that." I said: "You will never get it unless you do. I could go out and get 1,000 signatures for annexation if I could guarantee the franchise. You could not get one."

Q. As a matter of fact are they not getting signatures?

A. There is no question about that. My personal interests would be advanced 100 per cent by annexation.

Q. How?

A. Because we only get 10 cents a pound for our wool. If we had annexation we would get 20 in California. We have to send it to London and ship it through the United States.

Q. What do you think were the causes of the revolution?

A. Simply 2 cents a pound on sugar—to get some treaty or some arrangement with America. They did not see their way clear to get it in the face of the McKinley bill. They thought Harrison would be reëlected and the Republican policy would be continued.

Q. But at the time of the revolution Harrison had been defeated?

A. Yes; but this thing was marked up long before that. They wanted to force it upon the Harrison administration, if they could, before the inauguration of Mr. Cleveland.

I have carefully read the foregoing and pronounce it an accurate report of my interview with Col. Blount.

(Mr. Blount didn't care to have this certified.—E. M.)

No. 26.

Statement of C. M. Hyde.

HONOLULU, April 3, 1893.

Hon. J. S. BLOUNT,
Commissioner, etc.:

Since I saw you at your residence last Saturday afternoon, it has occurred to me that it might be advisable for me, occupying such a position as I do at the islands, as the only resident missionary of the A. B. C. F. M., to write out for your information and consideration such a statement of facts as might assist you in arriving at just conclusions in regard to the political and social condition of affairs, and the proper course for the United States Government to take at this juncture.

I have no occasion and certainly no desire to appear as either advocate or assailant of any persons or parties here. Nor have I any authority to act as the representative of the American board in matters outside of my special province as principal of the training school of

Hawaiian pastors and missionaries, except so far as it has its bearings on my instructions "to induce in the Hawaiians more of the sentiments of personal independence and self-reliance, and to develop that strength of character which shall enable them to withstand the unfavorable influences that have hitherto depressed them, and still exist from their contact with so large a foreign population."

You will pardon me in what I have to say if I introduce more of the personal element than you would meet in ordinary diplomatic correspondence. It is this very element that throws upon any such question those side lights that give the aspect of vitality and reality to what else might be only abstract discussion of abstruse principles of government and social order.

When I arrived here June 1, 1877, and began to study the situation, I found that I must first disabuse myself of the notion that it was Hawaiian civilization and a Hawaiian government under which I was to live. Such nomenclature was right and proper, but the church and state, nominally Hawaiian, was really managed by the few foreigners who had the direction of affairs. Not that the foreigners were exercising an usurped authority and the natives simply subject to their beck and call, but rather this, that the management of affairs of church and state was under the direction of the missionaries in the one case, and trusted advisers in the other; and that without such direction, not to say control, both churches and government would disintegrate speedily because of utter lack of the needful ability to maintain an independent organic existence.

The number of superannuated missionaries has constantly diminished till now there are only three surviving, only one of these an ordained preacher. The management of the churches has fallen entirely into the hands of the native pastors, with no direct continuous personal supervision. What I can do by correspondence or by chance visits and what Mr. Emerson can do by similar means (only in his case these are official and in some places semiannual,)—this constitutes all that we two workers can well do for the 57 Hawaiian evangelical churches, with their membership of 5,427 communicants out of a total population (native) of 34,436, with only one foreign pastor (Rev. H. H. Parker, of Kawaiajao Church, Honolulu) among the whole number (34) of pastors. The native churches are growing poorer and feebler each year, less able and willing to support the native pastorate.

One reason for this growing unwillingness is the demoralization of our churches under the influence of the native sovereign Kalakaua. It was his custom to appoint natives to office without regard to fitness, but rather because of social position among their own people and subserviency personally to himself. In this way, as our church members are among the better class of Hawaiians, they were selected as officials, but made to feel that their tenure of office depended upon his own pleasure. As there were not offices enough to give to all jealousies arose, and removals were necessary to make places for some whom it was the necessity of the moment to placate. In this way a greed for office-holding was introduced and fostered, till in perversion of the native translation of 1 Corinthians, 12 31, office seeking was made to seem the duty of every church member (seek the "highest offices for yourselves").

Another means of demoralizing the native churches was the idea instilled assiduously by the King, that a State church was the desirable religious establishment for Hawaii. He was to be the head, and

each pastor was to receive his salary from the Government treasury promptly, and amply sufficient for all his needs.

It is this same element of personal rule which the King cherished and constantly pushed forward in politics. In this he was helped by the style of political management which was introduced under the sugar-planting interests. Soon after I arrived there occurred the first advance made by the King in this direction. The Haiku Sugar Company had succeeded in building a canal to bring water from the windward side of Maui down to Kiamakuapoko to irrigate their cane fields there. Another company wanted to build a canal higher up, of course cutting off the water supply of the upper gulches that fed the Haiku ditch. The cabinet refused them a charter.

A loan to the King of \$40,000 was effected, and at this place that cabinet was dismissed at midnight and a ministry more favorable to the other party appointed, and the influence of money rather than principle became paramount. From that time onward the King pushed his schemes of personal aggrandizement as fast and as far as he dared. In Mr. Gibson he found a willing tool, who, for the sake of retaining his official position, did the King's bidding, and put through one iniquitous and ruinous measure after another. The foreign community remonstrated and yielded, remonstrated, opposed, and yielded, till finally forbearance ceased to be a virtue, and the situation became so embarrassing, perilous to all business, social, moral, and political interest, that an uprising of the sensible and intelligent and respectable part of the community (commonly stigmatized as the missionary element) led to the promulgation of the constitution of 1887, which abridged the power of the King, and was intended to make the cabinet, appointed by approval of the Legislature, the responsible organ of legislative and executive authority.

I refused to join the league under whose management this constitution was secured because it was a secret organization, whose leaders might initiate measures to which I could not consent. I published in the newspapers over my own name, however, the first and only public complaint that was thus openly made of the conduct and character of the King, and asked for a public meeting to formulate demands that would secure good government for the benefit of the community and end the misrule which was ruining the natives and scandalizing the foreign community. The common talk at that time was about shooting the King at sight, but I could not be convinced that a stable government would ever be secured by assassination.

The special occasion for the very vindictive feeling at that time was the conduct of the King in getting an opium license passed by the majority of the Legislature, then under his personal control, selling the license to one Chinaman without delivering it, but pocketing the money (\$75,000 or thereabouts), selling it afterwards to another Chinaman, who was shrewd enough to secure first the delivery of the license. All this was supported by sworn affidavits published in the newspapers, to which the King made no reply.

Another fact that incensed the community was the revelation about that time of the King's use of old superstitious practices and abominable orgies to degrade the Hawaiian people and make them the more ready tools to accomplish his purposes. In seeking a charter for the secret society he had formed (the Hale Nana, a mixture of Free Masonry, Mormonism, and diabolism) the character of that institution came to be quite generally known. You can obtain information about it from reliable sources. Suffice it for me to say that part of the exercise was the

worship of the King as divine. It was affirmed that as a god he could do no wrong, and by a curious Hawaiian perversion of logical reasoning he did various things that no one would hesitate to call vile as well as wrong to prove that he was a god.

It was hoped that the new constitution would give us a change. But largely through various judicial decisions the royal prerogatives and not the constitutional limitation of Hawaiian sovereignty have been assigned the supremacy. It has been one series of dissappointments after another. The late Queen was in England when the constitution of 1887 was promulgated. She was bitterly disappointed at what her brother had done. Taking advantage of the vexation felt by many in the community at the various developments of royal prerogative, she sent for R. W. Wilcox to head a revolution, with the idea that Kalakaua would be compelled to abdicate and she would be placed upon the throne. But this scheme failed.

When she became Queen the first act was one to disappoint those who were ready to support a constitutional monarchical government with a responsible ministry approved by the Legislature. She claimed the privilege of nominating her own cabinet. The point was yielded, but the Legislature prorogued January 14, 1893, was of such a complexion and so manipulated that there was constant friction between the Queen's adherents and the supporters of representative constitutional government. Yet forbearance was exercised again and again; hopes were cherished in spite of convictions to the contrary from evident tendencies and attempts. These culminated in the transactions of January 10-17, with which you are familiar from the published statements.

The point to which I wish to call your attention is this, that the political system under which thus far Hawaiian affairs have been managed is utterly unfitted for the present changed conditions. It answered fairly well under the Kamehamehas. But the last Kamehameha (though older than his brother Kamehameha IV and passed by in Kamehameha III's election of his successor, because of personal unfitness) was restive under constitutional limitations and arbitrarily set aside the constitution under which he was appointed. The native element in the population at that time was too dominant an element to be successfully resisted.

Now, business and commerce have brought to these islands so large a foreign element that their interests are virtually the controlling element, politically and socially. But while they are the controlling element, and that fact can not be gainsaid, there has not ever been, nor is there now, so far as I am able to judge, any disposition to do any injustice to the natives. The present movement has been under the management of those who are and always have been the best friends of the natives, and in seeking to secure and support their own rights they seek and secure the true rights and the highest interests of the native population.

The organization of a constitutional government originated in the desire of the chiefs for a more stable tenure of property titles than simply the pleasure of the sovereign. When attempts to secure from abroad competent persons for this work had repeatedly failed, the American missionaries were requested to aid in this work. Interested in all that concerned the welfare of the Hawaiian people, they consented, but first resigned their commissions as missionaries of the American Board. They sought no emoluments for themselves nor their families, and the records of those days show how faithfully, tirelessly, self-sacrificingly they discharged the duties of their new and responsible positions, which

no one then would have taken up with all their disabilities except those intent with all singleness of purpose in elevating and sustaining a Christian nation here.

In 1870 the American Board withdrew from all supervision of the work here. Other influences have come to the front with the opening of commerce from the Pacific coast States. How intimate those relations have come to be, the statistical reports will show. Permit me to allude, in closing, to the changed social condition of the Hawaiian people. It is often asserted that a fundamental mistake was made in mission work by not (from the very outset) instructing the people in the English language. But those who take that view are persons who do not stop to think under what different conditions mission work was begun seventy years ago. English text-books and teachers were impossibilities then; they are not yet the great success which had been hoped, when the experiment was begun in 1876 of making English the medium of instruction in the Government schools. There are no pure Hawaiians at this day, so far as I know, who have been instructed in these Government schools who would be considered promising candidates to be trained for a collegiate course.

In all my intercourse with young Hawaiians I have met only one whom I would call worthy the name of a student, capable of abstruse thought, the study of principles, the acquisition of scientific or philosophical methods. Hawaiian is still the language of the Legislature and the judiciary, and every biennial period the attempt is made to make the Hawaiian, not the English language, the authoritative language of the statute book. The Americanization of the islands will necessitate the use of the English language only as the language of business, of politics, of education, of church service; and open the wide field of English literature to a people who have only poorly edited newspapers and a meager number of very rudimentary manuals as their text-books in science, or their highest attainments in culture.

The desire for official position without proper fitness for it is an element to the great disadvantage of the Hawaiian. Money thus easily made is foolishly as well as quickly spent for momentary enjoyments. Young people ruin themselves, their lives, their property, their families, in sensual enjoyments, and it is almost impossible to train them to habits of industry, thrift, forethought under the temptations about them to vice, idleness, extravagance. When Rev. Mr. Kuaea was made minister of finance, with every bank note he signed, he delighted in saying "How rich I am making this country."

In changing the political system of the country there is no abandonment of the original idea of the American mission, nor any betrayal of its high aims. I came here at the expense of the American board. To kind friends among the foreign residents I am indebted for the comfortable—not luxurious—home their hospitality has provided for an overburdened worker interested in everything that concerns the welfare of the community.

I have shirked no responsibility nor any burden of toil and care in doing all I could for the Hawaiian people. They have at times misinterpreted my actions, but they have never doubted the sincerity of my purposes, nor withheld their expressions of appreciation and approval. They may have expected too much, but they have always been ready to listen to any words of advice or warning I have had occasion to utter. It is as natural for them to follow a leader whom they think they can trust as for an Anglo-Saxon to take his stand independently whether others come to his support or not. They have not yet learned

the rudimentary principles of government and independent citizenship. Their lawyers can not grasp the details nor the generalizations that are necessary for the successful advocate or judge. Their ministers in our Christian churches may know how to shepherd the flocks in pastures, fenced and barred; but to beat off cunning and fierce destroyers they need other qualifications than a kindly spirit and a devoted attachment. There is no educated physician of native race in practice of his profession at the islands. There is no artisan, nor mechanic, nor trader in business for himself. As masters of the smaller coasting craft they have risen higher above their fellows and done better for their employers than in any other line of business.

It will take time and patience and devotion to righteousness and truth as well as genuine sympathy to uplift and adopt and then to adapt American political system to this community, but I believe that the foregoing statement of facts will show that it is, in the line of past procedure, the only hopeful way out of present difficulties, a necessity and an urgency.

We, who have lived some length of time in the country, know the weaknesses of the Hawaiian race, as well as their many excellent characteristics. The evidences that have shown such weaknesses are cumulative. The incidents that have developed such weaknesses, have not often been made matters of record and so can not at a moment's notice be recalled to substantiate such statements as might be made in regard to the unfitness of the Hawaiians for such predominance, politically and socially, as has hitherto been accorded to them.

Here is one incident of recent occurrences: The acting pastor of a church on Maui found that the Sunday-school superintendent was drinking heavily of sweet-potato beer and was often drunk. He brought the case before the deacons, but they decided that they would do nothing about it, for two reasons assigned: (1) Sweet-potato beer was the common food of the people; (2) drunkenness was so common that it could not be treated as an offense. Thereupon the pastor on the succeeding Sunday proceeded to read a long proclamation after the fashion set by the Provincial Government, deposing the Sunday-school superintendent for reasons assigned, as unworthy of his official position.

The people of Kaumakapili church in this city who do not like the well-known opposition of their pastor to the late Queen and her misrule presented a petition for his removal. The chief reason assigned was that they had not paid him his salary in full for the last two years, and this violation of their contract they acknowledged and made it the basis of their petition that he should be removed from the pastorate.

You will find that such is the childishness of this people, only two generations removed from lowest barbarism and heathenism, that the working of the political system is utterly unreliable. If voting is their privilege, it is sufficient to pose as a special friend of Hawaiian prejudices to secure an overwhelming majority for any such partisan. No matter how many times he may have deceived them, any demagogue who will promise whatever they may foolishly desire at the moment is the one whom they will follow. In this desire to perpetuate what is Hawaiian, and make that predominant, they are easily led to go back to heathen practices and ideas. To break up this tendency, for their own best welfare I know nothing better than to Americanize the political system. They will then be free to choose what is for their best good, not bound to cling to what is old and effete.

Social regeneration is as necessary as individual regeneration to

Christianize a nation. The individual instances of Christian character have not had for the last twenty years the environment favorable for any legitimate and proper development; and this has been largely owing to the political system. Instead of simply saying that the King's advisers, not the King, would be held responsible for mistakes in political management, the old constitution positively asserted that the King is not amenable to law. It was too much like the old Hawaiian idea of autocratic rule, limited only by fear of assassination. To get rid of the spirit of submissiveness to despotic authority, and substitute for it the Christian principle of obedience to righteous rule, is absolutely essential to the proper development of the national and individual life.

The old system will not work in its want of adaptation to the present civilization of the country. We can not trust business interests to the decision of a Hawaiian jury. In the management of the Kamehameha estate, of which I speak from personal knowledge as one of the trustees under the will of the late Mrs. C. R. Bishop, we are forced to put up with an inefficient administration of much of the property, because no Hawaiian jury would be likely to give us a verdict according to the law and evidence. Take what occurred at the last session of the circuit court in Kau. A Hawaiian jury brought in a verdict standing 10 to 2. The judge said that it was proper; according to the law 9 to 3, would be accepted as valid. On the next case, when the jury came to a decision they were unanimous. But some sapient juror remarked that the judge had just said a verdict of 9 to 3 was valid, so they talked and talked till finally three jurors changed their votes, and then their verdict was reported to the judge.

In the change of the political system, that seems to me now unavoidable and imperative, I see no other first step than annexation. Then let other matters be made the subject of careful consideration. We can not go on any longer under the old political system. I had hoped that we could. I did not believe annexation was wise or expedient, and have always said so to Mr. Stevens, whose views of the situation here had convinced him of the immediate necessity of such a step. The Queen did not show out her true character fully until the last week of the last parliamentary session. The logic of events has forced me to the conclusion that the old political system can not be made to work satisfactorily or enduringly even any longer. In seeking for a political system that will meet the requirements of the case, I see nothing better than immediate annexation. That will settle forever many things that now militate against the stability of any political system for the islands as the people are now. Other political questions must be left for future deliberation.

I think that intelligent Hawaiians, who have at heart the best interests of the country and the people, are very generally of that opinion. Give us annexation, and plans will be at once pushed for such a development of the country as can not be even thought of under any other circumstances. Talk about a protectorate is idle. We have had enough of legal fictions. The institutions and connections of the country are mainly American. Let us have the name, as well as the appearance; the real power as well as the nominal acquiescence, and the Hawaiians will accept the situation. They will have to make the best of it, whatever may be decided upon for them. The best thing for the whole people is now to make American citizens of themselves as fast as they can. Those who know that they are aiming at the highest possible ideal can afford to wait with patience for its realization. The overthrow of an

obstructive and ruinous social and political system is the best preparation for the spread of the Gospel of Christ, and the enjoyments of its privileges and blessings.

Yours respectfully,

C. M. HYDE.

NORTH PACIFIC MISSIONARY INSTITUTE.

No. 27.

Statement by Col. C. P. Jaukea, late of Her Majesty's personal staff.

On arriving at the palace shortly after the landing of the United States forces, I found Her Majesty's household in a state of nervous excitement. The Queen, although calm and collected, showed signs of uneasiness. This feeling soon increased to one of grave alarm and apprehension when, a few minutes later, the troops were seen moving in the direction of the palace, and, without warning, immediately take a position a short distance from, and in full view of, the palace and Government building.

This unexpected show of force right under the palace walls deeply impressed Her Majesty; and when on the day following the United States forces were seen encamped in the Arion Hall, adjoining the Government building premises, and commanding the palace, it at once became evident that they were landed for some other purpose than the protection of life and property.

When therefore during the afternoon of the same day the revolutionists took possession of the Government building no resistance was offered by the Queen's forces, it being impossible to successfully resist them without precipitating a conflict with the United States forces.

C. P. JAUKEA,

Late of Her Majesty's Personal Staff.

No. 28.

Interview with Chief Justice A. F. Judd, Honolulu, May 16, 1893.

Q. Please state where you were born.

A. In Honolulu, January 7, 1838.

Q. Has this always been your home?

A. With the exception of four years in the United States, two at Yale and the other two at Harvard law school, and on occasional visits to the States and a trip to Europe. I entered the practice of law in this country in 1864, and was elected twice to the Legislature—in 1868 from South Kona, Hawaii, and again for Honolulu in 1870, and in 1873 I was appointed attorney-general by Lunailo, and on his death in 1874, on the election of Kalakaua, I went onto the bench as associate justice of the supreme court. I continued on the bench until now, having held different positions. I took the position of first associate justice in 1877, and was appointed chief justice in 1881. I have been in judicial life since my first appointment as judge in February, 1874, and have had my office in the Government building during all that time, and am somewhat familiar with political changes that have taken place.

Q. How were your judges selected prior to the constitution of 1887?

A. They were appointed.

Q. How selected prior to 1887?

A. They were appointed by the King. The supreme judges have always been appointed in that way, and, whatever has happened to this country, I think the sovereigns have always aimed to give us good men as judges.

Q. Who did Kalakaua appoint first as judges?

A. Judge Allen was chief justice under a former appointment—he being in the United States at the time of Kalakaua's election, of course was merely continued in office. The other judges were Hartwell and Widemann. Hartwell was appointed attorney-general and Widemann as minister of the interior. Judge Harris was then made first associate justice and I second associate justice.

Q. None of these were men of native blood?

A. None.

Q. Were they men of substantial character?

A. Yes; all of them. We have had two judges of native blood on the bench.

Q. Appointed by whom?

A. By Kamehameha III and Kamehameha V. The first was Judge Ii. He was a pure native. The other judge of native blood was R. G. Davis. He was half-white.

Q. How was your Legislature made up prior to the constitution of 1887?

A. It consisted of one body—nobles appointed by the Crown and representatives elected by the people.

Q. How many nobles?

A. Twenty.

Q. How many representatives?

A. It seems to me twenty-four—perhaps twenty-six—I do not know positively.

Q. The number of representatives exceeded the number of nobles prior to 1887?

A. I do not remember, but I think so.

Q. How were nobles selected?

A. Appointed by the King on nomination by the cabinet.

Q. And the representatives were——

A. Elected by the people.

Q. What suffrage qualification had you?

A. Under the constitution of 1852 there was no property qualification. The Legislature consisted of two houses that sat separately. King Kamehameha V refused to take the oath to that constitution when he took the throne in the fall of 1863, and he called a convention of delegates to revise the constitution, with the purpose of limiting the power of the people and strengthening his own prerogatives. I was secretary in that convention, and after a very warm discussion the King was unable to agree with the delegates as to the measure of that property qualification. He then dismissed the convention and proclaimed the constitution of 1864, which prescribed a small property qualification for voters.

Q. What was the amount of that property qualification?

A. Two hundred and fifty dollars a year, I think.

Q. Was that property qualification for voters the main point on which the King and the convention disagreed?

A. It was.

Q. Prior to that there was no property qualification?

A. No.

Q. This constitution of 1864 then came by virtue of a proclamation of the King?

A. It did. The people acquiesced in it after awhile, and, although there was a good deal of dissatisfaction felt, the people voted under it and agreed to it, and a good many believed that it was wise—that is, making the Legislature of one house and not of two.

Q. Prior to the constitution of 1864 how were nobles appointed?

A. By the King.

Q. What support had the King in reducing the franchise of the native population of the islands?

A. He had the support of his cabinet, and I think that is about all.

Q. What was the disposition of the more intelligent people here?

A. They considered it very arbitrary. The King at that time was very much opposed to the growth of American influence and republican ideas. He was very bitterly opposed to the influence of the Americans, and especially American missionaries. His aim was to strengthen the royal prerogatives.

Q. But if he cut off the number of native votes by property qualifications would he accomplish any addition to his strength?

A. He had one house then only, and there could be no negative action on any affirmative action of his. It was not necessary for him to have a majority of each house.

Q. Were the bodies equal in number?

A. I think not; I think the representative body was larger. It was proportioned according to the population of the districts.

Q. Under the constitution of 1864 did you have a property qualification?

A. We did for a while.

Q. How long?

A. For several elections. It was finally eradicated by amendments to the constitution.

Q. In what year?

A. I can only speak from memory, but certainly before 1870, but I certainly can not say without reference to books.

Q. How was that brought about? What state of opinion brought that about?

A. It was mainly the feeling that this was an encroachment. Public sentiment did not feel the necessity for it. Demagogism was then not prevalent. I think the Hawaiians voted better then than they do now. That is, demoralizing influences had not set in.

Q. At that time, I suppose, it was somewhat of a struggle between the King and the people?

A. Yes, precisely.

Q. And they were attempting to recover a part of the power they had lost under that constitution?

A. Yes.

Q. I see in the compilation of your laws, page 220, section 780, the following:

For the island of Hawaii, eight, that is to say:

One for the district of North Kona, beginning at and including Keahualono, and extending to and including Puuhao; one for the district of South Kona, beginning at Puuhao and extending to and including Kaheawai.

One for the district of Kau.

One for the district of Puna.

Two for the district of Hilo.

One for the district of Hamakua.

One for the district of Kohala.

For the island of Maui, seven, that is to say, two for the district composed of Lahaina, Ukumehame, and Kahoolawe.

One for the district composed of Kahakuloa and Kaanapali.

One for the district beginning with and including Waihee and extending to and including Honuaula.

One for the district beginning with and including Kahikinui and extending to and including Koolau.

One for the district beginning with and including Hamakualoa and extending to and including Kula.

Two for the districts composing the Islands of Molokai and Lanai.

For the island of Oahu, eight, that is to say: Four for the district of Honolulu, beginning with and including Maunaloa, and extending to and including Moanalua.

And one for the district composed of Ewa and Waianae.

One for the district of Waialua.

One for the district of Koolauloa.

One for the district of Koolaupoko.

For the island of Kauai, three, that is to say: One for the district of Waimea, beginning with and including Nualolo and extending to and including Hanapepe, and also including the island of Niihau.

One for the district of Puna, beginning with and including Wahiawa, and extending to and including Wailua.

One for the district of Hanalei, beginning with and including Kapaa, and extending to and including Awa-awa-puhi.

Please say how many representatives you had under that?

A. Twenty-six.

Q. When was that established?

A. There have been laws of this character altered little by little, but a law of this general character has been in existence from very early times—that is from 1852. There would be occasional changes, adding one representative to one district and taking one away possibly from another district.

Q. I ask your attention to section 774 of your compilation of laws:

The house of representatives shall be composed of not less than twenty-four nor more than forty members, who shall be elected biennially.

Prior to 1887 you had in a legislative body twenty-six representatives?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it ever larger than that?

A. I think not.

Q. That gave them a popular element in the Legislature—a majority over the power of the King as represented in the nobles?

A. That is the way it was generally exercised. The King never appointed his full number.

Q. But the constitution itself provided that he might appoint thirty and that the representatives might be forty?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The fact was he generally appointed twenty, and the representatives were twenty-six?

A. Yes.

Q. So that there remained from this an excess of political power in the representatives in the legislative body as against the Crown?

A. That is true; but they rarely ever divided on that issue—nobles on one side and representatives on the other. Some of our best legislation was accomplished through the nobles. They were excellent men.

Q. What class of men generally?

A. Such men as Mr. C. R. Bishop, S. G. Wilder, and Mr. Dowsett. They were appointed by Lunalilo, who filled up the body to twenty.

Q. Were they generally appointed from the class of men who repre-

sented the intelligence and wealth and morality of the community or not?

A. In those days they were nominated to the King by his cabinet, and they were representative of the property of this Kingdom, combining also a fair representation of character and intelligence, until the middle of Kalakaua's reign, when, as vacancies occurred, he would appoint natives generally who did not have these characteristics of wealth, character, and intelligence.

Q. How was a ministry appointed and removed?

A. Under every constitution prior to 1887 the ministers were appointed by the King and removed by him; but until Kalakaua's reign it was a very rare thing that any King changed his ministry. They had a pretty long lease of political life. My father was minister for nine or ten years, and Mr. Wyllie for a longer period. It was a very rare political occurrence, and made a great sensation when a change was made. Under Kalakaua things were different; I think we had twenty-six different cabinets during his reign.

Q. How long was his reign?

A. From 1874 to 1891.

Q. What were the property qualifications of electors prior to 1887?

A. None—no property qualification.

Q. They had to be 20 years of age, and to be able to read and write?

A. If born since 1840 they had to be able to read and write, but this test was rarely applied. If born before that there was no qualification at all.

Q. Under the constitution of 1887 the same qualification of an elector for representative was continued?

A. Yes; substantially the same.

Q. Was there any very considerable change in the matter of the qualification of a voter for representative under the constitution of 1887 in the matter of allowing foreigners to vote?

A. There was.

Q. Please state it.

A. Previous to that time only citizens could vote; that is, native born or naturalized, or those who had received letters of denization. The constitution of 1887 allowed all residents, if they had those qualifications, excepting Asiatics, and they were not allowed to vote, even those who were citizens by naturalization.

Q. Did that cover the Portuguese element?

A. We allowed Portuguese to vote.

Q. Then the races that were excluded under that from the privilege of voting were the Chinese and the Japanese?

A. Yes.

Q. How about the qualifications to read and write for that class of voters—I mean the Portuguese, Americans, and Europeans who were allowed to vote? Did the qualifications as to reading and writing apply to them?

A. It did.

Q. Were there many Portuguese then voting under the constitution of 1887?

A. A good many voted. Not having the statistics before me I can not say what proportion.

Q. Under that constitution of 1887 were the number of nobles and representatives the same?

A. Exactly the same—twenty-four nobles and twenty-four representatives.

Q. The cabinet was appointed by the Crown?

A. Yes.

Q. And how removable?

A. Only by vote of want of confidence passed by a majority of elected members.

Q. What was the character of the increased power of the cabinet under the constitution of 1887 over that of 1864?

A. It made the ministerial responsibility clearer, I think, than it existed under the constitution of 1864.

Q. In what way was it made clearer?

A. By express provision after 1887, if I mistake not, saying that whenever any act was to be done by the sovereign it was to be done by and with the advice of the cabinet. That the supreme court has held to be the advice of a majority of the cabinet.

Q. Would that be so in the matter of the exercise of the veto power?

A. We thought not. That is, the justices of the supreme court thought not. Under the constitution, which made the legislative power consist of the King and the legislature, we felt that this act in approving or vetoing a bill was a legislative and not an executive act.

Q. What did the word signify, then, in relation to the power that the King could only do it with the advice of the cabinet?

A. We construed that power of the King which could only be exercised through the ministry as applying solely to executive and not to legislative acts.

Q. He could do nothing, then, without the sanction of a majority of the cabinet in the matter of administration?

A. No, sir.

Q. A single member of the cabinet would not answer?

A. No, sir. The Thurston ministry broke up on that principle, Ashford advising the King, contrary to the advice of the supreme court, that he was not bound to act unless all the members of the cabinet advised a certain measure. That led to a serious difference in the cabinet, which resulted in breaking it up.

Q. The court held that it required a majority?

A. Yes.

Q. Which Ashford was that?

A. C. W. Ashford. After his return from Canada he seemed to be very much changed.

Q. Your house of nobles was equal in number to the representatives. What was the qualification of an elector for nobles?

A. The property qualification was an income of \$600 a year, or unincumbered real property of the value of \$3,000. We held that where a man was paid wages and his board that his board was not to be included; that he must have a clear income of \$600.

Q. I wish to ask you the reason for these changes—what they were intended to accomplish—and I wish to ask you because of your high official position as chief justice and because of your high character?

A. The main grievance was this: The Legislature was composed of officeholders. I mean the representatives prior to 1887. The district justice, nominated by the governor of each island, would use his judicial influence by making it very easy with the offenses of the people. The same thing was true of deputy sheriffs, tax assessors, tax collectors, and all minor officials. When once in the Legislature they could be very easily controlled either by threats of withdrawing the offices from them, or by promises of other offices. As was well expressed by Mr. Gibson, who was premier at one time, the King was the larger part of the

Legislature. That is, his influence exerted through these agents became paramount. He could accomplish, against his ministry even, almost any measure he chose.

Q. Did he appoint all these officers to which you referred?

A. Not directly, but the governors, being appointed for four years, and being his favorites, would appoint any officials he suggested, and as a matter of fact Kalakaua nominated, directly or indirectly, the mass of the officials in this country.

Q. Do you mean to say that by the appointment of governors who were personal friends of his there came to be appointments of subordinate officers who were in sympathy with the King in his political views and his general wishes?

A. I do, and more especially to carry out the money votes which he was very eager for in order to pay his debts, the expenses of his tour abroad, of his coronation, of the military embassy to Samoa, and other extravagances which every respectable person thought very unwise. I recommended in my report to the Legislature a change in this respect, *i. e.*, in the qualifications of candidates to the Legislature, excluding judges, etc. Another cause, hardly second in importance, was the matter of the removal of ministries. I have said that up to that time there had been twenty-six changes of cabinets. It had unsettled the community so greatly and gave opportunity for what is called "backstairs cabinets" by adventurers and others that there was very little stability in the Government. It was almost impossible for any ministry to carry out any settled policy, certainly any policy that did not please the King.

Q. You changed the constitution so as to guard against that improper mode of the appointment of inferior officers?

A. It forbade any person being appointed to office during the whole time for which he was elected, and also forbade the election of anybody who held any office under the Government.

Q. Then you cut off that power of the King in the use of his patronage?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. As to the appointment of nobles, the idea was to take that away from him?

A. The nobles were elected by what was supposed to be the wealthy and influential class.

Q. That was taken away from the King and placed among the wealthy and influential classes?

A. Yes, so that they could have representation in the Legislature.

Q. Under that a minority of the natives only could vote for nobles?

A. Only a minority of them could vote; it gave them great dissatisfaction.

Q. Any other changes of consequence?

A. I think not.

Q. You say this new manner of selecting nobles gave the natives great dissatisfaction?

A. It did. The first election held under the constitution was very satisfactory. The natives voted well. Good men were elected. Then they were told that the white people had advantages, by reason of their wealth, over them, and this idea at election time, that they were put in an inferior position, was always forced upon them.

Q. Will you be kind enough to state how this new constitution was established?

A. The two events which brought this matter to a culminating point

were (1) the opium steal of \$71,000, by which a Chinaman named Aki was made by the King to pay him a bribe of \$71,000 of hard coin in order to obtain the exclusive franchise for selling opium, and (2) the expense of the expedition to Samoa in the *Kaimiloa*. A secret league was formed all over the islands, the result of which was, the King was asked to promulgate a new constitution containing those provisions that I have before alluded to. It was very adroitly managed by the Ashfords, and more especially by V. V. Ashford, who obtained the confidence of the King and Mr. Gibson. He was the colonel of the rifles, and he assured them that if he was paid a certain sum of money and made minister to Canada that he would arrange it so that the movement would be futile.

Q. How was he to do that?

A. By preventing the use of the military I suppose. And he arranged with the military authorities and Capt. Haley that they should be called out to preserve public order, although it was this large and well-drilled force which made the King fear that if he did not yield things would be very critical for him.

Q. Was that a Government force?

A. It was organized under the laws.

Q. A volunteer organization?

A. Yes.

Q. So that the men in sympathy with the movement of this secret league went into it and constituted it under form of law?

A. Of course I do not know what was told the King privately, but I know that he felt it would be very dangerous to refuse to promulgate the new constitution. I have no doubt that a great many things were circulated which came to his ears in the way of threats that were unfounded.

Q. What was the outside manifestation?

A. One great feature of it was its secrecy. The King was frightened at this secrecy. It was very well managed. The judges of the supreme court were not told of it until just before the event took place. I think it was the 2d or 3d of July, 1887.

Q. Was there then a mass meeting?

A. There was a large mass meeting held, and a set of resolutions was presented to the King, requiring that a new ministry be formed, by Mr. W. L. Green and one other person whose name I have forgotten.

Q. Was there any display of force?

A. The Honolulu Rifles were in detachments marched about in different portions of the town, having been called out by the legal military authorities.

Q. Who were the legal military authorities?

A. The governor of the island, Dominis, and Capt H. Burrill-Haley, the adjutant-general.

Q. Were they in sympathy with the movement?

A. No, sir; the officers of the corps were in sympathy with the movement.

Q. Who were they?

A. Ashford and Hebbard; I do not remember all.

Q. Did the governor order them out, not knowing of this state of things?

A. I think he did. I think he knew it; but it was to prevent as I believe, something worse happening. As I said, there were threats made.

Q. Of what sort?

A. I understood that at one time there was a very strong feeling that the King should be forced to abdicate altogether, and it was only the more conservative men born here who said that the King and the Hawaiians should have another opportunity.

Q. Were there not two elements in that movement, one for a republic and the other for restraining the power of the King?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there not two forces in this movement coöperating together up to a certain point, to wit: those who were in favor of restraining the King by virtue of the provisions of the constitution of 1887, and those who were in favor of dethroning the King and establishing a republic?

A. I understand that there were, and that the more conservative view prevailed.

Q. And the men who were in favor of a republic were discontented at the outcome?

A. They were, and they didn't want the Hawaiians to vote at all; and the reason that the Portuguese were allowed to vote was to balance the native vote.

Q. Whose idea was that, was that the idea of the men who made the new constitution?

A. Of the men who made the new constitution.

Q. It was to balance the native vote with the Portuguese vote?

A. That was the idea.

Q. And that would throw the political power into the hands of the intelligence and wealth of the country?

A. That was the aim.

Q. How was this military used?

A. It was put about in squads over the city.

Q. The officers of the corps were really in favor of the movement for the new constitution, and were called out by Governor Dominis to preserve order?

A. Yes. After the affair was over he was thanked by a military order from headquarters.

Q. Do you suppose he was gratified with thanks, under the circumstances?

A. Haley said to me when he showed me the order, "It is a little funny to thank a man who kicked you out, but I suppose I've got to do it."

Q. The King acceded to the demand for a new constitution and of a cabinet of given character?

A. In the first place he acceded to the proposition to make a new cabinet named by Mr. Green. The former cabinet, consisting of Mr. Gibson and three Hawaiians, had just resigned a day or two before. In three or four days the cabinet waited upon him with the constitution.

Q. What cabinet?

A. The cabinet, consisting of Mr. Green, minister of foreign affairs; Mr. Thurston, minister of the interior; Mr. C. W. Ashford, attorney-general, and Mr. Godfrey Brown, minister of finance. I was sent for in the afternoon of July 5, to swear the King to the constitution. When I reached the palace they were all there, and the King asked me in Hawaiian whether he had better sign it or not. I said "You must follow the advice of your responsible ministers." He signed it.

Q. This ministry had been appointed as the result of the demand of the mass meeting?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And then, having been appointed, they presented him with the constitution of 1887 ?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And he signed it ?

A. He did.

Q. Was that constitution ever submitted to a popular vote for ratification ?

A. No; it was not. There was no direct vote ratifying the constitution, but its provisions requiring that no one should vote unless he had taken an oath to support it, and a large number voted at that first election, was considered a virtual ratification of the constitution.

Q. If they voted at all they were considered as accepting it ?

A. Yes, sir. I do not think any large number refused to take the oath to it.

Q. It was not contemplated by the mass meeting, nor the cabinet, nor anybody in power, to submit the matter of ratification at all ?

A. No; it was not. It was considered a revolution. It was a successful revolutionary act.

Q. And therefore was not submitted to a popular vote for ratification ?

A. Yes, sir. It had mischievous effects in encouraging the Wilcox revolution of 1889, which was unsuccessful. I think it was a bad precedent, only the exigencies of the occasion seemed to demand it.

Q. Was there discontent with that constitution on the part of Kalakaua ? Was he ever satisfied with it ?

A. He was very skillful in concealing his views. I do not think he was satisfied with it.

Q. Was the ex-Queen ever satisfied with it ?

A. I think much less satisfied with it than he was, and commenced movements against it even before her brother died—while she was princess. From my intimate acquaintance with her, I knew that she ran away with the idea that she was Queen only of the native Hawaiians and not of the whites, even though born here.

Q. Have the natives as a race been discontented with these changes ?

A. As shown in their public utterances in the Legislature, at election times, and through their native newspapers, I should say yes; but from my acquaintance with them personally, I am unable to see that it has worked to their injury, and I do not see evidences of their dissatisfaction.

Q. Were they in this secret league to which you had made reference ?

A. I think there was only one person of mixed blood in the league.

Q. Did your politics take on anything of a racial form at any time; if so, when ?

A. Occasionally a native in the Legislature would lose his head and say severe things against the whites as a class. It is generally frowned down upon by the most respectable of the natives and the foreigners. It has, however, been made a much more prominent feature in politics of late.

Q. Did Gibson use that race feeling to obtain power, and to maintain himself in it ?

A. He did; and he also used flattery to the King to exalt his position. He fostered in the King's mind the idea of proclaiming himself emperor of the Pacific in connection with the Samoan affair.

Q. But in dealing with the natives in the matter of suffrage did he play on the matter of race feeling ?

A. Somewhat. His emissaries generally looked to other means—gin among them.

Q. Was he in the habit of abusing the whites, those who are called missionaries?

A. Yes; the first mischief he did was in thwarting the treaty of reciprocity.

Q. In what year was that?

A. In 1873.

Q. Before Kalakaua was King?

A. Yes; and the ministry of which I was a member, Mr. Bishop being leader, owing to the fact that King Lunalilo was in consumption, felt that it was prudent to abandon it.

Q. You were going to speak of race feeling in regard to politics?

A. It has been almost impossible to elect any kind of a decent white man in Honolulu for many years.

Q. Why?

A. I once had a conversation with a very prominent native and asked him why they never succeeded in electing a good white man in Honolulu. He said:

The man whom you regard as the best man the natives oppose just because you want him elected.

Q. I suppose you were not with the committee of safety during the late revolution?

A. I was not informed of any of their proceedings. They kept me out.

Q. Did you know that a constitution was going to be proclaimed in 1893 before it was done?

A. I had heard hints during some years before that the Queen was anxious to proclaim a new constitution, but I did not hear of her present intention until the morning of Saturday. Shortly before the prorogation, at 10 o'clock in the morning, a gentleman told me that immediately after the prorogation Mr. William White, the lottery advocate in the Legislature, was going to the palace with a large number of people and that the Queen was going to proclaim a new constitution. I mentioned it to my associates on the bench. They didn't credit it. I mentioned it to a few others, among them the French consul. It disturbed me very much. Immediately the Legislature was prorogued I looked out from the balcony and saw a large number of natives dressed in black and wearing beaver hats marching over to the palace with banners and carrying a parcel.

I said to myself that is the new constitution. Being invited by the chamberlain to go over there, which is customary after prorogation, I urged my associates to accompany me. Judge Dole had an engagement and could not go. Judge Bickerton and I went over. We stayed until 4 o'clock and saw the whole thing, except we were not in the private room with the Queen when she had her ministry there. The speech that she made, when she said she had designed to promulgate a new constitution but had met with obstacles and was prevented for the present, I wrote from memory. She said it in Hawaiian. I went home that evening, wrote it down from memory, and furnished it to the press.

Q. What was the point of it?

A. She was under great emotion. I never saw her in such a state of agitation. At the same time she controlled herself. It was really a magnificent spectacle. She said she had listened to thousands of voices demanding a change in the constitution—demanding a new constitu-

tion—and she thought the opportune moment had come. The constitution was very defective, and she turned around to defer to me as her witness, because I had had occasion so often to construe it. She had prepared a new constitution which she thought would meet the purposes required and would please the people; but she said with great sorrow: “I am obliged to tell you that I can not do it now. I have met with obstacles, but I ask you to go home; continue to love me, and I will continue to love you, and in a few days you will have your wishes gratified.” Immediately a member of the Legislature, the throne room being full of the Hui Kalaianas, turned around and said: “What shall we do with these men who prevent the gratification of our wishes?” meaning the ministry. We hushed him up; told him to keep quiet, and I left the palace.

Q. What do you suppose she meant that in a few days they would be gratified?

A. She hoped to overcome the objections of her cabinet. Parker told me that the reason he stayed by her without leaving her all that afternoon was that he was afraid she would break away from the cabinet, go out on the balcony, and say to the people: “The ministers won’t approve it, and my chief justice won’t swear me to it. Here is your constitution. Now look out for these men.” We stayed there not under any physical compulsion. I sent in two messages by the chamberlain asking to be excused, but she sent word asking me to remain. Evidently she expected that thing done then and there. Mr. Wilson, the marshal, was in a great state of excitement, and told me that he had been fighting the battle alone all the morning with her, and wanted me to go in and use my influence to prevent her from doing it. I said that if the Queen asked me to come into her council I should be glad to do it, but I could not swear her to the new constitution.

Q. Have you any personal knowledge of improper relations between Wilson and the ex-Queen?

A. I know this as a fact, that when the supreme court decided that on the death of Kalakaua she could require the resignation of the cabinet appointed by him and could appoint her own cabinet, that she made three conditions with the new cabinet, and one of these conditions was such that Mr. Peterson would not consent to resume office under her. The three conditions were these: That Wilson was to be marshal, a native boy named Joe Aea was to be made turnkey of the prison, and that Wundenberg was to be dismissed as postmaster-general. Wundenberg had dismissed Henry Poor from a clerkship in the post-office, whose mother, living on Emma street, was a very strong friend of the Queen.

They were schoolmates together with me, and she, Mrs. Poor, is in charge of two boys. One of the boys is Dominis’s own son by a woman named Mary Purdy. She is married to the messenger of the foreign office, named Kamiki, and the other child is a son of Joe Aea, and rumor says it is the Queen’s own child. I do not know whether it is the Queen’s child or a child of Aea’s wife. I got it from Kamiki, who was deprived of the service of his wife from being Dominis’s mistress. When Dominis died he died with one hand in the hands of the Queen and the other in Mary Purdy’s hands. On one occasion I went to her about the morality of the palace, and she professed to me to be in favor of religion and morality. I went to her on account of a great deal of scandal in regard to the character of the palace invitations.

Q. Did Wilson live in the bungalow?

A. Yes.

Q. And when she went back to Washington Place he always had a cottage there?

A. Yes.

Q. He was marshal?

A. Yes; he had been clerk of the waterworks before that.

Q. Judge, you have a good many races of people here. Could you establish stable government here on the basis of a qualification that they should read and write the English language?

A. That would limit the number qualified to vote very much. It would exclude nearly all the old Hawaiians. It would exclude the Portuguese, except the younger class that have been to school here, and, of course, the younger Hawaiians, who are now taught English exclusively.

Q. What would be the proportion between the white and native vote, putting the English test?

A. I can not say.

Q. Would it leave the native vote in excess or not?

A. I think it would.

Q. Now, on the basis of reading and writing English, could you establish a permanent form of government?

A. I doubt it very much.

Q. Could it maintain a government such as obtains in the States of the United States—New York, for instance?

A. It depends upon the character of the imperial government over it.

Q. What do you mean?

A. I mean that a republic of our own would not be at all successful.

Q. Why?

A. Because our natives are so likely to be influenced by demagogues, and more especially such influences as obtained in the last Legislature, such as the lottery—such schemes as that. The natives joined with the lower class of whites. They have not sufficient character to resist.

Q. Could you establish one that would make life and property safe and preserve order?

A. I doubt it very much.

Q. Would you be willing to take your chances on that sort of government?

A. No sir. As a property-holder and a man of family I would not like to take my chances.

Q. Could you maintain a good government here as a State in the Federal Union, like the State of New York?

A. I have not thought that was possible, because I do not suppose the United States would ever consent to have two Senators from a place like this.

Q. I am not talking about what they would consent to, but as to what you consider the qualifications of the Hawaiians to vote. I do not want to imply that the Government of the United States means to do anything.

A. Yes, I believe we could.

Q. What is the character of the Hawaiian as a voter? Is he an intelligent voter?

A. That is a matter of comparison, of course. He is easily influenced.

Q. In what way?

A. When his prejudices are excited, and when he is told the usual election stories; that something is going to happen unless they vote for such and such a man.

Q. Is he in the habit of selling his vote?

A. I believe there has been a good deal of bribery in this way, paying a man's taxes for him—there being a qualification that a man shall have paid his taxes.

Q. Are they influenced much in elections by liquor?

A. Until the Australian ballot went into effect. The election of 1886 was largely managed by gin.

Q. What is their character as to honesty?

A. So far as they are concerned, they are not especially addicted to larceny.

Q. Not more than the white race?

A. No; I have lived in my present residence twenty-one years; have never had a theft; we live with our houses very loosely fastened.

Q. What is the moral character of the race?

A. The seafaring class are very much addicted to the use of liquor.

Q. What is the character of the Hawaiian women for chastity?

A. They are not chaste. At the same time they do not expose their immorality to public view. I think strangers would see scarcely anything of it. There is an outward observance of the laws of decency and morality.

Q. Why do they observe it outwardly and not practice it in secrecy?

A. I think it is the influence of their religious teaching. It is a source of profit to them.

Q. How?

A. Sailors and mechanics visit them, and that is what supports their families very largely in the low part of the town.

Q. Is that the character of the Hawaiian women generally?

A. I must except many very good, virtuous women.

Q. I do not mean exceptions.

A. They are accessible.

Q. As a race they are not chaste?

A. Their instincts are towards the sexual desire.

Q. Then the domestic circle is not marked by chaste conversation and life?

A. They are very careless in their conversation before their children.

Q. There is a good deal of intermarriage between the whites and natives here. What is the result of that? Is it a better type?

A. It is a more intelligent type.

Q. Are they not better morally?

A. As a class, no.

Q. Are the half-castes generally the result of matrimonial alliances?

A. There are a large number that are not.

Q. What social recognition have these half-castes?

A. They have always received social recognition. They have always been sought after by strangers.

Q. How in social life here; are they received among the whites?

A. Those of good character are. There are several large families received on terms of perfect equality.

Q. The Portuguese population here, is that leaving much?

A. Yes.

Q. To what extent; rapidly, would you say?

A. Yes. On account of their inability to obtain land.

Q. Why can not they obtain land?

A. A great many lands have been tied up by long leases, although the Government has commenced the system of throwing open lands to homesteaders.

Q. But still the tendency is to leave?

A. Yes; they want to go to California—to America.

Q. Then is it the land only?

A. No; it is the desire to go to America; it is their El Dorado.

Q. The Japanese population is probably your future reliance for labor?

A. Yes; but I think the Chinese make the best laborers.

Q. But the authorities who have been controlling the Islands have taken the view that it was best not to allow the Chinamen to come in in large numbers?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the action of the Government has been toward restricting that, and looking to Japan for laborers?

A. Yes; that has been the policy of the country for a long time.

Q. Are these Japanese beginning to get the desire for suffrage.

A. I only hear it through the newspapers.

Q. What do you hear?

A. I hear that they will in time demand suffrage.

Q. What do you think of them as voters?

A. I think they would vote as the consul wanted them to vote. They are an inferior class, brought up with the idea that they must obey their superiors.

Q. They belong to the lowest class of the Japanese population?

A. Yes; they have very great deference for their superiors.

Q. Are they learning to read and write the English language to any extent?

A. Those who remain in the field do not have the opportunity. Their children go to school and learn English.

Q. Your native population—do they understand generally how to read and write the native tongue?

A. Lately they are losing the ability to speak Hawaiian well, by reason of their minds being directed in school to English.

Q. What books have they in the Hawaiian language?

A. Very few books outside of school books and religious books, and a few trashy novels.

Q. They have the Bible and the Pilgrim's Progress?

A. Yes.

Q. You indicated a desire to make a statement in reference to certain occurrences in the legislature of 1892.

A. The body of Kalakaua arrived here on the 29th of January, 1891. At 2 o'clock that day Liliuokalani took the oath to support the constitution of 1887, which I administered. Kalakaua's cabinet consisted then of Cummins, C. N. Spencer, Godfrey Brown, and A. P. Peterson. There was a great deal of discussion and wire pulling as to whether that cabinet should have the right to continue. Finally the opinion of the court was asked and it was held that she had liberty to ask for their resignation. They resigned and she appointed Parker, minister of foreign affairs; Widemann, finance; Spencer, interior, and Whiting, attorney-general.

At the general election which took place in 1892 all the representatives of the island of Oahu were elected from the Liberal party, of which Robert W. Wilcox was the leader (with one exception, W. R. Wilder), who was elected for one of the districts of Honolulu. The Legislature was opened on the 20th of May. On the 6th of June a vote was taken to expunge MacFarlane's resolution, which was directed against Minister Stevens, which was carried by 33 to 13. On the 30th of August the Parker ministry was voted out by 31 to 10. There

was no new cabinet appointed until the 12th of September. That was E. C. MacFarlane, minister of finance; Parker, foreign affairs; Gulick, interior, and Neumann, attorney-general. On the 15th of September there was another vote of want of confidence in this MacFarlane cabinet. It received 24 votes against 21. The question as to whether that was a sufficient constitutional number to pass it was referred to the judges of the supreme court, who decided that 25 votes were necessary.

Meanwhile, on the 4th of October, there was a special election held on this island, and Maile, a native from the fish market, and Hopkins, a half-white, were elected as nobles, by a very large majority, over two very respectable men, M. P. Robinson and H. Waterhouse, by the so-called lottery faction; that is, people who were bound to carry the lottery bill through.

On the 17th of October there was another vote of want of confidence introduced in the MacFarlane ministry, and it passed 32 to 15. On the 1st of November, at 10 o'clock in the morning, the Queen appointed Cornwell minister of finance, Gulick minister of the interior, Nawahi minister of foreign affairs, and Creighton, attorney-general. At half-past 12 they were voted out—26 to 15, the same day. The 4th of November, rumors prevailed that the Queen would agree to appoint G. N. Wilcox minister of the interior, Cecil Brown attorney-general, P. C. Jones minister of finance, and M. C. Robinson minister of foreign affairs.

On the 8th of November this cabinet was appointed and sworn in. Then the country felt easy. The next important event was on the 6th of December, when the Legislature sent a request for an opinion to the justices of the supreme court upon the question whether an amendment to the constitution which had passed two successive Legislatures required the approval of the Queen. We answered that it did not.

Q. What was the constitutional provision?

A. It was something with reference to allowing legislation restricting the residence of Chinese here. The idea was that any laws that might be passed restricting terms of residence or rights of Chinese here would not be held unconstitutional.

Q. At that time was there any restriction on Chinese immigration?

A. Oh, yes; there were restrictions that had passed the Legislature with reference to their entering the Kingdom, but when once in the Kingdom they had the rights of all residents under Hawaiian law, and by our constitution no class legislation would be permissible under the constitution. The object of this amendment was to allow legislation of that character.

Q. Do you have reference to legislation providing that the Chinese should not reside here after the contract term had expired?

A. Yes; I think also as to the character of the employment they should engage in. It was the desire to pass that law which gave rise to this submission to the court. The constitution of 1887 left out all the provisions which had previously existed as to the sovereign signing an amendment to the constitution. The only popular reference was that any amendment that had passed one Legislature would have to be published three months previous to the election, and then if it passed the second Legislature it became a law.

Q. Was there no direct submission to the people?

A. Only in that way. On the 21st of December this ministry, which had the confidence of the people, began to have difficulty with the Queen with reference to the appointment of circuit judges under the new act.

Q. In what way?

A. They nominated Mr. Whiting and Mr. Frear.

Q. And she was not willing?

A. At first she was. The appointment of circuit judges was not to go into effect until the 1st of January, but it was deemed advisable that these gentlemen, who were in the practice of law, should be notified beforehand to arrange their business, as terms of the circuit court would begin with the new year. She first agreed that she would make these appointments. Then she said she did not care to appoint Mr. Frear, but wanted Mr. Rosa. I had a long talk with her. I told her that Mr. Rosa's habits would make him unfit; that he got drunk. She finally on the 3d of January appointed those two judges. On the 29th of December there was talk all over town and in the lobby of the Legislature that there would be a vote of want of confidence against the Wilcox ministry, and on the 4th of January Mr. Bush introduced one. It failed, 19 to 22. On the 10th of January the lottery bill, which everyone supposed was dead, was moved up by C. L. Hopkins, who had just been elected by the lottery people.

Q. What is he doing now?

A. He is in the fishing business. I can not say he is in the opium business. It passed on the second reading to the astonishment of everybody by 20 to 17. It was hurried right along and passed its third reading on the 11th of January, 23 to 20. Six of the members of the house had gone home. On the 12th at half past 1 Kapahu introduced a vote of want of confidence in the Wilcox cabinet, and it passed, 25 to 16. Noble C. O. Beyer being the twenty-fifth man and he voted that way because Mr. Widemann was promised by the Queen that he should form a new cabinet. On the 13th of January there was no quorum in the morning. At half past 2 the cabinet came in—Parker, Cornwell, Peterson, and Colburn. That was Friday. That night quite a number of members tried to get their forces together to introduce a vote of want of confidence in that ministry. People said no, it is no use. Saturday morning Mr. Peterson announced to the Legislature that the Queen had signed two bills that had interested the community for a long time—the bill licensing the sale of opium and the establishing of smoking joints, and the lottery bill, giving an exclusive franchise to these individuals for a term of twenty-five years to establish a national lottery, for which they were to give the Government \$500,000 a year.

Q. Did the bill provide how it should be used?

A. It provided that a certain sum should be used for the laying of a cable between here and San Francisco.

Q. Any other public work?

A. I do not now remember.

Q. Did you participate in the meetings of the committee of safety on 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th of January?

A. I did not, being a judge.

I have carefully read the foregoing and pronounce it an accurate report of my interview with Mr. Blount.

A. F. JUDD.

No. 29.

Interview with the Hui Kalaiaina, Friday April 21, 1893.

At half past 3 a committee of the Hui Kalaiaina called at the headquarters of the Commission and presented resolutions from that society, which were read by the interpreter, Mr. Solomon Kaleiope.

In accepting the copy of the resolutions Mr. Blount responded as follows:

GENTLEMEN: Very much of the duties of my mission I can not communicate to you. I will say, however, that your papers which have been presented I will accept and forward to the President in the nature of information indicating the opinions of your people in these islands in reference to the inclination on your part to support the existing condition of things; that is to say, whether you are in favor of the Provisional Government and annexation, or whether your preference is for royalty. I am gathering information on lines of that sort for the purpose of submitting it to the President. That is the extent of what I can say to you by way of response. I would like to ask, however, a few questions. Which is the chairman of your committee?

INTERPRETER. W. L. Holokahiki, Honolulu.

(These questions were given and answered through the interpreter:)

Q. On the day of the prorogation of the Legislature a number of natives were reported to have gone in to see the Queen—about thirty in number—and that their object was to ask for a new constitution. Was that a committee from this organization?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many voters, people who vote for representatives, are there in this order.

A. Some thousands as we have it in our books; about 3,000 of native Hawaiians.

Q. What did the Queen say in response to your request?

A. That she was quite ready to give a new constitution, but her cabinet is opposed to it. Her cabinet refused it, so that she could not do otherwise. She told the people that they had to go home quietly and wait for the next session of the Legislature.

Q. When would that be if the Government had not been overthrown?

A. The time, according to our laws, was two years, and that would run us up to 1894.

Q. Then the information was that nothing could be done under two years on account of the disapproval of the cabinet?

A. Yes; the Queen could do nothing.

Q. She said she could do nothing?

A. Yes; because the constitution says she can do nothing without being approved by her cabinet.

Q. What did the committee do when they went out; did they give this information to the native people?

A. Yes, sir. This committee shortly after they came out they told the people they could not do anything now. That they would have to wait until the next session. Also the Queen came out and told the people she could not give them any constitution now because the law forbids.

(A great many petitions were exhibited; sometimes they were to the Queen and sometimes to the Legislature, asking for a new constitution.)

(A book was also shown, containing the names of members of the organization throughout the Islands, as follows:)

(Oahu, 2,320; Maui, 384; Hawaii, 266; Kaai, 222, and Molokai, 263.
Q. (To interpreter.) Why don't other natives join the organization?

A. They sometimes go to meetings. When anything happens they go together.

Q. These are active members of the organization?

A. Yes.

Q. In matters of this sort the natives followed the lead of the organization?

A. Yes, sir.

We have read the foregoing and pronounce it to be a correct report:

A. SOLOMON KALEIOPU, *Interpreter.*

W. C. HOLOKAHIKI.

J. ALAPAI.

JOHN KANUI.

J. A. KAHOONEI.

J. B. KUOHO.

J. KEEUI.

T. C. POLIKAPA.

D. W. KANAILEHUA.

No. 30.

*Interview with J. W. Kalua, president of the Annexation Club, and others,
May 1, 1893.*

Q. Please give the names of the delegates and the islands they represent?

A. Interpreter J. W. Kalua, president of the Annexation Club and chairman of the delegation, Rev. A. Pali, C. E. Coe, W. F. Pogue, C. F. Horner, and E. H. Bailey, all of Maui.

(Through interpreter.)

Q. Mr. Kalua, were you chosen by a convention of delegates from various districts chairman of the delegation to present their wishes on the subject of annexation?

A. I was.

Q. Are the natives you represent in favor of annexation unless they have the right to vote?

A. They are not.

Q. Are they in favor of it with any property qualifications?

A. They are not in favor of it.

Q. Have the annexation speakers in addressing them conveyed the idea to them that the right to vote would be preserved to them if they went into the American Union?

A. It has been said to them in speeches.

Q. If the right to vote is preserved to them they are willing to give up the Crown and become annexed to the United States?

A. They are.

Q. Mr. Coe, were you born in the Island?

A. I was born in Grant County, Wis.

Q. How long have you lived here?

A. Twelve years this coming fall.

Q. Are the natives in favor of annexation unless the right to vote is preserved to them?

A. I think not.

Q. Would they be in favor of annexation with a property qualification?

A. No, sir.

Q. With the right to vote preserved to them, they prefer to be a part of the United States rather than to be under the Crown?

A. Yes, sir, thinking that the progress of the country would be advanced by being part of the United States.

Q. Provided the right to vote is preserved?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Mr. Horner, is that your understanding of the situation?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Pogue, is that your understanding?

A. It is.

Q. Mr. Kalua, how many voters do you represent on the island of Maui?

A. Taking the annexation list for me to go by—the foreigners represent three-fourths and the natives represent one-fourth of the lists of the annexation club—in all 700.

(The interpreter, Mr. Kalua, says there are more names on the lists than 700, but they have not all been opened yet. He does not know the exact number. He says the people have not all subscribed who will subscribe, owing to the short time the club has been started—they have not had the opportunity.)

(The notes of the foregoing were read over to the interpreter and others and pronounced correct.—E. M.)

No. 31.

Interview with Rev. J. Kanoho, of Lihue, Kauai, Wednesday, April 19, 1893.

(Mr. George Mundon, interpreter.)

Mr. BLOUNT. What is your occupation?

A. I am a minister of the Gospel.

Q. How many members of your church?

A. Sometimes 30 and sometimes 50.

Q. Do you belong to the annexation club?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many members are there in that club?

A. I can not state exactly how many.

Q. Well, about how many?

A. I think about 200.

Q. Are they in favor of annexation?

A. They are in favor of annexation.

Q. Are they in favor of annexation without having the right to ballot?

A. No, sir; they are not in favor of annexation without they get their right to vote.

Q. How do they feel towards the Queen?

A. A portion of them would like to have the Queen replaced. Those who have not signed for annexation would like to have her back. Those who have signed are not in favor of having her returned.

Q. Have most of them signed in favor of annexation or not?

A. Yes; a majority of them have signed annexation papers.

The foregoing has been translated to me by Mr. George Mundon, and I pronounce it a correct report.

J. KANOHO.

HONOLULU, *April 19, 1893.*

NO. 32.

Interview with John Lot Kaulukou.

HONOLULU, *Thursday, April 13, 1893.*

Mr. BLOUNT. Where do you live?

A. In Honolulu.

Q. Were you in the city on the 14th of January last?

A. I was.

Q. Will you please give me a statement of the causes of the revolution which resulted in the dethronement of the Queen?

A. I will tell you what I know. On the 14th of January, the Queen dismissed the Legislature—discharged every member of the house at 12 o'clock. The Queen went into the palace with several people. On that day it was the first time I heard of the Queen's intention to declare a new constitution. Since 1887, after the decree of that constitution, the people were asking and filing petitions to the legislatures of 1890 and also 1892. There were many names on the petitions to his late Majesty Kalakaua, and when he died his sister came on the throne. The people sent petitions to the legislature and to Her Majesty the Queen to make a new constitution, because the people wanted to have a new constitution—a constitution for equal rights between everyone in this community.

Q. You mean by equal rights everybody to have the privilege to vote who were twenty?

A. Yes. The constitution of 1887 is to take away the rights of the natives to vote for the nobles. For instance, if I had property of \$2,999.99 I had no right to vote for nobles under that constitution, but a man who had an income of \$600, without property, he had that right. In these islands there were nine nobles and that man with an income of \$600 had a right to vote for nine nobles, and a man of property of \$2,999.99, he had no right to vote for noble, except one representative in the ward where he lived.

Q. You mean to vote for a member of the house of representatives instead of nobles.

A. Yes; and this man, with an income of \$600, he had a right to vote for nine nobles in these islands and also a representative in the ward where he lived. He voted for ten men. For that reason the people claim it is not right.

Q. These petitions to the legislature and to the Queen, what did they ask for in the matter of the election of nobles? Did they ask that the Crown should appoint them or the people be allowed to elect them?

A. That the people be allowed to vote for all—to give everyone an equal vote for both noble and representative. That was the intention of the petitions.

Q. Do you know what this constitution the Queen intended to proclaim contained in that connection?

A. No one in this community knows.

Q. You do know that the demand from the people was for the election of nobles by all classes of the people?

A. Yes; without any qualification.

Q. Well, please go on with your statement.

A. Many people went into the palace to see the Queen and also Kalakaua, and they sent a petition to the Queen and also to the legislature, and called a mass meeting, and that is the only reason Wilcox is elected; also Mr. Bush and Antone Rosa, and also the reason why they were elected in 1890.

Q. On the idea of making a new constitution on the ground these petitions asked for?

A. Yes; and also in 1892.

Q. In the elections of 1890 and 1892 the line of division amongst the people was upon that question of a new constitution, giving everybody the right to vote for nobles and representatives?

A. Yes; for any candidates running to oppose that view it was impossible for that man to go to the legislature in 1890 and 1892. They did not want the idea of taking all the power from the Queen. Under this constitution they took every power from the Queen.

Q. What power did they want to give the Queen?

A. In regard to veto. They wanted to give some power to the Queen. A bill goes to Her Majesty. They want to give that privilege to the Queen; if she thinks a bill not proper, not right, she should have the right to veto it.

Q. She did have that power and exercised it, didn't she?

A. After the case came before the court, the court decided in favor of her power to veto.

Q. When was that decision made?

A. I think about 1888 or 1889. It was after 1887.

Q. If that was settled by the court in 1888 or 1889, it would hardly be in the campaign in 1890 and 1892?

A. The real object of the people was for the constitution. They did not care about the veto question. They claimed the constitution was forced on Kalakaua. The people wanted a new constitution.

Q. You say the constitution was forced on Kalakaua. How was it forced on him?

A. He did not like this constitution.

Q. Why did he proclaim it?

A. People told him "if you don't sign this constitution we will overthrow you."

Q. What people?

A. White men—foreigners.

Q. Where did they live?

A. Here.

Q. And in the other islands?

A. In this island and in the other islands. I saw some from other islands.

Q. How many?

A. Saw only one that I remember.

Q. Any natives in the meeting which demanded the new constitution of Kalakaua?

A. Very few. About three or four natives went there.

Q. The native population is in the majority. Why didn't they stand

by him—by Kalakaua? He did not expect them to help him or he would not have yielded to the whites.

A. The Government had many soldiers and also volunteers. Volunteers supported the view of the new constitution in 1887. Many Portuguese. The officers had commissions from King Kalakaua. Government furnished guns and ammunition for them. Those people are the very people to oppose the King and go in favor of the new constitution. The Portuguese officers and men were opposed to the King.

Q. Do I understand you to mean that the desertion of these Portuguese officers and troops left him without the military power to oppose this movement of the whites?

A. The Portuguese officers and Portuguese soldiers went together with the volunteers at that time. There were two kinds of volunteers, white men, really white men, and the Portuguese joined together with the Thurston crowd and opposed the King.

Q. Were they volunteers?

A. Yes.

Q. How many soldiers had the Thurston crowd?

A. Including Portuguese, about 300. .

Q. How many had the King?

A. I think the King had 700 or 800.

Q. Was the King with 800 troops afraid of Thurston with 300?

A. He was not afraid. His Majesty wanted to go and fight, but so many of his friends would go back on him.

Q. Why did they go back on him?

A. I don't know.

Q. Who were they?

A. Haley was one of them. He was an Englishman, I understand. The King did not want to have bloodshed, so he signed his name on that constitution. I have no doubt in my mind that if the King had opposed this crowd we would have no more town of Honolulu. There would have been property lost and lives lost—great many.

Q. You mean in 1887?

A. Yes.

Q. But he did not want to see that?

A. No; he didn't.

Q. Well, please go on where I interrupted you.

A. After that we got a new constitution, and every one of us took oath to support it. I myself do not like the constitution—the way of getting it—but the regulation issued from the interior office if any one of the natives did not take the oath to support that constitution he had no right to vote. For that reason I myself and all the rest of my native friends took oath to support the constitution. So we lived under that constitution, and the people did not like it; I mean the natives. They did not like it, not because everything in the constitution is bad, but they did not like the way of getting it. They were disgusted by the way of getting it. Part of that constitution is really part of the constitution of Kamehameha V.

In the election of 1890 Wilcox was a leader, and Bush and several others. Their platform to go before the people is that they want a new constitution. Part of their crowd came in and joined the natives and said they must have a new constitution. At that time, if I remember right, McCarty—Charlie McCarty (he was one of the volunteers against the King in 1887)—was one of the candidates for noble in 1890 to oppose the constitution, and by uniting of foreigners and natives

the whole island on that principle elected members of the House of Nobles and Representatives.

Q. How did they manage to elect nobles with the property qualification?

A. As I told you, whoever had an income of \$600 had a right to vote for nobles.

Q. Were a majority of the nobles elected in 1892 for or against the constitution?

A. They did not want this constitution.

Q. You do not understand my question. In 1892 you elected nobles. Now, were a majority of the nobles elected in 1892 for or against the constitution?

A. They were against the constitution of 1887. They wanted to have a new constitution. Some of them say, all I want is amendments, but a majority of the people wanted a new constitution. So you see a majority of the people wanted a new constitution. I suppose that is the reason the Queen wanted to have a new constitution.

Q. Now, a majority of the nobles and representatives being in favor of a new constitution, why didn't they pursue the plan laid down in the constitution?

A. The trouble was at that time, before the election they came forward to the people with the idea of a new constitution, but when they go inside the house some of the people go back on their constituents and they turn around. Some of them, like Wilcox. He was strongly in favor of a new constitution, but he never did anything in the house to get a new constitution. Some of them introduced a bill to make a new constitution, and some people say that is against the constitution. But yet people talk outside "new constitution! new constitution!" When we go before the house we never get constitution. They never did anything. That is the reason we did not get a new constitution. The people wanted to have a constitution for equal rights.

On the 14th of January I was in the palace myself, and before I went into the palace I heard the Queen intended to proclaim a new constitution. I went in to see if it was true or not. While there I saw Chief Justice Judd. He asked me, what is all this? I said I didn't know. I heard the Queen was going to proclaim a new constitution. He asked me what sort of a constitution? I said I didn't know. He said he would give \$50 for a copy of that constitution. We stayed there about an hour, perhaps two hours, and then the Queen came from the blue room.

Q. What you call the throne room?

A. Yes. She said:

My people, I am sorry to say I can not proclaim a new constitution to-day, because of the advice from my cabinet not to do so. Therefore, my people, I want you to go home. Behave yourselves and keep quiet. Do not make any disturbance.

The people went home.

Q. Was that speech made in the throne room?

A. Yes; so the people went home quietly. On Sunday morning the first I knew there were some posters on the street, the committee of safety calling for a mass meeting on Monday. There were no names on it; just committee of safety calling mass meeting at the armory on Beretania street. Sunday was a very quiet day—no disturbance, no riot; no reason to make any one believe a revolution had come on Saturday and Sunday—and Monday morning I saw another poster to have another mass meeting for natives on Palace square at 2 o'clock. I was at this meeting on Palace square.

Q. How many people were there?

A. I think, including foreigners and natives, about 5,000. There were many foreigners there.

Q. How many foreigners?

A. I think more than 500, between 500 and 1,000, the rest were natives. They made speeches and thanked Her Majesty, the Queen, for her intention to proclaim a new constitution. She could not do anything now because her cabinet had advised her not; but the meeting thanked her for her idea to proclaim a new constitution. They adopted resolutions as follows:

Resolved, That the assurance of Her Majesty, the Queen, contained in this day's proclamation, is accepted by the people as a satisfactory guaranty that the Government does not and will not seek any modification of the constitution by any other means than those provided in the organic law.

Resolved, That accepting this assurance, the citizens here assembled will give their cordial support to the administration and indorse them in sustaining that policy.

The meeting adjourned and the people went home. They made no disturbance. Saturday the Queen ordered the people to go home quietly. The natives always listen. They always obey. On this day, Monday, Bush and Nawahi told the people to go home quietly and calmly. They did so. I went home. Several others went home without any idea of any revolution to come after that. About 5 o'clock in the afternoon was the first time we had news of the landing of the Boston's troops on shore—on the same landing you came the other day. We went down to see. Heard that some marines and blue jackets were there.

If you were here at that time you could hear foreigners and natives asking this question: "What does this mean? For what reason do these people come ashore?" From there they marched on Fort street, turned their right on Fort street and came up to the consul-general's office—Mr. Severance. I suppose there were twenty of them formed there. There were perhaps twenty or twenty-four went over to the minister's; the rest of them marched over to King street, the front of the palace. They went over with guns, Gatling guns.

Q. The soldiers had Gatling guns?

A. Yes; they had everything ready to meet their enemies.

Q. How long did they stop in front of the palace?

A. I think they stopped in front of the opera house about three or four minutes, and from there they went over to the front of the palace. When they got there they saluted the flag.

Q. What flag?

A. The Queen's flag. The Queen generally had the flag up when she was in the palace. From there they went over to the corner of the palace. They remained there.

Q. How long?

A. About five minutes. From there they went over to Atherton, the place where the consul-general lives. I was there myself. I saw them sitting down smoking. After that I came to the Government house. While I was there, I think they came from King street and took charge of Arion Hall for that night.

Q. Who did the building belong to?

A. Mr. Gilbert J. Waller.

Q. They got it from him for occupation that night?

A. I do not know. I heard they went in without permission. They remained there for the night.

Q. How long altogether were the troops about the palace; how much time did they stay there?

A. They stayed in front of the Opera House about five minutes and went over to the end of the palace gate and stayed another five minutes.

Q. Did they show any signs of being mad in any way—of wanting to fight?

A. What I understand is this: I saw their guns like this (holding his hands in a position to show that the weapons were ready for use), facing them towards the palace. Their intention I do not know. That evening everything around the town was very quiet. If I am not mistaken there was a band playing at the hotel that evening. A very important question in the minds of the people was: "Did you see the troops of the *Boston* come? What does this all mean?"

Q. Who were talking in this way, whites or natives?

A. Whites and natives too. I said nobody knows. Perhaps they have come to support the Queen's Government. I do not know. I will go back a little. On Monday the white men held their meeting at the armory. I was not there myself. There was nobody there except foreigners and some Portuguese.

Q. When you say foreigners, do you mean whites?

A. Yes, Germans, Americans and different nationalities. I think, from what I heard, there were only five natives there—Kanakas.

Q. Who were they?

A. One of them, I understand, is the editor of a newspaper under the control of the Serano E. Bishop—J. U. Kawainui. I heard there were five others.

Q. Was Wilcox there?

A. No, he was one of the speakers at the Palace square.

Q. Is he the man who headed the Wilcox revolution?

A. Yes. Wilcox says like this: "Any man who insults a lady is nothing but a pig and a hog, and more especially a man who insults the dignity of his Queen. He is nothing but a pig and a hog." At that time Wilcox had nothing to do with foreigners. He was strongly opposed against them. Tuesday morning the town is very quiet. The only question is this: What is all this? We never had any idea of a revolution or disturbance. About afternoon the only excitement I know we heard the news of the shooting of a man by Capt. Good, captain of the guard now at the barracks. He was sent to carry an order from the station house to stop the man to carry guns and ammunition that day. So Good shot him. People then saw there was some trouble coming up. Before that I saw some of these people here. I mean Thurston, C. L. Carter, W. L. Castle going around the streets. What they did I do not know. I saw Charlie Carter before 12 o'clock go over to Arion Hall and meet with one of the officers of the *Boston's* troop. The conversation I do not know. That evening, about half past 2, we heard the news of the proclamation of the Provisional Government and the overthrow of the Queen.

Q. What time was that?

A. About half past 2, I think. I did not look at my watch. I was there myself. A gentleman, now a judge on the bench, Mr. Cooper, he read the proclamation with his hand shaking.

Q. What day was this?

A. Tuesday the 17th. The marines of the *Boston* were lying between the fence of the Government house. They were lying there when the new government was proclaimed. Lying between the Government house and Arion Hall.

Q. How far is Arion Hall from the Government house?

A. About 50 or 60 feet.

Q. When that mass meeting was in session on the 16th where were the troops? Were there any troops on shore?

A. No. After that, about 5 o'clock of the same day, the troops landed.

Q. What did that mass meeting determine on that day?

A. The day the troops landed?

Q. Yes.

A. I can not tell you positively what was the object of their meeting. As I heard it, they wanted to overthrow the Queen because she was against her oath by her intention to proclaim a new constitution. Before Cooper read his proclamation for a new government, the marines of the *Boston* were lying at the same place. I was at the station house at that time with plenty of foreigners and also natives—plenty of white men and also natives ready to support Her Majesty the Queen's Government. We could have gone up there and cleaned those soldiers of the Provisional Government out in fifteen or twenty minutes. We had everything ready to go and fight. We could have cleaned up every one of them in fifteen or twenty minutes.

The barracks were in the hands of someone for Her Majesty the Queen. The station house was in the hands of foreigners and natives under control of the Queen's Government. So you see the Government building was the only place taken by the Provisional Government at that time. The barracks, the Queen's palace, and the station house were in the hands of the Queen's friends. I was one of the soldiers ready to support the Queen's Government. I think about 500 of us were there that day. Sam Damon came down there. He went out to Bill Cornwell, minister of finance; I saw him with Sam Damon.

Sam Parker was down at the station house. Peterson, the attorney-general, was there; Antone Rosa was there; in fact, the whole cabinet was there. The marshal was there; Deputy Marshal Martin was there, and a large crowd ready to go up to the Government house against the Provisional Government. While I was there I saw C. L. Hopkins in a carriage with a letter, and he went up to his excellency Mr. Stevens's residence. About half an hour afterwards Hopkins returned to the station house again with his answer to that letter.

The answer was, I understand, I am not positive, "I recognize the Provisional Government at this time." That is my understanding. I do not want you to think I saw the letter. We thought before Hopkins went up there that his excellency Mr. Stevens was in favor of Her Majesty's Government. When Hopkins arrived at the station house and some of the members of the cabinet read the letter they told us his excellency Mr. Stevens was in favor of the Provisional Government. He would not support Her Majesty's Government. For that reason we could not do anything, because we did not want to fight with the United States Government.

Q. When this man came back from the American minister with the letter recognizing the Provisional Government was the Queen then in possession of the barracks and the palace and the station house?

A. She was in control of the palace, in control of the barracks, and the station house. She was ready to meet the Provisional party. I assure you if Mr. Stevens had never sent any letter of that kind that evening I have no doubt the people in the Government building would have to clean out.

Q. How many were there?

A. About 50.

Q. Who knows how many troops the white people had there then—who else besides yourself knows about it?

A. Antone Rosa knows it; Henry Poor, he is three-fourths white; Charles Hopkins, and several others. At the time that man returned from Minister Stevens's house the station house, the barracks, and the palace were in control of the Queen.

Q. Was the Queen in possession of the barracks, station house, and palace when the proclamation was read?

A. Yes; I am sure. When we had news from Mr. Stevens in favor of the Provisional Government, then some of our friends said:

It is no use for us to go and fight the Americans. There are few soldiers here but there are 65,000,000 of people behind. It is no use to fight.

If Mr. Stevens had never sent that letter to recognize the Provisional Government I say Her Majesty would have remained on the throne to-day.

Next morning I read a letter from Minister Stevens in the newspaper. He said:

I recognize the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, because it takes the palace, the station house, and the barracks. That is my reason why I recognize the Provisional Government.

Now he had recognized the Provisional Government before they had taken charge of the station house, the palace, or the barracks. There was only the Government house in the hands of the Provisional Government. We could not fight the United States. If Mr. Stevens had never sent any word of that kind, if he had never interfered, you would see these people cleaned out in fifteen or twenty minutes, and the Queen remain on her throne till to-day.

Q. How do you know what was in the letter which Mr. Hopkins carried to Mr. Stevens?

A. I do not know. I saw Antone Rosa write a letter and Hopkins took it to give to his excellency, Mr. Stevens.

Q. The letter Mr. Rosa wrote in the station house?

A. Yes.

Q. When Hopkins came back he brought an answer. To whom?

A. To the members of the cabinet, because they remained in the station house.

Q. Where is the letter?

A. I suppose Sam Parker or the Queen has it.

Q. Will you find out and furnish me with the letters?

A. I will try.

Q. I want the letter taken by Mr. Hopkins and given to Mr. Stevens and the reply.

A. Yes.

Q. Well, please continue your narrative.

A. Her Majesty the Queen did not surrender her Government to the Provisional Government, but to the United States Government.

Q. How do a majority of the people feel towards the Provisional Government?

A. They are against it.

Q. By what majority, if there was a vote on the Australian ballot system?

A. I do not think the Provisional Government would get one-tenth of the native people from the Island of Hawaii to Niihau.

Q. That is the native people?

A. Yes.

Q. How about the whites?

A. I say I think nearly a majority of the white men in town is against the Provisional Government, or perhaps half and half.

Q. I have heard a good many natives were signing papers here and in other islands in favor of annexation. If that is true, how do you account for it?

A. I think some of them have signed their names in favor of annexation. I will give you the reason: Because their horses run in pasture of very people in favor of annexation. Some of them work under them on plantations. So they have control of them. Some natives sign because they are afraid of being turned out from their work. They say they will have no bread and butter; but if you declare an election like the Australian law, when their master or boss would have no control of them, it would differ.

I have carefully read the foregoing and pronounce it an accurate report of my interview with Col. Blount.

J. L. KAULUKOU.

No. 33.

Statement of Liliuokalani.

His Excellency JAMES H. BLOUNT:

SIR: On the morning of the 26th of November, 1890, I went to Iolani palace, where I met His Majesty Kalakaua's ministers, Mr. J. A. Cummins, C. N. Spencer, G. Brown, and A. P. Peterson, awaiting the appearance of His Majesty.

We did not have to wait long and were ushered into the library, the King seating me in his chair and formally introduced his ministers to me. After exchanging assurances of fidelity to each other and faithfulness in the discharge of their official duties, the ministers left, and the King and I were left to talk over matters.

He told me of things that had transpired a few months back. That some of the ministers had thrown guns and ammunition into the sea from the steamer *Waimanalo*. It was done to prevent him from having them, and had evidently been directed by the reform party with whom a portion of his ministers were in accord, instead of keeping them for his protection and safety. These ministers were working with a party of conspirators, who are the very same parties who have been the means of the overthrow of my government on the 17th of January, 1893. They are called the missionary or reform party. The King went on to say that his guards had been reduced to twenty men and they were barely sufficient to protect me if there should be any disturbance. He had requested Mr. Cummins, minister of foreign affairs, to send back to the palace all the guns that were at the station house and that the carriages had been sent to the palace but the guns themselves had been kept back. It was an insult by his cabinet and he felt keenly his weakness; that he had no more power or influence since his cabinet was working against him. He explained all these things because he wanted me to study my situation so as to be able to cope with it.

The time for his departure on the U. S. S. *Charleston* drew near and he bade the Queen and myself farewell, and I felt in my own heart some misgivings that I would never see him again.

I spent a few nights in the palace and realized the insecurity of the situation. Every two or three nights there was an alarm of some kind. There was a fear that something was going to happen; what that something was no one could tell. Mr. Cummins had heard of some conspiracy but could not prove anything.

During the session of 1890 the Honolulu Rifles were disbanded, but the members of that company were still allowed to carry arms in the streets and to wear the uniforms.

I asked my husband, the Hon. John O. Dominis, how all this could be allowed. He referred me to the minister of foreign affairs. On inquiring of the minister he said that they were part of the Knights of Pythias and were permitted to carry arms. This was very unsatisfactory, and my husband and I concluded that there must be some underhanded dealings somewhere. After that I preferred to remain at Washington Place, only going to the palace during office hours.

A few weeks passed, and during that time grand preparations were made to receive the King on his return; but the morning of the 29th of January, 1891, the city was startled with the news that the U. S. S. *Charleston* was in sight with the Hawaiian flag flying at half mast.

I was so shocked by the news that it seemed as if I was in a maze, especially as those things which took place on that day was all done in a hurry by my ministers, of whom Mr. Godfrey Brown seemed to be leader.

Things that might have been put off for a day or two were all done that day, and I had no time to think wisely of my situation, or to realize the sad grief that had fallen on Kalakaua's Queen and myself and on the whole nation.

On that day, at 11, I was told that I was to take the oath. I sent a note immediately to my husband (at Washington Place) who was lying on a sick bed, and told him of the arrival of my brother's remains, and of all that had transpired, and he came to the palace weak as he was.

We conversed on the subject before us; also about the constitution. I told him I did not wish to sign it, as there was a general feeling in the community, and principally amongst the native Hawaiians, that it was not a good constitution, as it had been forced on the King and the Hawaiian people, but my husband persuaded me to sign it, and I obeyed.

At 2 o'clock p. m. we entered the room where all the privy councillors were assembled and there, in their presence, I took the oath of office and swore to abide by the constitution of 1887. As we left the room and waited in the blue room to receive congratulations as well as condolences, just before the members came in a piece of paper, hurriedly written, was thrust in my hand, on which was written, "Do not sign the constitution; I shall soon explain why." But the deed was done. Chief Justice Judd was the first who came forward, but instead of congratulations, said in an undertone, "Should your ministers come up, say to them that they may keep their portfolios." I suspected something wrong and kept my countenance.

After all the others had come and gone their turn came. Mr. Cummins, as head of the cabinet, said: "Your Majesty, we wish to say that we are not quite sure that we can hold our commissions." Then Mr. Brown finished the sentence for him by saying that the constitution distinctly states that the cabinet could only be dismissed by the Legislature; therefore, all that was required would be to have new commissions made out for them. It will be seen there is no clause in the constitution providing for the cabinet in case of the demise of a sovereign.

I asked them each to keep their portfolios until after the King's funeral, and at that time I would discuss the matter. On the 15th of February, 1891, the funeral took place, and on Monday, the 16th, at 9 a. m., Mr. Cummins and I had a private conference. He evidently wanted to know what my decision would be. I told him I thought they ought to resign, and I would give him another position.

At 10 I met the following gentlemen in the cabinet council: Mr. J. A. Cummins, Mr. C. N. Spencer, Mr. G. Brown, Mr. A. P. Peterson. I told them I had studied over the situation, and concluded that they could not remain as my cabinet; that they ought to resign. They said they had also considered the question and concluded that I ought to give them new commissions, and asked me to give them more time to consider, and it was granted them. It took two weeks before it was finally settled.

At 12 m. of the same day an audience was granted to Admiral Brown, as he intended to sail soon. When the hour for the reception arrived, I was surprised when the American minister, J. L. Stevens, came also, as no notice had been previously given to my chamberlain that it was his intention to come.

After the usual form of presentation was over Mr. Stevens took the opportunity to make an address, which I thought was not at all suited to the occasion. It was the first step that Mr. Stevens took to interfere, and I felt at the time that he would take some future occasion to make trouble. Two days after Admiral Brown remarked to me that I did not seem overpleased with Mr. Stevens's speech and that my eyes flashed fire.

Two weeks elapsed, when the cabinet consulted the supreme bench, and was told that they could not hold their seats or positions without I gave them new commissions, so they resigned.

The reading of the King's will took place, and Admiral Brown was invited by the Queen dowager to be present. I appointed my new cabinet. They were Mr. S. Parker, minister of foreign affairs; Mr. C. N. Spencer, minister of interior; Mr. H. A. Widemann, minister of finance; Mr. W. A. Whiting, attorney-general. I also appointed Mr. C. B. Wilson marshal.

Before I appointed my ministers Messrs. Bush and Wilcox called and offered their services, but as Mr. Bush had shown his ingratitude to the late King, and Mr. Wilcox a disposition of disobedience on the occasion of his revolution of 1889, I felt I could not have such men for ministers, and appointed others, which made them very angry.

I began a tour to the different islands with my husband and quite a large retinue. It took us nearly six months to make a complete tour, now and then returning between times to Honolulu on business matters, and in the month of July my husband was taken sick and on the 27th of August, 1891, he breathed his last. I felt his loss very much, as his experience of several years' service with Kamehameha IV and V, and also under Lunalilo and Kalakaua's reign, proved valuable to me. He was a kind and affectionate husband, a man of honor, and esteemed by all who knew him. To those whom he gave in charity it was never spoken of. His death was a severe loss, for I needed him most at that time to advise with in the affairs of state.

Soon after the appointment of my ministers I asked my husband to come to the palace and stay. He did not wish to because he had to climb those long stairs; so I told him I would have the bungalow put in repair and furnished, and Mr. Robertson, my chamberlain, had instructions to that effect, and to see that it was done.

My husband made a request that when the ministers were ready to put up the iron fence around the palace grounds (for which the Legislature of 1890 had given appropriations) he would like to have a wicket gate made for his own convenience. I told him to speak to Minister Spencer, which he did, but the gate was not finished until 1892, and it had never been used by anyone except Mr. Robertson, my chamberlain, to let the young ladies and gentlemen of the Minuet Club pass through.

Here I will state that in 1889 that palace walls had just been completed at a great expense to the Government and after the Wilcox revolution, this very L. A. Thurston, the agitator, who was in the cabinet that year, saw fit without any regard to the heavy amount expended on the wall, ordered the whole wall to be torn down; hence the appropriation of 1890 for an iron fence. The missionary ladies' party clapped their hands with glee as they stood outside the post-office and said, "Thank the Lord the country is ours." Had their fathers left a dying request that they should eventually control and hold power over these islands? One would suppose so from the actions of their sons and daughters.

I return to the events which took place after my husband's death. I asked my cousins Princes Kawananakoa and Kalauliaule to come and stay at the bungalow, but they did not seem inclined to do so, so one day Mr. Wilson asked if he and Kitty, his wife, might not come and stay with me, as he thought that it was necessary I should have some one near me to protect me, as he was fearful that some evil-minded person might do me harm, as there were parties who did not hesitate to make hateful remarks about me in his presence. Perhaps I was the obstacle to the full accomplishment of their wishes—that is *power*.

Mr. Wilson is a man of great decision and firmness of character, and as he had been appointed marshal of the Kingdom, I thought it would not be out of the way if I did accept his offer. I regretted in one sense shortly after that, that I had consented, because he was not the same person I had known as a boy. He was 19 years of age when he courted Evaline, a young girl who had almost grown up in our household, and my husband and I encouraged their marriage; but many years had flown by, and he had been through rough experience in his duties and exhibited now and then how well suited he was to the appointment of marshal. He had a brave heart and his wife I have a great fondness for.

The Legislature, Mr. Wilson said, was about to convene, and it was necessary for him at such a time to be near me, and I thought it best to let them remain till after the prorogation.

The day arrived for the opening of the Legislature, and I felt that my troubles had commenced. With such a party of men as those who comprised the Reform party, and with such unscrupulous men as Thurston, W. O. Smith, Alex. Young, J. Marsden, W. C. Wilder, and Henry Baldwin, as leaders, I knew that my cabinet would find it a difficult matter to contend against such a party.

Laws were made mostly for their special benefit, and others that would prove injurious to the Hawaiians and other nationalities. They brought in measures which only tended to prolong the session and to give them time for their scheme of annexation to ripen. In the meantime Thurston took a trip to the States to attend to his cyclorama, and at the same time try to make stipulations for annexing these islands.

In the month of August the Reform party began their policy of dismissing the ministry. They made promises to Mr. Cummins, of the

National Reform, and Bush, Wilcox, and Ashford, of the Liberal party, and P. P. Kanoa of seats in the cabinet if they joined their party, and they did so, besides taking Kamauoha, Iosepa, and another member with them, which made the Reform party very strong. On the 31st of August, for no good cause, the Parker ministry was voted out in accordance with a clause in the constitution of 1887, that any minister could be voted out by a majority of the members of the House for "want of confidence." It had been decided by myself and cabinet that our policy should be one of economy and retrenchment. This had been our course from the commencement of my reign, binding ourselves strictly to and guiding our course according to the laws and regulations of our Kingdom. The Parker ministry had no sooner gone out than twenty-five Hawaiian members of the House petitioned me to appoint Mr. Parker again. Next day Mr. Baldwin asked for audience and came with a request that I would receive the Hons. Kanoa and Kauhane and ask them to form a cabinet for me.

I received those gentlemen, but they brought with them a petition with a list of names, principally of the Reform party, that I would nominate from those names my cabinet. They called the [*sic*] a constitutional principle. I knew if I yielded to their request I would be yielding my own right under the constitution, which gave me the right to appoint and the house to dismiss.

Two weeks passed and I appointed Minister Parker, Gulick, Macfarlane, and Neumann. The policy of this ministry was retrenchment in all directions, and Mr. Macfarlane, as minister of finance, immediately set to work with that purpose in view, and laid many satisfactory plans for them to pursue. In order to carry out the rigid economies prepared by Mr. Macfarlane, I consented to a reduction of \$10,000 in the appropriation for my privy purse and further reductions in "household expenses, state entertainments, and the military."

They had, however, been in office only a few days when the American minister, J. L. Stevens, made a request through Minister Parker that he would like to call on me the next day, the 16th of October, and that he would bring his secretary with him. The hour was set for 11 and a cabinet council was called to sit at 10. When the hour arrived, the cabinet rose to depart. I asked them to remain, but Mr. Macfarlane begged to be excused, as he had once, while as noble in the house, brought in a resolution against Mr. J. L. Stevens on account of a speech he made on the 30th of May, reflecting on the administration in Hawaii. Mr. Gulick and himself were excused and Mr. Parker and Mr. Neumann remained. Mr. Parker went to the door and received Mr. Stevens and at the same time asked what was the purpose of his visit, that he might apprise me. Mr. Stevens said he would mention it to me in person. They entered, followed by Mr. H. W. Severance. He seated himself in a manner which no gentleman would in the presence of a lady, and drew from under his arm a document which he read, stating that my Government had grossly insulted him, the ambassador of the United States and minister plenipotentiary for that nation, and holding them responsible for an article which appeared in the Bulletin reflecting upon his indifference in sending relief to the captain and crew of a shipwrecked American vessel.

He then read a clause in international laws relating to a minister's position in foreign lands. While he was reading he seemed to belaboring under great excitement and anger, and when he finished reading I rose and said my cabinet would give the matter their best consideration, whereupon Mr. Stevens and Mr. Severance took their leave. Was

he seeking to make trouble? I remarked to Mr. Parker and Mr. Neumann that it appeared that way. Next day a lunch was given by the ladies of the Central Union Church; the occasion was to help pay for the new church on Beretania street. Mr. Henry Severance took the occasion to say to me that he was entirely ignorant as to the intention of Minister Stevens before they arrived at the palace, as he had not told him of the object of the visit and was surprised at Mr. Stevens's conduct. I did not answer. Some correspondence passed between Mr. Stevens and my ministers, which resulted in the cabinet entering a suit for libel against the Bulletin, which was afterwards withdrawn by Mr. Stevens.

It was during this month that a meeting was held at the residence of Mr. Alexander Young, and a discussion arose as to my obstinacy in not appointing one of their number. They called this "constitutional principle." At this meeting it was proposed to dethrone me. The question was asked how it was to be accomplished, when it was stated that Capt. Wiltse of the *Boston* would assist.

Changes of ministry followed rapidly. The Cornwell cabinet lasted only one hour. Its members were W. H. Cornwell, J. Nawahi, C. T. Gulick, and C. Creighton. Without giving this cabinet any trial they were immediately voted out.

Here I must mention that when the Mafarlane ministry was voted out I wished to send them back to the house again, but Mr. Macfarlane and Mr. Neumann advised to the contrary. I felt loath to give up a cabinet composed of men in whom I had reason to know the community had confidence that their transactions would be straightforward and honest.

The Wilcox (Reform) cabinet came next. They were appointed by stratagem, as I found out afterwards. The policy of this cabinet was retrenchment, no changes in the monetary system of the country, and to make a commercial treaty which would bring us in closer relationship with the United States.

Their first policy they failed to carry out, as they went into all sorts of extravagant measures, such as \$5,000 for sending a commission to Washington—and that commission were to consist of Thurston, Wilcox, and others—with the purpose of annexing these islands; \$12,000 to send the band to Chicago, and \$50,000 for the Volcano road. All these measures were for Mr. Thurston's private benefit, but were passed in the house. It had always been customary for the ministry to consult the King or sovereign in cabinet council on any measure of importance, but in this instance and on all occasions the cabinet had already decided on those measures, and simply presented them to me for my signature. I had no resource but to acquiesce.

Whenever I expostulated their answer was generally "We have consulted the chief justice, and are of one opinion." I found that I was simply a nonentity, a figurehead, but was content to wait patiently until the next session, when probably they would be voted out.

It required diplomacy to overthrow the Wilcox cabinet and the Liberals used it. The cabinet felt secure because those who worked amongst the members as wire-pullers were so sanguine about their success, but where corruption is practiced there is no stability, and such it proved in this instance.

A short time before the overthrow of the Wilcox cabinet Cummins, Bush, R. W. Wilcox, Ashford, and their followers, finding that their hopes of being in the cabinet would never be realized, left and turned to help the Liberals once more, and with the aid of some of the Nationals

they were successful. They did not like the actions of the cabinet when it became known that the ministry had no consideration for the Queen and were carrying things in such a high-handed way.

These members had been deceived by the Thurston party, and they now combined to help the Liberals. Mr. White was the introducer of the bill providing for a constitutional convention; also the opium and lottery bills. He watched his opportunity and railroaded the last two bills through the house, but he failed in regard to the first bill.

A vote of want of confidence was then brought in. Three days before members flocked in at Washington Place and wanted to know if I wanted to get rid of my ministers. I said "No, it is not my privilege," they departed and others came and went. Mr. Colburn and Ashford called and said they understood it was my wish. I answered them as I did the others. Mr. Ashford said "I see, Mr. Colburn, we have made a mistake, but Your Majesty, should it be your desire to be rid of your cabinet, we can be of great service in bringing it about, but we would expect to have a representation in the new cabinet." I asked who of their number they would put forward, and Mr. Ashford replied "Mr. Cummins, Bush, and myself." I made no further reply, and they left.

It was a practice among some of the native members to sell their votes for a consideration. This was taught them by the Thurston party. They would come to me and then return to that party and repeat all that was said, for which they were usually paid something.

The Liberals won and the cabinet was voted out, partly because they were so sure of their success and on account of their own corrupt practices.

Mr. Geo. N. Wilcox and Mr. Robinson I have a high consideration for. Mr. P. C. Jones is a hearty sympathizer with his party, while I think Mr. Cecil Brown capable of doing anything that the Reform party directed him to do. Mr. Berger's vote was the casting vote. It was decided between Mr. Parker and myself that Mr. Widemann was to be a member of the next cabinet and for that reason Mr. Berger voted against the Wilcox cabinet. And so it was, for Mr. Widemann gave his consent and afterwards he withdrew. The next day Mr. Parker, Cornwell, Colburn, and Peterson were appointed. These gentlemen were accepted by the majority of the people in the house, who applauded them on their entrance, because they were men of liberal views, although they were not considered representative men, because they were not backed by moneyed men.

The same day of their appointment they advised me to sign the opium and lottery bills. I declined at first, as I wanted to please my lady friends, but they said there should be no hesitation on my part, as the house had passed those bills by a large majority, and they had been signed by the President and committee. I had no option but to sign. It took place on the 13th of January, 1893.

During the month of November, 1892, a private note was sent me informing me of the intentions of the American minister, J. L. Stevens, with the aid of some of our residents, to perfect a scheme of annexation, and that the cabinet had knowledge of the fact, but I gave little heed to it at the time.

On the 17th of December, 1892, another note was received, of which the following is a copy:

Her Majesty Queen LILIUOKALANI, may it please your Majesty:

MADAM: Referring to the confidential communication I took the liberty of addressing your Majesty a few weeks ago, about the attitude and utterances of the Ameri-

can representatives here, the perfect correctness of which have been confirmed by subsequent information, I now beg to be allowed to state, that through the same trustworthy source I have been informed that in a very late moment of effusion, some American official gave to understand that he had instructions to press and hurry up an annexation scheme, which he confidently expected to carry through at no distant date, with the help and assistance of the present cabinet.

If your Majesty will kindly weigh this information by the side of the bold open declarations and annexation campaign made at the present time in the Bulletin, by the Rev. Sereno Bishop, the well-known mouthpiece of the annexation party, I think that your Majesty will be able to draw conclusions for yourself, and realize not only that there is yet danger ahead, but that the enemy is in the household, and that the strictest watch ought to be kept on the members of the present cabinet. This again in strictest confidence from

Your Majesty's humble and faithful servant.

The above was written by a gentleman in whose word I have great confidence as a man who had the best interest of Hawaii at heart.

It was on the receipt of this note that I sent for the British commissioner, James H. Wodehouse, and asked his advice on the matter. I asked whether he thought it would be wise for me to invite all the foreign representatives of the diplomatic and consular corps fearing that a disturbance might arise over the political situation. He said he should not interfere with our local matters, and he dissuaded me from the idea, as he said it was like acknowledging that there was actual danger. "Did I think there was any danger?" I answered, "there might be." The morning of the 14th of January, 1893, arrived with all preparations for the closing of the Legislature. At 10 a. m. I called a cabinet meeting for the purpose of apprising them of their positions in the house and other preliminary instructions. I told them it was my intention to promulgate a new constitution. The cabinet had to meet the Legislature and we adjourned. At 12 m. I prorogued the Legislature. I noticed that the hall was not filled as at the opening. There were not many ladies present in the audience, and I also noticed that several members of the Legislature belonging to the Reform party were not there. This looked ominous of some coming trouble.

On entering the palace I saw Mr. Wilson at the entrance of the blue room. I went up to him and asked if all was ready. He replied, "Yes." Then I said, "You will have to be brave to day," and I passed into the blue room and sat awaiting my ministers. A half hour passed and they did not come. After a little longer delay they arrived. I immediately judged from their countenances that something was wrong. I had a few days before planned that I would sign the constitution in the throne room and in the presence of the members of the Legislature, the majority of whom had been elected by the people for the purpose of working for a new constitution.

At the commencement of my reign petitions were sent from all parts of the kingdom asking for a new constitution. Mr. Iosepa, of Hani; Kaui, of Ewa; Nahinu, of Molokai; Kanealii, of Waihee; Kamauoha, of Kohala, and other members came to me repeatedly and asked for a new constitution. Mr. Parker, from the commencement of his ministry, advocated a new constitution, as well as most of my friends, but I was cautious in my answers to them; but to Mr. Parker I had always said it would be a good thing, and he said he would sustain me when the proper opportunity arrived.

A month later I met two members of the Legislature, and started in to make up a new constitution from Kamehameha V and that of 1887. After completing it, I kept it till the month of October, when I placed in the hands of Mr. A. P. Peterson, and asked him to correct it, and if he found any defects to strike them out and to put in such clauses as he thought would be good for the people and for the country. He

took it and kept it a whole month. To my knowledge he consulted many lawyers and others in regard to many points of interest in the document. When it was returned I looked it over and found no changes had been made, so I concluded that it was all right.

A week before the closing of the Legislature I asked Mr. Peterson to make a preamble for my new constitution, but up to the day of prorogation he had not made one.

Early in January I mentioned to Capt. Nowlein, of the household guards, and Mr. Wilson, the marshal, my intention to promulgate a new constitution, and to prepare themselves to quell any riot or outbreak from the opposition. They assured me they would be ready, and I gave strict injunctions of secrecy and showed Mr. Wilson a plan of the throne room on the day of the signing.

Mr. Parker and Mr. Cornwell had given me assurances of their support before their appointment as ministers, while Mr. Peterson understood that such was my intention, and although I had not mentioned it to Mr. Colburn, he had heard of it already from Mr. Peterson.

It appears that immediately on their learning of my intentions Mr. Colburn, on the morning of the 14th of January, immediately acted the part of a traitor by going to Mr. Hartwell, a lawyer, and informed him of my intentions, and of course received instructions from him to strongly advise me to abandon the idea.

This, then, was the cause of the delay and my long waiting in the blue room. The members of the diplomatic corps had been invited; also the members of the supreme bench and members of the Legislature, besides a committee of the Hui Kalaiaina. The latter were invited to be present because it was through them that many petitions had been sent to me. When the ministers arrived I told them everything in the throne room was ready and the guests were awaiting our presence; that we must not keep them waiting. I was surprised when the cabinet informed me that they did not think it advisable for me to take such a step, that there was danger of an uprising, etc. I told them that I would not have undertaken such a step if they had not encouraged me. They had led me out to the edge of a precipice and now were leaving me to take the leap alone. It was humiliating. I said, "Why not give the people the constitution and I will bear the brunt of all the blame afterwards." Mr. Peterson said, "We have not read the constitution." I told him he had had it in his possession a whole month.

The three ministers left Mr. Parker to try to dissuade me from my purpose, and in the meantime they all (Peterson, Cornwell, and Colburn) went to the Government building to inform Thurston and his party of the stand I took. Of course they were instructed not to yield. When they went over everything was peaceful and quiet, and the guests waiting patiently in the throne room.

The ministers returned and I asked them to read the constitution over. At the end I asked them what they saw injurious in the document. Mr. Peterson said there were some points which he thought were not exactly suited. I told him the Legislature could make the amendments. He begged that I should wait for two weeks; in the meantime they would be ready to present it to me. With these assurances I yielded, and we adjourned to the throne room. I stated to the guests present my reasons for inviting their presence. It was to promulgate a new constitution at the request of my people; that the constitution of 1887 was imperfect and full of defects. Turning to the chief justice I asked, "Is it not so, Mr. Judd?" and he answered in the affirmative, in the presence of all the members assembled.

I then informed the people assembled that under the advice of my

ministers, I had yielded, as they had promised that, on some future day I could give them a new constitution. I then asked them to return to their homes and keep the peace.

I noticed the look of disappointment in their faces when I retired. During all that transpired in the blue room from, 1 o'clock p. m. to 4 p. m., I was not at all agitated; was as calm as could be expected under the circumstances. When I reached the landing of the upper hall I heard a commotion below in the yard, so I hurried to the front veranda, accompanied by Prince Kawanauakoa and Kalaniauaoe, and from there I addressed the people, saying that their wishes for a new constitution could not be granted just then, but will be some future day. They must go home and keep the peace and to pray for me, which they have done ever since.

There was a dinner prepared, at which forty persons sat down; everything was orderly and without confusion in the palace, and everything remained so all night. At 11 a. m. Sunday, the 15th, Mr. Parker came in to say that there was a meeting taking place in the Government building by the Reform party, but he did not say of what nature.

All Sunday everything seemed quiet until Monday morning. Even if any great commotion had been going on I would have remained indifferent; the reaction was a great strain, and all that took place after that I accepted as a matter of course. It was the disappointment in my ministry.

At about 10 a. m. Monday, the 16th of January, notice was issued by my ministers, stating "that the position I took and the attempt I made to promulgate a new constitution was at the earnest solicitation of my people—of my native subjects." They gave assurances that any changes desired in the fundamental law of the land would be sought only by methods provided in the constitution itself and signed by myself and ministers. It was intended to reassure the people that they might continue to maintain order and peace.

At about 5 p. m., however, the troops from the U. S. S. *Boston* were landed, by the order of the United States minister, J. L. Stevens, in secret understanding with the revolutionary party, whose names are L. A. Thurston, Henry Waterhouse, W. R. Castle, W. O. Smith, A. F. Judd, P. C. Jones, W. C. Wilder, S. B. Dole, Cecil Brown, S. M. Damon, C. Bolte, John Emmeluth, J. H. Soper, C. L. Carter. Why had they landed when everything was at peace?

I was told that it was for the safety of American citizens and the protection of their interests. Then why had they not gone to the residences instead of drawing in line in front of the palace gates, with guns pointed at us, and when I was living with my people in the palace?

I was sitting alone in the blue room when Mr. Widemann and Dr. Trousseau came in hurriedly to inform me of the approach of the troops. I asked them to go out and tell the people to be quiet, which they did.

There was no intention on the part of the Hawaiians to harm them or to raise any disturbance of any kind, nor was the life of any American citizen in danger. These revolutionists, having their wicked plans and objects in view, and feeling sure of the support from the American minister, had worked their feelings to such a state of excitement that they called a meeting of the citizens and met at the armory at Punch Bowl street on Monday at 2 o'clock p. m. There may have been 1,200 present, but the majority of those present simply went to see and hear what the revolutionists had to say, and had no sympathy with them or

their ideas. At the meeting they made incendiary remarks and appointed what they called a committee of safety. The Hawaiians called a massmeeting and passed resolutions supporting the actions of the Queen. It was a movement intended to reassure the people and to ward off the danger which they saw was approaching.

The troops remained in front of the palace until dark, when they withdrew to the Arion Hall.

That evening the Royal Hawaiian Band played as usual at the Hawaiian Hotel, and a large crowd of people met and everything around was quiet and peaceful. Tuesday morning at 9 o'clock Mr. S. M. Damon called at the palace. He told me that he had been asked to join a revolutionary council, but that he had declined. He asked me what he should do and whether he should join the advisory or executive councils, suggesting that perhaps he could be of service to me; so I told him to join the advisory council. I had no idea that they intended to establish a new Government.

At about 2:30 p. m. the establishment of the Provisional Government was proclaimed, and nearly fifteen minutes later Mr. J. S. Walker came and told me "that he had come on a painful duty, that the opposition party had requested that I should abdicate." I told him that I had no idea of doing so, but that I would like to see Mr. Neumann. Half an hour later he returned with the gentleman, and I explained to him my position, and he advised that I should consult my friends. I immediately sent for Mr. J. O. Carter, Damon, Widemann, Cleghorn, my ministers, also Mr. Neumann, Walker, and Macfarlane being present. The situation being taken into consideration and found, that since the troops of the United States had been landed to support the revolutionists, by the order of the American minister, it would be impossible for us to make any resistance. Mr. Damon had previously intimated to Mr. Parker that it was useless to resist, their party was supported by the American minister. Mr. Damon also said at the meeting that it was to be understood that I should remain at the palace and continue to fly the royal standard. At 6 p. m. I signed the following protest:

I, Liliuokalani, by the grace of God and under the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against any and all acts done against myself and the constitutional Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming to have established a Provisional Government of and for this Kingdom.

That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America, whose minister plenipotentiary, His Excellency John L. Stevens, has caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the said Provisional Government.

Now, to avoid any collision of armed forces, and perhaps the loss of life, I do, under this protest and impelled by said forces, yield my authority until such time as the Government of the United States shall, upon the facts being presented to it, undo (?) the action of its representative and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

Done at Honolulu this 17th day of January, A. D. 1893.

(Signed)

(Signed)

(Signed)

(Signed)

(Signed)

(Addressed)

To S. B. DOLE, Esq., and others composing the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

LILIUOKALANI R.

SAMUEL PARKER,

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

WM. H. CORNWELL,

Minister of Finance.

JOHN F. COLBURN,

Minister of Interior.

A. P. PETERSON,

Attorney-General.

A letter was sent to the marshal of the Kingdom requesting him to deliver everything to the Provisional Government.

All that night and next day everything remained quiet.

At 10 a. m. the 18th, I moved to Washington Place of my own accord, preferring to live in retirement.

On the 19th of January, I wrote a letter to President Harrison, making an appeal that justice should be done.

His Excellency BENJAMIN HARRISON,
President of the United States:

MY GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND: It is with deep regret that I address you on this occasion. Some of my subjects, aided by aliens, have renounced their loyalty and revolted against the constitutional Government of my Kingdom. They have attempted to depose me and to establish a Provisional Government in direct conflict with the organic law of this Kingdom. Upon receiving incontestable proofs that his excellency the minister plenipotentiary of the United States aided and abetted their unlawful movement and caused United States troops to be landed for that purpose, I submitted to force, believing that he would not have acted in that manner unless by authority of the Government which he represents.

This action on my part was prompted by three reasons, the futility of a conflict with the United States, the desire to avoid violence and bloodshed and the destruction of life and property, and the certainty which I feel that you and your Government will right whatever wrongs may have been inflicted upon us in the premises. In due time a statement of the true facts relating to this matter will be laid before you, and I live in the hope that you will judge uprightly and justly between myself and my enemies.

This appeal is not made for myself personally but for my people who have hitherto always enjoyed the friendship and protection of the United States.

My opponents have taken the only vessel which could be obtained here for the purpose, and hearing of their intention to send a delegation of their number to present their side of this conflict before you I requested the favor of sending by the same vessel an envoy to you to lay before you my statement as the facts appear to myself and my loyal subjects.

This request has been refused and I now ask you that in justice to myself and to my people that no steps be taken by the Government of the United States until my cause can be heard by you. I shall be able to dispatch an envoy about the 2d day of February, as that will be the first available opportunity hence, and he will reach you with every possible haste that there may be no delay in the settlement of this matter.

I pray you, therefore, my good friend that you will not allow any conclusions to be reached by you until my envoy arrives.

I beg to assure you of the continuance of my highest consideration.

(Signed)

LILIUOKALANI R.

It appears that President Harrison could not have taken notice of my appeal, or perhaps he was as anxious as the Provisional Government to annex these Islands, for the 16th of February I find he sent a message to the Senate transmitting the treaty, with a view to its ratification, without having first investigated or inquired into all the conditions or points of our situation, or that of the United States itself. I will not attempt to write the President's message, as you are already aware of its text.

I also wrote a letter to Mr. Cleveland, dated the 31st of January, 1893.

His Excellency GROVER CLEVELAND,
President-elect of the United States:

MY GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND: In the vicissitudes which happened in the Hawaiian Islands, and which affect my people, myself, and my house so seriously, I feel comforted the more that, besides the friendly relation of the United States, I have the boon of your personal friendship and good will.

The changes which occurred here need not be stated in this letter; you will have at the time at which it reaches you the official information, but I have instructed the Hon. Paul Neumann, whom I have appointed my representative at Washington, to submit to you a précis of the facts and circumstances relating to the revolution in Honolulu, and to supplement it by such statements which you may please to elicit.

I beg that you will consider this matter, in which there is so much involved for my people, and that you give us your friendly assistance in granting redress for a wrong which we claim has been done to us, under color of the assistance of the naval forces of the United States in a friendly port. Believe me that I do not veil under this a request to you the fulfillment of which could in the slightest degree be contrary to your position, and I leave our grievance in your hands, confident that in so far as you deem it proper we shall have your sympathy and your aid.

I am, your good friend,

LILIUOKALANI R.

On the 31st of January the Hon. Paul Neumann received his appointment as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the United States of America. On the 1st of February he departed for Washington, with Prince David Kawananakoa to accompany him on his commission, to negotiate for a withdrawal of the treaty and to restore to us what had been taken away by the actions of the revolutionists. At my request Mr. E. C. Macfarlane kindly consented to accompany the commission.

Happily, Providence ordered otherwise than as was expected by the revolutionists. Man proposes and God disposes. My commissioners arrived in time to stay the progress of the treaty. The members of the Senate became doubtful as to the correctness of the actions of the commissioners of the Provisional Government.

President Harrison's term expired, and President Cleveland's inauguration took place, and I hailed it as a good omen, having met him in 1887 while he occupied the Presidential chair that year, and I have not been disappointed.

President Cleveland's first act has been to withdraw that annexation treaty; the second, to send a Commissioner to investigate the situation in Hawaii Nei.

Your arrival in this country has brought relief to our people and your presence safety. There is no doubt but that the Provisional Government would have carried out extreme measures toward myself and my people, as you may have already seen ere this, by their unjust actions. If the President had been indifferent to my petitions I am certain it would have brought serious results to myself and tyranny to my subjects. In this I recognize the high sense of justice and honor in the person who is ruler of the American nation.

In making out this lengthy statement I will present the main points:

(1) That it has been a project of many years on the part of the missionary element that their children might some day be rulers over these islands and have the control and power in their own hands, as was the case after the revolution of 1887. Mr. W. W. Hall openly stated that they had planned for this for twelve years. It was a long-thought-of project, a dream of many years. So also said Mr. F. S. Lyman, of Hilo, in his speech to the people in the month of January. He said, "Fifteen long years we have prayed for this, and now our prayers are heard."

The disposition of those appointed to positions of authority, to act with the missionary element, tends to make the Government unstable, and because they found I could not easily be led by them, they do not like me.

(2) The interference of the American minister, J. L. Stevens, in our local affairs and conspiring with a few foreign people to overthrow me and annex these islands to the United States, and by his actions has placed me and my people in this unhappy position.

(3) My attempt to promulgate a new constitution. It was in answer

to the prayers and petitions of my people. They had sent petitions to the late King, and to the Legislature ever since 1887.

The Legislature is the proper course by which a new constitution or any amendments to the constitution could be made; that is the law. But when members are bribed and the Legislature corrupted how can one depend on any good measure being carried by the house? It is simply impossible. That method was tried and failed. There was only one recourse, and that was, that with the signature of one of the cabinet I could make a new constitution.

There is no clause in the constitution of 1887, to which I took my oath to maintain, stating "that there should be no other constitution but this," and article 78 reads that—

Whosoever by this constitution any act is to be done or performed by the King or Sovereign it shall, unless otherwise expressed, mean that such act shall be done and performed by the Sovereign by and with the advice and consent of the cabinet.

The last clause of the forty-first article of the constitution reads:

No acts of the King shall have any effect unless it be countersigned by a member of the cabinet, who by that signature makes himself responsible.

My cabinet encouraged me, then afterwards advised me to the contrary. In yielding to their protest I claim I have not committed any unconstitutional or revolutionary act, and having withdrawn, why should the Reform party have gone on making preparations for war, as they did?

(4 and lastly.) That on the afternoon of the 16th of January, at 5 p. m., the United States troops were landed to support the conspirators, by orders of the United States minister, J. L. Stevens;

That on Tuesday, the 17th of January, 1893, at about 2:30 o'clock p. m., the Provisional Government was proclaimed, and Minister Stevens assured my cabinet that he recognized them, that Government; that at 6 p. m. of the same day I yielded my authority to the superior force of the United States.

We have been waiting patiently, and will still wait, until such time as the Government of the United States, on the facts presented to it, shall undo the act of its representative.

I hope and pray that the United States and her President will see that justice is done to my people and to myself; that they will not recognize the treaty of annexation, and that it may forever be laid aside; that they will restore to me and to my nation all the rights that have been taken away by the action of her minister; that we may be permitted to continue to maintain our independent stand amongst the civilized nations of the world as in years gone by; that your great nation will continue those kind and friendly relations that have always existed for many years past between the two countries. I can assure that Hawaii and her people have no other sentiment toward America and her President than one of kindest regard.

The Provisional Government, instead of being under the guidance of the President and cabinet, as the responsible heads of the nation, are virtually led by irresponsible people, who compose the advisory councils and "provisional army," and who set the laws of the land at defiance. A continuance of this state of things I consider dangerous to life and to the community.

I pray, therefore, that this unsatisfactory state of things may not continue and that we may not suffer further waste, justice may be speedily granted and that peace and quiet may once more reign over our land, Hawaii Nei.

Interview with Albert B. Loebenstein, of Hilo, Hawaii, surveyor and civil engineer, Tuesday, April 11, 1893.

Mr. BLOUNT. What is your business?

Mr. LOEBENSTEIN. I take charge of lands belonging to the Government in respect to rents and suggestions I am pleased to give relative to their reservation, whether best to sell them or what disposition.

Q. Will you tell me in whose hands the lands of the islands generally are?

A. Government lands?

Q. The whole land system?

A. The Crown lands, the Government lands. The amounts of Government land is about 873,000 acres and of Crown over 900,000 acres, throughout the group.

Q. Who owns the residue?

A. Bishop estate and private parties?

Q. What is the amount owned by private parties?

A. I can not say. The report of 1890 will give the figures of that.

Q. Can you tell me as to the holdings of the Kanaka population?

A. They are very small indeed.

Q. Can you give me any figures?

A. I can not. The tax returns would give that most accurately.

Q. To whom should I apply for that?

A. To the minister of finance. I know it is very small, and each year diminishes in amount.

Q. By leases and sales?

A. Mostly by mortgages, which foreclose by nonpayment of interest and principal. The Chinese have a large amount of lands which were originally assigned to Kanakas on these islands.

Q. Have they absolute title?

A. In most instances they hold by lease.

Q. They are not lands which belonged to the chiefs?

A. No; they are lands which come under the head of Kuleanas—small holdings, seldom over 5 acres in extent, and on these islands they are the principal lands which form taro patches and receive irrigation. They are now controlled by the Chinese.

Q. The Chinese are not owners of sugar plantations, are they?

A. No; I believe there is but one sugar plantation owned by Chinese, and that is on the island of Molakai. That has since been sold, and now the only plantation interest owned or controlled by Chinese is one on the island of Hawaii, and more particularly the plantation of Pepeekeo, in the district of Hilo, of which one-third of the capital stock is owned by one C. Afong.

Mr. LOEBENSTEIN continuing at 11 o'clock Wednesday, April 12.

Mr. BLOUNT. This is a map of Hawaii?

Mr. LOEBENSTEIN. Yes.

Q. What do the various colors represent?

A. The yellow represents land belonging to the Crown, the green that owned by the Government.

Q. And the remainder?

A. The remainder represents individual ownership and other ownership, including lands conveyed by the Government, and also Kuleanas,

which represent small parcels conveyed to the original tenants, who resided on the land at the time that the land system was established.

Q. By whom?

A. By Kamehameha III. They were conveyed by the King on confirmation of the land commission subsequent to 1848.

Q. Were not some of them conveyed to chiefs?

A. No; all the lands which were conveyed to the chiefs were merely in reward for services rendered by their ancestors at the time of the conquest by Kamehameha I.

Q. Now, what part of the lands, outside of the Government lands and the crown lands, belongs to what is known as Kuleanas, and what part belongs to individuals and corporations?

A. At the time the awards were made about 11,000 acres in all were conveyed as Kuleanas by the King and privy council. Subsequent to that, and I might say for a short time preceding, sections of land were sold by the King, and subsequently by the Government, and royal patented to individuals—Hawaiians and foreigners—about 290,000 acres in all.

Q. What part of the 290,000 acres did the natives get?

A. On the Island of Hawaii, two-thirds; this is approximate. I want to be on the safe side, giving the Hawaiians the benefit of the ratio. Then there remained, of course, the lands which are still owned by the Government, and also those which come under the crown lands proper. On figuring up the area of the crown lands of Hawaii, allowing for those lands whose area is not correctly known, I should say there were over 625,000 acres of crown lands on the Island of Hawaii. There are nearly 600,000 acres of Government land. There are lands which come under the head of unassigned lands, and also those which have not yet been investigated, that I should say were nearly 150,000 acres more.

Q. What do you mean by unassigned?

A. At the time the land system was established a list of lands was made out. Certain lands were to be given to chiefs; others were reserved by the King, and the remainder were to form what has since been called Government lands. Certain lands were overlooked, and have since come under the head of unassigned lands. The larger portion of the crown lands are now under lease for long terms of years.

Q. What is the limit?

A. Thirty years, allowed by law. A number of these leases have lately been made, which of course throws them out of any calculation for development by small settlers for sometime to come.

Q. To whom are they leased?

A. Corporations.

Q. And for what purpose?

A. Grazing purposes and cane cultivation. That land is only suitable for that purpose and also for the needs of planters.

Q. What do you mean by the needs of planters?

A. They felt that they required land for the purpose of planting cane, and they offered so much a year, and generally they got it—sometimes far below the actual value. I know of several instances where leases have been executed for crown lands far below their actual value.

Q. To corporations?

A. Yes. Of course a large quantity part of this crown land is absolutely worthless. A reference to the map will show that most of these crown lands converge towards the backbone of the island. Then there

is a large amount of lava and other volcanic country unfit for anything, but enough remains to be applicable to purposes of farming, especially small farms. In the higher altitudes crops can be raised which are grown in temperate zones, and nearer the level of the sea tropical products. I should say that of these 625,000 acres 50 per cent can be made available, after the leases which now tie them have expired. I think the value of the crown lands has been very much overrated.

Q. You speak of the natives owning Kuleanas, and then of their having gotten lands sold by the Government.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The latter class; are they in small parcels or not?

A. The largest amounts of land sold to the native Hawaiian by the Hawaiian Government are seldom over 100 acres in extent. There are some which are of larger area, and when so have generally been purchased by a number of individuals pooling together.

Q. Well, now, the pooling of these lands; who owns them?

A. To-day?

Q. Yes.

A. Individuals.

Q. For sugar culture?

A. Yes, and for grazing. I should say that by far the larger part is now in the hands of foreigners.

Q. Did the natives sell it?

A. They sold it and they raised money on it by mortgage, and in some instances lost it by foreclosure.

Q. Have they conveyed away in that way the larger proportion of their holdings?

A. I should say that not over 10 per cent of the land originally conveyed to the Hawaiians or purchased by them from the Government has remained in their hands to-day.

Q. The lands sold then are generally in the hands of these corporations?

A. Yes, sir. I should state, in this connection, that the larger portion of the lands sold by the Government is situated in the districts of Kohala, Hamaqua, and Hilo, the three districts on the island of Hawaii which now produce over one-half of the crop of the Hawaiian Islands, over 60,000 tons. The districts of Kona and Kau in the olden times were mostly settled by Hawaiians. The fishing was good, and they preferred to live there in preference to living on the windward side of the Island. As the plantations throughout the group expanded and their needs for land increased, it gradually assumed control of these little sections.

Q. By purchase?

A. The process would be this: The Hawaiian would get hard up. He wanted to raise money on his property, and of course the plantation was always ready to advance that money; or if he went to other parties it would sooner or later be transferred to the plantation. The man who had made him advances would want his interest or principal, and in the natural course of events it always came over to the corporation, and this is how they managed to obtain the whole or larger part of the land.

Q. Now, the lands on the leeward; who are they owned by now mostly?

A. The ownership is about even between the descendants of the original awardees and the others who have obtained control in the manner I have just stated.

Q. What are they used for?

A. For grazing lands and sites for dwellings. The leeward side is largely volcanic—very rough and rocky—and the lower contours are unfit for anything but grazing. The higher contours are generally on larger awards, which are now owned by others. This condition holds good with the other islands as on Hawaii, only more emphatically so.

Q. You mean to say that these changes of title are more emphatic than on Hawaii?

A. Yes; Hawaii is only a sugar-producing island of comparatively recent date, while Maui and Kauai were the initial points of the sugar industry.

Q. How about this island?

A. Sugar on this island is of comparatively recent date. The total amount of land owned by Hawaiians on these islands does not exceed 7,000 acres. I am giving approximate figures.

Q. How much is owned by other parties?

A. The remainder. I think the area of this island is about 340,000 or 350,000 acres.

Q. And the remainder, after taking out the amount owned by natives?

A. About 65,000 acres is owned by the Crown; a small tract is owned by the Government and the Bishop estate, and private parties, mostly foreigners, come in for the remainder. Of the 7,000 acres I have given 1,200 acres or thereabouts is now under cultivation by the Chinese in rice and taro patches.

Q. Did they get that from the natives?

A. Yes. The remaining 6,000 is what is called Kula land, or plateau land. It is all heavily mortgaged.

Q. About what rate of interest is charged?

A. The legal rate is 9 per cent.

Q. Suppose more than that is charged?

A. If it is with the consent of the mortgagor, he is held.

(Mr. Loebenstein here presented a map of the island of Maui.)

Q. Will you please tell me what opportunity you have had for getting this information you have been giving this morning?

A. I have been a surveyor for a number of years and I am constantly traveling over all the islands of the group. I have taken great interest in the land system here and given it a careful study. I know the Hawaiian language thoroughly—I speak it, read it, and write it.

Q. How long have you been in the islands?

A. Off and on, fifteen years. I was born at Macon, Ga.

Q. You have not been south since you have been away?

A. No.

Q. Your surveying has been done at the instance of private parties or the Government?

A. Both. The Government has frequently retained me for work when their own corps was insufficient to carry on the work, but I am not a salaried Government official.

Q. You have perhaps found it more profitable to have private employment?

A. Oh, by far.

Q. When employed by the Government you get the same rate of pay?

A. I charge the same rate as I do to private parties. I would say this—that I also hold an appointment as Government land agent for the island of Hawaii, and my duties are to maintain an oversight and

supervision of Government lands. I have always endeavored to look out for the interest of the people as against the grasp and greed of other parties—that is in respect to fair figures for rentals, and setting apart such lands as I think should be set apart for homestead settlers, so as to give the experiment of small farming in the country a fair trial. Of the lands set apart for homestead purposes on the island of Hawaii there are about 7,000 acres in all, which have been laid out in tracts not exceeding 20 acres.

Q. Now, going from the land question, do you know anything about the causes which led to the dethronement of the Queen and the establishment of the Provisional Government?

A. I believe I have kept myself posted on the events of the day. I believe I understand to some extent how the crisis was brought about.

Q. Please give me your views.

A. Since the forcing of the new constitution upon Kaulakaua there has been a constant endeavor on the part of the Sovereign to undermine those constitutional checks which were set against the royal prerogative. That of course led to constant collision.

Q. You mean force?

A. No; constitutional collision. In many instances the constitutional side of the question, as I understand it, was set aside. That is to say, by opinions and decisions from the highest court in the land—the supreme court. The sovereign was generally sustained. All these different results and different tendencies finally combined in making the issue very plain and broad. Then again the Hawaiian looks upon the Government and upon official position as a legitimate source from which to fill his pocket. In other words, he is naturally corrupt. The younger generation have only the one ambition—to become Government employés. For this reason the sovereign has generally been able to depend on that element in its encroachments on constitutional liberty. These different streams all converged into that revolution of a few months ago, which set aside the Queen. I know, of course, that at times there must have been a private understanding and differences of opinion which were adjusted in order to maintain a peaceful condition of affairs.

Q. Who were these private understandings between?

A. In this statement I am giving my own individual opinion. I have nothing authoritative, but events have occurred at times which any lover of constitutional liberty, or anything which meant the independence of white men, would grit his teeth over and still find things would remain the same.

Q. Did these differences run along the race line generally?

A. I could answer that in this way—that what differences there have been have generally resulted in the race line being sharply drawn, and the Hawaiian would of course use his vote in strengthening his side of the case. There has been no working in harmony between the two races for the last ten years.

Q. The difference then practically has been between the whites and the Crown and the natives on such questions as you have already indicated? Is that true?

A. It is undoubtedly so.

Q. Did there seem to be a general sentiment amongst the whites for annexation?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When did that get to be pronounced?

A. You mean as a public enunciation?

Q. You can state it both ways.

A. It became a public enunciation January 16, and before that time there had been several. I know of one instance where the same movement was in force to bring about annexation.

Q. What time was that?

A. Between the months of March and October of 1892.

Q. Was that the Ashford-Wilcox movement?

A. Yes; I was requested to join the movement. It was a secret conspiracy at that time.

Q. The object being to dethrone the Queen?

A. To overthrow the throne and have annexation. I won't say to what republic. It was the initial step to evolve a system of annexation.

Q. Why did it fail?

A. In the first place the officials nabbed the head conspirators before the thing was ready. My personal conviction is that the time was not ripe; that capital, which is proverbially timid and slow to accept a new order of things, was unwilling to embark in the scheme.

Q. Did the leaders of that movement have anything to do with the failure of the capitalists to join?

A. Yes, sir; I believe it was the want of responsible men—who were known as men of financial standing in the community—that was the cause of the failure. Some of the leaders who were then announcing annexation are now violently opposed to it.

Q. And were they on the 16th of January?

A. I know of two who in public utterances opposed the movement.

Q. What is your judgment as to the disposition on the part of the people toward the Provisional Government?

A. Hawaiians, you mean?

Q. You can take the several classes in such order as you want.

A. I believe the feeling among the whites generally is in support of the Provisional Government. There are exceptions, but I think I have a right to say they do not represent the respectable element in the community.

Q. How are they in point of numbers? What percentage of the white population?

A. I know there are very few.

Q. There is an English element here. How is it disposed towards the present Government?

A. Equally divided as to annexation and nonannexation.

Q. Is it true or not that they and the whites generally are looking at the matter from a business standpoint?

A. In my conversations with a number of leading sugar-planters, and managers who represent owners, they have advanced several reasons like this: We are fully aware that the bounty is a thing that can be knocked in the head. We do not care. We want better government. And as for the contract labor, we can get along without it. We have enough Japanese in the country now. Some of them look at the thing from a financial point of view, and might be unwilling to express these views.

Q. What do they desire and expect if they entered into union with the United States?

A. Stable government.

Q. What do you mean by stable government?

A. A government which is not under the pleasure of a sovereign whose mere will or wish or pleasure will overthrow constitutional rights.

Q. The larger part of the population here is not white?

A. No, sir; they are not—whites only a small minority.

Q. Well, then, if the Portuguese and the Japanese and the Kanakas were allowed suffrage, would they not overthrow the political power of what is called the best people here?

A. The Hawaiians alone would do it without the aid of the other elements.

Q. With that in view, what is the expectation of the better class as to the question of suffrage in connection with their desire for annexation?

A. The original intention was—which is a matter of history—to apply for union with the United States and to be accepted by them under a territorial form of government.

Q. And so avoid the suffrage question?

A. Yes.

Q. Looking to the fact that, as you have said, the native population would overwhelm the better elements in any political contest if manhood suffrage was adopted, what condition, what relation could they hope to have with the Government of the United States to protect them from that situation?

A. A territorial form of government, formed on lines parallel to the government of the District of Columbia. That was the original idea and expectation when the Queen was dethroned.

Q. After the Provisional Government was established?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You say that was the original idea?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What is the idea now—any change of feeling or belief or hope?

A. I do not think so. I think the feeling remains the same; but, in view of the opposition which this has brought forth, the matter has now evolved into a desire to give them civil rights.

Q. Who?

A. The Hawaiians.

Q. To what extent?

A. Votes.

Q. Without qualification?

A. That has not been entered into, so far as I know.

Q. Do you think, in view of what you have said about the Government being overwhelmed by a popular vote, would you suppose they would be satisfied to go into the Union, giving unqualified suffrage to the native population?

A. I do not think they look that far ahead. I believe that the suffrage given to the Hawaiians would make them a football and an object which different political parties would try their best to get hold of. At the same time the Hawaiian has no love for the present dynasty of sovereigns.

Q. And if the question of annexation was submitted now?

A. It would be overwhelmingly defeated.

Q. By whom?

A. By the Hawaiians.

Q. Have you thought over that, and are you giving me your deliberate opinion?

A. I have studied the matter carefully.

Q. Then I will ask you why it is that so many of the native population are signing petitions in favor of annexation?

A. It illustrates the natural instability and unreliability of the

Hawaiian character. He signs petitions in favor of one thing to-day and repudiates it by signing a different one to-morrow.

Q. Then how could you feel assured that if submitted to a ballot he would vote against annexation?

A. He is in the hands of political leaders of his own race.

Q. And their leaders are against it?

A. Their leaders are at present against it. Personally, he is indifferent.

Q. The revolution of 1887, from which came the constitution of that year, was that accomplished by the people about Honolulu and on this Island?

A. The practical part of it was accomplished by the people of this town. There were divisions and auxiliary branches sworn to bring about the same results on the other islands.

Q. Made up of what race of people?

A. Whites, entirely.

Q. They did not participate in the actual movement in Honolulu at the time of the overthrow of the Queen?

A. No; it was purely and simply a movement by the people of Honolulu.

Q. Was there any participation on the part of anybody on any other island than this?

A. Only a moral support.

Q. I mean any physical force which was resorted to?

A. No; but a number of them were prepared to exert it if necessary to do so. I was one of them.

Q. You say there had been an organization in existence for some time for that purpose among the whites?

A. For annexation?

Q. No; I am speaking of the movement of 1887.

A. Yes, sir; it was conceived some time in January, 1887, and culminated in June, if my recollection is correct.

Q. The object of it was to wrest from the King the authority to appoint nobles?

A. Well, the object was to bring about a cleaner condition of affairs and to check his tendency to absolutism.

Q. Where did they get their arms from?

A. From San Francisco, and they were supplied by various mercantile firms in this town. I would say that there were in existence several militia companies who had arms and ammunition for sometime.

Q. In the movement of the 14th of January had there been any preparation in the way of the white people possessing themselves of arms?

A. I can only speak from hearsay and reading the papers.

Q. What did you believe?

A. That there was no preconcerted action whatever.

Q. They went to the armory, it appears from some proceedings furnished at Washington, and got arms. Do you know anything about those arms?

A. They were taken there after the mass meeting had been held in town protesting against the action of the Queen.

Q. From what source taken there?

A. From several mercantile houses here.

Q. What kind of arms?

A. Rifles—Winchester and Springfield, and whatever guns were there. Private citizens who had arms in their possession responded

and delivered them over to the committee of safety. When we heard of this on the other islands we put our guns in order. I had several.

Q. Is it the practice on the other islands to do as you did to have arms?

A. No, it is not; but very few had been as prominently identified as myself in matters of this kind. I had several rifles given to me at the close of hostilities in 1889. There was fear that an outbreak might occur on one of the other islands and naturally these arms and a lot of ammunition were given to me.

Q. And were they distributed about town in the same way?

A. I do not believe they were. It was for fear hostilities might arise and it was deemed best to distribute them there. A number there are of men who frequently go hunting and as a rule have a rifle or two in the house. But the Hawaiian is not naturally bloodthirsty. He is too indolent, and any crisis or issue which would have to be fought out by force of arms with native Hawaiians pitted against white men would be merely the result of demagogue teachings.

Q. Is it not generally accepted here that the superiority of the white race always suppresses the inferior races?

A. Yes; that is the feeling among white people.

Q. Is not that true?

A. Yes; emphatically true.

Q. Whenever you get to an emergency and the people are thoroughly aroused there is a feeling on the part of the white people that they can exert their will?

A. Certainly; and the average Hawaiian does not care.

Q. He is not disposed to fight?

A. No; it is not in him, but the leaders and half-castes—they are the dangerous element in the community.

Q. Well, but in a contest with the whites have they ever been able to successfully rally this native force?

A. No. I speak from experience, gathered in 1889, where a comparatively small body of whites were able to cope with an immeasurably superior force of natives. The average Hawaiian really does not care in this contest for annexation, but in any case at issue between his color and white men he will side with his own race. Get the leaders out of the way and the Hawaiians would very soon be reconciled. A few leaders keep alive the race issue.

Q. Is it not easy in a legal way to get rid of these leaders?

A. They can be influenced by financial considerations.

Q. Then, in order to control popular elections here, it would be necessary to resort to the use of money with the leaders?

A. I know it would be necessary or else give them places. The younger men are the ones on whom these demagogues depend. The younger ones really have a hatred of white men.

Mr. BLOUNT. Thank you. I will not detain you longer.

My father arrived in United States in 1848 from Germany. He was more or less mixed up with political matters there. He was traveling in Macon at the time I was born. I was brought up in New York City—graduate of Cooper Union—as a civil engineer and mechanical engineer. I was born in Macon in 1857, when my father, who was a musical artist, was traveling.

I have carefully gone through the foregoing interview between Col. J. H. Blount and myself and pronounce it to be an absolutely accurate report.

ALBERT B. LOEBENSTEIN.

HONOLULU, April 17, 1893.

No. 35.

Interview with Curtis J. Lyons, assistant on Government survey, Honolulu, Wednesday, April 12, 1893.

Mr. BLOUNT. Mr. Lyons, I ask you to give me what you conceive to be the causes of the revolution—the causes of the dethronement of the Queen and the establishment of the Provisional Government?

Mr. LYONS. The revolution of 1887 was the spontaneous rising of the better elements here against the ultramonarchical government of Kalakaua.

Q. Let me interrupt you here. What do you mean by the better element of the people?

A. By the better element I mean the leading element in society and in business.

Q. And what nationalities would cover that?

A. Americans, English, and Germans.

Q. Please proceed.

A. The influence of the King over the Legislature was one of the grievances, and the meddling of Kalakaua unnecessarily with foreign matters in the Pacific, which would naturally lead us into trouble.

Q. What foreign matters?

A. Samoan matters. Then the taking of a large bribe from the Chinese for an opium license was especially aggravating. To illustrate the meddling of the sovereign in the Legislature. At a previous Legislature I have seen—

Q. Previous Legislature to what?

A. Previous to 1887—I have seen the King in the noon interim for lunch go with a body of legislators to the house of Mr. J. E. Bush, then minister of the interior, to arrange things for the afternoon session. It was the acknowledged object of their meeting there. The feeling in 1887 became very great. A body of volunteer riflemen was drilled.

Q. By whom?

A. By one of the Ashfords.

Q. They were not organized by the Government?

A. They were organized under the volunteer act; that is, volunteer companies were allowed, and under that act this volunteer company was drilled. Clubs for rifle practice were formed. The revolution was accomplished by means of a mass meeting which included the larger part of the foreign population of Honolulu. The rifle company was called out ostensibly to preserve order.

Q. By whom?

A. As I understand it, Antone Rosa, the attorney-general. He was requested to order it out. I do not know the details. At that time I was in charge of the survey office. I did not deem it honorable to join the movement, although my sympathy was with it. The rifle company came over to the Government building ostensibly to protect the life of William M. Gibson. A committee was sent to Kalakaua.

Q. Who was William M. Gibson?

A. He was then premier, minister of foreign affairs. The committee went to the King with demands, the main feature of which was the appointment of a new ministry which should prepare a new constitution. The ministry was appointed and the constitution promulgated in one week. This constitution had three notable features of reform. The first, that no executive officer of the Government should be elected

to the Legislature nor any member of the Legislature appointed to executive office during the biennial period for which he held office. That the nobles in the Legislature who had previously been appointed by the King should be appointed by a restricted vote having a property qualification.

Q. What was the property qualification?

A. It was a yearly income of \$600, or property of \$3,000 in real estate. The third important feature: the King was not to dismiss a ministry without a legislative vote of want of confidence. The vote for representatives which had been previously enjoyed was untouched. The vote for nobles was an entirely new feature which had never been enjoyed by any one previously. After this revolution—the Reform party which sustained it—

Q. Will you wait one moment? With a property qualification of \$3,000 or an income of \$600 to vote, how would the number of native voters compare with the number of white voters?

A. That could be settled by reference to the great register. My impression is that about 25 per cent of the voters would be Hawaiians.

Q. And the balance would be whites?

A. That is my impression.

Q. The result of that would have been to have given—if the whites were united—the election of nobles to them?

A. If they had been united it would.

Q. Was that the object of the change in that particular?

A. The object of the change from the King's appointment to the electoral appointment was to limit the power of the King.

Q. The effect would be the disqualification of the mass of the native population, so that there would not be more than 25 per cent of them having the right to vote as against 75 per cent of the whites. So that the proportion was fixed in order to give the white element the greatest power in the selection of the body of natives [nobles]?

A. It was not done with any reference to whites or Hawaiians. It was simply on the general principle of giving to those who had sufficient intelligence to earn \$600 per year the predominating influence.

Q. Conceding that principle, was it not expected that the principle applied would result in the whites having the power to select the body of nobles?

A. I can not say that was the exact intention as between the whites and the Hawaiians.

Q. Was it the expectation of the intelligent people on the islands that the application of this principle would mark out somewhat about what you have stated—25 per cent of the votes for the nobles by Hawaiians and the remainder by the whites—was that in the minds of the ruling class here then?

A. Any reflecting person of that class would see that that would be the consequence.

Q. Please resume.

A. After the successful ending of that revolution, matters went on well for some months, but there gradually developed a disruption.

Q. Of what?

A. The elements that carried the revolution through. What was called the National Reform party originated in opposition to what was called the Reform party. It gathered to itself a large element of the Hawaiian strength. It didn't sympathize with the main movement, and the Legislature of 1890 secured the ministry of that party.

Q. What party?

A. The National Reform party as opposed to the original Reform party. It is hard to define the elements of party in this little community. There was more or less complaint about the constitution of 1887.

Q. In what way—the matter of the election of nobles?

A. Principally in regard to the election of nobles.

Q. What was the exact point of complaint?

A. That the property qualification was too high. The Reform party claimed that the Hawaiians, the complaining party, had never had the privilege of voting for nobles anyway. Therefore they were not deprived of anything. The Legislature of 1892 may be characterized largely as a struggle for the possession of the ministry for the Government. It revealed, too, to thinking people the weakness of the system. I mean the ministerial system.

Q. What weakness did it reveal?

A. The change of government being placed so entirely in the hands of the Legislature it became a temptation to gain possession of the Government by manipulation.

Q. On the line of vote of confidence or want of confidence?

A. Yes. That Legislature lasted about seven months. The community generally became weary of the long struggle.

Q. Do you mean all classes and all races?

A. Yes. Several critical measures were hanging over the community. One was for unlimited paper currency—a paper currency based upon real estate, and practically unredeemable.

Q. What became of that currency bill?

A. It was defeated.

Q. By what vote?

A. I do not remember. I think it was not a very large majority.

A. (Continuing.) There was a bill for legalizing a lottery scheme which was favored very largely by the Hawaiians in the community as well as in the legislature. There was also a bill for renewing the opium license. Later in the session, about four months after the beginning of the session, a ministry was secured which commanded the respect of the business part of the community. Later on in the session there were attempts made to oust this ministry. The party which may be characterized as the reform party opposed this. They said that such a measure would tend to weaken the whole system of government, and it might perhaps bring on a crisis.

Q. In the form of debates in the legislature?

A. No; as outside advice. There was a feeling that if the Government didn't maintain its superiority that foreign interference might take place. The advice of these people who were in favor of what afterwards became the annexation movement, was to retain that ministry, and my opinion is that if it had been retained the Queen would have been on her throne to-day.

Q. Do you mean by that that the condition of that ministry would have been in accord with the views and feelings of the Reform party?

A. No, sir; but the displacement of that ministry produced alarm and resentment. It produced a feeling that the Government was unreliable. There was a withdrawal of business confidence. With reference to annexation ideas at that time, I would say that the general feeling as understood among planters and others was against it for this reason, that contract-labor system, which has been considered almost essential, would doubtless be broken up; and in the second place the United States tariff coming into effect here would affect business unfavorably in many

respects; in the third place there was little confidence that the sugar bounty would be continued and in the fourth place it was persistently said that the United States would not take us. I have favored annexation in a quiet way, so far as it was courteous for a person in my position, for a great many years. One attempt was made to oust the ministry, which is known as the George Wilcox ministry, which might be characterized as the Reform ministry which failed. Later on the lottery bill was passed by a very small majority, only one white man, as I remember, voting for it. I myself remonstrated with one of the members of the Legislature against making that a race issue, as the Hawaiians appeared to be making it so.

Q. Will you explain to me what you mean by making it a race issue as the Hawaiians appeared to be doing?

A. They seemed to regard it as somehow intended to benefit them.

Q. What was the exact idea they had as to how it would benefit them?

A. I do not know. I do not comprehend, myself. There is an instinctive tendency on the part of the Hawaiians to take the crown side upon questions of this sort. On one occasion in the Legislature the argument was seriously brought forward in favor of a bill that the Queen favored it. I forget what bill it was.

Q. Brought forward by some man making a speech?

A. Yes. (Continuing.) The lottery bill passed and there was a doubt in the minds of its supporters whether the ministry would carry it out. They took occasion of that to oust the ministry. That was the day before the closing of the Legislature.

Q. This was the 13th of January, the Legislature adjourned on the 14th.

A. Yes; the lottery bill passed on Wednesday the 11th. The vote of want of confidence in the cabinet passed on the 12th, 25 to 16. On the 13th, in the afternoon, the new ministry took their seats. There was an unusual amount of enthusiasm in the audience at the time this ministry was voted out.

Q. The Wilcox ministry?

A. Yes; I noted the enthusiasm among the Hawaiians with great concern.

Q. What was the occasion of your concern; what disturbed you?

A. I felt that the Hawaiian element had taken advantage of its majority and its ability to coalesce with other parties, and had taken the weak and vicious side—that it would bring trouble.

Q. What sort of trouble?

A. Indefinite. I could hardly say what. I thought that they would become bankrupt—not have money to carry on the Government, possibly.

Q. Did you think of it possibly creating a revolution?

A. No; I did not, because there was no intention of a revolution at that time. To put it plainly, we expected to grin and bear it until something turned up. On Saturday morning it was known generally that the lottery and opium bill had been signed by the Queen. The prorogation of the Legislature was set for noon. My own statement of the case was that it was time for the Hawaiians themselves to step down and out. I have always been a friend to the Hawaiians and tried to do what I could for them always. I have felt that they were wrecking their own Government, as a man might steer a ship to destruction. Nothing was generally known at the prorogation of a new constitution. There had been some abortive attempts to secure a constitutional convention in the Legislature. It resulted in nothing.

Q. Any petition to the Legislature on the subject of the constitution?

A. There had been many petitions.

Q. What was the substance of the petitions; what was wanted by the petitioners?

A. A large reduction in the property qualification or abolition of it. My recollection is that there were other important changes wanted to which I paid little attention.

Q. Where did these petitions come from?

A. The natives.

Q. From all the islands?

A. I can hardly say. It was deemed that the oath to support the constitution among legislators precluded a constitutional convention.

Q. The opposition to the constitutional convention was placed by the opponents on the ground that there was no authority to call a convention?

A. Yes; that there was only one way—to amend it—and that was specified in the constitution itself.

Q. And that was by a vote of two successive legislatures?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you familiar with the affairs of Saturday afternoon?

A. I was simply a spectator. I left my office half an hour after the legislature closed, rather wondering why the band continued playing at the palace. I passed legislature hall. I saw men talking. I said to myself the circus has begun. I saw soldiers drawn up in line from the palace gate.

Q. How many of them?

A. I should say 75, or about that number. The palace yard was full of natives waiting on the grass, and many out in the street. I saw a small flag held at the foot of the palace stairs.

Q. What kind of flag?

A. A small Hawaiian flag. The flag of the Hui Kalaiaina (the last word means statesmanship). A man met me at the palace gate. He said the ministers had just resigned. In fact, that they had just fled from the palace over to the Government building.

Q. How do you know they had fled?

A. I do not personally know. That was what was always stated and never contradicted.

Q. Do you mean that somebody was trying to arrest them, or that they went away from the Queen because they were unwilling to coöperate with her in this movement?

A. The general statement made was that they were intimidated; that there were threats made in case they did not yield to the command of the Queen to assent to the constitution.

Q. What sort of threats?

A. That they would be placed under arrest, and there was an opinion that the natives might use mob violence.

Q. Whose opinion?

A. That was understood to be the fear of the ministers then.

Q. Do you know of any of them having said so?

A. I do not know. I should say, from their general demeanor that afternoon, they were very much perturbed. They appeared like men who were afraid. I went immediately down town. The news was just spreading that the crisis was taking place at the palace. Citizens came up to the Government building to see what was going on.

Q. Do you mean by citizens white people?

A. Yes. I saw Mr. Cornwell, Mr. Peterson, and Mr. Colburn. I

believe Mr. Parker remained at the palace. I returned to the Government building to watch the progress of events. I was there when the Queen's messenger, Col. Richardson, came over and commanded the ministers to go back and wait upon the Queen.

Q. What was the form of the command? Do you know whether it was a command or an invitation?

A. I called it a command because that is the term usually applied to the Queen's orders to her ministers.

Q. It is an official phrase?

A. Yes. I stood at the front door of the Government building when Mr. Thurston stood there. He said: "This thing must not be repeated." He intimated—though I can not say what words he used—that it would continually be repeated under the present state of things. After some time we saw the society of the Hui Kalaiaina file out from the palace. The leader threw out his hands to intimate that they had not obtained what they wanted.

Q. What time in the day was this?

A. About 3 o'clock.

Q. How many were there of that organization present?

A. I should say about thirty in uniforms—in black with dress hats—carrying a flag at their head.

Q. Was it a committee from that society?

A. I do not know how they were appointed.

Q. That did not cover the number of that political organization in the islands?

A. It had been a large organization. It was first organized by Dan Lyons, who edited a paper a year or two previous. His main idea was to make public officers elective, but it had become entirely independent of his management and control. The size of the organization at that time I know nothing about.

Q. Would you suppose there were more than thirty persons in the islands connected with it?

A. I have no means of forming an opinion. I paid little attention to the society, thinking it amounted to nothing. They first formed in the front of the palace, until the Queen came out on the upper balcony and made a speech to them.

Q. Did you hear the speech?

A. I did not; I was too far off. I also saw at the same time a Hawaiian, who I was told was White, of Lahaina, come to the front steps and begin to speak in an excited manner. He was led back into the palace.

Q. By whom?

A. I think by Col. James Boyd. The soldiers then broke up and the audience gradually dispersed. There was great excitement among the foreign lookers on. I quietly went home myself.

Q. You were not at the meeting at Mr. Smith's house Saturday?

A. I was not. I met a prominent citizen Sunday noon. I said: "I believe annexation is the only thing to cure this." He said to me: "I believe a great many are now coming to feel that way." I had said two weeks before in a private conversation with Judge Judd that I believed annexation was the only cure for this. He shook his head. He said: "I do not know." About this same Sunday he acknowledged to me that I was right.

Q. Who did?

A. Judge Judd. It was about that time. I will not be sure whether it was Sunday or Monday. The *Boston* came into port on Saturday

morning from Hilo. Monday morning after reading the paper and noting the call for the two mass meetings in the afternoon, I said to my wife: "The situation is very serious indeed. It is more serious than it was in 1887. That with the arms and men at the disposal of the Queen they might use force to put down the other mass meeting or there might be a riot between the two elements outside of that." I also said—not knowing about any plans—that it would be wise for the *Boston* to land her troops to preserve order.

I went down to my office. I heard of the manifesto of the Queen disavowing her conduct of Saturday. About half past 9 a messenger from Mr. Colburn's office came to our office with the orders that if any trouble ensued that the staff of the survey office should report to the station house for service. Our names were taken down. I went over to the minister's office. I simply said to him, "I am not in a state of health for active service." His reply was, "We shall expect a very good excuse if you are not there." I left him, saying that perhaps I should be there. I attended the mass meeting at the armory or skating rink. It was very crowded. I felt it was a very critical moment. It would seem as if the Government forces might at any time be sent to disperse the meeting. The speakers all carried the main idea that the community must not again be exposed to this continual danger of revolution; that something must be done to put a stop to events which would lead at any time to revolution. This state of things kept our families in a state of alarm, injured business, and could not be endured longer. Nothing was said about annexation.

Q. Anything said about dethronement?

A. Nothing, directly. The speeches are reported, and correctly, in the papers of the succeeding day.

Q. So that was the spirit of the meeting?

A. Dethronement?

Q. Yes.

A. It was not so stated. It was to denounce the Queen's action; that steps must be taken to prevent any recurrence of that state of things.

Q. What sort of steps were in the minds of the speakers and audience?

A. There was evidence of very intense feeling and determination.

Q. To do what?

A. The vote was to sustain the committee of safety.

Q. In what?

A. In such steps as they might see fit to take. The meeting adjourned quietly and the history of the landing of the troops is well known.

Q. Now I will ask you on another branch; if the matter of the support of the Provisional Government was left to the people who had the privilege of voting under the constitution of 1887 on the question of sustaining the Provisional Government, what would be the result under the Australian ballot system?

A. I am inclined to think it would be against it.

Q. How much?

A. I can not say. I know there has been a growth of annexation feeling among the Hawaiian population.

Q. I simply want to know, taking the test by popular vote, what would be the results?

A. So far as I could judge I should say it would be against them, judging from my general acquaintance with the population.

I have carefully read through the foregoing and pronounce it an accurate report of my interview with Mr. Blount.

CURTIS J. LYONS.

No. 36.

Statement of Curtis J. Lyons.

HAWAIIAN LANDS.

The entire area of the Hawaiian Islands was anciently divided up into *ahupuu*as or small districts, each of which had its individual distinctive name. These divisions were either valleys, or strips of land between gulches, or strips with artificial boundaries, which were well conserved.

The feudal system under which these were held is described in Prof. Alexander's Brief History of Land Titles, in President Dole's Historical Paper on the Evolution of Land Titles, and in the accompanying series of papers by the writer of this, published in 1875 on Land Matters in Hawaii.

In brief, the actual history of the transition from the feudal system to the fee simple system which took place in the period from 1846 to 1850 may be stated as follows: It being premised that while the theory of the division of lands differed more or less from the actual practice, the ends attained were virtually the same.

The chiefs, under Kamehameha III, were holding lands in fief, varying in the number of those held by any individual chief from forty or more to one, according to rank or past service of the holder. The common people were tenants of these chiefs, or else of the King when living on his private lands.

Each chief made a division in writing with Kamehameha III as sovereign, in which the chief relinquished all right in about one-half of the lands held by himself and received from the sovereign a similar relinquishment in toto of the said sovereign's claim on the remaining half. This transaction was entered on the opposite pages of the book called the *mahèlè* book (*mahèlè* meaning division), one page bearing the deed from the King to the chief of the half of the lands by name enumerated, and the opposite page the relinquishment, by the same chief, of all claim on the other half.

The next step was the assignment by the King of much the larger portion of the half which remained in his hands to the Government or public domain. The third step was for the chiefs to also give up a small portion of their half to the same public domain.

Thus the property known as the Government lands became established, land which has ever since been more or less in the market, and of which the choicest portions were by especial effort placed by sale at nominal price in the hands of native Hawaiians.

The next step was for the chiefs to have their individual titles confirmed by the land commission. It was a subsequent matter to obtain formal royal patents.

The lands reserved by Kamehameha III, as above mentioned, with the choicè lands which had been previously regarded as his own, were united in theory, and treated by himself and by Kamehameha IV as private lands. Kamehameha V, and the Legislature coöperating with him, made them inalienable, and created the board of crown commis-

sioners to take charge of them. Thus they became national property, the income of which, however, belonged to the occupant of the throne, and has never been accounted for to the Legislative Assembly. These are now known as the crown lands.

As an undercurrent to all these transactions, the small feudal holdings of the common people who had been tenants of the King on his private lands, and of the chiefs on their lands, and of the Government on its lands were made fee simple titles by what is termed the *Kuleana* system under the authority of the same land commission that confirmed the titles of the chiefs. The word *Kuleana* means primarily, "an interest in," and now is the name of a small holding awarded as above. The word *Evant* is used for all patents based on sales of Government land.

The above is a brief résumé of the essential points in reference to Hawaiian land matters as treated at length in the papers alluded to above. It is hoped that this succinct statement will aid in a study of the subject.

CURTIS J. LYONS.

HONOLULU, April 12, 1893.

LAND MATTERS IN HAWAII.

By C. J. LYONS.

[Published in the *Islander*, Honolulu, 1875.]

No. 1.

The change from barbarism to civilization that has taken place on these islands has in no respects had more material importance than as regards land matters. A more generally diffused understanding of some subjects connected with these matters may tend to benefit the community, especially as it may enable some to comprehend and grapple with certain difficulties that are universally felt to exist, and which however seem to be beyond the combined skill and executive ability of any one individual to remove.

The particular kind of civilization that took root on Hawaii was not of the kind that destroyed all that preceded it. It might have crushed out all ancient vested rights, ignored ancient subdivisions of land, and created a *carte blanche* upon which to begin *de novo* the marking out and mapping off of real estate; possibly endeavoring to introduce the monotonous rectangles of a United States public survey among the valleys and ridges of this diversified country.

Such a civilization would have treated the Hawaiian language as too paltry to put into print. Yet one is sometimes tempted to wish that not quite so much deference had been paid to the conservative side of the question. More of this hereafter.

The ancient divisions of land will therefore be our first subject to attend to. The islands were, if the phrase may be allowed, tremendously peopled in many portions thereof. I can think of no word to express the swarming state of population that must have existed in localities. Even had Capt. Cooke made no estimate, the evidences of such population are unmistakable. In general principles there must have been an inevitable diminution of the people with the advent of civilization, from the simple fact that the resources of the country would not support those same people so soon as their wants were increased. They were already industrious; what more could they raise from the soil, or furnish any way, save as they pandered to vice, in return for the accouterments of a new civilization. These are pertinent reasonings; certainly so to those who moralize on the diminution of races, though to follow them out would be a digression from our present subject.

Consequences of a long occupancy of this soil by a dense population, minute subdivision of land, and nomenclature thereof. Every piece of land had its name, as individual and characteristic as that of its cultivation.

The *unit* of land, so to speak, seems to have been the *ahupua'a*. Its name is derived from the *ahu* or altar (literally pile, *kuahu* being the specific term for altar), which was erected at the point where the boundary of the land was intersected by the main road, *alaloa*, which circumferenced each of the islands. Upon this altar at

the annual progress of the akua makahiki (year god) was deposited the tax paid by the land whose boundary it marked, and also an image of a hog (puua) carved out of kukui wood and stained with red ochre. How long this was left on the altar I do not know, but from this came the name (ahupūāia) of the pile of stones, which title was also given to the division of land marked thereby. Many a time have I set up compass on ancient landmarks of this sort, especially on Hawaii. One near Honolulu may still be seen on the north external slope of the crater of Salt Lake. This, besides marking the boundary of the Halawa and Moanalua, marked also the limits of the Kona and Ewa districts. Near by I picked up an ancient ulu maika, the rolling stone of the old bowling game of maika. The more common name of the altar on the island of Oahu was kaananiau.

The ahupūāia ran from the sea to the mountain, theoretically. That is to say, the central idea of the Hawaiian division of land was emphatically central, or rather radial. Hawaiian life vibrated from uka, mountain, whence came wood, kapa for clothing, olona for fishline, ti-leaf for wrapping paper, ie for rattan lashing, wild birds for food, to the kai, sea, whence came ia, fish, and all connected therewith. Mauka and makai are therefore fundamental ideas to the native of an island. Land, as we shall see in a subsequent article, was divided accordingly.

No. 2.

In a previous article we have seen that the old Hawaiian system of dividing lands was preserved under the new system of titles; that in populous portions the subdivision was very minute, and that the main idea of the ahupūāia, or primary division, was to run a strip from the shore to the summit of the mountain, in order to give an equable share of all the different products of the soil and sea.

The ahupūāia, however, was by no means any measure of area, as it varied in size from 100 to 100,000 acres, and on the almost worthless wastes of interior Hawaii attained to an even greater extent than this. Taking the above-mentioned island first in order, the common ahupūāia is found to be a strip say of 1,000 feet average width, and running from the seashore, not by any means to the top of the mountain, but to the zone of timber land that generally exists between the 1,700 feet and 5,000 feet line of elevation. The ordinary ahupūāia extends from half a mile to a mile into this belt. Then there are the larger ahupūāias, which are wider in the open country than the others, and on entering the woods expand laterally so as to cut off all the smaller ones, and extend toward the mountain till they emerge into the open interior country; not however to converge to a point at the tops of the respective mountains. Only a rare few reach those elevations, sweeping past the upper ends of all the others, and by virtue of some privilege in bird-catching, or some analogous right, taking the whole mountain to themselves.

Thus Mauna Loa is shared by three great lands, Kapapala and Kahuku from Kau, and Humuula from Hilo. Possibly Keauhou from Kona may yet be proved to have had a fourth share. The whole main body of Mauna Kea belongs to one land from Hamakua, viz: Kahohe, to whose owners belonged the sole privilege of capturing the ua'a, a mountain-inhabiting but sea-fishing bird. High up on its eastern flank, however, stretched the already mentioned land of Humuula, whose upper limits coincide with those of the *mamane*, a valuable mountain acacia, and which, starting from the shore near Lanipahoehoe, extends across the upper ends of all other Hilo lands to the crater of Mokuaweoweo.

These same lands, generally, had the more extended sea privileges. While the smaller ahupūāias had to content themselves with the immediate shore fishery, extending out not further than a man could touch bottom with his toes, the larger ones swept around outside of these, taking to themselves the main fisheries much in the same way as that in which the forests appropriated. Concerning the latter, it should here be remarked that it was by virtue of some valuable product of said forests that the extension of territory took place. For instance, out of a dozen lands only one possessed the right to *kalai uaa*, hew out canoes from the koa forest. Another land embraced the *wauke* and *olona* grounds, the former for *kapa*, the latter for fish line.

On East Maui, the division, in its general principles, was much the same as on Hawaii, save that the radial system was better adhered to. In fact, there is pointed out to this day, on the short spur projecting into the east side of Haleakala crater, a rock called the "Pohaku oki aina," land-dividing rock, to which the larger lands came as a center. How many lands actually came up to this is not yet known.

On West Maui the valleys were a very marked and natural mode of division. The question suggests itself as to how the isthmus would be appropriated. Some powerful chiefs of Wailuku and Waikapu seem not only to have taken the isthmus, but to have extended their domain well up the slope at the foot of Haleakala. So that there is the rare case of a long range of lands in Kula, East Maui, without any sea coast.

On Molokai and Lanai, there are exceptional cases of lands extending directly across, from sea to sea.

On Oahu the ahupuaa seems to have been oftentimes quite extended. Waikiki, for instance, stretches from the west side of Makiki Valley away to the east side of Wailupe, or nearly to the east point of the island. Honouliuli covers some forty thousand acres on the east slope of the Waianae Mountains. Generally speaking, however, the valley idea predominates. Thus Nuanu (with its branch Pauoa), Kalihi, Moanalua, Halawa, etc., are each the limits of single lands. So Waimanalo, Kailua, Kaneohe, Heefa, etc., are ahupuaas. The long, narrow strip so common on Hawaii is less frequent on this island, excepting in Ewa district. Singularly enough the ahupuaa of Waianae mounts the summit of the Kaala range and descends into the table-lands between Ewa and Waialua, and sweeps on up to the summit of the Koolau Mountains. One would suppose that naturally that table-land would be divided between Ewa and Waialua.

On Kauai, the writer is not familiar with the general divisions. Probably the interior of the island belongs to a few large lands, while narrow and rather short strips are quite common along the shore, interspersed with large or first-class ahupuaas.

No. 3.

The next subject that claims attention is that of the subdivision of the ahupuaa.

The subdivision of the Ahupuaa were called *ili*. Some of the smallest ahupuaas were not subdivided at all, or at least seem not to have been, while the larger ones sometimes contained as many as thirty or forty *ilis*, each, of course, named with its own individual title and carefully marked out as to boundary. The word is the same as that used to designate surface, and, in latter times, area.

There were two features of the *ili*, referred to by the terms *lele* and *ku*, which are worthy of notice. The former is its desultory character, like unto that of the states of Germany. That is to say, the *ili* often consisted of several distinct sections of land—one, for instance, on the seashore, another on dry, open land, or *kula*, another in the regularly terraced and watered *kalo* patch or *aina loi* district, and another still in the forest, thus again carrying out the equable division system which we have seen in the ahupuaa.

These separate pieces were called, *lele*, i. e., “jumps,” and were most common on Oahu. Indeed I know of none on the island of Hawaii. Some remarkable examples occur near this town. Punahou had anciently a lot on the beach near the Kakaako Salt Works; then the large lot with the spring and *kalo* patches where is now the school, and again a forest patch on the steep sides of Manoa Valley. Kewalo meanwhile had its seacoast adjoining Waikiki, its continuous *kula* on the plain, and one-half of Punchbowl Hill and its *kalo* land in Pauoa Valley. Kaakaukui held Fisherman's Point and the present harbor of Honolulu; then *kalo* land near the present Kukui street, and also a large tract of forest at the head of Pauoa Valley. The *kalo* lands of Wailupe are in Pauoa Valley. In Kalihi and also in Ewa are *ilis* with from eight to ten different *leles*, a most prolific kind of land, and now furnishing a truly desultory job for a surveyor to map out.

These different pieces were called variously, either by their own individual name, or by that of the whole *ili*, thus puzzling one sadly when attempting to obtain information with respect to them.

The second feature is referred to in the word *ku*, short for *ili kupono*. There were two kinds of *ili*; the *ili* of the ahupuaa, and the *ili kupono*. The *ili* of the ahupuaa was a subdivision for the convenience of the chief holding the ahupuaa; *alii ai ahupuaa*.

The *konohikis* of these divisions were only the agents of the said chief, all the revenues of the land included going to him, and the said land, in Hawaiian parlance, “belonging to the ahupuaa.”

The *ili kupono*, on the contrary, was nearly independent. The transfer of the ahupuaa to a new chief did not carry with it the transfer of the *ili kupono* contained within its limits. The chiefs, previously holding the *ili kupono*, continued to hold them, whatever the change in the ahupuaa chief, having their own *koeles* (chiefs' patches), worked by their retainers. There was, however, a slight tribute of work due to the ahupuaa chief; sometimes one or two days in a month, sometimes even less, or only certain days in the year. The *ilis* which were used as places of refuges and those of the god Kaili, did not render even this tribute. Such were Kaahumanu', *ilis* in Waikiki.

On the *ili kupono*, Waimea on Hawaii furnishes an eminent example. Nineteenths of this ahupuaa are taken up with the independent *ilis* of Puukapu and Waikoloa, to say nothing of half a dozen small ones of the same kind. Accordingly when a Waimea ahupuaa was declared in late years a crown land, it was necessary to declare Puukapu also a crown land, as though not included in Waimea.

Waikoloa was given by Kamehameha I to Isaac Davis, and it has remained in the Davis family ever since. When therefore the limits of Waimea were settled by the boundary commissioner, the Crown commissioners knew hardly more than they had previously of where the Crown land was situated. How much labor and confusion this principle has brought about remains yet to be seen.

Within the ilis all large kalo patches seem to have had specific names, especially on Oahu, which was the most microcosmic of the Islands. The koeles, or chief's patches, more particularly. *Kihapai's*, i. e., dry land patches, with their intervening ridges of small stones, or earth weeds, had also their appellation. These ridges of cultivation, often rows of sugar cane, too, were in cultivated sections, very frequently the boundaries of the ahupnaa, called *ivi*, bone—short for *ivi kuamoo*, backbone—and curving enough they are. Sometimes changed in ancient times, amidst fierce battling between the clans each chief could summon from his land.

The date of this division is fixed about twenty generations back in Hawaiian tradition, the names of the chiefs establishing it being given. The moku or district was fixed at the same time, such as Kona, Kau, Puna, Hilo, Hamakua, and Kohala on Hawaii. On Maui are some smaller divisions than the moku, called *kalana*, Laha-ina being one of these. Wailuku, Waikapu, Waiehu, and Waihee were independent, belonging to no moku. On the map it is necessary to form a new district, and call it Wailuku, Nawaieha being too cumbersome and ill-understood. Olaa on Hawaii, it is said to have been independent of Puna and Waimea of Kohala. Otherwise the district division was very exact and comprehensive.

One other anomaly remains to be noted here. A large tract of forest land in Hamakua, Hawaii, was once cut off from a number of ahupuaas for the use of the whole district, and is called Kamoku to this day, becoming at the time of the "mahele," which must come next in our way, Government land.

No. 4.

We now come in regular course to a brief notice of the *mahele*.

The *mahele* was a phenomenon in national history not often repeated. The *mahele* was, in one sense, a revolution. In another sense it was most eminently a conservative movement.

To write a full history of this change would require more leisure, or, more correctly speaking, more time and strength than most persons in our community and in active life have at their own command. It will only be in place here to indicate its main features. I am very well aware that there may be widely different views on this subject among those of the legal profession, and those put forth here may be called decidedly unprofessional. It may be suggested, however, that occasionally the unprofessional opinion has the advantage. This is often the case with respect to theological matters, sometimes decidedly so in medical matters, and the common sense of honest jurymen frequently cuts at once through the entanglements of legal questions on both sides to the desired point of equity and justice to both sides.

The *mahele* was simply an endeavor on the part of the majority of the Hawaiian chiefs, and especially on the part of Kamehameha III, to secure to all parties what, on the ordinary principles of acquiring property, seemed to belong to them. It was contemporary with the organization of the department of the Hawaiian Government in 1845-46.

The theory which was adopted in effect was this, that the King, the chiefs, and the common people held each undivided shares, so to say, in the whole landed estate. Whatever the legal deduction from the status under the former feudal system might be, the fact in equity was acknowledged that whoever had a share in making the land valuable held an interest in that land. Legally speaking, the title of the whole was in the King. The King who conquered the whole, viz, Kamehameha I, had partitioned the lands among his warrior chiefs, retaining a certain revenue from them, in default of payment of which the land was forfeited. These chiefs did the same to those below them.

Kamehameha III for the common good waived his title to the whole, under conditions—conditions that those under the chiefs should be treated in like manner, and, moreover, that a certain portion, one-third, should be given to a common landed estate, called Government lands, the proceeds of which were to go to the public treasury, and which should furnish that facility for the acquirement of real estate in fee simple which is so necessary for the growth of a community.

In other words, the Hawaiian nation agreed to divide as individuals their as yet undivided inheritance, the King taking a share proportioned to the general idea of the dignity of his position. (It should be stated that the word *mahele* signifies division.) It was moreover agreed that there was to be a portion devoted to the general good in two ways, viz, by rendering it obtainable to those who desired land and by using the proceeds for the benefit of the public treasury. It will be seen

that there was a double *mahele*—first of all amongst themselves, and second, of each with the general treasury.

This last was the trying point with the chiefs. It required no little effort to bring about its accomplishment, and no little self-denial and resolution on the part of those who thus gave up what they regarded as their lands. The scenes in the meeting of the council for this purpose have been described by eyewitnesses as thrillingly interesting. Almost everyone of those who took part in this peaceful but patriotic revolution has gone from the presence, we hope not from the remembrance, of this community. Among the ranks of these noble dead are Kamehameha III, and Kekuanaoa, Paki, Kekauonohi, John II, who was most active in bringing about the change, and a host of lesser chiefs. Messrs. Richards, Judd, Ricord, and afterwards Lee, were the leading spirits in inducing the chiefs to see the benefits of the new policy and system.

There were two great sacrifices made by the chiefs. The division with the Government we have noticed. Far be it from anyone to misappropriate these Government lands, thus conscientiously given up by the old Hawaiian chiefs for the national good. The other sacrifice was that of the *kuleana*, or land of the small tenant. These small tenants were permitted to acquire a full title to the lands which they had been improving for their own use. In the true view of the case, this was perfectly a measure of justice, for it was the labor of these people and of their ancestors that had made the land what it was. This subject will lead us to consider the land commission.

No. 5.

The lands having been divided, as we have seen in the last article, it became necessary in order to establish the real estate business of the Kingdom on a practical basis to give some formal evidence of title sanctioned by the law of the land. The *mahele* was an anomaly. The land commission, appointed to carry out the principles of the *mahele*, was another. Both were eminently practical and just in their idea.

Five gentlemen, John Ricord, William Richards, Z. Kaauwai, James Young Kanhehoa and John II, were appointed by the King in February, 1846, to hear testimony upon the claims of individuals, and to issue awards to the claimants for the land claimed by metes and bounds. These commissioners drew up a careful statement of principles to guide their conduct in making the awards.

This statement was approved by act of Legislature and made law. It was further ordained that no claim should be valid unless approved by them, and unless presented before a certain time. The only appeal was to the supreme court. The commissioners took the oath of office and held their first meeting for regular business in March, 1846. The first claim upon and award signed was to James Voss, on the lot at the south corner of Hotel and Alakea streets. The taking of testimony was an herculean task, when we consider that the number of claimants were over 10,000. It was found that the taking of testimony, the surveying of boundaries, and the making final award would each have to be separate stages of work. Accordingly, while the first volume of land commission records contain lengthy masses of testimony attached to each award, in the second volume awards only are given, the testimony being thereafter by itself in another series of separate volumes. The commissioners worked with most commendable energy, going to every part of the islands to meet the people and prepare for awarding the *kuleanas*.

Kuleana means, originally, a property or business interest in anything. The common people were in former times assigned certain portions of the chief's lands, to occupy at the will of the chief. Generally speaking, there was a good degree of permanence in this occupancy, provided that service was duly paid to the superior. In 1839 a law was promulgated that no one should be deprived of his land without due cause, which law was a preliminary step to the subsequent one of giving to all those common people who would come forward, present their claim, their testimony, and pay the expenses of settling the whole matter a fee simple title in their improved lands. In the town of Honolulu all lots were to be subject to a commutation fee of one-fourth of their unimproved value to the Government. Elsewhere the award was in fee simple, without commutation. These awarded claims came to be known by the term "*kuleana*."

After the testimony in regard to their existence was taken the next step was to scatter a horde of surveyors all over the Kingdom, with memoranda of claims, to survey each separate one by itself, and send in the survey to the office, generally on a sheet of foolscap paper. At the office they were copied in huge, unwieldy volumes—volumes, however, ten in number, of infinite value to the real-estate interests of this little Kingdom. Of the surveys, more hereafter. They were generally paid for by the piece, at the cheap rate of \$2 to \$3 per *kuleana*. The total expenses for the land commission expenses were all borne by the claimants, and amounted to from \$6 to \$12 to each *kuleana*. Cheap enough; yet the poor natives were often a long

time in collecting the amount to pay over to the agent who distributed the papers containing award.

In fact, it seemed all like a dream to the common people, so long serfs under masters. All sorts of reports would spread through the country to the effect that the whole thing would be knocked in the head; that such and such lands were to have no kuleanas taken out of them, etc.

Then there was a vast deal of haphazard about the matter. In kalo patch land it was comparatively easy to determine where and where not the kuleana should extend, though many a contest between the claimant and konohiki chief's man took place even there. It was impossible for the commissioners to go upon the ground, so that responsibility in a large measure depended on the surveyor. In dry or kula land, where the soil has to remain fallow for years between crops, it was difficult to decide what a kuleana should contain, and, as we shall see, there was much variety of practice.

No. 6.

Mention was made in the last number of the haphazard or lack of uniform rule in establishing the boundaries and extent of kuleanas. The best illustration of this may be derived from an example. Three surveyors were sent to Hawaii to as many different districts to measure and report kuleanas. Directions, "to include what the claimant has cultivated and improved." Surveyor No. 1, a stranger to the country, found the people cultivating on the kula land, say, two or three acres of upland kalo. Not taking into account the fact, alluded to in our last number, that it was necessary for the land to lie fallow for two or three years before another crop of kalo could be produced from it, he surveyed merely the amount under actual cultivation. The kuleanas were awarded accordingly, the poor people having no one to take their part, and as a consequence in many cases abandoning their newly-acquired property as utterly insufficient for their needs.

No. 2, a native Hawaiian, was assigned to a district where the resident American missionary was one who took an active interest in the new order of things, and who believed—and not without some reason—that the people had the main right to the land anyway, on general principles. The consequence of this was that surveys were sent in from 15 to 30 and even 40 acres in extent, and were awarded.

Surveyor No. 3, meanwhile, after an arduous campaign among the kalo patches, with an ever-watchful konohiki to contest his progress, and to whom the reply to appeals for advice to the land commissioners was sent "Do the best you can," came out into the kula lands of his district. Multiplying the amount under actual cultivation by the number of seasons in which it would have to lie fallow, the estimate was made of from 6 to 12 acres as the ordinary run of upland kuleanas, and surveys were sent in accordingly. Reports of what was going on in the neighboring districts soon came in and, rather puzzled thereby, our man lay on his oars for a few weeks to see what would turn up. Finding that his surveys, too, were approved of he went on through the district on his own principles.

In defense of the above inconsistency the plea may be urged that the commissioners had such a mountain of business to dispose of that "anyway to get through" might well be their motto. To resurvey in all these cases was next to impossible, also to obtain full information. Then, while there lived a King who thus favored his subjects, it was expedient to make all speed possible lest a change might introduce worse confusion.

Another inconsistency was in the awarding of titles below high-water mark and on reefs in some instances and not in others. The immediate vicinity of Honolulu Harbor as compared with Pearl River and Kaneohe Bay furnishes a notable instance of this.

After the awards of the kuleanas came the awards to the lesser chiefs and to foreigners to whom lands had been given of the *ilis* which we have described above. They were generally though not uniformly awarded by their external boundaries, expressly stating in the award and in the patent based thereupon the *excepting of all kuleanas contained therein*.

The ahupuaas were awarded to the chiefs to whom they belonged in a similar manner, the exception including the *ilis* awarded as above, and also such *ilis* as by the statute law were declared on the basis of the *mahele*, as we have previously seen to be either crown or Government lands. Of course, when the *mahele* was made the division took place; the ahupuaa to one chief, or to the crown or Government, as the case might be, and the *ili kupono*, described in a previous number, to other chiefs, or the crown or Government, as the case might be. The crown and Government lands were expressly set forth by name in the statute at the same time that the land commission was created.

It is this existence of titles within titles unseparated one from another by especial survey that creates the unmitigated state of confusion that now exists on these islands. It might as well be confessed and made public that adequate steps may be taken if

possible to clear up the confusion, heightened as it is tenfold by the fact that all the kuleanas are recorded each by its own individual configuration and extent with no general map of any district. In the prospectus, so to call it, of the land commission, it was declared necessary to know the "configuration and extent of the several claims." The very important item of *location* was omitted. It was probably impossible to have carried out any general system of measurement which would have secured this, when we take into account the imperfect instruments employed by most who were employed in this really national work.

Another example from actual experience may come in here, perhaps to advantage. In Kalihi, Oahu, is an Ili of Government land. A large part of it was taken up, as usual with the kuleanas of the people resident thereon. The remainder was in all conceivable shapes, mixed in the interstices of the kuleanas, and including, however, some very valuable land. For some years the sovereigns of the country diverted this land to their own use. When, afterwards, it was deemed advisable to use or dispose of the land to the benefit of the Government, a survey was necessary to find where the Government land was situated. To this end every single kuleana lot, to the number of fifty or thereabouts, had to be resurveyed and located, errors, inaccuracies, and magnetic variation all to be taken into account, and their descriptions made out of what remained, to agree with the adjoining kuleanas, the whole involving about two months of labor. The resultant remainder of government lots of land were worth somewhere near \$1,500. More of this hereafter.

No. 7.

To sit in judgment on the past is not always advisable. It is easy, in the light of subsequent events, to perceive what would have been the wiser course. But it is not always easy to put ourselves in the places of our predecessors; to realize what difficulties may have beset them and what obstacles may have prevented the carrying out of their own conceptions of what should have been done.

This remark applies to the work of the land commission. The following imperfections in their work are very noticeable:

First. That already noticed, including titles within titles, kuleanas within ilis, ilis within ahupuaas, and so on, without distinct specification of what was expected within. It has frequently occurred that persons have purchased estate on the basis of the acreage of the whole, and then found, to their dismay, that one-fourth or even one-half of the area specified was taken up in kuleanas, titles in fact just as good as that of the larger estate around them. This has been a standing grievance with purchasers in this Kingdom, and has tended to bring the kuleana system into disfavor.

Second. The land commission ought to have been continued till all the land had been properly apportioned and award passed thereon by the commissioners, including in these awards also the crown and Government lands. The object aimed at, viz: the settling, for once at least, of titles, would then have been gained. The omission of the crown and Government lands has created uncertainty all over the group as to boundaries even to this day. The almost unlimited powers of the commissioners should have been used to put matters in a practical and accessible shape.

Third. The number of steps requisite to procure a full title has been too great. First the *mahele*, then the award, then the royal patent. Now, in the town of Honolulu, we will say, A and B have adjacent lots. A procures his award, and immediately goes on, pays the Government commutation, and receives a royal patent. B merely contents himself with the land commission award, leaving the future to look out for the payment of commutation. A and B both sell to C. C cuts up his property into small lots and sells. Now in some or other of these lots there will be at the same time, land commuted for, and land as yet uncommuted for. D, who has purchased one of these heterogeneous titles, wishes a full title, and is obliged to hire surveyors, lawyers, and what-not to find the imaginary line in his property, dividing the patented portion from the unpatented, describe the unpatented portion, and take out his "R. P." for the same in the name of the original awardee, dead, say twenty years ago. It would seem as if this threat of a government one-fourth ought to have been disposed of at the start.

Fourth. While the surveys were carefully recorded and indexed, there was an unaccountable lack of uniformity in the methods followed in making them. It would seem as though a person having the practical knowledge possessed by the late Hon. W. L. Lee, for so many years president of the commission, would have issued certain uniform rules to the persons employed. Instead thereof, we have every possible method of measurement adopted, every conceivable scale employed, meridians pointing everywhere, non-marking of corners; in short, everything left to the sweet will of the man who was hired at from \$2 to \$3 per kuleana to do the measurement. Nor was one district assigned to one man. No less than a dozen tried their hands at waikiki, no one being required to guide himself by the notes of another. Of course

overlaps and interlayers are the most common things imaginable. It has been the practice heretofore to regard the person holding the earlier award to take precedence in the case of an overlap and the one holding possession in the case of an interlayer. Some doubts in high quarters have been expressed, however, on this matter.

As we have said above, the real reason for all this looseness lies in the fact that there was little money to pay out and little time to wait for the work. It may be added that there was not then a single thoroughly competent land surveyor on the ground. The grounds for this assertion may be stated hereafter. Civil engineers there were, and amateur surveyors, but no thoroughly competent land surveyor.

To hasten the "quieting of titles" it was enacted by the Legislature that all claims not presented before a certain date should revert to the Government. This date was postponed several times. The land commission itself was driven to the policy of awarding titles by ancient boundaries, without survey—that is to say, simply by the name of the *ahupuaa* or *ili*, leaving the owners to fix the boundaries as best they could. In that way it was enabled to close its labors at the time prescribed by statute, viz, on the 31st of March, 1855. The receiving of evidence was finally closed on the 30th of December previous.

Even then an act had to be passed in 1862 "for the relief of certain *Konohikis*," enabling some such who had received land at the time of the *mahele* to receive an award from the interior department for the same, up to a certain date, beyond which the land, in unawarded, was to revert to the Government.

The question now comes up: Will these lands thus unawarded now be claimed by the Government? And, moreover, will similar lots in town be thus claimed? The view of the case taken at the time was this: "For the good of the community, land owners must be compelled to go through certain forms of law, failing in which the lands are forfeit." Was or was not this, in the circumstances, a constitutional act?

No. 8.

The land in the Hawaiian Islands was considered at the time of the *mahele* as belonging to the nation. It was divided off according to principles deemed equitable and titles were given, emanating really from the Government, representing the nation, by the King as the executive power. This, I think, is the true theory of the then new departure in land matters. The power to whom were given the Crown lands was not the power that gave legality to the new titles. The Crown lands were set aside for the private emolument of the King. The Government lands were for the benefit of the whole, for the parties as a whole, that divided the land.

When, therefore, the rule was made, or law passed, that lands not awarded should vest in the Government, it would seem to have been perfectly in the power of those making the law so to enact. It hardly seems proper, therefore, at the present day to assume that such lands should revert to the Crown as "Crown lands." They should revert to the Crown as the representative of the Government, not for the private use of the King, but for that which the King represents in his official capacity.

Where parties have been a long time in actual occupation of such lands, it would seem as if some liberal terms might be adopted which would facilitate the obtaining of a title, without waiving the right of the Government, against which the statute of limitations, *i. e.*, of twenty years' occupation, does not hold.

The government lands about the year 1850 were put into the market throughout the islands. Previous sales had been made in a few localities, especially in *Makawao* and *Manoa Valley*. Agents were appointed in the different districts to receive applications, to attend to the surveys, and to report; also to collect the money for the land and forward to the interior office. The same desultory system of surveying was followed as in the case of *kuleanas*. Probably, between the years 1850 and 1860, nine-tenths of the available government land was taken up. The agents were, some of them, the American missionaries, who considered it not inconsistent with their position to assist the people in obtaining lands in advance of mere speculators. A commission was allowed; in at least one case it was declined, all service being rendered gratis.

After all this selling of land the Government were perfectly in the dark as to what remained. A lull in the business took place, and when in after years some of the remnants were applied for, it was impossible to proceed with any confidence in disposing of them. In addition to this, a new policy came in, with another administration, of refusing to sell land, partly from the revival of the ancient theory that the King was the Government; partly from a feeling that a fixed revenue might be derived from the remainder; partly from the cropping out of the ever-prevalent dislike of seeing lands go into the hands of foreigners; and partly from the difficulty of proceeding intelligently to work.

For instance (and this is from actual experience), a tract of, say, 10 acres, in *Palolo*

Valley remained to the Government. It lies at the foot of the steep valley side, and may or may not extend up that side or pali to its summit. The land above was awarded by survey, and to find how far down the face of the mountain it may extend it is necessary to run all the old lines of that upper land; probably two or three days of hard work would be none too much to do this in a reliable manner. In fact, one can be sure of nothing in such cases without surveying all the adjoining lands. A perfect incubus this has been on the disposal of the remaining government lands.

It was this state of things, as much as anything else, that led the late minister of interior, Dr. F. W. Hutchison, to institute the Government survey. A general survey seemed the only possible way to get at the facts of the case. It would be perfectly impossible to-day for the Government to state definitely what land it possessed in any one district.

Add to this the need of general maps for business purposes, for assessment of taxes, for any discussion of schemes for the benefit of the country, for searching of records, for the information of courts of law, of strangers, especially of scientific men, to say nothing of navigators, and one sees abundant reason why a general survey should be made.

Moreover, the Government failed in one important part of its duty, namely, in locating its own grants and awards. It is but fair that it should undertake that work as far as is practically useful and is possible without too great expense.

Another demand for general maps lies in the fact that while a person may in a few years become a walking encyclopedia of information respecting localities and titles, etc., in a district, he is liable to leave at any time, when all his stores of knowledge become annihilated in a moment, no record thereof being left for the benefit of his successor.

There is now remaining to be noticed the "boundary commission" business. As was stated before, a large number of ahupuaas and ilis were awarded by name only. The land commission having ceased to exist, it became necessary to provide some means of legalizing the lines of boundary between awarded lands wherever they had not been awarded by survey. This and nothing else is the business of the boundary commission. It is not concerned with boundary disputes as such. It is only when the locality of an award, and in a very few cases of a royal patent, has nothing but the ancient traditions and testimony founded thereon to determine it that the commissioner is called upon by the owner to issue a "certificate" defining it, "either by survey, by natural topographical features, or by permanent boundary marks." It will be seen that a description by means of ancient names of localities—"wahi pana"—is not in the limits of the statute.

The act for the appointment of boundary commissioners was passed in 1862. At first there were two for each gubernatorial district, the police or district justice in each place acting as umpire in case they disagreed. This, as might be expected, was a failure, and subsequently the late G. M. Robertson, of the supreme bench, became sole commissioner for the group. In 1868 the law was modified, since which time there have been four commissioners, one in each main district. Their work has progressed very slowly owing to various causes.

It is a matter of regret that there has been so little uniformity in their methods of procedure. Of a large number of lands thus defined no maps whatever have been filed in the interior department. Complaints often arise that sufficient notice is not given to parties concerned residing, as they oftentimes do, at a distance. The best way of procedure would seem to be this: Maps of the lands in question, prepared from good surveys by persons approved at the interior office, and containing such full information as to be intelligible to all concerned, should be on file in some public office, say for ninety days previous to the decision, and due notice given thereof in order that all parties may consider the matter at their leisure.

A better organized land office is very much needed. The general clerk of the interior office has too great a diversity of business to give due attention to it. The second clerk is mainly occupied in making out royal patents on awards and furnishing copies of documents. The surveyor-general has the topographical survey on his hands, while his assistants are bandied about from one kind of job to another, the whole groaning under the weight of the entanglement of old and new that has been previously pointed out in these papers.

The object aimed at should be that the Government should know the location of its own patents for land, and be able to furnish information concerning the same. It should know, too, what is left unpatented, and it was more for this object than any other that the then minister of interior, F. W. Hutchison, instituted the Government survey in 1870.

No. 37.

Statement of E. C. Macfarlane.

HONOLULU, May 9, 1893.

MY DEAR MR. BLOUNT:

I hand you herewith the statement you desired me to make as to the causes leading up to the dismissal of the several cabinets of the last Legislature. In this statement I have confined myself entirely to the bare facts you ask for, without attempting to introduce any of the arguments brought out in the debates. I have copies of all the proceedings in the Legislature, if you should want to read them at any time, and I hope to have another opportunity before your departure to talk over Hawaiian affairs with you.

I leave for Hawaii to-day to attend to some important matters in connection with the Volcano House Company, returning on Wednesday of next week. All of the papers in connection with the lottery petitions, will be in proper shape upon my return. I am only waiting for the clerk of the Legislature to make his affidavits.

In haste,

Very respectfully,

E. C. MACFARLANE.

HONOLULU, May 6, 1893.

Hon. JAMES H. BLOUNT,

United States Commissioner, etc., Honolulu:

SIR: Shortly after the commencement of the last session of the Legislature, it was an open secret that the Volney-Ashford-Wilcox party were planning a revolutionary movement, which had the support of the annexationist element, and that the latter element had the sympathy of the United States minister. I was firmly of the opinion that such a conspiracy was on foot and that it had the sympathy of Mr. Stevens, and a speech made by him on Decoration Day afforded me an opportunity to bring the matter before the assembly in the following inquiry:

SIR: I am constrained to ask Her Majesty's constitutional advisors whether they intend taking any steps to rebuke the unwarrantable action of the United States minister on a recent public occasion—an action which could only be intended to interfere with and obstruct the administration.

This was replied to by the minister of foreign affairs as follows:

Hon. J. S. WALKER,

President of the Legislature:

SIR: In answer to the question propounded by the honorable noble for Honolulu, E. C. Macfarlane, I would say, that Her Majesty's Government has given the matter careful consideration and has already taken action in the premises.

The following day I addressed the house upon a question of privilege, as follows:

MR. PRESIDENT: My attention has been called to an editorial in a morning paper criticising my question asked yesterday of his excellency the minister of foreign affairs.

I do not intend to be placed in a false position by the Advertiser, hence the privilege of which I avail myself. Let it be understood that I yield to no one in admiration of the great Republic in respect for its generous, liberty-loving people; neither do I fail to appreciate the generosity covered by our treaty of reciprocity. In a sense, the American minister represents that Republic and its people, but it is

only when he conducts himself within the lines laid down for diplomatic representatives.

I maintain that if this Government and people desire to retain the respect of the governments and peoples of the world they must be self-respecting and must resent all interferences with our affairs, when conducted with a proper regard for other nations, by foreign representatives. I have said that the American minister represents the American people, but I must again qualify this assertion by saying that he best does so when he refuses to interfere in our domestic affairs at the instance of a faction in this community, whose organ is the Advertiser, whose leaders are ex-ministers of Hawaii, who, like the followers of Moses, are longing for the flesh pots of Egypt, and whose purpose seems to be to rule or ruin. Against this faction every friend of the Hawaiian people must stand arrayed.

The inquiry by the minister of foreign affairs went so far as to call forth from Mr. Stevens a disclaimer of any intention to interfere with our domestic affairs. The matter was discussed with the Hawaiian members of the house in caucus, and they were made to believe that unless the objectionable matter was expunged it would embroil the country in complications with the United States, which would likely lose them the independence of their country.

Of this action in caucus I was informed by several of the Hawaiian members, and the following day Representative Kamaooha introduced a resolution to expunge from the records of the assembly all references to the matter, which resolution was carried.

In accordance with an understanding with the leaders of the Reform party, the conservative element in the National Reform party joined with the former and voted out the Parker-Widemann cabinet. The want of decision on the part of that cabinet in dealing with the Horner banking act (which proposed an unlimited issue of irredeemable paper money) was the principal reason for desiring the change. The unaccountable failure of that ministry to act vigorously and promptly in this matter created a strong opposition to the members throughout the whole business community.

On Saturday, September 3, 1892, the leaders of the Reform party called a caucus of the members of the assembly and passed the following resolution:

Be it resolved, That whereas a resolution of want of confidence in the cabinet was passed by the Legislature on August 30 last, such resolution being passed by a vote of 31 to 10; and

Whereas, by reason of the adoption of such resolution, the constitutional necessity has arisen for selecting a new cabinet;

Now, therefore, we, members of the Legislature, feeling this to be a fit occasion to more firmly establish the constitutional principles upon which our system of government is based, do hereby, regardless of previous party affiliations, declare that, under the principles of responsible representative government established in this Kingdom, Her Majesty should summon a leading member of the Legislature who voted in favor of such resolution of want of confidence, to form the new cabinet, thereby recognizing the constitutional principle that the cabinet should possess the support and confidence of, and represent the majority of, the Legislature, the elected representatives of the people;

And resolved further, That we do hereby pledge ourselves to govern our future action, as members of this Legislature, in support of this constitutional principle.

This resolution was sent to Her Majesty and called forth the following reply:

IOLANI PALACE, *September 7, 1892.*

Hons. ALEXANDER YOUNG, J. N. S. WILLIAMS, and WM. O. SMITH:

GENTLEMEN: As the bearer of a resolution passed upon by certain members of the Legislature, Her Majesty was pleased to grant you an audience and graciously promised to reply to the subject-matter of the resolution. I am now directed to say that Her Majesty is pleased to note the desire on the part of the gentlemen whom you represent "to more firmly establish the constitutional principle upon which our system of government is based, recognizing the principle that the cabinet should pos-

sess the support and confidence of, and represent the majority of, the Legislature, the elected representatives of the people."

The opinion is expressed that Her Majesty should summon a leading member of the Legislature who voted in favor of a resolution of want of confidence to form a new cabinet.

Sincerely desiring to meet the wishes of the representatives of her subjects, it has pleased Her Majesty to summon the Hon. A. P. Peterson to assist in the formation of a cabinet.

Her Majesty trusts that the acceptance of the suggestion to call a member of the majority of the Legislature to form a cabinet will bring about the result sought for.

Her Majesty also desires to express her appreciation of the courtesies received at the hands of the gentlemen of the committee.

I have the honor to be, gentlemen, yours respectfully,

JAMES W. ROBERTSON,
Her Majesty's Chamberlain.

Mr. Peterson endeavored in every way to meet the wishes of the caucus in the formation of a cabinet, but the reform faction were irreconcilable, and would not agree to anything that he suggested. The resolution above quoted is misleading. I will not say designedly, for the contention was persistently made in caucus by Mr. Thurston, the framer of the resolution, that upon the defeat of a ministry, not only should Her Majesty send for a leading member of the victorious opposition, but that the opposition should select a cabinet, and send their nominations to the Queen for her acceptance, insisting that she should recognize this course as a constitutional principle.

I and a few others objected to the establishment of such a precedent, urging that under the constitution the Queen had the right to name her cabinet, which could only be removed by a want-of-confidence vote of the majority of all the elective members of the Legislature. See article 41 of the constitution, which reads:

The cabinet shall consist of the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of the interior, the minister of finance, and the attorney-general, and they shall be His Majesty's special advisers in the executive affairs of the Kingdom; and they shall be *ex officio* members of His Majesty's privy council of state. *They shall be appointed and commissioned by the King and shall be removed by him only upon a vote of want of confidence passed by a majority of all the elective members of the Legislature, or upon conviction of felony, and shall be subject to impeachment. No act of the King shall have any effect unless it be countersigned by a member of the cabinet, who by that signature makes himself responsible.*

I see no good reason for departing from the meaning of this clause of the constitution so plainly expressed, and there was at least one good reason for doing so—the possibility of a majority of the Legislature which contained no material from which to form a cabinet outvoting that part of the Legislature from which a cabinet would naturally be selected. And again, it implied that Her Majesty could not go outside of the house to select her ministers. I consider it a decided advantage in the community that the Sovereign should have the privilege of selecting his or her advisers from the whole country.

The meaning of the constitution is plainly that it is the Queen's prerogative to appoint a cabinet, and that of the Legislature to dismiss it—not by any scratch vote, but by a majority of all the elective members.

Over a week passed without arriving at any settlement in the matter of forming a cabinet, during all of which time Mr. Peterson and myself met the members in caucus, from time to time, without reaching any result.

Mr. Peterson failing to form a cabinet, Her Majesty called upon me, on a Saturday, to do so, saying to me that a ministry must be formed to meet the house on the Monday morning following, as the tension

upon the community was becoming too great. It would have given me satisfaction could I have arranged a cabinet to satisfy a majority of the caucus, but in the limited time given me it was impossible to do so, it being evident that Mr. Thurston and his friends did not intend to permit the house to be prorogued without having a ministry selected from their faction. Accordingly I formed a cabinet which I thought would be acceptable to a majority of the assembly and to the community.

Mr. Thurston and his friends at once attacked the cabinet and immediately brought in a resolution of want of confidence, which failed to carry. In the meantime an election was called to fill the seats made vacant by the resignations (on taking cabinet positions) of Mr. Paul Neumann and myself as nobles for the island of Oahu. The clear-cut issue in this election was to indorse or not to indorse the ministry. The result of the election was the return of Messrs. Maile and Hopkins, who went before their constituencies as supporters of the ministry, and who were elected by an overwhelming majority—the cabinet thereby receiving the indorsement of a large majority of the electors for nobles of the island of Oahu.

No better expression of approval could be asked for by members of a representative government than that thus accorded to our cabinet, immediately following the defeat of a no-confidence resolution in the house.

This expression of confidence at the polls was the more emphatic, coming from the electors of the island of Oahu, who are accorded nine noble representatives out of the twenty-four, in deference to their property and income qualification, and might have been expected to lessen the virulence of the opposition.

Despite this verdict of the noble voters for the island of Oahu, which certainly represents the wealth and intelligence of the Kingdom, the unreconciled minority persistently pursued their tactics to force out the ministry.

As minister of finance, I had arranged with the two local banks for the protection of the depositors in the Postal Savings Bank, and on October 12 I informed the assembly that on the following Monday I would present the appropriation bill, outlining the financial policy of the ministry, and at the same time bringing forward additional revenue measures.

On the Monday morning, October 14, before any opportunity had been given to introduce the promised bills, a vote of want of confidence was introduced. Following is a copy of the resolution which was introduced by Representative Waipuilani:

Whereas the present cabinet has not announced or given any intimation or evidence of any financial policy which will extricate the country from its present dangerous financial situation; and

Whereas it is essential to the commercial progress of the country that more favorable treaty relations with the United States be obtained, whereby our products can obtain a free market in that country; and

Whereas the present cabinet has shown no disposition to favor any such policy, and the present head of the cabinet has displayed such conspicuous hostility toward the representative of that country in this Kingdom, and the general tone of the administration has been and is one of opposition and hostility to the United States of America and American interests, thereby rendering it improbable that any changes in our treaty relations favorable to Hawaii can be negotiated by this cabinet; and

Whereas the cabinet has given no evidence of any intention to attempt to remedy existing scandals in the police department, and have otherwise failed to evince any ability to successfully guide the nation through the difficulties and dangers surrounding it: Therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Legislature hereby expresses its want of confidence in the present cabinet.

The debate on this resolution was almost altogether taken up with the attitude of the cabinet towards the American minister, who had a grievance against the *Bulletin* newspaper for publishing reflections on his not sending out the *Boston* in search of a missing American boat's crew. Mr. Stevens seemed to think that the cabinet controlled the *Bulletin*—which it did not—and a rather lengthy correspondence took place between him and the foreign office on the subject, which ended in the attorney-general's entering a suit for libel against the paper, after the editor's refusal to publish an apology dictated by the American minister.

During the debate I was anxious to have this correspondence read, which would have shown that we had tried to meet Mr. Stevens's wishes in every way, but the house would not allow the correspondence to be read. I regret that I can not here reproduce the letters, which would show a conspicuous absence of the hostility dilated on in the resolution.

I have already said that I was prepared with a financial statement; as to the other count in the indictment—alleging scandals in the police department—this resolved itself into a demand for the dismissal of the marshal; but, though much was said, nothing was proved against him. When the reform cabinet took office, the members of it seemed to forget how very scandalous the marshal was, for they retained him in office during the whole term of their incumbency.

On Tuesday, November 1, the Cornwell-Nawashi cabinet took office and was voted out the same day, no opportunity being afforded to outline a policy.

On Friday, November 4, Her Majesty called upon Cecil Brown to form a cabinet, Mr. Brown not being at the time a member of the assembly. This fact, however, did not call forth from Mr. Thurston and his friends any protest, as it was well understood that he (Mr. Brown) would form a ministry that would be acceptable to the reform party; the "constitutional principle" which Mr. Thurston and his friends had contended for being easily forgotten when occasion required. They continued in office simply because they allowed the assembly to do as they pleased with the appropriation bill, the result being that the grand total of the budget alarmed the assembly and produced disaffection, leading up to a vote of want of confidence. The vote, however, failed to carry, but a second attempt was made soon after, and the cabinet was voted out on the 11th of January, 1893. Two days later the Parker-Colburn cabinet took office, and the house was prorogued the following day.

During the time I had a portfolio frequent conferences with Her Majesty satisfied me that she was anxious to promote legislation and to keep down expenses of government, going so far as to suggest to me that the first reduction in the appropriation bill should be made in her privy purse and royal state.

In reference to the lottery bill, about which so much has been said derogatory to the Queen, it should be said that Her Majesty was quite willing to see it fail; but a majority of the members of the Legislature had been worked upon by individuals who had circulated petitions favoring the establishment of a lottery, and the bill having passed, Her Majesty declined to exercise her prerogative in vetoing the bill, a prerogative which she refused to avail herself of, excepting upon the advice of her constitutional advisers.

In this connection I should say that the lottery bill was, during my brief ministry, in the hands of a committee and did not come up at

all for discussion. My colleagues and myself were, however, a unit against it, and in negotiating financial assistance for the Government I distinctly said so, both to Mr. Damon and Mr. Irwin, the representatives of the local banks.

In the matter of the opium bill, there was a division of sentiment on the part of the Brown-Wilcox cabinet (reform), two ministers voting for and two against the measure, it being a question upon which there might be an honest difference of opinion, the opinion being held by a large portion of the community that prohibition did not prohibit.

What followed the prorogation of the Assembly it is not my purpose to touch upon.

I have the honor to remain, sir, your most obedient servant,
E. C. MACFARLANE.

No. 38.

Interview with George Mundon, of Kealia, Wednesday, April 19, 1893.

Mr. BLOUNT. Do you work for Mr. Blaisdell?

A. I am hauling wood for him.

Q. Do you belong to the Annexation Club.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Are you for annexation?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Are you for annexation if your people are not allowed free suffrage?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Are a majority of the native population that way?

A. No, sir.

Q. They are opposed to annexation unless they are assured they have the right to vote?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Then, is that the case of those in your club?

A. Yes, sir; that is the case as long as they get their franchise.

Q. Well, outside of the club, are a majority of the natives for or against the Queen, if they had their choice?

A. I can not say.

Q. Do not you mingle with them?

A. Well, before the overthrow of the Government the majority were against the Queen's action.

Q. About the new constitution?

A. No, not particularly the new constitution, but the way she carried on.

Q. Did they want her dethroned?

A. I can not say they wanted her dethroned, but they were talking against her political actions.

Q. You were not here during the revolution?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you know anything of the sort was likely to take place?

A. I did not think it was going to take place as soon, but I thought it would take place.

Q. What made you think it would take place?

A. In regard to the way the Government was carried on. It was against the wishes of the people.

Q. What people?

A. Hawaiian people and whites. There was a good deal said about it. She would appoint her favorites to office—her cabinet officers.

Q. What time was this?

A. I am talking about the time the last legislature was sitting. She would appoint ministers—that is her cabinet—the legislature would vote them out, and she would take a part of them back again. I think we had four or five changes in that way. That was talked about greatly. It was against the wishes of the people—and one particular point I want to say—it was against my wishes and a majority of the Hawaiians, the retaining of our marshal, Charlie Wilson. He was always in office. We thought he was an incompetent man. The Wilcox cabinet was approved by all of us. We thought it was a good cabinet. Through some bribery they were voted out.

Q. Were you here?

A. No, sir; but I take and read the papers.

Q. Was it from the newspapers you heard there was bribery?

A. I heard it from friends. We knew our representatives were not very good men—men of no standing—and especially one named Akina. He is half Chinese. He is a lawyer. He came up here with a salary of \$250. He had a family to support. He was up here six or seven months. We knew he could not live on \$250, and on his return he must have brought down \$300 or \$400 worth of furniture.

Q. Any more persons you think were bribed?

A. I can not say positively that he was bribed; but there was one of our natives, Paul Kanaa—I won't say he was bribed, but he voted against the party he went for.

Q. Did the Reform party elect him?

A. Yes, sir. He even voted out the Wilcox cabinet.

Q. Did he help to vote out any other cabinet before that?

A. I can not say, but I think that he did. Rumors were sent out to Kealia that the United States would send out a Commissioner; that the United States flag was going to be taken down and the Commissioner was going to put back the Queen. They felt sorry for the Queen and wanted her put back—some of them, not all—some of the ignorant people. Down where we live they are not all well posted.

Q. Are they mostly ignorant?

A. I can not say they are ignorant. They can all read and write.

Q. Do they generally speak English or native?

A. Native; but some of them understand English and speak very well?

Q. How are they generally occupied?

A. They plant taro; some work on plantations—bullock drivers and so on.

Q. Do they make their own living generally; they do not beg or live at public expense?

A. No, sir; they all earn their own living.

Q. Is it generally true of the native population that they do not beg nor steal but make their own living?

A. Yes, sir; they all make their own living. We have no stealing. It is a very rare case to have a native up for larceny.

Q. Who generally commits larceny?

A. The Chinese.

Q. How about the Portuguese?

A. The Portuguese are very seldom brought before the court. I do not think we have Portuguese brought before the court once in a year.

Q. How about the Japanese?

A. Well, very seldom.

Q. Do they (the Chinese) intermarry with your people some?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is that generally agreeable to the native population?

A. No, sir; it is against the wishes of the native population.

Q. Is there much of it done?

A. Well, yes; they manage to get some of the young girls by bribing the parents with money.

Q. To pay for the girls?

A. They do not exactly pay right out, but by giving presents to the parents and girls.

I have carefully read the foregoing and pronounce it an accurate report of my interview with Mr. Blount.

GEO. MUNDON.

HONOLULU, *April 19, 1893.*

No. 39.

Interview with Samuel Parker, Honolulu, Thursday afternoon, April 6, 1893.

MR. BLOUNT. Mr. Parker, you are a Royalist, I suppose?

MR. PARKER. I am.

MR. BLOUNT. Will you be kind enough to give me your views of the causes which led up to the establishment of the present Government?

MR. PARKER. My honest opinion is this: I think it never would have taken place if the Reform ministry had not been put out. When the Wilcox ministry went in the Reform party controlled the Government. I mean by this what they called the Reform ministers. The cabinet council consisted of four ministers and the sovereign—the Queen. That is my reason for saying when that ministry went in that that meant the Government.

MR. BLOUNT. In other words the action of the Queen was controlled by the ministry?

MR. PARKER. Yes; by the ministry.

MR. BLOUNT. Now, why did the removal of the Reform ministry lead to the deposition of the Queen as you understand it?

MR. PARKER. The four ministers that came in were not Reform ministers, but were what might be called a fair ministry, being comprised of two Hawaiians and two Americans. There was the opium bill and the lottery bill—both helped the downfall. They were passed through the house during the Wilcox ministry, which was called the Reform administration. This opium bill and lottery bill had passed the Legislature. When we went in we advised the Queen to sign the opium bill and the lottery bill. The Queen signed it, and it was counter-signed by the minister of the interior, and became a law.

MR. BLOUNT. What were the reasons for passing the lottery bill?

MR. PARKER. The same reasons that there were for passing the opium bill. There was a money franchise of \$500,000 to be paid the Government every year. Out of that \$500,000 certain amounts were to be given to different public institutions. It was to be divided up into parts—to the leper hospital so much; I do not remember the sum. A proportion was for a telegraphic cable between the United

States and the Islands. It was to be divided up in that way. We thought it would be a benefit to the country.

Mr. BLOUNT. In the way of revenue for the purposes to which it was to be appropriated?

Mr. PARKER. Yes; it was in the bill. Out of the \$500,000 there must be so much to this institution and so much to that; so much for a railroad, etc. I do not remember the sums.

Mr. BLOUNT. Who was this franchise voted to?

Mr. PARKER. It was given to four or five men—people living on these Islands. The franchise was in their name. It was reported to us that it would go to the Louisiana Lottery people, but that was not known in the franchise. It was the supposition it was to go to the Louisiana Lottery people, or to some syndicate in the United States.

Mr. BLOUNT. What were the reasons for the opium bill?

Mr. PARKER. The opium bill was for giving a revenue. Now, as there is no license, there is a certain amount of opium being smuggled into the Islands. We do not have force to protect our shores. We have no revenue cutters as you have in California, and we thought that as opium was coming into the country all the time, it would be better for the Government to derive some benefit from it; to have the license put up at public auction and sold to the highest bidder. It would be estimated at from \$100,000 to \$200,000 a year. It was discussed thoroughly by the Legislature and carried by a big majority. The Reform ministry was divided on that—two in favor and two against it. It passed the house by a big majority.

Mr. BLOUNT. Is it your opinion that this movement would have occurred if there had been no effort to proclaim a new constitution?

Mr. PARKER. I think it would.

Mr. BLOUNT. Why do you think so?

Mr. PARKER. A majority of the capitalists of the town had no confidence in our ministry. I think it would have come about any way.

Mr. BLOUNT. Come about soon?

Mr. PARKER. It would have come about, because even when this attempt of promulgation of the new constitution was made, we were told that they would support us for what we had done—for holding out against the Queen in requesting us to sign the new constitution. This was said to us at that time—at the time when the Queen was asking us to sign it. During the day they had a meeting of the citizens. I mean such men as Thurston, Hartwell, and leaders of the Provisional Government. They told us they would back us up. They admired us for our pluck in holding out against the Queen's wish.

Mr. BLOUNT. Would this imply a disposition to take action towards dethronement?

Mr. PARKER. I think it came from the McKinley bill—the first action was on account of the McKinley bill.

Mr. BLOUNT. What do you mean by action?

Mr. PARKER. They said that unless something is done—closer relations with the United States—we are bankrupt. That was long before the Legislature came in session. When I first went into the cabinet.

Mr. BLOUNT. Who do you mean said this?

Mr. PARKER. A majority of the sugar men. Those now at the head of the Provisional Government—capitalists and planters. They said that something must be done to get closer relations with the United States to hold us up; with sugar down to \$45 and \$50 a ton, something ought to be done; a commercial treaty or something ought to be negotiated with the American people.

Mr. BLOUNT. The question of annexation was not presented then, was it?

Mr. PARKER. No; the question was how could we get any commercial treaty with the McKinley bill in force. That was the talk of a commercial treaty with the United States to benefit these islands.

First the opium bill; then came the lottery; then came the promulgation of the new constitution. That, perhaps, hurried matters. I was the trusted party on one side, and it was never broached to me in that way. I suppose those causes brought it about. You see our Queen had already issued a proclamation, countersigned by our ministry, that she would never do anything.

Mr. BLOUNT. Of what sort?

Mr. PARKER. Of bringing about a new constitution. This was on Saturday or Sunday morning.

Mr. Parker here presented this memorandum of Mr. Peterson:

On Sunday evening, January 15, 1893, at 6:30 o'clock, Mr. L. A. Thurston came to my house in company with J. F. Holburn, minister of the interior. He said he wished to have a talk with me. He said the committee on safety had had a meeting the night before and had come to the conclusion that things could not go on as at present, and that the committee had decided that the Queen should be dethroned and a provisional government established. He said that Mr. Stevens would land his troops and support the movement, if a proclamation to that effect was issued from any building in town. He then asked Mr. Colbert and me if we would, without consulting with our colleagues, take control of the situation, and in our own names ask the American minister to assist in carrying out their proclamation. We declined.

Mr. PARKER. In the memorandum of the meeting I omitted the statement he (Mr. Colbourn) made about "Parker being a treacherous liar, etc." Did not want to think we were trying to take advantage. I told them not to put that in the memorandum.

Mr. BLOUNT. Was there any movement, any effort on the part of the Queen or her ministers or friends to induce Mr. Stevens to take action in the interest of her Government?

Mr. PARKER. Yes; Mr. Peterson and myself called on Mr. Stevens. As to what occurred in this connection this memorandum discloses:

On Sunday evening, January 15, at half past 7 o'clock, Mr. Samuel Parker, Her Majesty's minister of foreign affairs, and myself, as attorney-general, called upon J. L. Stevens, American minister, at his residence, to talk over the situation and to obtain, if possible, from Mr. Stevens the stand he, on behalf of his Government, would take in the event of an armed insurrection against the Queen's Government, at the same time informing him that Her Majesty's Government were perfectly capable of dealing with the situation. Mr. Stevens stated that he desired to protect the Government, and advised Her Majesty's Government not to resign, but said, in answer to a direct question put to him by me, that in case the Government called upon him for assistance he did not see how he could assist them as long as C. R. Wilson remained marshal of the Kingdom, terming Mr. Wilson a scoundrel.

The only reason given by Mr. Stevens for this position taken by him was that Mr. Wilson had caused the arrest of his (Mr. Stevens's) Chinese coachman for carrying concealed weapons, although Mr. Stevens stated that he had other matters against Mr. Wilson which he did not state. After which Mr. Parker and myself left.

On Tuesday afternoon, January 17, at 2 o'clock, Mr. Parker and myself again called upon Mr. Stevens at his residence in Nuuanu Valley to learn if possible the truth of the statements made publicly by the leading members of the so-called committee of safety to the effect that Mr. Stevens had promised that if a proclamation declaring a provisional government was issued he (Mr. Stevens), on behalf of his Government, would immediately recognize such Government and support it with the United States forces at his command. I asked Mr. Stevens what action would be taken by him (Mr. Stevens) in case the insurgents attacked Her Majesty's Government and the Government called upon him for assistance.

Mr. Stevens replied that in that case he could not come to the assistance of the Government. I then asked Mr. Stevens what his action would be in case Her Majesty's Government should treat the insurgents as rebels and attack them and arrest them. Mr. Stevens replied that in that case he should feel it his duty to interfere

with the force at his command. Mr. Stevens further said that he had made up his mind that if any number of what he considered responsible citizens should ask his assistance in establishing a provisional government he should grant that assistance and should recognize them as such and support them. Mr. Stevens, during this conversation, was lying on a sofa in his private office and spoke with difficulty, as if in a weak and exhausted state. At 2:30 o'clock Mr. Parker and I left Mr. Stevens and proceeded to the station house, the headquarters of Her Majesty's cabinet and Government.

A. P. PETERSON.

Mr. PARKER. At 5 o'clock Monday the troops were landed. When I found out they were on shore I went up to the club and found the governor.

Mr. BLOUNT. Who was the governor?

Mr. PARKER. Mr. Cleghorn. There was a little complication in our military law. We were really both at the head of the military.

Mr. BLOUNT. You were secretary of state?

Mr. PARKER. I was secretary of the foreign office—what we called minister of foreign affairs. I was responsible for all money paid out to the military, but the governor was supposed to be commander in chief. Our military laws are complicated in that way.

Mr. BLOUNT. You went up to protest against the landing of the troops to Mr. Stevens. What did Mr. Stevens say?

Mr. PARKER. I said: "What does this all mean?" He said: "I gave orders."

Mr. BLOUNT. The next thing was your formal protest, and that you will hand us.

Mr. PARKER. I do not know whether I can do it.

Mr. BLOUNT. What was the substance of it?

Mr. PARKER. The substance was that he ought to have notified us in accordance with international law. Hastings wrote it. I got the governor to make a protest, too, so that he could not say he got authority. This was on Monday evening.

Mr. BLOUNT. What day was the Provisional Government proclaimed?

Mr. PARKER. On Tuesday.

Mr. BLOUNT. At what hour.

Mr. PARKER. About 4 o'clock, I think.

Mr. BLOUNT. When that was done, what action was taken by the Queen—when the troops were landed?

Mr. PARKER. The troops were landed on Monday and the protest was made on Tuesday, and on Tuesday I had a meeting of the Diplomatic Corps. I invited them to come. There was Mr. Woodhouse, the British minister; Mr. Carnavara, the Portuguese minister; Mr. Vizavona, the French minister, and Mr. Fugii, the Japanese minister, present. We asked their advice on the subject. The advice from them was to offer no resistance. Mr. Stevens did not come. He sent word that he was not well enough.

Mr. BLOUNT. Was that after the proclamation?

Mr. PARKER. No; before.

Mr. BLOUNT. In this consultation it was assumed that the Provisional Government would be proclaimed and you were advised to offer no resistance.

Mr. PARKER. I think that was it. We had heard there was going to be trouble.

Mr. BLOUNT. You said the Diplomatic Corps advised no resistance.

Mr. PARKER. Yes; not to have any bloodshed, because they all knew we had a big force. We had seen Mr. Stevens before. Mr. Stevens had told us that they would not assist us.

Mr. BLOUNT. Did he say who he would assist?

Mr. PARKER. I think that will appear in our memorandum. He considered the committee of safety represented the capitalists—represented the people—the responsible people.

Mr. BLOUNT. Does that appear in your paper?

Mr. PARKER. I think so.

Mr. BLOUNT. Won't you please state the circumstances attending the conference between the cabinet and the Queen about signing the new constitution?

Mr. PARKER. Before the Legislature met that Saturday morning we were asked to come there and meet her, in the first part of the day.

Mr. BLOUNT. You had met her in the morning?

Mr. PARKER. No; this was the day when the Legislature was prorogued. In the morning she asked us to come there to talk about this situation. I arrived there first, but my colleagues were late. I waited for them. Nine o'clock or ten, I do not remember exactly, was the hour for the Legislature to meet at Legislature Hall. When my colleagues arrived we had to go right out without having a meeting. In the meantime she had stated that she wanted us to come there in order to sign the new constitution. I said: "Your Majesty, we have not seen the new constitution." It will be time enough, she said, when you come here. I will show it to you and your colleagues. She asked me to be there soon after the prorogation of the Legislature. Just then my colleagues came up to the palace. I said: "Your Majesty, we have no time. We have to be at the Legislature now." I told my colleagues we had to go right over to the hall. We left her.

On the way, I told them that the Queen was requesting us to be there at such and such a time for the promulgation of the new constitution; I said I had not seen it and that I had told her we could not do anything until we first read it. That was what I told my colleagues. After the Legislature was prorogued someone said to me that the diplomatic corps would like to meet the cabinet before they went over. Of course, I did not know what was up. It seemed that a rumor had got down town that the Queen was going to promulgate a new constitution. Rumors got out, and the diplomatic corps wanted to ask me if it was so. I said it was a fact. I had not seen the constitution, but the Queen had requested me to be there with my colleagues. I told them I had not seen the constitution and had no idea what kind of document it was. We all assured them that we would not consent to sign the constitution and then we went over to the palace.

We went into the blue room. She said "I sent for you gentlemen; I was requested by my people to promulgate a new constitution. I want you gentlemen to sign it or to consent to it." They all looked to me. I said: "Your Majesty, we have not read the constitution, but before we read it, you must know it is a revolutionary act. It can not be done." She said: "Read it; see what it is." On that point we said, after we had read it: "We advise you to give it up—not to think any more about it." By that time she got pretty well excited, and some of my colleagues said: "If you insist upon it, we will resign." I said: "Now, gentlemen, if you will walk out into the next room, I will have a few words with her Majesty." They went out. I talked to her, but of course she said that it was her people's wish, and so many thousand signatures had been sent in. She said: "I have thought over the matter carefully, and think that I ought to give them a new constitution."

I told her I would not and my colleagues would not agree to it. There were a good many words passed between us. She said: "Why don't you resign." I said I would not resign unless it was according to law. When I got down to Government house there was Mr. Thurston, Mr. Hartwell, and Mr. Smith, the attorney-general there, and a great many others for consultation in regard to this. They all complimented us; said they would give us all assistance, etc. I told my colleagues they might as well go over with me. They went over and persuaded her (the Queen) to give it up.

Mr. BLOUNT. Was this Monday?

Mr. PARKER. This was Saturday.

Mr. BLOUNT. She agreed to give it up that night?

Mr. PARKER. Yes; that day. I do not know exactly the words she used. On Sunday we called on some influential people around town, Mr. Damon, vice-president of the Provisional Government, and half a dozen other prominent men. We knew they were friends of the Queen and friends of the people, and they thought if the Queen would come with some proclamation of some kind and assure the people that she would give up all idea of the promulgation of a new constitution that they thought the people would be satisfied. That was on Sunday afternoon. Some thought we ought to have the committee of thirteen arrested, but I thought it was not necessary.

On Sunday night we prepared a document for her to sign, and Monday morning I went there about half past 8. She was at breakfast. I showed her this document. I said I wanted her to sign; the cabinet advised her to sign the proclamation, and I would have it brought up. I had had it set up at the printing office, so that it would be ready to be struck off by thousands. The copy was made out at my office. She signed it and it was given out to the public and a copy sent to the diplomatic corps. A little later on they thought that we ought to have sent a special one to the diplomatic corps. So we got up another in a little different wording and sent them to the diplomatic corps addressed to them.

Mr. BLOUNT. When was the Provisional Government determined on?

Mr. PARKER. I do not think it was given out to the public. There was nothing spoken of in public about the Provisional Government. That was kept secret. They had a meeting on Saturday night. We got hold of it that they were talking about this dethronement, and on Sunday it was substantiated. I for one have talked to the people and have also advised the Queen not to make any demonstrations whatever against the Provisional Government, as it was understood that it was only to be a temporary government until the matter was settled by the United States. If it was permanent I do not think it will work.

Mr. BLOUNT. Why?

Mr. PARKER. The head is all right, but it does not go to prove that what they do will be heeded by him. Now, the parties that consist of that Provisional Government outside of Damon, Dole, and Allen, and one or two others, are not men of standing, men of such stamp as would not carry weight in any country. That is the kind of men who are making our laws. I do not think the representative men here would want to live under such a government, with such men at the helm, if it was permanent. I was a member of the board of health. I would not take the oath to support this Provisional Government. I was minister under the Queen. I was using all my influence among my people to keep quiet, to keep the peace, and to assist all we can in keeping

everything quiet until it is settled for annexation, protectorate, or whatever the case may be.

Mr. BLOUNT. What is the feeling of the majority of the people here?

Mr. PARKER. Among the Hawaiians it is for the restoration of the Queen. That is my own feeling, and I think I speak for the people, too.

Mr. BLOUNT. You have a table of the registered native voters for 1890. What is the total vote there?

Mr. PARKER. About 9,000 voters in all. Out of that I will say if it was secured—a valid vote—out of 9,000 there would be 8,000 in favor of restoration.

Mr. BLOUNT. Native population?

Mr. PARKER. Yes.

Mr. BLOUNT. How would you class all other voters besides those you have named?

Mr. PARKER. Foreign voters. I think they would be divided. I would not want to express my opinion. The majority would be for annexation. That is my opinion—among foreign voters.

Mr. BLOUNT. What would be your opinion as to the majority, if the 13,000 votes were all polled; how many of them would be for royalty, and how many against?

Mr. PARKER. I say in regard to royalty—I suppose out of 13,000, I would put it 10,000 for restoration.

Mr. BLOUNT. Suppose you take a little time and make some figures.

Mr. PARKER. There are 9,000 native voters. When I speak of natives I know, but when I talk of foreigners I am at a loss. I know most are for annexation, except perhaps a few English and other nationalities. The Englishmen are naturally prejudiced. I can speak for Hawaiians, but would not want to give my opinion on foreigners. I would put it, out of 9,554 native voters 8,500 would be in favor of it (royalty) and 1,000 against it, among Hawaiians. One-fourth of the foreigners would be for the restoration of the Queen, I think, but it might not be as much as that.

Mr. BLOUNT. You wanted to qualify a while ago in what you said about the restoration of the Queen.

Mr. PARKER. The restoration of the Queen under an American protectorate would be a more stable government than the old régime. There is a feeling that unless we are under some country like the United States it would be the same old revolutionary trouble coming up all the time. I do not think it would be a very stable government. There is a certain class of people here—a certain class like the Germans and Portuguese. They say, "Give us a revolution and it will give us something to do—give us a dollar and a half or two dollars a day." I understand the Provisional Government is paying \$40 a month and found. That class of people would sooner have a revolution night in and night out. So that I say I do not think it will ever be a stable government unless we are under a protectorate. If we are under a protectorate I say let it be the United States. I do not say this because you are the American Commissioner.

Mr. BLOUNT. Your idea is that a majority of the people are for the Queen, but that if the Queen were reinstated she would not be able to maintain permanent order here without the sanction of her authority by a protectorate, say, of the United States?

Mr. PARKER. That is what I think. I have not talked with the Queen on the subject; that would be my advice to her. I would not accept the same position I had before the revolution unless there was a protectorate. If she said: "I want you to be in the same position you

held before this revolution took place—minister of foreign affairs,” I would say, “no: unless you have it under a protectorate.” It is no use looking to England, Japan, France, or Germany. All our benefits are derived from the United States.

Mr. BLOUNT. What is the feeling of your people on the question of their right of suffrage?

Mr. PARKER. The right of suffrage means of course a great deal to the Hawaiian people. If they were admitted as the District of Columbia, which has no vote, the natives would not like it. It would be an eyesore to them. They want suffrage.

Mr. BLOUNT. Is there any apprehension in their minds about the question of suffrage?

Mr. PARKER. Yes; they are very well posted on that.

Mr. BLOUNT. Is there any apprehension that the friends of the Provisional Government contemplate any deprivation of the right of suffrage?

Mr. PARKER. Yes; it was given out that the natives could not be trusted and it was out in native papers just as quick as it was in other papers. There was a howl when they heard that; when young men, nursed by Hawaiian women, as they said, would ever live to work against the interests of Hawaiian people. I said to the people that we could not expect to be under a monarchical government all the time; a change is bound to come some day. Every day this thing becomes more apparent. The native race is decreasing every year.

Mr. BLOUNT. Would you please state the cause of that?

Mr. PARKER. That has been brought up in the legislature year after year, and all the conclusions we could come to was that we are like all dark races—that they go out when the white man comes in. It is a problem why we should die out. I have eight children, and many others have as many. If all other Kanakas should have two children each we should increase very much. I can not account for the decrease.

Mr. BLOUNT. Is it a fact that they do not have so many children as other people here?

Mr. PARKER. Oh no; I can show you a dozen of my stamp. I have eight children, another five, and so on. I am seven-eighths native; my wife is seven-eighths. That is nearly all Hawaiian, with little foreign blood in it.

Mr. BLOUNT. Children are born, but not raised?

Mr. PARKER. Yes; they are careless. It is a customary thing for Hawaiian women to give birth to a child this morning and then ride out horseback in the afternoon. The better class, though, go under proper treatment. I have been married twenty-one years. With our first child my wife was in bed nine days. My aunt said, why should she lie in bed so long? When she gave birth to her first child she was out the next day.

The Hawaiians are good breeders, but they are careless. When the children get fevers they give them cold baths. When the smallpox was here, about 1881, some 400 or 500 natives died. Other nationalities very few. Natives will sit in draft or jump into a bath if they are fevered. They are very careless in that way.

Mr. BLOUNT. You said awhile ago that the native vote, as expressed in secret ballot, would not show the same opinion as if they were asked to sign a petition.

Mr. PARKER. It would never be the same.

Mr. BLOUNT. Why?

Mr. PARKER. You take the plantations. Every plantation has more or less men under them. They look up to the owner of an estate as to a little king, or as their guardian, and they would sign any petition that he wanted them to do. Mr. Spreckles has 300 native laborers. They would all favor the side he did. Mr. Rentre was in favor of restoring the Queen. Everyone of the people on his plantation signed a petition for restoration. They worshiped him. If I was for annexation, every one of the people in my employ would sign it. All laborers would do exactly as the overseers wanted. They say the Queen is our Queen. But supposing they had to do it in secret ballot; they would say, we want restoration. The Wilder Steamship Company, rank annexationists, employ natives. They could intimidate these natives. If you gave them a secret ballot they would vote as they felt.

I have carefully read the foregoing and find it to be a correct report of my interview with Col. Blount.

After the troops were landed I met Mr. Thurston, and laughing at me, he said, "Who ordered those troops ashore?" I replied, "I don't know. I suppose your committee of safety had it done."

My impression was that they were landed in the interest of the movement of the committee of safety.

SAMUEL PARKER.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, June 15, 1893.

No. 40.

Statement of the Hawaiian Patriotic League.

His Excellency GROVER CLEVELAND,

President of the United States of America:

SIR: The undersigned are the officers and executive committee of the Hui Hawaiian Aloha Aina (Hawaiian Patriotic League), a political association, with branches in every district of the Kingdom, representing, together with a large following of foreigners, over 7,500 native-born Hawaiian qualified voters throughout the islands (out of a total of 13,000 electors), and to which is annexed a woman's branch of over 11,000 members.

This league was formed for the purpose of uniting the efforts of all who love this country as an independent commonwealth, and of insuring by all legitimate methods the perpetuation of the autonomy of the Hawaiian Kingdom and the restoration of its legitimate sovereign, Queen Liliuokalani, who was ruthlessly and wantonly deposed by a mob of foreign filibusters, abetted by the United States minister resident and shielded by the United States forces, which were by him landed on their behalf, in violation of all international laws.

The Queen, though having ample force to quell the insurgents, yielded her throne, not to them, but "to the superior forces of the United States," in order to avoid useless bloodshed. She then appealed to the Government of the great Republic for justice and redress, and she carefully instructed her people to quietly submit to the rule of the usurping Provisional Government pending the result of her appeal.

Our patriotic league, following the Sovereign's intentions, has also repeatedly warned its members to keep the peace, under every provocation, and await with patience the judgment of the United States Government; and while we can boast of having up to the present time successfully subdued every popular tendency for agitation or armed resistance, we must also proclaim, to the credit of the Hawaiian people, that they have behaved with a discipline, a decorum, and a forbearance which we believe no other nation on earth would have shown under similar circumstances, that of a country not conquered, but confiscated by a faction of aliens.

But it is now already several months that the Provisional Government have assumed the reins and instated, under the protection of the American flag, a true pretorian tyranny, without any regard for popular rights and wishes or for constitutional principles. And the people's patience is wearing out, looking anxiously for a solution from the United States Government (hitherto our great friend and constant protector) and expecting by every incoming mail some action, no sign of which is yet forthcoming.

In the mean while the situation here is growing highly unsatisfactory—every day worse—and loud complaints are heard from all sides. The Provisional Government have succeeded in making themselves unpopular even with their adherents, and their rule is becoming daily more odious to the natives, who are not even granted the shadow of a representation in their councils. The Hawaiians generally are being dismissed from public service to make room for hungry foreigners, adherents of the Provisional Government; and, as if to incite a revolt, the native feelings have been purposely aggravated by the desecration of the royal palace and by numerous other instances of petty despotism, which can not fail to be galling to the real citizens of this country. In their administration they are exceeding all the possible rights of a provisional government in repealing statutes made by the lawful representative Legislature and enacting an interminable string of new laws, some of which are simply useless or childish though vexatious, others really obnoxious. In their financial policy the Provisional Government compromise the future to meet the present extravagant wants, hoping that "Uncle Sam will pay the bills."

All public works and improvements are virtually at a standstill, whilst they are squandering the public funds in the maintenance of a mercenary soldiery, recruited from runaway sailors, escaped criminals from other countries, or other bad characters from the slums of San Francisco, who are extravagantly paid and live luxuriously at the expense of the honest taxpayer. And the money thus wasted could be used to much better advantage at the present time by furnishing useful work to the deserving and suffering laboring classes.

All these and other substantial grounds for the general discontent make it an uncontrovertible fact that the Provisional Government are incapable of maintaining themselves in power except through the help and propping up of the United States Government. Left to their own resources they would not be saved, even by their large force of alien mercenaries, who are their only supporters, but who remain so prudently, cautiously, intrenched in the royal palace, trembling every night for fear of some attack, the idea even of which has never yet been entertained by the royalists.

But the obvious and utter weakness and unpopularity of our self-assumed administration have thrown a general veil of uncertainty and

uneasiness on the whole country, whereby all transactions are paralyzed and the value of real estate reduced to naught, even the Government bonds, which have always been above par, having lost nearly 10 per cent. Every kind of business has become seriously depressed, the working classes are suffering for want of work, and the wheels of progress and industry are stopped, threatening stagnation and disaster, whereby all classes are becoming impatient, the natives chafing under the insults of the Provisional Government and beginning to talk of revolt, and the foreign element of our league beginning to press for relief from a situation which has evoked many bitter enmities.

To render the matter still more serious the time is waxing near when the taxes are becoming due, and there is a general disposition to refuse to pay any money to the present government until things are settled by the United States' decision. Of course a general refusal of taxes would precipitate serious complications; but, as the situation is now, already it is only through the greatest vigilance that the patriotic league manages to repress the feelings of its members. And if the present condition continues a while longer the result may be an outburst that the patriotic league, hitherto the leading influence of the country, will be unable to prevent, and lives and property may be jeopardized.

Truly, therefore, may it be said that the situation is growing intolerable and delay unbearable; and there will be, there can be, no relief until the United States Government has determined our future, and thereby a permanent legal government has been put in power here.

Under the circumstances, which the public press openly and justly qualifies as "disastrous and deplorable," we, the undersigned, are moved, in answer to our league's wish, to take the liberty of addressing your excellency, through your accredited minister here, Hon. J. H. Blount, and of respectfully saying that since the fate of our little kingdom and its inhabitants is in your hands, we do humbly pray that a speedy solution may be reached to avoid impending calamities, and so that we may once more enjoy the blessings of peace, prosperity, and a proper government.

That the natives have as yet been quiet, apparently apathetic, must not be construed as meaning that they are gradually accepting the new order of things, by which they are deprived of all their rights in their own country. They are simply waiting, in their simple faith in the generosity and honor of the most liberal and honorable Government of the world; and they expect *justice*, id est, *restoration* of their legitimate sovereign. And the American Government must now be sufficiently well informed of the enormous injustice committed against this defenseless and peaceful nation, so that it seems to us that little or no doubt can yet be entertained by any impartial mind as to what ought to be the proper course for dealing with the "*faits accomplis*" here, and no doubt as to the true royalist sentiments of the large majority of our people.

But owing, as we represent, to the gathering storm, all good citizens are anxious that no more delay than actually unavoidable should now occur in the settling of this matter; and, therefore, if it is considered by your Government necessary for the question to be referred to Congress, we do respectfully, but most earnestly, fervidly beseech, in the name of our people, that it be submitted if possible to this now coming extra session.

And we further pray that Almighty God will vouchsafe you and

your Government his divine guidance in assisting you to deal fairly and justly with an unhappy nation, whose sole hope lies in you.

Most respectfully, your excellency's humble servants,

(Signed)

J. A. CUMMINGS, *Honorary President.*

JOSEPH NAWAHI, *President.*

JNO. E. BUSH, *Vice-President.*

J. W. BIHIKANA, *Vice-President.*

JOHN LOLE KAULUKOU, *Vice-President.*

J. E. KAUNAUIANO, *Vice-President.*

JAMES K. MERSEBURG.

JOHN KAPUMAWAHO PRENDERGAST.

ABRAHAM K. PALEKALUHI.

SAM'L K. AKI.

H. S. SWINTON.

JAS. K. KAULIA, *Secretary.*

S. M. KAAUKAI.

W. L. HOLOKAHIKI.

JNO. SAM. KIKUKAHIKO.

L. W. P. KAUEALII.

J. KEKIPI.

F. S. KEIKI.

J. MAHIAI KANEAKUA.

HONOLULU, *July 15, 1893.*

No. 41.

Statement of the Hawaiian Patriotic League.

MEMORIAL ON THE HAWAIIAN CRISIS

I.—*Generative causes.*

The strongest argument of the men who, for personal aims, crave for the overthrow of the Hawaiian national monarchy, is that the natives are incapable of self-government, and to this flimsy and false argument the United States minister resident, J. L. Stevens, as a complaisant echo, adds that the natives are always "misled by unscrupulous hoodlum foreigners," "unscrupulous hoodlum" being apparently Mr. Stevens' pet diplomatic qualification for every man who does not agree with his diplomatic friends and accomplices.

The historian's ready answer to these calumnies is that ever since the pacification of the country, which followed Kamehameha's conquests, the natives when left alone have had a most satisfactory, peaceful, and progressive Government, while all the dissensions, riots, and troubles recorded in the annals of these islands have ever been *by or through* foreigners seeking to wrench the power and wealth from the poor natives, these being ever the peaceful and patient sufferers thereby, not "misled," but terrorized and oppressed.

As it can be seen, even in Alexander's *Brief History*, all political difficulties experienced by our native Government in the past, up to the present one, have been through foreign extortion and violence, beginning with the outrages committed by whalers and lawless sailors or adventurers down to the intemperate domineering pretensions of for-

eign representatives, so that a rapid review of ancient history will serve to shed a true light on the present situation.

The unjustifiable seizure of the islands by Lord Paulet (1843), some features of which are not very different from our present situation, was brought about by the high-handed enforcement of trumped-up charges and claims by the English consul Charlton, and the French incident in 1849 was caused by Consul Dillon's arrogance. As Alexander's history states it, "for years the Honolulu community was kept in a state of turmoil by consular grievances," and in 1846 a table of such grievances, prepared by order of the Legislature, "formed a roll 120 feet long." Every consul, and more prominently at one time the United States Commissioner Brown, insisted on "the right of diplomatic interference with the internal affairs of the Kingdom," and of "ready access to the person of the Sovereign." (Alex., 261.) It would now seem that in those early times the various powers represented here were vying with each other to seize any pretext which might give them a shadow of right for taking possession of these desirable and coveted islands, so that the late policy of Minister Stevens and Capt. Wiltse, of lying in ambush and waiting for the most trivial pretext to jump on the native Government, has not even the merit of being original with them.

Fortunately, in the past, the various great powers have been generous, disinterested, and honorable enough to disown the political cupidity of their agents, and this is one of the reasons why the natives to-day are so patient and peaceful; they know that the great American Republic is the most honorable and generous of all nations, and takes the lead in all just and liberal ideas, moreover they have such an inborn faith in and respect for the United States Government, whom they have been taught by their early teachers to regard as their best friend and natural protector, that they can not be otherwise than confident that history will only repeat itself and that their precious independence will not be less respected by America than it has been by England and France.

This confidence is all the more justifiable, as this is not the first time that the country has been disturbed by some annexation craze. In 1853 things here reached such a crisis that the foreigners then living in Honolulu, and "especially men recently arrived from California thought that 'the times were ripe,' and organized with the view of forcing on King Kamehameha III, annexation to the United States; 'petitions in favor of it were circulated and signed and strong commercial interests used for its furtherance;'" and stranger yet to say the King got to be "so tired of demands made on him by foreign powers, and of threats by filibusters from abroad, and by conspirators at home to overturn the national government" that he himself declared in favor of annexation "as a refuge from impending dangers." (Alexander.) But fortunately, at that time, the last remaining faithful missionaries of the old stock strongly opposed the project, believing "that its effects would be disastrous to the native race" (Alex., 277), and the honest American diplomats of the period indorsed that opinion. And here, let it be said to their honor, the early American missionaries have ever been found on the side of the rightful native authorities, advising them and helping them to resist foreign aggressions, and being allowed in consequence full political control. Even to-day, faithful to their original mission, the Roman Catholic and Anglican clergies are still found on the side of the native independent government.*

* The fact of these two religious denominations not being favorable to annexation may make it interesting to add here a statistical note about the approximate distri-

But the descendants of the early American missionaries have turned against the honorable traditions of their fathers; they only attend to the natives now to negotiate some ironclad mortgage deed, and they no longer care whether or not the "effects of annexation would be disastrous to the native race," although the old reasons therefor are just as patent now as forty years ago. Further than that, they have not only ceased to be the trustworthy advisers and helpers of royal authority, but they have been bent solely on using all their moral and financial influence to grasp the administrative power for the furtherance of their own ends and interests, and from these men arise all the present troubles.

This change in the morality of the missionary descendants came to its climax through sugar, and it may here be said that sugar has been a curse to these favored islands, making some few men—foreigners—immensely rich, but impoverishing the masses, the natives especially, and bringing about corruption and greed, and political venality unknown to the converts of the early missionaries.

The sugar greed was of long and gradual growth, the early efforts to give it an impetus by appealing to American generosity having repeatedly failed through the prudence of Congress; and it can be safely said that just prior to the season of extraordinary financial prosperity that followed the treaty at last granted in 1876, by the kindness of our great and good friend, the Republic of the United States of America, all the old foreign complications had worn out, so that the native Government was running smoothly and our people at large were living in peace and in greater harmony than they have ever since. It was a time when we had less wealth and less selfishness, but more quiet contentment.

The divergence of sentiment and lack of harmony came about through the ambition, the sordid desire of foreign residents and sons of missionaries to accumulate great wealth and grow suddenly rich. To accomplish this end the few who had the advantage in lands, money, and friends saw that the main point for them was to control the Government, so as to secure the special legislation necessary to carry out their designs, and especially to procure the indispensable cheap labor and keep them down under labor laws equivalent to slavery. To this faction this country owes the undesirable and un-American introduction of Chinese, Japanese, and the still more ignorant and illiterate Portuguese. Millions of public money, under the fallacious pretext of "encouragement to immigration," have been spent for the sole purpose of bringing in laborers for the planters, and even the voyage around the world of King Kalakaua was made use of to try to obtain Indian

bution of the population according to religious beliefs, and it must be taken as very significant that, in the last census, the religious element was left out altogether, for the reason that the missionary party who presided over the operations of the census could not allow their decline to be made public together with the ascendancy of their rivals. In the absence of other authorities, the Catholic clergy claim 30,000 adherents on these islands, about 18,000 being natives, out of a total of 40,000; and as the Anglicans, Mormons and Seventh-Day Adventists also claim quite a number of converts, it is thus seen that very considerably less than 22,000 natives remain under the spiritual sway of the annexationists' faction, and, moreover, it could easily be ascertained from the missionary publications that, within the last few years, the Hawaiian communicants reported by their churches have diminished in the proportion of about 90 per cent (2,200 against 21,000), the reason of this is solely the anti-patriotic anti-Hawaiian anti-loyal attitude assumed by the missionary churches and their schools, wherein teaching the children to pray for the country and sovereign has been discontinued. Even in the Kamehameha industrial school, founded with the money of the last of that illustrious native family, the pupils are taught rank republicanism and disloyalty to their country and race, and forced to sign the annexation pledge.

coolies under British jurisdiction, which would have made this country practically an English colony, had it not been for the veto of the American Government, and yet the idea was not entirely abandoned. for only a year ago Mr. Marsden, one of the commissioners who went to Washington to beg for annexation, was sent to India to try to revive the matter, and he reported in favor of it.

This goes to show the reason why so many annexationists in the country have alternately shifted from loyal Hawaiians to rank annexationists, according to what appeared most expedient for their purposes or gain; thus it can be safely said that few indeed is the number of those who want annexation for mere patriotism; for the majority, it is essentially a question of dollars and cents they think they can make out of Uncle Sam, and even to-day, many of the hottest annexationists would turn right over to any other power if they had any prospect of making more money by such a change.

Through the American reciprocity treaty of 1876, which was granted essentially with the idea of benefiting especially the aborigines, American gold began to roll in by millions into the coffers of the planters, who were thus enabled to pay usurious interests to our bankers and capitalists, large commissions (as high as 7 per cent) on all sales and purchases to the commission merchants, the balance of the profits still constituting princely incomes, with which the planters were enabled to travel abroad with their families, while the silent authors of this untold wealth—the poor laborers—got barely enough to cover their nakedness and food enough to give them sufficient strength for their daily task.

This inhuman and immoral system could not last eternally, and the masses, including the foreign laborers, realizing its injustice, gradually obtained control of the Government; this, moreover, culminating in 1886, in the Gibson anti-missionary administration.

When the planters and their missionary friends realized that the administrative power was slipping out of their hands, through the fact that the Kanaka, in spite of all coaxing and bribery used, would not always vote to suit the selfish wishes of that class, nor submit himself to their greedy tyranny, it was deemed a necessity to down them, and from that time dates the determination on the part of the wealthy foreign class to gradually rob the native of his political manhood, which he knew too well how to use; and this policy culminated in the assertion made by Commissioner Thurston, in the states, that henceforth Kanakas must be totally disfranchised and not allowed to vote, otherwise the infinitely small minority of the sugar revolutionists would be swamped. And this is how and why the Kanakas are incapable of self-government.

At the same time the sugar oligarchy began to look out for a political change that would bring their waning power back to them. They thought that they would find the desired goal in annexation, through which they could use the United States as their supporter. Conspiracies were then initiated for the purpose of bringing about annexation, and were continued for over three years against the same King Kalakaua who had been instrumental in obtaining the long-wished-for treaty for the planters. This flagrant ingratitude culminated in 1887 by the first revolution, planned and carried out exclusively by a handful of foreigners at the instigation of the missionary sugar-planters and capitalists, who formed that party afterwards known under the deceptive name of "reform party." Through the adroitness of the King,

this movement was only partially successful, inasmuch as the overthrow of the monarchy, then contemplated, could not be accomplished.

It, however, gave a very severe blow to public liberties and to equal rights, because a reactionary constitution was forced upon the masses, which has since been the law of the land without having ever been submitted to the approval or ratification of the people; and its modification has been strenuously opposed by our plutocrats, because they knew, from its inception, that the said document was a fraud and a snare. It professed to be liberal, but it was about as deceptive a document as the character of the men who inspired it. It disfranchised a large number of natives, while it gave to utter strangers, and to all the illiterate Portuguese then under the influence of sugar-planters and others, the unprecedented right of voting without having to take any allegiance to the Government. The reaction, which naturally followed the violent inauguration of such a retrograde factum, led to the second revolution, attempted in 1889, by some natives under R. W. Wilcox—the only instance in Hawaiian history in which the natives tried to assert themselves politically without foreign help.

The failure of this movement did not deter the natives, but aroused in the masses a strong feeling of opposition to the reform cabinet then in power, which was formed by the very same men who headed the present rebellion. This opposition of the masses showed itself very emphatically in the regular elections following, notwithstanding the inequalities of the franchise, which virtually gave the wealthy classes the control of half of the law-making power of the land; the Hawaiian people, whom the missionary sugar-planters had aimed to control in this manner, repeatedly carried a majority at the polls in all the elections since 1890, and the only method left to the reform party to attain the ends to control the Government has been by bribery and corruption, with that very wealth which the generosity of the American people had given to Kalakaua for the general benefit of all his subjects. Thus the good that the great American nation had intended for the Hawaiians turned out in the hands of a few greedy foreigners to be the means of oppressing those very same natives.

The flagrant inequalities thrust by this revolutionary constitution on the native people, thus disfranchised in their own country, has been the bone of contention ever since. The Hawaiians have been as a unit at the polls in carrying the representative seats for the special object of obtaining a new constitution doing away with the injustice embodied in the present one. They have, for four years, demanded the enactment of a law by the Legislature, authorizing the election of delegates to a constitutional convention, for the framing of a really liberal organic law. In seeking a new constitution, the natives do not want to disfranchise anyone or put any qualification upon a voter other than that he should be a resident in the country for a certain period of time and should know how to read and write in his mother tongue; but they do want equal rights for all.

However, every honest effort made by the native Hawaiians to secure a liberal change of this nature, a change that would give freedom and equality to every soul that came freely into this country, has been defeated by the most unprincipled means that men can be capable of employing; and to their shame, the missionary sugar planters, the descendants of men who preached the eternal principles of good morals and claimed freedom and equality as their birthright, are the very men who stand in the way of the fulfillment of these liberal principles. But the very people who have been represented to the great American

nation as being illiterate, illiberal, and not worthy of sympathy, not worthy of the manly right to vote, are about the only ones here who are struggling for liberty and equality to-day, and these are the much traduced Hawaiians. Thus the political situation here for years past can be clearly defined as follows: The Hawaiians have been patiently and peacefully contending to regain by legal means a just political status, whereby all the foreigners would also enjoy equal liberal rights; while the reform party have been intent on realizing, by violent and arbitrary ways, the gradual but total disfranchisement of the natives, and accessorially the control of the poorer classes of foreigners, by capricious property qualifications.

In other words, the sugar oligarchy have sought to override all true constitutional principles and to realize the un-American phenomena of creating a plutocracy of their class, to whom all other classes and interests should be politically and materially subservient.

In this they may have been encouraged by the docility of the Hawaiians in general; but certainly neither the revolution of 1887 nor the *coup de main* of 1893 have in any way been revolts against unfair, oppressive administration, while they may be fairly characterized as desperate grabs for personal power, which the plutocratic faction could not obtain by fair, honest means at the ballot box.

Furthermore, the policy of the reform party may be said to be one of gross ingratitude, in the sense that the native legislators—of whom it is safe to say that they always acted with decorum and intelligence equal to any State legislature in the Union—have never refused to enact laws or appropriations for the benefit of the sugar industry, which has been fostered in every practical way. Our statute books are full of liberal laws, and in nowise oppressive, showing ample evidence of the intelligent and progressive character of our Government, and of generous provisions for the protection of foreign capital and fostering of industries conducted here by foreign investors. In no other part of the world, under aboriginal rule, have foreigners prospered so well as here. Even the system of taxation ought to satisfy any men but selfish plutocrats; for it is the masses, the poor people, who bear the principal weight of direct and indirect taxation (which is heavier than in the United States), while taxes on property are very light and easily evaded; planters have never been taxed anywhere near to a just proportion to the actual values, and, moreover, their taxation has been reduced by 25 per cent since the McKinley act came into effect, while no reduction of any kind has been granted to the other classes.

Having regained temporary possession of the power, through the revolution of 1887, the sugar missionaries dropped for a time their annexation schemes, and merely tried to use the United States to keep themselves in power, reserving annexation as a desperate expedient. This is proved by the treaty which they attempted to negotiate in 1889-'90, in which a special clause, now known as the "bayonet clause," allowed them to call at any time for the landing of the United States troops, to protect them and any cabinet they might uphold. This treaty was rendered impossible by the turn of the elections in 1890, in which the sugar planters and missionary influence combined were downed by the strong will of the natives, allied with the foreign workingmen and mechanics, who opposed the coolie-labor policy of the wealthy class.

The reform party then turned again to their old schemes of plotting for annexation. Rumors of conspiracies and expected uprisings on their part have been rife ever since 1890, and the liberal results of the various

elections of 1892 only increased their desperate activity. Mr. Thurston, the reform star, was openly accused of being the leader of these conspiracies, one positive manifestation of which was the movement instigated by the reform party in May, 1892, which led to the arrest of R. W. Wilcox and V. V. Ashford, both of whom were saved from legal punishment through the influence of the leaders and "respectable men" of the sugar missionaries, who feared being exposed and implicated in the movement.

Unfortunately the popular party was divided into two factions, making three with the sugar missionary reform party. These divisions rendered the last Legislature utterly impotent to carry out strict party measures, and was the means of prolonging the session to an unprecedented length of time, about eight months. It also raised the expectations of the annexationists and plotters to the highest pitch, which increased when they found a willing abettor in the person of the United States minister, Stevens. Hence they resolved to seize the first plausible excuse, the first practical reason for another revolution; and unfortunately this apparent reason and pretext was given to them by the Queen herself, in her endeavors to meet the popular will.

It must be inserted here, that it was only because the immortal principles of justice, liberty, and equality were violated or ignored in the Bayonet Constitution of 1887 that the Queen to satisfy her own people undertook to suggest to her constitutional advisers, the cabinet, the promulgation of a new constitution embodying these desirable features and addressed to the masses, not to a mere faction. Upon the advice of her ministers she withdrew the proposition and requested her people to be patient, to forbear, to wait until a legitimate time, when she hoped they would be enabled to secure the object of their wishes. This act of the Sovereign, too liberal to be forgiven by the reactionary reform party, drove them to a desperation, because it would have forever thrown the control of the Government out of the hands of the wealthy minority. Therefore the missionary offsprings and their plutocratic friends and followers used it as a pretext for robbing the last and only vestige of right left to the Hawaiian in his own country, his independent nationality, his flag, denying him even the claim to be a human being.

Now to show what authority the insurgents had to dictate in the matter it will be in order to resort to statistical points. The last official census, made in 1890, corrected to date, puts the total population of the group at 96,075. Out of this number 15,570 are Chinese, 18,474 Japanese—two races not allowed as yet to take a share in local politics, though the Japanese Government now claims for its citizens equal rights with other foreigners. The balance of the population is distributed into natives and half-castes, 40,622 plus 7,495 Hawaiian born of foreign parents and into 13,912 foreigners, among whom the Americans count only a total of 1,928 "of all ages and sexes," the British 1,344, the Germans 1,034, the Portuguese 8,602, and other nationalities 1,004. Thus the total American element all over the islands amounts to only about two-hundredths of the whole population and one-seventh of the total number of foreigners.

More especially in Honolulu, which is only part of the country that participated in the insurrection, the Americans number only 767 males, as against 2,003 other male foreigners (among which are no less than 529 English) and against 6,902 male natives. Furthermore, all our American residents are *not* in favor of annexation; it is only a fraction of this small number of 767 Americans, with a few Germans and Portu-

guese (therefore a minority unsupported by the rest of the population), who have accomplished the overthrow of the recognized native Government, through the American official influence.

Can it be possible that so small a faction, and so heterogeneous at that, whose only force is to be loud-mouthed and utterly regardless of veracity, should be allowed to impose their whims on the rest of the population, and rule it contrary to all American ideas of popular government?

To cover their numerical weakness, the annexationists' faction have tried to awaken American sympathies by alluding to the necessity of protecting American capital, which they claim to be so largely invested in these islands. To give plausibility to this assertion, tables have been prepared, purporting (on estimations, not on any positive documents) to show that the total capital engaged in sugar (in corporations and nonincorporated plantations) amounted to \$33,420,990, out of which \$24,735,610 were claimed to be American, or about four-fifths; \$6,038,130 British, \$2,008,600 German, \$226,280 native, and \$299,000 of other nationalities. This fantastic array is contradicted by the mere fact that out of a total of \$537,757 for internal taxes, Americans paid only \$139,998 (official figures), or one-fourth, while, according to the above statement, American plantation stock alone, outside of commercial firms and other American taxable property, ought to have paid over \$247,000. But even allowing that a large portion of the sugar interests may be *apparently in American hands*, it is far from correct to call it American capital.

It is an undeniable fact that outside of Mr. Claus Spreckels, of California, no American has ever brought into this country any capital worth mentioning, but many have sent away fortunes made here; most of our present American capitalists, outside of sons of missionaries, came here as sailors or school-teachers, some few as clerks, others as mechanics, so that, even if now they do own or manage, or have their names in some way connected with property or corporations, this does not make their wealth of American origin. Those who are now independent run their plantations or business firms on money made here, out of the Hawaiian people and from Hawaiian soil, through coolie labor; the others are simply running on capital borrowed principally from English or German capitalists, and their concerns should be more justly called English or German capital because, in case of bankruptcy, such capital would really be lost, not American capital.

The local Cræsus, American by birth, the banker, C. R. Bishop, came here poor and started his fortune by marrying the wealthiest native princess, whose lands and income allowed him to duplicate it by banking on Hawaiian capital; surely his can not be termed American capital. The conclusion of all this must then be, that certainly American capital and interests here can be cheerfully acknowledged as very large and important, and entitled, like all other foreign capital and interests, to every consideration and protection; but American annexation can not be justified on the sole ground of the asserted extreme preponderance of such American capital, or on the pretension of that capital to be entitled to special or exclusive protection or favor, not any more than German or English planters would be entitled to ask for annexation to their countries on the same grounds.

II.—*Development.*

The phase by which the budding conspiracies of the reform party bloomed out into open rebellion can not be better compared than to the filibustering schemes of the well-known Walker and other historical desperadoes, with this difference, however, that all those expeditions were made without participation of any United States official, the United States Government, on the contrary, making every effort to check and frustrate those attempts against international laws, whilst the Hawaiian crisis has been helped, promoted, precipitated, encouraged, and countenanced by two representatives of the United States Government. Moreover, it can be boldly asserted that the Honolulu filibusters (for they repeatedly admitted it themselves) would never have dared to attempt their uprising without the moral stimulus and promises of the United States minister, nor would they have had strength to carry it out successfully against the Queen's well-armed forces and the numerous volunteers ready to fight for her, nor could they have maintained themselves one day in power, without the material armed support of the United States troops on shore and the guns of the U. S. S. *Boston* trained on the town.

Therefore, this military interference and aid to a mob of filibusters can only be qualified as an overt act of piracy by a United States officer against a defenseless friendly government. The whole proceedings are the most outrageous example known in modern times of naval forces abusing their power without urgent cause and without previous declaration of war. If sustained by the American Government the action of Capt. Wiltse will be a precedent that will set to naught all international rights, all security of weak powers against their more powerful neighbors; henceforth any group of lawless, quarrelsome foreigners residing in any port of other nations will be justified in raising a riot on the most flimsy pretext, and then calling on warships of their own nationality to help them to take possession of, "annex" the place, against the rights and wishes of the aborigines. It will then only be a question of the survival of the strongest, of possible application wherever a weak native government or a pacific population can be cowed by a foreign element sufficiently strong or enterprising; but what renders the facts still worse in our case, is that they have been the result of a long premeditated policy.

The extreme intimacy of Minister Stevens with the various members of the Reform party, to the exclusion of all men belonging to other parties, had been remarked even before Kalakaua's death, and it was common talk that plotting accompanied dining at the United States legation in Nuuanu street. It was whispered with glee by the Reform partisans that Stevens had been sent here purposely to promote annexation, which the death of Kalakaua seemed to facilitate, hence it is not surprising now to note that, from the start of her reign, Stevens shows himself inimical to the Queen, evidently as reflecting the opinions of his Reform friends. Far from acting like the representative of a friendly government, his relations with the Hawaiian administration were ever unfriendly, meddling, and quarrelsome to such a degree that, at one time, the chairman of the committee on foreign affairs of the Legislature suggested that he be given his passport, and it is greatly to be deplored that the suggestion was not acted upon. The address he had the presumption of making to the Queen, on her accession, was of the nature of a threatening lecture from a rigid Sunday-school teacher to a very vicious child, and was as ungentlemanly as it was undiplomatic,

according to the universal rule which prohibits every diplomatic agent to interfere in the internal affairs of a foreign country.

Then claiming the old forgotten assumption of "ready access," so abusively used here by consuls fifty years ago, he took the pretext of some flimsy newspaper article to make a display of his ignorance of common etiquette as well as of his spiteful feelings, by forcing himself on the Queen and trying to make Her Majesty and her ministers personally responsible for that article, which eventually did not justify any ordinary legal proceedings.

During the various changes of cabinet that marked the end of the Legislature, Mr. Stevens was satisfied only when reform missionary men were chosen for ministers, and his extraordinary antimonarchic oration on Decoration day, as much as his attitude towards the Parker cabinet, during the days that preceded the revolt, plainly show how biased he was, and bent on embarrassing the Hawaiian Government.

The other actor in our tragedy, Capt. Wiltse, from the time Admiral Brown left him in charge of the station, made no secret of his purpose to secure annexation, and boasted that he would not leave before it was accomplished; if he did not keep his word in its entirety, it is certainly not through any fault of his. During the parliamentary changes of cabinet he openly stated that, in case the Queen did not select for her ministers Reform men, or men satisfactory to that party and to Minister Stevens, the *Boston* troops would be landed to interfere, and thereby bring about annexation. Even the foreign diplomats were aware of those boasts. Unfortunately Wiltse's utterances were not taken into sufficient consideration and treated seriously by the Hawaiian Government, but were deemed only to be expressions of intemperate language of an eccentric officer, not to use any harsher term, whom the American correspondents were making fun of.

But there is no doubt now that at all times he has been an extremely industrious intermeddler in Hawaiian politics, frequently lowering his high position by interviewing hackmen on the streets on local affairs. Further than this, the officers of the *Boston* will probably testify to the fact that several times during the legislative period, and evidently in accord with a preconceived plan of seizing any favorable incident or pretext, the United States troops were kept in readiness for landing when there was not the smallest sign of disturbance or even excitement in town or in the Legislature.

And it must here be recorded that Capt. Wiltse made a veritable debauch of military demonstrations during the Legislature, landing troops and guns several times a week, and parading them through the town as no other foreign vessel had ever done before, with the undoubted intention of intimidating the native population and preparing future events.

After the exhaustive accounts that have been published of the facts of the revolution, and especially after the printed statements made by the Queen and her envoy, P. Neumann, and by the attorney-general, Peterson, the various details of which appear to us perfectly exact and correct, we do not deem it to be in our province to offer a new narration, but simply to point out certain facts and their signification in the interest of the people we represent.

Of the new constitution, which has been the apparent motive for the explosion of the long prepared revolution we have already stated, that it was desired and demanded by nine-tenths of the native population; moreover, to make the position of the Queen plainer, it may be well to recall the fact that in this country all previous constitutions had been

granted by the free will of the different sovereigns, until the last one 1887, was extorted out of Kalakaua by an armed mob of foreigners led by the same men who directed the present rebellion, so that the Queen might have considered herself perfectly justified by the local precedents as to her power of granting a new constitution at the request of her own people.

Rumors of this new constitution had been current during the session of the Legislature, so that the surprise assumed by the reform party was not genuine, and it may be well to ask what there was in the document prepared for the Queen so *utterly obnoxious* to the reform party, and how they could possibly know what its contents were, since its text has not been published?

The first outcome of the Queen's attempt to proclaim her new constitution (Saturday, January 14), was a meeting in the office of W. O. Smith, of about 70 members of the reform party, which afterwards they had the impudence of calling a public meeting (!) and in which it was decided to support the cabinet against the Queen (for the maintenance of the old constitution), and to exact from Her Majesty "guarantees" against any further move in the matter on her part. But this conservative decision did not satisfy the firebrands who wanted annexation, and who immediately held another meeting secretly, about two dozen of them, at Mr. Thurston's house, in which a secret "committee of public safety" was appointed, composed of about the same incorrigible demagogues who had concocted and led the "1887 revolution."

This committee then ordered a mass-meeting at the armory (Monday, 18th), to which from 700 to 800 foreigners responded, many of whom were utter strangers, tourists, sailors from the merchantmen in port, and many others only present through mere curiosity, so that it is safe to say that in this meeting (which was going to have such an influence on the political destiny of the whole country) not half of the men present were legal voters, the natives especially being absolutely absent and assembled elsewhere. The object of this meeting was clearly stated as merely to give authority—or a shadow of it—to the self-appointed 13 members of the "committee of public safety," and to empower this committee to demand and obtain from the Queen "assurance and guarantees of a better government," *id est*, a promise to respect the 1887 bayonet constitution, this pet offspring of the reform party. Nothing more was demanded of the public at the meeting, as the perusal of the speeches there made by the most responsible speakers, Messrs. Wilder, Glade, Young, and others, will conclusively show. Not the smallest allusion was made to an impending change of government, and not one man in the audience, outside of the leaders, did guess that the resolution then submitted for approval meant anything beyond "guarantees from the Queen for good government and preservation of order."

And certainly not one dreamed that in the innocent looking tail of this resolution, running as follows: "And we do hereby further empower such committee to further consider the situation and further devise such ways and means as may be necessary to secure the permanent maintenance of law and order, and the protection of life, liberty, and property in Hawaii," there could be meant a dethronement of the Hawaiian monarchy by a clique of foreigners without any submission to or indorsement by the voters at large; and worse than that, a subsequent wild rush for annexation to the United States without even consulting the whole foreign element. We claim that, had this meeting realized that such were the intentions of the self-appointed committee of public safety, the revolution would not have been carried, or at least

only an infinitesimal minority would have backed it. But this meeting in itself was only representative of a mere fraction of the population, for, at the same hour, at Palace Square, another meeting of between five and six thousand natives and loyal foreigners cordially supported the Queen, accepting her apology for withdrawing her constitution and her promise of leaving the matter to be accomplished constitutionally.

Thus the majority of the population of the town was plainly with the monarchy, and the Provisional Government, which was subsequently appointed by the committee of public safety, represents but the arbitrary assumption of a clique, with no popular backing. We claim that they can sustain themselves through force and only so long as no appeal is made to the electors, but soon as an election be held not one of the members of the Provisional Government would receive even a decent minority of votes, for they only represent the old reform party—that party defeated at the polls in 1890 and 1892, and who is now in power through a surprise under false pretenses. The utter weakness of the Provisional Government and of the party back of it was unmistakably shown on the day of the proclamation (Tuesday, 17th), when the whole population ought to have been in arms if they had been in sympathy with the insurgents (as falsely represented in America); while on the contrary, it was with the utmost difficulty that fifty ill-armed men could be mustered to march on the Government house, for a cash consideration, and with the positive understanding that in case of failure they could take refuge behind the files of United States marines, and from there on board of the *Boston*.

What was the attitude of Minister Stevens during the leavening of the revolution will be better gathered from the official documents and affidavits of the Queen, her ministers, and her marshal. We need only, in the name of the people, ask that this diplomat should be made to answer positively *why* he ordered the landing of the *Boston* troops, right after the two meetings above mentioned had so peacefully transacted their business and so quietly dispersed? There was not the smallest sign of excitement, the whole population manifested only the most pacific disposition, everyone being under the impression that, with the work of these two meetings and the adoption of their resolutions, the whole matter had come to an end, and that things would be satisfactorily and peacefully settled between the Queen, her ministers, and the self-appointed committee of public safety.

Especially the natives, from whom alone any fear could have been entertained of "riot or danger to persons and property" (for such has been Mr. Stevens' flimsy excuse) were exceptionally quiet or even indifferent, and they are not a fighting race; no groups were seen in the streets, the royal troops had quietly laid their arms as usual in the barracks; there was no display of police forces, and not a shadow of danger breathed in the whole atmosphere, so that the United States troops had no business on shore. Mr. Stevens then refused to give officially any reasons for this landing, and it has since been said that it was executed at the request of the self-appointed committee of public safety, who had yet no legal standing, this going to show that, at that early date (16th) Stevens was already disposed to acknowledge their authority and attend to their wishes in preference to deferring to the regular and legal Government.

The landing was made without any previous official notification, an act contrary to all international rule, and it was evidently precipitated by the fear that, in the meantime, the Queen might have proclaimed martial law, which would have made the position more embarrassing,

and probably would have prevented any further complication. We say, therefore, that the landing of the troops was a direct violation of all civilized laws, and ordered for no other purpose than that of helping the brooding insurrection. The further facts of the force being made to occupy the Arion Hall, alongside the Government houses and opposite the palace, when other buildings (the two armories, and the new shed in construction on Merchant street) were available, shows that the intention was to command the Royal Palace and interfere with the movements of the Royal troops, so as to render possible the seizure of the public treasury, and the farce of proclaiming the new Government, although it was reported that Mr. Stevens had promised to recognize their proclamation whenever it was made from any building in town.

The official documents and the examination of witnesses will show that when the proclamation was made by the armed mob at the Government house, and there recognized by the United States representatives, the Queen's full force, with artillery and Gatling, were still in possession of the palace and barracks and of the strong police station, and this last could not have been taken without a severe siege which the Provisional Government alone was utterly incapable to undertake and carry out; therefore, the legal Hawaiian Government was still *de facto* in power and able to maintain their situation, and Mr. Stevens has willfully prevaricated in his *assertion* to the contrary. It was only when it became known that Mr. Stevens had declared that he would recognize and protect against the Queen any government formed by any group of what he would consider (as to him) "responsible citizens," that the Queen, her Government, and her numerous partisans surrendered to avoid useless bloodshed, and surrendered under protest, not to the insignificant Provisional Government, but to the superior forces of the United States warship.

At that time, the natives would have shown fight, but all their leaders urged upon them to keep quiet, as everything was left in the hands of their constant protector, Uncle Sam, who would see that justice be duly rendered; and most admirably, most deservedly, quiet they have kept ever since, under severe provocation, but confident in American honor and impartiality, that justice would be done.

As soon as all danger had disappeared by the surrender of the Hawaiian Government, a couple of hundred men, all foreigners, and principally penurious Germans and Portuguese, flocked to help the new Provisional Government and take the place of the disbanded Hawaiian guards; but this was not done out of sympathy for the movement, and still less out of a wish for annexation (the possibility of which had not yet permeated the public as being the saving anchor for a weak usurping Government). No, the adhesions to the Provisional Government were merely out of personal convenience, and their number only goes to show, not the popularity of the reform filibusters, but simply how many men there were in town out of employment, who gladly jumped at the chance of gaining a salary.

As the "Liberal," an uncontrovertible authority in the matter, said: "The revolution was a Godsend to many people out of work (from the results of decrease in business through the McKinley bill), who for weeks had been destitute; they shouldered their guns to fight for bread as much as anything else, and while the guard was maintained (by the Provisional Government) they had a very congenial employment and a good pay." Very good indeed for these foreigners, but we Hawaiians take this occasion for protesting against the lavish expendi-

ture of public funds, made from a nearly bankrupt treasury, for the maintenance of an extravagantly large, useless, and dangerous military establishment of armed aliens who have no vested interests in the country, mere mercenaries, officered by men known for the hatred they bear against the Hawaiian people. We protest all the more because the very men who thus squander the people's money on several hundreds of unnecessary play soldiers, are the very same ones who, in the last legislature, ridiculed and opposed a total of sixty men for the Queen's guard and purposely reduced the police force.

We must here dwell on the fact that no Hawaiians, even from among those few who are said (with great flourish of trumpets) to favor the insurrection, enlisted in the Provisional Government Army, in spite of all pay and uniform allurements; but, on the contrary, we must take good note of the fact that the Hawaiians of the old royal band refused, to a man, to continue their service under the Provisional Government, preferring starvation prospects to perjuring their loyalty; they started an independent organization, with instruments paid with their own money, and the people show their appreciation of the boys' noble and disinterested fidelity by patronizing their concerts in unusual crowds. And this may be taken as a good sign of the general feelings of the natives against the Provisional Government sprung on them by their old enemies, the Reform party.

But eight days had not yet elapsed before the loyalty, fidelity and patriotism of the incongruous, discordant crowd, who supported the Provisional Government manifested itself by dissensions running riot, to such a point that the only manner of saving the new order of things was to implore Mr. Stevens for a declaration of American protectorate. Since this protectorate has been withdrawn the Provisional Government have certainly had no trouble in maintaining themselves, but simply through the fact that the natives are quietly and peacefully awaiting for the decision of the United States.

It would be foreign to our aim here to follow the Provisional Government in its subsequent career of despotism and intimidation practiced in the name of American liberty and under the protection of American bayonets.

It will suffice to say that we, Hawaiians, do not and can not contentedly acknowledge the right of a faction of turbulent foreigners to dictate in our country for the satisfaction of their greedy selfishness and lust of power; but we are ever ready to bow and submit to the rule of the majority, whenever legally expressed, and we would willingly abide by the decision of a plebiscite, honorably and fairly carried out, if such was the will of America. Therefore, we proclaim that we have not and never will recognize the present Provisional Government, a government sprung out of a *coup de main*, abetted and shielded by foreign intervention and run by a clique who do not enjoy the confidence of the people, their unpopularity being so thoroughly known to themselves that they expected to maintain themselves only by disfranchising the whole nation. They rule only by the force of bayonets, through martial law and the Draconian treason laws they enacted for their support, and we do protest against their arbitrary assumption of legislation, repealing old laws and making new ones of odious nature, thereby exceeding all rights that a provisional administration can dare to assume.

Of the men of the present Government we have nothing to say, except that they are politicians repeatedly defeated at the polls who want to rule or ruin, or mere boys utterly unknown and of no weight,

chosen for the fact of their being willing to jump into a harum-scarum, break-neck policy; but we do protest against their pretention of perpetuating themselves in power without reference to the people; and we most solemnly protest against their high-handed policy of gagging the press, of intimidating officials into taking the oath of allegiance, and signing annexation petitions and club rolls against their free convictions; of spitefully discharging others, especially Hawaiians and old residents (conveniently accused of being "royalists") to make room for foreigners, new comers, Hawaiian haters, and of calling to the supreme bench and other high public offices aliens of brief residence, whose sole claim is that they carried a gun under the protection of the *Boston* sailors.

But all coercive measures are of no avail, for the Hawaiians remain Hawaiian, true to our race. To us, Hawaii and our native government are just as dear as America is to every true-born American, and no loyal and patriotic subject of the glorious stars and stripes can blame us for being imbued with a similar patriotism, for loving the dear land of our birth, and even preferring our modest flag to any other, however glorious it may be.

We do not believe that the times and circumstances warrant the present movement of annexation; our people are not yet ripe for it, and we prefer remaining under the paternal rule of our own monarchy that understands our wants and wishes, and under which we claim to be quite capable of self-government. Nevertheless, we want it well understood that we Hawaiians have no objection against America or the Americans; on the contrary, we have been brought up to honor and respect our great and good neighbor, and through American teachings more than half century of civilization and experience of self-government have given us an intelligent appreciation of the political doctrines and democratic principles of constitutional government, with America and Great Britain as chief patterns.

More particularly do we value, respect, and comprehend the fundamental principles of the American Constitution, such as "no taxation without representation," "the rule of the majority," and "government of the people, by the people, and for the people;" and we have tried to follow those principles, when not disturbed by an intriguing, bribing plutocracy of foreigners who repudiate such liberal principles and wish to make peons or pariahs of us. Without past political experience of American institutions we could not accept contentedly any such forms of restricted government as the Provisional Government commissioners to Washington, without any authority from the people, have tried to obtain from the United States in order to keep their clique in power. If annexation is to be accomplished with any justice it must be by the consent of the majority, not at the beck of a few adventurers or greedy plutocrats, men who, to further their private ambition or avoid impending bankruptcy, have remorselessly thrown on the United States the responsibility of a very dishonorable action, that of robbing a people of their nationality, men also who, through their annexation scheme, would entangle the United States Government with some foreign problems of difficult solution—the Japanese one especially.

It has not yet been clearly demonstrated that annexation would benefit either this country or America, and to us it seems as if both sides may have much to lose and little to gain by it. In what concerns America we can not presume to pronounce on military or strategic reasons, but we do agree with many eminent American writers that annexation would rather be a source of danger, a cause of weakness to

the United States, without giving them better commercial advantages than such as can be more safely and easily obtained by intimate treaty relations with an independent government here. On our side, the gain from annexation to such a distant country is also difficult to prove, while the fiscal policy of the United States may at times place our sugar, rice, coffee, and other tropical products at a disadvantage by binding us to rival interests and preventing our seeking freely the most advantageous outlets.

For all the above reasons and others too long to enumerate, we protest against the present movement in favor of doing away with the independence of our country; we protest against the effort made to force annexation to the United States without consulting the people, and we especially protest against the interference of the United States minister, Stevens, in Hawaiian politics and his violation of our sovereign rights by the unjustifiable landing of the United States troops and the biased recognition of the insurgents.

We particularly resent the presumption of being transferred like a flock of sheep or bartered like a horde of untutored savages by an unprincipled minority of aliens who have no right, no legal power, no influence over us, not even a claim of conquest by fair-handed warfare, and we can not believe that our friends of the great and just American nation could tolerate annexation by force against the wishes of the majority of the population, for such an annexation would be an eternal dishonor, an indelible stain on the pure escutcheon of the leading nation of the world.

It is therefore with the utmost confidence in the wisdom, honor, and impartiality of the United States Government that we respectfully but earnestly pray for our independent autonomy and the restoration of the Hawaiian Monarchy; and our gratitude will ever bind us more indissolubly to the great Union by a stronger tie than any enforced annexation could ever realize.

God save Hawaii Nei.

God bless the great Republic and its magnanimous and just leader, President Cleveland.

J. A. CUMMINS,
JOSEPH NAWAHI,
JNO. E. BUSH,

For the Hawaiian Patriotic League.

KA HUI HAWAII ALOHA AINA.

[Hawaiian Patriotic League.]

KE KUMUKANAWAI.

CONSTITUTION.

Oiai ua ike ia ae nei ka loli ano nui ana o ko kakou aina, he mea hoi e manaoia ai, e hoopilikia ia ana kona Kuokoa ame na Pono Kivila o kona mau Makaainana, a me na Kupa, a no ia mea, he mea pono e kukuluia ona Hui manao lokahi a makalala mawaena o na kanaka a pau e aloha ani i ka Aina, me ka nana ole i ka Aoao Kalaiaina a Manaoio Hoomana paho. Nolaila:

E hooholoia. O makou o na makaainana kupaa a me na Kupa Aloha Aina, a makee maluhia hoi o Hawaii nei, no ke

Whereas vital changes in our country have taken place, which may affect its independence and the civil rights of its subjects and citizens, thereby rendering indispensable a compact and zealous union between all men who love the country, irrespective of party or creed;

Therefore, resolved, That we, the patriotic, peaceful, and loyal subjects and citizens of Hawaii nei, for the purpose

kiai makaala ana i ko makou mau Pono Kivila, ma keia, ke hooihui nei makou ia makoniho ma kekahi Ahahui, malalo o ke kumukanawai mahope ae nei. penei:

Inoa.

PAUKU 1.—O ka inoa o keia Ahahui, oia, “Ka Hui Hawaii Aloha Aina.”

Ka hana.

PAUKU 2.—O ka hana a keia Ahahui oia ka malama ana a me ke kakoo ana, ma na keehina hana maluhia a kue kanawai ole, i ke kulana Kuokoa o na Pae Aina o Hawaii, a ina he mea hiki ole ke malamaia ko kakou Kuokoa, alaila, o ka kakou hana oia ka hooikaika ana i na hana kue ole i ke kanawai a me ka maluhia e hoomau ia ai ka Pono Kivila o na kanaka Hawaii a me na Kupa makaainana.

Na mahela.

PAUKU 3.—Aia iloko o keia Ahahui e kukulu ia he hookahi Hui Nui ma Honolulu i kapa ia “Ka Hui Kuwaena” [central body] a mai loko aku ona e kukulu ia ai i mau Ahahui lala ma na Apana Koho o na Mokupuni.

Na Lala.

PAUKU 4.—[A] O na Lala o keia Ahahui, oia na kanaka Hawaii maoli o keia aina, he 20 makahiki a oi aku i make-make e hoopaa ia iakou iho malalo o na kumuhana o keia Ahahui, ua kupono ia e lilo i mau hoa, a lilo hoi i mau lala mamuli nae o ke kakanu inoa ana malalo o keia Kumukanawai.

[B] O na kanaka a pau o na Aina-e, e noho nei i keia wa he mau Pono Kiviia ko lakou iloko o keia aina a i lokahi pu hoi, na manao e kakoo i na kumuhana a keia Hui, a i makemake e hoopaa ia lakou iho no ua Hui la. ma ke kakanu inoa ana malalo o keia kumukanawai, e lilo no lakou i mau hoa Hanohano (Lala) no keia Ahahui.

Na Hoonohonoho Ana.

PAUKU 5.—O ka Hui Nui Kuwaena [central body] o “Ka Hui Hawaii Aloha Aina” oia ke noho mana maluna o na Ahahui lala o kela a me keia apana koho, a e lawelawe ia ana e ua Luna Nui malalo iho nei, penei:

1—Peresidena Hanohano. 1—Peresidena. 2—Hope Peresidena. 1—Kakano-lelo. 1—Pauku a me 13 mau Hoa Kuka, a o lakou a pau, oia ka Aha Hooko o 19 lala. O keia mau luna a pau he poe kanaka Hawaii maoli, a e koho ia lakou ma ka Balota, no ka manawa a e hoaka-kaia e na Rula o keia Ahahui.

of peaceably guarding our civil rights, do hereby form ourselves into a league, under the following constitution:

Name.

ARTICLE 1. The name of this association shall be the Hawaiian Patriotic League (Ka Hui Hawaii Aloha Aina).

Object.

ARTICLE 2. The object of this association is to preserve and maintain, by all legal and peaceful means and measures, the *independent autonomy* of the islands of Hawaii nei; and, if the preservation of our independence be rendered impossible, our object shall then be to exert all peaceful and legal efforts to secure for the Hawaiian people and citizens the continuance of their civil rights.

Divisions.

ARTICLE 3. The league shall consist of one central body in Honolulu, with branches in the various districts of the other islands.

Membership.

ARTICLE 4.—(A) All the natives of this country, over 20 years of age, who are willing to pledge themselves to the objects of this league, are eligible for membership thereof and may become members by signing this constitution.

(B) All foreigners, at present enjoying or entitled to civil rights in this country, and in sympathy with the objects of this association and willing to pledge themselves to it by signing the constitution, may be admitted as *honorary members*.

Organization.

ARTICLE 5.—The central body of the *Patriotic League* shall rule over all the district branches, and shall be conducted by the following officers:

1. Honorary President.
1. President.
2. Vice-Presidents.
1. Secretary.
1. Treasurer.

And 13 councillors, who together shall constitute an executive council of 19 members. All these officers must be native Hawaiians and must be elected by

E koho no na Ahahui Lala o na apana koho i ko lakou Lunahoomalu, Hooe Lunahoomalu; Kakauolelo a me ka Puna, a e koho i hookahi Elele i wahaolelo no lakou e hele mai ai imua o ka Ahahui Nui (Hui Kuikawa) ma Honolulu, a ua loa i na Elele la ke ku leana e hele ai ma na halawai o ka Aha Hooko a me na halawai o ka Ahahui.

Na Luna Hanohano.

PAUKU 6.—O na kanaka o na Aina E, e lilo ana i mau lala, e kohoia lakou e ka Aha Hooko no na kulana hanohano e like me keia :

1. Peresidena Hanohano.
2. Hope Peresidena Hanohano.
2. Kakauolelo Hanohano.

7. Hoa Kuka Hanohano, a oi aku paha e like me ka mea e hooholoia ana e ka Hui ma keia hope aku;

O keia mau Luna Hanohano oia ka Aha Cuka [Advisory Council] e noho pu a e koho me ka Aha Hooko.

Na Hana a na Luna.

PAUKU 7.—O na hana a na Luna Nui, ua like no ia me na hana maa mau e pili ana ina Hui e ae e like me keia ano Ahahui, a e hoakaka pono ia ana hoi ma na rula e aponoia ana ma keia hope aku e ka Aha Hooko.

Na halawai.

PAUKU 8.—Na halawai o ka Hui e kahea ia no ia e ka Peresidena, ma ke kauoha a ka Aha Hooko, a o kekahi mau Hoa paha he 10;

E kaheaia na halawai a ka Aha Hooko e ka Peresidena ma ke noi a kekahi mau hoa 3, o ua Aha Hooko la;

O na hana o na halawai a pau o ka Hui a me ka Aha Hooko e alakai ia no ia e na rula o na anaina maikai, a me na rula maa mau o na Ahaolelo.

Kipaku ana.

PAUKU 9.—O kela a me keia hoa o ka Hui a o ka Aha Hooko paha, e hanaana i kekahi hana e kua ana i ka manao a me na hana a keia Ahahui, e kauohaia no ia e ku imua o ka Aha Hooko, a ina ahewa lakou iaia, e kipakuia no oia mai ka Hui aku.

Na hoololi o ke kumukanawai.

PAUKU 10.—O na hoololi a me na pakui ana mai i keia Kumukanawai, e hana wale ia no ia ma ka hooholo ana a na halawai mau o ka Hui.

Aponoia ma Honolulu, i keia la 4 o Maraki, 1893.

Peresidena Hanohano

Peresidena

Hope Peresidena

“ “

J. A. CUMMINS,

J. NAWAHI,

J. K. KAUNAMANO,

J. W. BIPIKANE,

ballot, for such term of office as may be provided in the by-laws of the league or council.

The district branches shall elect their chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, and treasurer, and shall appoint one *delegate* to represent them before the central body in Honolulu, which delegate shall have a right to attend the meeting of the executive council and of the league.

Honorary officers.

ARTICLE 6.—Foreign members shall be elected by the executive council to the following honorary offices: 1 honorary president, 2 honorary vice-presidents, 2 honorary secretaries, and 7 honorary councillors, or more, as may hereafter be determined by the league. These honorary officers shall constitute an advisory council who shall sit and vote with the executive council.

Duties of officers.

ARTICLE 7.—The duties of the various officers shall be those pertaining to the respective offices, as is usual in all similar organizations, and shall be more expressly defined in such by-laws as may be hereafter adopted by the executive council.

Members.

ARTICLE 8.—Meetings of the league shall be called by the president, at the request of the executive council or of any other ten members;

Meetings of the executive council shall be called by the president, at the request of any three members of said council;

All proceedings of meetings of the league and of the executive council shall be governed by the usual decorum and rules of parliamentary usage.

Expulsions.

ARTICLE 9.—Any member of the league or of its executive council who may commit an act violating the spirit and purposes of this league may be summoned before the executive council, and upon conviction by them be expelled from the league.

Constitutional amendments.

ARTICLE 10. All amendments or additions to the present constitution must be approved by a general meeting of the league.

Adopted, Honolulu, this 4th day of March, 1893.

Honorary President.

President.

Vice-President.

“ “

No. 42.

Interview with the Hawaiian Patriotic League, May 2, 1893, printed with Mr. Blount's No. 4, dated May 4, 1893.

No. 43.

Statement of A. P. Peterson.

His Excellency J. H. BLOUNT,
Commissioner, etc.:

SIR: The causes which led to and the motives which actuated the trouble in Hawaii are varied. In the first place the passage of the McKinley bill and the consequences resulting led to a feeling of dissatisfaction among the merchants of Honolulu and the planters generally. This feeling of dissatisfaction has also led to a feeling in favor of annexation with the United States among a few, and that feeling caused them to assist in the background the Ashford and Wilcox rebellion in the spring of 1892. And when that failed through the arrest and trial of the leaders, even although they were not found out and arrested, the same feeling of dissatisfaction still led them to look about for any pretext to carry out their ideas and by this means serve their pecuniary interests.

If the price of sugar had been higher we would have had no revolution. Another cause was the feeling of the Missionary or Reform party that they and they only possessed the divine right to rule, to rule at all hazards, if not in one way then in another. They could not forget the long years when they had had complete control of the Government, when their word had been law with the Kings of Hawaii, and which rule had been wrested from them by a movement which had joined together the natives, disgusted with missionary rule, and the mechanics, discouraged at the hordes of Chinese and other Asiatic labor brought into the country by that rule, which uprising in 1890 had wrested from them their power. This feeling of desire to rule can best be illustrated by Mr. Thurston's statement, made at a public meeting in Honolulu during an election campaign in 1892, when he said: "That to carry out their object they would join hands with the devil if necessary."

This statement coming from Mr. Thurston thoroughly illustrates the idea of rule or ruin policy which has been adopted by the Missionary party of which he is the leader. This idea led that party in the last Legislature to adopt a course which they did. Having been elected practically upon a joint platform with the National Reform party, the party which in that Legislature adopted a conservative course, and were naturally in sympathy with the best people and the best interests of the country, they, the Missionary or Reform party, took the first opportunity to break loose from their natural ally, the National Reform party, and to join with the common enemy whom then had opposed during the election, what was known as the Ashford and Bush wing of the Liberal party, simply for the reason that upon the overturn of the Wideman cabinet, whom all parties had agreed should go out, they, the Missionary party, had not the appointment of the cabinet to follow. This joining with the common enemy naturally estranged the members of the National Reform party and forced them into an alliance

with the more conservative wing of the Liberal or native party, as no party in the Legislature had a working majority.

After the overthrow of the Wideman cabinet the opposition, headed by Mr. Thurston, took a position in favor of what they called the constitutional principle, that the Queen should call a leading member of the opposition to form a cabinet. The Queen did so, and called me. I being a member of the National Reform party and not their choice, they objected to my forming a cabinet because I had stated to them my determination not to enter such cabinet. But they decided to waive that point if I would name or form such cabinet as they should nominate and select in caucus. This I declined to do and notified the Queen that I could not form a cabinet. She then called upon Hon. E. C. Macfarlane, another leading member of the opposition, who formed what is known as the Macfarlane cabinet. This was still not satisfactory to them, as they claimed, because they had been told that every member of the cabinet had not been Mr. Macfarlane's own selection, but in reality because Mr. Macfarlane and the majority of the cabinet selected were not from their party.

They immediately attempted to oust them, upon the sole ground that the constitutional principle, as they claimed, had not been adhered to. They failed upon the first attempt, but later, having thoroughly organized and appointed a committee which had no name, but which can only be called a corruption committee, they succeeded, by the use of a large amount of money, in finally ousting the cabinet, having won over, through these peculiar and almost unheard of means in Hawaii, sufficient natives to carry their vote. The Cornwell cabinet which followed, and which was the personal choice of the Queen, was within a few hours summarily dealt with by this combination of the missionary and the devil and put out in a few hours. This was followed by a cabinet which was formed by the Hon. Cecil Brown, who was not a member of the Legislature and was in no sense a leading member of the opposition, and who but a few weeks before had been defeated for a seat in the house, but, getting together a number of members from the Reform party, he satisfied the desire of that party in his choice.

Although they had sworn to stand by the constitutional principle before spoken of, as soon as a cabinet was formed satisfactory in its personnel to this party which lacked by a considerable number a majority in the Legislature, they were perfectly willing to abandon their constitutional principle and stand and support a cabinet composed of their own members. When this cabinet, which they had sacrificed so much principle for, was voted out for purely political reasons, they realized that their hold upon the politics of the country was forever gone unless they could by some grand coup regain their power by overturning representative government. In this connection it may be said that the charge made by the insurgents who formed the Provisional Government, in their proclamation of corruption in the late Legislature, was to a certain extent true. But it is no valid reason for their action, as the Reform Party, representing as they did the planters and therefore a large part of the wealth of the country, were the people who paid the money and caused the corruption and should be blamed very much more than the Hawaiians who took their money.

All these causes combined bound together a few hundred people in Honolulu, dissatisfied malcontents, either because they were not making as much money as formerly, or because they had not the control of the Government, who were only too glad to take advantage of the attempt of the Queen to promulgate a new constitution, especially

backed as they were, or as they claimed to be and as after events showed were true, by the assurances of Mr. Stevens, the American Minister.

It is not necessary for me to go into the details of the revolt here, as the most of it has already been told by me in a number of affidavits already on file, and I shall confine myself to mentioning only a few facts, which, if stated at all, have been misrepresented.

On Saturday afternoon, after the prorogation, and after the Queen had declined to promulgate a new constitution, a meeting was held at the office of W. O. Smith and over seventy of the prominent citizens of Honolulu, most of whom were afterwards actively engaged in the movement to dethrone the Queen, signed a document agreeing to support the cabinet of which I was a member in the stand they had taken against such promulgation, and promise that that support should exist so long as the cabinet stood by their position. In less than three hours the meeting which formed the Committee of Safety was held at Mr. Thurston's house, and they were determined to break their pledge unless the cabinet would agree to dethrone the Queen and form a Provisional Government. This breaking of their pledge did not surprise the cabinet, as they could expect nothing but such a failure to keep their word from the men who were engaged in it.

This action of the Queen in attempting to promulgate a new constitution, although it was petitioned for and desired by ninety-nine one-hundredths of her native subjects, was deprecated by her cabinet and was entirely new to them, although statements have been made to the contrary, and by their efforts solely the danger was averted. Upon the promise of the citizens who had signed the agreement to support the cabinet, they acted and advised the Queen that it was necessary for her to issue a proclamation stating the circumstances under which the attempt to promulgate a new constitution was made, and assuring the foreign representative and the people that she recognized her mistake and that no attempt hereafter would be made to alter the existing constitution except as provided therein. This proclamation was issued and signed by the Queen and cabinet and assurances were also sent to the representatives of foreign Governments that such was the Queen's intention.

This proclamation, and especially the assurances to foreign representatives, which was looked upon as a treaty with the foreign powers and at any time could have been treated as such, was deemed satisfactory by the majority of the prominent and wealthy merchants of the city. The mass meeting which had been called by the insurgents and the counter mass meeting called by the opposition were both attempted to be stopped, but the committee of safety felt that they had gone so far that a meeting should be held denouncing the action of the Queen in order to avert further possible harm, it being understood among the leaders of that party that that was the extent to which their meeting should go. At their meeting on Monday afternoon they had less than 700 people present by actual count. The resolution presented at that meeting was confined entirely to the action which had been proposed, except the ending clause, which was slyly introduced by the most fiery members of the committee of safety, giving that committee liberty to act in any emergency which might arise. If the action which the committee saw fit to take within one hour under that resolution had been for one moment thought of by that meeting they would not have been able to carry their resolution.

The counter mass meeting was attended by more than six times as many people as attended the other, and understanding that the critical situation had ended by mutual consent, the meeting was conducted in

a peaceful and quiet manner. After the meetings the people dispersed to their homes and matters were quieter than they had been for many a day, until shortly after 4 o'clock word was heralded about the town that the United States troops from the *Boston* had landed at the request of the committee of safety. On Tuesday the Government was ready to meet any emergency, which fact Mr. Stevens, the American minister, was notified of, and were prepared to keep peace at all hazards, and at any time could have arrested and dispersed the insurgents, most of whom joined them only on the promise that the United States was behind them and would protect them. The Government had well armed and equipped more than ten men to one insurgent. Nothing was done by the Government except to keep in readiness, as they desired to first find out Mr. Stevens' position in the matter, which he had indicated in his conversation with myself and Mr. Parker on Sunday afternoon, but which was not absolutely certain.

After our conversation with Mr. Stevens, Tuesday afternoon, which has been detailed fully in our affidavits, and which was ended at a little after 2 o'clock in the afternoon and before the proclamation by the Provisional Government was issued, the cabinet came to the conclusion that it was absurd to think of resisting the United States, and waited only until Mr. Stevens formally notified them of his recognition of the Provisional Government, which he sent us in answer to a letter from us. This letter in answer to ours reached us before 4 o'clock and less than an hour after the issuing of the proclamation by the Provisional Government. After receiving his notification that he had recognized and would support the Provisional Government we entered into negotiations with the Provisional Government, and upon their promising certain matters in connection with the Queen's protest, which by the way they afterwards failed to carry out, we delivered up the station house, which was then, and always has been in time of trouble here, the headquarters of the Government, the barracks, and palace, under the protest which has been published and which explicitly says that we yielded to the superior force of the United States troops.

This ended the affair as far as the Hawaiians are concerned, who, acting upon the advice of their leaders, determined to leave their case to the justice of the American people in dealing with the protest of their Queen. Since that time the only danger which has menaced the community has been that caused by the presence of the troops of a foreign nation guarding the sacred halls of their chiefs, and the still greater menace of the vagabonds which the Provisional Government called in to their assistance and organized into what they term a Provisional army. These facts show that Mr. Thurston's statement that Mr. Stevens didn't recognize them until after the surrender is false, and also show that the whole affair was premeditated and thoroughly understood between Mr. Stevens and a few of the citizens of Honolulu.

It has been stated by the supporters of the Provisional Government that the main reasons for the movement they undertook were the passage of the opium and lottery bills at the close of the Legislature. To show the untruthfulness of these statements it is only necessary to call attention to the fact that the opium bill was passed by an overwhelming majority at the desire of nearly all classes in the community, and was supported by two members of the administration, which they have repeatedly stated was entirely satisfactory—Mr. Robinson, minister of foreign affairs, and Mr. Brown, attorney-general.

As to the lottery bill, from its first mention it was supported by the Hawaiians generally, by the mechanics almost to a man, and by a majority of the storekeepers, smaller merchants, and clerks. It was

opposed by the banks and the larger wholesale merchants, who gave as their reason for such opposition that it was not wise to place such political power as the bill proposed, or which might be taken under it, in the hands of a single corporation. The argument used in favor of the passage of the bill was that times were hard; that there seemed no immediate prospect of better times coming; that the poor man and the small dealer would be forced to the wall unless some relief was had; that while they did not believe in lotteries generally, it was the only tangible relief in sight and as such was grasped at. In fact, the arguments were exactly such as the same men use now in favor of annexation to the United States—anything to better our financial condition. To show the public feeling on the question of the lottery it is only necessary to refer to the special election held in Honolulu last October for the election of two nobles for the island of Oahu, when almost entirely upon the issue of the lottery Hopkins and Maile were elected by a large majority; they supporting the lottery, as against Mr. Brown and Mr. Robinson, afterwards called into the Wilcox cabinet, and Mr. H. Waterhouse, a member of the provisional council.

The cabinet of which I was a member have been accused publicly and privately of having favored the purpose of the Queen to promulgate a new constitution, and in support of that it has been said that Her Majesty told me, at the meeting in the palace, that I had had the constitution in my pocket for a month. What she did say was, in answer to a remark by Mr. Parker, that we didn't know what the constitution contained; that I—Mr. Peterson—had had it in my possession for several weeks. The explanation of that remark is this: During the early part of the session of the Legislature, some three or four months before the prorogation, the Queen sent for me one day and handed me a roll wrapped in newspaper, and, without saying what it was, asked me to look it over and see if I could propose any changes. I carried it home and looked at it and found it to be a draft of a constitution. I did not read it through, and can not say whether or not it was the same as was afterwards shown to us in the palace. I thought nothing of the matter at the time, as the subject of a new constitution was then before the Legislature in the shape of a bill providing for the calling of a constitutional convention; but as I was opposed to the measure, and shortly afterwards voted against it in the house, I was not desirous of assisting in the project, as I supposed this to be, and so did not look at it again after the first day. Some two or three weeks after the Queen sent Mr. Robertson for the package, which I returned exactly as I received it, having looked at it but once, and having made no changes.

The course the cabinet pursued during the revolution has been much criticised, but it must be remembered that the cabinet had only been in office but a day or two, that the most of them were green in their positions, and felt that the wisest course for them to pursue was to be guided by the advice of more experienced men in public affairs. They accordingly took no important step without consulting either with the diplomatic corps or a number of prominent citizens who kindly assisted Her Majesty's Government, among whom were J. O. Carter, Paul Neumann, and E. C. Macfarlane. These gentlemen, after learning Mr. Stevens's attitude, were convinced, and so advised the Queen and cabinet, that the best course to pursue was what was finally done, to yield to the superior force of the United States.

I remain, your obedient servant,

A. P. PETERSON.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *July 13, 1893.*

No. 44.

Interview with Wm. Hyde Rice, of Lihue, Kauai, April 28, 1893.

Q. You filed on April 20, 1893, four petitions?

A. Yes.

The petitions are as follows:

To the honorable W. H. Rice:

We, the undersigned, residents of the islands of Kauai and Niihau, Hawaiian Islands, do hereby nominate and depute you as delegate to represent us at Honolulu before the United States commissioners in matters concerning the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States to endeavor to procure for us equal rights and privileges accruing to citizens of the United States.

(Signed by 137 names.)

To the honorable W. H. Rice:

We, the undersigned, residents of the islands of Kauai and Niihau, Hawaiian Islands, do hereby nominate and depute you as delegate to represent us at Honolulu before the United States commissioners in matters concerning the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States to endeavor to procure for us equal rights and privileges accruing to citizens of the United States.

(Signed by 18 names.)

To the honorable W. H. Rice:

We, the undersigned, residents of the islands of Kauai and Niihau, Hawaiian Islands, do hereby nominate and depute you as delegate to represent us at Honolulu before the United States commissioners in matters concerning the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States to endeavor to procure for us equal rights and privileges accruing to citizens of the United States.

(Signed by 43 names.)

To the honorable W. H. Rice:

We, the undersigned residents of the islands of Kauai and Niihau, Hawaiian Islands, do hereby nominate and depute you as delegate to represent us at Honolulu, before the United States Commissioners in matters concerning the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States to endeavor to procure for us equal rights and privileges accruing to citizens of the United States.

(Signed by 81 names.)

Q. How did you come by these?

A. I was telephoned from the Waimeau natives asking me if I would represent them here before Commissioner Blount. I said that I had no wish to come, but if it was their wish I would be willing to represent them.

Q. How far from where you are?

A. About 25 or 30 miles from my residence.

Q. Then what?

A. They said they would draw up papers and send them around to be signed at the precincts in that place.

Q. Here is the fifth petition similar in form presented this morning, the 28th. How did you come by this?

A. It was sent up from the island of Nuphau last Sunday. They wished to circulate them all around the islands, but hadn't time.

Q. And you were not near when these papers were gotten up?

A. No; I was not. I have not been near any of their meetings.

Q. Were you governor, at any time, of the island?

A. Yes.

Q. When?

A. I was governor for about one year of the islands of Kauai and Niihau.

Q. What year?

A. From the 14th of February, 1892, to the abolition of the office by the existing Government.

Q. Where were you on the 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th of January, 1893?

A. I was on the the island of Kauai?

Q. When did you learn of the dethronement of the Queen and the substitution of the Provisional Government?

A. On the 23d of January.

Q. Was there anything known of any movement of this sort in the island prior to its happening?

A. No. We had some rumor that there would be trouble on that Saturday morning—that there might be some trouble, as the Wilcox ministry had been voted out Thursday afternoon. I heard on Friday morning.

Q. That there might be trouble?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. On account of the going out of the ministry?

A. Yes.

Q. What sort of trouble was indicated?

A. We had no idea.

Q. You did not know whether it would take the form of force or what?

A. We had no idea.

Q. Was there any suspicion of the dethronement of the Queen?

A. I think not.

Q. Have you anything you wish to add, Mr. Rice?

A. I had been with the Queen when she told me of the appointment of the Nawahi ministry; as they called it, the Nancy Hanks ministry. She told me who the appointees were. I said: "That won't hold; you had better have another ministry ready."

Q. Are you interested in sugar-planting?

A. I am not a sugar-planter. I own stock in a plantation. My business is running a cattle and horse ranch.

Q. You superintend that, but you have some investments in sugar?

A. Yes; I have stock in one sugar plantation. I inherited the stock. I am not what is called a sugar-planter.

Q. What is your idea about annexation?

A. I think if we are not annexed to the United States I do not know what will become of us, because we are incapable of ruling ourselves.

Q. Why?

A. There are so many different factions and interests that it will produce pandemonium if we tried to rule ourselves.

Q. Do you mean by that that the native element is not qualified for self-government?

A. I mean that.

Q. Why?

A. Because no native is capable of carrying on business for himself, and much less of carrying on government.

I have carefully read the foregoing and pronounce it a correct report of my interview with Col. Blount.

W. H. RICE.

No. 45.

Interview with Antone Rosa, Honolulu, April 17, 1893.

MR. BLOUNT. I would like to have your opinion as to the various causes which culminated in the dethronement of the Queen.

MR. ROSA. The only legitimate cause—if that can be construed into a cause—is this: The Queen signing the opium bill, which passed more than two-thirds of the house and was favored by two members of the cabinet, and her signing the lottery bill, and the presumption on their part that the Queen was using her influence in an underhand way to oust the Wilcox cabinet. Those were the immediate causes.

Q. What were the remote causes?

A. The remote causes I should judge to be a dissatisfaction on their part in not being able to control the Government. I mean by that in not having their own men at the head of the Government. I do not think they cared much about the minor offices, but the cabinet and the principal offices of the Government they wanted to control, claiming that they are the substantial people of the country; and I can not see any more tangible cause than this. The Queen since her reign has not exercised any of the powers her late brother did.

Q. What do you mean by the powers he exercised?

A. Such as meddling with politics, demanding certain persons to be put in office, and undue expenditures of public money. She did not have as much right to enter into politics as her late brother, because during his reign whenever the ministry did not carry out his projects he would dismiss them without a vote of want of confidence.

Q. Without a vote of want of confidence?

A. Yes; prior to the constitution of 1887.

Q. After that did he dismiss the ministers without a vote of want of confidence?

A. No, he did not; he could not. He sometimes would obstruct some of the movements of the so-called Reform party. It went so far one time as to force the cabinet to require the King to make a pledge; I do not think he was made to sign it.

Q. What was the pledge?

A. That he should not in anyway obstruct the proceedings of the ministers, nor interfere in politics, but that he should accept every advice from them, as they were responsible for the King's acts under the constitution. I do not think he exercised any rights against the cabinet except what he thought he had a right to; as, for instance, the right to veto. They contended that he did not have that right personal to himself, but that it was a right which he should exercise by and with the advice of his cabinet. That question was submitted to the supreme court and they decided in his favor.

Q. By unanimous vote?

A. I can not say; but I could refer to it. It was decided in favor of His Majesty's contention that it was a personal prerogative.

Q. What was the cause of the revolution of Wilcox?

A. The revolution of Wilcox on July 20, 1889, was a public demonstration of the natives' opposition to the constitution.

Q. How?

A. They contended that he was the undercurrent in the attempt to overthrow the Government, but he publicly denounced it in a letter, written at my instance and at the instance of another friend of his.

He was then quartered at the boathouse. I personally thought he was a party to it.

Q. That Wilcox was?

A. No; that His Majesty was. I personally felt that way.

Q. How do you mean he was a party to it?

A. I can not tell you from any direct evidence; but circumstances appeared to me as though he was a party to it.

Q. In what way; what was the scheme he was trying to effectuate?

A. It was the overthrow of the 1887 constitution, and to be replaced by another one which he framed. The fact of his having his Queen removed from the palace the night before the movement; the fact of his intimacy with certain revolutionary leaders, and other circumstances, which I can not call to mind, make me think so. I was very intimate with him then, but felt that his conduct through the whole matter was unjust.

Q. You think that he was secretly promoting the movement to undermine the Government with a view to giving him the powers he had prior to the constitution of 1887?

A. I believe so.

Q. Was that generally entertained?

A. I believe so—by the cabinet.

Q. Who was in the cabinet?

A. Thurston, minister of the interior; Damon, minister of finance; C. W. Ashford, attorney-general and Jonathan Austin, minister of foreign affairs. About 1 o'clock in the morning the King received a message that the movement was to dethrone him and put Liliuokalani in power.

Q. When he received this message where was he?

A. In the palace.

Q. Was that the day before the revolution broke out?

A. It was the same morning. It was supported by the fact that W. R. Castle and others had approached the present Queen and asked her if she would not take the throne. This may require corroboration. It is secret history. It is not denied that she had been approached on that subject. I do not know whether she favored it or not, but he distrusted it and somewhat intimidated it to me personally.

Q. Now to pass on, how about the Wilcox cabinet? How did that happen to get out?

A. It was a very satisfactory cabinet. It did not seem so to the house. They were got out by means of some maneuvering. The Nationalists and Liberals joined to get them out.

Q. The Liberals came over to the Nationalists?

A. Yes. And which ever way they went they tumbled out the cabinet. I suppose the reason is that the natives feared they were an annexation cabinet. The natives were all afraid of them save myself. I did not believe it, because up to that time they were all anti-annexationists, and I knew Wilcox was against it at that time and prior to it. He has always been friendly to the natives, always opposed to anything that might lead to annexation, and he is a good man, particularly friendly to the natives. But he has always said if it was done voluntarily by the natives he was willing to join in.

Q. The constitution of 1887 took from the King the power to appoint nobles?

A. Yes.

Q. It then provided for an election by electors having \$3,000 worth of property unincumbered or an income of \$600?

A. Yes.

Q. The elimination of everybody except persons having these qualifications left the relative strength of the foreign population in what proportion?

A. I should presume three-fifths of the voters were foreigners and two-fifths natives; perhaps less. The foreigners became much stronger.

Q. There was also coupled with that the permission on the part of foreigners who claimed their citizenship in other countries to vote?

A. Yes; by registering and taking oath. It was always a dangerous element to the native people, because a man for the sake of a few months' occupation could vote.

Q. The power to appoint nobles was taken from the King and conferred practically upon what are sometimes termed foreigners?

A. Yes, that is true; there is no question about it.

Q. Was that or was it not a cause of discontent among the native population?

A. Yes; I suppose it was.

Q. Do the native population want the right to vote for nobles themselves or do they want the power vested in the Queen?

A. I believe that they want the power in themselves, but I myself and a few of us have always felt that it is an unsafe thing to give them all that power, and that is one reason why it has not been adjudged safe to give them full power—only to give them some limited power.

Q. How far did you want to go?

A. I should go down to three or four hundred income and, say, a thousand dollars' worth of property. I presume they would be satisfied if that right were given to the Queen. Then opposition would come from the foreigners to that.

Q. You think they would be content to give up the right to vote for nobles?

A. I believe so.

Q. Is it the desire of the native population to have the Queen appoint the nobles rather than to have the right to vote for nobles themselves?

A. I think so; that is, of the mass. Now, a person like me—I would not like to see it.

Q. You want more extended suffrage?

A. Yes. I would rather the sovereign should not exercise that right. She might be influenced to appoint persons who ought not to be appointed—who would not fail, for instance, in the Legislature to vote for the measure she favored or that the cabinet favored. She might appoint very good men, like Mr. Bishop, Mr. Irving, and Mr. Damon and others.

Q. Is it that feeling of preferring the exercise of the power of creating nobles growing out of the old relationship of the masses of the people to a chief, and consequent tendency to obey a chief, rather than an appreciation of the forms of popular government?

A. Yes; I have not the least doubt that it is the desire of more than nine-tenths of the Hawaiian population, meaning native Hawaiian. They have always felt that as long as a Hawaiian was at the head of the Government—their sovereign—that they were always safe as regards the country and its general welfare. I believe if this subject were put to a popular vote I would be right in my view.

Q. Do you mean to say that you believe that they would favor the appointing of the nobles by the Queen?

A. I do.

Q. And would not care for an election of nobles by the people?

A. Yes.

Q. Is the preference for the appointment of nobles by the Queen the result of the fear that in an election they may sometimes lose in a contest with foreign residents, or is it independent of any fear of foreign residents, or is it a fear of their own ability to wisely elect nobles?

A. I do not think it is from a fear on their part to wisely elect nobles, but it is from a fear that the foreigners will be supreme in the elections. The result of the elections so far since this right has been taken away from the sovereign confirms what I say—the nobles nominated under this system by the foreign element have nearly all been elected.

Q. Suppose the property qualification was reduced to moderate figures, would that make any change in the sentiment of the natives on the question of preference between the appointment of nobles by the Queen and voting for them?

A. I hardly think so. I think they prefer that power left with the throne.

Q. Suppose the property qualification to vote for a noble was the same as that which obtains in the matter of electing a representative, would the native mind prefer to create nobles in that way, or would it prefer that the Crown should appoint them?

A. My impression is that they would prefer to have the right in their own hands, not distrusting the Queen, however.

Q. Why would they prefer it?

A. It would be granting them rights which they never had.

Q. You think, then, if they had the right to elect in the way that I have indicated that that old disposition to subserviency to the chief would be replaced by a disposition to select their government by popular methods. I do not mean the dethronement of the Queen, I mean in the way I have indicated?

A. I think they would use that privilege fairly. They would not be subservient to the sovereign. I think they would exercise it fairly and wisely.

Q. Then is it with them a selection between the present mode of electing nobles and the Queen's appointing them?

A. I do not know that it would make any difference to them as to whether they exercised the right or the Queen did, for the reason that the subject has not been much discussed among them. They consider it unfair that they in their own land should not have the right to vote for nobles. That has been the contention. It has not been put in the shape you have placed it, so that I can not give you any idea in that form.

Q. Is the discontent of the native population with the mode of selecting nobles that it takes away from the natives the right to vote?

A. Yes; there is no doubt about that. That is clearly the reason why there is so much discontent. I have no hesitancy in answering that.

Q. In the fear of political aggressions by foreign residents to the disadvantage of the natives, is it true that the natives feel that they would be secure in the appointment of nobles by the Queen or by manhood suffrage?

A. It is true that they would feel more secure if the nobles were either appointed by the sovereign or by giving the native population the right to vote for them without any property qualification. It is the popular view now and the subject has been a source of discontent for years to the Hawaiian people. It appears in the newspapers and all

over the country, in fact. The revolution of 1889, of Wilcox, was with that view mainly.

Q. With a view of doing away with that mode of electing nobles?

A. Yes, sir; and to restore it to the sovereign or popular vote. Of course this view would be very strenuously opposed by the foreign element.

Q. Is that the view of the mass of the population of the islands?

A. There is no question about it.

Q. How do a majority of the people of the islands feel toward the existing government?

A. They are opposed to it.

Q. I hear—I don't know as to the truth of it—that a good many of the native people are signing petitions for annexation, which would indicate that they were in line with the Provisional Government?

A. I do not believe it. Those who are signing, perhaps, are those directly affected by pecuniary considerations, such as being in the employment of persons who favor annexation, and such as being in a position to receive money from them in any business way—in a legitimate way, probably—and for fear that they would be dismissed from service.

Q. Suppose the matter of sustaining the Provisional Government in its policy and purposes was submitted to a popular vote in the islands with the qualification of a person voting for representative, what would be the result, in your opinion?

A. I think they would be swamped.

Q. By how much?

A. I should say four-fifths.

Q. Of the total vote?

A. Yes. Practically speaking, they have no support. They get it simply from a business point of view. The best test as to their support would be to see their list of citizens' oath. You will find they have two oaths. One the citizen's oath, the other the official oath. They have a strong list of Government employés, Hawaiians, who say they are in favor of annexation. Certainly they would say so. The only independent body of natives was the Hawaiian Band. They are the only ones who stood out, notwithstanding my advice to sign the official oath. I signed one. I am a notary public. I did not sign the citizen's oath.

Q. Did you write the communication addressed to Mr. Stevens, the American minister, on the 17th of January, 1893, signed by Samuel Parker, minister of foreign affairs; William H. Cornwell, minister of finance; John F. Colburn, minister of the interior, and A. P. Peterson, attorney-general?

A. I did.

Q. What was done with that paper; who did you deliver it to?

A. I delivered it to Hopkins. A press copy was taken. I wrote the address myself, and Mr. Hopkins was dispatched with it, and I left the room. It was written in the marshal's office at the station house.

Q. Was there a reply from Mr. Stevens?

A. I was not there when the reply was received.

Q. A reply was received?

A. Yes; a reply was received to the effect that the Provisional Government being in possession of the Government building, treasury, and Government archives, he recognized them as a Government de facto.

Q. Up to that time was the Queen in possession of the barracks, palace, and station house?

A. She was.

Q. Up to that time had there been any effort on the part of the Provisional Government to take possession of them?

A. No effort whatever.

Q. After the reply of Mr. Stevens came was there any demand on the part of the Provisional Government for the surrender of these places?

A. I only know from hearsay. I saw Mr. Damon and others who came to the station house for that purpose, quite late, about half past six or seven.

Q. Was that after the reply?

A. Long after.

Q. Up to that time the people who proclaimed the Provisional Government made no aggressive movement beyond going to the Government building?

A. None whatever.

Q. After they issued the proclamation everything remained in *statu quo* until the recognition by Mr. Stevens of the Provisional Government?

A. Yes.

Q. Subsequent to this was the proposition on the part of the Provisional authorities to the Queen to surrender?

A. Yes; I was there when Mr. Wilson surrendered. I think they had McCandless there. He made a few remarks. He said that he would only surrender on condition that the United States troops would make demand on him, or the Queen should ask him to surrender.

Q. Now, after this response from Mr. Stevens, was there a cabinet consultation on the subject of surrender?

A. I can not tell you, either from hearsay or in anyway. After receiving that reply from Mr. Stevens it fell flat like a pancake.

Q. How much time intervened between the reception of that reply and the surrender of the station house and barracks?

A. Two hours.

Q. In these two hours, where were you?

A. Around the neighborhood of the station house in my office; within a space of say, 200 yards. Business people and everybody thronged around the station house and by Bishop's bank.

Q. What was their object?

A. To hear the news as to whether Mr. Stevens had recognized the Provisional Government. I remember the news was brought to me that he had declined to recognize it. Then news came that he had recognized it.

Q. There was an eagerness obtaining in the minds of the people, both in the reform party and the native population, to know just what Mr. Stevens was going to do?

A. Exactly, it was the turning point of everything.

Q. And when that was ascertained?

A. It fell flat as a pancake.

Q. And when that was ascertained, the minds of all persons seemed to accept that as authority?

A. Oh, yes. It was Mr. Stevens' attitude in the matter to which all persons looked up. Bear in mind, Mr. Blount, that the evening before I had heard from two members of the cabinet that Mr. Stevens had told them troops were landed to protect people and to keep the Queen in office, and I was surprised to hear this.

Q. Who told you this?

A. Colburn and Parker. They said they had Mr. Stevens's word that the troops were landed to protect the Queen.

Q. Where were the troops stationed at the time of the proclamation?

A. Between Arion Hall and the Government building, with their field pieces out.

Q. At what point?

A. Right in front of Arion Hall, 50 or 100 feet from the corner of Music Hall. They faced there while the proclamation was being read faced, the Government building.

Q. Were the troops formed?

A. They were formed.

Q. Where was the artillery?

A. I can not tell you whether it was on that side of Music Hall or on the other side.

Q. What street were the troops on?

A. I do not know whether it is called Wilder's lane or Gibson's lane. It was the lane or street between Arion Hall and the Government building.

Q. Where was the artillery?

A. With the troops on the same street.

Q. They were not in the hall, but formed on that lane or street?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was the situation when the proclamation of the Provisional Government was read?

A. It was.

Q. And nothing further was done by the Provisional Government in the matter of taking possession of the Palace, the barracks and the police quarters until Mr. Stevens had formally recognized it?

A. Nothing was done by it.

Q. And when that was made known, the recognition by Mr. Stevens, there was a feeling on the part of the native population and of foreigners that this determined the controversy?

A. Yes; the Provisional Government had a few men around the Government building.

Q. Where?

A. Around the Government building. I think there were about 30 or 40 in the inclosure of the Government building.

Q. They didn't come out of the inclosures?

A. No.

Q. Were there any guards at the entrance of the inclosure?

A. No.

Q. Do you know anything of a visit of Mr. Parker and Mr. Colburn to Mr. Stevens on Monday?

A. I do not know of my own knowledge, except that we often sent them there.

Q. Were they sent on Monday?

A. Two or three times.

Q. What report did they bring back?

A. That the troops would be landed. That they would be landed to protect the Queen.

I have carefully read the foregoing and pronounce it an accurate report of my interview with Mr. Blount.

A. ROSA.

Interview with M. M. Scott.

HONOLULU, *Monday, April 10, 1893—9:20 a. m.*

MR. BLOUNT. Please tell me the causes, the surface and the bottom causes of this movement, the action of the people here in establishing the Provisional Government.

MR. SCOTT. There has been a conviction since I have been here—ten or eleven years—that under the reign of Kalakaua, with his methods of controlling legislation under the old constitution, that with the irresponsible voting and irresponsible legislators, being controlled by the royal power, that that form of government could but lead to disastrous results here under his reign.

MR. BLOUNT. You are referring to the condition before the constitution of 1887?

MR. SCOTT. Yes; and his notorious corruption of members of the Legislature, especially Hawaiian members.

MR. BLOUNT. You now speak of prior to 1887?

MR. SCOTT. Yes; that was the cause of that movement in 1887. Well, of course after his death (Kalakaua) the present Queen came on the throne, and, as you are perhaps aware, the first thing she did was the dismissal of the ministers who had been appointed by Kalakaua; I believe the supreme court giving a decision that she was not bound to retain them, although this ministry had a majority in the Legislature. I think the court decided that by his death the ministry went out.

MR. BLOUNT. Who were the judges of the court then?

MR. SCOTT. Judd, Bickerton, and Dole.

MR. BLOUNT. Was it a unanimous decision?

MR. SCOTT. I think it was; no, I am inclined to think, perhaps, that Dole dissented on the grounds—well, I have forgotten what. I will not testify about that. Then the people who had known the former Queen here—Liliuokalani, as she was called—while recognizing the fact that she was a very headstrong woman, thought that by giving her the support of the better element of the community she might change her course for the better, and they did flock around her, all the foreign community and the missionaries.

A missionary here means, in the political slang of the day, anyone who is not affiliated with a few of what I conceive to be the worst elements of demagogues. It makes no difference what he is, a non-believer or a Buddhist, if he affiliates with the party for good government he is generally called a missionary. They related around here, and a paper published here by Bush and a number of his followers declared, that the Queen had ignored the claims of her own people, paid no attention to them. His paper was nasty, as it usually is, and said all manner of disagreeable things about the Queen. The paper was the strongest advocate of annexation.

MR. BLOUNT. What is the name of the paper?

MR. SCOTT. Ka Leo (this means "The Truth"). He even advocated taking her off her throne. Then came the election for the last Legislature, and of course they voted out the old ministry. This man Bush joined in with the opposition. The Queen positively declined having anything to do with Bush or Wilcox. She would not consent to give them any place because of the way in which they had assailed her personal life. Everyone knew she could not very well do it. Then they

went along very slowly, this Legislature did, and voted out minister after minister.

Mr. BLOUNT. Will you please state how many ministers were voted out?

Mr. SCOTT. About the middle of the session they voted out the whole ministry which she had appointed when they went in—Widdeman, Whiting, Parker, and Spencer.

Mr. BLOUNT. When was that?

Mr. SCOTT. About the middle of the session, after they had been going about two months.

Mr. BLOUNT. Of 1892?

Mr. SCOTT. Yes. Then, after a vacation of two or three weeks, after political log-rolling, they tried to get her to listen to the appointment of a good ministry. All at once there was the appointment of another ministry, consisting of Macfarlane, Neumann, Parker, and Gulick.

Mr. BLOUNT. The former had been voted out?

Mr. SCOTT. Yes. They immediately took a vote of want of confidence against it after they went in and failed by one—24 to 25. They then went on not more than two weeks more, and brought up a vote of confidence and carried it largely—35 to 15. The natives voted against them.

Mr. BLOUNT. Against the cabinet?

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, against the cabinet.

Mr. BLOUNT. What cabinet was that?

Mr. SCOTT. That was the second one—Neumann, Macfarlane, Spencer, Porter, and Gulick. After a vacation of some days, it is said, she came to her senses, and really was desirous of putting in a ministry that would please the Legislature and a majority of the property-holders of the country. They put in then this ministry: P. C. Jones, minister of finance; Cecil Brown (an Englishman) attorney-general; George Wilcox, of Kanai, one of the largest property-holders in the country, minister of the interior, and a half-white man, Mark Robinson, also a large property-owner, minister of foreign affairs. That was a ministry suitable to all classes of the community. All the better element joined in expressing satisfaction—English, German, Americans—all were perfectly satisfied with them.

That went on, and it was supposed, until a few days before the adjournment of the Legislature, that that would hold. In the meantime they declared a policy—the first ministry that had had nerve enough to say anything about what their policy was going to be. The other ministry was afraid to say whether they were opposed to the bank bill or the lottery bill. They did not know how to please the Hawaiians. They said they should fight for retrenchment and make the expenses of the Government come within the income. They were opposed decidedly to the lottery scheme, to the Horner bank bill, and to the opium bill. Then it was thought that they would hold until a few days before the adjournment, when it was found there had been a majority got for the lottery bill and the opium bill also. The Queen said if she could pass these two bills her ministry would have to resign.

Three days, I think it was, before the adjournment they passed the lottery bill and the opium bill. They let the bank bill go, because the natives were not so particular about that. They wanted the lottery. So that passed, and then the better element of the community here got around these ministers and said: "Do not resign; leave it to the Legislature to vote you out." They did not resign. I had talked with some of them. They said they could not afford to resign, and then the day

before the adjournment—the next day after they passed these bills—she signed them immediately, although delegations here from the Woman's Temperance Union and the churches called upon her and asked her not to do so. Then, the night after they passed them, they went around to Mr. C. A. Berger, a son-in-law of Mr. Widemann, to get him to vote to put out the ministry. They told him if he would vote for putting out the ministry they would let his father-in-law form a cabinet for the Queen.

MR. BLOUNT. Let me ask you a question on that point. What is the evidence of this promise?

MR. SCOTT. Mr. Berger's own statement to various gentlemen around here.

MR. BLOUNT. Who are they?

MR. SCOTT. I do not know that I can mention any. It was put out at the club by Mr. Cecil Brown. I do not know that he told me so himself. It is certainly true. It is common talk. Perhaps, however, you do not wish to take this.

MR. BLOUNT. I wish to take all you have to say.

MR. SCOTT. I am positive all this is true. So far as my feelings go in the politics of this community I have no interest. After they voted them out Mr. Widdeman was sent for. She began to name the cabinet she had chosen. She said the office of minister of the interior was filled by Mr. Colburn. "Oh, then," said Mr. Widdeman, "I will have nothing to do with it. I should do all the work and get all the blame. I will have nothing to do with it."

MR. BLOUNT. Was the minister of the interior the only one named?

MR. SCOTT. The minister of finance, Mr. Cornwell.

MR. BLOUNT. Now, any others?

MR. SCOTT. I do not know of any others.

MR. BLOUNT. It was at this point that he, Widdeman, declared he would have nothing to do with it?

MR. SCOTT. Yes.

MR. BLOUNT. How did you get that information?

MR. SCOTT. I got it from people to whom Mr. Widemann told it. I got it from several people who visited his house, whose veracity I can certainly vouch for.

MR. BLOUNT. That's enough.

MR. SCOTT. Then immediately she appointed Mr. Colburn, Mr. Peterson, Mr. Cornwell, and Mr. Parker. Then came the morning of the prorogation. A majority of what is called the Reform party—that is, I think, all of them in fact did not appear at the prorogation.

MR. BLOUNT. What was their idea for absenting themselves?

MR. SCOTT. They were so disgusted, Mr. Blount, with the last week or ten days of the Legislature, the means used to get the ministry out and the substitution of a ministry that nobody had confidence in. They made no concerted action. I do not think they went together, but each one resolved within himself he would not appear there any more. They saw the futility of having worked four or five or six months of this session; they wanted to get to their business. They had large business interests out on the Islands. They got tired and disgusted with this idle talk.

MR. BLOUNT. Will you allow me to ask you there—the men who absented themselves—what class of people did they belong to?

MR. SCOTT. They belonged to what is generally known as the Reform party—that is, to reform the methods of politics and legislation. Such men as Young, of the iron works; Walbridge, of Waliuku, manager of

a plantation; Anderson, one of the nobles of Waliuku, and Al Wilcox, of Kuai, owner of a plantation. That class of men. The most responsible men in the community.

Mr. BLOUNT: Generally large property owners?

Mr. SCOTT: Yes, and representatives of property interests.

Mr. BLOUNT: Who made up the other side; what class of men?

Mr. SCOTT: About fifteen natives, whose names you could not write down, coming from various outer districts. Did not, perhaps, represent \$500 worth of property in the country. The men on this side who did represent property were Cummins, who had a large property once, but, like all other Hawaiians, wasted it and is heavily in debt, and Peterson (he was in the ministry).

Mr. BLOUNT. These were both natives?

Mr. SCOTT. Yes. I do not know of any white men on that side. I think perhaps a few, three or four, did remain just for appearance's sake.

Mr. BLOUNT. Let me ask you, were they all natives on that side?

Mr. SCOTT. The side that stayed in?

Mr. BLOUNT. Yes.

Mr. SCOTT. Yes. Generally natives.

MR. BLOUNT. What else besides natives?

Mr. SCOTT. They were nearly all natives. Some few half-castes like Mr. White, of Lahaina. They were nearly all natives or half white men. The English, I think, and the Americans, the nobles and the representative men, all absented themselves to a man. At the time I was at Wakiki, I moved out to Wakiki, I think it was about 2 o'clock.

Mr. BLOUNT. What day?

Mr. SCOTT: The same day. I think it was about 2 o'clock Saturday. I have forgotten the day of the month. We were startled at Wakiki—we were all there on Saturday afternoon. We heard that the Queen had proclaimed a new constitution. I do not know whether the message was that she had or was going to proclaim a new constitution. Everybody was on the *qui vive*. I did not go up at all. It seems that she had invited a number of legislators, I do not know how many, over to the palace to partake of some kind of a collation, but before the collation came around, I believe it was before, she sent for the ministers. She was dressed in her robes of state. She said she had proclaimed this constitution or was going to and wanted them to sign it, I was told, without reading it.

I was told by men who were there. This is hearsay. When they said they had not read it she said, "Why do you say so, when you have had it in your pocket three weeks." She told them she did not want to hear any more advice. She said, "You know if I go out and proclaim it to my people they may come in and tear you limb from limb."

Mr. BLOUNT. How did you get that information? Just in the same way?

Mr. SCOTT. I got it from Chief Justice Judd. He said she looked like a fiend.

Mr. BLOUNT. Please go on.

Mr. SCOTT. Well, I believe it was told me, two or more were inclined to sign. Peterson and Colburn refused, and asked for time. They went over to the Government building. Colburn went down to W. O. Smith's office and asked what support they could get from the community if they refused to sign it. He advised them not to sign it; said that they would have the support of all the better element of the community.

Mr. BLOUNT. What do you mean by what support they could get from the community?

Mr. SCOTT. In case they refused to sign it. They were frightened to death—thinking of the Kalakaua riots. They went to the men they were in political opposition to for support, knowing they were the only men to be depended upon. They knew they had real backbone. This was told them by Thurston, Smith, Castle, Emmeluth, and others. Mr. Emmeluth is a mechanic. He is a man of sound sense. He told me that this constitution was coming two weeks before. Then immediately the men around the street went into Smith's office and organized this committee of thirteen.

Mr. BLOUNT. Yes.

Mr. SCOTT. I noticed—I did not come to town—that there was a meeting at the armory that evening.

Mr. BLOUNT. Before going on further, what was the size of the crowd at Smith's office?

Mr. SCOTT. That I can not tell. There were the thirteen there. I do not know how many more.

Mr. BLOUNT. Please go on.

Mr. SCOTT. On Monday morning I noticed there was a meeting at the armory. The notice was to the effect that all who were opposed to the late revolutionary methods of the Queen would meet at the armory. I think that was at 2 o'clock. I am principal of a school of 300 white children. A great many rumors came up, one that the meeting was going to be opposed by martial force. Mothers came in carriages after their daughters and sons, especially the small ones. I concluded it was better to dismiss the children and let them go home before the excitement commenced in the streets. I did. I went down to this meeting. It was assembled at the armory. I should judge there must have been twelve or fifteen hundred people there.

Mr. BLOUNT. Were you present at the meeting?

Mr. SCOTT. Yes; I was present at the meeting. I saw very few Hawaiians there. I saw one or two Chinese. It was a meeting of Americans, Englishmen, and Germans. The fact is it represented the property of the community.

Mr. BLOUNT. What institution of learning are you connected with?

Mr. SCOTT. I am principal of the Fort street school. I did not know what the procedure was going to be. I was afraid there would be trouble. I fully looked for it. I knew there was a determination on the part of the men. I knew they would do whatever they wished to do. W. C. Wilder was chairman of the meeting. There was Thurston there. Wilder stated that it was for no clique this meeting was called. It was for the whole community. He said they wanted to have this kind of thing stopped. Thurston gave an outline of the proceedings from Saturday up to the present time, what had occurred at the palace. The resolutions were read, as you know, for that committee of thirteen to take proceedings so as to insure tranquility and confidence in the community. That is the best of my recollection. I speak from memory.

The Germans were largely represented by the best Germans in the community and after several speeches by various men and after I read the resolutions over I knew perfectly well it meant some radical measures. We were not aware of just what it meant. I talked with no one. I said to myself it means business. The resolutions were passed unanimously with one dissenting voice, with Mr. S. R. Walker against it. He was vice-consul for England. He was well aware, he said, some

measures had to be taken, but he thought it left too large a latitude for the committee. Mr. Swanzey, his partner, voted for it.

Mr. BLOUNT. Is Mr. Walker engaged in business here?

Mr. SCOTT. He is head of the firm of Theo. Davis & Co. Mr. Davis is in England.

Mr. BLOUNT. What sort of business?

Mr. SCOTT. A large importing house; importing goods of every nature. It is as large a store as may be found in San Francisco or New York. They are agents for a number of plantations—sell large amounts of goods for the use of the laborers.

Mr. BLOUNT. What plantations are they agents for?

Mr. SCOTT. I can not give the names of them; three or four in Kohala. I can not name them just now; several in Hamakua, the most productive districts; two in Hilo, very large. He is a shrewd business man—made his fortune out of the bounty of the United States.

Mr. BLOUNT. What bounty do you mean?

Mr. SCOTT. Sugar; the reciprocity treaty. He was as poor as Job's turkey when he came here. He is now opposed to everything American. I went home. This was 2 o'clock, Monday. At 7 o'clock at night we had three or four telephonic messages about the landing of the troops. In this connection this committee of thirteen had got together and had asked the minister, I believe, to take precautions against disorder—they did not know what might occur—to take the precaution of landing troops. Some of them went down to Arion Hall. Next morning I came up town about 10 o'clock. I heard they were going to dethrone the Queen and establish the Provisional Government. At 2 o'clock—no, half past 1—I went to the Government building. I then went up to the Rifles' armory. They were piling in arms.

Mr. BLOUNT. Who?

Mr. SCOTT. The supporters of the intended Provisional Government and citizens. I did not know there were so many arms in the country. The people were grouping together.

Mr. BLOUNT. Was it a Government armory?

Mr. SCOTT. No; it had been used for a skating rink and dancing hall. It was the place the meeting was held in the day before. Then I came down town. I was in Fort street. I heard the pop of a gun. Doors were suddenly shut, and there was great excitement. I went to the corner, and was told a policeman had been shot. A loaded wagon with arms from Hall & Sons was going to the armory. The policeman tried to stop it. The fellow (the driver) pulled out a pistol and shot the policeman in the arm or chest, or somewhere.

Mr. BLOUNT. What was the character of the guns at the armory?

Mr. SCOTT. They were guns, I think, that had been carried from their homes during the movement of 1887. Generally Springfield rifles. They had kept them at their homes since that movement. They said they had four or five hundred. They were taken just as soon as they were got in. Zeigler, a German, and two or three others got their companies out and marched out to the Government building.

Mr. BLOUNT. Were these volunteer companies?

Mr. SCOTT. Yes; a great many had belonged to the movement of 1887. They were well drilled men and splendid shots. They marched down to the Government building. I suppose there were 300. They marched down in half an hour. Then that proclamation was read. I stayed around there awhile. Wilcox said he thought there was going to be a fight. He had just come from the station house. They did not know what to do. He said the ministers were all in the building.

They seemed paralyzed; did not know what to do. I said, "Who is going to fight?" He said the police. I said, "Oh, pshaw."

MR. BLOUNT. Who are you talking about?

MR. SCOTT. Luther Wilcox. I stayed around some time. Finally I saw a man from the station house come into the Government building. Then I heard the station house was going to give up. I said to a man afterwards, "What made you fellows give up?" He said, "We did not know how well they were prepared." The fact is, the Hawaiian, when he comes in contact with the white man, looks to be directed by him. He is loath to oppose him in any way.

MR. BLOUNT. Well, if you will continue with your narrative?

MR. SCOTT. I was telling you about this police station. They said they thought it was no use to resist. They put it on the grounds afterwards that it was seeing the *Boston's* men ashore. The fact is the *Boston's* presence there was nothing. I talked to the officers. They said they had nothing to do with it beyond a matter of security. They had no intention and there was no possibility of their taking any part any more than they did in 1889 when they were landed for Mr. Merrill. Mr. Soper had taken charge of the marshal's office and things were as quiet next day as they had been before this whole thing so far as the movement goes. Then three days after they sent this commission to Washington. That is all I know about this.

I will say this in passing, Mr. Blount: It is the people who want to make a living and bring up families who favor annexation. They recognize the Hawaiian as going. He will be nil. They recognize the fact that this country, left as it is, would become Asiaticized. With the dying out of this dynasty it must become Asiaticized or Americanized. There are eighteen or twenty thousand Japanese here—the very worst class. Now, Mr. Blount, if you want to know anything about the Japanese—

MR. BLOUNT. I do not care to go into that now. I may later.

MR. SCOTT. I want to say in regard to the report about the *Boston's* men bringing this about, that the *Boston* had gone to Hilo ten days before this—I am not sure how long—taking Minister Stevens and his daughter, who was drowned, and the *Boston* did not get back until Saturday morning. I think it was 11 o'clock when she entered—11 or after. The fact is no one expected this. It came like a clap of thunder, except to those on the inside.

MR. BLOUNT. Do you think the absence of the *Boston* had anything to do with the Queen selecting that time for the purpose of proclaiming the new constitution?

MR. SCOTT. I have heard it said. It was generally believed around here at that time that it was so. If it had remained here perhaps she would not have taken that course. I can not say, however; I do not know.

MR. BLOUNT. I ask you for this reason: I happened to take up this book (Senate Ex. Doc. No. 76, Fifty-second Congress, second session). In a letter dated Honolulu, January 18, 1893, from Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster, Mr. Stevens says: "Immediately after the *Boston* and myself had left Honolulu the unscrupulous adventurers around the Queen improved the opportunity to push through the Legislature an astounding lottery franchise, with the obvious intent to sell it out to the Louisiana lottery men."

MR. SCOTT. I went up to Mr. Stevens. He said, in speaking of Capt. Wiltse, that he talked a good deal, but, after all, he was a man of unusual information here. He (Capt. Wiltse) said they were going to

pass the lottery bill and put out the ministry. He (Mr. Stevens) paid no attention to it. He hardly thought so, because if he had thought they were going to pass the lottery bill he should not have gone. He said Capt. Wiltse was perfectly sure—talked about it all the while up. When they got back to Lahaina they heard they had passed the lottery bill.

MR. BLOUNT. Why would they do it in the absence of Capt. Wiltse and Mr. Stevens?

MR. SCOTT. Mr. Stevens told me that in view of the fact that the United States Government had forbidden lottery literature to circulate through the mails he should have protested against that bill. He told me that himself. I am satisfied that there was a settled intention on the part of the Queen to get this constitution and appoint that house of nobles.

MR. BLOUNT. Do you imagine they would take advantage of the absence of Mr. Stevens to do that? Did they apprehend anything more than a protest; or what is your opinion; or have you any knowledge on that point?

MR. SCOTT. I have no knowledge. I am inclined to think that in view of the relations of the two governments that any protests made by the United States ought to have a decided influence upon anything of that kind. That is what I judge. I know nothing, of course.

Early in the session Mr. Macfarland, who is a member of the Legislature, got up and asked the ministers if they had taken any measures to rebuke something the American minister had said at a Grand Army of the Republic meeting. They voted to table it almost unanimously.

MR. BLOUNT. What was the point of offense?

MR. SCOTT. He spoke about the civil war. He referred to the action of the South; that they deemed their cause good; that the United States Government did not arrest men for treason, or something of that kind. Anyway, Mr. Macfarland thought he saw an allusion to the condition of things here. No one else seemed to think so.

MR. BLOUNT. What is the condition of opinion in the islands as to the Provisional Government?

MR. SCOTT. Of course it has the support in Honolulu and in the other islands of the property owners generally and the more stable and responsible elements of the people. There are certain men, quite a number, who were adherents of the Kalakaua régime who do not indorse the Queen's action. There is a good deal of bitterness here against what is called the missionary element. "Missionary" is a very vague term. It has no significance at all. It is the responsible element in a community like this. They are not liked by the natives, who prefer to follow demagogues who give them fair promises. They are easily led.

MR. BLOUNT. Do they always follow that class?

MR. SCOTT. They follow it implicitly I assure you.

MR. BLOUNT. Who, then, would you say were the leaders of the Kanakas?

MR. SCOTT. There is White, of Lahaina; Mr. Parker, Mr. Nahawi, of Hilo; Mr. Bush, the editor of *Ka Leo*; and, I might say, Mr. R. W. Wilcox. There was one time when he was the greatest leader among them.

MR. BLOUNT. What influence has he now?

MR. SCOTT. I think he has espoused the side of annexation now, and perhaps he is not so popular; but I think they are all what might be termed annexationists, or a majority.

MR. BLOUNT. A majority of what?

Mr. SCOTT. Kanakas.

Mr. BLOUNT. In favor of annexation?

Mr. SCOTT. Yes; I said once to White, "What is your opinion on the subject?" He said all were for annexation, but they did not wish to be disfranchised. That is what they fear. They do not care for the Queen. I believe two-thirds would be in favor of annexation if this matter of the franchise could be satisfactorily explained to them. The Princess Kaulani is not a favorite with the people; they do not want her to reign. They have said we only wish the Queen to reign her reign out and then we want the United States to take care of us. The English would like to have Kaulani reign. They are a very responsible set of men—large property owners. They wish to see good government. None of the Queen's friends wanted Kaulani. They say the English will have all influence with Kaulani. The old Hawaiian is an excellent man. You put him in certain relations and let the white man give him advice. He is a noble fellow, and looks up to the white man as to a feudal lord. He wishes to know "What am I to do?" He wishes to be taken care of.

Mr. BLOUNT. What do you mean by "old Hawaiians?"

Mr. SCOTT. I mean those not mixed with foreign blood; those who have something of the old native character. He is as simple as a child. There are about thirty-five or forty thousand.

Mr. BLOUNT. Do you mean when you speak of the native Hawaiians, that there are thirty-five or forty thousand?

Mr. SCOTT. Yes.

Mr. BLOUNT. That is what I want to get at.

Mr. SCOTT. I think probably great many of them have a tincture of foreign blood in them.

Mr. BLOUNT. Let me ask you: Is it generally true that the controversies with Kalakaua prior to 1887, subsequent to 1887, and up to the revolution largely followed the lines of a racial division?

Mr. SCOTT. Yes; he began that after——

Mr. BLOUNT. I am not asking about the time when they began to talk cheap politics. What I want to know is this: Whether or not prior to 1887, subsequent to 1887, and down to the revolution the controversies followed racial lines.

Mr. SCOTT. This present revolution?

Mr. BLOUNT. Yes; were the contests generally parallel with racial lines?

Mr. SCOTT. They were.

Mr. BLOUNT. Did these contests, parallel to what we have termed racial lines, grow out of difference of opinion on questions of taxation or questions of taxation and legislation? How did they grow?

Mr. SCOTT. No; they grew out of office. Mr. Gibson advised it.

Mr. BLOUNT. Please bring that out.

Mr. SCOTT. In the spring of 1882, when they held the election here, he advised it. He was the originator of the phrase "Hawaii for Hawaiians." He was a man of marked ability. He was the president of the board of education. He made speeches couched in careful language when the foreigners would see or hear them. He spoke Hawaiian well. His cry was "Hawaii for Hawaiians." He said to the people, the missionary has not been your friend. He leaves no opening for you. He leaves no outlet for you. He does not wish you to hold office. He (Gibson) puffed up Kalakaua with the idea that he could be emperor of all the Pacific islands. The planters and commercial community generally were against Gibson as being an unsafe adviser.

On leaving Mr. Scott spoke of certain statistics he had prepared and which had been sent to Washington. Col. Blount did not care to go into it.

APRIL 14, 1893.

I have read over the foregoing report and pronounce it to be a correct one in every particular.

M. M. SCOTT.

No. 47.

Interview with Admiral Skerrett, April 8, 1893, printed with Mr. Blount's No. 2 dated April 8, 1893.

No. 48.

Statement of W. O. Smith of events prior to January 17, 1893.

MR. SMITH. About 11 o'clock on Saturday morning, the 14th of January, I went into Mr. Hartwell's office, the corner of Fort and Merchant streets, and found Mr. Hartwell, L. A. Thurston, and John F. Colburn, minister of the interior, in the back room talking very earnestly. They requested me to sit down. Mr. Colburn was very much excited. They stated that Mr. Colburn had just come to see Mr. Hartwell and Mr. Thurston and they asked him to remain, and Mr. Thurston stated very briefly what Mr. Colburn had told them, and Mr. Colburn proceeded to state himself that the ministers had been informed by the Queen that she would promulgate a constitution immediately after the prorogation. Mr. Colburn was very much excited and evidently alarmed.

MR. J. B. CASTLE. Did he say when the Queen gave this information for the first time—that morning, was it?

MR. SMITH. His conversation and statements gave me the impression that, as far as he was concerned, the first they had heard of it was that morning, but subsequently he told me himself that he did know of the existence of the constitution the night before, and on another occasion he told me that he had known of the existence of the constitution about a week prior to that, but that he did not know until that morning that she was about to promulgate the constitution, and that she expected her ministers to support her in it and for him to sign it. Colburn's manner was that of a scared man—frightened—very much in earnest. The conversation that was conducted after that lasted perhaps fifteen minutes after I got there, between Mr. Thurston and Hartwell on one side and Colburn on the other. Mr. Thurston and Mr. Hartwell advised him, by all means, that they should not consent to the promulgation of the constitution, and that if they would stand to that they would be supported by the community in that matter.

MR. J. B. CASTLE. In their action?

MR. SMITH. In their action.

MR. CASTLE. Let us go back a little bit. Had the trade, if there was such a trade, in the Legislature between the opponents to the ministry and the advocates of the lottery bill, grounded within it anything whatever about a constitution?

Mr. SMITH. I did not know, but believe, from my knowledge of the facts at the time and the subsequent events, that all, or nearly all, of the native members of the Legislature were informed in regard to the matter of the constitution and of its promulgation. I judge this from their conduct in the house, and from the reports which I afterwards learned of a meeting which a number of the native members of the Legislature had held Friday night. It was reported that John Kaluna, representing the district of Makawao, among others, was very violent in his speech, stating that he could kill five or six men and would be perfectly willing to be hung for it, or die, if he only had the opportunity to kill five or six or more, in defense of the constitution.

Mr. CASTLE. One of the members made a distinct reference in the light of subsequent events to that action to be taken on Saturday, didn't he?

Mr. SMITH. I so understood.

Mr. CASTLE. You don't remember hearing it in the house? It was alluded to afterward?

Mr. SMITH. Well, I say this: At various times during the session there were at times allusions to the matter of a new constitution and a constitutional convention and constitutional amendments. These statements would generally be made when the subject of some one of the constitutional amendments was brought up and with more or less feeling, and at certain times there was some excitement; there were insinuations, references, to something that was to be done, but we didn't attach any special importance to it. I do not believe myself, from what I know of the circumstances, that most of the members—in fact, I do not know any of them had any definite idea of a plan of promulgating a new constitution until very late in the session. There were a number of amendments pending which had not been disposed of—the question of a constitutional convention had not been disposed of until quite late in the session.

Mr. CASTLE. Have you any doubt that when the election, one year ago this month, took place that part of the programme of the liberal party, so called, was a new constitution, mainly on the lines desired by the Queen, Wilcox, Bush, and the rest?

Mr. SMITH. Speeches made in public and reported in the papers of the camp meetings of the liberal party certainly quoted speeches—

Mr. CASTLE. You have no knowledge except from these general sources?

Mr. SMITH. No.

Mr. CASTLE. And Mr. C. A. Brown told me one year ago last month that that constitution was entirely prepared and engrossed, ready for signature, and it awaited nothing but the opportunity. I suppose that he gained his knowledge from the inside affairs at the palace.

Mr. SMITH. I don't know.

Mr. CASTLE. I want to establish, if possible, what connection there was between, you might say, four important bills—four important things in the legislature—the constitution, the opium bill, the lottery bill, and, it may sound paradoxical, but the registration act.

Mr. SMITH. You want to what?

Mr. CASTLE. I want to establish the relation that existed between them. The registration act was desired of course, by the planting interest, the lottery and the opium and the new constitution by the other other interests.

Mr. SMITH. Well, there was undoubtedly some connection; it was connected with a general dissatisfaction with the result of the legisla-

tion; the natives had not been able to carry their measures as they had hoped. The Queen was disappointed in not being able to command and control the public affairs to the extent that she had wanted, and it became very manifest after the appointment of Judge Frear to be judge of the circuit court under the new judiciary act that the Queen was determined to have a different state of affairs. She had advocated strenuously the appointment of Antone Rosa to be judge of the circuit court with Whiting. Rosa's habits were such that the ministers would not consent to it at all. While that very matter was pending he went to Lahaina to attend circuit court at the December term and was intoxicated publicly in Lahaina and the ministers would not consent. She felt that was a check to her power, and from conversations with those ministers since they have stated, and it was apparent to us, that from that moment her determination was to have a different state of affairs at whatever cost.

Now, going back to the events of Saturday, Mr. Colburn had to leave Mr. Hartwell's office, because the prorogation was to take place at 12 o'clock and the ministers had to be there, and he hurried away. You asked me about being present at the chamber of commerce. I was there, certainly. What was the subject of that?

Mr. CASTLE. Why, I understand that the first inkling in the chamber of commerce to such portion of the business community as was there was that this thing was on the tapis. The object of that meeting was to take action on the signature of this lottery bill, to pass that memorial which was sent by a committee to the Queen.

Mr. COOPER. That was what I understood from Mr. Glade.

Mr. SMITH. Immediately after this interview in Mr. Hartwell's office with Colburn I went up to the chamber of commerce, at which a meeting of the merchants was being held, and stated to the meeting that I had information that a constitution was about to be promulgated by the Queen, without giving my source of information. I told them that I had authentic information, so authentic that certain actions which they had before them at that time were deferred in consequence of my statement to that effect.

Mr. CASTLE. Did you go to the prorogation?

Mr. SMITH. No; I did not go to the prorogation.

Mr. SMITH. No white members did except Berger and Peterson, did they?

Mr. SMITH. I do not know who went; I did not go myself. In the neighborhood of 1 o'clock on that same Saturday, John F. Colburn came to my office again in very great excitement. He was dressed in full dress with a silk hat, and still had his blue sash on, which ministers wear on state occasions. He came along Merchant street in the direction of Bishop's bank, and came right to my office and asked me in a very exciting manner to come at once to the attorney-general's office, in the Government building. I said that I would, and offered to get in the same hack with him. He said it would be better to take another hack, and immediately told the driver to drive on, and drove with speed to the Government building. I immediately entered another hack and came up to the Government building, up to the attorney-general's office, and it may then have been half-past 1. In the attorney-general's office upstairs, in Aliiolani Hale, were the attorney-general, A. P. Peterson, minister of finance, W. H. Cornwell, and Minister of the Interior, J. F. Colburn. There were also present L. A. Thurston, F. W. Wundenburg, E. C. Macfarlane, and myself. Mr. Colburn was the chief spokesman at first.

Mr. CASTLE. Sam Parker was not there at that meeting?

Mr. SMITH. No; Sam Parker, the minister of foreign affairs, was not at the attorney-general's then at that time. Mr. Colburn, in an excited manner, told about an interview at the palace with the Queen after the prorogation, in which she had produced the proposed new constitution and demanded that the ministers sign it with herself, and that he as minister of the interior should sign it, I do not recollect definitely which, and narrated how he and Mr. Peterson and Mr. Cornwell had escaped from the palace. Mr. Thurston spoke very emphatically, although calmly, advising that by no means should they sign the constitution or consent to her proposition.

Mr. COOPER. Was there not something said about their resigning at that time?

Mr. SMITH. There was, both on that occasion and at Mr. Hartwell's office at 11 o'clock. We advised Mr. Colburn that the ministers should not resign, and that if they resigned it would give the Queen an opportunity to appoint new ministers who would accede to her wishes, and the complications would be greater than they otherwise would be. While we were in the attorney-general's office, John Richardson, in the uniform of an officer of the Queen's staff, came with a message from the palace requesting the three ministers to go over there. At that time the whole of the Queen's guard was drawn up in front of the palace on King street side under arms. On the Waikikki side of the main entrance to the palace, and on the Ewa side of that entrance, was a large crowd of natives—two or three hundred, probably.

Mr. CASTLE. Half as many more on the Makai side?

Mr. SMITH. Yes. The band was at the palace and there appeared to be a large number of people in attendance around the palace, all the officials and attendants that were generally about the sovereign on an occasion of prorogation. We were also informed that the chief justice was at the palace at the request of the Queen waiting to administer the oath to her upon her signing the new constitution.

Mr. CASTLE. Is that the way that was?

Mr. SMITH. He was there all the afternoon.

Mr. CASTLE. He was there for that purpose?

Mr. SMITH. He was there for that purpose.

Mr. CASTLE. And he knew there was to be a new constitution?

Mr. SMITH. I was informed that he knew there was to be a new constitution, and on that account he remained there.

Mr. CASTLE. To administer the oath.

Mr. SMITH. That was what she wanted him for.

Mr. COOPER. Bickerton was also there?

Mr. SMITH. Bickerton was there. When Maj. Richardson came with the message for the ministers to go over, some one or more of them asked us who were present what they should do. We told them not to go, Mr. Thurston explaining to them that so long as they, the three of them, were there, they constituted a majority of the Government, and that it might become important for them to act in regard to public affairs. Colburn expressed his unwillingness to go, stating that he feared what the excited mob might do. He felt that their lives were in danger if they went back to the palace again. It was then decided by them to send back a message by Richardson to Samuel Parker, minister of foreign affairs, to come over to the attorney-general's office from the palace, and shortly he did come, and the whole situation was again discussed. Mr. Parker urged that the other ministers return to the palace with him. It was deemed inadvisable for them to do so, but

Mr. Parker, who made light of the danger, said that he would go back again and try and dissuade her from pursuing the course which she had mapped out. There was a good deal of conversation about the matter, and shortly after that, during Mr. Parker's absence, Thurston and I left the Government building to return to our offices down town.

Mr. CASTLE. Where were Colburn and Cornwell at this—?

Mr. SMITH. They were here in the attorney-general's office.

Mr. CASTLE. Now, then, tell me the connection. At half-past 2, or very close to half-past 2, you came out of the Government building in a hack, and I jumped in with you. At that time Colburn and Cornwell were crossing the street.

Mr. SMITH. That is later. Thurston and I left the Government building to go to town, and we walked along as far as Richard street, when we were overtaken by a messenger requesting Mr. Thurston to return. He did return to the Government building, and I kept on to my office. Arriving at my office I found a large number of people—?

Mr. COOPER (interrupting). No, you met Mr. Neumann and myself on the corner and we went into your office, three of us; that was the first time I came down Merchant street.

Mr. SMITH. Near my office on the way I met Paul Neumann and Mr. H. E. Cooper, and I asked them to go into my office. In my inner office Mr. Neumann and Mr. Cooper and myself discussed the situation and discussed the danger of disturbance.

Mr. COOPER. And that the ministers should be supported against the Queen.

Mr. SMITH. And that the ministers should be supported against the Queen. We also discussed the question of under what circumstances the troops of the American ship of war *Boston* would be justified in

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Neumann stated that if the Queen persisted in carrying out her object that it would be warrantable for foreign interference. Mr. Neumann stated that.

Mr. SMITH. He took the ground also that they could not land excepting only upon the request of the minister of foreign affairs.

Mr. CASTLE. The minister of foreign affairs only?

Mr. SMITH. The Government. While we were talking this matter over, perhaps ten minutes, several people came to this inner office, and we requested them to retire.

Mr. COOPER. I never left the office at all from the time I first went in until the committee of safety had been formed and finally adjourned.

Mr. SMITH. People began to crowd into my office shortly after that, and there was very deep feeling and considerable excitement and very determined expression of opposition to the proceeding of the Queen, and individuals began signing the paper.

Mr. COOPER. I will show you how it was. Mr. Thurston wrote down seven or eight names who were gentlemen present at that time in his own handwriting; we did not sign it; and then he says, "I am going out to see others, will you take this chair and take care of this paper and get their signature?" I said, "yes," and when he went out several of us got into a discussion with Mr. Neumann, and he took the ground that the Queen had not yet committed an overt act which would amount to treason or revolution. On our part we contended that she had, and he then left the office.

Mr. SMITH. The expression was very strongly expressed that the ministers should be supported in their attitude toward the Queen in refusing to accede to her request and that they ought not to resign, and it was requested to return to the Government building and so state

to the ministers that that was the sentiment of citizens so far as we had been able to ascertain. I immediately returned to the Government building. On entering the yard and before reaching the front door of the building I met the ministers going over to the palace with Messenger Richardson.

Mr. CASTLE. All the ministers?

Mr. SMITH. My impression is they were all four. I stopped and gave the communication to them to that effect that they should be supported by the community in refusing to accede to the Queen's wishes, and they proceeded on and went into the palace yard, and I returned to my office. At my office I found there was still a large number of people.

Mr. CASTLE. That was the time you picked me up?

Mr. SMITH. Yes. It must have been in the neighborhood of an hour and a half after that—

Mr. CASTLE. I got on to the quarter-hour car that goes down town from Thomas Square at quarter-past 2. It was just about half-past 2 by the clock of this building when I noticed the crowd there in the Government building. And looking on I saw there was one white man here and saw that it was McStocker, and I jumped out to ask him what was up when you drove out of the yard and beckoned to me before I had a chance to ask him, and I jumped in the hack with you and went down town. Colburn and Cornwell were at that moment crossing the street. The whole affair, of course, became so tense and exciting that I could not swear now whether they were going this way or that way.

Mr. SMITH. They were going toward the palace gate. My conversation with Coburn was just before he left the Government building yard. We returned, and down at the office were a large number of people going and coming; a great deal of excitement. I noticed on my return there was quite a list of names signed at the desk.

Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Cooper was at the desk with that list.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Cooper had charge of that matter of the signatures, and people were asking him about it and what was to be done, and what was going to be done, and various statements, and the offices, both front and rear offices, became filled with people. After a little I volunteered and did return again to the Government building to ascertain how matters stood, so as to communicate with the meeting, and at the Government building there were a good many people. Upstairs, I noticed after awhile, there were several of the foreign representatives and Mr. J. O. Carter and others. I understood afterwards that they had been in consultation with the ministry. We waited around the building here an hour or so, and watching the palace to see what was to be done.

At this time some of the troops had stacked their arms and were lying around on the grass. The crowd of spectators on the left-hand side had diminished. The people at the palace, attendants, seemed to be about the same as ever; there were people going from the interior on to the veranda, they all seemed to be waiting. Finally there was a move and commotion, and the soldiers returned and took their arms and were drawn up in line. The crowd of people in the Government building yard all crowded toward the gate, and many went into the yard. I, with others, went to King street on the inside of the Government fence opposite the palace yard gate to see what was going on. After some further delay, there was evidently some passing to and fro and some commotion in the palace, we saw a train of ladies pass from the rooms on to the west side of the palace towards the throne room,

and there was another little delay for some little time. And then the Queen and some ladies came out of the throne room and went upstairs and came out on the balcony, and from there she made remarks. We could not hear what she said.

Mr. CASTLE. But it was undoubtedly the speech which was afterwards published?

Mr. SMITH. Yes. Shortly after that there was a number of representatives and others came out of the palace on the front steps and there several speakers harangued the audience. The meeting at the palace seemed to be at an end, and this was now about half-past three or a little later.

Mr. COOPER. Colburn came in and took his seat right opposite where I was sitting, and as soon as Colburn showed himself in the door and commenced to speak Peterson went out.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Calburn overtook Mr. Thurston and myself returning to my office and told us the situation, how the Queen, in great anger, had stated to the people who were assembled that she had been unable to carry out her wishes and the desire of many; that it was her wish to promulgate a new constitution, but that she had been prevented, but she would shortly do it; and that we heard from various sources of the violent speeches of William White, representative from Lahaina, and others, threatening bloodshed and generally of a most violent character, and we returned and reported this to the meeting. My offices were crowded with people, so that it was with difficulty that we could get into the room at all, and Mr. Colburn worked his way in. Mr. Peterson appeared about that time or a little later, and Mr. Colburn made this statement briefly. What occurred was about as has been published, and it was generally known. There were a few short speeches made by different persons present. I made some remarks, and one or two others, finally Mr. Thurston spoke very briefly, and then on Mr. Thurston's motion those present organized themselves into a meeting. Mr. H. E. Cooper was chosen chairman and W. O. Smith secretary.

Mr. COOPER. Then the motion was to appoint a committee of nine, the first motion was, and then it was afterwards made thirteen, and then by a vote of the meeting I was made a member of the committee.

Mr. SMITH. It was voted that a committee of thirteen be appointed to form plans for action and call meetings, report any time, at their discretion, and be called a committee of safety. At that time there was some serious apprehension, we could not tell what, that disorder might follow; what steps might be taken next; whether the constitution might not be promulgated that very afternoon or the next morning, or at any time; there was simply an intense feeling of uncertainty and a feeling that danger to the community was very imminent. She had practically promised it in a few days. The remarks and action were very short—right to the point; intense feeling and determination was manifested, and meanwhile from those present the following committee of thirteen was appointed: L. A. Thurston, W. R. Castle, C. Bolte, W. C. Wilder, W. O. Smith, J. A. McCandless, H. F. Glade, A. S. Wilcox, T. F. Lansing, H. Waterhouse, Andrew Brown, F. W. McChesney, and, by special vote, H. E. Cooper. Mr. Glade was not present, but was communicated with—asked if he would be willing to serve.

Mr. COOPER. After the committee was formed the other gentlemen were requested to retire. Then a message was sent for Mr. Glade and Mr. Wilder and they came.

Mr. SMITH. And they signified their willingness to serve on the com-

mittee. After further delay, almost immediately the others present were requested to retire and the committee held a meeting. The situation was briefly discussed—the imminence of danger and the safety of the city; what action should be taken for protection was the main subject of discussion. And in view of the fact that at the station house there was a large armed force and at the barracks, and that nearly all of the arms were in possession of the supporters of the Queen, and there was no organization at the time outside of those forces, and it was simply unknown how many arms were available, the question was at once discussed whether a protectorate should not be sought from the United States steamship of war *Boston*; that question was, of course, first raised, whether the United States would render assistance, or what their attitude would be, and then a special committee consisting of L. A. Thurston, W. C. Wilder, and H. F. Glade were appointed to wait upon Mr. J. L. Stevens, United States minister, and inform him of the situation and ascertain from him what, if any, protection or assistance could be afforded by the United States forces for the protection of life and property, the unanimous sentiment and feeling being that life and property were in imminent danger. By that time it was so dark that I lighted the electric light. We had to have light before we concluded our meeting and deliberations.

Mr. COOPER. My first acquaintance with the affair was when I met Hartwell on the street. I met him coming out of his office.

When this question came up as to whether or not what assistance the United States troops might give, I made the following statement to the committee: That I had gone, at Mr. Hartwell's request, to see the captain of the *Boston*, Capt. Wiltse, about half past 11, and I informed him of the situation, and he immediately sent for Commander Swinburne, who, in turn, sent for the officer of the deck, and all necessary preliminary preparations were made, and that was Capt. Wiltse's first news of it. He didn't know anything about it before I came there. And Capt. Wiltse said that he was there for the purpose of protecting life and property of American citizens, and if called upon he would do it. I afterwards came ashore and met Mr. Smith and Mr. Neumann and retired to Mr. Smith's office.

Mr. SMITH. During this meeting of the committee of thirteen and the discussion of the situation, it was made manifest to us, from what had transpired during the day and the action of the Queen, that she was in a condition of revolution, that is, her act was entirely revolutionary; that there was a feeling of perfect uncertainty of what would take place or how great the danger was, but we were simply convinced that established government was at an end, that we were in a state of revolution, and with the forces in her command, and the utter disregard for the constitution and laws, that we as citizens had simply got to look to ourselves for safety and protection, that the intelligent part of the community had got to take matters in their own hands and establish law and order. The probabilities of what the Queen would do were discussed; there was no certainty in regard to that, excepting that she would undoubtedly persist in her revolutionary intentions; what would be done, how soon martial law might be declared or any other course would be taken, what steps would be taken, we simply could not tell, and after discussion Mr. Thurston made the following motion: "That steps be taken at once to form and declare a provisional government."

The seriousness of the step was considered, but it was deemed, decided unanimously by the committee that some such steps had got

to be taken for protection of life and property, and it was then, and after Mr. Cooper's statement in regard to his visit to the *Boston*, that the committee consisting of Thurston, Wilder, and Glade were appointed to meet the American minister, and were instructed to report the next morning at 9 o'clock, at a meeting to be called at the residence of W. R. Castle.

I went home about dark or a little after, and just had dinner when Mr. Thurston called at my house on his way home, asking me to meet the committee and one or two others at his house at 8 o'clock. I went there and found Mr. Thurston, W. R. Castle, F. W. Wundenberg, A. S. Hartwell, S. B. Dole, and C. L. Carter. Mr. Thurston stated that the committee had waited upon the American minister, and that he had said that the United States troops on board the *Boston* would be ready to land any moment to prevent the destruction of American life and property, and in regard to the matter of establishing a Provisional Government they of course would recognize the existing government whatever it might be.

Mr. Thurston stated to Mr. Stevens the proposition that was under consideration, of establishing a Provisional Government, and in case those steps were taken, he asked Mr. Stevens what his attitude would be, and Mr. Stevens had told him whatever government was established, and was actually in possession of the Government building, the executive departments and archives, and *in possession of the city*, that was a *de facto* government proclaiming itself as a government, would necessarily have to be recognized. Everything had culminated in a few hours, we were laboring under intense feeling, and it was arranged that different ones of those present should begin drafting papers. Mr. W. R. Castle undertook to draft something in the nature of a brief historical statement, which would be for a preamble to the declaration. Mr. Thurston was to work upon the matter of the form of the Provisional Government. Judge Dole quietly stated that he was not prepared to take part in the movement, but that he would assist, at Mr. Thurston's request, in drafting the declaration. I was requested to draft papers to be submitted to the American minister requesting the landing of the troops, in case it became necessary. At a late hour we retired, and the next morning at 9 o'clock the committee of thirteen met at W. R. Castle's residence.

The meeting continued until noon. The committee appointed to wait on the American minister made a report to the committee similar to the report made to us the night before. Among the various propositions and matters discussed was a matter of calling a public mass meeting, and it was decided to call a meeting at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the next day, Monday, to be held if possible at the old rifle armory on Beretania street, near the corner of Punchbowl street. Mr. Andrew Brown was appointed a committee to procure the armory, make the arrangements for the meeting, and to see to the publication of the notice, which notice was prepared there during the meeting, and a committee of three, consisting of L. A. Thurston, W. R. Castle, and W. O. Smith, were appointed to arrange a programme for the public meeting and secure the speakers. During this meeting Mr. A. S. Wilcox stated that as he had deemed it important for him to return to Kauai that he thought it was his duty to resign from the committee.

While he was in perfect sympathy with the movement, he felt that in the excitement which might be created it was very important for those who had their homes on the other islands to return and endeavor to maintain peace and quietness in the other islands. His resignation

was accepted, and Mr. J. Emmeluth was elected to take his place. Mr. Glade stated that owing to his position as German consul he deemed under his instructions that it would be improper for him to continue a member of the committee and tendered his resignation, which was accepted, and Mr. Ed. Suhr was appointed to fill his place. At this meeting Mr. L. A. Thurston was appointed to draw the resolution to be presented at the mass meeting and the report of the committee.

Mr. COOPER. That was just after Glade and Wilcox had resigned; just when we were going to break up it was suggested as to whether we should not go on and perfect the organization of the Provisional Government and the form that it should take. Mr. Castle presented his historical preamble, which was not read, but Mr. Thurston had stated the general plan that he had in mind as to the form the Provisional Government should take, stating that it should consist of an executive council and an advisory council. The mention of names was suggested by the meeting, that Mr. Thurston should be the leader and the head of the Government. Mr. Thurston questioned the wisdom of that on two grounds: First he had business arrangements which might call him away, and on the further ground that he was considered such a radical mover that he believed it was wise to have some one who was more conservative. That was dropped right there. Mr. Dole's name was not mentioned at that meeting.

Mr. SMITH. At that meeting and the previous and subsequent meetings most meager minutes were kept, because of the possible danger of our being arrested and of these records being used against us. The night before Mr. Thurston requested Mr. Wundenberg to ascertain as far as he could what arms were available and how many men with arms could be depended upon. Just at the close of the meeting on Sunday, about noon, at W. R. Castle's, Mr. Wundenberg came with Mr. Soper, and they reported that the prospect of obtaining arms was very discouraging, but that after making a thorough search of the town only about sixty stand of arms were found that were not in possession of the Government.

After we adjourned Mr. Thurston and I called upon the American minister again and informed him of what was being done. Among other things we talked over with him what had better be done in case of our being arrested or extreme or violent measures being taken by the Monarchy in regard to us. We did not know what steps would be taken, and there was a feeling of great unrest and sense of danger in the community. Mr. Stevens gave assurances of his earnest purpose to afford all the protection that was in his power to protect life and property; he emphasized the fact that while he would call for the United States troops to protect life and property, he could not recognize any government until actually established. He repeated that the troops when landed would not take sides with either party, but would protect American life and property. Thurston and I then began to arrange in regard to the speakers, who to see. Thurston said that he would see quite a number; among them was Mr. Swanzy, T. R. Walker, Cecil Brown, and some others. I rode down town and found James F. Morgan and asked him to be one of the speakers. He consented to be. And I saw two or three others and then went to the printing office and hastened up the matter of the publishing of the posters.

At the meeting at Mr. Castle's there was considerable discussion in regard to when to have the mass meeting; some were in favor of having it on Sunday; a feeling too had been expressed at the meeting on Saturday afternoon that there should be a mass meeting called

right off on Sunday, and at the meeting some thought better to have the meeting early Monday morning, there being such a feeling of absolute uncertainty in regard to what course the Queen would pursue, whether she would proclaim the constitution and disorder and riot precipitated. It was finally concluded, however, that the meeting should be held at 2 o'clock and that all business houses be requested to close.

Sunday evening several of us met again at Mr. Thurston's. Mr. Thurston did not return from his interview with Cecil Brown and others until about 8 o'clock in the evening. Meanwhile a message had been left at my house by Colburn that the ministers would like to meet a committee of five from the committee of thirteen. We were also informed that the ministers had had a meeting sometime during the day of Sunday, in which several of the citizens were present—Mr. F. A. Schaefer, Mr. S. M. Damon, and Mr. J. O. Carter, and one or two others. At this meeting in the evening the work was further arranged, the different parts of it assigned, and at a late hour we returned home.

The next morning, Monday, January 16, the meeting was held of the whole committee of thirteen at the office of L. A. Thurston over Bishop's Bank, corner of Merchant and Kaahumanu streets. Mr. Thurston was ill, suffering much at times. The meeting lasted nearly all the forenoon, subject to a number of interruptions, one interruption being that of the marshal, C. B. Wilson, who called Thurston out into Mr. W. F. Allen's office and protested against the holding of a mass meeting in the afternoon. This meeting at Mr. Thurston's office during the forenoon was held under great difficulties, there being many interruptions, and different ones having to withdraw at various times for various matters pertaining to the business in hand. The condition of Mr. Thurston's health caused us a good deal of anxiety. He had been suffering before that with a severe cold upon his lungs and from loss of sleep and mental strain he was weak and was attacked with dysentery.

At that meeting it was decided that he should be one of the speakers at the public meeting. He had objected to it, not desiring to take so prominent a part, fearing that it might produce unnecessary antagonism; more than that, his physical condition was such that he hardly felt able. It was deemed very important that he should speak, and the order of business at the meeting was decided upon. Mr. W. C. Wilder reluctantly consented to act as chairman, and the matter of a request of the ministers that a committee of five be sent to wait upon them was considered, and a committee was appointed consisting of C. Bolte, J. A. McCandless, W. C. Wilder, F. W. McChesney, and H. Waterhouse, to meet the ministers. They retired, and during their absence other general matters were discussed. Information was being received in regard to public matters generally.

Mr. CASTLE. Was Wilson's action there simply a protest; it went out that he had warned them not to have it?

Mr. SMITH. Thurston reported it as a protest against this meeting being held. Thurston asked him why, and he said that it would provoke disorder. At this meeting we were informed of the fact that another mass meeting had been called for the same hour, 2 o'clock in the afternoon, to be held at Palace Square, the junction of Richard and King streets, signed by the committee on law and order, and that many of those posters had been placed over our posters, and that there was evidently an attempt to prevent our meeting or create confusion and to mislead. Mr. Thurston had on his own authority before the meeting prepared a poster, and it was in the process of being printed exposing

the fraud, and he had a copy of it then and submitted it to the meeting, but it was of a nature which we considered inflammatory, and on the whole we decided not to have it posted.

The committee of five returned and reported that they had met the four ministers, and the ministers stated to them that they had no communication to make, and wanted to know what the committee wanted. They talked over the situation and showed our committee a proclamation signed by the Queen and the ministers stating that she would never again attempt to force a new constitution. Before the meeting broke up the form of the request to the American minister in regard to the landing of the troops was adopted and signed by the committee of thirteen, requesting the American minister to land troops, and this request was signed by the committee of thirteen, and decided to be delivered to the minister to be held by him but not to be acted upon until a further request was received from the committee.

After the adjournment of the meeting fifteen or sixteen different copies of the request were typewritten and attached with five or six blank pages to each copy, and these were distributed among several members of the committee before proceeding to the meeting, and the request of Mr. Stevens was delivered to him before the meeting was held. By 1 o'clock business began to be closed. Before 2 o'clock a large number of people had assembled at the armory, and by 2 o'clock a very large number was there. After Mr. Thurston had finished speaking at the mass meeting, and while others were speaking, the members of the committee discussed very earnestly what to do in regard to this petition. If it was to be circulated for signatures, some notice to that effect would have to be given before the meeting dispersed; and we were in very great doubt, some being very earnestly of the opinion that they should be signed as universally as possible, the opinion being that they would be signed by nearly all of the twelve hundred present, but it did not seem opportune and we waited. The meeting was finally adjourned, as it seemed to some of us sooner than we expected, and nothing was done about the signing of the petition, and the committee felt somewhat at a loss what to do, but word was passed around among us at once to meet at my office again, and within twenty minutes after the adjournment of the meeting the committee met.

Mr. SMITH. There was a short and earnest discussion of what was to be done; it was then nearly 4; our plans had not been perfected, papers had not been completed, and after a hasty discussion, the time being very short, it was decided that it was impossible for us to take the necessary steps, and we should request that the troops be not landed until next morning, the hour in the morning being immaterial, whether it was 9 or 8 or 6 o'clock in the morning, but we must have further time to prevent bloodshed, and Mr. Thurston and I were appointed to proceed at once to the American minister and inform him of our decision. We proceeded at once to Mr. Stevens' house, the United States legation, stated the case to him, and he said that as a precautionary measure, and to protect American life and property, he had ordered the troops to be landed at 5 o'clock, and that they would come. It was then decided to adjourn to meet at the house of Henry Waterhouse at 8 o'clock in the evening. The meeting broke up, and some of us went down to see the troops landed. Thurston gave up—sick. He had to go to bed.

At 8 o'clock in the evening we met at Mr. Henry Waterhouse's. All of the members of the committee were present except Thurston, Castle,

and Wilder, they all being ill. Mr. James B. Castle was present, taking the place of W. R. Castle, and C. L. Carter taking the place of Thurston. There were also present by invitation Alexander Young, J. H. Soper, Cecil Brown, H. P. Baldwin, and F. W. Wundenburg.

Previous to this meeting, beginning with the meeting on Saturday afternoon, the suggestion of sending the *Claudine* to San Francisco with dispatches to the United States Government was discussed, and at this meeting Monday evening it was moved that she be sent at once to San Francisco. The motion was amended that action be deferred until after the establishment of the Provisional Government. Amendment carried.

A committee of two, consisting of C. Bolte and C. L. Carter, was appointed to make a list to form an executive council of five members and an advisory council of eight members. Before this it had been suggested that Judge Dole be chosen to act as the head of the government. After some discussion Mr. Bolte was appointed a committee to wait upon Judge Dole and to invite his attendance at the meeting, and after an absence of some length Mr. Bolte returned with Judge Dole. And Judge Dole was not willing to consent at that time, stating that he did not favor fully the idea of annexation at this time and asked if it would not be better to have a regent here and Kaiulani declared the Queen. But after discussion he consented to take the matter under further consideration and let us know his decision the next day at 12 o'clock, the committee endeavoring to persuade him. He recognized that the logical events and manifest destiny of the island was annexation, but he did not know whether it was the wisest step now. There is no doubt that the Queen has vacated the throne.

He said that if he did decide to join us he would first resign as judge of the supreme court. P. C. Jones, S. M. Damon, Cecil Brown, J. A. King, and W. O. Smith were suggested to serve on the executive council, which was contemplated as five. Mr. Cecil Brown refused. Mr. Soper was requested to take the place of commander of the military forces, and he accepted conditionally. A finance committee of three was appointed, consisting of McCandless, McChesney, and J. B. Castle, to collect the lists of arms and ammunition and buy or otherwise procure the same.

At 10 o'clock the next day, January 17, the committee met at the office of W. O. Smith, and Mr. C. L. Carter, on behalf of the committee, reported the names of those who had consented to go upon the executive and advisory councils. It was voted that the advisory committee be increased from eight to thirteen, and additional names be suggested to the committee, from whom they could select the five additional names. Various names were suggested. It was voted that the committee request Mr. Wilder to report if the *Claudine* could be chartered to go to San Francisco and at what cost. It was voted that the Inter-island steamship companies be requested not to allow any vessels to leave for the other islands before 10 o'clock on the next day. At 11 o'clock the judge came before the committee and stated that he would accept the position as chairman of the executive council.

It was voted that the executive council be S. B. Dole, J. A. King, P. C. Jones, W. O. Smith, and C. Bolte, and that the advisory council consist of S. M. Damon, L. A. Thurston, J. Emmeluth, J. A. McCandless, F. W. McChesney, W. R. Castle, W. C. Wilder, Andrew Brown, J. F. Morgan, H. Waterhouse, E. D. Tenney, F. Wilhelm, and W. G. Ashley. During the meeting in the forenoon Mr. S. M. Damon came in and reported that he had had an interview with the Queen, in which

he had advised her not to make resistance, but to submit, and that she would have every opportunity for presenting her claims, and Mr. Damon stated that he was willing to join the movement. Mr. Dole, before he retired, signed his written resignation as a judge to the supreme court and forwarded it to the minister of foreign affairs.

The meeting adjourned and met again at 1:30. It having been understood that Mr. Dole should have the say in regard to who the members of the executive council should be, he was asked at this final meeting if he approved of the names that had been suggested, and he, upon looking them over, stated that objection had been raised in regard to the name of Mr. Bolte, and that as he himself was not very well acquainted with Mr. Bolte that it would be better that he should not be upon the executive council. Mr. Bolte at once expressed his approval, that he only wished to serve in any capacity which would further the object. And then, after a brief discussion, it was decided to reduce the number of the executive committee from five to four, and that they should fill the offices of foreign affairs, interior, finance, and attorney-general, in the order in which they were named, and it was decided to increase the number of the advisory committee from thirteen to fourteen and add Mr. Bolte's name to the list. The members of the executive council and advisory committee were then finally approved and acted upon.

The committee of thirteen then signed the proclamation, and the executive council then signed the commission of J. H. Soper as commander in chief of the forces, and three copies of the proclamation were completed. The final signing of the papers was completed about twenty minutes past 2, and after a little delay the committee of thirteen, with the executive and advisory councils, started to proceed to the Government building. They had hardly reached the corner of Merchant street before a shot was heard, and it was reported that a policeman had been shot at E. O. Hall & Son's store, and people were seen running from the direction of the Government building towards the spot, and there was considerable commotion. The committee and councils proceeded to the Government building and the proclamation was read. Previous to starting, leaving my office, Mr. Dole requested Mr. A. S. Wilcox to go up to the Government building and come back and report whether there was any armed force at the Government building. He went up and looked through and went through to Queen street, and came back and reported that he did not see any armed men.

After the reading of the proclamation the councils convened in the office of the minister of the interior, and subsequent events occurred and business was done in the following order:

Orders No. 1 and No. 2 were issued.

Liquor saloons were ordered to be closed.

Letters were sent to the members of the diplomatic and consular corps announcing the establishment of the Provisional Government and requesting recognition.

Mr. Wodehouse, British commissioner, and Mr. T. R. Walker, British vice-consul, called to verify the report of our occupation, etc.

Deputy-Marshal Mehrtens came from the police station, and we sent by him a copy of the proclamation to the ex-ministers and an invitation to them to come and see us.

Mehrtens came again, asking us to go to the police station. We declined and instructed him to tell the ex-ministers if they wished to see us they must come to the Government building.

Ministers Parker and Cornwell came.

Messrs. Damon and Bolte returned with Parker and Cornwell to the police station to meet the other ex-ministers.

Messrs. Damon and Bolte returned with the four ex-ministers, who requested that the Queen should have an opportunity to make a protest.

Mr. Damon went with them to see the Queen.

Ex-ministers and Damon returned stating that the Queen gave up under protest, and that Marshal Wilson had been ordered to give up the station house. And we sent an officer with a squad of men to take possession of the station.

As to the precise time when the letter of recognition was received from American Minister Stevens I can not be positive. My recollection is that it was about the time that Messrs. Damon and Bolte returned from the police station with the four ex-ministers, but the records of our proceedings at the time, kept by the secretary, place it *after* the return of Mr. Damon and the ex-ministers from their visit to the Queen. In any event it was very late in the day, and long after Messrs. Wodehouse and Walker had called.

Before the letter of recognition was received from Mr. Stevens, Lieut. Young, of the U. S. S. *Boston*, called upon us, and stated that he was ordered to verify the correctness of the assurance that we were in occupation of the Government building and departments.

These events occupied the time till after dark; meanwhile many matters demanded our attention.

I sent for the attorney-general and desired to examine him in reference to the events connected with the revolution of the 17th of January, 1893. He said he preferred not to be examined; that he would bring me a paper containing a history of those events, prepared by himself and some other gentlemen. The next day he brought the paper to which this is attached, saying it was a part of the record. I asked him if he would allow me to see the whole record. He hesitated about it and said that he would prefer to talk with Mr. Dole first. While I have seen him frequently since he has never referred to the matter again. When he handed me the paper he said he did not care to be examined himself; that if there was anything in it that I did not understand he would explain it to me.

JAMES H. BLOUNT.

HONOLULU, *July 15, 1893.*

No. 49.

Interview with J. H. Soper, June 17, 1893.

Q. Where were you born?

A. In Plymouth, England.

Q. How long have you lived here?

A. I came here in December, 1877.

Q. Are you a naturalized citizen?

A. Of this country?

Q. Yes.

A. I have taken the oath of allegiance to this Government.

Q. Are you a British subject?

A. I am an American.

Q. How long did you live in the United States?

A. I was 4 years of age when I went there. My father was a naturalized citizen.

Q. What year was that?

A. 1850. I was born in 1846.

Q. How long did you live in the United States?

A. Until 1877.

Q. That would be twenty-seven years?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you take the oath of allegiance here?

A. To this Government?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. Are you an American citizen?

A. Yes, sir. I didn't forswear my allegiance to the United States.

Q. You came here in what year?

A. In 1877.

Q. Were you in command of the military forces at the time of the dethronement of the Queen?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How much artillery was turned over?

A. Twelve guns altogether.

Q. What were they?

A. Eight centimeter Krupp guns and four 7-centimeter guns.

Q. Were they German guns?

A. They were Austrian guns, the same pattern as Krupp guns.

Q. How many small arms?

A. I can not say, from memory. I have a record of it over there. I can not say, from memory. I would have to look over the record, in order to be exact.

Q. Will you furnish me a memorandum soon?

A. Yes.

Q. And of the ammunition?

A. Yes.

Q. How much small arms did the committee of safety get up with a view to the movement against the Queen?

A. I should say we had in the neighborhood of—I think I have a record of that also.

Q. You will bring me that also?

A. Yes.

Q. What sort of arms were they?

A. Springfield and Winchester repeating rifles, called Winchester sporting rifles.

Q. Where did they come from?

A. From hardware stores here.

Q. Were they brought here for purposes of revolution or not?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Brought here for military purposes?

A. I do not think so. I can not say as to that. They were part of the stock in the store.

Q. What store?

A. Castle & Cooke. The largest number came from there—that is, 19 or 20 Winchester repeating rifles, model of 1886. There were quite a number of Springfield rifles from the times of 1887 and 1889.

Q. Where had they been kept?

A. In the hands of individuals.

Q. Where were you when the proclamation was read?

A. In the Government building.

Q. Can you state the number of troops you had there at the time the proclamation was read or within 20 minutes afterwards?

A. I can not say, exactly. I never kept any account. It was not very long before we had in the neighborhood of between 150 and 200 men. I can not say exactly how long after.

Q. What was the first detachment that came?

A. The first squad that came down was about 15 men. They came from the armory on Beretania street.

Q. How long after that before the second squad came?

A. In about 5 or 10 minutes.

Q. How many were there in that squad?

A. I should say about 15 or 20.

Q. Well, the next arrivals?

A. I didn't see them. They kept coming right along at short intervals.

Q. How many were there when they finished reading the proclamation?

A. I should imagine there would be about perhaps 60 or 75.

Q. And how long was it after the proclamation was read before you had 150 men?

A. I can not say, exactly.

Q. Did you have that many in an hour?

A. The proclamation was read about half past two. I do not know how long it took to read it. I was not paying much attention to the time consumed in the reading, but in an hour afterwards, I should say, we had about 150 men.

Q. In an hour after it was finished?

A. I should think so. I have not paid any special attention to that since that time.

Q. Were you at Henry Waterhouse's on Monday night before that?

A. Yes; I was there.

Q. Who else was there?

A. Henry Waterhouse, C. L. Carter, Mr. Cooper, Mr. Wundenberg, W. R. Castle. There were a number of others. I can not say positively now without looking over the list of names.

Q. What list of names?

A. I should have to look over the names of the present Government and supporters of the Government in order to pick out the entire number.

Q. About how many persons were there?

A. Probably twelve or fifteen.

Q. What was the object of the meeting?

A. To ascertain what advice or assistance to give to the committee of safety—the committee of thirteen.

Q. What advice to give to the committee of safety?

A. That is what I understood it to be. That is, to work in conjunction with them.

Q. Many of them were members of the committee?

A. Yes; and some of those were people called in by the committee to counsel with them.

Q. Were you offered that night command of the military forces—solicited to take it?

A. Yes.

Q. How was that done—by a vote of the meeting?

A. I went outside for some purpose or other—I think to get a drink

out on the veranda. When I went back the proposition was made to me. What they did while I was out I do not know. I did not go out at the request of any one.

Q. What response did you make?

A. I said I was not a trained military man, and was rather averse to accepting any position I was not especially trained for, under the circumstances, and that I would give them an answer on the following day; that is, in the morning.

Q. You did not give them any answer that night?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you see Mr. Stevens that night?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did anybody in the meeting go to see him, so far as you heard?

A. Not so far as I know of.

Q. Was anything said about his agreeing to recognize the Provisional Government in the event of their getting possession of the Government building and reading their proclamation—orny hea er building?

A. You mean at this meeting?

Q. Yes?

A. I can not say positively as to whether I understood it at that meeting, or the following morning. I understood he would recognize a *de facto* government.

Q. What did they say was a *de facto* government?

A. A Government that was in possession of the Government building, archives, treasury, etc.

Q. The treasury, archives, etc., were in the Government building?

A. Yes.

Q. The understanding was then that if the Provisional Government got possession of the Government building and read the proclamation that then he would recognize it as a *de facto* government?

A. I believe that was the understanding.

Q. You do not remember whether it was that night or the next day?

A. It is possible that it was at that meeting that evening, but I do not know.

Q. Are you inclined to believe it was that evening?

A. I won't say positively as to that.

Q. It was either that evening or the next morning?

A. Yes.

Q. Until you heard that did you agree to accept the military command?

A. No.

Q. It was after that that you agreed to accept that command?

A. I feel pretty sure it was. The particular point which decided me was the fact of Judge Dole agreeing to accept the position as the head of the Government.

I have read the foregoing and it is a correct report of my interview with Mr. Blount.

Mr. Soper was sent for several times with a view of having him read the foregoing, but up to this time we have been unable to get him here.—E. M.

No. 50.

Interview with Claus Spreckels, Friday April 21, 1893.

Mr. BLOUNT. Please state whether or not you had any message from the American minister and whether any conversation with him?

Mr. SPRECKELS. I had.

Mr. BLOUNT. Be kind enough to state it?

Mr. SPRECKELS. He sent down on Tuesday, about 3 o'clock whether I would be kind enough to come up to his house to see him. I took a carriage and saw him at 4 o'clock that Tuesday afternoon. He told me that Mr. Parker had no influence with the Queen, but that Paul Neumann could control her, and, if I would, if I could, control Paul Neumann; that Paul Neumann tell the Queen that she be in favor of annexation, and tell the Kanakas who follow her to go all for annexation.

He said that he expected to be here only thirty or forty days, and he would like for annexation to be before he left; some words to that effect.

No. 51.

Interview with Claus Spreckels, June 5, 1893.

Mr. BLOUNT. Is this a copy of the contract made with laborers by planters? (Copy attached hereto.)

A. It is.

Q. What means have the planters of enforcing their agreements?

A. The law upholds that contract.

Q. Suppose the laborer does not work satisfactorily?

A. That brings him to the police court—make complaint.

Q. What punishment is inflicted?

A. I am hardly able to answer that. I do not know how they carry out the law.

Q. Can you state—is the remedy at law for the enforcement of contracts generally satisfactory to the planters?

A. I would say, yes. This contract is made first with the Japanese Government. This Government makes the contract, and this Government makes the contract with the planters, and that is the contract you have there between the planters and this Government.

Q. Does the Government pay any expenses in the matter of the laborers?

A. No; the planter pays passage money and all expenses.

Q. Who pays for the officers connected with the inspection of laborers?

A. I am unable to answer that.

Q. Are you familiar with the lands in all these islands?

A. I am.

Q. Are they suitable for much else than sugar-cane culture?

A. That is their principal use.

Q. Could the sugar cane be grown here without cheap contract labor?

A. No.

Q. Suppose they could not get it, what would be the condition?

A. They would have to close the plantations.

Q. What would become of them?

A. They would be cow pastures or something.

Q. The contract laborers that have been brought here, the great mass of them, was it done under the stimulus of the reciprocity treaty with the United States or not?

A. Yes, sir; it was.

Q. Up to that treaty there had been little done?

A. We had the first year the treaty was in force about 16,000 tons of sugar—that is, in 1876; maybe 18,000, but I think 16,000.

Q. And after that it increased to?

A. About 140,000 tons. I think this year there was 150,000 tons.

Q. What amount did these islands get in the way of remission of duties annually up to the time of the passage of the McKinley law?

A. When the plantation is in full blast they got in the neighborhood of \$5,000,000 per annum.

Q. What do you mean by plantation in full blast?

A. That is to say, as we find them now. It took some time to get the machinery, etc., ready. They were not ready the first year or so.

Q. Were profits great, then?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Ranging between what figures?

A. In some plantations they never made any profit.

Q. But where they were well managed?

A. I should think some years they have made 50 per cent and even over.

Q. How high would you say—as much as 80?

A. I do not think you could go 80 per cent. Some plantations have not made a cent even with that treaty.

Q. How was that?

A. I should think bad management.

Q. Well, where it was well managed 50 per cent and upward was usual?

A. I would not say every year. It depends on the price of sugar.

Q. Would not the duty itself make a large profit?

A. Yes, sir. A good plantation can hold its own and make money at the present price of sugar.

Q. What is generally the character of the lands in these islands?

A. They are very rich lands.

Q. Is there very much of it waste land—mountain land?

A. A great deal.

Q. Where do these fine lands generally lie?

A. In the valley—sometimes in the interior—most on the coast.

Q. The great mass of lands, are they arable?

A. No; not the great mass. There would be more land for sugar cane if they had water; but the trouble is, shortness of water in places where they have good land.

Q. Are most of the cultivated lands irrigated?

A. Most of them lie on the trade-wind side where they get the rain. On the island of Hawaii there is no irrigation. On the island of Maui there is most irrigation.

Q. Your lands there are irrigated generally?

A. Yes, and we get some rain.

Q. Have you had to expend much money there to get water?

A. I spent a million of dollars. I have about 40 miles of ditch.

Q. Before you irrigated it, were they useful for any purpose?

A. No; there were a few cattle running on them in winter time.

Q. When was it done?

A. I commenced in 1878 to build the ditch.

Q. Would you have been willing to have invested your money in that way but for the reciprocity treaty?

A. No, sir; I would not.

Q. Has most of the irrigation been brought about under the influence of the reciprocity treaty?

A. Yes.

Q. And the profits, then, have largely come from reciprocity and cheap labor.

A. Yes.

Q. If both of these were abandoned, what would be the material prospects of the islands?

A. There would be no prospects at all. We could get along—the majority of the plantations—without any subsidy if we had labor, but without labor we could not get along at all.

Q. You would have to go out into the world and get cheap labor?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You have been how long here—this last visit?

A. Since April 18.

Q. Have you met with any sugar-planters since your arrival?

A. I have.

Q. Those of them who are declaring themselves in favor of annexation, how do they look at the labor question in connection with annexation?

A. They think that the United States will make a different law for the islands. If they could not get labor they don't want annexation.

Q. But they are satisfied they will get such legislation?

A. Yes, sir; they think and hope the United States will do that.

Q. Tell me some gentlemen who has argued that with you?

A. Glade, of Hackfelt & Co. He is interested in sugar.

Q. Who else?

A. Mr. Shafer; he is opposed, if he can not get labor.

Q. Does he believe he can get labor?

A. He does not think so; not quite so as the others do.

Q. Who else?

A. We have about ten plantations in our control. They all do not want it.

Q. What part of the sugar in these islands do they produce?

A. Our plantations?

Q. Yes.

A. We have 45,000 to 50,000 thousand tons a year—fully one-third—Claus Spreckels, Irwin & Co. We have control of that much. We are agents for 20,000 tons more.

Q. Now, other owners of plantations?

A. Baldwin does not want it if he can not get labor. He has about 20,000 tons.

Q. Does Mr. Baldwin argue that the Government of the United States will relax the laws for these islands?

A. Yes; he believes so. They say where there's a will there's a way. We will get it. Now, Judge Widemann, he is against annexation anyhow.

Q. Is Campbell a sugar-planter?

A. Yes; he has interests.

Q. Is it your impression that the calculation of all sugar-planters who are in favor of annexation believe that the United States will

modify their general laws against contract labor so that they can maintain a system of contract labor in the islands?

A. I would not say contract labor. They say we may have to give up contract labor, but we can get all the labor we want from Japan.

Q. How?

A. They say: We send an agent there and send money and he sends them here, and when they are here then they can make a contract with them.

Q. They think in that way they can evade the labor laws of the United States?

A. Yes; they think they can get around it. My opinion is that they can not, but they think they can get around the United States laws. President Dole called upon me the Saturday before last and asked if I would not be kind enough to go before the ministry and talk the labor law with them on Tuesday. I went there and I asked President Dole whether he had studied the immigration laws and whether he found that I was correct. He answered that he found that I was correct in that way. "But," he said, "I have belief that the United States will give us a separate law that we can get laborers here."

Q. Did that idea seem to be in the minds of other members of the cabinet?

A. Yes; that the United States will give them anything they ask for.

Q. You have been talking politics with these people here. What sort of idea have they as to the kind of government they want and expect for these islands in the event of annexation?

A. Their idea is that when they are annexed to the United States they will have a governor—some of them will be appointed by the President—and leave it to them, so to say, to rule these islands.

Q. Do they ever speak of the Washington, D. C., form of government as suitable?

A. Some speak about that; that they would like to have a government like that.

Q. Are they in favor of a system of government that allows the natives generally to vote?

A. They do not want the natives to vote.

Q. Would they be in favor of any form of government that would leave the natives a majority of the voters?

A. No, sir; they would not.

Q. Would they consider any such government a stable government?

A. They think it would be stable with the United States cutting out the Kanakas so that they could not vote.

Q. This is, then, largely a struggle to take political power from the natives and put it in the hands of the whites?

A. Exactly.

Q. And that is what they hope to get in the event of annexation?

A. Exactly.

Q. What is the feeling of the natives on the subject of annexation?

A. I think that seven-eighths at least would be opposed to it. Some are employed by the Provisional Government. They had to sign the annexation roll or be discharged.

Q. And they signed to hold their places?

A. Yes.

Q. Is the argument made to the native that if he is annexed to the United States his right to vote will be preserved?

A. That I can not say.

Q. What is your opinion on this question: If a vote was had by

persons who are qualified under the constitution just abrogated to vote for representatives under the Australian ballot system, in what proportion would annexationists appear to anti-annexationists?

A. I think they would be only one-fourth against three-fourths, if left to a vote.

Q. Have you been studying the question since you have been here?

A. I have studied it very much.

Q. What about whites in the islands—what proportion for and against annexation? I mean Europeans and Americans.

A. That is hard to say; I do not think the people would be more than half for annexation in Honolulu, but in the other islands very few.

Q. What would be the proportion in Honolulu, do you think?

A. In Honolulu it might be three-fourths in favor of annexation, for the simple reason that they are afraid of each other. If he did not do it he would lose trade. He is at heart the other way.

Q. Would you say that there are as many as one-third of the whites—Europeans and Americans—that would be against annexation?

A. I should say so.

Q. Where people had surplus money have they been pretty generally investing in sugar stocks in past years?

A. I do not think they have.

Q. Is there much sugar stock owned in Honolulu?

A. Yes; there is a great deal owned.

Q. Is President Dole interested in sugar stocks?

A. I hardly think so. He may have a few shares.

Q. I notice at the mass meeting held here January 17 several persons made speeches, among them W. C. Wilder. Has he interest in sugar at all?

A. I do not think so. He may have a few shares.

Q. What is his occupation?

A. They run this Wilder Steamship Company. They sell lumber.

Q. They are interested, therefore, in handling sugar?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. H. F. Glade; is he interested in sugar?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. He is consul-general of Germany?

A. I believe so.

Q. I see Mr. Young making a speech—what is he?

A. He is a sugar planter.

Q. Is he president of the Planters' Labor and Supply Company?

A. No; I think Mr. Irwin is.

Q. Has Bolte any interests in sugar?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. H. P. Baldwin made a speech. Has he any interest in sugar?

A. Yes.

Q. Large interests?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. J. Emmeluth?

A. No; he is a tinsmith.

Q. A man of any means?

A. I do not think he has.

Q. A man of education?

A. I do not know.

Q. Mr. R. J. Greene. Is he interested in sugar?

A. Not that I am aware of. I do not know him. He can not be of much consequence.

Q. Mr. P. C. Jones; has he any interest in sugar?

A. Yes; some.

Q. Mr. J. A. King; any?

A. I do not think he has.

Q. Mr. W. O. Smith?

A. He has an interest.

Q. Mr. Henry Waterhouse?

A. He may have a small interest.

Q. Mr. Damon?

A. I don't know.

Q. Mr. Tenney any?

A. Some.

Q. Mr. McChesney any?

A. No; he is a groceryman.

Q. A man of any means?

A. I do not know.

Q. Any education?

A. I do not think he has.

Q. Was Mr. Young at one time president of the Planters' Labor and Supply Company?

A. Yes; I think so.

Q. Has there been any idea here of trying to get a treaty so as to let pineapples come into the United States at a low rate?

A. Yes.

Q. Do they hope to get much out of that?

A. I really don't know.

Q. Has there been any idea here among people as to any advantage coming out of annexation in connection with the Pearl River Harbor?

A. Yes.

Q. What do they look forward to in this connection?

A. They think the United States would take Pearl Harbor and improve it and buy their property there for big prices.

Q. Who are interested?

A. Dr. McGrew is about the principal owner there.

Q. Any of the Waterhouses interested there?

A. Yes.

Q. Is Mr. Henry Waterhouse?

A. Yes.

Q. Any others?

A. There is another, named Jake Brown, married to a native woman.

Q. Is he for or against annexation?

A. For annexation.

Q. Is there an idea amongst these people that there would be a cable built to San Francisco if there was annexation?

A. Yes.

Q. Pretty strong feeling of that sort?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the impression amongst business people—planters—as to the increase of the value of property in the islands by annexation?

A. The idea is that property will advance about treble, and a great many are waiting to sell it. They calculate there would be a big boom.

Q. They are holding their property with the idea that there will be big profits in the event of annexation?

A. That is the idea.

Q. The Planters' Labor and Supply Company is under the control of the planters, is it not?

A. In some ways it is, but they have made a political machine out of it.

Q. But I mean to say that the stock is owned by planters, mostly?

A. No, sir.

Q. How is that stock generally held?

A. I really do not know.

Q. In what way is it used as a political machine?

A. Well, they use the agents for their ends. The agents give the managers directions for the natives—how they shall vote.

Q. That is the way it is generally done?

A. Yes. And the managers will do what the Labor Supply Company say. Since 1886 I have never worried about politics. Stood entirely clear.

Q. Please tell me the members of the Wilcox cabinet that was voted out before the prorogation?

A. Cecil Brown, G. N. Wilcox, M. P. Robinson, P. C. Jones.

Q. What is Robinson's business?

A. He is with Allen & Robinson. They deal in lumber.

Q. Is he interested in sugar?

A. Very little.

Q. Is he interested in bananas?

A. Yes.

Q. Interested in the labor question mainly in that connection?

A. Yes.

Q. Wilcox—is he interested in sugar?

A. Yes.

Q. Largely?

A. Not very largely.

Q. Jones—has he any sugar interests?

A. Some.

Q. Cecil Brown?

A. I do not think he has any. He may have a share or two.

Q. There is no indication at present of any hostilities between the people and the Provisional Government, so far as you have been able to observe?

A. None whatever.

Q. What is keeping the people quiet?

A. They are waiting to see and hear the Commissioner's report that justice may be done to them by the President to put the Queen back, who would have stayed there if it had not been for Minister Stevens sending the troops ashore. I was not here, but am expressing the mind of the people as I understand it. Samuel Parker and others have told me.

Q. And that is what keeps them quiet?

A. Yes; they think justice will be done them when Cleveland hears the report, and the truth of how the Queen was dethroned.

Q. Suppose the Government of the United States were to decline to annex the islands, would the Provisional Government be able to maintain itself without outside aid?

A. If the money would hold out and the people were willing to pay what they pay for soldiers they could hold it.

Q. You think, with an army maintained here, that the natives would stay quiet for all time?

A. They can not help themselves. They have nothing. All ammunition taken away from them. Everything like weapons forbidden. I

can not bring a rifle here. No native allowed to buy any firearms or powder.

Q. Suppose they had arms?

A. Then this Government could not stand. They would bring the Queen back to the throne. That is my idea. The Provisional Government would never be there if the United States troops were not landed, and they knew that long before they landed.

Q. What class of people make up this army?

A. As far as I know, many who were in the chain gang—many who were in prison; fellows of character you would not like to meet after dark.

Q. The people of intelligence and wealth here don't participate much in hostilities; they hire these fellows?

A. Yes; they leave it to them.

Q. There are very few firearms in the island other than those possessed by the Government?

A. Very few. The natives are forbidden to have them.

Q. The people, therefore, remain quiet because they have no arms.

A. Yes; they think it better for them to leave it to the President to decide when he can see how they were wronged by Stevens.

Q. What is the weight of public opinion here on the question as to whether or not the landing of the troops and the posting of them at Arion Hall had to do with the success of the revolution?

A. It had everything to do with it. If the troops were not landed there would be no Provisional Government to-day.

Q. Is that public opinion here?

A. It is; but, of course, the other side would say different.

Q. The wealth of the city of Honolulu—was it not largely built up after the reciprocity treaty with the United States?

A. Yes, about three-fourths after the treaty.

Q. Most of the nice homes built since then?

A. Oh, yes; I should think something like three-fourths have been built up since that treaty.

Q. Well, property holders as a general thing are in favor of annexation because they believe a great increase in the value of their private estates would ensue, and that large improvements would be made at Pearl Harbor by the United States?

A. That is what they calculated.

Q. And the cable?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, then you would say that this is a movement on the part of property holders to enhance their private interests?

A. Yes, and a certain desire to rule this country.

Q. Mr. Spreckels, do you know Mr. Samuel Parker well?

A. I do.

Q. Do you know his general reputation for truth and veracity?

A. I do.

Q. And from that would you believe him on oath?

A. I would.

Q. Do you know Mr. Cornwell the same way?

A. I do.

Q. Would you from his general reputation believe him on oath?

A. I would; yes, sir.

Q. Do you know Colburn?

A. I do not.

Q. Do you know Peterson?

A. I know him by sight.

Q. You know Parker and Cornwell well?

A. Yes; I have known them since 1876.

I have carefully read the foregoing and pronounce it an accurate report of my interview with Mr. Blount.

CLAUS SPRECKELS.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,

June 12, 1893.

In pursuance of the agreement hereto attached, the said laborer did arrive in this country on the —, 1892, and in accordance with the said agreement has been assigned to labor for — as a laborer at —, and has accepted such assignment.

Now, therefore, the said employer stipulates and agrees to and with the said board of immigration of this Kingdom, that he will faithfully pay to the said laborer twelve dollars and fifty cents per month for said period of three years, beginning from the commencement of such service.

And the said employer hereby stipulates and agrees that he will faithfully keep and perform all the other stipulations in the said agreements set forth, to be kept and performed by the said board, in favor of the said laborer.

And the said employer agrees with the board of immigration, that the contract for the service of the said laborer shall not be transferred to any third party during the term of this contract without the consent of the said board of immigration or its agent.

And it is further understood, stipulated, and agreed, by and between the parties to this agreement, that it shall be the right of the said board of immigration, at any time, during the time in this agreement stipulated for its duration, upon the representation of the said laborer, to cancel this contract for any cause deemed by the said board to be sufficient, refunding the said employer such proportional sum of the amount advanced by the said employer as the unexpired portion of the time of service agreed upon may bear to the whole time herein above set forth.

But if the agreement shall be cancelled by a magistrate, for nonfulfillment or violation of any of the conditions thereof on the part of the said employer, then no refunding will take place.

And it is further understood and agreed that all personal taxes levied by the Government shall be paid by the employer, without deducting the same from the wage stipulated. And further, during the continuance of this agreement the said laborer is to be properly lodged and provided with good medical attendance by the employer.

In testimony, we have hereunto set our hands, at Honolulu, Oahu, this—day of —, 1892.

THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION,

By —, President.

This memorandum of agreement between the Hawaiian Government, represented by Robert W. Irwin, Her Hawaiian Majesty's minister resident and special agent of the Hawaiian bureau of immigration, party of the first part and —, a Japanese subject, party of the second part: Whereas, the said party of the second part has expressed a desire to proceed from Yokohama to Hawaii as an agricultural laborer; and, whereas, His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Government have given their consent thereto: and whereas, the Hawaiian Government has agreed to furnish the wife and two children of the said party of the second part, if they accompany him, free transportation to Hawaii, and upon arrival there to secure for the said party of the second part agricultural employment, and employment for his wife; and whereas, it has been determined by and between the parties hereto, in order to avoid any misunderstanding which might otherwise arise, to conclude at once a contract for the purposes hereinbefore recited. Now, therefore, this agreement witnesseth:

The Hawaiian Government, in consideration of the stipulations hereinafter contained, to be kept and performed by the said party of the second part, covenants and agrees as follows:

1.—To furnish free steerage passage, including proper food, from Yokohama to Honolulu, to —, his wife, —, and to his two children, if they accompany him, which fact is to be noted at the bottom of this agreement, and also to procure proper transportation for the said party of the second part and his family from Honolulu to the place where such labor is to be performed. The vessel in which

such passage from Yokohama to Honolulu is furnished to be subject to the approval of the Chiji of Kanagawa.

II.—On arrival at Honolulu, the Hawaiian Government agrees to obtain employment for the said party of the second part, as an agricultural laborer, for the full period of three years, from the date such employment actually begins, and also, proper employment for the wife of the said party of the second part. Until such employment is obtained, the Hawaiian Government will cause to be provided for the party of the second part, and his family, lodgings commodious enough to secure health and a reasonable degree of comfort. The Hawaiian Government will, during the continuance of the contract, cause to be furnished to the said party of the second part and his family, fuel for cooking purposes free of expense.

III.—The Hawaiian Government guarantees to the said party of the second part wages at the rate of twelve dollars and fifty cents per month, and to his said wife ten dollars per month, payable in United States gold coin, with lodgings, and an allowance of one dollar per month for each of the said two children. The said party of the second part shall furnish blankets and bed clothing for himself and his family.

IV.—The Hawaiian Government agrees to cause to be provided for the said party of the second part and his family medicines and good medical attendance free of cost.

V.—The Hawaiian Government guarantees that twenty-six days of ten hours each actual work in the field, or twelve hours each in and about the sugar mill and sugar house, shall, within the meaning of this agreement, constitute one month's service as an agricultural laborer. Work overtime exceeding thirty minutes to be paid for at the rate of twelve and one-half cents per hour to the said party of the second part, and eight cents per hour to his wife.

VI.—The Hawaiian Government guarantees to the said party of the second part and his family the full, equal, and perfect protection of the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom, and agrees that, during the continuance of this contract, the said party of the second part and his family shall be exempt from all and every kind of personal tax.

VII.—Fifteen per cent of the sum payable to the said party of the second part, and to his wife, as wages, shall be remitted monthly by the employer directly to the branch of the specie bank (Shōkin Ginkō) established at Honolulu in the name of the said party of the second part, and for all amounts so remitted the said bank shall issue receipts to and in favor of the party of the second part.

VIII.—The Hawaiian Government, having guaranteed employment and wages to the said party of the second part, shall have the right to assign, withdraw, and reassign the said party of the second part to such plantations for labor as it may see fit. In case of such withdrawal and reassignment, all the expenses incidental thereto shall be paid by the Hawaiian Government.

IX.—The said party of the second part agrees to proceed to Honolulu by the vessel provided for him in accordance with this agreement.

X.—On arrival at Honolulu, the said party of the second part agrees to accept such employment as the Hawaiian Government may, under this contract, assign to him, provided no valid objection thereto exists. In the matter of any such objection he agrees to abide by the decision of the bureau of immigration.

XI.—The party of the second part acknowledges to have received from the Hawaiian Government the sum of fifteen dollars and fifty cents silver yen to meet his necessary expenses and for other purposes, and he agrees to repay the said sum in monthly installments after his employment actually begins, not exceeding fifty cents silver yen each month until the said sum is paid, which payments shall be made by the employer to the board of immigration; but in the event of sickness, protracted over twenty days in any one month, the installment for such month shall be deferred.

XII.—During the continuance of this contract the said party of the second part agrees to fulfill all the conditions of this agreement, and to observe and obey the laws of Hawaii, and he further covenants and agrees to diligently and faithfully perform all lawful and proper labor which may, under this agreement, be assigned to him by the Hawaiian Government during the full period of three years from the date such labor actually begins.

Signed and sealed in quadruplicate in the English and Japanese languages, at Yokohama, this November 14th, A. D. 1892. Two copies to be retained by the Hawaiian Government, one copy by the party of the second part, and one to be left in the custody of the Chiji of Kanagawa.

One man

No woman

No children

R. W. IRWIN,

Her Hawaiian Majesty's Minister Resident and Special Agent of the Bureau of Immigration.

Voluntary Emigrant.

I hereby certify that the foregoing agreement was executed by both parties in my presence, and that by virtue of the authority in me vested by his Imperial Japanese Majesty's Government I have approved the same.

Kanagawa Ken Chiji.

(Attached to this is a Japanese translation.)

No. 52.

(Statement of Lieut. Commander William Swinburne, May 3, 1893, printed with Mr. Blount's No. 4, dated May 4, 1893.)

No. 53.

(Statement of L. A. Thurston, March 16, 1893, printed with Mr. Blount's No. 2, dated April 8, 1893.)

No. 54.

Dr. Trousseau's statements.

MAY 16, 1893.

Hon. J. H. BLOUNT:

SIR: As you are not acquainted with me, I take the liberty of stating who I am. Born in Paris, France, in 1833, I am now a little over 60 years of age. I graduated in Paris as a physician in 1858. If you ask who is Trousseau, you will be probably answered, why, he is one of the Royalists.

In 1848 when 15½ [years] old I enlisted in the first battalion of the Mobile under the Republic and fought under the presidency of Cavaignac on the memorable days (three) of June, 1848, when the young citizens of Paris, three battalions, under command of McMahon, afterwards President of the Third Republic, defeated the insurgents.

In 1852, at the coup d'état, I was a medical student, was caught fighting against Napoleon III, narrowly escaped being court-martialed and shot or sent to New Caledonia.

I have been and am to this day a staunch believer in republican institutions, always fought against monarchy, so did my father; I am a great admirer of the United States Republic. Was I not a Frenchman, I would like to be an American. Indeed, if you decide on annexing the islands, in the straightforward, dignified way in which I know it will be done, I will probably be one of the first to swear the oath of allegiance to the United States.

This is, Mr. Blount, the kind of royalist I am.

From that *point de vue* I entreat you to consider my memorial, and if I have bored you, as I am afraid I have, please consider that all I am after is justice and fair play and you will bear up with me.

Yours, most respectfully,

G. TROUSSEAU.

SUNDAY MORNING, *May 21, 1893.*

MY DEAR NORDHOFF:

Inclosed please find a rectified list of taxpayers.

Take for granted—

(1) That all Chinese and Japanese are against annexation.

(2) That no corporation can have an opinion, as no one knows in many cases who are the shareholders; in cases where it is known I have stated it.

(3) That no native estate, such as Lunailo's, Mrs. Bishop, Queen Emma Kalakaua, although they may be administered by annexationists, can be considered as such as far as the capital is concerned.

This list, therefore, is grossly misleading and insulting to the memory of the chiefs. Now we have all the natives who pay a large amount of taxes, some quite a sum.

The 35,000 Asiatics pay \$5 apiece, say (the laborers alone) \$185,000. Some own property; anyhow they pay licenses to the extent of over \$50,000. You can, therefore, form your opinion of who really pays the expenses of the Government mostly since Spreckels has declared himself to you as against annexation.

Now about my memorial to Mr. Blount.

After inquiry yesterday I find that I had no right to give it to you to read just now. Therefore you will please not mention to anyone that you have read it, except to Mr. Blount, as you would put me to serious trouble indeed. It has for the present, anyhow, to be considered as of a strictly confidential nature, and therefore you will please do so, and not use any part of it.

When the time comes I will be glad to let you have it.

Very truly yours,

G. TROUSSEAU.

You found out yesterday that I had not deceived you about Spreckels. The interview is a big thing for our side.

HONOLULU, *June 27, 1893.*

Hon. J. H. BLOUNT,

United States Commissioner:

SIR: In reference to your inquiries at the hotel this morning, I beg to state: That I was down town on January 16, 1893, a little before 5 p. m. There was a large gathering of foreigners about Fort and Merchant street corners. I inquired and was told that the United States forces would be landed at 5. Soon I saw C. L. Carter ride towards the wharf. I followed. Boats were landing troops, guns, and ambulance material; they were in undress campaign uniform. I saw C. L. Carter hand a letter to the commanding officer. The forces formed, marched up Fort street, then into Merchant street. I met Wideman; we jumped into a hack and drove at full speed to the palace, ahead of the forces. We met the Queen; she was composed; had already heard of the landing of the men, and said the United States minister means to support the committee of safety. Wideman and I said at once it must be the case; but it would be such an outrage that surely your Majesty will get justice from the United States Government. We stood on the veranda facing King street. Soon the forces advanced and formed in this manner:

We comforted the Queen; I left Widemann and others with her; drove hastily to the club. Met Wodehouse, Canavarro, and Vezzavona.

coming from Mr. Stevens's. They told me they had just seen him about his reasons for landing the forces. Wodehouse said to me: "I told Stevens that the town was as quiet as a Quakers' meeting. I asked him (Mr. Stevens) if the Queen's Government had asked for the landing of the troops. He answered no. What is the object then? Protect law and order. But there is no breach of law and order. Answer: Ladies about town are very nervous and fear trouble. Why, said Wodehouse, ladies are driving about as usual with their children. No answer. We left, said Wodehouse." What is your impression, I said. Why, said the three, no doubt but that Stevens means to help the committee of public safety. At the same time happened the incident with Mr. Giffard and an officer of the *Boston*, fully related in my memorial. That same evening after seeing Chairman Carter at the hospital, as related also in my memorial, say about 9 o'clock, I went by request to the Government building to meet the ministers and a number of persons friendly to the Queen's Government.

After some discussion it was decided to make no resistance, as all of us understood that the United States forces who had then taken possession of Arion Hall were there to support any movement contemplated by the committee of safety. Therefore, I can assure you in perfect good faith that there was no doubt in anybody's mind but that if resistance was shown the United States forces would take the part of the revolutionists. Chairman Carter's statement was enough to prove that. The next day, January 17, only 25 men took possession of the Government house. When Mr. Cooper read the proclamation hardly that number were present. I was leaning on the fence of the Government building and saw the whole performance as related in my memorial.

The United States troops were under arms in Mr. Nacayama's yard, guns in position ready to advance, some of the men drawn up under the veranda of Arion Hall, and some with, I think, one gun in the alley from Nacayama's yard to Arion Hall.

This is, Mr. Blount, a succinct report of what I know of the facts on January 16 and 17, 1893. For more details, I beg to refer you to the last part of my memorial.

The men who had been instructed to provide the necessary force for the taking of the Government building are Mr. P. Gardiner, an Englishman, and Mr. Harry Von Verthern, an American by birth, of German origin. They are willing to give you full information about their action, the assurance they had of the support of the United States forces, etc.

Respectfully submitted.

G. TROUSSEAU.

Hon. J. H. BLOUNT:

SIR: I beg to be excused if, unbidden, I take the liberty of addressing you. I understand that you wish to make a thorough investigation of our situation, and my position as a physician and old resident perhaps enables me to throw light on some obscure points. For over twenty years I am connected professionally with all political parties and the royal family.

I arrived here in 1872, under the reign of Kamehameha V. His prime minister, Dr. Hutchinson, was his physician as well. The King was not well, and shortly after I was called to see him. I soon found out that his condition was critical. I told his ministers that his days were

counted, and shortly after he was himself acquainted with his own condition.

According to the constitution, which he had himself promulgated in 1864, he had the right to appoint his successor. Urged to do so, he demurred. His nearest kinsman was Lunalilo, a Kamehameha by his mother. But he was addicted to drink, and somewhat of a wag. The King hated him, the feeling being reciprocal. How well I remember the scenes at the old palace the day before the King's death. Most of the chiefs were there, all of the pretendants to the throne. The dying King was urged to make an appointment; Mrs. C. R. Bishop (Pauahi) urged her own claim. Friends of Kalakaua, of Queen Emma, widow of Kamehameha IV., urged their respective claims. Lunalilo kept silent, never went near the King's room. At last, in my presence, the King said: "The throne belongs to Lunalilo; I will not appoint him, because I consider him unworthy of the position. The constitution, in case I make no nomination, provides for the election of the next King; let it be so." He died the next morning. Thus ended the hereditary monarchy in the islands.

To this very important point I beg to call your special notice, as I will refer to it hereafter.

After a short interregnum, just long enough to get the Legislature together, Lunalilo was elected unanimously, and his election indorsed by public opinion, foreign as well as native. For the first time in many years our missionary friends and their sons and relatives mustered courage to recover their long-lost power. They used flattery, claimed recognition for their support towards the election, and Mr. E. O. Hall, father of the present W. Hall, had the formation of the new cabinet. I was the physician and friend of the King. I did not interfere in politics, and limited myself to my duties as such. I had a good deal of influence with him, but often, when I would be away, he would start drinking again in spite of me. Some good qualities in the man had strongly attached him to me.

One night, after a bout on board one of the American warships in port, he returned to Waikiki, went to sleep under his veranda, with thin underclothing, exposed to the strong trade wind. Within twenty-four hours pneumonia set in and for days his condition was serious. He recovered, however, but remained suffering from chronic pneumonia and pleurisy.

We decided on going to Kailua, Hawaii, a splendid health resort specially for lung troubles, and a favorite place of the Hawaiian chiefs. As soon as I decided to take the King off to Kailua, the chiefs and pretendants understood that his condition had become critical, and all insisted in following the King.

Mrs. Bishop (Pauahi), Queen Emma, now dead, Liliuokalani, the deposed Queen, her sister Likelike, now dead, Kapiolani, wife of Kalakaua, and others, came along with us, and none left the King's side either by day or night. We lived in a very large native hut, and I dare say not less than 30 or 40 people slept there at night. I was the only white man there, and it was, I assure you, interesting to watch the chiefs, their rivalries and intrigues.

Lunalilo was constantly urged as Kamehameha V. had been, to appoint his successor; he had a great regard and perhaps a softer feeling toward Queen Emma, and would, I think, have married her, had it not been the influence of an old mistress, a half-white, who was also there with us. Mr. C. R. Bishop, Dominis, Kalakaua, the cabinet ministers, and the chief justice made flying visits to us, never remaining more

than a day or two. All made me promise not to let the King die at Kailua, but to bring him back in time to Honolulu. The King often pointed out to me the maneuvers of the chiefs. He often said to me: "If I appoint any one it would be Emma, but I shall leave it to the people. I have been elected and the next King must be elected." As he did not ask me to keep the secret, I would often say to the chiefs, to the cabinet ministers: "Please do not bother him; his mind is set; he will make no appointment." But they mistrusted each other and kept at him. In the meantime he kept failing, and I saw and told him he was nearing his end. I also said that I had promised to bring him back to Honolulu. He said: "Why won't they let me die here?" I answered: "You have appointed no successor; the ministers say that there are many things to settle, signatures to give, and so forth."

Yielding reluctantly to my entreaties, we started, the whole crowd of us, and safely reached Honolulu, where the greatest ovation was made to the dying King. He lived one more week, during which I never left him either by day or night. The very same scenes that had taken place when Kamehameha V died were renewed with perhaps more insistence.

The premises—his father's house—were thronged day and night by natives and foreigners. At last the King asked me to allow no one to bother him and no one in his room except his immediate attendants and Queen Emma. They made sure that Queen Emma would be appointed, but being appealed to constantly, I repeated, which I knew to be a fact, that he would make no appointment.

Nearly the whole of the natives were in favor of Queen Emma. The whole of the foreigners, with few exceptions, were in favor of Kalakaua—the whole, anyhow, of the so-called missionary party. The King died without appointing his successor.

The same interregnum took place. The legislature was called together and the election got through during the greatest excitement.

All of the native members were instructed to vote for Queen Emma by their constituents. But for the first time in Hawaiian history bribes were used by the missionary party and only 6 Hawaiian members stood fast for Queen Emma; the rest followed the lead of the missionary party and Kalakaua was elected. When the result was proclaimed from the balcony of the legislative hall, a mob of natives invaded the house to punish the native members for the treachery, and had it not been for the United States marines, commanded by Captain, now Admiral, Skerrett, the native members would have been killed. As it was, three or four fared rather badly. No violence was manifested toward any white member. And here I make another strong point, that it would be impossible to mention one single case of violence committed by a single native against a foreigner in the whole history of the islands, even when foreigners were absolutely at their mercy. Capt. Cook was the first and only victim, and he surely brought it upon himself.

Probably Kalakaua never would have reigned, and no one can possibly deny that his ascension to the throne was due to the foreigners' influence and the quelling of the riot by the United States and English forces.

I wish you to make another point of this well-known fact, which could be vouched for to you by Admiral Skerrett himself. Is this an hereditary monarchy?

Kalakaua always thought, wrongly however, that my influence over Lunalilo had prevented the latter from appointing Queen Emma. Lu-

nalilo's mind was settled on the subject. Kalakaua showed the greatest friendship to me, and was, up to his death, quite confidential.

He soon found out that the missionary party who had put him in power wanted to get the upper hand and drive the natives to the wall, as has always been their wont.

Several times he appealed to me to form a cabinet, once coming all the way from Kona, Hawaii, all alone, but a native retainer, to my place 5,000 feet up Maunaloa, where I had retired for rest.

I returned with him to Honolulu, and not wishing to enter into politics, advised him to call on Mr. S. G. Wilder, now dead (brother of Mr. W. C. Wilder, one of the commissioners of the Provisional Government at Washington), to form a cabinet.

This was done in the middle of the night after our return from Hawaii. Wilder was a friend of the King, just to the natives, popular with all parties.

But although himself quite the reverse of a missionary, his family associations (he had married a daughter of Dr. Judd) prevented him from fully renouncing the party.

He was a clever man, but used his power mostly for his own benefit. However, it is under his ministry that an impulse was made in improvements that did benefit him personally, but benefited the country as well.

But the King still resented the missionary influence and at last discarded it by appointing Mr. Gibson at the head of a new cabinet. The missionary influence ceased from that time, and Mr. Gibson became a great favorite of the King and the natives. He was a man of undoubted ability, a thorough politician, but a dreamer.

Hawaii for the Hawaiians was his motto. The missionary party hated him, but until 1887 he matched them in every move. He pandered to every whim of the King, encouraged him to extravagant and useless schemes; hence his power in retaining office.

Nevertheless, no one can deny that it is under his detested rule, under the Kamajameha constitution, that the prosperity of the islands came to its height. The reciprocity treaty, the higher price of sugar, enriched everyone, and, although the missionary party kept active and anxious to regain power, the mass of the people did not otherwise object to Mr. Gibson's rule and to the extravagance at the palace by which the whole retail trade of the islands was largely benefited.

The King was fond of display; had the military craze for show more than anything else. He organized several military companies. Our missionary friends did not lose their opportunity.

Selecting officers that neither the King nor Mr. Gibson suspected, they asked for the organization of the "Honolulu Rifles" and obtained it. Mr. V. V. Ashford was the chief of the organization.

The secret object was the overthrow of Mr. Gibson and of the King himself and the proclamation of a republic.

A secret league was formed; I was asked to join, but refused. The price of sugar went down gradually from \$120 to \$80 a ton. This created some discontent and helped to make successful, in a certain degree, the revolution of 1887.

The move was an overt act of treason. The "Honolulu Rifles" had sworn allegiance to the King; had received from him presents, favors, and their flag. He had encouraged and helped them in every possible way, was proud of their appearance, and reviewed them often himself. When I was asked to join the league and refused I knew what was coming; I knew that a constitution establishing a republic was prepared.

In refusing I had assured the leaders that I would not betray them in giving their names, but that I was opposed to the movement, to the overthrow of the King in particular, and that I would use whatever influence I might have in bringing about a compromise.

I advised the King to dismiss Mr. Gibson and appoint a ministry more in accord with public opinion, and warned him that in not doing so he was taking great risks. He thanked me but assured me that he was prepared; that he would make no attack, but if attacked would defend himself. I once more asked him to dismiss Gibson but failed to persuade him. In the meantime the fighting enthusiasm of the "Honolulu Rifles" cooled down considerably when they heard from their spies and myself that they would get a rather hot reception at the palace.

I then volunteered to bring about a compromise and was authorized to ask the King to sign a new constitution. I advised him to yield, representing to him that personal government was a thing of the past; that if he resisted, although I did not doubt but he was able to do so, there necessarily would be bloodshed between natives and foreigners, and that he risked interference from the United States. He told me that he would sign a new constitution if presented to him. I so reported to the leaders. The constitution was hurriedly recopied, substituting monarchy for republic, and the King signed it, and Mr. Thurston was intrusted with the formation of the new cabinet.

In the meantime, although I admit that the power of the King required to be curtailed, the reading of the enactments of the Legislature under this detested administration will convince you that no measure was ever neglected or opposed that possibly could assist or forward the interest of the foreign residents. The motto, "Hawaii for the Hawaiians" never infringed on our rights except in the appointment to Government offices.

In fact the Hawaiian statute book will show from the earliest period to this very time that always due regard has been paid to the prosperity of the white settler, and that every care had been taken to secure their comfort and happiness. I do not hesitate to say that the laws of this little country, although enacted with a constant majority of native representatives, can compare favorably with those of any other civilized country. From 1887 has begun the real period of unrest.

The establishment of a republic with the intention of immediate annexation to the United States was the object of the revolution. Ever since the missionary party, encouraged more especially by the attitude of Mr. Stevens, has been conspiring against the monarchy.

Coming now to more recent events, I will consider them with absolute impartiality.

The Legislature of 1892 was protracted and agitated by constant changes of cabinet. However, two measures only were passed that may be considered as harmful. I refer to the opium license bill and the lottery bill. All other measures demanded by the foreign residents as necessary to their welfare were passed without opposition by the native members. The missionary party alone used bribes to recover power with the well-known object of using it to do what they succeeded only in doing by revolution and treachery on January 16 last. Hence the resistance of the Queen and her friends to let them gain and retain their power.

The opium bill was carried not only by the natives, but by a majority of the whole of the members.

When I arrived in the country, opium was licensed. Any one acquainted as I am with the Chinese will know that the license is the best

and the only way to stop smuggling. Several foreign citizens, now strong supporters of the Provisional Government and strong annexationists, whose names are in every body's mouth, have been more or less connected with opium smuggling, and although the Provisional Government itself had nothing to do with it, I am sure their chartered vessel, the *Claudine*, on which the commissioners went after the revolution, although manned by none but picked supporters of the Provisional Government and none but white men, returned chockful of opium.

Anyhow, as I said before, the opium bill was supported by some of the best white members, strong annexationists. I now come to the lottery bill. I believe you have seen the petition. I have seen it, as it was brought to me to sign, which I declined to do. You will notice that it was signed by nearly every shopkeeper in Honolulu. The missionaries proper did not sign it.

I, for one, as a Frenchman, had no particular dislike to the bill, accustomed as we are in Europe to the working of it. Portugal, Spain, Italy, Austria, Prussia, and other continental nations have state lotteries. France has no state lottery, but any one for a charitable or national purpose can be authorized by the Government to draw a lottery.

The City of Paris, the Credit Foncier, have drawings of their bonds every three months. Furthermore, the Louisiana lottery is still in existence in the United States and \$1,000 worth of its tickets are sold here monthly by the employés of some of our best mercantile firms. The natives were all in favor of it. Chinese lotteries are in full swing every day in Honolulu, and are patronized by foreigners as well as natives. Why in presence of a petition in favor of the bill should the Queen, who had vetoed no bill during the session, veto this particular bill?

Now, the new constitution that the Queen wanted to promulgate is supposed to have precipitated the crisis. The constitution of 1887 in partially disfranchising the natives and giving a vote to all foreigners, without even a residence clause, has always been distasteful to them. This you will readily understand. They wanted the old Kamehameha constitution back, the one indeed under which everyone in the islands except the natives themselves became rich and prospered.

When it was abrogated in 1887, taxation, even with the acknowledged extravagance of Mr. Gibson's regime, was only $\frac{3}{4}$ of 1 per cent on the value of real estate.

In the year 1887 only it had to be raised to 1 per cent—a low enough rate you will admit. But even these low rates never have been paid, mostly by the planters, who always managed to have their friends appointed as tax assessors, and I have known plantations which only paid the rate on their income, or dividends, instead of on their capital.

Even then another fraud has been constantly committed with the tacit consent of even Mr. Gibson's administration. It consisted in this: Declarations of value have to be made on July 1, of each year; during the last part of June all the available vessels in port would be loaded and cleared at the custom-house before the evening of the 30th of June. Thousands of tons yearly escape taxation this way.

Returning to the new constitution, the queen was constantly pestered by the native leaders to promulgate a new one.

Her advisers, even Mr. Wilson, who, as you probably heard, had a great deal of influence with the Queen, entreated her to give up the idea. Her excuse was in the constant verbal and written demands of her people, who as a whole have no objection to personal government

as long as it is exercised by their own chiefs. The prime and perhaps only real objection to the constitution of 1887 on the part of the natives is that it was exacted from the King by an armed force and in a revolutionary manner.

However, granting that the queen was wrong in asking her ministers (she did nothing more) to help her in proclaiming the new constitution, she had abandoned the idea and made, I believe, a sufficient public retraction.

No, Mr. Blount, these were not the causes of the revolution.

The Missionary party, backed by Mr. Stevens and Capt. Wiltse, made the revolution to regain lost power.

They were at the time backed by the planters and business men on account of the low price in sugar and the McKinley bill.

Almost daily, to my personal knowledge, meetings were held at Mr. Stevens' house in which the possibilities of a peaceful revolution with the prospects of annexation were discussed. Prominent at these meetings were the Chief Justice, Mr. Dole, Mr. Thurston, Mr. Hartwell, Charles Carter, and others, also Capt. Wiltse.

The latter, for the last three months before the revolution a guest of the Pacific Club, of which I am a member, became so offensive that I and others took issue and expressed it to him and often asked him: "Well, captain, when are you going to hoist the American flag?" Fully six months before the revolution Mr. Stevens asked Mr. George d'Anglade, French commissioner, now consul for France in New Orleans, and my friend Canavarro, the Portuguese chargé d'affaires, to dinner. They went and found the only guests besides themselves Mr. Thurston and Mr. Hartwell. I met them the next day and they expressed their thorough disgust at Mr. Stevens' action.

They soon found after the first course the annexation question was slyly brought about and felt that they were asked there to commit themselves. They kept on their guard and as soon as dinner was over withdrew and left Mr. Stevens and his two other guests.

I now come to the condition of affairs on January 16, the day the forces were landed.

After the two meetings the town was as quiet as ever it had been. The Queen had withdrawn the constitution.

The natives "Hui Kalaiaiaina" had peacefully submitted. There was no breach of law and order. Being down town, I noticed some excitement in Merchant street by the post-office and corners of Fort street. I inquired the cause of it: "The United States forces will land in a short while," I was told. A few minutes after, Charles Carter rode down in a hack, I followed and saw him at the foot of Fort street waiting for the landing of the troops. He received the commanding officer, handed him a letter, and showed him where to go. A large crowd gathered. I went back, met Widemann, and we drove hastily to the palace.

Soon the forces with Gatling guns, etc., marched up and formed in the space between the palace, Kawaiaho church, and the Government building, and halted there under arms. After comforting the Queen, telling her that the United States could not possibly sustain Mr. Stevens's action, I left at once to find out more about the trouble. I drove hastily to the club, saw Wodehouse, Nanavarro, and Vizzavona in a hack. They alighted to speak to me. As we met, Mr. Giffard, of Irwin & Co. (Spreckels) joined us.

They said: "We just came from Stevens to find out about the landing of the forces. We asked him at whose request they landed." He

said, "Ladies about town are very nervous and feared trouble" "Why," said I (Wodehouse speaking), "the town, Mr. Stevens, is perfectly quiet, as quiet as a Quaker's meeting." Continuing: "Were you asked by the Queen's Government to land the troops?" "No." "What is your object?" "Protect law and order." "Why," said Wodehouse, "there is no breach of law and order." No answer. The Frenchman, Vizzavona, said:

"But why are the forces occupying an armed position on the principal square of the town commanding the palace and the Government building?" No answer. "We left" said Wodehouse "and are satisfied that Stevens means to assist a movement from the committee of safety." The five of us were standing on the sidewalk, corner of Beretania street and Alakea close to the club. All at once rides up an officer from the *Boston* and asks to speak to Mr. Giffard. After a short conversation with the officer, Giffard returned to us and said, "What do think they want?" Why the use of the Music Hall as quarters for the forces. I have refused." We went to the club. Within ten minutes the officer returned with a written request to Mr. Giffard for the use of the Music Hall.

The request was from Mr. Stevens himself. Giffard answered "I can not grant the request. The Music Hall belongs to my principal, Mr. Irwin, who is away. And again the Music Hall commands the Government building and the palace. I do not feel justified in giving the United States forces such a commanding position, entrenched at that, as long as I am satisfied that the forces are landed against the expressed protest of the foreign representatives and of the Queen's Government." (We knew from the cabinet members that they had protested.) This ended the Music Hall business.

Later on Mr. Stevens also in writing requested the use of Arion Hall, close by, and it was granted for one night only. Instead of leaving on the morning as agreed upon, notwithstanding a protest from Mr. Nacayama and Mr. Waller, the lessees of the premises, the troops held the premises until after the event of January 17. Is it not patent that Mr. Stevens and Capt. Wiltse meant them to support the movement which took place next day at 3 p. m.?

That same evening, January 16, at about 8 o'clock, I met Charles Carter at the hospital. I am his family physician. He asked me to go and see his wife, who was pregnant—close to her confinement—and felt very nervous on account of the part he, Charles Carter, was taking in the movement. He had been to my house and heard that I was at the hospital. I said I would go at once. I asked, "What are you about anyhow?" He said that they had asked Stevens to land the troops; that he would support them; that they were going to depose the Queen, and never stop short of annexation at any cost. I represented to him that I doubted very much if the United States would sustain Stevens. He said, "It is all arranged beforehand, and we can carry our point with Foster and Harrison before the new administration comes in."

Knowing poor Charley, as I do, from his boyhood (and a big over-fat boy he is still), I did not think it worth my while to argue with him. However, I said, "The Queen will do what is right if asked to do so." He said, "We will not give her the chance. We will depose her. Annexation is the word."

The next morning, a patient of mine, P. Gardiner by name, an Englishman, called. He was under treatment. He said, "I am in a hurry to-day" (the office being pretty full); "try not to keep me waiting." This was about 10 a. m. He added, "To-day (January 17th) we

depose the Queen. I have to be on hand any time after 12 o'clock. The call will be one tap of the bell. 'Tower Bell.' Knowing my man well as one of the unemployed, and knowing that his sympathies were the other way, I said, "What do you get for that job?" "One hundred dollars cash, \$2.50 a day and board afterwards, and the promise of a billet of not less than \$100 a month." "Who made you the promise?" "Thurston." The man is still connected with the revolutionists, and is willing to make the statement to Mr. Blount himself.

I said "Do you mean fight?" Answer: "Why, the United States forces will support us." After 12 o'clock I kept on the lookout for that one tap of the bell. At 2 p. m. my assistant, whom I had sent to pay a bill to E. O. Hall & Son, rushed in and said, "John Good just came to Hall's to get arms, got them into his express wagon; a policeman went to stop the wagon and Good shot him in the breast."

They drove up King street, supposed to go to the armory on Bere-tania street. I started on foot to the armory, which is close to my office. Saw a few men there, amongst them the man Gardiner, and went to the club, still watching for that one tap of the bell. I got to the club at 2:15 p. m., met there several people, amongst them C. A. Brown, who had been prominent in the 1887 revolution, and who, I knew by Charles Carter and others, to be one of the committee of public safety. He had no arms and wore a morning suit.

I said: "Well, Brown, you are going to depose the Queen at the stroke of the bell." He said: "How do you know?" I answered "Never mind." I added "I understood that you will be supported by Stevens." He said "Well you have got it pretty straight. That's just how it is." "You are waiting for the tap of the bell," said I. (The tower is close to the club.) He said, "Yes."

At half past 2 o'clock I heard the one tap. He (Brown) started at a good pace. I followed. He went into the Government building and I stopped outside the fence in the street leading from King to Queen street. My glance could not count more than 20 people about, outside of the *Boston* men who were under arms in Mr. Nacayama's yard, in the lane between the said yard and Arion Hall and under the veranda of Arion Hall.

Gatling guns were drawn up in Nacayama's yard.

A few minutes before 3 p. m. an unknown person—Mr. Cooper, I heard since, a perfect stranger—now judge—read a proclamation of which I only heard a part.

I went to the barracks. There were the Hawaiian troops, one hundred or so in number, ready for action if ordered out.

I went to the station house, and saw a number of foreigners rushing in and putting themselves at the disposal of the marshal. Before an hour had elapsed I found out that Mr. Stevens had already recognized the Provisional Government and that the Queen had ordered, under protest, the surrender of the barracks and station house to avoid bloodshed. I can assure you, Mr. Blount, that the Queen's Government was perfectly competent to take care of the situation; that the force in the Government building had no arms nor ammunition to speak of, and that the whole game was one of bluff, a surprise, a *coup de main*, as we call it in French. Why? The clerks in the Government building were at their desks; the routine of the various departments was going on. A handful of filibusters, backed by Mr. Stevens and Captain Wiltse, did the job, and the Queen and her friends, trusting to redress from the United States, yielded to avoid bloodshed, and with the full knowledge

that if resistance was shown the United States forces would support the rebels.

I am satisfied that by this time you have formed a correct opinion of all facts, and perhaps you will find this long memorial rather tedious.

I will now try to conclude and spare your patience. It will be presumptuous for anyone, Provisional Government, royalists, native, and so forth, to try to advise the United States about ourselves.

The question, therefore, simplifies itself. If President Cleveland and yourself have made up your minds about the necessity of annexing the islands, very well; we have nothing more to say, and no one better than yourself, Mr. Blount, can bring it about.

You must be well aware by this time that the Provisional Government is not a popular government. If you wish to go to the trouble, procure the roll of the annexation club and the very complete registry of voters made only a couple of years ago. A short comparison will show you the comparative number of voters on the annexation roll. After that, take into consideration that every business firm connected with the movement has compelled their employes under threat of dismissal to sign the roll and you can form a pretty correct opinion of how the Provisional Government stands.

Therefore, satisfied that the Provisional Government is only a revolutionary government put in power by the United States forces and without any support from the majority of the population, the United States can refuse to treat the question of annexation with the Provisional Government.

Let the United States Government put things back where Mr. Stevens found them on January 17; restore the queen; let her call her Legislature together and state to them, by special message, that in presence of the necessity in which the United States are placed to secure the possession of the Hawaiian Islands, she herself is prepared to abdicate in favor of Grover Cleveland, President of the United States, and expects the representatives of the people to make no opposition to the measure, and at once ratify a treaty of cession as agreed upon between yourself and herself.

Being done in that manner you will find little opposition, and all of us will assist in bringing the matter to a safe and peaceable solution.

If, on the other hand, the United States only wish to secure supremacy and absolute control of the islands without annexation, the same course can be safely followed.

Restore the Queen and make with her, in accord with the Legislature, a cast iron treaty to suit yourselves.

Take for instance the treaty between France and Tunis or England and Egypt; they are not exactly a protectorate, as the flags of the two countries do not fly either in Tunis or Egypt, but in both countries the native rulers and legislatures are under the complete and absolute control of the European powers, and from my reading both systems work well, notwithstanding the jealousy of France in Egypt and of Italy in Tunis.

Here, where no other power means to interfere, I think such a system would answer. However, you are the best judges. But whatever you wish you can get with the almost unanimous consent of this small nation, when, on the contrary, if you treat with the Provisional Government the large majority will feel that a great wrong has been committed towards a people who have always been friendly to the United States, are so now, and only wish to be allowed to attend to their affairs themselves.

A third solution is a protectorate, same as we (the French) had in Tahiti, until the ruling chiefs became extinct. The French flag was raised, but the Pomares enjoyed the use of the palace, a pension from the French Republic, and a kind of state befitting to the ancient owners of the land.

But I understand that such a protectorate would not be agreeable to the United States statesmen.

Further back I made a strong point of the fact that this was no more on hereditary monarchy. These people are truly the elect of their subjects, Kalakaua by direct vote, and Liliuokalani by his appointing her as his successor under, not only the Kamehameha constitution, but under the constitution 1887 made by the revolutionists themselves which confirmed his appointment. During the King's absence to the coast, when he died, these very people were in power, and Liliuokalani was by them accepted as regent.

A few words now about the capital (American) invested in this country.

I do not hesitate to say that Mr. Spreckels represents the only really American capital invested here.

The loan is English money, so are the tramways, and a large number of the plantations, principally in Kohala, on the island of Hawaii.

The whole of Mr. Bishop's capital is Hawaiian. Mr. Bishop came here as a poor clerk, married Pauahi, and out of the Kanaka country made what he owns. He never lived in a house built by himself or owned by himself until his wife died, leaving him all. Not only that, but Mr. Bishop has invested very large sums in the States all out of this country's resources.

Mr. Damon is also a creature of Mrs. Pauahi Bishop.

Mr. James Campbell came here as a journeyman carpenter.

The Ii estate—C. A. Brown's wife is an Ii.

The Robinsons estate, the Lunalilo estate, the Bishop estate, the Kalakaua estate, and Hawaiian capital represents a very large portion of the tax-paying capital, and are not represented in the annexation party. Take now the taxes paid by the Chinese and the Japanese, and if you will go to the trouble of consulting the tax assessors' books you will find that the annexation club does not represent the wealth and influence of the country.

None of the American firms or planters ever brought a cent from the United States here. In dividends and investments they have exported millions of dollars.

As far as the missionaries proper are concerned, they brought exactly nothing. They were housed and fed by the natives, their children tended for them, and their churches built for them free of expense. They were given land by the people, who served them, nursed them, cooked for them, did all the most menial work without compensation, drew them about in hand carts to church and to their social entertainments, and paid them besides a tax of 10 cents a week per head for each adult all through the districts over which they had spiritual control. When I lived in Hawaii, Mr. Bond, a missionary and wealthy planter, still collected from the natives of his district the weekly 10 cents himself.

The revolution was made by Messrs. Dole, Thurston, W. O. Smith, C. L. Carter, Judd, etc., all sons of missionaries, who owe the whole of their social and pecuniary position to the natives.

In their respective professions as lawyers they never were able to make a living.

Dole, Thurston, and Smith's clearest income has been as trustees of

various native estates, mentioned before. Of course all have interests in plantations, outside, I think, of Dole and Thurston. These people on the whole are good enough people, honest, I dare say on any subject in which their ambition or their interest is not directly connected. But they are all suffering from a very serious complaint, a swelled head, incurable I am afraid. But I must not abuse your patience any longer, and will subscribe myself,

Yours, respectfully,

G. TROUSSEAU.

Since writing the above memorial I have had communication of a pamphlet shortly to be published by Mr. Stevens. I will not discuss the very lame apology he gives for his interference nor the absolutely false statements in which he indulges. These I believe sufficiently elucidated by your personal information. But his slanderous attacks on the private character of the Queen I will not leave unchallenged.

In my memorial I referred to the undoubted influence Charles B. Wilson had over the Queen. I will now explain that influence. Wilson persuaded the Queen, I believe, that she was safe in his hands. He is a determined man, has got plenty of personal courage, and often told the Queen that, had he been marshal of the Kingdom in 1887, the King never would have been compelled by the force of arms to sign the constitution; he would have nipped the conspiracy in the bud. Right or wrong, the Queen believed him, hence his influence.

I have known the Queen intimately for over twenty years. When I arrived here she had not been married long, and her husband, John O. Dominis, an American, and an intimate friend of mine, was fondly beloved by her. John Dominis's character was unimpeachable—ask any one who knew him—Mr. C. R. Bishop, Mr. W. F. Allen, and others. I am now speaking from a physician's point of view. John was, to use a euphemism, rather irregular as a husband—as many husbands in my experience are. He was fond of society, sometimes took more liquor than was good for him, and occasionally (although he never kept a regular mistress) had some love adventures. In this small community they were reported to his wife, and I can vouch to how she suffered by it. She was exceedingly fond and jealous of him. But, like most unfaithful husbands, he would not have for one moment shut his eyes on even any sign of unfaithfulness on the part of his wife. As long as he was alive, any one slandering his wife would have, I assure you, been severely punished. If there has been any failing in the Queen's faithfulness to her husband it never has been known, and as far as Wilson is concerned, it is on the part of Mr. Stevens an unmitigated lie. Did I know that Mr. Stevens would resent it as we do in my country I would to-day go and give him the lie. But he would probably have me arrested and convicted, and, busy as I am with my arduous profession, I can't afford it.

Mr. Wilson has a half-white wife, an intimate friend of the Queen. Although not a young woman, she is still attractive, and has been one of the prettiest half-white women in Honolulu. I have also been her physician and known her well. She is, and always has been, of a jealous disposition, and notwithstanding Mr. Stevens' abominable statement, would never countenance an intimacy between her husband and any other woman, even were she the Queen. She is now more attractive than the Queen is or ever has been.

That Mr. Stevens believes these stories I strongly doubt. They suit his purpose. If he is not wholly responsible for them, he has accepted them, without control, from Sereno Bishop, and others who know better.

The whole matter, Mr. Blount, is an outrage that makes an honest man's blood boil.

G. TROUSSEAU.

May 16, 1893.

No. 55.

(Interview with Henry Waterhouse, May 2, 1893, printed with Mr. Blount's No. 4, dated May 4, 1893.)

No. 56.

Interview with C. B. Wells, of Wailuku, Maui, May 15, 1893.

Q. What is your business?

A. I am manager for two sugar plantations.

Q. Where were you born?

A. In the State of New York.

Q. How long have you lived in the islands?

A. Over thirteen years.

Q. Were you here on January 14, 1893?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you here during the revolution?

A. I was not in Honolulu. I was in Maui.

Q. When did you first learn about it?

A. About four or five days after it was over.

Q. Then you could not give me any information about events here?

A. None whatever.

Q. What sort of laborers do you work on your plantations?

A. Hawaiians, Japanese, Chinese, and Portuguese.

Q. How many in all?

A. It varies according to the work we have. We run as high as 425 people.

Q. How many are contract laborers?

A. About half, I think.

Q. What is the character of the Japanese laborer?

A. The Japanese are of very low caste indeed. I think they are the lowest people in this country in every respect—not only in morals, but in their relations to each other—in regard to the bond of sympathy.

Q. Are they a combative people among themselves?

A. Very.

Q. How are they gathered up in Japan—from what class?

A. Those who came to this country first were the riffraff of the cities, but later on they have been gathered from the interior and are a better class.

Q. Are they intelligent?

A. No.

Q. Do they bring their women to any extent?

A. No; not a large percentage. In lots of 50 there might perhaps be 13 women.

Q. What is the character of the women?

A. A majority of them loose in their morals.

Q. Do they work in the fields with the men?

A. We try to separate them; put them to light work, such as irrigating cane. I think a majority of the women who come here are not married to the men; come here merely to live with them.

Q. Loose women?

A. Yes; that is my impression.

Q. Why do you take them out of the fields?

A. On account of their morals. They were likely to entice men to cohabit with them. I have caught several in the act.

Q. Is that the character of the women generally?

A. That is my impression. My impression is that a majority of them are rather loose; that for a consideration they will sell their body.

Q. What about the Chinese women?

A. There are none here to speak of.

Q. What about the character of the men—Chinese laborers?

A. I think as a whole they are a peaceful, quiet race of people and reliable laborers.

Q. Do they speak the English language much?

A. No; a great many of them speak the Hawaiian language. Some speak pigeon English.

Q. After their contract has expired do they remain here in any considerable number?

A. Of late a good many have returned to their own country.

Q. Those who remain here, what do they do?

A. Some remain on plantations. A large majority of them—I don't know how they exist. I think through opium and gambling.

Q. Any engaged in cultivating taro and rice?

A. Yes. Many of them are crowding out the natives in making taro (poi).

Q. Any engaged in fishing?

A. Not to a great extent. They are certainly getting control of the raising of taro and the making of poi.

Q. Do any of them get to be merchants?

A. A great many of them.

Q. Now, the Portuguese.

A. They are the best class of laborers we have here. They are extremely industrious; they are sober; they practice strict economy; they save money and are a very desirable class of people. The only drawback is you have to pay them more wages. They can not live as cheaply as the Japanese and Chinese.

Q. You have quit bringing them here on that account?

A. Yes.

Q. How are the Portuguese, educated or illiterate?

A. As a whole they are illiterate. The rising generation is being educated and is quite bright.

Q. Now, about the Hawaiians. How do they work?

A. They are very good in certain work—irrigating and handling of water and driving bullock teams.

Q. Not as good in cane fields as Chinamen?

A. Well, if they have good overseers and watch them they will do good work.

Q. How about Chinamen?

A. They are faithful workers.

Q. Without overseers?

A. No; no laborers are, excepting Portuguese. If you send 3 or 4 Portuguese a distance to mend a fence or road they will do the work, but Hawaiians will talk and idle. Chinamen about the same. China-

men are very good. I am doing contract work with them. I give them watering and stripping to do at a certain figure. I find it works very satisfactorily. They work hard, and you don't have to have any overseer.

Q. If the question were submitted to the people who voted under the old constitution with the only qualification for a voter that he should read and write, what would be the result—for or against annexation?

A. So far as the foreigner is concerned there would be a very large majority in favor of annexation, and the Portuguese would be a unit for annexation. As to the Hawaiians I think that a majority would not be in favor of it.

Q. What would be the final result of these combined votes?

A. That is a question that would be rather hard for me to answer.

Q. Suppose it was done under the Australian ballot system?

A. I am inclined to think it would be against annexation. It might be in favor of annexation, if the Portuguese were allowed to vote.

Q. They vote whether they can read and write or not; don't they?

A. Yes.

Q. That has been so from the beginning?

A. Since 1887. I am inclined to think if the Portuguese voted under the Australian system, as a large percentage are illiterate, that perhaps they would be voting against annexation when they meant to vote for annexation.

Q. Do you think you could have good government here if you only required of a voter knowledge sufficient to read and write the English language?

A. I doubt it very much.

Q. Why?

A. Because I think we would go back to the old order of things.

Q. What is the old order of things?

A. The state we had under the deposed Queen.

Q. What is that state?

A. The Hawaiians getting control of the legislature and going in for extravagance which the foreigners were having to pay for. The money was not coming out of the pockets of the people who were voting the money. It was coming out of other pockets. The action of the Queen in wanting to spring this new constitution shows her feeling toward foreigners and her deliberate intention of making them pay the fiddler, so to speak, and without giving them any privileges.

Q. What do you mean by privileges?

A. That we could exist here and run our plantations. I have no doubt if she could have her way she would disfranchise every foreigner in the country and put it wholly in the hands of Hawaiians.

Q. Why do you think that?

A. I think we have had sufficient evidence of it in her actions in the Legislature. In removing men from the Wilcox cabinet, men of stability of character and influence, removing them to put in men who were irresponsible and would soon wreck us.

Q. You think then with the privilege of any native to vote who could read and write the English language that you would drift back to the condition of things you have just stated?

A. Yes.

Q. What would you think of the Japanese as voters?

A. I would most emphatically condemn any move toward giving the Japanese franchise.

Q. Would it make the situation you speak of worse?

A. I think it would make it a very serious matter.

Q. The Chinese allowed to vote—still worse?

A. I do not think so. I think the Chinese would be the opposite of the Japanese. I think the Japanese would be controlled by their Government. They would vote as they were directed to vote. The Chinese are not very friendly with the Japanese, and they would vote to the contrary.

Q. Who would control the Chinese vote?

A. I think they would be very largely controlled by their societies.

Q. How many overseers have you on your plantations?

A. Nineteen.

Q. Do you have to have men with every squad of hands during the hours of labor?

A. There is an overseer with every gang of 20 or 30 people. I have a head overseer who looks after all the different gangs.

Q. Suppose a fellow is idling in the field, what do you do?

A. Well, if he is a day man, he is discharged.

Q. If he is a contract laborer?

A. We dock him. We give him half or three-quarters of a day and if they keep it up we resort to the law and have them arrested for refusing to work.

Q. What do you accomplish by putting him in jail?

A. It has been rather unsatisfactory as a rule. The first offense he is merely ordered back to his work and the plantation has to pay the cost of the court and charge it to the man. He does not care. He has to work it off.

Q. Well, what do you do then?

A. If he refuses to obey orders and work he is arrested again. Perhaps a light penalty of two or three dollars fine is inflicted. That the plantation can pay and take out of his wages, or if the plantation refuses to do so he is put on the road to work it out. The third offense he is likely to have three months' imprisonment. That is a new law enacted in the last Legislature. Before that you could go on having him arrested and paying fines. It was better to drop the man than to go on with that.

Q. At this time most of the laborers are Japanese?

A. Yes; almost entirely. A few Chinese come in, but very few.

Q. The Portuguese cost so much you do not get them?

A. Yes. A large number leave the country and go to California. I venture to say that 25 per cent of the Portuguese have left this country within the last eighteen months. The wages have been cut down in order that the plantations might exist, and I doubt if they could exist if they didn't have wives and children to work. By all working they can get along very well. Many more would leave the country if they had means.

Q. Then the sugar planters' best reliance for labor now is by negotiations with the Japanese Government?

A. That is the only way we have now to speak of.

Q. Are you in favor of annexation?

A. Strongly.

Q. What would be the effect on property here—on values?

A. Outside of sugar plantations I think lands would enhance in value. It would open up our crown lands and bring a desirable class of people here.

Q. Are not the crown lands very largely leased out?

A. A great many of them have not been leased out.

Q. They are good lands.

A. A great many are very good lands.

Q. What is being done with them now?

A. Nothing in particular. A great deal of crown land is idle now for the reason that there is not large enough area for plantations, but it would be large enough for the support of a family. It would be good for raising pineapples, bananas, etc.

Q. Well, that population coming here to engage in that business would be a new condition of things?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What do you think about the value of sugar lands; would they go up or not?

A. I do not think they would go up at all.

Q. Do you not think that this influx of population you speak of would have generally the effect of increasing values of every sort?

A. Well, that would very largely depend on the arrangement regarding our sugar going into the United States. If the plantation was realizing more for sugar it would increase the value of lands. There is no sugar land to take up. It is mostly taken up.

Q. And the additional population that would come here would engage in the raising of fruit?

A. Yes; fruit and coffee. I have great faith in the coffee industry. I think a thrifty farmer coming here could take small pieces of land. I think some plantations would be better off if they could go into some scheme of that character.

Q. That would involve the building of houses for these people?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you would expect men to come with means enough to build his house?

A. Well, I think if they only had partial means that a portion would be advanced to them.

Q. Well, what about his supplies while he was making a crop?

A. I have no doubt the plantation would advance him a certain percentage while he was making a crop.

Q. Charging him interest, of course, on advances?

A. Yes; certainly. I think probably certain portions would be advanced without interest. That would be a matter he would have to take his chances on.

These notes have been read to me by Mr. Mills, and I pronounce them an accurate report of the interview between myself and Col. Blount.

C. B. WELLS.

HONOLULU, May 15, 1893.

This was done because Mr. Wells was leaving the island. He could not wait until the notes were transcribed.—E. M.

No. 57.

Interview with Judge H. A. Widemann, Honolulu, May 20, 1893.

MR. BLOUNT. Judge, where were you born?

A. Hanover, Germany.

Q. How long have you lived here?

A. Forty-seven years.

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Q. What offices have you held in that time?

A. I have held every office this country can give. Sheriff of the island of Kanai in 1854; circuit judge there in 1863, and deputy governor of that island at the same time. I held, also, a great many smaller offices from 1854 to 1865—tax collector, school inspector, road supervisor; chief clerk of the interior office in 1865; associate justice of the supreme court in 1869; minister of the interior in 1874. During those years I have been privy councilor; member of the board of health, and member of the board of education. I was a noble from 1881 to 1887, appointed by the King. I was elected noble in 1887 to 1892. February, 1892, I was taken ill and Mott Smith took my place, and when he went to Washington I got well and took the place back. That brings us up to date.

Q. On January 17, 1893, it is reported that the ministers of Liliuokalani, with the Hon. S. M. Damon, went to the palace and held a consultation with the Queen on the subject of her yielding to the movement for a provisional government. Were you there?

A. I was there at the Queen's request.

Q. Will you be kind enough to tell me in a general way what was said and done?

A. There were present besides the ministers, Samuel Damon, Judge Carter, Paul Neumann, and myself.

Q. What was the subject-matter of the interview?

A. It was a communication from the Provisional Government touching her being turned out of office, her deposition which had been sent her in the course of the day. I objected to reading the document; I didn't know but it might be insulting. The Queen's Government was then in possession of the barracks and the police station where the arms and ammunition were. The question was, whether she should make opposition to the Provisional Government. The advice given was that we were too weak to oppose the United States forces, and consequently that she should surrender. The police station was surrendered immediately after the consultation. We were there perhaps an hour in this consultation. Whilst we were, Mr. Stevens's letter to the Queen's ministers, saying he had recognized the Provisional Government, was read by Sam Parker, Her Majesty's minister of foreign affairs. Mr. Neumann and Joe Carter were appointed a committee of two to draw up a protest for Her Majesty. We waited until they had done so. We all approved of that protest, and then the Queen signed it.

Q. Was it dark then?

A. It was after dark; lamps were lighted.

Q. What was the condition of the city as to quiet when the troops were landed on the day before?

A. There were no people on the street. It was as quiet as things could be. I went to the palace to speak to the Queen. I told her that the soldiers had landed and were coming towards the palace. Fearing lest they should attack the palace, I advised Her Majesty to be ready to go with them if they should come to her and ask her to go with them. I said this in my consternation upon seeing foreign troops landed in a peaceful country when there was no show of any disturbance.

Q. Was that consternation pretty general?

A. Most decidedly it was.

Q. Did that state of mind continue until the dethronement of the Queen and the surrender of the barracks and station house?

A. Yes; until we heard of the establishment of the Provisional Government and then we knew what was what.

Q. Everything quiet after that?

A. Everything was quiet. There was not a dog bark or a cock crow.

Q. Were you in the Legislature in 1892?

A. I was a member by appointment as a minister.

Q. Will you be kind enough to tell me how many parties were represented in that Legislature and by what names they were designated?

A. Three parties and some independents, National Reform, Reform, and Liberal.

Q. How many members had each of these?

A. Nine National Reform; 14 Reform; 21 Liberals, and 4 Independents.

Q. Who were the 4 Independents?

A. R. R. Hind, J. Marsden, W. H. Cornwell, and A. Drier.

Q. How do those four gentlemen stand on the subject of annexation?

A. At the present moment?

Q. Yes.

A. Marsden is an annexation man. Hind is not, Cornwell is not, and Drier is not. I am sure of those two. I am not sure of Hind.

Q. Twenty-five was a majority of the Legislature?

A. Yes.

Q. Did any one of these parties have that number?

A. No.

Q. How did it happen that so many cabinets were nominated and voted out on want of confidence in 1892?

A. In the beginning of the session there was no possibility for uniting the parties to vote out a ministry. The first cabinet held until September. In September W. A. Whiting, attorney-general, resigned, and Paul Neumann was appointed in his place. E. C. Macfarlane, with several others of the National Reform party, sided with the Reform party, and got also a few of the natives to side with them, and voted out the first cabinet.

Q. Why did Macfarlane make this move?

A. He objected to Neumann, a party member, going into the cabinet without the consent of the party.

Q. What party did Neumann belong to?

A. The National Reform. The Neumann cabinet did not meet the approval of the Reform party.

Q. Who were at the head of the new cabinet?

A. Sam Parker, Neumann, Macfarlane, and a man by the name of Gulick. It did not meet the approval of the Reform party, and, in consequence, after a week or two they were voted out.

Q. By what parties in the Legislature?

A. Then it was a conglomeration, party lines completely gone. Macfarlane burst the party lines. They were voted out after a fortnight. The Reform party laid down the principle that the Queen should appoint a cabinet from the members of the party that voted out a cabinet. The Reform party never voted out any cabinet because they could not on account of lack of numbers. Then the new cabinet was appointed. They lasted about half an hour or twenty minutes. They were voted out again. A new cabinet was appointed which satisfied the Reform party.

Q. Was that the Wilcox cabinet?

A. Yes. When I returned from San Francisco—I was gone about two months—they were voted out. They got just 25 votes to vote them out.

Q. What party voted them out?

A. The Liberal party—the native element.

Q. They must have had some other party to help them.

A. The National Reform party.

Q. Then a new cabinet was appointed?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that ever voted out?

A. No.

Q. It was appointed the day before the Legislature was prorogued?

A. Yes; on Friday.

Q. What was the cause of all this turning out of cabinets?

A. The great desire on the part of a great number of the members of the house to get into the cabinet themselves.

Q. The hope of getting into the cabinet made these combinations possible and successful?

A. Yes.

Q. Who were the members who wanted to be ministers?

A. John Ena, E. C. Macfarlane, A. P. Peterson, J. A. Cummins, J. N. S. Williams, Paul Neumann, J. Marsden, Alex. Young, W. H. Cornwall, W. C. Wilder, C. W. Ashford, R. W. Wilcox, J. E. Bush, J. Nawahi, William White, and W. O. Smith.

Q. Was this last Wilcox cabinet constituted wholly of Reformers?

A. Yes.

Q. This left out of the cabinet and representation from the National Reform or Liberal parties?

A. Yes.

Q. Did that produce any dissatisfaction among aspirants for cabinet places?

A. Decidedly. It produced strong dissatisfaction among the Liberal party. They had been told before they would come in. Bush would have cut his throat before he would have sided with the Reformers but for the idea that he would get in himself.

Q. Is he an annexationist now?

A. No; he is an antiannexationist.

Q. On the voting out of the second cabinet, I think, you said they went all to pieces; there were no parties?

A. Yes.

Q. Am I to understand that they just turned loose in a sort of scramble for cabinet places?

A. That was the simple reason for it.

Q. Was there ever a time when the Reform party had anything like a majority of that body?

A. Not in 1892.

I have read the foregoing and pronounce it an accurate report of my interview with Mr. Blount.

H. A. WIDEMANN.

HONOLULU, *June 10, 1893.*

Judge Widemann, June 15, 1893.

Chief Justice Judd, who understands the native language, says "he heard the Queen's speech on the 14th of January. She said to the crowd she would proclaim a new constitution hereafter." She used the words "ma keia man la." These words may signify a few days, a few

months, or a few years. The term is indefinite. It may be one hundred years. It is equivalent to the expression, "one of these days."

This conversation was at noon on Monday, January 16, 1893.

H. W. WIDEMANN.

No. 58.

Interview with H. A. Widemann.

I beg to state that I lived in Honolulu in January and February last past and took due notice of all the events that took place during those months. In the latter days of January and on the 1st of February everything was as quiet as could possibly be, and there was no reason whatsoever to fear or be apprehensive of danger to property or danger to life or limb of any man, woman, or child.

I did consider then, and do consider now, that the hoisting here of the American flag at that time for the protection of life and property was absolutely unnecessary.

H. A. WIDEMANN.

HONOLULU, *July 15, 1893.*

No. 59.

Interview with Robert W. Wilcox.

HONOLULU, *Tuesday, April 18, 1893.*

Mr. BLOUNT. Mr. Wilcox, where were you educated?

Mr. WILCOX. Partly in these Islands and partly in Italy, at the military academy at Turin.

Q. How came you to go there?

A. I was sent by the Hawaiian Government.

Q. In what year?

A. In 1880; the latter part of 1880.

Q. When did you return?

A. In 1887.

Q. Are you a native?

A. I am a native. My father is an American, from Rhode Island--Newport. My mother is a Hawaiian.

Q. Then you are one-half Hawaiian and one-half white?

A. Yes.

Q. You came here in 1887. How long did you remain?

A. About four months.

Q. Where did you go then?

A. I went to San Francisco with my wife.

Q. How long did you remain there?

A. About one year.

Q. And then you returned here?

A. I returned about April, 1889.

Q. Was that the year in what occurred what is termed the Wilcox rebellion?

A. Yes; on July 30, 1889.

Q. You were in what was called the Ashford-Wilcox rebellion?

A. Yes.

Q. In what year?

A. In 1892.

Q. Were you in the Legislature at that time?

A. I was in the Legislature at that time. I was in the Legislature in 1890. I was one of the youngest men from the island of Maui.

Q. Then you have been identified all the while, from 1887, with public affairs in these Islands?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you understand the feelings of the whites and the natives?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the cause, or what were the causes, which led to the dethronement of Queen Liliuokalani?

A. When what was called the Wilcox cabinet was ousted by the House in January—about the 12th—I do not remember the date, and then on Friday a new cabinet was formed by the Queen, composed of Sam Parker, Cornwell, Colburn and Peterson. We met in the afternoon, and members of what we call the Reform party did not come, and we decided that the house should prorogue on Saturday at 12 o'clock. At noon the Queen came in and prorogued the house. A good many members of the house were not there—nearly all the members of the Reform party were not there—and soon the house prorogued. One of the members came to me and told me we were wanted up at the palace. So we all went up to the palace. As soon as we got in there we found a big body of people, what is called Kalaiaina. We stayed in the reception room of the palace, and the English minister was there, the French commissioner was there, the Portuguese minister was there, but not the American minister. He had just come back from Hilo that very morning. So we waited, the Queen was in another room with the ministers.

The rumor was whispered around that there was to be proclaimed a new constitution. The judges of the supreme court, two of them, were there—Chief Justice Judd and Bickerton. Of course we waited there until the foreign representatives went away. We heard the Queen insisted that the ministers should sign and that the ministers would not sign this document. I stayed there until the whole thing ended, because I wanted to know what would happen. We stayed there until between 5 and 6, when the Queen came out and gave a little speech saying she wished to proclaim a new constitution, but was prevented. She would proclaim one in the future if the people would insist upon it. Then we went home. I went out with Mr. Parker and, in the meantime, I heard that they had got up an organization—the committee of safety they called it. I went home and stayed there. I did not care to go into any side, just hold myself neutral.

On Sunday Mr. Colburn called on me. He asked me if I would assist the Government. He said Mr. Thurston had been there and wanted him to sign a document to call the *Boston* marines on shore and to proclaim the Provisional Government. Mr. Colburn wanted me to help them to stand by the Queen. I told him I had no objection. I would assist them as far as I could. He said their headquarters were at the station house. He went away. I stayed at home. I did not bother myself about the station house.

Mr. Colburn called on me again in the evening. He wanted me to go to their meeting at the Government building. He took me down there. I saw there Dr. Truseau, Mr. Gulick, Mr. Macfarlane, Paul

Neumann, John E. Bush, and Anton Rosa, and some foreigners also were there. They were also consulting over the situation—what to do. Marshal Wilson was there. They stood up and talked. Wilson decided it was proper to arrest the committee of safety, but nobody seconded his motion, and they asked my opinion. I said the only thing was to suppress them before they made any progress. They said they are going to have a mass meeting at the armory on Beretana street, of the committee of safety. Then they came to the conclusion to have a meeting of the people who wanted to support the Government in the square right opposite the Government building, and some one talked about that the Government should proclaim martial law, and stop all these rebels and riots and all that kind of thing. Paul Neumann, who was present, said it would not be necessary; it would only create friction.

I told Paul Neumann that if there was any bloodshed the Government would be responsible for taking such a very weak stand. Paul Neumann said there was a document to be read there to dethrone the Queen, by the opposition party. He said, "that is no treason." I said, "if that is not treason we had better give up the whole thing." Then we came to the conclusion to have a mass meeting at the same hour with the others. That was on Monday. I went home with Mr. Bush. He asked my opinion. I told him, "I think you can not do anything. I am not going to get myself in trouble. I would rather be neutral." So I went home. The next day—the 16th—I was called to make a speech in the meeting. It was merely to get the people to harmonize and keep the peace.

Q. What meeting was that?

A. The meeting of the people to support the Queen's Government. I did not make a speech. I told the people to behave and keep the peace and order, and they passed a resolution and I was appointed to be a member of that committee to see the Queen. So I went up that afternoon to see the Queen at the palace. She received us. Mr. Parker was there. She detained us a little while. Mr. Parker gave us a little champagne, and when we left there we went out toward the Government building. A native came up and told us the *Boston* men had landed. We went down to see the *Boston's* soldiers, and when we got around to the consulate we saw the *Boston's* men marching up. They halted there and divided the men; sent part of them up to the legation. Some stayed, I think, at the consulate. The main body marched up to King street, marched up by Merchant street to the front of the Government building, near the eastern corner of the palace fence. They stayed there awhile and then went as far as Atherton's place.

In the evening Colburn called and asked me to go to the Government building. When we got there they were talking about the landing of the *Boston's* men. I saw the representatives of other countries there. Finally the *Boston's* men came back and took a house behind the Opera House near the Government building. They stayed there until the next day. Next day I went down town in the morning. I saw Mr. Damon, the present vice-president. I asked him about it. He told me the best thing was to take no side—neither the Government nor the committee of safety. He didn't want annexation, he said. He had told me himself about that sometime previous to that. I didn't take any part. There were rumors around town that I was appointed commander in chief of the Queen's guard. Many of my friends asked me about it. I told them there was no truth in it. I stayed down the

city nearly all that day. People were running about—all curious about seeing the *Boston's* men on shore.

The committee of safety was working hard to enlist men for the new Provisional Government to be proclaimed. Peterson came up to me and asked me if I would use my services and see what is called the "Drei Hundred," a German element—see them and get them to take part in this movement. I said, "What is the situation?" He said he thought he could ouster the American minister, and it would be all right. I said, "I think we are taking a very weak stand." I was afraid we were going to have bloodshed—on account of the weakness of the Government. I went home, and then went down the city again. I saw a cart coming from E. O. Hall's. A policeman tried to stop it. Capt. Good, the present captain of the guard, was on the cart. He fired and hit the native on the shoulder. They then ran up Fort street. There were no police that day—all kept down at the station house, and the soldiers were kept in the barracks. The streets were left at the mercy of anybody. The "Drei Hundred" marched down on Beretania street to the armory. They got ammunition there and went down to Government building. I heard the new government was proclaimed in the Government building and supported by these thirty men. I went home and stayed home.

Q. Were those all the troops that were there?

A. All that were there then. Others came in afterwards.

Q. How long afterwards?

A. About an hour afterwards—about sunset. They kept on coming, little by little. Dole resigned that day as justice of the supreme court and joined in. I went home, but, of course, the news was abroad what they were doing. The Queen and ministers consulting, they gave up the Government under protest, which was published afterwards—next day. Gave up to the superior force of the United States.

Q. Where were the United States troops at the time of the reading of the proclamation?

A. Right behind the opera house, in a building they called Arion Hall.

Q. In the house or on the street?

A. Some inside and some outside. They took possession of that quarter.

Q. Were they formed or not?

A. No; they just guarded the place.

Q. Had they arms?

A. Yes; and one or two Gatling guns—one or two, I am sure of that.

Q. At the time of the surrender of the Queen in the manner you have stated was she not in possession of the palace, barracks, and station house?

A. Yes.

Q. No attempt had been made by the Provisional Government to take them by force?

A. No.

Q. What time in the day did Minister Stevens recognize the Provisional Government—how long after it was proclaimed?

A. Nearly right afterwards.

Q. Now, when the Provisional Government was recognized by Mr. Stevens, what was the effect on the Queen and her followers?

A. They all gave up.

Q. And was it on account of the recognition by Mr. Stevens that

there was no effort on the part of the Queen to take the Government building?

A. Yes; on account of the recognition by Mr. Stevens and the presence of the United States troops.

Q. Was it or not the opinion of both parties that the recognition by Mr. Stevens ended the contest?

A. Yes; the recognition by Mr. Stevens ended the contest, because the Queen's Government knew they could not go against Mr. Stevens's recognition.

Q. How many troops did the Queen have in all at the time of that recognition?

A. She had a regular guard at the barracks; I think about 150.

Q. One hundred and fifty volunteers?

A. One hundred and fifty in all; and down at the station house some 200 or 300 men, with Wilson's police and volunteers. They were armed. They had guns and Gatling guns.

Q. Were you in the palace on the 14th.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What troops were about there?

A. The Queen's guard.

Q. How many?

A. About 80.

Q. There were certain of the members of a certain political society there asking for a new constitution. Was that a committee from that society?

A. Yes.

Q. Not only from Honolulu but from the other islands?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it a large organization and has it much influence among the native population or not?

A. So far as the question of the constitution was concerned it had nearly all of the natives. At every election that point was talked about by every member to secure election.

Q. Why did they want a new constitution? What was the matter with the constitution of 1887?

A. They felt that they were forced by the constitution of 1887, by the party who got up that revolution, and that the qualification for noble voter barred most of them from voting.

Q. Tell me how that was?

A. To vote for noble on these Islands a voter must have an income of \$600. If not an income, a property qualification of \$3,000.

Q. Unincumbered?

A. Yes. Then there was a party called the Liberal party. We didn't mean a constitution giving all power to the Queen. We meant a constitution for equal rights.

Q. Do I understand you to mean this: That there was a large party that wanted to give the Queen power to appoint the nobles, but the Liberals were opposed to giving her the power to appoint the nobles, but wanted freer franchise in the matter of electing nobles?

A. Yes; and the Liberals held that the Queen ought to let the strongest party in the House form a cabinet, and not appoint the favorites.

Q. How was the bulk of the native population on that question?

A. The bulk of the natives were Royalists. They held the old idea; the Queen must have all power.

Q. Is that the general feeling among the native population?

A. Yes, sir; except the enlightened natives. They have a different opinion.

Q. Now, your own idea. What qualification did you want for voting for nobles?

A. The qualification of learning.

Q. What sort of property qualification, or any?

A. I wanted about one-half of the present qualification; and the voter to know how to read and write and understand the constitution.

Q. That was in order to give to the native element a larger liberty in the matter of electing nobles?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In the desire to proclaim a new constitution did the Queen seem to be meeting the wish of the native population?

A. Yes.

Q. She had, then, in her desire to have a new constitution the support of the natives?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see that constitution?

A. I did not. I only heard from persons who read it.

Q. What did you hear it was?

A. Joseph Nawahi—the Queen gave it to him to read.

Q. What did he report to you?

A. He reported to me that the nobles and representatives should be elected, but one-third of the nobles to be appointed by the Queen.

Q. Who was to elect the other two-thirds?

A. The other two-thirds of the nobles were to be elected by the same people who elect representatives now.

Q. What was to be the qualification of a person who voted for nobles under that constitution?

A. The same as that for representatives. The judges of the supreme court were only for six years, to be recommissioned every six years.

Q. And how about the cabinet?

A. The cabinet was to be appointed by the Queen.

Q. And to go out by a vote of want of confidence?

A. Yes; and I asked him further about the exercise of suffrage. I understood him to say the foreigners must take the oath of allegiance and stay here five or six years, except those foreigners who came here and were allowed to vote by royal signature.

Q. You say that since 1887 the natives have been wanting to restore the old constitution?

A. Yes.

Q. Giving to the Queen more power?

A. Yes.

Q. Have the parties been divided here on that line?

A. Yes.

Q. Why didn't the last Legislature do something in the matter of a new constitution?

A. A majority opposed it. Even some of the natives dodged around. They said they would support the convention for the new constitution, but when the thing came up they tried to dodge.

Q. Why did they try to dodge?

A. I suppose they were influenced by the Reform party.

Q. But if they had voted as they were expected to do by the people who elected them, would they have had the power to make a new constitution?

A. Yes; because there were two bills before the House to call a con-

vention of representative men all over the Islands to come and make a new constitution, but it was defeated on the compromise in 1890, and in 1892 they were defeated badly.

Q. What was the compromise of 1890?

A. To go by amendment. In 1890 we passed a good many amendments, and in 1892 those very people who promised to support it—they went back on their promises—so it was defeated.

Q. What was proposed in these amendments?

A. One proposed to reduce the qualification to \$300. That was the principal point.

Q. Are these amendments in print?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you bring them?

A. Yes.

Q. How did the Liberals manage to get these representatives of this new constitution movement to vote against these amendments?

A. The Reform you mean?

Q. Yes.

A. They used their influence against it.

Q. What was their influence?

A. They have a good deal of influence. Some of the men depended upon them. Many of the Reform party were sugar planters. They held mortgages on the property of some of the legislators; some of them were dependent upon them for their pasturage.

Q. Tell me about the voting out of the several cabinets in 1892.

A. The first cabinet was called the Widemann-Parker cabinet. They were only voted out by combining the Progressive Liberals with the Reform. The Progressive joined with the Reform. They got a majority and ousted that cabinet. That was how that cabinet was ousted.

Q. Be kind enough now to state to me the parties in the body on the assembling of the last Legislature, the points of difference between them, and why the first cabinet was voted out.

A. They did anything to get the cabinet out. They had no confidence in it. Of course the Reform didn't like that cabinet, and the Progressive Liberals didn't. Even the natives didn't like it. The Progressive Liberals thought that by having a new cabinet their views would be carried out. Some of them wanted to form a convention for a new constitution. That was not brought up before because the Reform opposed that.

Q. Both the Liberal party and the Reform party wanted a new constitution?

A. The Liberal party wanted a new constitution and the natives did, but the Reform didn't want a new constitution.

Q. What is the difference between the Liberal party and the natives?

A. The only difference is the natives wanted to give the whole power to the Queen. The Liberal party did not believe in that.

Q. Well, please go on.

A. They voted out the cabinet. Then the Queen appointed another cabinet, what is called the Macfarlane cabinet. It took a week to form it. That cabinet was voted out.

Q. Why were they voted out?

A. They did not like them; they felt they were ignored. They laid out a platform for the leader of the house to form a cabinet for the Queen. Then another cabinet came in—Cornwell, Nawahi, Creighton, and Gulick. We had a meeting the night before of the Reform and the Progressive Liberals. Nearly all the men who voted out the former

cabinet were at the meeting. They worked around about using all their influence to work upon the native members by means of promises and money. Then the Macfarlane cabinet was voted out. The natives stuck together to hold that cabinet in.

Q. How was the vote on that?

A. Twenty-seven to twenty-eight.

Q. Who furnished the money?

A. Friends of the Reform people. The Reform knew that their friends were using money to get some native votes to get that cabinet out.

Q. How do you know that money was being used?

A. I was told so, and I know it is a fact.

Q. How do you know it is a fact?

A. It was talked about. It was general belief.

Q. Was it generally believed, as you do, that the majority was gotten by the use of money?

A. Yes. (Continuing.) Then this cabinet of Cornwell, Nawaki, Creighton, and Gulick came in. We had a meeting the previous night. We all decided we would vote them out without ceremony.

Q. Who decided that? Who was the meeting composed of?

A. Reform and Liberal. Because we felt the Queen was ignoring the majority of the house.

The cabinet was voted out in three hours. Then, afterwards, it took two weeks to form the Wilcox cabinet, which was composed of the Reform party. The Liberal was left out this time. I was a Liberal, but I didn't kick. I said I would keep still; I would pay them back in some way. Bush was a Liberal then; he was kicking. Ashford was at Hawaii. Finally the Queen's party commenced working against this cabinet. Mr. Parker asked me how I would vote. I told him I was tired about the cabinet, and I asked him if he was going to be in. He said yes. He asked me if I would take some position abroad. I told him I could not take a position except as minister. He said we were going to have a new constitution. He said that as soon as they have a new cabinet they would proclaim a new constitution.

I did not believe what he said. I think he was merely working to get people to vote the cabinet out. I told him there was no need of a new constitution for giving a friend a position abroad. He said they might send me out as consul-general to Hongkong. I said the cabinet did not act right and could expect nothing from me. When they brought the resolution against that cabinet I stood and explained my vote. I explained where they stood, so we had 25 votes when that cabinet was voted out. On the 13th, which was Friday, the new cabinet was formed by the Queen, Sam Parker, Cornwell, Colburn, and Peterson.

I want to explain the influence of the white population here about voting. Macfarlane and Paul Neumann, when their places were vacant—two candidates were put out by the Reform party, called the Missionary party, Mr. Waterhouse and Mark Robinson, and the other party put up—

Q. What other party?

A. The other foreign element here. They put up Mr. Maile and Mr. Hopkins.

Q. What do you mean by this other foreign element?

A. I mean nonmissionaries, as noble voters. They need to get foreign voters to elect nobles. All the missionaries stood solid to vote for their candidate.

Q. Were the whites defeated in that election?

A. Yes; they are generally defeated. It is a question of prejudice with them. When the word "missionary" is raised that party would be defeated.

Q. Well, the missionary element is an American element?

A. Yes; Boston men. They are the sons of missionaries from Boston.

Q. Are there any other nationalities; what are they?

A. Some Portuguese, some English, some Germans.

Q. What is the feeling of the people here towards the native Government; take the native population?

A. They are always for the native Government.

Q. Then they are not in favor of this Government?

A. No.

Q. How about the whites?

A. The whites in general do not favor the Government. Some of them are for annexation, and some of them would rather have independence of the country.

Q. Well, now, the annexationists who are not for this Government here, why are they opposed to this Government; are they apprehensive that this Government is not inclined to give the franchise to the native people?

A. Yes; and besides they disapprove of the way it was brought about.

Q. What do you mean by the way it was brought about?

A. The way it was established. They have in mind that this Government was put in by Minister Stevens.

Q. That is the opinion of the native population?

A. A good many whites feel the same way.

Q. There are a great many whites who feel that this Government was set up by Mr. Stevens?

A. Yes; the landing of the *Boston's* men and the recognition on the same day before they got the station house and the barracks.

Q. Was there any opinion on Saturday the 14th, or on Sunday, that the troops were going to be landed and would be in the interest of the dethronement of the Queen?

A. On Sunday the news came from Colburn. Thurston went up to him with a document to get him, Peterson, and Cornwell to send for the troops to support the Provisional Government. He assured him that Minister Stevens would do what is right to support them if they would only sign the document. Nobody had an idea that the troops were going to be landed, except by the request of the Government, until Monday evening. The 16th the troops were landed, and it was a surprise to everybody. Nobody knows who called them.

Q. What was the condition of the city at the time as to peacefulness?

A. Peaceful; just the same as before. Nobody was thinking about revolution. On Sunday Mr. Parker asked me if I would take the post of commander-in-chief. I told him I would take it if I had the appointment in writing. He told me he had to see his colleague. Cornwell said he would have to consult other members of the cabinet and let me know the day afterwards. I never heard anything from them any more. I met Sam Parker. I blamed them for not acting—suppressing the people before they got in the Government building. They said the reason was they could not do it. I said if they had appointed me I would have suppressed it before anything happened. I would have gone and seen Mr. Stevens myself. Mr. Stevens told them he would not assist them.

Q. Told them on Sunday?

A. No; Monday. That is what Parker told me; the American Gov-

ernment would support the committee of thirteen, because they were the only wealthy people of the country; would not support the Government. He told me he did not know what to do. We could not fight the United States. I blamed them. I attacked them in the newspapers on their weakness. Many of the natives accused the Government of being slow—not energetic.

Q. Going back to the voting out of the Wilcox cabinet—the Progressive Liberal party united with the native element in the Legislature and voted out the Wilcox cabinet because they had no representation in the Wilcox cabinet?

A. They all represented one side—the Reform side.

Q. When that shifting of the Liberal party and the native element took place and the Reform element lost the cabinet, how did they accept it?

A. The Reform—they accepted it in bad grace. They never appeared any more. They quit the house. None of them appeared around there.

Q. Now the Legislature was prorogued, when would another assemble?

A. In 1894; in two years, unless a special session be called.

Q. That would leave the Queen with the last cabinet for two years?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was the situation which offended them?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any understanding between the Liberal element and the native element that if this Wilcox cabinet was voted out that she was to proclaim a new constitution?

A. It was talked over.

Q. By whom?

A. It was whispered around. Sam. Parker said there would be a new constitution. I do not like to talk. He talked confidentially as a friend.

Q. That is all right. This is not for local consumption.

A. And some of the members who had been up to see the Queen told me also about the new constitution; that the wish of the people would be fulfilled by a new constitution.

Q. Now, was the Liberal element favoring a new constitution?

A. They had already done so.

Q. Were they in favor of the Queen doing it by proclamation?

A. Yes.

Q. The Progressive Liberals?

A. Yes.

Q. They were for the native element when it narrowed down to a controversy between the reform element and the native element?

A. Yes.

Q. And they were willing for a new constitution?

A. Yes; the whole thing was promised since after 1887. It was promised by candidates running for office.

Q. Do you mean to say that popular elections were all on the line of a new constitution?

A. Yes. In 1890 the Thurston cabinet was a strong one, but on that alone it was defeated; a majority was elected and the cabinet was ousted out, and of course the members did not carry out the wishes of the people; they tried to promise the people the other way.

Q. Who did that?

A. Those in 1890 who were in the cabinet—Widemann and the others.

Q. What is the reason the whites say they do not want the natives to have suffrage?

A. They have an idea that the natives would have control of the Legislature. That is the whole idea. They wanted to have the whole thing in the hands of the sugar-planters.

Q. The sugar-planters are not many in numbers. How would they have it in their hands?

A. Of course, they have the high qualifications.

Q. Were many sugar-planters elected nobles to the last Legislature?

A. Some of them. I don't know how many. On the islands of Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai the nobles are controlled by sugar-planters. This is the only island they can not control.

Q. All the islands except this elected candidates of sugar-planters—nobles?

A. Yes. Here the most popular would be elected. Generally sugar-planters are not popular on account of cheap labor.

Q. They do not like the sugar-planting interest because it brings cheap labor?

A. Yes; the workingmen are against that.

Q. Do the Chinese intermarry much with natives?

A. Not very much. The Chinese merchants marry natives.

Q. How about the Japanese?

A. Not very much.

Q. Do the Portuguese and natives marry very much?

A. They marry among themselves, principally.

Q. The principal intermarriages are between the natives themselves?

A. They marry sometimes with foreigners—nearly all half-castes are Americans—that is, their fathers are Americans.

Q. What is your attitude in the matter of the present Government? I mean, how do you feel about it? Do you feel that it ought to be continued or ought to have been established?

A. For myself, I tell you frankly, I am not for the present Government.

Q. What is your objection to it?

A. My objection is that this Government is a government *de facto* of the Missionary party. It is not a popular one. It is against the wishes of the natives and a good many white people. It was established by Mr. Stevens, and in my heart I could say I am a lover of justice. I do not believe in a government established by a strong hand. If I am defeated I am all right. I am a revolutionist.

Q. What do you mean by saying "I am a revolutionist?"

A. I mean that I have started several.

Q. What was your motive for the revolution of 1889?

A. The constitution.

Q. What did you want then?

A. I felt something like the people here felt about the constitution of 1887, that it was forced upon them. Kalakaua was forced to sign it.

Q. What was your plan to change it?

A. My plan was to restore the old constitution, with some little amendments, to suit the view of the people—not to have a high qualification of voters.

Q. Well, to do that you took the Palace, and then, what was your next step?

A. I took the Palace with a view that I would be supported by the King's guard. Of course, if I had that I would have had everything in my hands.

Q. Why did you think they would support you?

A. I had some understanding with them. The King hinted to join with the matter. Then we were to join with Ashford and have no opposition.

Q. Did you take the Palace by an understanding with Kalakaua?

A. Yes; when I got there Kalakaua went down to the boathouse.

Q. Did you see him?

A. No. He sent word to go—that he would not allow me inside the Palace.

Q. Who?

A. The King. He sent R. H. Baker with a message that I must not go in the Palace—and those in the barracks told me to stay in the yard—but do not take possession of this place. I said to Baker to go and see Kalakaua again. He went down to see the King, and I never heard anything until the rifles commenced around. A party of sharpshooters took possession of the opera house. They were whites. The first thing I was fired upon by them—fired upon without any notice. I had twelve men who took possession of the Government building. When fired upon some men ran away—got shot. My men were unarmed. Had only a few arms. We sent off shell up on the opera house. I wanted to take the Palace at that time. I had no men at that time. My men were scattered.

Q. Why did they scatter?

A. They were fired upon and they all jumped over the wall and went away. I went into the bungalow and stayed there.

Q. What was Kalakaua doing all this time?

A. He stayed down there until I gave up in the evening.

Q. Who was he siding with?

A. Well, I do not know. He could go back and take possession of the whole Government.

Q. Did Liliuokalani have anything to do with it in anyway?

A. No; she was a confidential friend of mine then. She knew something about it. I told her we had a little difficulty with her brother. I told her to go and see Kalakaua and make up the difference. I told her if Kalakaua got it into his head that the movement was to put her on the throne, I might be in a bad position.

Q. What has become of Baker, the go-between between you and Kalakaua?

A. He is living here.

Q. What is his position in the present Government?

A. Nothing. He was the man who went with Kalakaua, when he died in San Francisco.

Q. There was never any understanding between you and Liliuokalani that she was to take the place of Kalakaua if you were successful?

A. No; but before that the Reform people wanted to put her on the throne. The people talked, but it was all talk.

Q. Is Ashford the man in whose behalf the British minister interfered, in the matter of having him tried by a foreign jury, in 1892?

A. Yes; V. V. Ashford.

Q. Is he here now?

A. Yes.

Q. Where is his brother?

A. Here—Clarence—he was with him in 1892. He was a Liberal.

Q. What was the object of the movement in 1892?

A. The object was to establish a republic, with a view, when the people were educated to it, to favor annexation with the United States.

Q. You proposed to experiment with a republic and in the course of time to get into the American Union?

A. Yes.

Q. As a State?

A. Yes. When I was in prison in 1892 Mr. Stevens made a speech in my favor at some Grand Army affair.

Q. Did he want you discharged?

A. He did his best. He said they did not arrest people in America for such things.

Q. There was no force used in that Ashford-Wilcox conspiracy in 1892?

A. No; it was one object to have equal rights—that was all.

Q. It is sometimes said that natives are signing petitions for annexation here, and that they are in favor of it. What have you to say about that?

A. It is not true; they may sign under some influence against their will.

Q. What sort of influence?

A. They hold positions; they would have to give up positions; they have no other occupation. Besides, they do not like these people to annex them.

Q. They hate the people who want to?

A. They hate the Provisional Government. They remember what the Commissioner said when he went to Washington.

Q. What is their idea?

A. They did not like Thurston speaking against them. He said they were like Indians. It brought great prejudice against them.

Q. Are they suspicious that this is a movement in which they will lose very largely their political power?

A. Yes.

Q. And that it is intended to put the foreigners in control?

A. Some of them think so. They think they would be disfranchised, something like Alaska Indians.

Q. The movement of 1892—did that contemplate the use of force in overturning the Government?

A. No; we talked about education. We thought we had a big following and would be supported by the people. Of course, the Government took an active part in it—took an active part in suppressing it.

Mr. BLOUNT. I think I have asked all I want to ask you. Is there any statement you would like to make yourself in connection with this matter?

A. No.

APRIL 27, 1893.

Q. Do the natives generally have some stock—horses and cattle?

A. Yes.

Q. How do they graze them?

A. On land; they lease it—pay so much a year.

Q. Who are the people who own the land; are they corporations or individuals?

A. Some individuals, some corporations. These sugar-planters, they have long leases on what is called crown lands.

Q. And the natives have no other means of grazing a cow or a horse?

A. Except by letting it go on their land and paying so much a year.

Q. Does this fact enable the sugar-planters and owners of plantations to exert any influence over the native vote?

A. They have great influence on those points.

Q. How?

A. In the election of 1892 at Kauai, Messrs. Gay and Robinson, who owned large amount of property there, told a good many of the natives, who voted against their candidate for representative, to take away their horses and the few cattle they had on their land.

Q. What did they do with them?

A. They sold them—they had no place to keep them.

Q. Does that appear to enable them to control the native vote to a considerable extent?

A. Sometimes, but we have secret vote in this country now. They can not control it so well as they used to.

Q. Would that enable them to get natives to sign a petition for annexation?

A. In that way they sign petitions because they are obliged. They have their horses and cattle.

Q. The only chance the native has to get his stock grazed is on land belonging to large planters; sometimes individuals and sometimes corporations.

A. Yes.

Q. Generally corporations?

A. Yes; planters, generally corporations.

I have carefully read the foregoing and pronounce it an accurate report of my interviews with Mr. Blount.

ROBERT W. WILCOX.

HONOLULU, *April 27.*

No. 60.

Statement of C. B. Wilson.

FACTS IN RELATION TO THE REVOLUTION OF 1893, AND THE CAUSES WHICH LED TO IT.

Two years ago the nation was preparing its decorations to joyously celebrate and welcome the home-coming of His Majesty King Kalakaua, who was away on a visit of business to the United States, endeavoring to benefit his country and people by working for a modification of the existing treaty of reciprocity with the United States, in the direction of securing the admission of more Hawaiian products and manufactures free of duty into the United States. He had gone on this errand a sick man—at the direct instigation and strong pressure of the planters and their friends, led by Thurston and others. They hoped that through his royal rank and genial *bonhomie* to gain those privileges from the American Government which they themselves when in power as the cabinet of 1887 had failed to secure.

On the 29th of January, 1881, the U. S. S. *Charleston*, bearing the body of the deceased monarch, in charge of Rear-Admiral George Brown, arrived in Honolulu harbor. The *Charleston* was draped in mourning and her yards were cockbilled, which was the first intimation to the Hawaiian people that their monarch had laid down his life in the attempt to benefit the sugar planters. The arrangements for the celebration of his return with rejoicing were changed to that of mourning for Hawaii's dead.

Hurried arrangements were made to carry out the change in the form of government that the sad circumstances had made necessary. His late majesty's cabinet called a meeting of the privy council of state to be held at the palace on that day at noon. To this meeting the princess regent, now Queen, by hereditary right and the provisions of the superseded constitution of 1865, as well as by the direct provisions of the constitution of 1887, was summoned to be present in order to take the *oath of office* and to be sworn in as sovereign, as provided for in the constitution which had been forced on her late royal brother at the point of the bayonet during the uprising of 1887, at the instigation of the same Thurston and his associates.

At this meeting her troubles began. Naturally and properly opposed to a constitution promulgated by her late brother under compulsion of force, to which she had never consented, and feeling secure in her right to ascend the throne under the provisions of the superseded Kamehameha constitution, she hesitated to sign the constitution or to take the oath which might bind her to acknowledge the validity of that document. The chancellor of the Kingdom, Chief Justice A. F. Judd, advised her to sign it, as the oath was merely the same as in the previous constitution, and hinted to her that the then ministry could not hold office under the commissions signed by the late King. Thus induced, she reluctantly but finally signed the document and took the oath.

Picture the scene: The dead body of her brother and late sovereign still on board of the *Charleston*, no definite arrangements yet made to bring it ashore; men at work in the very palace where they were draping it with mourning; no relatives near or far save a child niece 8,000 miles away in England and an invalid husband who died a few months later; a subtle tempter promising—you shall do as you want if you willingly give in on this one point; and a grief-stricken and lonely woman in the first pangs of mourning, bereavement, and the bewilderment of a sudden change called upon to assume the duties of head of the nation.

Could anyone doubt the result? The chief justice's advice was followed. The oath was taken to support the Constitution of the Hawaiian Islands, and immediately on the adjournment of the Privy Council, the politicians both in it and out of it were at work. The chief Justice at once stepped up to Her Majesty and whispered to her that if the ministry resigned, as they could not legally hold their portfolios unless commissioned by her, she should ask them to hold their portfolios until after the funeral. This was indeed a most remarkable action of the chief justice toward a woman thus suddenly called on to attend to matters of the most important and serious nature possible, as well as a singular prejudgment of matters which have to, and did, come before him in his official capacity as head of the supreme bench.

For not without a struggle did the late King's cabinet give up the reins of power, bowing only to the decision of the supreme court. It was appealed to, as provided for in the Constitution. It will be remembered that Mr. J. A. Cummins was the minister of foreign affairs and nominal premier in this cabinet which was now compelled to retire. This fact accounts for much which happened later, as will be related in due time. Considerable feeling ran through the community at the time of the discussion, on the claim of right by the late King's ministers to hold office in defiance of the Queen. The Thurston faction saw that their power was slipping surely and slowly from them, and they made every effort, privately and publicly, to prevent the Queen from acting contrary to their wishes and plans.

However, as before stated, the supreme court decided that His late Majesty's cabinet could not hold office by virtue of their commissions, signed by the deceased King, and Her Majesty exercised her undoubted privilege of selecting new counsellors. These were Messrs. S. Parker, H. A. Widemann, Charles N. Spencer, and W. A. Whiting. It was a most conservative cabinet, although not at all favored by or favoring the Thurston faction. Mr. C. N. Spencer, since deceased in February, 1893, the minister of the interior, an American and a very old resident of this Kingdom, was a member of the cabinet appointed by the late King, who had just resigned on account of the decision of the supreme court. He had previously, however, signified both his absolute willingness and his deliberate intention of resigning his office as a matter of courtesy to the sovereign, even though the supreme court should decide that the King's cabinet had the right to continue their offices under the Queen. None of his colleagues had expressed such opinions and seemed determined to hold their seats at all hazard; this no doubt influenced Her Majesty in her determination to select new advisers.

Troublous indeed were the scenes at the opening of her reign, and now she had to meet trouble from without as well as from within. His excellency, John L. Stevens, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States of America, had by virtue of his office an official audience of the bereaved and mourning sovereign in the palace on the day following the burial of the body of the late King, on which occasion he addressed Her Majesty as follows:

MADAM: It is my official duty to offer to Your Majesty congratulations on your accession to the throne, in accordance with the provisions of the constitution of your Kingdom. Turning from the funeral scenes through which we have just passed, I address Your Majesty words of hope as to the future of your reign. Standing on the border land of death and the future world, of which we have been so solemnly reminded by what has just transpired in our midst, and reverent towards the Supreme God, to whom all are accountable, the minister of the United States expresses his earnest gratification that Your Majesty has taken the firm resolution to aid in making your reign a strictly constitutional reign, to maintain the constitutional right of your ministers to administer the laws, and always to acknowledge their responsibility to the Legislature in the performance of their sworn obligations. In the wish thus to respect the supreme authority of the constitution and the laws, Your Majesty places yourself in the exalted rank of the best sovereigns of the world, and thus will avoid those embarrassments and perplexities which have so often disturbed the peace and crippled the prosperity of countries not blessed with free and enlightened constitutions. It is my earnest prayer that Your Majesty may be able to carry out your noble resolution, and thus have full time and opportunity to discharge the duties which Your Majesty justly regards necessary to the success of your reign and beneficial to your whole people. In endeavoring to make good these auspicious promises, Your Majesty will have the full sympathy and the good wishes of the Government which I have the honor to represent at this capital.

Picture to yourself the time and scene. An elderly editor of an obscure country journal, accidentally pitchforked into the position of the national representative of one of the greatest nations on earth—and a republic at that—lecturing a monarch born and educated to the purple, a woman in the hour of deepest bereavement, in the style and with the ideas that he would have used to a Sunday school class of little children or possibly to a benighted heathen from the depths of barbarism.

From this time forward he showed by every means in his power at every opportunity the determination to make himself obnoxious to the Queen and her Government by his high-handed and dictatorial actions and speeches, both to herself personally and everyone in her Government that he had to deal with officially.

His mode of doing this was generally characterized by pettiness, as

the following instances will show: He once asked permission of the Queen to introduce to her two or three friends. What was the astonishment of the officials to see him drive into the palace yard with all the tourist guests of the hotel, about 30 or 40 in number. As it so happened the Queen was indisposed, so that they had only the privilege of seeing through the palace. Upon receiving the excuses of the Queen, Minister Stevens announced the fact to his guests, and in a few minutes afterwards withdrew, leaving the party in the charge of the palace officials. On another occasion the Queen was holding a general reception. Several influential and wealthy American visitors to the Islands were desirous of being presented to Her Majesty. Minister Stevens met them at the palace, and when he got to the door of the throne room he left the party standing in the hallway while he marched in alone, and standing before the Queen hastily read over a list of names and marched out again, leaving his amazed countrymen and ladies to their own devices, from which awkward position they were rescued by the courtesy of the Queen's officials, and ushered into her presence. Again, at a state dinner at the palace, he signalized himself by killing mosquitoes, clapping both hands together with a loud report, letting the mosquitoes fall into his soup, from which he afterward picked them out. The onlookers and others at the table were simply paralyzed by his coarse breach of etiquette.

Upon another occasion at a luau given on the palace grounds, to which himself, wife, and family were invited, he created great irritation by his ungentlemanly and dictatorial insistence on having seats placed at the Royal table, when a table had been specially set apart for the families of diplomatic representatives, for his second daughter and lady friends. He expressed himself in language quite unbecoming a gentlemen of his position.

When raiding a Chinese gambling den, the police at one time arrested a murderous-looking inmate of the place, armed with a specially sharpened immense sheath knife. He was placed under arrest with a second charge of carrying a deadly weapon contrary to law. Minister Stevens immediately insisted on his release without trial, and the return of the deadly blade, as the Mongolian was an *attaché* of the legation, to-wit, his coachman, and was therefore privileged from arrest, notwithstanding the fact that he was not registered at the foreign office as such according to international law and custom. To avoid any further fuss with the American dictator, the murderous Celestial highbinder and criminal servant over whom had been unwarrantably thrown the *agis* of the American eagle, was released.

In April last, when V. V. Ashford, R. W. Wilcox, and others were under arrest on a charge of treason, a vagabond hoodlum, better known as "the bad man from Alabama," who had been parading up and down Merchant street, the principal business street, with cartridge belt stuck full of cartridges, and a Springfield rifle, loudly uttering that he was prepared to fall in when the word was given for a move to be made, on which he was promptly arrested by a police officer. Minister Stevens interfered in this man's behalf also, to secure his release, as he would no doubt have of the rest could he have even furbished up the slightest claim to interfere, and thus show his sympathy with revolutions and the enemies of Her Majesty's throne and life.

When it came to attempting to search for a missing boat from the wreck of the American ship *W. A. Campbell*, which contained six or seven men, a woman, and a young child, he refused to allow the *Boston* to go, on the grounds that he feared a revolution and damage to life

and property in its absence. This was during the Macfarlane-Neumann and the Cornwell-Nawahai cabinets regime, when the Thurston faction were in opposition. A few weeks later, when they had got into power, he took occasion to use the *Boston* to convey himself and family to Hawaii. The incident caused strong comment amongst Americans in Honolulu on his heartlessness and cowardice in taking care of Americans and American interests, and called forth several communications which were published in the *Daily Bulletin*, a leading newspaper owned by a private corporation. The articles referred to are as follows:

In the legislative assembly on Tuesday, the 27th of September, 1892, Noble Cornwell, under suspension of the rules, moved the following resolution:

"Whereas, information from authoritative sources has been received that an American vessel has been wrecked near the coast of Hawaii, and by reports of one boat's crew of survivors that another boat containing the captain and his wife, and other people, was still missing;

"Resolved, That Her Majesty's Government is hereby requested to inquire into the expediency of assisting the castaways, and is hereby authorized in that behalf to employ the services of one of the Inter-island steamers for the purpose of searching for the missing people, to render assistance if possible;

"Resolved, further, That the Government be authorized to incur the necessary expenses connected therewith."

On motion of Noble Baldwin the words "if deemed necessary" were added, and the resolution passed, and referred to the cabinet.

On the 28th of September the following communication appeared:

Editor Bulletin:

I would like to ask through your columns "of those who have the authority" why the U. S. S. *Boston* is not sent out in search of the missing boat of the American ship *Wm. A. Campbell*. I will venture to say that if the U. S. minister's or consul-general's wife and child were in that boat the *Boston* would have steamed to sea in search of it several days ago.

AN INDIGNANT AMERICAN.

In its issue of the 29th was this editorial:

The U. S. S. *Boston* leaves port this afternoon on a cruise in search of the missing boat of the lost ship *Wm. A. Campbell*. This movement is to be placed to the credit of the action taken by the Hawaiian Legislature on a resolution introduced by Noble Cornwell. While there is no certainty that the captain's party have either perished or been picked up, there is a chance that they may be found alive on the wide ocean by the cruiser. Better late than never that the search is instituted.

The above was one of the specifications in Minister Stevens' libel suit. "Another Indignant American," on the 30th says:

Editor Bulletin:

It is just one week ago to-night since the American Minister Stevens, Consul-General Severance, and the U. S. S. *Boston* were communicated with on the subject of instituting search for the missing boat's crew of the wrecked *W. A. Campbell*, a report of which appeared in the *Bulletin* first on last Friday afternoon. The answers were vague and indefinite, except such as received from the *Boston* which supplied the information that no instructions had been received. Now, this afternoon, the *Boston* starts on her belated trip in the cause of humanity. The excuse can not be offered that the attention of these officials was not drawn to the need for humane action, nor can poverty of the nation they represent be advanced, in atonement for disgusting quiescence. If the *Boston* comes across a ship's boat containing fourteen grinning ghastly corpses, including those of a loving mother and her babe—a woman and her child—it will not be a pleasant picture to contemplate, nor will it be a source of satisfaction to Hubites when they reflect upon the odium which has already been cast upon the namesake of the capital city of the old "Bay State," by the senility and Chinese-like stolidity of the man from Maine.

On October 1 "Looker-On" writes:

Editor Bulletin:

Last Friday, news was brought of a terrible disaster at sea. One boat was picked up off the Hawaiian coast, and the exhausted survivors were able to tell of the still more desperate condition of the occupants of another boat, supposed to be following the first. A woman in a delicate condition and a baby were sharing the awful hardships of the open sea in a small ship's boat. The vessel was American. In the port

of Honolulu was lying a ship of the much-vaunted Navy. Moreover, a large number of local steamers were anchored in the harbor waiting for employment. Thanks to private charity and generosity a short ineffectual search was made by the steamer *Kinau*, whose owners declined to receive remuneration for what, in their opinion, was the performance of an act of common humanity. Meanwhile, the *Boston* lies calmly as if nothing had happened. Her searchlights sweep the heavens at night, resting for a moment on the hotel cupola, then another moment on the rising tower of the American church, then flash away to far Waikiki or elsewhere, calculated no doubt to strike terror into the Hawaiian breast, and to show the futility of trying to evade the searching eye, not of Providence, but of Uncle Sam. There were those who said that it had been better if that light had swept the horizon beyond Hawaii for that speck in the wide ocean to which were clinging a mother and her child. However, nothing absolutely is done, except that some theories are propounded by the American consul-general. Besides this, nothing.

It is said on good authority that the captain of the *Boston* offered his ship, but that the American minister declined the offer. He was afraid, it is said, that something might happen if the *Boston* were to leave port. Here, then, two reflections arise. First, why is the *Boston* here at all? and, secondly, is it not manifest now that there are occasions when we are deprived of the maternal protection of the United States and need a small force of our own? Finally, seeing that humanity was being sacrificed to miserable considerations of politics, a member of the Hawaiian Legislature moves that steps be taken immediately to attempt relief to the unfortunate captain and his family. This poor little Kingdom, not in anyway connected with the disaster, was about to rescue citizens of the United States because the representatives of their own country would not move hand or foot. And this is the country to which the Advertiser invites us all to address ourselves for permanent protection and relief. An English man-of-war would have been under weigh within two hours of receiving the intelligence. The fact is, the American Republic has so much to think of at home that it has no time to spend over such trifles as shipwrecks. And, if in an unfortunate moment of mental obstruction Hawaii were ever to seek admission to the Union, she would find that this little Kingdom would be too small to occupy the absorbing interest which, according to the Advertiser, would be directed to her interests.

Minister Stevens took such exceptions to those articles that he forthwith visited the minister of foreign affairs, and stated that he wished a personal interview with Her Majesty, without informing the minister of the nature of his proposed visit. On the appointed day and hour, Minister Stevens, accompanied by Consul-General H. W. Severance, arrived at the palace. He was ushered into the Queen's presence with a document in one hand, which subsequently proved to be the articles that had been printed in the "Bulletin," already referred to, and a volume under his other arm. He was asked politely to take a seat, and did so, flinging one leg over the arm of the chair, and in this uncouth position before a lady he most heatedly announced to the Queen, and to her amazement, that he was there not as plain Mr. Stevens but as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States of America. Then drawing himself up to an erect posture, proceeded in a very ungentlemanly tone to inform the Queen that it "was the President of the United States of America addressing the Queen of Hawaii." He then went on to say that he was not to be insulted by any newspapers in her realm, and said he referred to certain articles which had been published in the "Bulletin," copies of which he had brought with him to place before Her Majesty. He expected an apology from the Queen, and also that she give him redress for the insult he had received. He then read extracts on "international law" from the book which he had carried under his arm. He also read an "amende honorable," which he insisted should be published in the "Bulletin," but was not. It was as follows:

We desire to express our deep regret for the admission to our columns of communications reflecting on official American representatives relative to the wrecked ship *Wm. A. Campbell*. We are satisfied that the insinuations and reflections contained in those communications are entirely unwarranted and unjust. The United States officials now at Honolulu are responsible to their own Government at Washington, and not to residents of foreign countries. Nor are they at liberty to explain

the reasons of their official actions in the public prints. Both the present minister and the consul-general, so far as we know, during their residence here, have always conducted themselves with discretion and propriety. These anonymous assaults upon them are wholly unjustifiable, and if this paper has in any way implied a reflection upon their official conduct we think it just to withdraw all such implication, and frankly make this "*amende honorable*."

Their excellencies Samuel Parker and Paul Neumann, Consul-General Severance and Her Majesty's chamberlain were witnesses to this extraordinary scene. At the conclusion of this most insane and unheard-of proceeding, charging her with something that she neither knew of or had any control over—namely, the conduct of a newspaper with which she had no connection—Her Majesty properly referred him to her ministers.

The cabinet, at Mr. Stevens' request and instance, commenced criminal proceedings for libel against the editor of the paper in question. The suit was afterwards withdrawn at the request of Mr. Stevens, when he found what a scrape he had got himself into, both at home and abroad, by his tyrannical and insolent action towards Her Majesty, and towards suppressing the privilege of free comments of the press on public men, which when an editor himself he had freely availed himself of, and which the Hawaiian, like the American, Constitution, expressly guarantees. His violation of diplomatic etiquette, by going direct to Her Majesty, without first stating the nature of his interview to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and his violent and personally insulting language, would anywhere else have caused his recall, as a *persona ingrata* to the Sovereign, but the Queen good-naturedly overlooked the insult and forgave his ignorance and ill-temper.

His actions were privately apologized for by Consul General Severance at a social at Fort Street Church, who said that if he had known the nature of the errand he would never have accompanied the minister. Previous to this incident he had been selected by American residents for the honor of giving an address at the decoration-day services. On that occasion he took the opportunity to air his antimonarchical sentiments by condemning all monarchies in general, and greatly reflected on the Hawaiian monarchy. Noble E. C. Macfarlane brought the matter up in the Legislature on a question of privilege, and a resolution was passed calling on Minister John L. Stevens to make an explanation to Her Majesty's Government, but influences were brought to bear, and the subject-matter was dropped from the records, on the ground that America might take it as an ungrateful action on the part of Hawaii, and it might influence the safety of a pending treaty then in the process of negotiation. He had made a somewhat similar public exposure of his sentiments in an address at the Young Men's Christian Association Hall previously. We shall now drop Minister Stevens' peculiar actions, and take up the consideration of Her Majesty's reign from the time when he first began his uncalled for interference with herself and her Government.

After the period of mourning the Queen went on several tours of inspection, visiting all of the islands and the most important districts on each. In every place she was most enthusiastically received by the foreigners as well as by the native Hawaiians. The evidences of her popularity with every class in every place were universal and sincere. The only ones who expressed any dissent were disappointed and disgruntled politicians who had failed to get any office or influence with her, such as Messrs. J. E. Bush, R. W. Wilcox, the Ashfords, and Rev. S. E. Bishop, but even these found the tide of popular feeling in her favor too hard to stem and too openly expressed to be disguised or

covered up. It may be stated here that after having showered on the Queen the most constant, and unlimited, and unparalleled abuse both in their newspapers and in the Legislature to which they were elected members, that towards the close of the session Messrs. Bush and Wilcox, with Mr. C. W. Ashford, proffered their services to help her in any way she deemed advisable, and professed extreme loyalty to and affection for her.

In due time the biennial election took place in February, 1892, and when the Legislature met in May it was found that the house was divided amongst three parties, the planting missionary element with Messrs. Thurston, Baldwin, and Smith at their head; the liberals, and the national reform party. The ministry were supported by the latter, and Thurston's party, in order to oust them and get into power, formed an unholy alliance with their political enemies, the liberals, by promising them a share of the power so gained and pledging themselves not to abandon the agreement until the Queen had given into their desires and appointed a cabinet of their nomination.

In order to give a fictitious color of constitutionality and liberty to their nefarious office and power-seeking schemes, Mr. Thurston enunciated the astonishing principles, not to be found in the Hawaiian constitution, that the Queen must appoint her cabinet on the dictation of whomsoever a majority of the legislature should nominate in caucus as the leader to select a ministry. In pursuance of this object ministry after ministry was rejected by a vote of these combined parties in the house, not with any regard to the merits of the gentlemen comprising them, but solely with a view towards compelling Her Majesty to assent to their return to full and uncontrolled power, although they represented but a minority of both the noble and the representative voters of the Kingdom. To secure their ends and keep their majority together the Thurston-Baldwin faction entered on a career of the most shameless corruption and bribery ever known in a Hawaiian Legislature, and by so doing defeated cabinet after cabinet. Finally, however, on a cabinet being selected by Her Majesty, every member of which either belonged to or strongly favored the interests of their clique, the alleged principle vanished into thin air, and they basely deserted their quondam liberal allies without compunction, having, as they thought, secured their return to power untrammelled till the following election in 1894.

Amongst the cabinets thus unceremoniously overthrown in their greed for office was that known as the Macfarlane-Neumann cabinet, consisting of Messrs. E. C. Macfarlane, Samuel Parker, Charles T. Gulick and Paul Neumann. This cabinet for talent, executive ability, honesty, patriotism, and integrity is probably unequaled in the history of the Kingdom. Every man in it was American, being either an American citizen or the descendant of one. It had the support and confidence of the financial and business circles. Yet by unblushing bribery and corruption, to the disgust of everyone, they were forced out of office on a second vote of "want of confidence," after the first one had failed. At this time, if the Queen had promulgated a new constitution and dissolved the Legislature she would have had an overwhelming support both from foreigners and Hawaiians.

It is to this period that we must also go for evidence that Messrs. Stevens and Wiltse had been for a long time engaged in conspiring to overturn the Monarchy here; for on the failure of the first vote of want of confidence in the Macfarlane-Neumann ministry, and before bribery had got in its work to secure a majority in favor of a second,

a provisional government was proposed to Messrs. Stevens and Wiltse by Messrs. J. A. Cummins and others of the then united faction of the liberals and Thurston crowd. They pledged themselves then to support such movement with all the forces at their disposal if the move could be made. This statement is made on the authority of a statement under oath by one who was present at a caucus held at Mr. Alex. Young's place at that time, when Mr. J. A. Cummins announced the fact to the meeting. The movement, however, was not made, as the public feeling of all classes at the time was so strong and bitter against the tactics of Messrs. Thurston and Co. that they knew that they would have suffered severely from the popular indignation if they attempted to do anything of the kind. They went as far as to try how many men they could enlist to serve their purpose, but met with such rebuffs and rebukes as to cause them to desist. Most of those whom they approached told them that they had not forgotten their behavior in the 1887 affair.

In the meantime the bribery had succeeded, the Macfarlane-Neumann cabinet were out, and after a short interval Messrs. Nawahi, Cornwell, Gulick, and Creighton were appointed as the cabinet, but were promptly voted out in a couple of hours after taking their seats. Although unwilling to surrender her constitutional prerogative at the demand of the Thurston faction, the Queen determined, in the interests of peace, to appoint her next cabinet from amongst the more moderate of their number, and did so, in the vain hope that that would cause them to run the country's business at least fairly to every party and stop. The ministry now appointed (the Brown-Wilcox ministry) was entirely satisfactory to the so-called reform party, but as their late allies (the liberals) had not been consulted in its formation, and were not represented in its composition, they refused to support it, and a spectacle was presented of a ministry governing the country who represented a minority in the house, and these but a feeble minority of the voters of the country. Such a state of affairs could not last, except under the peculiar electoral conditions of Hawaii, and only by political trickery and extensive bribery was it kept up.

Finally, however, the National Reform party and the Liberals coalesced and by the requisite majority, twenty-five out of forty-eight, voted the Brown-Wilcox pro-missionary combination out of office. Personally, I was sorry to see them retire from office, as I considered them moderate men, who would exercise their power in a conservative way until the following election in February next year, but the actions of the Reform party had been so unscrupulous that their opponents determined to force them out. They first tried to get them to resign by passing bills obnoxious to their policy, such as the opium license law, which was opposed by all but Cecil Brown (attorney-general), and the lottery bill; but finding them determined on holding office they united, as I before stated, and by appealing to the patriotic sentiments of the Hawaiian members prevented the Reform party's gold from having any effect, and carried the vote of "want of confidence" by a considerable majority and by the requisite legal number (twenty-five) of members of the House. I may now here mention the circumstances attending the formation of the new ministry and the new Constitution proposed to be promulgated.

My first knowledge that Her Majesty had received at this time any idea of promulgating a Constitution was about the 8th of January last, when we had some conversation on the subject, in which I objected to its suitability and feasibility at the time. Although I knew that she

thoroughly believed she was doing her duty in the matter as a Queen toward her people, her race, and her country, and that she was right in thus acting toward her people, who had come to her as a last resort, having failed to get their desires after trying every other means. I knew that she had received petitions from all sections of the group with over 10,000 signatures, praying her to help her people with their desires for a new Constitution.

The liberal party, which was elected on a platform in which the main plank was the calling of a constitutional convention, were at this time under the perfect control of the missionary wing of the reform party, under Thurston's leadership, had gone back on their pledges and refused to grant a constitutional convention for the purpose of preparing a new constitution satisfactory alike to Hawaiians and foreigners in a proper and amicable manner, and afterwards placing it before the people for its ratification and promulgation, although the petitions in favor of it had over 4,000 signatures of voters. To meet such treatment by the Legislature after these thousands had signified their desire for it, was hard for her people. The people appealed to her for redress, and she, in her sympathy for her people, although in the beginning of her reign was taunted as being too much in favor of and under the advice and influence of the foreigner, and against her own people and race, determined to show them that a Hawaiian monarch's chief care was to redress the wrongs of the Hawaiian people whenever they were in the right, and especially as she was advised that it simply needed the royal mandate to relieve the oppression. To find me, whom she considered would acquiesce to her every behest, opposing her, was a severe strain for a monarch, especially as she knew that I myself was in sympathy with the general idea of amending the constitution by having a new one. To be met with opposition when one expects acquiescence and obedience, is a severe strain to anyone, but more especially to a monarch, who is also a lady, accustomed, therefore, to have her slightest wishes regarded as law.

As nothing further was said until the 13th, I considered that the matter had dropped, but on that day, in talking over the matter of the new cabinet, which was to be appointed in presence of Her Majesty, the matter was brought up again; I again urged the objections which I felt to the step, and, as I thought, successfully.

On the 14th of January, while at the palace waiting with the other invited guests, after the ministers had retired for consultation, owing to the prolonged wait, Governor A. S. Cleghorn urged me to go into the blue room and see Her Majesty, and find out what was the cause of the delay. I saw Her Majesty and Minister S. Parker, and, after hearing the state of affairs, I said: "I'll make this proposition, as you have here only a native copy of the constitution; have you an English version?" She replied: "Yes." "Then send for it," I said, "and send for the rest of the Cabinet and let them look it over, and if they find there is nothing radically wrong in it, you then sign it and we will stand by its results; but if it is not right, you follow the advice of your ministers." To this proposition both Her Majesty and Mr. Parker agreed, and Mr. Parker sent for the other ministers, who returned to the palace. The English version of the constitution was sent for and brought in by a messenger.

The proposition was laid before the cabinet by myself, which they accepted and began to inspect the proposed constitution. Just then I received a message that I was wanted outside. I went out, when a note was handed to me stating that I was required immediately at the

police station. I therefore excused myself and left the blue room. I was met by the chief justice and others, who wanted to know what had taken place. As I was in haste, I simply told them that the ministry had returned and were now in the blue room with Her Majesty, and that the rumor of their resignation was untrue. I then went on to the station house, and on my arrival there I was informed that Messrs. Thurston and W. O. Smith of the missionary party were organizing and enlisting men to overthrow the Queen and her Government. After making inquiry, I found that they alleged they were organizing simply to support the ministry in opposing the Queen, in the event of her promulgating a new constitution, in defiance of the ministry, by force of arms, as Minister Colburn had called upon Mr. Thurston that afternoon for advice, and informed them that the Queen intended to promulgate a new constitution. Mr. Thurston had advised Mr. Colburn to oppose the measure, and not to resign; that they would render all the assistance necessary. Hence they were enlisting the men at W. O. Smith's office for that purpose.

As this seemed to me to be a legitimate purpose I did not make any arrests, but as I saw from the excited condition of these men (Thurston, Smith, etc.) that they saw an opportunity to raise trouble, and now that the news had spread around town and knots of men were discussing the situation on the street corners, I felt it my duty to make every preparation to preserve the peace and safety of the town if they attempted to proceed to any violent acts. I therefore gave my instructions to the police and the specials to be carefully on the lookout for any symptoms of this kind, and returned to the palace to see how matters were proceeding there. On my way there I was informed by those whom I met that the Queen had given way to the advice of her cabinet and that the constitution matter was postponed.

When I arrived at the palace I found all the guests had gone except a Hawaiian social club, who had prepared a "luau" in the basement of the palace to celebrate the prorogation, and that Her Majesty was just seated as I entered. I was shown to a seat opposite Her Majesty, but had no sooner sat down than I was telephoned for to go right back to the police station, as I was wanted on an important matter. On my arrival at the station house I was informed that Thurston and his party were holding another meeting at W. O. Smith's office, and were still enlisting men. This was at 5 p. m. I therefore sent out my special officers with instructions to report at once on the slightest sign of a disturbance, and putting the regular police force on double duty I kept an extra guard all night at the station house, and made every preparation necessary to quell immediately any disturbance which might arise. Other specials were sent out to shadow the principals in the move, and instructions were given to the police to arrest all persons on the streets found with arms and ammunition, and to keep a strict watch on the dealers in firearms and their places of business until otherwise ordered by myself.

By the advice and consent of the cabinet I ordered the saloons closed at 9 o'clock p. m., two hours and a half earlier than usual, in order to induce the usual Saturday night crowd to disperse to their homes, and so keep the streets clear. These precautions were taken, as I could not foresee what their next move would be. As matters had settled down to their normal condition, and peace and quietness prevailed throughout the city, I could not understand why the Thurston faction should continue to hold meetings and enlist men. Nothing occurred that night to denote any signs of disturbance, except the meet-

ings of the Thurston faction, and on Sunday, the 15th, I received information from one special that a meeting had been held at Thurston's residence the night previous, and kept up until late, at which a majority of those afterwards known as the committee of safety were present.

I have learned since from one of those who were present that the object of the meeting was to overthrow the Queen by force and bring about annexation, Mr. L. A. Thurston being the leader. Mr. A. S. Hartwell, who was present, opposed the move, as he thought it was not the proper way to bring about annexation, but Thurston and the others did not agree with him and ridiculed his objections, in consequence of which Mr. Hartwell had withdrawn from the compact and stated that he could not be a party to any such action, and retired from the meeting. At this meeting Thurston stated that Minister Stevens had promised to support them, if they proclaimed a provisional government, with troops from the U. S. S. *Boston*, and that their cause could not be a success without those troops and Minister Stevens's assistance.

Another special brought in word that they were still recruiting and arming, and that they could only rely on about seventy-five men and not over eighty stand of arms. From another I received information that L. A. Thurston, W. O. Smith, W. R. Castle, J. H. Soper, John Good, C. W. Zeigler, H. Waterhouse, C. L. Carter, J. A. McCandless, J. F. Morgan, A. Brown, W. W. Hall, J. H. Fisher, J. Emmeluth, W. Chan, and C. T. Wilder were all out working the matter up round town among people to see how many stood on the matter; that some were on horse-back and others in hacks. Other specials reported that some of the above named gentlemen were constantly in and out of Minister Stevens's house (the United States legation), also those of W. W. Hall, L. A. Thurston, F. W. Wundenberg, and H. Waterhouse. Another special reported that Messrs. Thurston and Colburn had visited A. P. Peterson's house early that morning, but could not learn what their course of action was, but something serious was under foot.

On receipt of these reports, more special officers were detailed to procure further information, and report as soon as possible. I then sent immediately for Capt. Nowlien, and telephoned for Mr. Peterson, the attorney-general, and arranged for a meeting of the cabinet at the police station. On Capt. Nowlien's arrival I imparted to him the information I had received, and requested him to prepare and get the barracks and his men ready for active service, as it was evident these people (the Thurston faction) meant business. I also asked him to lay the state of affairs in town before Her Majesty, as I had to go myself to the police station immediately.

On my arrival there, I found everything in regular order and the men fully prepared for any emergency. The attorney-general arrived shortly after, as also did the other members of the cabinet. I laid before them the reports of the situation furnished me by my special officers. They were not much surprised at receiving such information as they were in possession of similar facts themselves and also of documentary evidence of the same, which Mr. Peterson produced and which I considered was sufficient cause for the arrest of these men on a charge of treason.

After a short consultation, I made a proposition to swear out warrants for the arrest of the ringleaders of the plot at once. The attorney-general objected to the proposition, giving the following reasons, stating that he had been called on by Minister Colburn and Mr. L. A. Thurston early that morning at about 6 or 6:30 a. m., who made a proposition to him showing a course of procedure fully prepared, which, if carried out, would cause the overthrow of the Queen and her

Government, and the establishment of a Provisional Government in its place. That Thurston had then stated to Minister Colburn and himself that the American minister, Mr. Stevens, would support such a move with the United States troops from the U. S. S. *Boston*. And that he had also showed them a form or draft of a letter or request to be sent to Minister Stevens, requesting him to land the troops from the *Boston*, to assist Ministers Colburn and Peterson under the guise of maintaining order and protecting life and property, if they (Peterson and Colburn) would consent to sign it as attorney-general and minister of the interior.

I could see at once that this was a bait offered them to swallow to legalize the landing of the United States troops, and for them to nominally remain as cabinet officers of the Queen's, but actually seceding from her and thus dividing the executive, so that they being still in authority would support the cause of the rebels, and it would be an easy task for them to accomplish their ends without risking their lives, as their rebellious act would be termed a legal resistance, and thus they held out these inducements to Messrs. Colburn and Peterson to become traitors to the Queen and her Government. Mr. Peterson also said that the arrest of these parties would precipitate a conflict with the United States troops, if Mr. Thurston's statements were true, which he (Mr. Peterson) was satisfied they were, and that the troops would be landed in any case. I then said we can protest against their landing, and if they insist on landing for any other purpose than for that of protecting the United States consulate and legation, that this Government will resist them, and so, in other words, the United States would have to declare war against this Government, and I doubt whether they would fire a shot in that case, as I doubt that Minister Stevens has the authority to declare war against a friendly nation, and furthermore we are in a position to resist all the troops that can land, as their complement, all told, is not over 250 men, and not more than 175 of these could be landed at the outside.

We can oppose them now with over 500 men, two Gatling guns, and a battery of artillery of about 12 pieces (rifled Austrian breech-loaders), with six or seven hundred rounds of ammunition, shot, shell, and shrapnel, and about fifty or sixty thousand rounds for Springfield and Winchester rifles, to say nothing of what the volunteers may have. The ministry then decided to inquire from Minister Stevens himself how far he was supporting the plotters with the United States troops, and to seek advice from and consult with those prominent business men who were friendly to the Queen's government, and also with the consuls and members of the diplomatic corps. Here our interview ceased for that morning, and Colburn, Cornwell, and Parker started off to arrange a meeting with those just mentioned for 2 p. m. that day.

When making my rounds about the city that afternoon in a hack with Mr. S. F. Chillingsworth, who became my deputy on the following day, while on our way down Nuuanu avenue I drew his attention as also that of the hackman when passing the United States legation to the presence of Messrs. L. A. Thurston, W. O. Smith, and A. S. Hartwell inside, and to that of Mr. C. L. Carter on horseback outside in the street apparently waiting for instructions. What were these people doing there, especially at that time on a Sunday, about 3 p. m. or a little after?

After returning to the office Mr. Colburn came along looking for W. O. Smith or Thurston. I told him I had just seen them at Minister Stevens's (the United States legation). About 4 p. m. I saw posters being put up which the conspirators had drawn up and had printed

that day, calling for a mass meeting on Monday afternoon, and signed "committee of safety." I met the cabinet at dinner at the Hawaiian hotel, and they stated to me that the result of their meeting at 2 p. m. had been satisfactory, and that they had decided that the Queen should issue a proclamation in the morning to the effect that she would not attempt to promulgate a new constitution again, as a guarantee of good faith to the diplomatic and consular corps, and that the course of the cabinet had the support of the merchants and business men who had attended the meeting. They also informed me that they had arranged for another meeting at the attorney-general's office for that evening at 8 o'clock.

After dinner, a little after 7 o'clock, we all left the hotel to go to the meeting at the attorney-general's office, excepting Ministers Parker and Peterson, who proceeded to the United States Legation to see Minister Stevens in regard to the situation, and get some definite answer as to his action in the event of an uprising. The meeting did not take place until 8:30 p. m., although Messrs. Parker and Peterson returned from Mr. Stevens's about 8 o'clock, as we waited for the arrival of the Hon. Paul Neumann. On his arrival at 8:30 o'clock the meeting opened for business. Mr. Peterson stated the object of the meeting was to devise ways and means to overcome the action of the conspirators in the event of an uprising. He also stated that he had been to see Mr. Stevens, the American minister, as to the stand he would take in regard to the conspirators, and the reply which Mr. Stevens had given Mr. Parker and himself was that he was ready to support a provisional government with United States troops from the *Boston*, which meant no doubt that he was against the continuance of the Queen's government, and he also stated to me that I was a scoundrel. When asked the reason of this statement, he said that it was because I had arrested his coachman, a Chinese, and other matters which he did not specify. We then discussed the question of the *Boston* landing its troops in regard to its legality, violation of international laws, etc. The force we had at our disposal was also discussed, as were other matters, such as the propriety of holding a mass meeting, the proposed proclamation by the Queen and cabinet, the proposed Provisional Government by the conspirators, the subject of arms and ammunition, and other cognate matters.

More information was supplied here, as to the force and strength at the command of the Thurston faction. I proposed that the ringleaders should be arrested at once, and that all arms and ammunition in the town be seized, and the island put under martial law till the arrests were effected. Messrs. Peterson and Neumann both objected, on the grounds that it would precipitate a conflict, as Minister Stevens had already declared himself, and that we must at all hazards avoid a conflict with the United States troops. A committee was appointed to draw up a resolution and to call a mass meeting in support of the cabinet's action, and other matters. The meeting then adjourned, and the committee met at once for the transaction of their business.

After the meeting at the attorney-general's office I went to the police station with those of my staff, and prepared a map and an outline of defense showing the outposts and the number of the men required to guard the town in the event of martial law being proclaimed by the Queen. The cabinet had concluded to make the police station their headquarters. The map also showed the number of pickets required for each guard, also the distance to and from all important buildings, as the station house, palace, barracks, Government buildings, and other strategic points, also the U. S. S. *Boston* from the same points. The police station itself was safe from the line of fire of the *Boston*, as there

were brick buildings full of sugar or other goods of a similar nature between the two spots, and the building was safe from being undermined, as the foundation is one solid mass of concrete from the coral of bed rock, and it would take months to undermine this, even with the most improved implements. As on the previous evening, I kept an extra guard at the police station all night. That night I received information that a caucus had been held at Mr. Henry Waterhouse's.

The following Monday, the 16th, I received information that the committee of safety were to meet at Thurston's office. I went over shortly afterwards to Mr. Thurston's office and met him and asked of him what they intended to do to-day, and also said to him that they had gone too far, as the matter of the promulgation of a new constitution was now settled and there would be a proclamation issued by the Queen to that effect. Thurston said, "I am sorry for the country, but what guaranty have we that this will not happen again. It is living on a volcano; there is no telling when it will explode." At this, I said if the foreign representatives are satisfied with the proclamation, that you people should be, and also as long as I was there it would not occur again in that way. He then replied: "Suppose you were to die to-night, what then?" I said "That is going to extremes; you are unreasonable, and we can not come to any terms." He said: "Charlie, it can not be helped now; it has gone too far and there is no one to blame but herself." I said: "I am sorry we can not agree about that," and left him. While I was talking with him I could see the members of the committee coming upstairs and going into the office formerly occupied by Mr. Frear, and close the door after entering. I then went over to the police station and gave instructions for the enlistment of men as special constables, and also sent an armed guard to the attorney-general's office in charge of Capt. R. P. Waipa, to receive instructions from the attorney-general, Mr. A. P. Peterson.

At 10 a. m. a committee from the conspirators had a meeting with the cabinet in the foreign office. I sent for Capt. Nowlien and told him to enlist volunteers and to send me 75 stand of Winchester repeating rifles, and for him to take what ammunition was wanted for the artillery (as it was then in my custody), and to get all the powder he required from the Government public powder magazine, and put it in the magazine at the barracks. By 12 m. the above was carried out and I had 700 men and over enrolled, mostly Hawaiians ready to take up arms in support of the Queen's Government, and a reserve of about 500 men, mostly foreigners. At about 12:30 p. m. the Queen's proclamation was printed and circulated throughout the city. It read as follows:

BY AUTHORITY.

Her Majesty's ministers desire to express their appreciation for the quiet and order which has prevailed in this community since the events of Saturday, and are authorized to say that the position taken by Her Majesty in regard to the promulgation of a new constitution was under the stress of her native subjects. Authority is given for the assurance that any changes desired in the fundamental law of the land will be sought only by methods provided in the constitution itself. Her Majesty's ministers request all citizens to accept the assurance of Her Majesty in the same spirit in which it is given.

LILIUOKALANI,
SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
W. H. CORNWELL,
Minister of Finance.
JOHN F. COLBURN,
Minister of the Interior.
A. P. PETERSON,
Attorney-General.

As both mass-meetings were called for 2 p. m., I sent a squad of police to each place to preserve the peace and keep order if necessary. About 3:30 p. m. the meetings had both adjourned, and the city was quiet, there were no signs of any disturbance or disorder of any kind. The attendance at the Thurston meeting was reported to me by count as being between five and six hundred people, mainly foreigners, and that at the Palace Square was estimated as numbering about 3,000. Both meetings were conducted in a very orderly manner, and there was no call for the services of the police at either meeting.

The meeting at the new armory, on Beritania street, was presided over by the Hon. W. C. Wilder, a member of the Legislature, and was addressed in several inflammatory speeches against the Queen by the Hons. W. C. Wilder, L. A. Thurston, A. Young, and H. P. Baldwin, also by Messrs. H. F. Glade (the German consul), C. Bolte, J. Emmeluth, and R. J. Greene. No hint, however, was given of the proposal to change the form of Government, although the Queen's proclamation was read and referred to as being of no value. The following resolutions were passed at the meeting:

(1) Whereas Her Majesty Liliuokalani, acting in conjunction with certain other persons, has illegally and unconstitutionally and against the advice and consent of the lawful executive officers of the Government, attempted to abrogate the existing constitution and proclaim a new one in subversion of the rights of the people;

(2) And whereas such attempt has been accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed and a display of armed force, and such attempt and acts and threats are revolutionary and treasonable in character;

(3) And whereas Her Majesty's cabinet have informed her that such contemplated action was unlawful and would lead to bloodshed and riot, and have implored and demanded of her to desist from and renounce such proposed action;

(4) And whereas such advice has been in vain, and Her Majesty has in a public speech announced that she was desirous and ready to promulgate such constitution, the same being now ready for such purpose, and that the only reason why it was not now promulgated was because she had met with unexpected obstacles and that a fitting opportunity in the future must be awaited for the consummation of such object, which would be within a few days;

(5) And whereas at a public meeting of citizens held in Honolulu on the 14th day of January instant, a committee of thirteen, to be known as the "committee of public safety," was appointed to consider the situation and to devise ways and means for the maintenance of the public peace and safety and the preservation of life and property;

(6) And whereas such committee has recommended the calling of this mass meeting of citizens to protest against and condemn such action; and has this day presented a report to such meeting denouncing the action of the Queen and her supporters as being unlawful, unwarranted, in derogation of the rights of the people, endangering the peace of the community, and tending to excite riot and cause the loss of life and destruction of property:

Now, therefore, we, the citizens of Honolulu, of all nationalities, and regardless of political party affiliations, do hereby condemn and denounce the action of the Queen and her supporters;

And we do hereby ratify the appointment and indorse the action taken and report made by the said committee of safety; and we do hereby further empower such committee to further consider the situation and further devise such ways and means as may be necessary to secure the permanent maintenance of law and order and the protection of life, liberty, and property in Hawaii.

Many of those present did not vote, and I was informed that the enthusiasm and applause came only from those who were previously acquainted with the objects of the leaders and were instructed to applaud at the proper time and place.

At the meeting at Palace Square the assembled multitude were addressed by the Hons. A. Rosa, J. E. Bush, J. Nawahi, and R. W. Wilcox, who severally cautioned the people against any acts of violence or turbulence, and urged them to support the course of Her Majesty's

cabinet. The Queen's proclamation was read and heartily indorsed by all present, and the following resolution was unanimously passed:

Resolved, That the assurance of Her Majesty, the Queen, contained in this day's proclamation is accepted by the people as a satisfactory guaranty that the Government does not and will not seek any modification of the constitution by any other means than those provided in the organic law;

Resolved, That accepting this assurance the citizens here assembled will give their cordial support to the administration and indorse them in sustaining that policy.

A committee was appointed to present it to Her Majesty, which they immediately proceeded to do.

The meetings seemed to have been safety valves for letting loose whatever excess of feeling there may have been in the popular mind, for by 4 p. m. it seemed as if the dissatisfaction was all over, as there was scarcely anyone to be seen on the streets. It was like a calm after the storm. About 4:30 p. m. I got information that the *Boston's* men were ordered to land. A watch was set to give the signal as soon as signs of activity should be shown on board the *Boston*, and in the meantime I sent for the cabinet. It was difficult to find them, not having seen or heard from them all day, and they could not be located as soon as they might have been.

About 4:40 p. m. the signal was given that the boats were being got ready on board the *Boston*, and that the artillery and gatling guns were being put into the boats, also the men were armed with small arms. At a little before 5 o'clock they were landed at the regular landing near Brewer & Co.'s and Charlton's wharf. I therefore sent a messenger down to find out who permitted them to land, or requested them to do so. The messenger returned and stated that they did not know themselves, but that they were to receive their instructions from shore, and that Mr. C. L. Carter had just got there and was giving instructions to the officers, as he judged by their actions.

About this time the cabinet arrived at the station house, and I reported what had taken place to them. Mr. Cornwell suggested that Messrs. Parker and Colburn go and see Mr. Stevens and protest against such actions. They started on that errand at once, Mr. Cornwell remaining at the station house. A little after 5 p. m. the American forces marched from the boat landing along Queen street and turned up Fort street and halted at the corner of Merchant and Fort streets, two doors off of which is the United States consulate.

There were three companies of blue jackets with Springfield rifles or small arms, one company of blue jackets with the Gatling guns and artillery, and a company of marines in full arms, having a total strength of 150 to 155 men in all ranks, fully equipped for actual service, with full belts of ammunition, and the caissons attached to the artillery were also full. At this point the company of marines were left to occupy the consulate. A company of blue jackets were ordered to the United States legation, and the remaining companies were marched up Merchant street into Palace Square, thence along King street between the palace and the Government buildings, and were halted in front of Mr. Hopper's residence, on the south corner of the palace inclosure, in full view of Her Majesty the Queen, about 200 yards away from the palace and the Government buildings. They remained there till after dusk, when they were marched out along King street to Mr. Atherton's residence, a distance of about 600 yards, and then stopped until they had some light refreshments of bananas and lemonade. Afterwards they were marched back to town and took up quarters for the night at the Arion Hall, a building separated from the Government

buildings by a lane known as Mililani street, about 20 feet wide, and not more than 200 yards directly in front of the Queen's palace.

Messrs. Peterson, Parker, Colburn, and Cornwell, after returning from the Government building, reported to me that Mr. Stevens had stated that he had landed the troops at the request of Mr. Thurston and the committee of safety, and that they (the cabinet) had protested against the landing of the troops, and requested the U. S. minister to withdraw the United States forces from the shore, but were refused or did not get any reply. Then the cabinet left me to attend another meeting of the Queen's friends. After the meeting the attorney-general, Mr. Peterson, returned to the station house, and remained with me there during the night. At 11:30 p. m. a special officer reported to me that the conspirators were now recruiting at Klemme's lodging house on Fort street, and that Mr. J. H. Fisher and J. B. Castle were there. I again proposed to Mr. Peterson to proclaim martial law in the morning and get out warrants for the arrest of the conspirators, and showed him a proclamation to that purpose, ready prepared for the signatures of the Queen and the governor of the island of Oahu. I also proposed placing an armed force in the Government building, but he thought that it was no use to send armed men there, as it was a bad building to defend, especially if Minister Stevens insists on continuing to support the conspirators, as we can not afford to fight the United States of America. Better let the matter rest until the morning and see what may develop.

Perfect quietness reigned through the city, there being a band concert at the hotel, which was attended by a large and peaceable crowd, as usual. The city was patrolled as usual by the regular police force, and, as before, I had a strong guard at the station house in case of a night attack. There were no unusual incidents during the night, with the exception of two fire alarms, neither serious, one a little before 12 m., and the other about 3 a. m., which were promptly extinguished by the fire department, which, by order of the cabinet, had been kept ready for immediate service ever since Saturday night, as also were the waterworks employes kept on duty in case these people might, in the fury of defeat or with a view of creating an occasion for the United States troops to interfere, attempt to create an incendiary scare. Every precaution was taken by Her Majesty's cabinet and every means that lay in their power was made use of to secure the protection of life and property, and nothing was lacking in this respect, so that nothing warranted the landing of troops from the *Boston*, as the Queen's government was in a position to put down any insurrection if left without interference from any foreign power. On Tuesday, the 17th, everything appeared very quiet, so much so that I dismissed the extra guards at the police station, but I still kept on the watchers on the stores of the dealers in arms and ammunition.

About 9:30 a. m. I received information that a meeting was held at the residence of Mr. H. Waterhouse, at which were present H. Waterhouse, T. F. Lansing, S. B. Dole, W. R. Castle, C. L. Carter, J. H. Soper, F. W. Wundenberg, W. W. Hall, J. A. McCandless, J. Emmeluth, and a number of others. I afterwards learned from one who was present at that meeting that discussion of various plans was had, and a committee of three was appointed to personally confer with Minister Stevens, and received his direct and personal assurance that they would get the support of the United States troops if they went on with the affair. Messrs. Soper, Carter, and Waterhouse were the committee. They went over to the United States legation, which is on the premises adjoining that

of Waterhouse, and returning immediately reported that Mr. Stevens had given them such assurance. At this meeting, also, Mr. S. B. Dole, was offered the presidency of the proposed Provisional Government. He said that he really was not an annexationist, and asked time to consider the proffer. The meeting adjourned to meet again in the morning to discuss matters, and appointed a committee to meet the Queen's cabinet at 10 a. m. at the foreign office.

The conspirators had agreed to proclaim a Provisional Government to overthrow the Hawaiian monarchy perpetually, and place either Chief Justice Judd or Justice S. B. Dole at its head, and that they were to hold another meeting before noon. At 11 a. m. I was informed that they had concluded to accept S. B. Dole as president of the Provisional Government, and that they had a guarantee from Minister Stevens of his support, backed by the troops, and that they would make a move on the Government House at 3 p. m. and on the police station at 4 p. m. I also received information at the same time that they would rendezvous at the armory on Beritania street. I immediately sent for the cabinet, and also for Capt. Nowlien; Nowlien came, but there were no signs of the cabinet. I gave Capt. Nowlien instructions to have 25 or 50 men in the basement of the palace ready for immediate service, as I expected the conspirators would make an attempt this afternoon. I also explained that I had been waiting for the ministers or a word from them ever since morning, and had sent several messengers to them, but they were closeted in the foreign office in consultation, and had received in return promises to come or send me word, but as yet there had been no appearance of anything of the kind. Capt. Nowlien then went back to the palace to get ready, as I told him his men might be required to be sent to guard the Government building as soon as the cabinet finished their meeting there, and if so I would let him know. I then sent out word for all the volunteers to report for duty promptly at 12 noon at the station house, and called in all of the regular police who were off duty to be at the station house at once.

At 1 p. m. I had 224 men under arms, and more men were coming in than I could find guns for, and fresh volunteers were coming in so fast that I finally instructed my men in charge not to register any more, as we had more than enough already. A little after 2 p. m. the ministers came down to the station house, and a few minutes later word was sent in that a police officer had been shot by John Good. A little later the officer came down the street, supported by a brother officer and Mr P. M. Rooney to the station house. The officer, whose name was Leialoha, was at once attended to by Dr. C. A. Peterson, the police physician, who was on hand at the time. Leialoha was then sent to the Queen's hospital. He was one of those who were on special detail, watching the stores of the dealers in arms and ammunition, and was shot in attempting to make the arrest of Mr Good, when he with others was removing firearms and ammunition in a wagon from the store of E. O. Hall & Son, limited, for the use of the insurgents. It was a very fortunate thing for Good and the others that the police on street duty were kept without firearms by my orders, as I had no desire to excite or terrify the people by any display of arms or armed men on the streets.

This occurrence, however, brought the people's excitement up to fire-heat, and people of both natives and foreigners flocked down to the station house by the hundreds to volunteer, and were in such an excited state that I was compelled to close the doors of the station house, for fear that the mob of volunteers would interfere with the discipline of

the men already under arms, and so begin a disturbance which would end in a conflict which foreign forces would call an opportunity to interfere in, under the pretence of upholding law and order. At 2:15 p. m. I received information that the conspirators were holding a meeting in W. O. Smith's office, and about 2:45 p. m. Mr. C. J. McCarthy came down from the Government building and stated that a Provisional Government had been proclaimed, with Mr. S. B. Dole as president. This was confirmed shortly afterwards by Mr. F. P. Hastings, secretary of the foreign office, and also by Mr. E. Norrie.

Previous to the proclamation of the Provisional Government, the forces from the *Boston* were drawn up in line of battle under command of Capt. Wiltse, facing the side of the Government building, and that prior to the proclamation, Mr. C. L. Carter, one of the conspirators, afterwards one of the commissioners to Washington, rode up on horseback and handed a large official document to Capt. Wiltse. This contained his orders from Minister Stevens presumably. I received information a little later that the proclamation had been read by H. E. Cooper, a lawyer recently arrived in the country, who had been an unsuccessful candidate for the office of circuit judge, and that thirty-five of the men, known as the "Drei Hundred," were then armed and in possession of the Government building.

After hearing of these actions of the now open rebels against Her Majesty and her Government, I proposed to the cabinet to send our armed forces out from all quarters, surround them, and shoot them down, as they were only a handful. Mr. Peterson, as before, urged that it would only accelerate a conflict with the United States troops, as he and Mr. Parker had been told by Mr. Stevens that the Provisional Government would be supported by the United States forces. On this the cabinet, with the coöperation of Messrs. E. C. Macfarlane, A. Rosa, and others, after consultation, decided to address a letter to Minister Stevens at once, to find out if he had recognized the Provisional Government. The letter was as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, etc.:

SIR: Her Hawaiian Majesty's Government having been informed that certain persons to them unknown have issued proclamation declaring a Provisional Government to exist in opposition to Her Majesty's Government, and having pretended to depose the Queen, her cabinet and marshal, and that certain treasonable persons at present occupy the Government building in Honolulu with an armed force, and pretending that your excellency, on behalf of the United States of America, has recognized such Provisional Government, Her Majesty's Government asks respectfully: Has your excellency recognized said Provisional Government, and, if not, Her Majesty's Government, under the above existing circumstances, respectfully requests the assistance of your Government in preserving the peace of the country.

We have the honor to be your excellency's obedient servants.

SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
WM. H. CORNWELL,
Minister of Finance,
JOHN F. COLBURN,
Minister of the Interior,
A. P. PETERSON,
Attorney-General.

HONOLULU, January 17, 1893.

The Hon. C. L. Hopkins was the bearer of the above communication to Minister Stevens, and was instructed to wait until he had received a reply. He returned to the station house with Mr. Stevens' reply at

about 3:30 p. m. or later, and handed it to the attorney-general. It was shown me by Mr. E. C. Macfarlane, and was substantially to this effect:

That he acknowledged the receipt of the letter from the cabinet, and that a Provisional Government had been duly constituted in the place of the Queen's Government, and that that Government was in possession of the Government building, the treasury and the Government archives, and was in control of the islands; and that he recognized that Government as the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands. He signed this simply as John L. Stevens, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States.

The governor of the island of Oahu sent the following protest against the landing of the troops from the U. S. S. *Boston* on the evening of the 16th of January:

OFFICE GOVERNOR OF OAHU,
Honolulu, January 16, 1893.

SIR: It is my duty to solemnly protest to your excellency against the landing this evening without permission from the proper authorities of an armed force from the United States ship *Boston*. Your excellency well knows that when you have desired to land naval forces of the United States for the purpose of drill, permission by the local authorities has been readily accorded. On the present occasion, however, the circumstances are different, and ostensibly the present landing is for the discharge of functions which are distinctly responsible duties of the Hawaiian Government. Such being the case, I am compelled to impress upon your excellency the international questions involved in the matter and the grave responsibility thereby assumed.

While solemnly protesting to your excellency against this unwarrantable proceeding to which I have referred,

I have the honor to remain, sir, your excellency's obedient and humble servant,
A. S. CLEGHORN,
Governor of Oahu.

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary United States of America.

Minister Stevens's reply to Governor Cleghorn was as follows:

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

SIR: Yours of yesterday, the 16th, regarding the landing of the United States naval forces in Honolulu, is received. I have carefully read its terms and import. My responsibility as the United States minister plenipotentiary at this critical time in Hawaiian affairs it is impossible for me to ignore. I assure you that in whatever responsibility the American diplomatic and naval representatives have assumed for may assume, we shall do our utmost to regard the welfare of all present and interests concerned.

Yours sincerely, and with the kindest consideration,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Hon. A. S. CLEGHORN,
Governor of Oahu.

About 4 p. m. a committee from the Provisional Government met Her Majesty's cabinet, and made a proposition for the settlement of the crisis. After the committee meeting Mr. S. M. Damon, on behalf of the rebels, made demand on me to surrender, which I refused to do. He said that Her Majesty's cabinet were willing that I should do so on the following terms, which he proposed, viz: That the Queen be deposed under protest, and remain in her palace with her guards until the affair was settled by decision of the United States Government. I stated to Mr. Damon and Mr. Macfarlane, who accompanied him, that if Her Majesty and the ministers were satisfied with those terms I would surrender, but only on the written order of the whole cabinet, approved by Her Majesty; and that unless I received such order in writ-

ing I would fight first, and would commence operations at once and order Captain Nowlien, who was awaiting orders, to open fire at once from our artillery on the Government building, and that the *Boston's* men must keep out of harm's way or suffer the consequences. They then left me to meet the cabinet again, and said they would let me know later. About 5:30 or 6 p. m. Messrs. Peterson and Macfarlane returned and handed me the following written order from the cabinet:

C. B. WILSON, Esq.,
Marshal of the Kingdom,

You are hereby authorized to surrender to the so-called Provisional Government this day established, headed by S. B. Dole, esq., the police station and Oahu prison and Government property in your possession or under your control.

Dated at Honolulu this 17th day of January, A. D. 1893.

LILIUOKALANI R.
SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
JOHN F. COLBURN,
Minister of the Interior.
WM. H. CORNWELL,
Minister of Finance.
A. P. PETERSON,
Attorney-General.

However, I did not make up my mind to give in finally until about 7 p. m. About 6 p. m. martial law was proclaimed by the Provisional Government. About 6.30 p. m. or later the cabinet returned to the station house in company with Messrs. E. C. Macfarlane, P. Neumann, A. Rosa, and others, and we held a council over the situation, as I was not yet quite satisfied what was the best course to pursue. On the advice of the cabinet and the above-mentioned gentlemen I gave way, and surrendered under the terms of the Queen's protest, which was shown me by the cabinet. It was as follows:

I, Liliuokalani, by the grace of God and under the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against any and all acts done against myself and the constitutional Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming to have established a Provisional Government of and for this Kingdom.

That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America, whose minister plenipotentiary, his excellency John L. Stevens, has caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the said Provisional Government.

Now, to avoid any collision of armed forces, and perhaps the loss of life, I do under this protest and impelled by said force yield my authority until such time as the Government of the United States shall, upon the facts being presented to it, undo the action of its representative and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

Done at Honolulu this 17th day of January, A. D., 1893.

LILIUOKALANI R.
SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
WM. H. CORNWELL,
Minister of Finance.
JNO. F. COLBURN,
Minister of the Interior.
A. P. PETERSON,
Attorney-General.

To S. B. DOLE, Esq., and others composing the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

This was received by Mr. Dole on behalf of the Provisional Government, and indorsed as follows:

Received by the hands of the late cabinet this 17th day of January, 1893.

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Chairman of Executive Council of Provisional Government.

About 7:15 p. m. I disarmed all the volunteers I had under my command at the station house, and in dismissing them to their homes I made a few remarks to them explaining the situation, that in order to save useless bloodshed Her Majesty had, on the advice of her cabinet, determined to submit to the United States force, and that she had ordered me to submit also and surrender the arms, ammunition, and other Government property to the Provisional Government, awaiting the decision of the United States, and that I would recommend them to go quietly to their homes and say or do nothing to cause any trouble to or irritation on the part of those now in power. They promised this unaniously and gave three hearty cheers. Mr. Peterson, the attorney-general, also made a few remarks, showing that it was not cowardice or fear on the part of those in authority that had caused them to take this action but simply the action of the United States representative and troops, with whom we desired no conflict. Mr. Neumann and others also spoke in the same strain, and after giving three hearty cheers again, the men dispersed quietly.

About 7:30 p. m., Messrs. J. H. Soper and J. A. McCandless came to the station house, and I formally delivered to Mr. Soper, as commander-in-chief of the Provisional Government's forces, representing the Provisional Government, the police station and the munitions of war stored therein. At about 8 p. m., a detachment of the Provisional Government's troops took possession. In the meantime, I introduced Mr. Soper to the regular police force as the person from whom they must take their orders in the future, in the following speech, which was interpreted to the men by Capt. A. S. Mahaulu:

Officers and members of the police force of Honolulu: It is with deep regret that I have to inform you that I have been requested by Her Majesty the Queen and her cabinet to surrender to Mr. Soper, commander in chief of the forces of the Provisional Government, all arms and ammunition, the police station, and all property under my control.

Gentlemen, it is not because I thought that you would not stand and fight, it is not because I could not trust you, and not because I was afraid that we would not win if we did fight, it was not for any of those causes, but it was in the cause of humanity that I gave way, especially when it was pointed out to me that we would have to fight a great nation like the United States with her millions of men, and to do this would only cause the sacrifice of hundreds of valuable human lives, which this country can not afford to lose without achieving finally the result we hope for. But, gentlemen, I was perfectly satisfied that you were ready, nay, more than ready, willing to stay by me in the defense of our Queen and country. I am satisfied if we had had a conflict to-day with the rebels we would have won, notwithstanding the aid of the *Boston's* men; but what would have been the result? We would have been forced to give way in the end, after having caused a great loss of life, and among the victims would have been many of our personal friends, and perhaps ourselves. It is better, therefore, to give way to the forces of the United States, and await patiently the time until our Queen's protest shall have been heard by that great and good nation, the American Republic, from which I have no doubt we will receive justice, and that they will have restored to us our country and Government.

In conclusion, gentlemen, I thank you for your attention, and especially for obedience to orders and instructions during my incumbency, and for the loyalty to your Queen and country you have always shown, but especially to-day. And I ask of you all to remain in the police force, to be as loyal to my successor as you have been to me, and to assist him and the new Government in perserving the peace and in maintaining law and order. With these words, I thank you again for your attention. Aloha.

The men then gave three hearty cheers, after which Mr. Soper took formal charge of the police station and made a short address to the men. This concluded the events of the day as far as I was personally concerned, and I went to my home.

On Wednesday morning Her Majesty received a verbal message from the executive and advisory councils, through her chamberlain, to the

effect that it was the desire of the councils that she should move from the palace to Washington Place, her private residence, on Beritania street; and also, that the royal standard was not to be hoisted. The above action was contrary to the terms of the surrender. At about 11 o'clock a. m. Her Majesty went out for a drive and did not again return to the palace.

Respectfully submitted.

C. B. WILSON.

MAY 15, 1893.

No. 61.

Interview of F. Wundenberg.

Q. What were the reasons which caused the Queen to desire a new constitution?

A. Her native Hawaiian subjects urged the measure. A great number of petitions, numerous signed, from all parts of the Kingdom were presented to her praying for a new Constitution, and delegations of her people waited on her, all clamoring for the restoration of the rights enjoyed and exercised by the native rulers and people under the Constitution of 1864.

Q. What objection had the native Hawaiians to the constitution of 1887?

A. The natives looked upon the Constitution of 1887 as having been illegally forced upon the nation, as it was not submitted to the vote of either the people or the Legislative Assembly. They felt that it was an outrage and denounced it as "the bayonet Constitution." The "Hui-Kalainaina" (National Party) was a native organization started shortly after the revolution of 1887, having branches in the remotest parts of the Kingdom. The avowed object of the party was to oppose the Constitution of 1887, and its supporters and candidates for Legislative honors were required to pledge themselves to work for a new Constitution.

Q. Was any action taken in the Legislature relative to a new Constitution?

A. Several native members presented resolutions in the Assembly having for their object the election of a Constitutional Convention. These resolutions were either ruled out on technicalities or voted down through the influence of the people now in power. Consequently very strong and bitter speeches were made by several native leaders such as Bush, Wilcox, Kaunamano, White, and others, which convinced the Queen that a crisis had arisen which left her no choice but to give heed to the unmistakable wish of her native subjects, or throw herself wholly into the hands of those who had promulgated the Constitution of 1887, and abandon forever her native subjects to their fate.

The murmurs against the Queen were growing louder from day to day, showing a gradual alienation of the natives from their Sovereign on account of her inaction.

Q. Did the natives think the Queen had the right to promulgate a new Constitution at her own will?

A. They most certainly did. They would have been satisfied, in fact would have preferred, that the whole matter should have been handled by a Constitutional Convention; but they could not see why a Constitution proclaimed by their Sovereign would not be fully as legal and

binding (if not more so) as a Constitution proclaimed by a self-constituted committee and maintained by bayonets against the will of both the Sovereign and people.

The committee of safety met at the office of W. O. Smith, in Fort street, Honolulu, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon of Monday, the 16th day of January, 1893, for the purpose of discussing the necessary steps to be taken in forming a new government.

Shortly after the committee met, it was decided that they were not ready for the landing of the American troops, and a committee of three, with Thurston as the chairman, was immediately dispatched to the American legation to prevail upon Mr. Stevens to delay the landing of the *Boston's* men. The committee returned shortly, and reported that Mr. Stevens had said to them: "Gentlemen, the troops of the *Boston* land this afternoon at 5 o'clock, whether you are ready or not." The foregoing report of Mr. Stevens' reply to the committee is as nearly literal as can be remembered, and gives a correct idea of the meaning conveyed. The committee of safety adjourned to meet the same evening at 7:30 o'clock, at the house of Henry Waterhouse, in Nuuanu valley. The American troops landed at 5 o'clock, as Mr. Stevens had told the committee they would, and marched up Fort street to Merchant, and along Merchant street, halting in King street, between the Palace and Government buildings.

At the time the men landed the town was perfectly quiet, business hours were about over and the people, men, women, and children were in the streets, and nothing unusual was to be seen except the landing of a formidable armed force with Gatling guns, evidently fully prepared to remain on shore for an indefinite length of time, as the men were supplied with double cartridge belts filled with ammunition, also haversacks and canteens and were attended by an hospital corps with stretchers and medical supplies. The curiosity of the people on the streets was aroused and the youngsters more particularly, followed up the troops to see what it was all about. Nobody seemed to know, so when the troops found quarters the populace dispersed, the most of them going to the band concert at the hotel, which was fully attended as it was a beautiful moonlight evening, all who were not in the secret still wondering at the military demonstration.

The committee met at Mr. Waterhouse's residence, according to adjournment, at 7:30 o'clock p. m. of the same day, January 16. The formation of some sort of government was under discussion and it was decided that a commander in chief of the forces supporting the proposed new government should be appointed. The position was offered to Mr. John H. Soper, who demurred, as he did not see any backing whatever to support the movement. Mr. Soper was answered by members of the committee that the American minister would support the move with the troops of the *Boston*. Mr. Soper still doubted, so a couple of the committee escorted him over to the legation, which, by the way, was in the adjoining premises, and the three came back after a time, reporting that Mr. Stevens had given them the full assurance that any proclamation of the Government put forward at the Government building, or any other building in Honolulu for that matter, would receive his immediate recognition and the support of the *Boston's* men. This assurance seemed to satisfy Mr. Soper, and he accepted the position.

On Tuesday afternoon, January 17, the committee of thirteen or Committee of Safety, proceeded from the office of W. O. Smith up Merchant street to the Government building and read the proclamation of a new

government at 2:40 o'clock, there being practically no audience whatever. As the reading proceeded, a dozen or so loungers gathered, and near the close of the ceremony about thirty supporters, variously armed, came running into the side and back entrances of the yard and gathered about the committee.

At this moment the United States troops, in the temporary quarters in rear of the Music Hall (less than 100 yards from where the committee stood), appeared to be under arms and were evidently ready for any emergency.

During all the deliberations of the committee, and, in fact, throughout the whole proceedings connected with plans for the move up to the final issue, the basis of action was the general understanding that Minister Stevens would keep his promise to support the movement with the men from the *Boston*, and the statement is now advisedly made (with a full knowledge of the lack of arms, ammunition, and men; also the utter absence of organization at all adequate to the undertaking) that without the previous assurance of support from the American minister, and the actual presence of the United States troops, no movement would have been attempted, and, if attempted, would have been a dismal failure, resulting in the capture or death of the participants in a very short time.

Having been present at the several meetings referred to in this statement, I hereby certify that the same is correct in every essential particular.

F. WUNDENBERG.

At about 8 o'clock in the evening of January 16, 1893, a meeting of some of the members of the Committee of Public Safety and a few others, was held at the residence of Henry Waterhouse. As my memory now serves me the following members of the committee were present, to wit: Henry Waterhouse, W. O. Smith, Andrew Brown, F. W. McChesney, C. Bolte, T. F. Lansing, J. A. McCandless, Charles L. Carter, John Emmeluth, and H. E. Cooper. There were also present James B. Castle, Cecil Brown, John H. Soper, J. H. Fisher, and F. Wundenberg, though not as members of the committee.

The discussion was general, no regular organization of those present being formed, the general drift of the conversation showing the object of the gathering to be the overthrow of the existing Hawaiian Government and the setting up in its place of a new one of some sort, not very clearly defined.

The choice of a leader was discussed and after a little conference it was decided to offer the same to S. B. Dole. Mr. Dole was accordingly sent for and invited to attend the meeting, to which he responded in person, and later when the offer of leadership was made to him he said he would take it into consideration and give an answer at noon of the next day.

The position of military commander was offered to Soper as previously described.

The general feeling of the members of the Committee of Safety, as repeatedly expressed by them during the meeting, was that Stevens would recognize any move they made in forming a new government and would support them with the U. S. *Boston's* troops.

The Attorney-generalship was offered to Cecil Brown; he declined, and shortly after left the meeting.

Throughout the whole meeting the discussion was quite irregular, each one speaking and interrupting without order or method.

The principal object of the meeting being the selection of a leader and a military commander, when these two matters were disposed of the parties separated informally.

F. WUNDENBERG.

No. 62.

(Statement of F. Wundenberg printed with Mr. Blount's No. 3, dated April 26, 1893.)

No. 63.

(Interview with F. Wundenberg May 15, 1893, with Mr. Blount's No. 9, dated June 6, 1893.)

LIST OF PAPERS—MISCELLANEOUS.

1. Letter from A. F. Judd *et al.* to L. A. Thurston, January 25, 1890. Subject: Sanford B. Dole *et al.* on voting laws.
2. Draft of constitution of January 14, 1893.
3. Committee of Safety to Mr. Stevens, January 16, 1893.
4. John L. Stevens to William Gifford, January 16, 1893. Subject: Asking for use of opera house for troops.
5. John L. Stevens to Mr. Walker, January 16, 1893. Subject: Asking for use of Arion Hall for troops.
6. Samuel Parker to John L. Stevens, January 16, 1893. Subject: Protest.
7. A. S. Cleghorn; Protest. January 16, 1893.
8. John L. Stevens to Samuel Parker.
9. John L. Stevens to A. S. Cleghorn, January 17, 1893.
10. Liliuokalani to S. M. Damon, January 31, 1893.
11. Annexation Club to Mr. Blount, March 31, 1893. Subject: Forwarding resolution.
12. Admiral Skerrett to Mr. Blount, April 1, 1893. Subject: Lowering the flag and withdrawing the troops.
13. Capt. C. L. Hooper to Mr. Blount, April 2, 1893. Subject: Lowering the flag and withdrawing troops.
14. R. W. Wilcox to Mr. Blount, April 6, 1893. *In re* Conspiracy, May, 1892.
15. R. W. Wilcox to Mr. Blount, April 7, 1893.
16. Admiral Skerrett to Mr. Blount, April 8, 1893.
17. Mr. Wilcox to Mr. Blount, April 19, 1893.
18. Mr. Wilcox to Mr. Blount, April 25, 1893.
19. C. J. McCarthy to C. B. Wilson, May 1, 1893. Subject: Position of *Boston's* troops January 16.
20. J. C. Quinn: Events of May 2, 1893.
21. Edmund Norrie to C. B. Wilson. Subject: Events of January 17, 1893.
22. H. P. Baldwin to Mr. Blount, April 25, 1893. Subject: Annexation.
23. Theo. C. Porter to Mr. Blount, May 11, 1893. Subject: Land ownership, taxes, etc.
24. J. W. Jones to Mr. Blount, May 15, 1893. Subject: Annexation.
25. A. Hassinger, June 20, 1893. Subject: *In re* Naturalization.
26. Thomas G. Thrum to Mr. Blount, June 20, 1893. Subject: Capital in sugar industry; tabular statement.
27. W. D. Alexander to S. M. Damon, June 24, 1893. Subject: Lands.
28. John H. Soper to Mr. Blount, June 20, 1893. Subject: Arms and ammunition.
29. C. J. Jaukea to Mr. Blount, June 21, 1893. Subject: Public debt.
30. J. A. King to Mr. Blount, June 22, 1893. Subject: Naturalization.
31. James W. Robertson to Mr. Blount, June 23, 1893. Subject: Landing of troops.
32. Hawaiian corporation tables.
33. J. O. Carter to Mr. Blount. Subject: Elections prior to 1887.
34. J. W. Jones to Mr. Blount, July 9, 1893. Subject: Census.
35. E. C. MacFarlane to Mr. Blount, July 13, 1893. Subject: Party classification of members of Legislature.
36. E. C. MacFarlane to Mr. Blount, July 13, 1893. Subject: Taxation.
37. E. C. MacFarlane to Mr. Blount, July 13, 1893. Subject: Statement of moneys expended on account of immigration.
38. Lieut. Young to Mr. Blount, July 16, 1893. Subject: Events of 17th of January.
39. E. C. MacFarlane to Mr. Blount. Lottery petitions.
40. Memorandum of persons killed, revolution of 1889.
41. Officers of the Planters and Labor Supply Company.
42. Petitions against annexation.

PART IV—MISCELLANEOUS.

No. 1.

Mr. A. F. Judd et al. to Mr. Thurston.

JANUARY 25, 1890.

His Excellency L. A. THURSTON,
Minister of the Interior:

SIR: Your communication of the 23d January on behalf of the cabinet addressed to justices of the supreme court, is received.

The first question upon which our opinion is asked is:

Whether section 24 of the act of 1888, "To amend and consolidate the election laws of the Kingdom," requires that in order to vote for a noble an otherwise qualified elector of nobles must have resided in one and only one of the "election districts" described in section 13 of the act, or does the context prohibit such sense and does it mean that he must have resided for three months within the district for the election of nobles, *i. e.*, the island of Oahu.

Subdivision first of section 24 contains the proviso that he (the voter for nobles) shall have resided in the country not less than three years, and in the district in which he offers to vote not less than three months immediately preceding the election at which he offers to vote.

The first section of the act defines "district" to mean an "election district" as prescribed in this act, unless the context prohibit such sense. The election districts are defined in section 13; they are twenty-four in number, and one representative is allowed for each district, and can be voted for by only the voters of the particular district.

But the nobles, twenty-four in number, are not apportioned to be voted for singly by the voters of the respective election districts, but nine nobles are to be voted for by each voter (who is qualified) on the island of Oahu, and six by each voter on the island of Hawaii, and so on throughout the group. For the purpose therefore of voting for nobles, the island of Oahu is the "district" as is also the island of Hawaii, etc.

If all the voters qualified to vote for nobles can vote for the number of nobles prescribed for the island on which the voter lives, it can make no difference in which "election district" within the island or group of islands he may reside, and any change from one to another of these districts into which the island is divided can not affect his right to vote for nobles, provided he has resided on the particular island where he offers to vote for three months immediately preceding the election.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the sense requires that the word "district" mentioned in the first subdivision of section 24, respecting qualifications of voters for nobles, means the island or group

of islands from which the nobles are to be elected, and not the "election districts" mentioned in section 13 of the act.

Before answering the second question we desire more time to consider it.

Respectfully submitted,

A. F. JUDD.
L. McCULLY.
RICH. F. BICKERTON.
SANFORD B. DOLE.

No. 2.

Draft of constitution of January 14, 1893.

PREAMBLE.

Whereas the constitution of this Kingdom contains many provisions inconsistent, ambiguous and contradictory in its terms, and is subversive and restrictive of civil and popular rights, and incompatible with enlightened constitutional monarchical government; and

Whereas the prayers of my people, coming in the form of petitions from all parts of this Kingdom, to myself and to the Legislature, asking for a new constitution embodying in its provisions equal rights among all my subjects; which prayer to the Legislature of this Kingdom has not been duly recognized by that body through undue and unjust influences; and

Whereas it has become imperative in order to restore order and tranquillity, and to gratify the just demand of my subjects for a new constitution to be remodeled upon the most liberal and popular form of Constitutional Monarchical Government, that a new constitution be at once promulgated.

Now, therefore, I, Liliuokalani, Queen of the Hawaiian Islands, in my capacity as Sovereign of this Kingdom, and as the representative of the people, and in accordance with their almost universal desire, and in conformity with their wishes, do annul and abrogate the constitution promulgated by Kalakaua on the 7th day of July, A. D. 1887, and do proclaim and promulgate this constitution.

CONSTITUTION.

ARTICLE 1. God hath endowed all men with certain inalienable rights; among which are life, liberty, and the right of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.

ARTICLE 2. All men are free to worship God according to the dictates of their own consciences; but this sacred privilege hereby secured shall not be so construed as to justify acts of licentiousness or practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the Kingdom.

ARTICLE 3. All men may freely speak, write, and publish their sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and no law shall be enacted to restrain the liberty of speech or of the press, except such laws as may be necessary for the protection of Her Majesty, the Queen, and the royal family.

ARTICLE 4. All men shall have the right, in an orderly and peace-

able manner, to assemble, without arms, to consult upon the common good, and to petition the Queen or legislative assembly for redress of grievances.

ARTICLE 5. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus belongs to all men, and shall not be suspended, unless by the Queen, when in case of rebellion or invasion the public safety shall require its suspension.

ARTICLE 6. No person shall be subject to punishment for any offence, except on due and legal conviction thereof in a court having jurisdiction of the case.

ARTICLE 7. No person shall be held to answer for any crime or offence (except in case of impeachment or for offences within the jurisdiction of a police or district justice, or in summary proceedings for contempt), unless upon indictment, fully and plainly describing such crime or offence, and he shall have the right to meet the witnesses who are produced against him face to face; to produce witnesses and proofs in his own favor; and by himself or his counsel, at his election, to examine the witnesses produced by himself and cross-examine those produced against him, and to be fully heard in his defence. In all cases in which the right of trial by jury has been heretofore used, it shall be held inviolable forever, except in actions of debt or assumption in which the amount claimed is less than \$50.

ARTICLE 8. No person shall be required to answer again for any offence of which he has been duly convicted, or of which he has been duly acquitted.

ARTICLE 9. No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

ARTICLE 10. No person shall sit as a judge or juror in any case in which his relative, by affinity, or by consanguinity within the third degree, is interested, either as plaintiff or defendant, or in the issue of which the said judge or juror may have either directly or through such relative any pecuniary interest.

ARTICLE 11. Involuntary servitude, except for crime, is forever prohibited in this Kingdom; whenever a slave shall enter Hawaiian territory he shall be free.

ARTICLE 12. Every person has the right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his house, his papers, and effects; and no warrants shall issue but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.

ARTICLE 13. The Queen conducts her government for the common good, and not for the profit, honor, or private interests of any one man, family, or class of men among Her subjects.

ARTICLE 14. Each member of society has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, according to law, and therefore he shall be obliged to contribute his proportional share to the expense of his protection and to give his personal services or an equivalent when necessary; but no part of the property of any individual shall be taken from him or applied to public uses without his own consent or the enactment of the legislative assembly, except the same shall be necessary for the military operation of the Kingdom in time of war or insurrection; and whenever the public exigencies may require that the property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor.

ARTICLE 15. No subsidy, duty, or tax of any description shall be established or levied without the consent of the legislative assembly,

nor shall any money be drawn from the public treasury without such consent, except when between the sessions of the legislative assembly the emergencies of war, invasion, rebellion, pestilence, or other public disaster shall arise, and then not without the concurrence of all the cabinet and of a majority of the whole privy council; and the minister of finance shall render a detailed account of such expenditure to the legislative assembly.

ARTICLE 16. No retrospective laws shall ever be enacted.

ARTICLE 17. The military shall always be subject to the laws of the land, and no soldier shall in times of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by the Legislature.

ARTICLE 18. Every elector shall be privileged from arrest on election days, during his attendance at election and in going to and returning therefrom, except in cases of treason, felony, or breach of the peace.

ARTICLE 19. No elector shall be so obliged to perform military duty on the day of election as to prevent his voting, except in time of war or public danger.

ARTICLE 20. The supreme power of the Kingdom in its exercises is divided into the executive, legislative, and judicial; these shall always be preserved distinct, and no executive or judicial officer or any contractor or employee of the Government or any person in the receipt of salary or emolument from the Government shall be eligible to election to the Legislature of the Hawaiian Kingdom, or to hold the position of an elective member of the same, except members of the privy council, notary public, attorney at law, and agent to take acknowledgment. And no member of the legislative assembly shall, during the time for which he is a member, be appointed to any civil office under the Government, except that of a member of the cabinet.

ARTICLE 21. The government of this Kingdom is that of a constitutional monarchy, under Her Majesty Liliuokalani, her heirs and successors.

ARTICLE 22. The Crown is hereby permanently confirmed to Her Majesty Liliuokalani and to the heirs of her body lawfully begotten, and to their lawful descendants in a direct line; failing whom, the Crown shall descend to Her Royal Highness the Princess Victoria Kaiulani and the heirs of her body lawfully begotten, and their descendant in a direct line; failing whom, the Crown shall descend to His Royal Highness the Prince David Kawanakoa and the heirs of his body lawfully begotten, and their descendant in a direct line; failing whom, the Crown shall descend to His Royal Highness the Prince Jonah Kuhio Kalmianale and the heirs of his body lawfully begotten, and their lawful descendant in a direct line. The succession shall be to the senior male child and to the heirs of his body; failing a male child he succession shall be to the senior female child and to the heirs of her body. In case there is no heir, as above provided, then the successor shall be the person whom the Sovereign shall appoint, with the consent of the nobles, and publicly proclaimed during the Sovereign's life; but should there be no such appointment and proclamation, and the Throne should become vacant, then the cabinet council, immediately after the occurring of such vacancy, shall cause a meeting of the legislative assembly, who shall elect by ballot some native ali'i of the Kingdom as successor to the throne; and the successor so elected shall become a new stirps for a royal family; and the succession from the Sovereign thus elected shall be regulated by the same law as the present royal family of Hawaii.

ARTICLE 23. It shall not be lawful for any member of the royal family of Hawaii who may by law succeed to the Throne to contract marriage without the consent of the reigning Sovereign. Every marriage so contracted shall be void, and the person so contracting a marriage may, by the proclamation of the reigning Sovereign, be declared to have forfeited his or her right to the Throne, and after such proclamation the right of succession shall vest in the next heir as though such offender were dead.

ARTICLE 24. Her Majesty Liliuokalani will, and her successors upon coming to the Throne shall, take the following oath: "I solemnly swear in the presence of Almighty God to maintain the Constitution of the Kingdom whole and inviolable, and to govern in conformity therewith."

ARTICLE 25. No person shall ever sit upon the Throne who has been convicted of any infamous crime, or who is insane, or an idiot.

ARTICLE 26. The Queen is the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, and of all other military forces of the Kingdom by sea and land, and has full power by herself, or by any officer or officers she may appoint, to train and govern such forces as she may judge best for the defense and safety of the Kingdom. But she shall never proclaim war without the consent of the legislative assembly.

ARTICLE 27. The Queen, by and with the consent of her privy council, has the power to grant reprieves and pardon, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment.

ARTICLE 28. The Queen, by and with the consent of her privy council, convenes the Legislature at the seat of Government, or at a different place, if that should become dangerous from an enemy or any dangerous disorder; and in case of disagreement between Her Majesty and the legislative assembly, she adjourns, prorogues, or dissolves it, but not beyond the next ordinary session; under any great emergency, she may convene the legislative assembly to extraordinary sessions.

ARTICLE 29. The Queen has the power to make treaties. Treaties involving changes in the tariff or in any law of the Kingdom shall be referred for approval to the Legislative Assembly. The Queen appoints public ministers, who shall be commissioned, accredited, and instructed agreeably to usage and law of nations.

ARTICLE 30. It is the Queen's prerogative to receive and acknowledge public ministers; to inform the Legislative Assembly by royal message, from time to time, of the state of the Kingdom, and to recommend to its consideration such measures as she shall judge necessary and expedient.

ARTICLE 31. The person of the Queen is inviolable and sacred. Her ministers are responsible. To the Queen belongs the executive power. All laws that have passed the Legislative Assembly, shall require Her Majesty's signature in order to their validity.

ARTICLE 32. Whenever upon the decease of the reigning sovereign the heir shall be less than eighteen years of age the royal power shall be exercised by a regent or council of regency, as hereinafter provided.

ARTICLE 33. It shall be lawful for the Queen at any time, when she may be about to absent herself from the Kingdom, to appoint a regent or council of regency, who shall administer the Government in her name; and likewise the Queen may, by her last will and testament, appoint a regent or council of regency to administer the Government during the minority of any heir to the throne, and should a sovereign decease, leaving a minor heir, and having made no last will and testa-

ment, the cabinet council at the time of such decease shall be a council of regency, until the Legislative Assembly, which shall be called immediately, may be assembled, and the Legislative Assembly, immediately that it is assembled, shall proceed to choose by ballot a regent or council of regency, who shall administer the Government in the name of the Queen, and exercise all the powers which are constitutionally vested in the Queen, until she shall have attained the age of eighteen years, which age is declared to be the legal majority of such sovereign.

ARTICLE 34. The Queen is Sovereign of all the chiefs and of all the people; the Kingdom is Her.

ARTICLE 35. All titles of honor, orders, and other distinctions, emanate from the Queen.

ARTICLE 36. The Queen coins money and regulates the currency by law.

ARTICLE 37. The Queen in case of invasion or rebellion can place the whole Kingdom or any part of it under martial law.

ARTICLE 38. The national ensign shall not be changed, except by act of the Legislature.

ARTICLE 39. The Queen's private lands and other property are inviolable.

ARTICLE 40. The Queen can not be sued or held to account in any court or tribunal of the realm.

ARTICLE 41. There shall continue to be a council of state, for advising the Queen in all matters for the good of the state, wherein she may require its advice, and for assisting her in administering the executive affairs of the Government in such manner as she may direct; which council shall be called the Queen's privy council of state, and the members thereof shall be appointed by the Queen, to hold office during Her Majesty's pleasure.

ARTICLE 42. The Queen's cabinet shall consist of the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of the interior, the minister of finance, and the attorney-general of the Kingdom, and these shall be the Queen's special advisers in the executive affairs of the Kingdom; and they shall be ex-officio members of the Queen's privy council of state. They shall be appointed and commissioned by the Queen, and hold office during the Queen's pleasure, subject to impeachment, or upon a vote of want of confidence passed by a majority of all the members of the legislative assembly. No act of the Queen shall have any effect unless it be countersigned by a minister, who, by that signature, makes himself responsible.

ARTICLE 43. Each member of the Queen's cabinet shall keep an office at the seat of Government, and shall be accountable for the conduct of his deputies and clerks. The ministers hold seat *ex officio*, as nobles, in the legislative assembly with the right to vote, except on a question of want of confidence in them.

ARTICLE 44. The minister of finance shall present to the legislative assembly, in the name of the Government, on the first day of the meeting of the Legislature, the financial budget, in Hawaiian and English languages.

ARTICLE 45. The legislative power of the three estates of this Kingdom is vested in the Queen, and the legislative assembly, which assembly shall consist of nobles appointed by the Queen, and of the representatives of the people, sitting together.

ARTICLE 46. The legislative body shall assemble biennially, in the month of April, and at such other time as the Queen may judge neces-

sary, for the purpose of seeking the welfare of the nation. This body shall be styled the Legislature of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

ARTICLE 47. Every member of the legislative assembly shall take the following oath: I most solemnly swear, in the presence of Almighty God, that I will faithfully support the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, and conscientiously and impartially discharge my duties as a member of this assembly.

ARTICLE 48. The Legislature has full power and authority to amend the constitution, as hereinafter provided, and, from time to time, to make all manner of wholesome laws not repugnant to the provisions of the constitution.

ARTICLE 49. The Queen shall signify her approval of any bill or resolution which shall have passed the legislative assembly by signing the same. If she approve not, she shall return it with her objections to the legislative assembly, which shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, it shall be approved by a two-thirds vote of all the members of the legislative assembly, it shall be presented again to the Queen, and she shall sign it, and it shall therefore be a law. In all such cases the vote shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill or resolution shall be entered on the journal of the Legislature.

ARTICLE 50. The legislative assembly shall be the judge of the qualifications of its own members, and a majority shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner, and under such penalties as the assembly may provide.

ARTICLE 51. The legislative assembly shall choose its own officers and determine the rules of its own proceedings.

ARTICLE 52. The legislative assembly shall have authority to punish by imprisonment, not exceeding thirty days, every person, not a member, who shall be guilty of disrespect to the assembly, by any disorderly or contemptuous behavior in its presence; or who, during the time of its sitting, shall publish any false report of its proceedings, or insulting comment upon the same; or who shall threaten harm to the body or estate of any of its members, for anything said or done in the assembly; or who shall assault any of them therefor, or who shall assault or arrest any witness or other person ordered to attend the assembly, in his way going or returning, or who shall rescue any person arrested by order of the assembly.

ARTICLE 53. The legislative assembly may punish its own members for disorderly behavior.

ARTICLE 54. The legislative assembly shall keep a journal of its proceedings; and the yeas and nays of its members, on any question, shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the journal.

ARTICLE 55. The members of the legislative assembly shall, in all cases, except treason, felony, or breach of peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Legislature, and in going to and returning from the same; and they shall not be held to answer for any speech or debate made in the assembly, in any other court or place whatsoever.

ARTICLE 56. The representatives shall receive for their services a compensation to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the public treasury, but no increase of compensation shall take effect during the year in which it shall have been made; and no law shall be passed

increasing the compensation of said representatives beyond the sum of five hundred dollars each for each biennial term.

ARTICLE 57. The Queen appoints the nobles, who shall hold their appointments during life, subject to the provisions of article 53; but their number shall not exceed twenty-four.

ARTICLE 58. No person shall be appointed a noble who shall not have attained the age of twenty-one years and resided in the Kingdom five years.

ARTICLE 59. The nobles shall be a court with full and sole authority to hear and determine all impeachments made by the representatives, as the grand inquest of the Kingdom against any officer of the Kingdom, for misconduct or maladministration in their offices; but previous to the trial of every impeachment the nobles shall respectively be sworn truly and impartially to try and determine the charge in question according to evidence and the law. Their judgment, however, shall not extend further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold or enjoy any place of honor, trust or profit, under this Government; but the party so convicted shall be nevertheless liable to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to the laws of the land. No minister shall sit as a noble on the trial of any impeachment.

ARTICLE 60. The representation of the people shall be based upon the principle of equality, and shall be regulated and apportioned by the Legislature according to the population to be ascertained, from time to time, by the official census. The representatives shall not be less in number than twenty-four nor more than forty-eight, who shall be elected biennially.

ARTICLE 61. No person shall be eligible for a representative of the people who is insane or an idiot, nor unless he be a male subject of the Kingdom who shall have arrived at the full age of twenty-one years, who shall know how to read and write, who shall understand accounts, and shall have been domiciled in the Kingdom for at least three years, the last of which shall be the year immediately preceding his election; and who shall own real estate, within the Kingdom, of a clear value, over and above all incumbrances, of at least five hundred dollars, or who shall have an annual income of at least two hundred and fifty dollars derived from any property or lawful employment.

ARTICLE 62. Every male subject of the Kingdom who shall have paid his taxes, who shall have attained the age of twenty years, and shall have been domiciled in the Kingdom for one year immediately preceding the election, and be possessed of real property in the Kingdom, to the value over and above all incumbrances of one hundred and fifty dollars, or a leasehold property on which the rent is twenty-five dollars per year, or of an income of not less than seventy-five dollars per year, derived from any property or some lawful employment and shall know how to read and write, if born since the year 1840 and shall have caused his name to be entered on the list of voters of his district as may be provided by the law, shall be entitled to one vote for the representative or representatives of that district. Provided, however, that no insane or idiotic person, nor any person who shall have been convicted of any infamous crimes within this Kingdom, unless he shall have been pardoned by the Queen, and by the terms of such pardon have been restored to all rights of a subject, shall be allowed to vote.

ARTICLE 63. The property qualifications of the representatives of the people, and of the electors, may be increased or decreased by law.

ARTICLE 64. The judicial power of the Kingdom shall be vested in

one supreme court and in such inferior courts as the Legislature may, from time to time, establish.

ARTICLE 65. The supreme court shall consist of a chief justice and not less than two associate justices, any of whom may hold the court. The justices of the supreme court shall hold their offices for a term of six years, during good behavior, subject to removal upon impeachment. Provided, however, that any judge of the supreme court or any other court of record may be removed from office on a resolution passed by two-thirds of the legislative assembly, for good cause shown to the satisfaction of the Queen.

The judge against whom the legislative assembly may be about to proceed, shall receive due notice thereof, accompanied by a copy of the causes alleged for his removal, at least ten days before the day on which the legislative assembly shall act thereon. He shall be heard before the legislative assembly.

ARTICLE 66. The judicial power shall be divided among the supreme court and the several inferior courts of the Kingdom in such manner as the Legislature may from time to time prescribe, and the tenure of office in the inferior courts of the Kingdom shall be such as may be defined by the law creating them.

ARTICLE 67. The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution and laws of this Kingdom and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority to all cases affecting public ministers and council and to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.

ARTICLE 68. The chief justice of the supreme court shall be the chancellor of the Kingdom; he shall be *ex officio* president of the nobles in all cases of impeachment, unless when impeached himself, and exercise such jurisdiction in equity or other cases as the law may confer upon him, his decisions being subject, however, to the revision of the supreme court on appeal. Should the chief justice ever be impeached, some person specially commissioned by the Queen shall be president of the court of impeachment during such trial.

ARTICLE 69. The decision of the supreme court, when made by a majority of all the justices thereof, shall be final and conclusive upon all parties.

ARTICLE 70. The Queen, her cabinet, and the legislative assembly shall have authority to require the opinions of the justices of the supreme court upon important questions of law and upon solemn occasions.

ARTICLE 71. The Queen appoints the justices of the supreme court and all other judges of court of records; their salaries are fixed by law.

ARTICLE 72. No judge or magistrate can sit alone on an appeal or new trial in any case on which he may have given a previous judgment.

ARTICLE 73. The Queen also appoints and commissions the governors of the several islands; the governors hold office for the term of four years, subject to impeachment.

ARTICLE 74. The following persons shall not be permitted to register for voting, to vote, or to hold office under any department of the Government, or to sit in the legislative assembly, namely: Any person who is insane or an idiot, or any person who shall have been convicted of any of the following named offenses, viz: Arson, barratry, bribery, burglary, counterfeiting, embezzlement, felonious branding of cattle, forgery, gross cheat, incest, kidnapping, larceny, malicious burning, man-

slaughter in the first degree, murder, perjury, rape, robbery, sodomy, treason, subornation of perjury, and malfeasance in office, unless he shall have been pardoned by the Queen and restored to his civil rights and by the express term of his pardon declared to be eligible to office of trust, honor, and profit.

ARTICLE 75. No officer of this Government shall hold any other office or receive any salary from any other Government or power whatever.

ARTICLE 76. The Legislature votes the appropriations biennially, after due consideration of the revenue and expenditure for the two preceding years and the estimates of the revenue and expenditure of the two succeeding years, which shall be submitted to them by the minister of finance.

ARTICLE 77. The enacting style in making and passing all acts and laws shall be: "Be it enacted by the Queen and the legislative assembly of the Hawaiian Islands, in the Legislature of the Kingdom assembled."

ARTICLE 78. To avoid improper influences which may result from intermixing in one and the same act such things as have no proper relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in its title.

ARTICLE 79. All laws now in force in this Kingdom shall continue and remain in full effect, until altered or repealed by the Legislature; such parts only excepted as are repugnant to this constitution. All laws heretofore enacted, or that may hereafter be enacted, which are contrary to this constitution, shall be null and void.

ARTICLE 80. This constitution shall be in force from the — day of —, in the year —, but that there may be no failure of justice, or inconvenience to the Kingdom, from any change all officers of this Kingdom, at the time this constitution shall take effect, shall have, hold, and exercise all power to them granted, until other persons shall be appointed in their stead.

ARTICLE 81. Any amendment or amendments to this constitution may be proposed in the legislative assembly, and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members thereof, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on its Journal, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to next Legislature; which proposed amendment or amendments shall be published for three months previous to the next election of Representatives; and if in the next Legislature such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members of the legislative assembly, and be approved by the Queen, such amendment or amendments shall become part of the constitution of this country.

We have read the document purporting to be a copy of the constitution presented to us by Queen Liliuokalani on January 14th last, and we deem it to be almost identical, except as to Article 62, which, according to our recollection, did not contain any property qualification for voters for representatives.

We are yours, respectfully,

SAMUEL PARKER,
A. P. PETERSON,
WM. H. CORNWELL.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *July 16, 1893.*

The proposed changes to the Kalakaua constitution were these:

ARTICLE 20. By adding to exceptions: Members of the privy council, notary public, agent to take acknowledgements.

ART. 22. By adding Princes Kawanakoa and Kalaniana'ole as heirs to the throne.

ART. 46. Changing the session of the Legislature to the month of April.

ART. 49. That the Queen shall sign and approve all bills and resolutions, even to those that are voted when passed over her vote.

ART. 56. Pay of representatives raised to \$500 instead \$250 for biennial term.

ART. 57. The Queen shall appoint the nobles not to exceed 24.

ART. 60. The representatives may be increased from 24 as at present to 48.

ART. 62. Only subjects shall vote, and the qualification of voters reduced.

ART. 65. The term of appointment of the supreme court judges, not for life, as before, but for six years.

ART. 75. The appointment of governors of each island for four years term.

No. 3.

The committee of safety to Mr. Stevens.

No. 7.] HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, HONOLULU, *January 16, 1893.*

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
American Minister Resident:

SIR: We, the undersigned citizens and residents of Honolulu, respectfully represent that, in view of recent public events in this Kingdom, culminating in the revolutionary acts of Queen Liliuokalani on Saturday last, the public safety is menaced and lives and property are in peril, and we appeal to you and the United States forces at your command for assistance.

The Queen, with the aid of armed force, and accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed from those with whom she was acting, attempted to proclaim a new constitution; and, while prevented for the time from accomplishing her object, declared publicly that she would only defer her action.

This conduct and action was upon an occasion and under circumstances which have created general alarm and terror.

We are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and therefore pray for the protection of the United States forces.

HENRY E. COOPER,
F. W. MCCHESENEY,
W. C. WILDER,
C. BOLTE,
A. BROWN,
WILLIAM O. SMITH,
HENRY WATERHOUSE,
THEO. F. LANSING,
ED. SUHR,
L. A. THURSTON,
JOHN EMMELUTH,
WM. R. CASTLE,
J. A. MCCANDLESS,

Citizens' Committee of Safety.

No. 4.

*Mr. Stevens to Mr. Gifford.*UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 16, 1893.

Mr. W. M. GIFFORD:

SIR: Please allow Capt. Wiltse and his men the use of the opera house hall for a fair compensation for the same.

Yours, truly,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

No. 5

*Mr. Stevens to Mr. Walker.*UNITED STATES LEGATION,
*Honolulu, January 16, 1893.*DEAR SIR: Will you let Arion Hall for use for the sleeping and lodgment of the soldiers and marines of Captain Wiltse, of the U. S. *Boston*, at a fair price? Let the bearer know.

Yours truly,

JOHN L. STEVENS,
United States Minister.

No. 6.

*Mr. Parker to Mr. Stevens.*DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
*Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 16, 1893.*SIR: I have the honor to inform your excellency that the troops from the U. S. S. *Boston* were landed in this port at 5 o'clock this evening without the request or knowledge of Her Majesty's Government.

As the situation is one which does not call for interference on the part of the United States Government, my colleagues and myself would most respectfully request of your excellency the authority upon which this action was taken. I would also add that any protection that may have been considered necessary for the American Legation or for American property and interests in this city would have been cheerfully furnished by Her Majesty's Government.

With the highest respect, I have the honor to remain,

Your excellency's obedient servant,

SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency, JOHN L. STEVENS,

U. S. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Honolulu.

No. 7.

Mr. Cleghorn to Mr. Stevens.

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF OAHU.

Honolulu, January 16, 1893.

SIR: It is my duty to solemnly protest to your excellency against the landing this evening without permission from the proper authorities of an armed force from the United States ship *Boston*.

Your excellency well knows that when you have desired to land naval forces of the United States for the purpose of drill, permission by the local authorities has been readily accorded.

On the present occasion, however, the circumstances are entirely different, and ostensibly the present landing is for the discharge of functions which are distinctly responsible duties of the Hawaiian Government.

Such being the case, I am compelled to impress upon your excellency the international questions involved in this matter and the grave responsibilities thereby assumed.

While solemnly protesting to your excellency against the unwarrantable proceedings to which I have referred,

I have the honor to remain, sir, your excellency's obedient and humble servant,

A. S. CLEGHORN,
Governor of Oahu.

His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS,
*Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
of the United States of America.*

No. 8.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Parker.

UNITED STATES LEGATION,

Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

SIR: Yours of yesterday in regard to the landing of the United States naval forces in Honolulu duly received and its import considered. In whatever the United States diplomatic and naval representatives have done or may do at this critical hour of Hawaiian affairs, we will be guided by the kindest views and feelings for all the parties concerned and by the warmest sentiments for the Hawaiian people and the persons of all nationalities.

Most sincerely, yours,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Hon. SAMUEL PARKER,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

No. 9.

*Mr. Stevens to Mr. Cleghorn.*UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 17, 1893.

SIR: Yours of the 16th, yesterday, regarding the landing of the United States naval forces in Honolulu, is received. I have carefully considered its import. My responsibility as the United States minister plenipotentiary at this critical time in Hawaiian affairs it is impossible for me to ignore. I assure you that whatever responsibility the American diplomatic and naval representatives have assumed or may assume, we shall do our utmost to regard the welfare of all persons and interests concerned.

Yours, sincerely, and with the kindest consideration,

JOHN L. STEVENS.

Hon. A. S. CLEGHORN,
Governor of Oahu.

No. 10.

*Liliuokalani to Mr. Damon.*HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *January 31, 1893.*Mr. S. M. DAMON, *Honolulu:*

Sir: You having stated that, as a condition upon which you would only authorize the lending by your firm of Bishop & Co. to me of the further sum of \$10,000, upon certain securities that I need not specify, I should hand to you the original new constitution that it was my intention to promulgate on the day of the prorogation of the late Legislature, January 14, 1893, I assure you that I am unable to comply with such condition, for the sole reason that such new constitution and all copies thereof and the draft thereof have been destroyed, the original constitution by my own hands and the copies thereof and the draft by my orders.

LILIUOKALANI.

In presence of—

PAUL NEUMANN,
HENRY HOLMES.

No. 11.

Resolution of Annexation Club, March 31, 1893.

MR. COMMISSIONER: An association has recently been formed here known as the Annexation Club. The vice-presidents of the club—its president being temporarily absent—its secretary and treasurer, and the chairmen of its regular committees now have the honor to present their regards to you. The first steps to form this association were taken on the 21st of this month, and its membership now includes some 2,000 of the residents of this city, who are, it is believed, fully representative of the intelligence and respectability, as well as of the material interests of this community.

A large number of the members of this association were not actually concerned in the establishment of the present Government, but all the members are convinced that it is essential to the safety and security of life and property in the Hawaiian Islands, and to the permanent welfare of the people here, that this country shall become an integral portion of the American Union.

The need of a strong permanent Government to steady political passions, and keep this community free from dangers both of internal discord and foreign interference, has become apparent to all of us, and we look forward with earnest hope to the time when Hawaii can enter the great Republic.

We have learned with profound satisfaction that President Cleveland has appointed you to visit these islands, as we understand, for the purpose of investigating their political conditions and needs. We are confident that the most searching examination and analysis will disclose the fact that the present Government was established as a matter of necessity and duty, in the interest of humanity as well as of civilization, and not as a scheme to promote the selfish objects of any set or clique. The head of the recent Government having disavowed her obligations to the only authority under which she held power, the constitution of 1887, and having publicly announced her solemn intention to govern by royal proclamation and not by law, the only course to follow to preserve the body politic was to establish this Government in the interests of law and order.

It is the hope of the members of this association that a treaty of annexation may soon be accomplished between Hawaii and the United States, which, while securing all the safeguards of a free and stable government to all native aboriginal Hawaiians as well as to those of foreign ancestry, will entail no burdens on the United States, but on the contrary will be a source of additional strength and satisfaction.

We are aware, Mr. Commissioner, that your own views on any of these matters will depend on the result of the observations and inquiries which you will make during your visit here, and that our call upon you must be regarded as entirely informal and unofficial.

We beg to present to you the compliments of the Annexation Club of Hawaii, and to express the hope that your visit will not only be enjoyed by Mrs. Blount and yourself but will result in a way which shall be most advantageous to all of the momentous interests involved.

No. 12.

Admiral Skerrett to Mr. Blount.

No. 110.]

U. S. S. MOHICAN,
FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, April 1, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to inform Special United States Commissioner Blount that in obedience to his directions the United States ensign over the Government building was lowered at 11 a. m. of this date and the force withdrawn from that building and the place designated as Camp Boston at the same hour. I learn that quite a number of people congregated about the Government building at the time; the force of marines stationed there were relieved by a force of the Provisional Gov-

ernment. There was no demonstration made by the populace present; no cheering, nor any other signs of either joy or grief.

I went on shore this afternoon and saw quite an access in numbers of those who were wearing the Annexation Club badge. There has been no evidence shown of unruly or riotous characters. Absolutely, there appears to be peace and quiet.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. SKERRETT,

Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,

Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

Special United States Commissioner, J. H. BLOUNT.

No. 13.

Captain Hooper to Mr. Blount.

U. S. REVENUE STEAMER RUSH,

Honolulu, April 2, 1893.

Hon. J. H. BLOUNT:

MY DEAR SIR: I witnessed the hauling down of the American flag and the raising of the Hawaiian flag over the Government building at this place yesterday, and was surprised not only at the absence of any indication of the violent and partisan feeling which I had been led to expect, but by the apparent apathy and indifference of the native portion of the assembled crowd, and also their politeness and evident good feeling towards Americans. As I passed freely around among them, accompanied by my son, we were kept busy returning their friendly salutes. The greatest good order prevailed throughout. There were no demonstrations of any kind as the American flag came down and not a single cheer greeted the Hawaiian flag as it was raised aloft.

The native men stood around in groups or singly, smoking and chatting, and nodding familiarly to passing friends, or leaning idly against the trees and fences, while the women and children which formed a large proportion of the assemblage were talking and laughing good naturedly. As the hour for hauling down the American flag approached, many people, men, and women, and children, could be seen approaching the Government square in a most leisurely manner, and showing more interest in the gala day appearance of the crowd than in the restoration of their national flag. The air of good-natured indifference and idle curiosity with which the native men regarded the proceedings, and the presence of the women and children in their white or bright colored dresses, was more suggestive of a county "fair" or horse race than the sequel to a "revolution."

Even the presence of the "armed forces" of the Provisional Government, numbering perhaps two hundred, parading the corridors of the Government house failed to elicit any sign of a feeling of anger or resentment. In half an hour after the exchange of flags had been made the crowd had dispersed and only the "force" of the Provisional Government, which I was told was necessary to prevent mob violence, remained to indicate that a "revolution" had recently taken place. While among the crowd I looked carefully for indications of "arms" upon the person of the natives but saw none, although with the thin clothing worn by them the presence of a revolver or such an arm could easily have been detected.

If any danger of mob violence on the part of the natives existed all outward signs of it were carefully concealed. Only evidences of the greatest good feeling were apparent.

Hoping that this short statement of the facts as they appeared to me may prove of interest to you,

I am, very truly yours,

C. L. HOOPER,
Captain U. S. Revenue Marine.

No. 14.

Mr. Wilcox to Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *April 6, 1893.*

Hon. J. H. BLOUNT,

United States Commissioner, etc.:

I beg to submit my scrap-book for your inspection, which will shed some light on the motives which actuated me and my associates in the conspiracy of May 1892.

You will please notice a letter from Fred. M. Somers to the San Francisco Examiner under date of May 24, 1892, and also an extract from the Illustrated American of December 26, 1891, and some extracts from the P. C. Advertiser of Honolulu of the month of May 1892. In the main these statements are correct.

My chief object was to establish a Republic with the view to ultimate annexation to the United States of America.

If annexation should be rejected by your Congress, which I hope not, I still believe that a Republic with the closest possible relations, commercial and otherwise, with the United States would be the best for Hawaii.

The reëstablishment of monarchy, in my humble opinion, ought not to be considered for a moment.

Most respectfully yours,

ROBERT W. WILCOX.

No. 15.

Mr. Wilcox to Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
April 7, 1893.

Hon. JAMES H. BLOUNT,

United States Commissioner, etc.:

Yesterday I stated in my letter to you the position I held for some time, which you will see in my scrap book. But I wish now to call your attention to the opinion of the Hawaiians as to the treaty made and submitted to your congress by the commissioner of the Provisional Government, which President Grover Cleveland has withdrawn from the congress. The Hawaiians are a unit against that treaty in its present form, because it was intended by those commissioners to disfranchise the Hawaiians.

The Hawaiians love liberty and the right of suffrage; and would only be willing to be annexed to the Union with the understanding that they

would be taken in as citizens of the United States. In other words, that the full privileges of United States citizens would be given to them.

The present Provisional Government started in a way to produce the most violent race prejudices. One thing is sure, every Hawaiian regards the Harrison Administration with disfavor and looks hopefully to Mr. Cleveland's Administration.

I am sure if the Congress of the United States admits Hawaii as a state of the Union, every Hawaiian will become a strong supporter of the Democratic party of the United States.

Respectfully, yours,

ROBERT W. WILCOX.

No. 16.

Admiral Skerrett to Mr. Blount.

U. S. S. MOHICAN,
FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, April 8, 1893.

No. 123.]

Col. J. H. BLOUNT,
United States Special Commissioner.

DEAR SIR: I have learned that the *Boston's* battalion consists of 153 men and that of the *Mohican's* battalion is 118 men; making a total of 271 men, who can be landed if required.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. SKERRETT,
Rear Admiral U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

No. 17.

Mr. Wilcox to Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *April 19, 1893.*

Hon. JAS. H. BLOUNT,
United States Commissioner, etc.

SIR: Referring to our conference of yesterday's *in re* "The establishment of this Provisional Government," I will submit the following appendix for your consideration:

That this Provisional Government was fostered and made predominant only through the American force of arms of the U. S. S. *Boston*, under the recognition of a decided minority of the white element, aided and abetted by United States Minister Stevens. Prior to any movement by the Queen's Government, and whilst her Government yet held the places, to wit, palace, barracks, station house, etc., there were 150 native soldiers and 200 policemen under arms, besides about 400 natives and foreigners who were ready to take up arms; the barracks and station house were amply supplied with war material (8 pieces of 75 centimeters caliber and 4 pieces of 5 centimeters caliber cannon and also two Gatling guns); there were also about 500 rifles, with a large supply of ammunition for same; whilst on the other hand the Provisional Government, before their recognition by Minister Stevens, *i. e.*, from 3 to 6 p. m.

on January 17, 1893, had only about 100 rifles and a very limited supply of ammunition, and it was only at 6 p. m. that their men numbered 100.

Under Minister Stevens' assurance—that he recognized the Provisional Government notwithstanding—the station house recapitulated at 6 p. m. that same day, with 200 rifles and other munitions.

The white element of this city did not join in with this Provisional Government until the morning of January 18, when they knew that the Queen's Government had given up everything to this Provisional Government, and then only under protest.

I have the honor to be yours, obediently,

ROBERT W. WILCOX.

No. 18.

Mr. Wilcox to Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *April 25, 1893.*

Hon. JAMES H. BLOUNT,

United States Commissioner, etc.:

SIR: Referring to the amount of appropriations by the Government on account of contract laborers or coolies, under the guise of encouraging emigration, I present the following list of appropriations from 1874 to 1890, inclusive, amounting to the sum total of \$1,315,000, as follows:

In 1874, encouraging agriculture and emigration	\$50,000
In 1876, encouraging of emigration	35,000
In 1880, encouraging of emigration	100,000
In 1882, encouraging of emigration (an act)	500,000
In 1884, encouraging of emigration	390,000
In 1886, encouraging of emigration	150,000
In 1888, encouraging of emigration	30,000
In 1890, encouraging of emigration	60,000
	1,315,000

In 1881 six thousand Chinese were imported. They brought with them the smallpox, which caused the death of three hundred native Hawaiians at Honolulu.

Nine-tenths of the above amount was spent for importing Chinese and Japanese laborers, while the other tenth was spent for Germans, Portuguese and Norwegians laborers.

The European class of laborers would be good citizens for the country, but were unable to make homes here, on account of the close and ruinous competition with the Asiatics. No men in the world can successfully compete with the Chinese and Japanese in most business pursuits or as laborers. For this reason Europeans of the laboring classes have left this country as soon as their contracts expired.

The late Legislature passed an act to limit the number of Chinese to five thousand annually. For some time previous Chinese emigration was stopped, Japanese being substituted for them.

If this country continues to be under the control of the sugar planters Hawaii will be only fit to be a home for rich sugar planters and their slaves—the paradise and inferno of the Pacific.

Yours obediently,


ROBERT W. WILCOX.

No. 19.

*Mr. C. J. McCarthy to Mr. C. B. Wilson.*HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *May 1, 1893.*

MR. C. B. WILSON:

DEAR SIR: As per your request of to-day I inclose you a diagram of the position of the *Boston* troops as of Monday evening, January 16, 1893. They remained in the third position for several days.



In connection with the arrival of the committee of safety, I would say that they arrived at the Government building at 2:30 p. m. on

Tuesday, January 17, loitered about the corridor a few minutes, asked Mr. Hossinger for possession of the building, and then Mr. Cooper proceeded to read the proclamation. He finished same at 2:40 p. m., at which time I received your telephone message and came to the station house.

Yours, etc.,

C. J. MCCARTHY.

No. 20.

Statement of J. C. Quinn.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, May 2, 1893.

A few brief notes of what I saw on January 17, 1893, the day the Provisional Government was established, about 2 p. m.

I was driving along King street, going towards the Government building; when I reached Palace square I heard a pistol shot; I looked back and saw a large crowd by E. O. Hall & Son. The minute the shot was fired I heard the rumbling of wheels in the direction of Arion Hall. I drove over that way and saw some of the blue jackets who were camped there getting ready for action.

They ran their cannon out so that it pointed towards Palace square. The blue jackets stood ready for action, some at the cannons, the rest formed in line behind the cannons with their guns in hands. I can't say positively whether there were two cannons or not. This detachment of blue jackets that I speak of were on the northwest side of the Arion Hall. The men and cannon, as they were drawn in line, faced towards Palace square. I drove around the Opera House, turned down Mililani street, which is on the southeast side of Arion Hall. I saw a lot of blue jackets drawn up in line, ready for action, with their cannon and men facing towards the Government building. The blue jackets I speak of means the ones which were landed from the *Boston* on the 16th of January last. I drove down Mililani street and around to the U. C. C. office. I saw Mr. Hall standing by his store. I asked him what the shooting was about. He said that John Good had shot a policeman, for trying to stop a wagon which contained arms. I told him that the blue jackets were getting ready for action. He said that was good and ran down towards the Arion Hall. In a few minutes I drove back to the Government building and saw some armed men standing in front of the building, armed with guns.

J. C. QUINN,

Manager United Carriage Co., Telephone 290.

No. 21.

Mr. Edmund Norrie to Mr. C. B. Wilson.

Hon. C. B. WILSON, *Honolulu:*

SIR: In response to your request to reduce to writing the verbal report which I made to you on January 17 in regard to the situation at the Government building and surroundings at the time of the proclamation of the Provisional Government I beg to submit it as follows:

I entered the Government building about 1 o'clock p. m. and went to the foreign office where I, from the window in the minister's private

office, watched the movements of the United States forces which were stationed on the Hayselden premises. The attached roughly-drawn diagram shows that the sailors were marched up from Kekaulike street through the alleyway between the opera house and the Arion Hall, and stood in the yard belonging to the premises occupied by Mr. Nakayama, inspector of Japanese.

Two Gatling guns were placed at the entrance to the said alley, trailed on the main entrance of the Government building. About 1:45 p. m. the placing of the troops was accomplished and the men stood at "attention," the infantry with arms "ordered," the artillerists with the drawing ropes of the guns in their hands ready to move. I estimated that one company with the half battery of Gatlings occupied Kekaulike street and the alley, while the rest of the sailors with two other guns were in the yard between the Arion Hall and Nakayama's house. I went down to Palace Square to see if the insurgents were beginning to move on the Government building as expected. In the gateway of Nakayama's premises towards Palace Square stood two officers of the *Boston* with drawn swords looking towards the town. I now saw Mr. Dole and a body of men coming up through Merchant street towards the Government buildings. They were crossing Alake street when I saw them. The *Boston* officers saw them at the same time and immediately went to Arion Hall. I returned to the foreign office and took up my place at the window overlooking the Arion Hall.

I noticed that all the *Boston* officers had placed themselves in the proper positions with their men ready to make a move. At this time Mr. Charles L. Carter came riding on horseback very fast towards the Arion Hall from Queen street [indicated by arrow on diagram] and stopped outside the Arion Hall, dismounted and entered the gate. Capt. Wiltse and another officer were sitting on the veranda of the hall facing the Government building. Mr. Carter approached Capt. Wiltse and handed him a large envelope, which he opened, and after having read the contents placed it in his pocket. He said something to the officer with him, who left, and going among the troops spoke to the different officers. Mr. Carter remounted and left by the same route along Queen street. A few minutes after Mr. Dole and party turned the corner of Palace Square and entered the Government yard from Kekaulike street and thence to the main entrance of the building, where they stopped and Mr. Cooper read the proclamation. As soon as he had finished I left and reported to you.

EDMUND NORRIE.

No. 22.



Mr. H. P. Baldwin to Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *April 25, 1893.*

Col. J. H. BLOUNT,

American Commissioner.

MY DEAR SIR: As you remember I had an appointment to meet you last Saturday morning for an interview as a delegate from a branch annexation organization on the island of Kauai. I found it impossible to come to Honolulu last Saturday, hence I failed to keep my engagement.



I called to see you Monday this week, but your secretary told me you were out, and I have since been told by the secretary of the Honolulu Annexation Club, Mr. Jones, that you will have no time for interviews till after the mail leaves Wednesday.

As I return to Kauai to-morrow, and will therefore have no opportunity of meeting you, I will give you briefly in writing the views as I understand them of that portion of the people of Kauai who favor annexation.

The two branches of the Annexation Club formed on Kauai are composed of all classes and include plantation men, ranchmen, tradesmen, mechanics, and ordinary workmen. Most of those who represent the property of the island are in favor of annexation and have joined the organization.

When the delegates from Kauai had a short interview with you last week I informed you that the Annexation Club from my side of the island passed a resolution favoring annexation providing Asiatic labor, which is considered almost indispensable for our plantations, should not be prohibited by the United States Government. Last week the organization, taking a broader view of the question, rescinded the former vote and passed an unconditional resolution in favor of annexation, trusting that in case annexation should take place the United States Government would take into careful consideration our labor requirements. The natives of the country furnish a very inadequate portion of the labor required for the numerous operations of the country. We are therefore obliged to draw on other countries for our labor supply. In this tropical country white men can not work in our cane fields. We have found that Asiatics are the most suitable and economical laborers for our work, such as Japanese and Chinese. These are introduced every year to take the places of those who leave, as very few of them make this country a permanent home.

You can readily understand why the labor question is a very important one to us and that any political change that may cut us off from the labor supply we have heretofore enjoyed may work serious injury to our sugar industry.

The belief that the United States would not allow Asiatics to come into the country has prevented some of the planters on Kauai from joining our annexation organization. The majority of those who have joined the organization have done so after careful consideration and because it is their firm conviction that the country can no longer maintain a good and stable independent government. Numerous reasons may be given for this, but I will state only a few of the more prominent.

(1) The unfitness of a majority of the voters for representatives in this country to have the franchise and use it for upright and progressive government.

(2) A growing jealousy among the natives of foreigners, who, they feel, are acquiring the property and business of the country.

(3) The diversified foreign population of the country, who come from all parts of the world. This population consists of all classes of men who come here for different purposes, a great many to make what they can out of the country and then leave. They compose a mixed population that can not and will not work together for good, honest and substantial government.

The history of our Government during the past few years must convince anyone who will give it a careful study that the late Hawaiian monarchs, who were really less competent to manage the affairs of state

than former Kings were, are totally unfit and incompetent to guide the affairs of the nation at this time of progress and prosperity; also, that corruption has been on the increase amongst Government officials and in the Legislature.

It is our belief that should this Government continue as an independent government, revolution and conspiracy, which has overturned and disturbed the affairs of government so often during the past six years, will increase in the future and result inevitably in anarchy.

I would add, for myself personally, that I was born in this country and have lived here all my life. I have acquired considerable property and represent plantations that have this year an output of about 23,000 tons of sugar. This is my home, and I desire to make it the home of my children if we can live under good government. I have not favored annexation till this last revolutionary act of the Queen.

I share in the solicitude expressed by many of the planters relative to the labor question and would be glad to have our Government continue independent if possible, but good government is of the first and greatest importance to this as it is to all countries, and it is the belief, for reasons given above, that we can not maintain good government without the protection of a more powerful nation that has led me to join the annexationists.

I remain, yours, very truly,

H. P. BALDWIN,
Delegate Kauai Annexation Club.

No. 23.

Mr. Theo. C. Porter to Mr. Blount.

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
Honolulu, May 11, 1893.

Hon. J. H. BLOUNT,

Special Commissioner of the United States of America:

SIR: In accordance with my communication of the 12th ultimo, I have caused to be prepared the following inclosures, viz:

No. 1.—Tabulated statement of taxes paid by different nationalities.

No. 2.—Tabulated statement of acreage owned by different nationalities on which taxes are paid.

No. 3.—Statement showing acreage and quality of Government lands and where situated.

No. 4.—Statement showing acreage and quality of Crown lands and where situated.

No. 5.—Statement showing acreage and quality of Bishop estate and where situated.

No. 6.—Statement showing acreage and quality of Crown lands, where situated, and available for lease or homestead.

No. 7.—Table showing a summary by nationality of the Government pay rolls, etc.

As I understand it, this will supply the desired information. It is not claimed that these tables and statements are absolutely perfect; such statistics never are and never can be, but they are as accurate as it is possible at this time and under the circumstances to make them. They include everything except the few delinquents, and the public lands—Government and Crown. The persons classed as “natives” are supposed to be of pure aboriginal birth and descent.

Under the head of "Half Castes" are included all who have any proportion of native blood, however small. Many of these are only a quarter native, some an eighth or less. The acreage of the Bishop estate, amounting to about 420,000 acres, is included in the "Half Caste" column. If this estate were entirely eliminated from the calculation, that class of our population would own only 7.78 per cent of the total taxable acreage instead of 28.67 per cent, as appears in the table. The large lands and very valuable buildings and improvements known as the Kamehameha School on the Bishop estate is free from taxation, and materially affects the taxes in the "Half-Caste" column. The Bishop estate, together with the Government and Crown lands, amount to 2,000,000 acres, or about one-half of the entire area of the country. In short, these tables show that the pure Hawaiian pays \$1.01 in \$7.39 of the taxes, owns 1 in every 7.02 acres of the taxable land, and holds two-thirds of the offices and positions under the Government.

In connection with the above, the following data compiled from the last census may be of interest:

The pure "Hawaiians and Half Castes" together constitute 45.01 per cent of the entire population, furnish 30.98 per cent of the males over 15 years of age, 70.18 per cent of the voters, 9.30 per cent of the laborers, 13.25 per cent of the merchants and traders, 35.55 per cent of the mechanics, 48.47 per cent of the drivers and teamsters, 74.57 per cent of the seamen, and 82.40 per cent of the fishermen. The 13.25 per cent appearing under the head of merchants and traders are fishmongers, fruit-venders, and the like. Such a thing as a merchant in the larger sense of the word can not be found among the pure natives.

Should there be any other information desired of this department or any of its bureaus, I shall at any and all times be pleased to give it to you.

I remain, with much respect, your obedient servant,

THEO. C. PORTER,
Minister of Finance.

No. 1.—Table showing the amount of taxes paid by various nationalities in the Hawaiian Islands, compiled from the reports of the tax assessors and collectors of the four divisions into which the islands are divided, for the annual period of 1891-92.

Taxation division.	Islands.	Americans and Europeans.	Natives.	Half-castes.	Chinese.	Japanese.	Other nationalities.	Total.
1	Oahu	\$128,048.42	\$22,898.09	\$13,278.03	\$48,237.64	\$7,915.79	None.	\$220,377.97
2	Maui, Lanai and Molokai.	42,940.87	16,687.76	3,640.79	14,317.49	13,556.67	\$370.10	91,513.68
3	Hawaii	64,252.19	23,705.44	9,275.48	11,814.36	29,838.61	None.	138,886.08
4	Kauai and Niihau.	39,275.26	8,095.53	674.38	12,896.61	16,015.00	359.72	77,316.50
	Total	274,516.74	71,386.82	26,868.68	87,266.10	67,326.07	729.82	528,094.23

Percentages of taxes.

Americans and Europeans	51.98
Natives	13.52
Half-castes	5.10
Chinese	16.53
Japanese	12.75
Others12
	100.00

The above tax includes poll and school taxes.

THEO. C. PORTER,
Minister of Finance.

HONOLULA, May 10, 1893.

No. 2.—Table showing the acreage on which taxes have been paid by various nationalities in the Hawaiian Islands, compiled from the reports of the tax assessors and collectors of the four divisions into which the islands are divided, for the annual period of 1891-'92.

Taxation division.	Islands.	Americans and Europeans.	Natives.	Half-castes.	Chinese.	Japanese.	Other nationalities.	Total.
1	Oahu.....	177, 168	38, 123	70, 949	*6, 042	200	None.	292, 482
2	Maui, Lanai, and Molokai.	227, 115	29, 410	78, 526	*3, 733	None.	None.	338, 784
3	Hawaii.....	479, 384	159, 733	377, 998	2, 541	None.	None.	1, 019, 656
4	Kauai and Niihau.	168, 825	30, 191	4, 072	8	None.	None.	203, 096
	Total.....	1, 052, 492	257, 457	531, 545	12, 324	200	None.	1, 854, 018

*Mostly leased.

Percentages of acreage.

Americans and Europeans.....	56.77
Natives.....	13.89
Half-castes.....	28.67
Chinese.....	.66
Japanese.....	.01
	100.00

THEO. C. PORTER,
Minister of Finance.

HONOLULA, May 10, 1893.

No. 3.—Summary of the Government lands for 1893.

Island.	District.	Areas.
		<i>Acres.</i>
Hawaii.....	Hilo.....	44, 047
	Hamakua.....	250, 969
	Kohala.....	15, 865.5
	North Kona.....	120, 047.5
	South Kona.....	29, 995.5
	Kau.....	92, 371
	Puna.....	34, 950
Total for Hawaii.....		588, 245.5
Maui.....	Lahaina.....	510
	Wailuku.....	644
	Honuaula.....	14, 484
	Hamakapoko.....	4, 550
	Hamakualoa.....	9, 255
	Koolau.....	17, 000
	Hana.....	18, 626
	Kipahulu.....	1, 162
	Kaupo.....	6, 612
	Kahikinui.....	25, 000
Total for Maui.....		97, 843
Lanai.....		30, 347
Kahoolawe.....		30, 000
Molokai.....		20, 000
Oahu.....	Honolulu.....	4, 575
	Ewa.....	2, 635
	Waianae.....	3, 648
	Waiialua.....	14, 000
	Koolau.....	329
Total for Oahu.....		25, 187
Kanai.....		23, 273
Total Government lands.....		814, 895.5

REMARKS.—The total area of the Government land at this date, estimated in round numbers, is 828,370 acres. The total value, independent of buildings, etc., was estimated in 1890 to be about \$2,128,850. The annual income at that time by

leases, etc., was \$67,636. Of this income \$19,500 was from wharfage, and \$7,800 from the rent of land with buildings thereon.

The Government lands at the above date were classified to quality as follows:

	Acres.
Cane and arable land	35, 150
Forest land	204, 670
Grazing land of fair quality	367, 270
Grazing land, barren and of little value	213, 800
Rugged inaccessible mountain tracts	40, 000
Old fish-ponds	780
Valuable building lots	130

Total estimated in 1890 861, 800

A considerable portion of the land classed above as "grazing land" might also be classed as arable for certain products, while much of the "forest land" is of the finest quality as regards soil and climate, but is at a higher elevation than land now generally cultivated.

By an act passed in 1890, nine unassigned lands, which had been claimed by the Government under a ruling by the supreme court in a parallel case, were transferred to the commissioners of Crown lands. These had been included among the Government lands in the estimate of 1890.

No. 4.—*Summary for the Crown lands for 1893.*

Islands.	Districts.	Areas.
		<i>Acres.</i>
Hawaii	Hilo	256, 939
	Hamakua	18, 864
	Kohala	57, 680
	Kona	2, 000
	Puna	66, 000
	Kau	187, 990
Total for Hawaii		589, 473
Maui	Lahaina	2, 084
	Olowalu	17, 040
	Kula	16, 283
	Hana	610
	Koolau	17, 408
	Kahakuloa	10, 523
	Kaanapali	4, 300
Total for Maui		68, 248
Molokai		21, 383
Lanai		17, 370
Oahu	Kona	5, 581
	Koolaupoko	9, 958
	Koolauloa	6, 672
	Waianae and Ewa	41, 967
Total for Oahu		64, 178
Kauai		154, 636
Total area of Crown lands		915, 288

E. and O. E.

W. D. ALEXANDER,
Surveyor-General.

No. 5.—Summary of the lands of the estate of Bernice Pauahi Bishop.*

Islands.	Districts.	Areas.
		<i>Acres.</i>
Hawaii	Hilo	5,843
	Hamakua	8,014
	Kohala	3,000
	North Kona	153,290
	South Kona	32,478
	Kau	78,874
	Puna	6,790
Total for Hawaii		288,289
Total for Maui		6,434
Total for Molokai		52,722
Total for Oahu		60,748
Total for Kauai		4,636
Grand total		412,829

* Mr. Alexander now estimates the Bishop estate at 420,000 acres.—F. C. P.

The annual rents of the estate at the present time amount to about \$50,000, and are increasing.

E. and O. E.

W. D. ALEXANDER,
Surveyor-General.

No. 6.—Crown lands available for lease, sale, or homestead.

Island.	District.	Name of tract.	Area.	Remarks.
			<i>Acres.</i>	
Hawaii	Kona	Puuwaawaa (about) ..	35,000	Very rocky and dry grazing.
		Haleohiu (about)	1,000	Rocky and dry grazing.
		Waiaha	200	Do.
		Puaa	859	Do.
		Onouli	367	Do.
	Puna	Olaa	47,000	Good agricultural land.
		Waiaholea	300	Rocky and dry grazing.
		Kaimu (about)	2,000	Do.
	Hamakua	Waimanu (about)	5,000	Leap Valley.
	Oahu	Makawai }	1,200	Kula Land.
Molokai	Ewa	Hopekea }	43	Do.
		Pouhala }	1,200	Rocky and dry grazing.
		Malapue (about)	1,200	
		Total	94,169	

THEO. C. PORTER,
Minister of Finance.

HONOLULU, May 6, 1893.

No. 7.—*Monthly pay roll of the Provisional Government—summary by nationality.*

No.	Nationality.	Amount.	Per cent in num- ber.
459	Hawaiians	\$18,631.00	52.34
205	Americans (including 77 school teachers)	18,367.49	23.38
110	British (including 37 school teachers)	9,148.74	12.54
19	Germans	1,371.33	2.17
27	Portuguese	866.63	3.08
13	Scandinavians	687.92	1.48
15	Japanese	762.60	1.71
7	Chinese	426.00	.80
3	South Sea Islanders	145.00	.34
1	Malay	60.00	.11
1	Russian	50.00	.11
17	Unclassified	631.66	1.94
877	Total	51,148.37	100.00

NOTE.—The above is the *monthly pay roll* of the entire civil service, except the salaries of the *cabinet ministers* and the pay of the police. The appropriation for the pay of the *police* is at the rate of nearly \$6,750 per month, and the members of the force are nearly all native *Hawaiians*. Should they be added to the above statement the Hawaiians will be found to hold at least two-thirds of the salaried positions under the Government. Should day-laborers be taken into account, the percentage of Hawaiians in the Government employ would be still further increased.

THEO. C. PORTER,
Minister of Finance.

HONOLULU, May 2, 1893.

No. 24.

Mr. J. W. Jones to Mr. Blount.

HEADQUARTERS ANNEXATION CLUB,
Honolulu, H. I., May 15, 1893.

Col. J. H. Blount, United States Commissioner, etc.:

DEAR SIR: Agreeably to your request, please find herein statement of annexation clubs on the various islands, with number of names on rolls of each island, and total.

I would state that there are 13 rolls still in circulation on this island, estimated to contain about 250 names. We are also informed that there are similar rolls on the other islands, which will be sent us as fast as turned in.

Number of names on Maui	554
Number of names on Oahu	2,572
Number of names on Hawaii	922
Number of names on Kauai	531
Total	4,579

Hawaii annexation clubs.—Hilo, North Kohala, South Kona, Hoo-kena, Napoopoo, Kapalilua.

Maui annexation club.—Wailuku.

Kauai annexation clubs.—Lehui, Waimea, Kealia.

I would also state that we have lists in the Hamakua District on Hawaii, the Lahaina, Hana, and Paia districts on Maui, and at Kaluaaha on Molokai.

Very respectfully,

J. W. JONES,
Secretary Annexation Club.

No. 25.

Mr. Hassinger's certificate.

I certify that the [following] tabular statement hereon made is correct, and is taken from the naturalization records of the interior department.

J. A. HASSINGER,
Chief Clerk of Department.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, June 20, 1893.

Oath of citizen or resident.

No. —.]

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *Island of* —, *District of* —, ss:

I, —, aged —, a native of —, residing at —, in said district, do solemnly swear, in the presence of Almighty God, that I will support the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, promulgated and proclaimed on the 17th day of January, 1893, not hereby renouncing, but expressly reserving all allegiance to any foreign country now owing by me.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, this — day of —, A. D. 1893.

No. —.]

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *Island of* —, *District of* —, ss:

I, the undersigned, —, do hereby certify that —, aged —, a native of —, residing at —, in said district, has this day taken, before me, the oath to support the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, promulgated and proclaimed on the 17th day of January, 1893.

—, 1893.

Oath of Government officer.

No. —.]

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *Island of* —, *District of* —, ss:

I, —, aged —, a native of —, residing at —, in said district, do solemnly swear, in the presence of Almighty God, that I will support and bear true allegiance to the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, and faithfully perform the duties appertaining to the office or employment of —.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this — day of —, A. D. 1893.

No. —.]

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *Island of* —, *District of* —, ss:

I, the undersigned, —, do hereby certify that —, aged —, a native of —, residing at —, in said district, has this day taken, before me, the oath to support and bear true allegiance to the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, and faithfully perform the duties appertaining to the office or employment of —.

—, —, 1893.

THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM.

Record of naturalization.

In the department of the interior. In the matter of the naturalization of——.

Be it remembered that on this —— day of ——, A. D. 18——, ——, an alien; and late a subject or citizen of ——, applied in writing to the minister of the interior to be admitted a citizen of the Hawaiian Kingdom pursuant to the acts of the Hawaiian Legislature in relation thereto, and it appearing by his said application and by other satisfactory proofs that he has resided within the Kingdom for two years next preceding said application and that he intends to become a permanent resident of this Kingdom, and that he is not a pauper nor a refugee from the justice of some other country, and his said application having been approved by the minister of interior, and the said —— having, on the —— day of ——, A. D. 18——, taken and subscribed the oath of allegiance required by law before ——, therefore I do admit the said ——, and declare him to be a citizen of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

—— of the Interior.

In re the matter of naturalization of foreigners.

Section 1284 of the civil code requires, "It shall also be necessary to validate the marriage of native female subjects of these Islands with male foreigners coming here to reside, that the foreigners have become first duly naturalized by taking the oath of allegiance."

This section was repealed by Chapter XXIII of the session laws of 1872. Since then, but few foreigners have taken the oath of allegiance (other than Asiatics) except those holding appointments under the Government, as required by Chapter XLII of the laws of 1874.

Letters patent of denization.

Name.	Nationality.	Date.
Clarence W. Ashford	British	July 10, 1883
William Foster	American	Aug. 7, 1883
Wm. Russel Austin	do	Oct. 8, 1883
Paul Neumann	American citizen	Oct. 11, 1883
Michael Thompson	American	Nov. 23, 1883
Julius H. Smith	do	Apr. 7, 1884
Joseph Sykes Webb	English	May 13, 1884
Geo. William Parker	do	Do.
Jno. William Pfleger	German	Oct. 4, 1884
Harry E. Avery	American	Oct. 6, 1884
James Brodie	British	Jan. 29, 1885
Rolando Knehn	American	Jan. 15, 1885
Volney V. Ashford	British	Feb. 11, 1885
J. Vanderbilt Simonson	American	Apr. 7, 1885
Elijah Nichols	do	Feb. 11, 1885
Patrick H. W. Ross	British	Sept. 1, 1885
Paul Petrovits	American citizen	Do.
Jay H. Reist	American	Oct. 13, 1885
A. Hoffnung	English	Aug. 15, 1885
Geo. E. Gresley Jackson	British	Jan. 16, 1886
Chas. B. Reynolds	English	Nov. 15, 1885
Edw. C. Webb, M. D.	American	Nov. 18, 1885
S. E. Craddock, M. D.	British	Jan. 13, 1886
Edward Hore	do	Jan. 23, 1886
Geo. Carson Kenyon	do	Do.
Jno. Josiah Jones	Jamaica	Jan. 25, 1886
Charles Creighton	American citizen	Feb. 26, 1886
Edmond Wright Norrie	Dane	May 13, 1886
Zeno Kelly Myers	American	Do.
John T. Dare	do	May 6, 1886
Allan B. Scrimgeour	British	May 13, 1886
James Clinton Hooker	do	May 31, 1886
Robert J. Creighton	do	June 29, 1886
A. W. Heydtmann	German	Dec. 30, 1886
Frank B. McStocker	American	Feb. 9, 1887
Abraham Rosenberg	German	Mar. 4, 1887
Henry Lardi Thiron	American citizen	Feb. 24, 1887
David McDonald	do	Mar. 22, 1887
Harry Weeks	British	Mar. 5, 1887

Letters patent of denization—Continued.

Name.	Nationality.	Date.
Charles Lind.....	American.....	Apr. 4, 1887
William Joseph Harris.....
John Calway.....
Charles N. Spencer.....	American.....	May 13, 1887
William John Cox.....	British.....	May 17, 1887
Melvin Staples.....	American.....	Aug. 11, 1887
John Ritson.....	British.....	Sept. 19, 1887
William Hurst Graenhalgh.....	American.....	Nov. 19, 1888
William Tufts Brigham.....	do.....	Feb. 26, 1889
Hong Yen Chang.....	American citizen.....	July 30, 1889
A. Van Clief Gear.....	American.....	July 21, 1890
Hugh James Gallagher.....	do.....	Do.
Philip Sheridan Woolsey.....	do.....	Do.
John Walter Jones.....	do.....	July 23, 1890
Dow Lee Huntsman.....	do.....	July 25, 1890
William Woodworth Bruner.....	do.....	Do.
Paul Hamil.....	do.....	Do.
William Todd Seward.....	do.....	Aug. 2, 1890
George Nelson Armstrong.....	do.....	Aug. 5, 1890
Frank P. Hastings.....	do.....	Mar. 2, 1891
John Ross.....	do.....	Oct. 28, 1891
Henry E. Cooper.....	do.....	June 30, 1892
Robert B. Brenham.....	do.....	Feb. 12, 1892
Francis M. English.....	English.....	Sept. 29, 1892
C. J. Falk.....	American.....	Feb. 14, 1893
Theodore C. Porter.....	do.....	Mar. 15, 1893
Francis M. Wakefield.....	British.....	May 15, 1893

Kalakaua, by the grace of God, of the Hawaiian Islands King. To all whom these presents shall come, greeting:

Know ye, that whereas by section number 443 of our civil code the royal prerogative is expressly reserved to us of granting to any alien resident abroad, or temporarily resident in this Kingdom, letters patent of denization, conferring upon such alien, without abjuration of allegiance, all the rights, privileges, and immunities of a citizen, which said letters patent shall render such denizen in all respects accountable to the laws of this Kingdom, and impose upon him like fealty to us as if he had been duly naturalized according to law; and

Whereas, by petition duly presented to us by ———, a native of ———, at present temporarily resident in this Kingdom, the said petitioner solicits of us the issue to him of such letters patent of denization.

Now, therefore, we, reposing trust and confidence in the said ———, and believing him to be well affected towards our person and Government, and by virtue of the royal prerogative expressly reserved to and reposed in us by law, as above recited, do, by these letters patent of denization, confer upon the said ——— without abjuration of his allegiance, all the rights, privileges, and immunities of a native Hawaiian subject, and he, the said ———, is hereby declared to be invested with all such rights, privileges, and immunities as aforesaid, subject, nevertheless, to an accountability to the laws of this Kingdom, and fealty to our throne in manner and form similar to that devolving upon naturalized subjects of this Kingdom.

Witness our hand and the great seal of the Hawaiian Kingdom at our palace of Iolani, this ——— day of ———, A. D. 18—.

By the King:

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Premier.

Kalakaua, by the grace of God, of the Hawaiian Islands King, to all to whom these presents shall come, greeting:

Know ye, that by virtue of section 433, Article VIII of Chapter VII of the civil code as amended by section 1 of Chapter X of the laws of 1887, and by and with the advice and consent of the cabinet, we do by these letters patent of denization, confer upon ———, a citizen of the ———, an alien temporarily resident in this Kingdom, without abjuration of allegiance, all the rights, privileges, and immunities of a native subject, nevertheless, in all respects to an accountability to the laws of this Kingdom and the like fealty to our throne as if he had been duly naturalized.

Witness our hand and the great seal of our Kingdom at our palace of Iolani this ——— day of ———, A. D. 18—.

By the King:

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Letters patent of denization.

Liliuokalani, by the grace of God of the Hawaiian Islands Queen, to all whom these presents shall come, greeting:

Know ye, that by virtue of section 433, Article VIII of Chapter VII of the civil code, as amended by section 1 of Chapter X, of the laws of 1887, and by and with the advice and consent of the cabinet, we do by these letters patent of denization confer upon _____, a citizen of _____, an alien, temporarily resident of this Kingdom, without abjuration of allegiance, all the rights, privileges and immunities of a native, subject, nevertheless, in all respects to an accountability to the laws of this Kingdom, and the like fealty to our throne, as if he had been duly naturalized.

Witness our hand, and the great seal of our Kingdom, at our palace of Iolani, in Honolulu, this _____ day of _____, A. D. 189—, and in the _____ year of our reign.

By the Queen: _____

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Letters patent of denization.

Liliuokalani, by the Grace of God of the Hawaiian Islands Queen, to all to whom these presents shall come, greeting:

Know ye, that by virtue of section 433, Article VIII of Chapter VII of the civil code, as amended by section 1 of Chapter X of the laws of 1887, and by and with the advice and consent of the cabinet, we do by these letters patent of denization confer upon _____, a citizen of _____, an alien, temporarily resident in this Kingdom, without abjuration of allegiance, all the rights, privileges and immunities of a native, subject, nevertheless, in all respects to an accountability to the laws of this Kingdom, and the like fealty to our throne, as if he had been duly naturalized, and to our pleasure.

Witness our hand, and the great seal of our Kingdom, at our palace of Iolani, in Honolulu, this _____ day of _____, A. D. 189—, and in the _____ year of our reign.

By the Queen: _____

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Letters patent of denization.

Sanford B. Dole, President of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, to all to whom these presents shall come, greeting:

Know ye, that by virtue of section 433, Article VIII of Chapter VII of the civil code, as amended by section 1 of Chapter X of the laws of 1887, and by and with the advice and consent of the executive council, I do by these letters patent of denization confer upon _____, an alien, temporarily resident in these islands, without abjuration of allegiance, all the rights, privileges and immunities of a native, subject nevertheless in all respects to an accountability to the laws of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, and the like fealty to its Government as if he had been duly naturalized.

Witness my hand, and the great seal of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands in Honolulu this _____ day of _____, A. D. 1893.

By the President, _____

Minister of the Interior.

Application for naturalization.

To His Excellency _____,

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, _____, 18—.

Minister of the Interior:

The undersigned, a native of the city of _____, district or county of _____, state of _____, country _____, respectfully represents that he has resided in the Hawaiian Kingdom for _____ years next preceding this application; that his present place of

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HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

residence is ———; that it is his intention to become a permanent resident of the Kingdom; that "he is not a pauper nor a refugee from the justice of some other country," and he prays that he may be allowed to take the oath of naturalization as provided by law.

We concur,

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Minister of Finance.

Attorney General.

Minister of the Interior.

Approved ———, 18—.

Nationality and number of naturalizations for each biennial fiscal period from April 1, 1876, to March 31, 1892.

Country.	Two years to March 31—			
	1878.	1880.	1882.	1884.
United States.....	7	23	18	14
Great Britain.....	7	3	6	8
Canada.....	1		1	2
Australian Colonies.....	1	3	1	1
Germany.....	4	3	4	2
Holland.....			1	
Russia.....		1		
Iceland.....			3	
Denmark.....				1
Norway.....			2	
Sweden.....			2	
China.....	5	1	2	2
East Indies.....			1	
Portuguese Colonies.....		1		2
Nova Scotia.....			1	
Buenos Ayres.....				
Italy.....			1	1
Belgium.....				
West Indies.....				
France.....				
Total for the periods.....	25	35	43	33

Country.	Two years to March 31—			
	1886.	1888.	1890.	1892.
United States.....	8	15	22	8
Great Britain.....	7	7	8	8
Canada.....	2		1	3
Australian Colonies.....		2		1
Germany.....	6	3	3	5
Holland.....				
Russia.....				
Iceland.....				
Denmark.....				
Norway.....				
Sweden.....		1	1	
China.....	8	4	5	91
East Indies.....				1
Portuguese Colonies.....			5	
Nova Scotia.....	1			
Buenos Ayres.....	1			
Italy.....				
Belgium.....	1			
West Indies.....	1			
France.....			1	
Total for the periods.....	35	32	46	117

No. 26.

*Mr. Thos. G. Thrum to Mr. Blount.*BUREAU OF CONVEYANCES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, June 20, 1893.

His Excellency J. H. BLOUNT,

*Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary**of the United States:*

SIR: I have the honor to hand you herewith the exhibit in detail, summary, and tabular form of the amount and nationality of invested capital in the sugar industry of these islands, as you desired, compiled from the last official returns, or later information of owners or agents. With the limited time at my disposal it has taken longer than was perhaps anticipated, but it is accurate throughout according to returns, and is believed to be full and complete. With a few exceptions, all ownerships have been verified as to nationality.

In the lists of nationalities I have purposely made divisions as to those born here of full or half foreign parentage, rather than that an opportunity of so valuable a showing—in case it might be required—be lost sight of by a too general classification.

Several corporation summaries show a larger division of nationalities than appear in their list of shareholders. This is accounted for by the necessary proportioning of interested parties where corporations are stockholders, as in the case of Brewer & Co.'s interests in the Hawaiian Agricultural Company, Honoum, Onomea and other concerns.

Trusting the same will meet your approval,

I have the honor to remain, yours, very respectfully,

THOS. G. THRUM.

D.—Hawaiian sugar plantations and planting interests, not incorporated.

[Compiled from agent's latest reports.]

	Estimated value.	American.	Hawaiian- born American.	British.	German.	Norwe- gian.
Beecroft plantation.....	\$40,000	\$40,000
Elecle plantation.....	150,000	75,000	\$75,000
Faye & Co., H. P.....	50,000	\$50,000
Gay & Robinson.....	150,000	150,000
Grove Farm plantation.....	250,000	\$250,000
Halawa plantation.....	100,000	100,000
Hanakua plantation.....	120,000	120,000
Hanamaulu plantation.....	150,000	150,000
Hawi mill and plantation.....	200,000	200,000
Kekaha Sugar Company.....	300,000	100,000	200,000
Knudsen V.....	250,000	250,000
Kukaian Mill Company.....	120,000	\$60,000	60,000
Lale plantation.....	75,000	75,000
Mendonca, J. P.....	75,000	*75,000
Meyer & Kruse.....	40,000	40,000
Niulii mill and plantation.....	200,000	200,000
Overend, R. M.....	30,000	30,000
Pioneer Mill Company.....	400,000	200,000	200,000
Puehuehu plantation.....	70,000	70,000
Smith & Co., A. H.....	50,000	50,000
Waialua plantation.....	150,000	150,000
Huelo plantation.....	30,000	30,000
Total.....	3,000,000	415,000	500,000	1,195,000	515,000	375,000

* Portuguese.

E. and O. Ex.

Honolulu, June 20, 1893.

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THOS. G. THRUM.

Agents' reports of estimated value and ownership of unincorporated plantations, situation, etc., to accompany Table D.

[Compiled June, 1893, for His Excellency J. H. Blount, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of United States.]

Beecroft plantation: Kohala, Hawaii. Probable value \$40,000. Owners: Executors Jas. Woods one half, T. H. Davies one-half; British.

Eleele plantation: Kauai. Estimated value \$150,000. Owned equally between Mrs. E. A. McBryde, English, and Aug. Dreier, German.

H. P. Faye & Co.: Mauna, Kauai. Estimated value \$50,000. Owners: H. P. Faye and V. Knudsen; Norwegians.

Gay & Robinson: Kauai. Estimated value of planting interests \$150,000. Ownership: British.

Grove Farm plantation: Kauai. Estimated value \$250,000. Owners: G. N. and S. W. Wilcox; both Hawaiian-born Americans.

Halawa plantation: Kohala, Hawaii. Estimated value \$100,000. Owner: Dr. J. Wight; British.

Hamakua plantation: Hawaii. Probable value \$120,000. Owners: C. Notley two-thirds, T. H. Davies one-third; both British.

Hanamaulu plantation: Kauai. Estimated value \$150,000. Owners: A. S. and H. H. Wilcox; both Hawaiian-born Americans.

Hawi Mill and plantation: Kohala, Hawaii. Estimated value \$200,000. Owner: R. R. Hind; British.

Huelo plantation: Maui. Estimated value \$30,000. Owner: W. R. Watson; British.

Kekaha Sugar Co.: Kauai. Estimated value \$300,000. Owners: P. O. and C. Isenberg and F. W. Glade, Germans, two-thirds, and G. N., A. S., and S. W. Wilcox, Hawaiian-born Americans, one-third.

V. Knudsen: Waimea, Kauai. Estimated value of planting interests, etc., \$250,000. Owner: Norwegian.

Kukalaui Mill Co.: Hamakua, Hawaii. Estimated value \$120,000. Owners: J. M. Horner & Sons (Americans), and T. H. Davies (British), each one-half.

Laie plantation: Oahu. Estimated value \$75,000. Owners: The Mormon Church of Salt Lake; American.

J. P. Mendonca: Koolau and Waialua, Oahu. Estimated value of planting, grazing, and stock interests, \$75,000. Owner: Portuguese.

Meyer & Kruse: Kauai. Estimated value, \$40,000. Owners: F. W. Meyer and E. Kruse; Germans.

Niuli Mill and Plantation: Kohala, Hawaii. Estimated value, \$200,000. Owner: C. F. Hart; British.

R. M. Overend, Hamakua, Hawaii. Estimated value, \$30,000. Owner: American.

Pioneer Mill, Lahaina, Maui. Estimated value, \$400,000. Owners: C. F. Horner, American, and P. Isenberg, German, each one-half interest.

Puehuehu Plantation, Kohala, Hawaii. Estimated value, \$70,000. Owners: Kynnersley Bros. and R. Wallace; British.

A. H. Smith & Co., Koloa, Kauai. Estimated value of planting interests, \$40,000. Owners: A. H. and J. K. Smith, Hawaii; born Americans.

Waialua Plantation, Oahu. Estimated value, \$200,000. Owner: R. Halstead; British.

E. & O. Ex.

THOS. G. THURM.

HONOLULU, *June 20, 1893.*

B.—Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investments therein and nationality of stockholders in each. Compiled June, 1893, from latest official returns for his excellency J. H. Blount, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

Corporations.	Capital stock.	American.	Hawaiian-born American.	American-Hawaiian ($\frac{1}{2}$ caste.)	British.	Hawaiian-born British.	British-Hawaiian ($\frac{1}{2}$ caste.)
Ewa Plantation Co.	\$750,000	\$380,100	\$140,000	-----	\$10,000	\$3,400	\$500
Haiku Sugar Co.	500,000	131,000	368,000	-----	1,000	-----	-----
Hakalan Plantation Co.* ..	1,000,000	1,000,000	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Hamakua Mill Co.	240,000	-----	-----	-----	240,000	-----	-----
Hana Plantation Co.* ..	300,000	296,000	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Co.* ..	10,000,000	9,655,800	316,200	-----	28,000	-----	-----
Hawaiian Sugar Co.	2,000,000	700,840	686,207	-----	570,417	5,600	90
Hawaiian Agricultural Co.	500,000	201,214	207,560	600	67,725	300	503
Heeia Agricultural Co.	150,000	106,500	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Hilo Sugar Co.	500,000	349,900	-----	-----	150,100	-----	-----
Honokaa Sugar Co.	200,000	10,000	-----	-----	53,000	-----	10,000
Honouu Sugar Co.	250,000	70,756	73,542	1,000	79,406	21,800	585
Hutchinson Sugar Plantation Co.* ..	2,500,000	2,500,000	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Kahuku Plantn. Co.	500,000	120,000	89,900	-----	153,000	9,000	25,000
Koloa Sugar Co.	200,000	4,000	8,000	-----	-----	-----	-----
Kilauea Sugar Co.	300,000	75,000	-----	-----	225,000	-----	-----
Kipahulu Sugar Co.	80,000	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Kohala Sugar Co.	480,000	302,000	5,000	-----	158,500	-----	8,500
Kukalaui Plantn. Co.	120,000	120,000	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Laupahoehoe Plantn. Co.	500,000	-----	-----	-----	500,000	-----	-----
Lihue Plantn. Co.	700,000	125,000	225,000	-----	-----	-----	-----
Mahee Sugar Co.	500,000	492,000	-----	-----	-----	8,000	-----
Olowalu Sugar Co.	150,000	51,500	-----	-----	40,800	3,300	-----
Onomea Sugar Co.	500,000	286,301	136,783	-----	70,208	-----	1,125
Ookala Sugar Co.	200,000	47,500	4,500	-----	141,000	6,000	-----

B.—Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investments therein and nationality of stockholders in each, etc.—Continued.

Corporations.	Capital stock.	Amount.	Hawaiian-born American.	American-Hawaiian (½ caste.)	British.	Hawaiian-born British.	British-Hawaiian (½ caste.)
Paauihan Plantn. Co.....	\$1,000,000	\$500,000	-----	-----	\$500,000	-----	-----
Pacific Sugar Mill Co.....	300,000	83,600	-----	-----	118,300	-----	\$6,200
Paia Plantn. Co.....	750,000	413,300	\$297,100	-----	16,600	\$4,200	-----
Paukaa Sugar Co.....	170,000	31,786	50,328	1,200	1,060	100	103
Pepeekeo Sugar Co.....	750,000	15,000	5,000	-----	530,000	-----	-----
Princeville Plantn. Co.....	240,000	154,368	5,325	-----	63,932	-----	63
Reciprocity Sugar Co.....	214,300	7,200	116,200	43,700	6,000	1,100	600
Union Mill Co.....	160,000	-----	-----	-----	150,000	5,000	5,000
Waianae Sugar Co.....	255,000	6,000	65,000	41,400	16,900	1,900	400
Waiakea Mill Co.....	300,000	-----	-----	-----	300,000	-----	-----
Waihee Sugar Co.....	250,000	122,000	60,000	-----	16,430	-----	263
Waikapu Sugar Co.....	250,000	123,000	-----	-----	2,000	125,000	-----
Wailuku Sugar Co.....	265,000	63,130	93,035	-----	86,840	1,500	8,166
Waimanalo Sugar Co.....	180,000	49,900	7,600	1,000	7,000	-----	95,000
Waimea Sugar Mill.....	70,000	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Total.....	28,274,000	18,594,695	2,960,280	88,900	4,303,218	196,200	160,098

* San Francisco corporations; all others Hawaiian.

E. & O. Ex.

THOS. G. THURM.

HONOLULU, June 20, 1893.

Corporations.	German.	Hawaiian-born German.	German-Hawaiian (half caste.)	Hawaiian.	Chinese.	Chinese-Hawaiian, Portuguese-Hawaiian (half caste.)	Portuguese.	All other foreign.	Total amount stock issued.
Ewa Plantation Co.....	\$35,500	\$3,000	-----	-----	-----	\$500	\$1,000	\$1,000	\$575,000
Haiku Sugar Co.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	500,000
Haikalan Plantation Co.*.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	1,000,000
Hamakua Mill Co.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	240,000
Hana Planter Co.*.....	4,000	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	300,000
Hawn. Coml. & Sugar Co.*.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	10,000,000
Hawaiian Sugar Co.....	26,503	10,000	10	333	-----	-----	-----	-----	2,000,000
Hawaiian Agricultural Co.....	15,477	-----	56	6,365	-----	-----	200	-----	500,000
Heeia Agricultural Co.....	13,500	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	30,000	-----	150,000
Hilo Sugar Co.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	500,000
Honokaa Sugar Co.....	126,200	-----	800	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	200,000
Honoum Sugar Co.....	680	65	-----	2,166	-----	-----	-----	-----	250,000
Hutchinson Sugar Plantation Co.*.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	2,500,000
Kahuku Plantation Co.....	49,000	-----	-----	1,100	30,000	\$3,000	17,500	\$2,500	500,000
Koloa Sugar Co.....	187,000	1,000	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	200,000
Kilauea Sugar Co.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	300,000
Kipahulu Sugar Co.....	80,000	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	80,000
Kohala Sugar Co.....	6,000	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	480,000
Kukaian Plantation Co.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	120,000
Laupahoehoe Plantation Co.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	500,000
Lihue Plantation Co.....	325,000	25,000	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	700,000
Makee Sugar Co.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	500,000
Olowalu Sugar Co.....	48,400	-----	-----	-----	6,000	-----	-----	-----	150,000
Onomea Sugar Co.....	1,291	-----	125	4,167	-----	-----	-----	-----	500,000
Ookala Sugar Co.....	1,000	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	200,000
Paauihan Plantation Co.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	1,000,000
Pacific Sugar Mill Co.....	91,900	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	300,000
Paia Plantation Co.....	18,000	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	800	-----	750,000
Paukaa Sugar Co.....	3	-----	-----	360	-----	-----	-----	50	84,990

* San Francisco corporations; all others Hawaiian.

† Swedish, \$1,000.

‡ \$500 Portuguese-Hawaiian.

§ Swedish, \$1,500; Danish, \$1,000.

|| British-Tahitian.

B.—Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investments therein and nationality of stockholders in each, etc,—Continued.

Corporations.	German.	Hawaiian-born German.	German-Hawaiian (half-caste).	Hawaiian.	Chinese.	Chinese-Hawaiian, Portuguese-Hawaiian (half-caste).	Portuguese.	All other foreign.	Total amount stock issued.
Pepeekeo Sugar Co					200,000				\$750,000
Princeville Planter Co	\$16,072		7	233					240,000
Reciprocity Sugar Co		\$100		6,100	23,300	\$10,000			214,300
Union Mill Co									160,000
Waianae Sugar Co	101,400		1,000	500		20,500			255,000
Waiakea Mill Co									300,000
Waihee Sugar Co	302		30	975					200,000
Waikapu Sugar Co									250,000
Wailuku Sugar Co	1,307		30	12,992					265,000
Waimanalo Sugar Co	15,409			3,700	400				180,000
Waimea Sugar Mill	70,000								70,000
Total	1,233,935	39,165	2,058	38,991	259,700	34,000	\$49,500	\$3,550	27,964,290

A.—Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investments and nationality of stockholders therein, with summary of each, being details to accompany table marked B.

[Compiled from last official returns, or later information, at request of his excellency J. H. Blount, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States. E. and O. Ex., Honolulu, June 20, 1893. Thos. G. Thurman.]

EWA PLANTATION COMPANY, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$750,000, in shares of \$100 par value each; 5,750 shares issued.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Castle & Cooke	American firm	900	\$90,000
Castle, S. N.	American	750	75,000
Welch & Co	San Francisco firm	750	75,000
Castle, J. B.	Hawaiian-born American	500	50,000
Atherton, J. B.	American	454	45,400
Castle, W. R.	Hawaiian-born American	450	45,000
Kopke, E.	German	250	25,000
Lowrie, W. J.	American	250	25,000
Cooke, C. M.	Hawaiian-born American	248	24,800
Lewers & Cooke	American firm	200	20,000
Allen, S. C.	American	125	12,500
Castle, H. N.	Hawaiian-born American	100	10,000
Hackfeld, J. F.	German	100	10,000
Allen, W. F.	American	50	5,000
Dillingham, B. F.	do.	50	5,000
Hall, W. W.	Hawaiian-born American	50	5,000
Bishop, C. R.	American	40	4,000
Hopper, J. A.	do.	30	3,000
Paty, J. H.	do.	25	2,500
Cleghorn, A. S.	British	15	1,500
Whitney, J. M.	American	10	1,000
Austin, J.	do.	10	1,000
Boardman, G. E.	Hawaiian-born American	10	1,000
Cunha, E. S.	Portuguese	10	1,000
Chrisholm, A.	Swede	10	1,000
Carden, I.	British	10	1,000
Egan, J. J.	American	10	1,000
Ferguson, C.	British	10	1,000
Howell, I.	American	10	1,000
Hubbard, L. H.	do.	10	1,000
Hopper, W. L.	do.	10	1,000
Iseberg, Mrs. Dora.	Hawaiian-born German	10	1,000
Lyle, A.	British	10	1,000
Lowrie, F. C.	American	10	1,000
Lyman, F. S.	Hawaiian-born American	10	1,000

A.--Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investments and nationality of stockholders therein, etc.—Continued.

EWA PLANTATION COMPANY, OAHU—Continued.

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Monsarrat, J. M.	Hawaiian-born British	10	\$1, 000
Malone, N. I.	American	10	1, 000
Peterson, E. U.	do.	10	1, 000
Peterson, A. P.	do.	10	1, 000
Robertson, A. G. M.	Hawaiian-born British	10	1, 000
Ramsey, W. J.	British	10	1, 000
Snow, F. S.	American	10	1, 000
Von Holt, H.	Hawaiian-born German	10	1, 000
Worn, W.	American	10	1, 000
Atherton, C. H.	Hawaiian-born American	5	500
Achi, C.	Chinese-Hawaiian (half-caste)	5	500
Boyd, J. H.	British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	5	500
Baldwin, H. P.	Hawaiian-born American	5	500
Barnet, J.	American	5	500
Baldwin, B. D.	Hawaiian-born American	5	500
Clapp, C. H.	American	5	500
Campbell, I. F.	do.	5	500
Carter, A. W.	Hawaiian-born American	5	500
Carter, C. H.	do.	5	500
Greig, W. H. C.	Hawaiian-born British	5	500
Hawaiian Construction Company.	American firm	5	500
Hines, Miss E. E.	British	5	500
Harrison, F.	do.	5	500
Harrison, A.	do.	5	500
Howard, W. L.	American	5	500
Hyde, Mrs. C. M.	do.	5	500
Kopke, Mrs. E.	British	5	500
Lewis & Co.	American firm	5	500
McKenzie, R. M.	American	5	500
McInerny, W. H.	Hawaiian-born British	5	500
Osborne, Mrs. G.	American	5	500
Rowe, E. C.	do.	5	500
Roth, S.	German	5	500
White, J. N.	American	5	500
Wilhelm, F.	Hawaiian-born German	5	500
Wall, C. J.	British	5	500
Wall, W. E.	do.	5	500
Wright, T.	do.	5	500
Wicke, H.	Hawaiian-born German	5	500
Brewer, M. A.	American	2	200
McInerny, E. A.	Hawaiian-born British	2	200
McInerny, I. D.	do.	2	200
Coan, Mrs. L.	Hawaiian-born American	7	700
Thrum, T. G.	British	10	1, 000
Total	5, 750	575, 000

SUMMARY.

American	\$380, 100
Hawaiian-born American	140, 000
British	10, 000
Hawaiian-born British	3, 400
British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	500
German	35, 500
Hawaiian-born German	3, 000
Portuguese	1, 000
Swede	1, 000
Chinese-Hawaiian (half-caste)	500
Total	575, 000

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

HAIKU SUGAR COMPANY, MAUI.

[Hawaiian corporation. Capital stock, \$500,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Baldwin, H. P.	Hawaiian-born American	2510	\$251,000
Alexander, S. T.	American	450	45,000
Alexander, S. T., Mrs.	do	50	5,000
Atherton, Mr. and Mrs.	do	355	35,500
Castle, S. N.	do	325	32,500
Castle, J. B.	Hawaiian-born American	250	25,000
Cooke, H. E.	do	205	20,500
Cooke, C. M.	do	175	17,500
Cooke, C. M., trustee.	do	50	5,000
Cooke, A. F., trustee.	do	25	2,500
Jones, P. C.	American	5	500
Damon, S. M.	Hawaiian-born American	50	5,000
Damon, H. M.	do	10	1,000
Jones, E. A.	do	5	500
Brash, W.	British	10	1,000
Wilcox, G. N.	Hawaiian-born American	262	26,200
Wilcox, S. A.	do	23	2,300
Wilcox, A. S.	do	23	2,300
Wilcox, H. H.	do	23	2,300
Wilcox, E. P.	do	23	2,300
Wilcox, C. H.	do	23	2,300
Wilcox, W. L.	do	23	2,300
Walsh, E. M.	American	50	5,000
Atwater, W. O.	do	65	6,500
Peterson, E. W.	do	10	1,000
Total		5,000	500,000

SUMMARY.

Hawaiian-born American	\$368,000
American	131,000
British	1,000
	500,000

[HAKALAU PLANTATION COMPANY, HAWAII.

[San Francisco corporation; capital stock, \$1,000,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Sundry San Francisco stockholders	American	10,000	\$1,000,000

HAMAKUA MILL COMPANY, HAWAIIAN.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$240,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Davies, T. H.	British	1,200	\$120,000
Janion, D. R.	do	900	90,000
Renton, J. R.	do	300	30,000
Total		2,400	240,000

HANA PLANTATION COMPANY, MAUI.

[San Francisco corporation, capital stock \$3,000,000, in shares of \$100 par value each, 10 per cent paid up.]

Sundry San Francisco stockholders	American	29,600	\$296,000
Bolte, C.	German	400	4,000
Total		30,000	300,000

A.—Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investments and nationality of stockholders therein, etc.—Continued.

HAWAIIAN COMMISSION AND SUGAR COMPANY, MAUI.

[San Francisco corporation, capital stock, \$10,000,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value
Sundry San Francisco stockholders	American	96, 558	\$9, 655, 800
Baldwin, H. P.	Hawaiian-born American	3, 162	316, 200
Campbell, T.	British	130	13, 000
Ross, Geo.	do.	100	10, 000
Morrison, H.	do.	50	5, 000
Total		100, 000	10, 000, 000

SUMMARY.

American	\$9, 655, 800
Hawaiian-born American	316, 200
British	23, 000
Total	10, 000, 000

HAWAIIAN AGRICULTURAL COMPANY, HAWAII.

[Hawaiian corporation, capital stock \$500,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Brewer, C., & Co. (limited)	Hawaiian corporation	1, 119	\$111, 900
Cooke, C. M.	Hawaiian-born American	1, 095	109, 500
Austin, J. W.	American	573	57, 300
Rice, N. R.	do.	132	13, 200
Rice, N. R. (guardian)	do.	264	26, 400
Judd, A. F.	Hawaiian-born American	170	17, 000
Hunnewell	American	138	13, 800
Austin, J. (estate of)	do.	138	13, 800
Welch, A., (estate of)	British	120	12, 000
Hackfeld, J. F.	German	120	12, 000
Lord, T. A.	American	115	11, 500
May, T.	British	109	10, 900
Henderson, Mrs. R. A.	do.	109	10, 900
Brash, W. G.	do.	25	2, 500
Liliuokalani, Her Majesty	Hawaiian	45	4, 500
Castle, J. B.	Hawaiian born American	93	9, 300
Hobron, T. W.	do.	86	8, 600
Smith, W. O.	do.	79	7, 900
Lewers, R.	American	65	6, 500
Hobron, T. W. (trustee)	Hawaiian born American	34	3, 400
White, Z. L.	American	46	4, 600
Alexander, M.	Hawaiian born American	30	3, 000
Hobron, Mrs. F. E. (trustee)	American	29	2, 900
White, J. N.	do.	29	2, 900
McCully, Mrs. L.	do.	25	2, 500
Allen, S. C.	do.	25	2, 500
Isenberg, Mrs. D.	German	23	2, 300
Lowrey, F. J.	American	14	1, 400
Collins, G. H.	do.	11	1, 100
Allen & Robinson	do.	11	1, 100
Jones, E. A.	Hawaiian-born American	11	1, 100
Jones, P. C.	American	11	1, 100
Fuller, Mrs. M.	do.	11	1, 100
Richards, M. A.	Hawaiian-born American	11	1, 100
Cooke, C. M. (trustee)	do.	10	1, 000
Hillebrand, Miss	do.	7	700
Judd, A. F. (trustee)	do.	7	700
Allen, W. F.	American	6	600
Norton, G.	American-Hawaiian (half caste)	6	600
Lyman, Mrs. M. B.	Hawaiian-born American	6	600
Lewers, H.	do.	5	500
Hatch, F. M.	American	6	600
Zeigler, Mrs. R.	German	6	600
Lewers, W. H.	Hawaiian-born American	5	500
Bishop, Mrs. C.	American	5	500
Monsarrat, J.	Hawaiian-born British	3	300
Hosmer, F. A.	American	3	300
Brewer, Miss M.	do.	2	200
Malone, Miss.	do.	2	200
Wood, J. Q.	do.	2	200
Livers, J. de	Portuguese	2	200
Bishop, S. E.	Hawaiian-born American	1	100
Total		5, 000	500, 000

A.—Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investments and nationality of stockholders therein, etc.—Continued.

SUMMARY.

American.....	\$201,214
Hawaiian-born American.....	207,560
British.....	67,725
Hawaiian-born British.....	300
German.....	15,477
Hawaiian.....	6,365
American-Hawaiian (half caste).....	600
British-Hawaiian (half caste)!.....	503
German-Hawaiian (half caste).....	56
Portuguese.....	200
Total.....	500,000

HEEIA AGRICULTURAL COMPANY LIMITED,, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$150,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Mendoca, J. P.....	Portuguese.....	300	\$30,000
Esberg, M.....	American.....	187½	18,750
Bachmann, S.....	do.....	187½	18,750
Grinbaum, M. S.....	do.....	270	27,000
Louissou, M.....	do.....	260	26,000
Cahn, D.....	do.....	150	15,000
Bolte, C.....	German.....	75	7,500
Buchholtz, J.....	do.....	60	6,000
Aschheim, A. (estate of).....	American.....	10	1,000
Total.....		1,500	150,000

SUMMARY.

American.....	\$106,500
German.....	13,500
Portuguese.....	30,000
Total.....	150,000

HAWAIIAN SUGAR COMPANY, KAUAI.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$2,000,000 in 20,000 shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Baldwin, H. P.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	5,100	\$510,000
Alexander, S. T.....	American.....	3,355	335,500
Mirlees, J. B.....	British.....	1,015	101,500
Watson, W. R.....	do.....	1,015	101,500
Spreckles & Bros., J. D.....	American firm.....	750	75,000
Wilcox, A. S.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	600	60,000
Wilcox, G. N.....	do.....	550	55,000
Welch, Andrew, (estate of).....	British.....	500	50,000
Watson & Co., M.....	British firm.....	500	50,000
Bishop, C. R.....	American.....	400	40,000
Gay & Robinson.....	British.....	300	30,000
Fowler, W.....	do.....	250	25,000
Hopper, J. A.....	American.....	265	26,500
Lewers & Cooke.....	American firm.....	150	15,000
Allen, S. C.....	American.....	200	20,000
Brewer & Co., C.....	Hawaiian corporation.....	200	20,000
Fowler, R. H.....	British.....	160	16,000
Smith, J. M.....	American.....	100	10,000
Morrison, H.....	British.....	100	10,000
Foster, T. R., estate of.....	do.....	100	10,000
Irwin, W. G.....	do.....	535	53,500
Cooke, C. M.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	400	40,000
Grinbaum, M. S.....	American.....	100	10,000
Walters, Dr.....	British.....	100	10,000
Soper, J. H. and J. H., jr.....	do.....	56	5,600
Hocking, A.....	do.....	50	5,000
Snow, Miss J. E.....	American.....	5	500
Dowsett, J. M.....	Hawaiian-born British.....	25	2,500
Holmes, H.....	British.....	25	2,500
McBean, A.....	American.....	25	2,500

A.—*Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investments and nationality of stockholders therein, etc.*—Continued.

HAWAIIAN SUGAR COMPANY, KAUAI—Continued.

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Cockburn, A.	British.	10	\$1,000
Hosmer, F. A.	American	25	2,500
Wood, J. Q.	do.	12	1,200
Paris, Miss A. M.	Hawaiian-born American	12	1,200
Knights, Miss E. B.	American	8	800
Halstead, Mrs. M. E.	British	13	1,300
Fuller, Mrs. I. S.	American	5	500
Frear, W. F.	do.	11	1,100
Crockett, A. W.	do.	8	800
Winter, Miss C. P.	do.	2	200
Armstrong, Miss A. M.	do.	2	200
Snow, Miss C.	do.	2	200
Hadley, Miss A. Z.	do.	1	100
Halstead, F.	British	12	1,200
White, J. N.	American	200	20,000
Haning, Mrs. H. H.	British	1	100
Phoffenhaur, W.	German	25	2,500
Klamp, S.	do.	60	60.00
Cummings, J. H.	American	10	10.00
Woon, W.	do.	10	10.00
Lackland, Mrs. A.	do.	5	5.00
Halstead, N.	Hawaiian, born British	2	2.00
Humberg, J. F.	German	20	20.00
Isenberg, Mrs. D.	do.	5	5.00
Greig, W. H. C.	Hawaiian, born British	18	18.00
Fries, A.	German	5	5.00
Garvie, A.	British	5	\$5.00
Wolters, W.	German	24	24.00
Rodick, G.	do.	10	10.00
Spreckels, C.	American	330	330.00
Hayward, H. M.	do.	30	30.00
Bosse, C.	German	58	58.00
Hyde, Mrs. M. C.	American	10	10.00
Fairchilds, G. H.	do.	20	20.00
Wilcox, H. H.	Hawaiian, born American	50	50.00
Schmidt, O.	German	10	10.00
Catton, R.	British	50	50.00
Fisher, J. H.	American	25	25.00
Hyman Bros.	American firm	45	45.00
Lewis & Co.	do.	150	150.00
Good, J.	American	20	20.00
Hackfeld, J. H.	German	20	20.00
Castle, J. B., trustee.	American	20	20.00
Hopper, W. L.	do.	10	10.00
Peterson, Mrs. E. W.	do.	10	10.00
Hopper, Miss M. L.	Hawaiian-born American	25	2,500
Hopper, Miss E. R.	do.	10	1,000
Gulick, T. L.	do.	10	1,000
Barnes, A.	American	10	1,000
Soper, M. E.	British	4	400
Oleson, W. B.	American	10	1,000
Baldwin, Miss W.	Hawaiian-born American	5	500
Macfarlane, G. W.	Hawaiian-born British	1	100
Sproul, A. M.	British	5	500
Richards, T.	American	5	500
Gardenberg, A.	do.	50	5,000
Lowrie, F. J.	do.	50	5,000
Wolers, C.	German	22	2,200
Stackable, E. R.	American	20	2,000
Goodale, W. W.	do.	50	5,000
Walsh, E. M.	do.	200	20,000
McInerny, J. D.	Hawaiian-born British	5	500
Baldwin, Mrs. L. M.	Hawaiian-born American	10	1,000
Scott, J. A.	British	30	3,000
Colville, J. W.	do.	100	10,000
Turrell, F.	American	100	10,000
Castle, Mrs. G.	do.	10	1,000
Castle, G. B. (trustee)	Hawaiian-born American	2	200
Castle, Miss C. D.	do.	5	500
Bowen, Mrs. W. A.	American	2	200
Malone, Miss J. N.	do.	10	1,000
Renwick, Miss.	British	9	900
Banning, B. R.	Hawaiian-born German	100	10,000
Coleman, Mrs. H. H.	Hawaiian-born American	6	600
Pode, Miss.	American	2	200
Howard, W. L.	do.	7	700

A.—Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investments and nationality of stockholders therein, etc.—Continued.

HAWAIIAN SUGAR COMPANY, KAUAI—Continued.

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Greig, Miss.....	British.....	50	\$5,000
Cotton, R. (trustee).....	do.....	78	7,800
Smart, G. F.....	do.....	125	12,500
Hardy, P.....	do.....	100	10,000
Park, J.....	do.....	100	10,000
Murray, T. D.....	do.....	50	5,000
Greig, D.....	do.....	50	5,000
Fowler, J. G.....	do.....	50	5,000
Howell, J. G.....	do.....	40	4,000
McIntosh, W.....	do.....	25	2,500
Dewhurst, J. B.....	do.....	25	2,500
Edison, J. E.....	do.....	15	1,500
Joergens, G.....	German.....	5	500
White, Mrs. Z. L.....	American.....	100	10,000
Total.....		20,000	2,000,000

SUMMARY.

British.....	\$570,417
Hawaiian-born British.....	5,600
American.....	700,840
Hawaiian-born American.....	686,207
German.....	26,503
Hawaiian-born German.....	10,000
Hawaiian.....	333
British-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	90
German-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	10
Total.....	2,000,000

HILO SUGAR COMPANY, HAWAII.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$500,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Irwin, W. G.....	British.....	1,500	\$150,000
Spreckles, C.....	American.....	1,499	149,900
Giffard, W. M.....	British.....	1	100
Spreckles, J. D., & Bro.....	American firm.....	2,000	200,000
Total.....		5,000	500,000

SUMMARY.

American.....	\$349,900
British.....	150,100
Total.....	500,000

A.—Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investments and nationality of stockholders therein, etc.—Continued.

HONOKAA SUGAR COMPANY, HAWAII.

[Hawaiian Corporation; capital stock \$200,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Schaefer, F. A., & Co	German firm	1, 180	\$118, 000
Marsden, J	British	500	50, 000
Foster, Mrs. M. E.	Hawaiian-British (half-caste)	100	10, 000
Mills, Mrs. C. T.	American	100	10, 000
Schaefer, Mrs. F. A.	German	40	4, 000
McInerney, M	British	30	3, 000
Von Mengersen, C	German	20	2, 000
Suhr, E	do.	20	2, 000
Widemann, A	German-Hawaiian (half-caste)	4	400
Widemann, G	do.	1	100
Widemann, Anna	do.	1	100
Widemann, H	do.	2	200
Berger, C. O	German	2	200
Total		2, 000	200, 000

SUMMARY.

German	\$126, 200
German-Hawaiian (half-caste)	800
British	53, 000
British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	10, 000
American	10, 000
Total	\$200, 000

HONOMU SUGAR COMPANY, HAWAII.

[Hawaiian corporation. Capital stock, \$250, 000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Brewer, C., & Co	Hawaiian corporation	1, 300	\$130, 000
May, T	British	259	25, 900
Wunderberg, F	Hawaiian-born British	218	21, 800
Spreckels, J., D. & Co	American corporation	113	11, 300
Carter, A. W	Hawaiian-born American	60	6, 000
Brash, W. G	British	60	6, 000
Kinney, W	do.	50	5, 000
Sherman, Jno	American	50	5, 000
Soper, J. H	British	50	5, 000
Hall, W. W	Hawaiian-born American	50	5, 000
Cartwright, A. J	American	38	3, 800
Jones, E. A	Hawaiian-born American	30	3, 000
Castle, W. R	do.	25	2, 500
Hobron, F. E., trustee	American	25	2, 500
White, E. O	Hawaiian-born American	25	2, 500
Good, Jno., jr	American	20	2, 000
Forbes, Mrs. M. J	Hawaiian-born American	19	1, 900
Cooke, C. M	do.	7	700
Austin, J., estate of	American	13	1, 300
Lyman, M. B	Hawaiian-born American	13	1, 300
Hall, Mrs. E. V	American	12	1, 200
Lindsay, A. B	British	10	1, 000
King, Sarah L	American-Hawaiian (half-caste)	10	1, 000
Dexter, E	American	7	700
White, J. N	do.	6	600
Carter, H. O	Hawaiian-born American	4	400
Carter, J. O., jr	do.	3	300
Hobron, T. W., trustee	do.	3	300
Hobron, T. W	do.	2	200
Dexter, R. A	American	8	800
Bidwell, J. E., estate of	do.	10	1, 000
Total		2, 500	250, 000

A.—Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investments and nationality of stockholders therein, etc.—Continued.

SUMMARY.

American.....	\$70,756
Hawaiian-born American.....	73,542
British.....	79,406
Hawaiian-born British.....	21,800
German.....	680
American-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	1,000
British-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	585
German-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	65
Hawaiian.....	2,166
Total.....	250,000

HUTCHINSON SUGAR PLANTATION COMPANY, HAWAII.

[San Francisco corporation; capital stock, \$2,500,000, in shares of \$50 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Sundry San Francisco stockholders ...	American	50,000	\$2,500,000

KAHUKU PLANTATION COMPANY, OAHU.

[Hawaiian Corporation; capital stock, \$500,000, in 5,000 shares, of \$100 par value.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Young, A.....	British.....	600	\$60,000
Castle, S. N.....	American.....	500	50,000
Davies, T. H.....	British.....	450	45,000
Castle, J. B.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	403	40,300
Afong, C.....	Chinaman.....	300	30,000
Cummins, J. A.....	British-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	250	25,000
Hackfeld, J. F.....	German.....	200	20,000
Bolte, C.....	do.....	200	20,000
Mendonca, J. P.....	Portuguese.....	175	17,500
Castle, W. R.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	150	15,000
Castle, G. P.....	do.....	150	15,000
Allen, W. F.....	American.....	100	10,000
Allen, S. C.....	do.....	100	10,000
Hall, W. W.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	75	7,500
Campbell T.....	British.....	70	7,000
Castle, H. N.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	50	5,000
Lewers & Cooke.....	American firm.....	50	5,000
Macfarlane, F. W.....	Hawaiian-born British.....	50	5,000
Hatch, F. M.....	American.....	50	5,000
Waterhouse, J. T. jr.....	British.....	50	5,000
Atwater, W. O.....	American.....	50	5,000
Bishop, C. R.....	do.....	50	5,000
Isenberg, Paul.....	German.....	40	4,000
Campbell, Jas.....	British.....	40	4,000
Wilson, Mrs. J.....	do.....	40	4,000
Ahlborn, L.....	German.....	35	3,500
Thurston, L. A.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	30	3,000
Dillingham, F. F.....	American.....	30	3,000
Smith, T.....	British.....	30	3,000
Brown, A.....	do.....	30	3,000
Lansing, T. F.....	American.....	30	3,000
Monteagle, R.....	British.....	25	2,500
Lycett, J.....	do.....	25	2,500
Shaw, J.....	do.....	25	2,500
Paty, J. H.....	do.....	25	2,500
Douse, F. G.....	do.....	20	2,000
Jones, T.....	do.....	20	2,000
Hopper, J. A.....	American.....	20	2,000
White, E. O.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	22	2,200
Grossman, M. E.....	American.....	20	2,000
Way, L.....	British.....	20	2,000
Whitney, J. M.....	American.....	20	2,000
Fisher, J. H.....	do.....	20	2,000
Tenney, E. D.....	do.....	15	1,500
Carlson, L. E.....	Swede.....	15	1,500
Achi, W. C.....	Half-caste Chinese.....	15	1,500

A.—Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investment and nationality of stockholders therein, etc.—Continued.

KAHUKU PLANTATION COMPANY, OAHU.

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Cartwright, A. J.	American	12	\$1, 230
White, W. J.	British	10	1, 000
Crozier, C.	do	10	1, 000
Atherton, J. B.	American	10	1, 000
Bowen, W. A.	do	10	1, 000
Austin, John	do	10	1, 000
Terry, W. S.	do	10	1, 000
Lyman, F. S., Jr.	Hawaiian-born American	10	1, 000
Thrum, W. F.	Hawaiian-born British	10	1, 000
Thrum, G. E.	do	10	1, 000
Lowrey, F. C.	American	10	1, 000
Monsarrat, J. M.	Hawaiian-born British	10	1, 000
Brown, C.	do	10	1, 000
Woon, W.	American	10	1, 000
Isenberg, Dora	German	10	1, 000
Barwick, Frank	British	10	1, 000
Hall, Mrs. W. W.	American	10	1, 000
White, Mrs. Anna.	do	10	1, 000
Austin, Miss M.	do	10	1, 000
Dow, H. M.	do	10	1, 000
Sorenson, T.	Dane	10	1, 000
Phillips, C.	British	10	1, 000
Peacock, N. C.	do	10	1, 000
Smith S.	American	5	500
Allen, N.	Half-caste American	5	500
Akan, A. K.	Half-caste Chinese	5	500
Kaulukou, J. L.	Hawaiian	5	500
Campbell, J. T.	British	5	500
Lowrey, Miss N.	American	5	500
Wicke, F. D.	German	5	500
Chung, Hoon W.	Half-caste Chinese	5	500
Fernandez, A.	Half-caste Portuguese	5	500
Andrews, Mrs. S. D.	American	5	500
Fuller, S. D.	do	5	500
Hall & Son, E. O.	America firm.	5	500
Hall, W. W., trustee	American	5	500
Kalani, J. L.	Hawaiian	5	500
Gilbert, O. H. J.	British	5	500
Brown, L. A.	American	3	300
White, C.	Hawaiian-born American	2	200
Hall, Miss C.	do	2	200
Mahiki, S.	Hawaiian	1	100
Total		5, 000	500, 000

SUMMARY.

American	\$120, 000
Hawaiian-born American	89, 900
British	153, 000
Hawaiian-born British	9, 000
British-Hawaiian (half caste)	25, 000
German	49, 000
Chinese	30, 000
Chinese-Hawaiian (half caste)	2, 500
Portuguese	17, 500
Portuguese-Hawaiian (half caste)	500
Danish	1, 000
Hawaiian	1, 100
Swedish	1, 500
Total	500, 000

A.—Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investments and nationality of stockholders therein, etc.—Continued.**KOLOA SUGAR COMPANY, KOLOA KAUAI.**

[Hawaiian corporation, capital stock, \$200,000, in 200 shares of \$1,000 par value.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Isenberg, P.	German	76	\$76,000
Cropp, A.	do.	75	75,000
Hackfeld & Co., H.	German firm	25	25,000
Cooke, C. M.	Hawaiian-born American	8	8,000
Pfeuger, Dr. H. H.	German	5	5,000
Hebron, T. H., estate of.	American	4	4,000
Suhr.	German	3	3,000
Bosse, C.	do.	3	3,000
Isenberg, D.	Hawaiian-born German	1	1,000
Total		200	200,000

SUMMARY.

German	\$187,000
Hawaiian-born German	1,000
American	4,000
Hawaiian-born American	8,000
Total	200,000

KILAUEA SUGAR COMPANY, KAUAI.

[Hawaiian corporation, capital stock \$300,000 in shares of \$1,000 par value.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Macfie, R. A., jr.	British	150	\$150,000
Spreckels, C.	American	150	150,000
Irwin, W. G.	British		
Total		300	300,000

KIPAHULU SUGAR COMPANY, MAUI.

[Hawaiian corporation, capital stock \$80,000 in shares of \$100 par value.]

Hackfeld & Co.	German firm	400	40,000
Pfugger, J. C.	do.	400	40,000
Total		800	\$80,000

KOHALA SUGAR COMPANY, HAWAII.

[Hawaiian corporation, capital stock \$480,000, in shares of \$500 par value.]

Robinson, Jas., (estate of)	British	221	\$110,500
Bond E.	American	276	138,000
Smith, J. M.	do.	144	72,000
Wight, J. Dr.	British	96	48,000
Castle, S. N.	American	60	30,000
Cooke, J. M.	do.	60	30,000
Wetmore, C. H.	do.	48	24,000
Robinson, C. J.	Hawaiian-British (half caste)	15	7,500
Hillebrand, J. (estate of)	German	12	6,000
Cooke, C. M.	Hawaiian-born American	10	5,000
Thompson, J. H. (estate of)	American	4	2,000
Robinson, J. J.	Hawaiian-British (half caste)	2	1,000
Frear, W. F. (trustee)	American	2	1,000
Pogue, M. W. Mrs.	do.	10	5,000
Total		960	480,000

SUMMARY.

American	\$302,000
British	158,500
Hawaiian-born American	5,000
British-Hawaiian (half caste)	8,500
German	6,000
Total	480,000

A.—Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investments and nationality of stockholders therein, etc.—Continued.

KUKAIAU PLANTATION COMPANY, HAWAII.

[Hawaiian corporation. Capital stock \$120,000, in shares of \$100 par value.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Horner, Jno. M	American	420	\$42,000
Horner, A	do	260	26,000
Horner, Jay M	do	260	26,000
Horner, Robt	do	260	26,000
Total		1,200	120,000

LAUPAHOEHOE PLANTATION COMPANY, HAWAII.

[Hawaiian corporation. Capital stock \$500,000, in shares of \$100 par value.]

T. H. Davis	British	5,000	\$500,000
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LIHUE PLANTATION COMPANY, KAUAI.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$700,000, in shares of \$100 par value.]

Isenberg, P	German	3,000	\$300,000
Rice, W. H	Hawaiian-born American	500	50,000
De la Vergne, E	American	250	25,000
Cooke, A. C	Hawaiian-born American	500	50,000
Isenberg, D	German	250	25,000
Isenberg, D. P. R	Hawaiian-born German	250	25,000
Parke, A. S	American	500	50,000
Youmans, C. N	do	500	50,000
Cooke, C. M	Hawaiian-born American	750	75,000
Wilcox, A. S	do	500	50,000
Total		7,000	700,000

SUMMARY.

German born	\$325,000
German, Hawaiian born	25,000
American born	125,000
American, Hawaiian born	225,000
	700,000

MAKEE SUGAR COMPANY, KEALIA, KAUAI.

[Hawaiian Corporation; capital stock, \$500,000, in shares of \$100 par value.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Spalding, Z. S	American	4,915	\$491,500
Blaisdell, W	Hawaiian-born British	80	8,000
Spalding, Mrs. R. C	American	5	500
Total		5,000	500,000

SUMMARY.

American born	\$492,000
British, Hawaiian born	8,000
Total	500,000

A.—Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investments and nationality of stockholders therein, etc.—Continued.

LOWALU SUGAR COMPANY, LOWALU, MAUI.

[Hawaiian Corporation; capital stock, \$150,000, in shares of \$100 par value.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Haneberg, A.	German	386	\$38,600
Haneberg, A.	do	33	3,300
Macfarlane, E.	British	83	8,300
Spreckles, J. D., Bros. & Co.	American firm	150	15,000
Allen, F. W.	do	30	3,000
Heen, H. A.	Chinese	50	5,000
Macfarlane, F. W.	Hawaiian-born British	33	3,300
Wolters, W.	German	38	3,800
Bosse, C.	do	20	2,000
Clamp, F.	do	6	600
Hatch, F. M.	American	10	1,000
Lan Cheong	Chinese	10	1,000
Spreckels, C.	American	325	32,500
Irwin, W. G.	British	325	32,500
Widemann, H. A.	German	1	100
Total		1,500	150,000

SUMMARY.

German born	\$48,400
American born	51,500
British born	40,800
British, Hawaiian born	3,300
Chinese born	6,000
Total	150,000

OOKALA SUGAR COMPANY, HAMAKUA, HAWAII.

[Hawaiian corporation, capital stock, \$200,000, in 2,000 shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Wright, J. N.	American	400	\$40,000
McKibbin, R.	British	295	29,500
Do	do	280	28,000
Green, A.	do	240	24,000
Mist, H. W.	do	200	20,000
Walker, W. G.	do	85	8,500
Dowsett, Mary	do	70	7,000
Bickerton, R. F.	do	70	7,000
Sproull, W. C.	do	90	9,000
Green, J.	do	50	5,000
Cartwright, B.	Hawaiian-born American	45	4,500
Hatch, F. M.	American	35	3,500
Williams, N.	Hawaiian-born British	25	2,500
Dowsett, J. M.	do	25	2,500
Bows, Mary	British	20	2,000
Austin, J.	American	20	2,000
Hustace, C. C.	do	10	1,000
Hall, Mrs. M. D.	do	10	1,000
Hackfeld, J. F.	German	10	1,000
Morgan, J. F.	Hawaiian-born British	10	1,000
Williams, J. N. S.	British	10	1,000
Total		2,000	200,000

SUMMARY.

American	\$47,500
Hawaiian-born American	4,500
British	141,000
Hawaiian-born British	6,000
German	1,000
Total	200,000

A.—Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investments and nationality of stockholders therein, etc.—Continued.

ONOMEA SUGAR COMPANY, HILO, HAWAII.

[Hawaiian corporation, capital stock \$500,000 in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Brewer & Co., C	Hawaiian corporation	2,500	\$250,000
Atherton, J. B.	American	1,250	125,000
Castle, S. N.	do	833	83,300
Castle, George P.	Hawaiian-born American	417	41,700
Total		5,000	500,000

SUMMARY.

American	\$286,301
Hawaiian-born American	136,783
British	70,208
Hawaiian	4,167
British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	1,125
German	1,291
German-Hawaiian (half-caste)	125
Total	500,000

PAAUHAU PLANTATION COMPANY, HAMAKUA, HAWAII.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$1,000,000, in shares of \$100, par value.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Spreckels, Claus	American	5,000	\$500,000
Irwin, W. G.	British	4,999	499,900
Giffard, W. M.	do	1	100
Total		10,000	1,000,000

SUMMARY.

American	\$500,000
British	499,900
Do	100
Total	1,000,000

PACIFIC SUGAR MILL COMPANY, HAMAKUA, HAWAII.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$300,000, in shares of \$100, par value.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Schaefer & Co., F. A.	German firm	676	\$67,600
Smith, Dr. J. M.	American	625	62,500
Purvis, John	British	525	52,500
Purvis, W. H.	do	250	25,000
Purvis, R. W.	do	250	25,000
Purvis, A. B.	do	100	10,000
Bishop, C. R.	American	200	20,000
Suhr, E.	German	75	7,500
Von Mengersen, C.	do	65	6,500
Foster, Mrs. Mary E.	British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	62	6,200
Kay, T. S.	British	56	5,600
Schaefer, Mrs. F. A.	German	19	1,900
Bosse, C.	do	19	1,900
Renjes, H.	do	18	1,800
Focke, H.	do	18	1,800
Hoting, J.	do	17	1,700
Schultz, H.	do	12	1,200
Hornor, W.	American	10	1,000
Massey, Miss	British	2	200
Paty, J. H.	American	1	100
Total		3,000	300,000

SUMMARY.

American born	\$83,600
British born	118,300
British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	6,200
German born	91,900
Total	300,000

A.—Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investments and nationality of stockholders therein, etc.—Continued.

PAIA PLANTATION COMPANY, MAUI.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$750,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Alexander, S. T.	American	2,156	\$215,600
Allen, W. F.	do	14	1,400
Atherton, Mrs. J. M.	do	290	29,000
Alexander, Miss I.	Hawaiian-born American	13	1,300
Alexander, Miss W. D.	do	10	1,000
Atwater, W. O.	American	115	11,500
Austin, W. R.	do	6	600
Allen, S. C.	do	16	1,600
Alexander, J. M.	do	200	20,000
Baldwin, H. P.	Hawaiian-born American	2,062	206,200
Beckwith, G. E.	American	20	2,000
Brewer, A. A. (trustee)	do	262	26,200
Castle, Mrs. I. B.	do	3	300
Carpenter, Miss H. E.	do	4	400
Cooke, Mrs. H. E. (trustee)	do	6	600
Colville, J. W.	British	42	4,200
Cornwell, Miss A.	Hawaiian-born American	46	4,600
Campbell, A. (estate of)	British	18	1,800
Canavaro, A. de S.	Portuguese	2	200
Canavaro, A. de S. (trustee)	do	6	600
Dowsett, J. M.	Hawaiian-born British	42	4,200
Dodge, F. S.	American	10	1,000
Dole, M. C.	do	26	2,600
Dickey, Mrs. A.	do	10	1,000
Gulick, T. L.	Hawaiian-born American	7	700
Hobron, Mrs. F. E.	American	263	26,300
Henderson, Miss B. A.	British	18	1,800
Hall, Mrs. M. D.	American	33	3,300
Hustace, C. J.	Hawaiian-born American	12	1,200
Hartwell, A. S.	American	400	40,000
Hatch, F. M.	do	25	2,500
Humburg, F. J.	German	10	1,000
Klamp, F.	do	15	1,500
Koch, Geo.	do	10	1,000
Kaiser, Carl	do	10	1,000
Lindsay, N. C.	British	4	400
Lord, T. A.	American	60	6,000
Laws, H.	do	30	3,000
Lewers, R.	do	12	1,200
Lazarus, J.	British	10	1,000
Lowrey, N.	American	1	100
Lowrey, Mrs. A. L.	do	2	200
Lane, Mrs. D. W. C.	do	2	200
May, T.	British	18	1,800
Mett, C.	German	20	2,000
Oleson, W. B.	American	10	1,000
Parke, Mrs. W. C.	American	12	1,200
Paris, Miss A. M.	Hawaiian-born American	4	400
Porter, Capt. Chas.	American	12	1,200
Purvis, Miss M.	British	10	1,000
Photenhauer, N.	German	9	900
Spreckels, J. D., Bros. & Co.	American firm	105	10,500
Smith, A. H.	Hawaiian-born American	21	2,100
Smith, A. H. & Co.	Hawaiian-American firm	52	5,200
Suhr, E.	German	106	10,600
Spooner, Miss M. E.	American	8	800
Smith, J. K.	Hawaiian-born American	149	14,900
Sterling, R. (estate of)	British	26	2,600
Smith, W. G.	American	10	1,000
Walsh, E. M.	do	10	1,000
Wilcox, A. S.	Hawaiian-born American	352	35,200
Wilcox, G. N.	do	243	24,300
Waller, J.	British	20	2,000
Total		7,500	750,000

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

1907

A.—Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investments and nationality of stockholders therein, etc.—Continued.

SUMMARY.

American	\$413,300
Hawaiian-born American	297,100
British	10,600
Hawaiian-born British	4,200
German	18,000
Portuguese	800
Total	750,000

PAUKAA SUGAR COMPANY, HAWAII.

[Hawaiian corporation, capital stock \$170,000, in shares of \$10, par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Cooke, C. M. (trustee)	Hawaiian-born American	4,653	\$46,530
Austin, B. H. (estate of)	American	2,500	25,000
Hobron, T. H. (estate of)	do	200	2,000
Hobron, E. C.	do	200	2,000
Smith, A. H.	Hawaiian-born American	200	2,000
Allen, S. C.	American	70	700
Dwight, S. C.	American-Hawaiian (half caste)	70	700
Kolomoku, H.	Hawaiian	35	350
Grieve, R.	British	100	1,000
Austin, J. (estate of)	American	62	620
Onomea Sugar Co.	Hawaiian corporation	60	600
Cooke, C. M.	Hawaiian-born American	55	550
Austin, S. L.	American	50	500
Smith, H.	American-Hawaiian (one-half caste)	50	500
Hoffman, Mrs.	American	47	470
Thurston, L. A.	Hawaiian-born American	70	700
Hobron, T. W. (trustee)	do	22	220
Hartwell, A. S.	American	20	200
Nott, Mrs. E.	do	10	100
Monsarrat, J. M.	Hawaiian-born British	10	100
Kellett, P. D.	British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	10	100
Wilson, C. B.	British-Tahitian (half-caste)	5	50
Shares not issued		8,499	84,990
		8,501	85,010
Total		17,000	170,000

SUMMARY.

American	\$31,786
Hawaiian-born American	50,328
British	1,060
Hawaiian-born British	100
German	3
Hawaiian	360
American-Hawaiian (half caste)	1,200
British-Hawaiian (half caste)	103
British-Tahitian (half caste)	50
Total	84,990

PEEPEKEO SUGAR COMPANY, HAWAII.

[Hawaiian corporation. Capital stock, \$750,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Baird, W. H.	British	250	\$25,000
Ashford, C. W.	do	25	2,500
Thurston, L. A.	Hawaiian-born American	50	5,000
Kennedy, C. C.	British	120	12,000
Wyllie, D.	do	30	3,000
Pullar, W.	do	20	2,000
Deacon, H.	American	80	8,000
Gilfillan, J.	British	40	4,000
Davies, T. H. & Co.	British firm	178	17,800
Young, A.	British	4,637	463,700
Austin, J.	American	70	7,000
Allen, W. F. (trustee)	Chinese	2,000	200,000
Total		7,500	750,000

A.—Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investments and nationality of stockholders therein, etc.—Continued.

SUMMARY.

British	\$530,000
American	15,000
Hawaiian-born American	5,000
Chinese	200,000
Total	750,000

PRINCEVILLE PLANTATION COMPANY, HANAIEI, KAUAI.

[Hawaiian corporation, capital stock \$240,000, in shares of \$100 par value.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Welch, A. (estate of)	British	600	\$60,000
Allen, F. H.	American	364	36,400
Allen, M. Y.	do.	364	36,400
Allen, E. H. (estate of)	do.	304	30,400
Hesselchaef, S. F.	do.	304	30,400
Cooke, J. M. Mrs.	do.	164	16,400
Conrade, A. (estate of)	German	160	16,000
Brewer, C., & Co.	Hawaiian corporation	140	14,000
Total		2,400	240,000

SUMMARY.

American	\$154,368
Hawaiian-born American	5,325
British	63,932
German	16,072
Hawaiian	233
German-Hawaiian (half caste)	7
British-Hawaiian (half caste)	63
Total	240,000

UNION MILL COMPANY, KOHALA, HAWAII.

[Hawaiian corporation, capital stock \$160,000, in shares of \$1,000 par value.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Renton, Jas.	British	45	\$45,000
Holmes, G. F. (executor)	do.	25	25,000
Janion, R. C. (executor)	do.	20	20,000
Davies, T. H.	do.	20	20,000
Kynnersley Bros.	do.	30	30,000
Renton, H. H.	Hawaiian-born British	5	5,000
Wallace, R.	British	5	5,000
Maguire, John	British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	5	5,000
Walker, T. R. (trustee)	do.	5	5,000
Total		160	160,000

SUMMARY.

British	\$150,000
Hawaiian-born British	5,000
British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	5,000
Total	160,000

A.—*Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investments and nationality of stockholders therein, etc.*—Continued.

RECIPROCITY SUGAR COMPANY, MAUI.

[Hawaiian corporation. Capital stock \$214,300, in shares of \$100 par value.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Cummings, W. H	American-Hawaiian (half-caste)	417	\$41, 700
Castle, W. R.	Hawaiian-born American	240	24, 000
Hobron, T. W.	do.	161	16, 400
Smith, W. O.	do.	150	15, 000
Wilcox, A. S.	do.	100	10, 000
Wilcox, G. N.	do.	100	10, 000
Wilcox, H. H.	do.	100	10, 000
Wilcox, S. W.	do.	100	10, 000
Baldwin, H. P.	do.	100	10, 000
Lau Chong	Chinese	148	14, 800
Achi, W. C.	Chinese-Hawaiian (half-caste)	100	10, 000
Akau, L., administrator	do.	56	5, 600
Hobron, E. W., trustee	Hawaiian-born American	50	5, 000
Paris, J. D., jr.	do.	40	4, 000
Tenney, E. D.	American	40	4, 000
McLane, M. J.	do.	30	3, 000
Walker, J. S.	British	30	3, 000
Hayelden, J. G., estate of	do.	30	3, 000
Minwai, N.	Chinese	24	2, 400
Hanuna, J. K.	Hawaiian	15	1, 500
Johnson, E.	do.	12	1, 200
Kanoa, P. P.	do.	11	1, 100
Morgan, J. F.	Hawaiian-born British	10	1, 000
Castle, G. P.	Hawaiian-born American	10	1, 000
Colburn, J. F.	Hawaiian-American (half-caste)	10	1, 000
Smith, H.	do.	10	1, 000
Paakaula, J.	Hawaiian	8	800
Dole, S. B.	Hawaiian-born American	8	800
Richardson, Geo. (estate of)	Hawaiian-born British (half-castes)	6	600
Ahina, A. M.	Chinese	5	500
Hanaŋke, J. B.	Hawaiian	3	300
Kahale, W. S.	do.	3	300
Kaaukai, S. M.	do.	3	300
Napualii, J.	do.	3	300
King, J. L.	American	2	200
Kahoohuli, P.	Hawaiian	2	200
Macfarlane, H. R.	Hawaiian-born British	1	100
von Gravemeyer, W.	German	1	100
Apa, Helen M.	Hawaiian	1	109
Total		2, 143	214, 300

SUMMARY.

American	\$7, 200
Hawaiian-born Americans	116, 200
American-Hawaiian (half-castes)	43, 700
British	6, 000
Hawaiian-born British	1, 100
British-Hawaiian (half-castes)	600
Hawaiian	6, 100
Chinese	23, 300
Chinese-Hawaiian (half-castes)	10, 000
German	100
Total	214, 300

A.—Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investments and nationality of stockholders therein, etc.—Continued.**WAIANAE SUGAR COMPANY, OAHU.**

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$255,000, in shares of \$100 par value.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Wilcox, G. N.	Hawaiian-born American	500	\$50, 000
Bishop, C. R.	American	45	4, 500
Isenberg, P.	German	7	700
Wilcox, A. S.	Hawaiian-born American	150	15, 000
Stirling, R. (estate of)	British	75	7, 500
Cleghorn, A. S.	do	37	3, 700
Macfarlane, E.	Hawaiian-born British	7	700
Jaeger, A.	German	7	700
Dowsett, J. M.	Hawaiian-born British	12	1, 200
Kruse, E.	German	10	1, 000
Hobron, E. C.	American	12	1, 200
Widemann, M.	German-Hawaiian (half-caste)	7	700
Chamberlain, A. C.	American	3	300
Kawainui, Mrs.	Hawaiian	5	500
Ahrens, Ang.	German	90	9, 000
Arnemann, W.	do	30	3, 000
Richardson, Mrs. E.	Chinese-Hawaiian (half-caste)	205	20, 500
Richardson, J. L. (children of)	American-Hawaiian (half-caste)	414	41, 400
Wright, J.	British	57	5, 700
Widemann, H. A.	German	730	73, 000
Berger, C. O.	do	110	11, 000
Bosse, C.	do	25	2, 500
Suhr, E.	do	5	500
Berger, C. O. Jr.	German-Hawaiian (half-caste)	3	300
Cleghorn, A.	British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	2	200
Macfarlane, G. E.	do	2	200
Total		2, 550	255, 000

SUMMARY.

German	\$101, 400
German-Hawaiian (half-caste)	1, 000
American	6, 000
American-Hawaiian (half-caste)	41, 400
Hawaiian-born American	65, 000
British	10, 900
British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	400
Hawaiian-born British	1, 900
Chinese-Hawaiian (half-caste)	20, 500
Hawaiian	500
Total	255, 000

WAIKAPU SUGAR COMPANY, MAUI.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$250,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Spreckels, C.	American	1, 230	\$123, 000
Macfarlane, G. W.	Hawaiian-born British	1, 250	125, 000
Irwin, W. G.	British	10	1, 000
Giffard, W. M.	do	10	1, 000
Total		2, 500	250, 000

SUMMARY.

American	\$123, 000
British	2, 000
Hawaiian-born British	125, 000
Total	250, 000

A.—Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investments and nationality of stockholders therein, etc.—Continued.

WAIHEE SUGAR COMPANY, MAUI.

[Hawaiian corporation, capital stock \$200,000 in shares of \$1,000 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Brewer, C., & Co	Hawaiian corporation	58½	\$58,500
Makee, C. B.	Hawaiian-born American	37½	37,750
Hastings, A. M.	American	20½	20,750
Herbert, K. S.	do.	20½	20,750
Tenney, R. S.	do.	20½	20,750
Noonan, H. G.	do.	20½	20,750
Spalding, W.	do.	20½	20,750
Total	200	200,000

SUMMARY.

American	\$122,000
Hawaiian-born American	60,000
British	16,430
Hawaiian	975
German	302
British-Hawaiian half-caste	263
German-Hawaiian half-caste	30
Total	200,000

WAIAKEA MILL COMPANY, HAWAII.

[Hawaiian corporation, capital stock \$300,000 in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Davies, T. H.	British	1,250	\$125,000
Young, A.	do.	1,250	125,000
Janion, D. R.	do.	375	37,500
Kennedy, C. C.	do.	125	12,500
Total	3,000	300,000

WAIMANALA SUGAR COMPANY, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$180,000, in shares of \$100, par value, each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Cummins, J. A.	British-Hawaiian (half caste)	950	\$95,000
Herbert, A.	American	200	20,000
Cartwright, A. J.	do.	100	10,000
Bishop, C. R.	do.	75	7,500
Bolte, C.	German	60	6,000
Cartwright, B.	Hawaiian-born American	50	5,000
Hobron, T. H.	American	41	4,100
Campbell, A.	British	40	4,000
Suhr, E.	German	25	2,500
Scholz, O.	do.	20	2,000
Hopper, J. A.	American	20	2,000
Bickerton, R. F.	British	20	2,000
Peirce, J., Mrs.	American	15	1,500
Kapiolani (Queen)	Hawaiian	15	1,500
Boese, C.	German	14	1,400
Cartwright, A. J., jr.	Hawaiian-born American	13	1,300
Smith, H.	American-Hawaiian (half caste)	10	1,000
Kahai, M.	Hawaiian	10	1,000
Shaw, Jona.	British	10	1,000
Tenney, E. D.	American	10	1,000
Agnew, H. J.	do.	10	1,000
Likelike	Hawaiian	10	1,000
Hackfeld, J. F.	German	10	1,000
Huber, Captain	American	9	900
Hobron, E. C.	do.	8	800

A.—Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investments and nationality of stockholders therein, etc.—Continued.

WAIMANALA SUGAR COMPANY, OAHU—Continued.

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Focke, H.	German	8	\$800
Emerson, D. Mrs.	American	5	500
Pierce, C., Miss.	do	5	500
Thies, G., Miss.	German	5	500
Stockmar, Mrs.	do	5	500
Thurston, L. A.	Hawaiian-born American	5	500
Bolte, C. Mrs.	German	5	500
Lau Chong.	Chinese	4	400
Hall, W. W.	Hawaiian-born American	3	300
Cartwright, B.	do	2	200
Roth, S., Mrs.	German	2	200
Liliuokalani.	Hawaiian	2	200
Cartwright, D.	Hawaiian-born American	1	100
Stoves, M.	American	1	100
Cartwright, K.	Hawaiian-born American	1	100
Cartwright, R.	do	1	100
Total		1,800	180,000

SUMMARY.

American	\$49,900
Hawaiian-born American	7,600
American-Hawaiian (half-caste)	1,000
British	7,000
British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	95,000
German	15,400
Hawaiian	3,700
Chinese	400
Total	180,000

WAIMEA SUGAR MILL, KAUAI.

[Hawaiian corporation, capital stock \$70,000 in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholder.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
H. W. Smidt	German	700	\$70,000

WAILUKU SUGAR COMPANY, MAUI.

[Hawaiian corporation, capital stock \$265,000 in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Brewer, C. & Co. (limited)	Hawaiian corporation	595	\$59,500
Smith, J. Mott.	American	75	7,500
Cummins, T. (estate of)	British	100	10,000
Cartwright, A. J. (estate of)	American	60	6,000
Welch, A. (estate of)	British	601	60,100
Robinson, M. P.	British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	50	5,000
Robinson, Jas. (estate of)	Hawaiian	120	12,000
Alexander, W. P. (estate of)	American	20	2,000
Bailey, W. H.	Hawaiian-born American	600	60,000
Bailey, E.	American	60	6,000
Mills College	American corporation	15	1,500
Campbell, A. J.	Hawaiian-born British	15	1,500
Forbes, Mrs. M. J.	American	10	1,000
Hobron, F. E. (trustee)	do	20	2,000
Isenberg, Mrs. D.	German	10	1,000
White, E. O.	Hawaiian-born American	5	500
Lowrey, W. J.	American	35	3,500
Rice, Mrs. N. R.	Hawaiian-born American	20	2,000
Rice, Mrs. N. R. (guardian)	do	40	4,000
Welch & Co.	American corporation	150	15,000
Robinson, Caroline	British Hawaiian (half-caste)	8	800
Frear, W. F. (trustee)	American	1	100
Robinson, James J.	British Hawaiian (half-caste)	1	100
Cooke, C. M.	Hawaiian-born American	39	3,900
Total		2,650	265,000

A.—Hawaiian sugar plantation corporations, showing amount of investments and nationality of stockholders therein, etc.—Continued.

SUMMARY.

American.....	\$63,130
Hawaiian-born American.....	93,035
British.....	86,840
British-Hawaiian (half castes).....	6,166
Hawaiian-born British.....	1,500
German.....	1,307
German-Hawaiian (half castes).....	30
Hawaiian.....	12,992
Total.....	265,000

DUTIES.

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, *Honolulu, June 19, 1893.*

The duties collected at the custom-house in Honolulu for the past five years on goods from all ports, other than American, are as follows:

Years.	Spirits.	Merchandise.
1888.....	\$157,958.44	\$126,243.64
1889.....	124,473.04	118,354.14
1890.....	196,678.72	182,573.39
1891.....	252,648.96	211,170.21
1892.....	139,289.53	95,409.99
Total for five years.....	871,048.69	733,751.37
A yearly average of.....	174,209.74	146,750.26

The yearly average income for five years on spirits being \$174,209.74, and the yearly average income for five years on merchandise \$146,750.26, making a total on all goods of \$320,960, which, multiplied by twenty, the number of years that our bonds have to run, makes a total income from duties alone, on goods other than American, of \$6,419,200. Our public debt is \$3,250,000; five years' interest on this at 6 per cent, as specified in bonds, is \$975,000; fifteen years' interest on same at 3 per cent (United States rates) is \$1,462,500, and add to this the total public debt, \$3,250,000, which makes a total of \$5,687,500, will show that the income (\$731,700) from customs duties alone for twenty years (the term of our bonds), taken on above average, will pay the entire interest on the public debt, together with the debt itself, and leave a balance in the Treasury of \$731,700.

No. 27.

Mr. Alexander to Mr. Damon.

HAWAIIAN GOVERNMENT SURVEY,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, June 24, 1893.

His Excellency S. M. DAMON,
Minister of Finance:

SIR: In accordance with your request I have had the areas of all the Government land sales, alias grants, to June 8, 1893, added up, making a total of 667,317.4 acres. A recent estimate of the lands at present held by the Government gives a total of 828,000 acres. Adding this amount to the total area sold, we obtain 1,495,317 acres as the approximate amount of land held by the Government at the end of the great division (Mahele) in 1848.

The Crown lands at present are estimated to contain 915,000 acres, including a few unassigned lands, which were transferred to the Crown by the Legislature of 1890.

The kuleanas proper or land commission awards to the common people, including a few lots awarded to foreigners (chiefly in Honolulu), amount to 28,658.5 acres.

These were generally either house lots or small pieces of cultivated land. The number of L. C. awards was 11,309, which included 177 awards made to chiefs or konohikis, whose names are in the Mahele book. Deducting these the number of kuleanas was 11,132, averaging 2.57 acres apiece.

My assistants have also added up those konohiki (chiefs') awards, whose areas were given in the index of land claims amounting to 133,012.6 acres. But these are only a small part of them, as most of this class of lands were awarded by name without survey.

For example, the Bishop estate alone at present comprises about 420,000 acres. However, adding the kuleanas and the surveyed awards to chiefs given in the index of land claims together, we obtain a total of 161,670 acres awarded at that time by survey.

I remain, yours, very respectfully,

W. D. ALEXANDER,
Surveyor-General.

Approximate division of the lands of the Hawaiian Kingdom, 1848-1855.

	Acres.
Crown lands (as in 1893)	915, 000
Government lands (as in 1848)	1, 495, 000
Kuleanas	28, 658. 5
Bishop estate for manual training schools (as in 1893)	420, 000
Other chiefs' lands surveyed before 1855	133, 012. 6
Other chiefs' lands not surveyed before 1855	1, 018, 329
Grand total	4, 010, 000. 1
Total of chiefs' lands, including Bishop estate	1, 571, 341

E. & O. E.

W. D. ALEXANDER.

Total area of land-commission awards.

KULEANAS.

Hawaii:	Acres.
Hilo	466. 35
Hamakua	2, 542
Kohala	2, 129. 16
Kona	2, 119
Kau	2, 124. 18
Puna	32. 18
Total area of Hawaii Kuleanas	9, 412. 87
Total area of Maui Kuleanas	7, 379. 74
Total area of Molokai Kuleanas	2, 288. 87
Total area of Oahu Kuleanas	7, 311. 17
Total area of Kauai Kuleanas	1, 824. 17
Total area of Lanai Kuleanas	441. 67
Grand total	28, 658. 49

*Total area of land-commission awards—Continued.***AHUPUAAS AND ILIS, OR LARGER TRACTS AND SUBDIVISIONS.**

Hawaii:	Acres.
Hilo	6, 620. 25
Hamakua	8, 248. 48
Kohala	1, 933
Kona	1, 261. 79
Total for Hawaii	18, 063. 52
Kauai	54, 272
Molokai	10, 343. 62
Oahu	32, 785. 62
Maui	17, 547. 83
Total area of Ahupuaas and Ilis surveyed for the land commission ..	133, 012. 59

E. & O. E.

W. D. ALEXANDER.

Estimate of area included in all Government grants (land sales) to date, June 8, 1893.

Hawaii:	Acres.	Acres.
Kohala	21, 520. 95	
Hamakua	63, 439. 41	
Hilo	14, 884. 41	
Puna	17, 411. 73	
Kau	215, 538. 81	
Kona	56, 101. 16	
		388, 896. 47
Maui:		
Lahaina	364. 17	
Kaanapali	2, 675. 00	
Wailuku	25, 825. 51	
Hamakua	18, 711. 53	
Koolau	2, 024. 72	
Hana	6, 216. 92	
Kipahulu	1, 540. 03	
Kaupo	11, 534. 73	
Kahikiinu	3, 595. 67	
Honuaula	15, 100. 84	
Kula	13, 054. 92	
		100, 644. 04
Oahu:		
Kona district	5, 549. 10	
Ewa district	7, 401. 31	
Waialua district	19, 596. 47	
Koolau district	12, 321. 94	
		44, 868. 82
Lallai		735. 93
Molokai		55, 960. 90
Kauai		15, 123. 25
Niihua		61, 088
Grand total		667, 317. 41

The foregoing estimate of areas is largely increased by the inclusion of several exceptionally large grants, viz:

	Acres.
Grant 2769 to J. P. Parker in Hamakua	37, 888
Grant 2791 to C. C. Harris in Kau	184, 298
Grant 3343 to C. Spreckels in Wailuku	24, 000
Grant 3146 to C. R. Bishop in W. Molokai	46, 500
Grant 2944 to J. M. and F. Sinclair in Niihua	61, 038
Total	353, 724

A recent estimate of area of present Government lands gave a total, in round numbers, of 828,000 acres, which, together with the total amount granted, would give, in round numbers, 1,495,300 acres as the amount originally held by the Government.

J. F. BROWN.

JUNE 8, 1893.

No. 28.

Mr. John H. Soper to Mr. Blount.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE VOLUNTEER FORCES OF THE
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
Honolulu, June 20, 1893.

His Excellency JAMES H. BLOUNT,
United States Minister:

SIR: I beg to transmit herewith memorandum of arms and ammunition, as per your request.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

JNO. H. SOPER,
Colonel, Commanding National Guard of Honolulu.

Memorandum of arms and ammunition in hands of Provisional Government January 17, 1893.

18 Winchester repeating rifles from Castle & Cooke.

24 revolvers from Castle & Cooke.

2 Winchester carbines from E. O. Hall & Son.

7 Winchester repeating rifles from E. O. Hall & Son.

5 Marlin repeating rifles from E. O. Hall & Son.

13,350 45-70 cartridges from E. O. Hall & Son.

2,750 45-70 cartridges from E. O. Hall & Son.

3,690 45-70 cartridges from sundry persons.

6 Springfield rifles from F. Wundenberg.

150 rifles, "private property," in the hands of forces most of whom came supplied with ammunition.

9 Springfield rifles from various parties.

3 Winchester rifles from J. T. Waterhouse.

1 Winchester rifle from J. Marsden.

1 Winchester rifle from H. Juen.

1 Winchester rifle from Dr. Whitney.

8 brass field pieces, 8 centimeters.

4 brass mountain pieces, 7 centimeters.

1 Gatling gun.

20 cases, 8 centimeters, 120 shells.

11 cases, 7 centimeters, 66 shells.

2 cases, 8 centimeters, 10 shells.

5 cases, 7 centimeters, 54 shells.

21 grapeshot.

20 Springfield rifles.

4 Springfield rifles, damaged.

100 Winchester military rifles without rear sights, and most of them otherwise damaged. These guns were discarded in 1887.

14,950 45-70 cartridges.

120 40-60 cartridges.

73 Springfield rifles.

96 Winchester military rifles—all but 27 lacking rear sights and majority out of repair.

1 Hotchkiss rifle.

3 Remington rifles.

1 Gatling gun.

7 Remington carbines rim fire.

12 muskets, muzzle loaders.

52 bayonets.

16 revolvers.

2 swords.

1 set single sticks.

1 set wooden ramrods.

10 canister for 8-centimeter guns.

54 shell for 8-centimeter guns.

1 keg powder.

10,340 45-75 cartridges, 500-grain bullet.

3,500 45-70 cartridges, 500-grain bullet.

4,120 45-70 cartridges, 405-grain bullet.

280 45-90 cartridges, 300-grain bullet.

640 45-60 cartridges, 300-grain bullet.

960 Remington cartridges.

240 45-75 cartridges, 350-grain bullet.

6,330 45-75 cartridges, 405-grain bullet.

4,600 44-40 cartridges, 217-grain bullet.

1,800 buckshot.

No. 29.

Mr. Jaukea to Mr. Blount.

[Private.]

HONOLULU, June 21, 1893.

His Excellency J. H. BLOUNT:

DEAR SIR: Referring to our conversation of this morning in regard to the large excess of the appropriations over the ordinary receipts passed by the Legislature of 1886, I have the honor to hand you copy of the minister of finance's report to the Legislature of 1887. In looking over the items which make up the total of \$4,567,377 the following items for permanent public improvements appear:

Addition to waterworks	\$75,000
Road damages	275,000
Road Nuuanu Pali	75,000
Encouragement immigration	150,000
New wharves	40,000
Purchase new tug	40,000
Interisland cable	65,000
Electric light	35,000
Completion new police building	26,000
Dredging Honolulu Harbor	40,000
Waterworks, Hilo and Molokai	30,000

Total	831,000
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To this total \$851,000 should also be added.

National debt falling due	\$267,900
Interest on national debt	255,000
Subsidy Oriental Steamship Company	72,000

Making a grand total of	1,445,900
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This should explain why the appropriations exceeded the ordinary revenue by such a large amount.

I am afraid that I will not be able to obtain the statement by the staff officers as requested in time for the mail. Mr. Robertson will call and explain personally.

Very respectfully,

C. P. JAJAUEKA.

No. 30.

Mr. J. A. King to Mr. Blount.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

Honolulu, June 22, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note of to-day's date asking what number of citizens were naturalized in these islands between 1860 and 1878, and to say in reply that the records of this department show the total number of foreigners naturalized between January 1, 1860, and December 31, 1878, to be 750.

I have the honor to be, your most obedient servant,

J. A. KING,

Minister of the Interior.

His Excellency JAMES H. BLOUNT,

United States Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary,
Honolulu.

No. 31.

Mr. Robertson to Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, June 23, 1893.

His Excellency, JAMES H. BLOUNT,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: I beg to submit the following statement:

I was on duty at Iolani palace on the 16th day of January last. The report of the landing of the United States naval forces, created a feeling of surprise and excitement among the officials at Iolani palace.

Standing on the front veranda of the palace building at the time the United States troops marched past, the scene greatly depressed me, and the immediate impression conveyed to my mind was that they had been landed to take possession of these islands.

Later on, and during the evening, I heard the rumor that the reason for their landing was for the purpose of assisting the revolutionists in carrying out their scheme for overthrowing the Queen and her Government. Next morning (Tuesday) on seeing the position in which the troops were quartered, commanding both the palace and the Government buildings, I felt assured that such was the case, and that the troops were landed for the purpose of intimidating the Government forces and to lend their aid to the revolutionists if it was required.

I have the honor to be, sir, your excellency's obedient and humble servant,

JAMES W. ROBERTSON,
Her Majesty's Chamberlain.

No. 32.

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations.

[From latest official returns, June, 1893. E. and O. Ex. Thos. G. Thrum.]

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations, showing amount of investments therein and nationality of stockholders in each.

[Compiled June, 1893, from latest official returns for His Excellency, J. H. Blount, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.]

Corporations.	Capital stock.	American.	Hawaiian-born American.	American Hawaiian (½ caste).	British.	Hawaiian-born British.	British-Hawaiian (½ caste).
Brewer & Co., C.....	\$600,000	\$187,200	\$228,200	-----	\$168,500	-----	\$2,700
Club Stables Co.....	25,000	6,800	-----	\$5,700	12,500	-----	-----
Daily Bulletin Pub. Co.....	15,000	100	-----	-----	3,000	-----	-----
Fashion Stables Co.....	60,000	17,798	93	-----	12,820	\$13,134	10
Grinbaum & Co., M.S.....	300,000	247,000	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Hall & Son, E. O.....	150,000	47,700	65,400	23,000	11,100	800	-----
Haleskala Ranch Co.....	220,000	68,400	151,600	-----	-----	-----	-----
Hamakua & S. Kohala T. & T. Co.....	5,375	1,292	206	-----	-----	-----	34
Haw'n Bell Telephone Co.....	50,000	13,910	4,180	-----	28,670	2,790	-----
Haw'n Carriage Mfg Co.....	45,000	44,600	-----	-----	-----	300	-----
Haw'n Construction Co.....	439,800	107,000	30,000	-----	25,000	-----	41,800
Haw'n Electric Light Co.....	20,000	7,400	7,200	-----	2,000	-----	-----
Haw'n Fruit & Taro Co.....	30,000	40	12,860	1,820	1,820	3,000	520
Haw'n Gazette Co.....	40,000	-----	40,000	-----	-----	-----	-----
Haw'n Hardware Co.....	75,000	20,350	1,250	-----	16,200	1,050	-----
Hawaii Holomua Pub. Co.....	2,000	-----	-----	-----	350	100	250
Haw'n R. R. Co.....	227,500	227,500	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Haw'n Tramways Co.....	325,000	-----	-----	-----	325,000	-----	-----
Hilo and Hawaii T. & T. Co.	\$9,900	4,345	1,830	79	2,847	32	2

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

1919

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

Corporations.	Capital stock.	American.	Hawaiian-born American.	American Hawaiian ($\frac{1}{2}$ caste).	British.	Hawaiian-born British.	British-Hawaiian ($\frac{1}{2}$ caste).
Hilo Soda Works Co.....	\$5,000	\$4,000	\$500		\$500		
Hobron, Neuman & Co.....	7,500	3,800	3,300	\$100		\$200	
Honolulu Dairy Co.....	20,000	500		500		16,300	\$500
Honolulu Iron Works Co.....	200,000	12,000			176,000		
Huauaua Sheep Stn. Co.....	100,000						
Interisland S. N. Co.....	425,000	95,800	125,800	2,000	78,300	9,700	21,400
Irwin & Co., W. G.....	500,000	246,500	10,000		242,500	1,000	
Kahului R. R. Co.....	150,000	150,000					
Kauai Telephone Co.....	14,700	3,340	6,510	154	873	8	
Kohala Telephone Co.....	7,930	1,165	1,070		3,765	990	100
Maui Telephone Co.....	10,000	6,267	853	70	2,114	252	6
Mutual Telephone Co.....	100,000	29,020	2,290	50	22,480	850	2,500
North Pacific Phos. and Fert. Co.	100,000	22,500	44,500		17,500		
Oahu R. R. and Land Co....	700,000	456,700	62,400		36,500	2,600	118,900
Pacific Hardware Co.....	150,000	147,000	3,000				
Press Pub. Co.....	16,000	1,550	800		13,650		
Peoples' Ice and Ref. Co.....	150,000	101,067	27,200		14,033	800	1,067
Puuloa Sheep Ranch Co.....	60,000					60,000	
Royal Haw'n Hotel Co.....	75,000			50	74,950		
Union Feed Co.....	75,000	14,850	7,000	1,500	40,000		750
Waiohinu Agricul. and Graz. Co.	15,900		3,400		500	2,400	
Wilder's S. S. Co.....	500,000	291,600	106,200		67,100		11,600
Woodlawn Dairy Co.....	100,000	100,000					
Woodlawn Fruit Co.....	30,000	1,900	550		900	1,750	
Total.....	6,150,705	2,690,994	948,197	33,473	1,289,520	233,006	201,639

[illegible]

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

Corporations.	German.	Hawaiian-born man.	German-Hawaiian (half caste.)	Native Hawaiian.	Chinese.	Chinese-Hawaiian (half caste). Portuguese- Hawaiian (half-caste).	Portuguese.	All other foreign.	Total amount stock issued.
Royal Hawaiian Hotel Co.									\$75,000
Union Feed Co.	\$10,500							\$400	75,000
Waiohinu Agricultural and Grazing Co.				\$8,700					15,000
Wilder's S. S. Co.	23,500								500,000
Woodlawn Dairy Co.									100,000
Woodlawn Fruit Co.					\$300				5,400
Total.....	299,523	\$28,839	4,701	51,620	44,640	\$36,763	\$420	13,565	5,877,400

E. & O. Ex.

THOS. G. THREUM.

HONOLULU, June 26, 1933.

C. BREWER & CO., HONOLULU, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$600,000, in shares of \$100 par value.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Bishop, C. R.	American	1,097	\$109,700
Welch, Andrew (estate of)	British	1,090	109,000
Carter, H. A. P. (estate of)	Hawaiian-born American	1,050	105,000
Cooke, C. M.	do.	400	40,000
Jones, P. C.	American	350	35,000
May, Tom	British	247	24,700
Wilcox, Geo. N.	Hawaiian-born American	163	16,300
Wilcox, A. S.	do.	163	16,300
Henderson, B. A.	British	136	13,600
Jones, Mrs. C. H.	Hawaiian-born American	109	10,900
Rice, Mrs. N. R.	do.	104	10,400
Hall, Mrs. M. D.	American	101	10,100
Bishop, E. F.	do.	100	10,000
Lunalilo (estate of)	Hawaiian	100	10,000
Waterhouse, H.	British	102	10,200
Cooke, C. M. & A. C.	Hawaiian-born American	81	8,100
Allen, S. C.	American	103	10,300
Pratt, Mrs. John	Hawaiian-born American	50	5,000
Fuller, A.	American	43	4,300
Carter, C. L.	Hawaiian-born American	40	4,000
Allen, W. F.	American	32	3,200
Foster, Mrs. T. R.	British-Hawaiian (half castes)	27	2,700
Brown, G.	British	27	2,700
Hobron, F. E. (trustee)	American	25	2,500
Judd, Miss H. S.	Hawaiian-born American	21	2,100
Wolters, W.	German	21	2,100
Mouritz, A.	British	20	2,000
Dole, S. B.	Hawaiian-born American	20	2,000
Crozier, Mrs. A. C.	British	20	2,000
Hobron, T. W. (trustee)	Hawaiian-born American	17	1,700
Robertson, S. M. (estate)	British	16	1,600
Judd, A. F.	Hawaiian-born American	15	1,500
Hillebrand, Miss M.	do.	15	1,500
Robertson, Mrs. S. S.	British	14	1,400
Maynard, Mrs. E.	do.	13	1,300
Bosse, C.	German	10	1,000
Cartwright, B.	Hawaiian-born American	10	1,000
Hoffman, Mrs.	American	8	800
Coan, Mrs. L. B.	Hawaiian-born American	8	800
Hall, W. W. (trustee)	do.	5	500
Judd, A. F. (trustee)	do.	5	500
Bidwell, J. E. (estate of)	American	5	500
Whitney, J. M.	do.	5	500
Carter, Geo. R.	Hawaiian-born American	4	400
Austin, Nancy (estate of)	American	3	300
Nolte, Miss	German-Hawaiian (half caste)	3	300
Johnson, Miss	Hawaiian-born American	2	200
Total.....		6,000	600,000

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

SUMMARY.

American.....	\$187, 200
Hawaiian-born American.....	228, 200
British.....	168, 500
Hawaiian.....	10, 000
German.....	3, 100
German-Hawaiian (half caste).....	300
British-Hawaiian (half caste).....	2, 700
Total	600, 000

M. S. GRINBAUM & COMPANY (LIMITED) HONOLULU, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$300,000, in shares of \$100 par value.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Grinbaum, M. S.	American.....	1, 485	\$148, 500
Louisson, M.	do.....	985	98, 500
Bolte, C.	German.....	500	50, 000
Gartenberg, A.	do.....	30	3, 000
Total		3, 000	300, 000

SUMMARY.

American.....	\$247, 000
German.....	53, 000
Total	300, 000

HAWAIIAN CARRIAGE MANUFACTURE COMPANY, HONOLULU, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$45,000, in shares of \$100 par value.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Dillingham, B. F.	American.....	325	\$32, 500
Dillingham, Geo.	do.....	100	10, 000
Angus, J. M.	do.....	15	1, 500
Spencer, J. G.	do.....	6	600
Wundenburg, F. W.	Hawaiian-born British.....	3	300
Unaccounted for		449	44, 900
		1	100
Total		450	45, 000

SUMMARY.

American.....	\$44, 600
Hawaiian-born British.....	300
Undenominated.....	100
Total	45, 000

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

CLUB STABLES COMPANY, HONOLULU, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$25,000 in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Graham, S. F.	American	57	\$5, 700
Holt, J. D., jr.	American-Hawaiian (half-caste)	57	5, 700
Foster, W. E.	British	125	12, 500
King, T. R.	American	10	1, 000
Peterson, A. P.	do	1	100
Total		250	\$25, 000

SUMMARY.

American	\$6, 800
American-Hawaiian (half-caste)	5, 700
British	12, 500
Total	25, 000

DAILY BULLETIN PUBLISHING COMPANY, HONOLULU, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation. Capital stock \$15,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value (proportion paid in.)
Logan, D.	British	25	\$2, 500
Parker, S.	Hawaiian	20	2, 000
Afong, C.	Chinese	9	900
McIntyre, H. E.	British	5	500
Muller, E. (trustee)	German	5	500
Muller, E.	do	5	500
Trousseau, G.	French	5	500
Johnstone, A.	American	1	100
Total		75	7, 500

SUMMARY.

British	\$3, 000
Hawaiian	2, 000
Chinese	900
German	1, 000
French	500
American	100
Total	7, 500

FASHION STABLE COMPANY (LIMITED), HONOLULU, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$60,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Sullivan, J. J.	British	128	\$12, 800
Buckley, J.	American	127	12, 700
Macfarlane, H.	Hawaiian-born British	120	12, 000
Davis, R. H.	American	19	1, 900
Macfarlane, G. W.	Hawaiian-born British	5	500
Macfarlane, E. C.	do	1	100
Union Feed Company	Hawaiian corporation	10	1, 000
Cornwell, W. H.	American	30	3, 000
Isenberg, D. P. R.	Hawaiian-born German	160	16, 000
Total		600	60, 000

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

SUMMARY.

British.....	\$12,820
Hawaiian-born British.....	13,134
American.....	17,798
Hawaiian-born American.....	93
German.....	140
Hawaiian-born German.....	16,000
British-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	10
Hawaiian-born Chilian.....	5
Total.....	60,000

HAWAIIAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, HONOLULU, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$50,000, in shares of \$10 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Campbell, Jas.....	British.....	2,523	\$25,230
Brown, J. F.....	American.....	562	5,620
Brown, C. H., Mrs.....	do.....	144	1,440
Meek, K., Mrs.....	Hawaiian.....	45	450
Hobron, T. H. (estate).....	American.....	225	2,250
Smith, W. O.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	148	1,480
Hall, M. D., Mrs.....	American.....	54	540
Brown, G.....	British.....	344	3,440
Brown, C.....	Hawaiian-born British.....	273	2,790
Cassidy, Jno.....	American.....	406	4,060
Smith, A. H.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	90	900
Gilman, M. H., Mrs.....	do.....	90	900
Brown, A. M.....	do.....	90	900
Total.....		5,000	50,000

SUMMARY.

British.....	\$28,670
Hawaiian-born British.....	2,790
American.....	13,910
Hawaiian-born American.....	4,180
Hawaiian.....	450
Total.....	50,000

E. O. HALL & SON (LIMITED), OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$150,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Hall, W. W.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	637	\$63,700
Ables, L. C.....	American.....	1	100
White, E. O.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	171	17,100
White, Anna.....	American.....	1	100
Fernandez, A.....	Portuguese-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	15	1,500
Cartwright, A. J.....	American.....	7	7,000
Hall, M. D.....	do.....	300	30,000
Smith, A. H.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	30	3,000
Allen, W. F.....	American.....	1	100
Chunghoon, W.....	Chinese-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	5	500
May, T.....	British.....	67	6,700
Rowell, Mrs. M. J.....	American.....	8	800
Henderson, Mrs. B. A.....	British.....	32	3,200
Wundenberg, F.....	Hawaiian-born British.....	8	800
Gilman, Mrs. S. A.....	American.....	35	3,500
Wilcox, S. W.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	7	700
Gurney, C. F.....	do.....	2	200
Hobron, T. H.....	American.....	7	700
Dole, S. B.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	8	800
Dole, A. C.....	American.....	6	600
Allen, S. C.....	do.....	15	1,500
King, Miss S. L.....	American-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	23	2,300
Palmer, F. H.....	American.....	50	5,000
Hall, Mrs. E. V. C.....	do.....	40	4,000
Campbell, A. J. (executor).....	British.....	18	1,800
Hall, W. W. (trustee).....	Hawaiian-born American.....	6	600
Total.....		1,500	150,000

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

SUMMARY.

American.....	\$47,700
Hawaiian-born American.....	65,400
American-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	23,000
British.....	11,100
Hawaiian-born British.....	800
Chinese-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	500
Portuguese-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	1,504
Total.....	150,000

HALEAKALA RANCH COMPANY, MAIU.

[Hawaiian corporation. Capital stock \$220,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Baldwin, H. P.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	758	\$75,800
Thurston, L. A.....	do.....	758	75,800
Brewer, C., & Co.....	American firm.....	342	34,200
Brewer, W. P. A.....	American.....	342	34,200
Total.....		2,200	220,000

SUMMARY.

American.....	\$68,400
Hawaiian-born American.....	151,600
Total.....	220,000

HOBROK, NEUMAN & CO. (LIMITED), OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation. Capital stock \$7,500 in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Smith, W. O.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	1	\$100
Morgan, J. F.....	Hawaiian-born British.....	2	200
Forbes, W. J.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	1	100
Neuman, E. R.....	American.....	31	3,100
Hobron, T. W., trustee.....	do.....	2	200
Ena, John.....	Chinese-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	1	100
Colburn, J. F.....	American-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	1	100
Hobron, T. W.....	Hawaiian born American.....	31	3,100
Godfrey, W. B.....	American.....	1	100
McCandless.....	do.....	2	200
Goodale, W. W.....	do.....	2	200
Total.....		75	7,500

SUMMARY.

American.....	\$3,800
Hawaiian-born American.....	3,300
American-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	100
Hawaiian-born British.....	200
Chinese-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	100
Total.....	7,500

*Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.***HAMAKUA AND S. KOHALA TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, HAWAII.**

[Hawaiian corporation. Capital stock \$5,375, in shares of \$25 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
S. Parker.....	Hawaiian.....	60	\$1,500
Wilder Steamship Co.....	Hawaiian corporation.....	20	500
Pacific Sugar Mill Co.....	do.....	18	450
Horner, J. M., & Sons.....	American.....	16	400
Honokaa Sugar Co.....	Hawaiian corporation.....	10	250
W. H. Rickard.....	British.....	10	250
C. Notley, sr.....	do.....	10	250
C. B. Greenfield.....	do.....	8	200
R. M. Overend.....	American.....	8	200
J. G. Jones.....	British.....	6	150
Paauhau Plantation Co.....	Hawaiian corporation.....	5	125
Hamakua Mill Co.....	do.....	5	125
R. A. Lyman.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	4	100
T. S. Kay.....	British.....	4	100
J. Faalilio.....	Hawaiian.....	4	100
J. F. Mills.....	American.....	8	200
L. S. Jungst.....	German.....	19	475
Total.....		215	5,375

SUMMARY.

American.....	\$1,298
Hawaiian-born American.....	202
British.....	1,446
British-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	35
German.....	794
German-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	1
Hawaiian.....	1,600
Total.....	5,375

HAWAIIAN FRUIT AND TARO COMPANY, WAILUKU, MAUI.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$30,000, in shares of \$20 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Daniels, W. H.....	British-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	10	\$200
Kepoikai, A. N.....	Hawaiian.....	63	1,260
Richardson, Jno.....	British-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	14	280
Holt, J. D.....	American-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	68	1,360
Copp, C.....	do.....	5	100
Kuana, J. B.....	Hawaiian.....	3	60
Kalua.....	do.....	5	100
Smith, H.....	American-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	15	300
Hopkins, C. L.....	British-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	1	20
Lonoaea, M.....	Hawaiian.....	5	100
Aki, M.....	Chinese-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	5	100
Clark, Thos.....	British.....	5	100
Clark, Thos, Mrs.....	do.....	1	20
Kanakaoale.....	Hawaiian.....	10	200
Jones, A. W.....	American.....	2	40
Nemhiwa, N. P.....	Hawaiian.....	5	100
Kealoha, Jno.....	do.....	3	60
Maule, W. S.....	do.....	2	40
Shaw, A. K.....	British-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	1	20
Ahpong.....	Chinese.....	5	100
Alama.....	do.....	5	100
Young Hee.....	do.....	12	240
Tam Yet.....	do.....	272	5,440
Treadway, H. G.....	American-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	3	60
Smith, W. O.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	300	6,000
Hons, Geo.....	German.....	2	40
Morgan, J. F.....	Hawaiian-born British.....	150	3,000
Davies, T. H., & Co.....	British firm.....	60	1,200
Ena, Jno.....	Chinese-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	100	200
Bailey, E. H.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	343	6,860
Cockburn, Alex.....	British.....	13	260
Garvie, Alex.....	do.....	12	240
Total.....		1,500	30,000

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

SUMMARY.

British	\$1,820
Hawaiian-born British	3,000
British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	520
American	40
Hawaiian-born American	12,860
American-Hawaiian (half-caste)	1,820
Chinese	5,880
Chinese-Hawaiian (half-caste)	2,100
Hawaiian	1,920
German	40
Total	30,000

HAWAIIAN GAZETTE COMPANY (LIMITED), HONOLULU, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$40,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Castle, H. N.	Hawaiian-born American	82	\$8,200
Whitney, H. M.	do	255	25,500
Baldwin, H. P.	do	25	2,500
Wilcox, G. N.	do	15	1,500
Wilcox, A. S.	do	10	1,000
Goodale, W. W.	do	10	1,000
Castle, W. R.	do	3	300
Total		400	40,000

HAWAII HOLOMUA PUBLISHING COMPANY, HONOLULU, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock \$2,000, in shares of \$5 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Waller, G. J.	British	30	\$150
Waller, G. J. (trustee No. 1)	do	20	100
Waller, G. J. (trustee No. 2)	do	20	100
Ena, Jno.	Chinese-Hawaiian, (half-caste)	20	100
Cummins, J. A.	British-Hawaiian, (half-caste)	50	250
Poepoe, J. M.	Hawaiian	25	125
Kualaku, G. W.	do	20	100
Kahai, M.	do	20	100
Merseburg, J.	German-Hawaiian, (half-caste)	40	200
Nathaniel, T. K.	Hawalia	6	30
Kaulia, J. K.	do	6	30
Kealakai	do	4	20
Kamokuiki, S.	do	2	10
Kamokuiki, Mrs. S.	do	2	10
Kana, Jas. S.	do	2	10
Mio, S. P.	do	1	5
Poepoe, J. E.	do	1	5
Brown, C.	Hawaiian-born British	20	100
Shares not issued		289	1,445
		111	555
Total		400	2,000

SUMMARY.

British	\$350
British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	250
Hawaiian-born British	100
Hawaiian	445
German-Hawaiian, (half-caste)	200
Chinese-Hawaiian, (half-caste)	100
Total	1,445

*Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.***HAWAIIAN HARDWARE COMPANY (LIMITED), HONOLULU, OAHU.**

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock \$75,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Campbell, James	British	125	\$12,500
Afong, C.	Chinese	187½	18,750
Wing Wo Chan Co.	do	25	2,500
Scott, Emma F.	American	12½	1,250
Sing Chong & Co.	Chinese	12½	1,250
Chong Wah, L.	do	5	500
Goo York Kee	do	10	1,000
Aswan	do	7½	750
Akaka	do	3	300
Aiona, C. Y.	do	4	400
Hendry, G. W.	American	25	2,500
Von Holt, H. M.	Hawaiian-born German	2	200
Brown, G.	British	17	1,700
Hendry, E. R.	American	166	16,600
Ena, John	Hawaiian-Chinese. (half-caste)	105	10,500
Wodehouse, J. H., jr.	British	20	2,000
Lyman, Mary B.	Hawaiian-born American	12½	1,250
Brown, C.	Hawaiian-born British	10½	1,060
Total		750	75,000

SUMMARY.

American	\$20,350
American, Hawaiian born	1,250
British	16,200
British, Hawaiian born	1,050
Chinese	25,450
Chinese-Hawaiian (half-caste)	10,500
German	200
Total	75,000

HAWAIIAN RAILROAD COMPANY (LIMITED), MAHUKONA, HAWAII.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock \$227,500, in shares of \$500 par value.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Wilder, S. G. (estate of)	American	453	\$226,500
Wilder, W. C.	do	1	500
Wright, C. L.	do	1	500
Total		455	227,500

KAHULUI RAILROAD COMPANY, MAUI.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock \$150,000, in shares of \$100 par value.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Wilder, S. G. (estate of)	American	1,125	\$112,500
Wilder, W. C.	do	355	35,500
Wilder, W. C., Mrs.	do	20	2,000
Total		1,500	150,000

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

INTER-ISLAND STEAMSHIP COMPANY, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$425,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Wilcox, G. N.	Hawaiian-born American	464	\$46,400
Wilcox, A. S.	do	400	40,000
Dreier, A.	German	255	25,500
Godfrey, W. B.	American	236	23,600
Sinclair, F.	British	233	23,300
Walsh, E. M.	American	217	21,700
Ena, J.	Chinese-Hawaiian (half-caste)	201	20,100
Foster, Mary E.	British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	181	18,100
Hobron, Francis E., trustee	American	120	12,000
Brown, C. H.	do	165	16,500
Wilcox, S. W.	Hawaiian-born American	100	10,000
Wilcox, H. H.	do	100	10,000
Ahlborn, L.	German	100	10,000
Walters, S. D. G.	British	100	10,000
Widemann, H. A., guardian	German	90	9,000
Annudsen, V.	Norwegian	61	6,100
Hall, Mrs. M. D.	American	60	6,000
Suhr, E.	German	60	6,000
Collins, D.	British	50	5,000
Brown, A. M.	Hawaiian-born American	46	4,600
Gilman, M. A.	do	46	4,600
Purvis, R. W. T.	British	42	4,200
Gray, R.	do	40	4,000
McLean, G. T.	Hawaiian-born British	40	4,000
Dickson, J.	British	40	4,000
Thurston, L. A., trustee heirs C. H. Alexander.	Hawaiian-born American	40	4,000
Gray, M. A., trustee	British	35	3,500
Brown, J. F.	American	35	3,500
Bosse, C.	German	35	3,500
Irwin, W. G.	British	33	3,300
Halstead, F.	do	33	3,300
McLean, J. L.	Hawaiian-born British	30	3,000
Dortmund, H.	Norwegian	30	3,000
Beckley, Geo. C.	British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	30	3,000
Spreckels & Bros., J. D. & Co.	American firm	27	2,700
Bishop, C. R.	American	25	2,500
Walbridge, Mrs. L. R.	do	25	2,500
Grieve, R.	British	25	2,500
Hackfeld, J. F.	German	22	2,200
Gandall, J.	American-Hawaiian (half-caste)	20	2,000
Howell, James	British	20	2,000
Hobron, T. W., trustee; Mrs. W. O. Smith.	Hawaiian-born American	20	2,000
McLean, W. H.	Hawaiian-born British	20	2,000
Harrison, E. V.	Hawaiian-born British	17	1,700
Godfrey, C. E.	American	17	1,700
Gray, M. A.	British	17	1,700
Smith, A. J.	American	15	1,500
Savidge, S.	British	15	1,500
Warfel, J. P.	do	12	1,200
Forbes, M. J.	American	10	1,000
Ross, W.	British	10	1,000
Lackland, Mrs. A.	American	10	1,000
McKibben, R.	British	10	1,000
Damon, Mrs. H. M.	Hawaiian-born American	10	1,000
Rosewarne, T.	British	10	1,000
Bryant, J.	French	10	1,000
Coney, L. A.	Chinese-Hawaiian (half-caste)	10	1,000
Marchant, L., estate	American	10	1,000
Cooke, A. C.	Hawaiian-born American	10	1,000
Kaluna, J.	Hawaiian	10	1,000
Rowell, M.	American	10	1,000
Von Holt, H. M.	Hawaiian-born German	10	1,000
Wills, T. C.	British	10	1,000
Kalama, M.	Hawaiian	10	1,000
Hobron, T. W. (trustee, Smith, M. A.)	Hawaiian-born American	9	900
Kailibaona, M.	Hawaiian	9	900
Halstead, E.	British	9	900
Hyde, M. T.	American	8	800
Beckwith, Mrs. E. S.	do	5	500
Ward, Mrs. C. P.	British-Hawaiian (half caste)	5	500
Wilcox, A. S. (guardian, Kalonakeeki)	Hawaiian	5	500
McBryde, A. M.	Hawaiian-born American	5	500
Everett, Mrs. T. W. (estate)	American	5	500
Dickey, C. H. (trustee)	do	5	500
Snow, E. B.	do	5	500

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

INTER-ISLAND STEAMSHIP COMPANY, OAHU—Continued.

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Gedge, N. E. (trustee)	American	5	\$500
Cartwright, B.	Hawaiian-born American	4	400
Damon, Mrs. N. B.	do	3	300
Carpenter, H. E.	American	2	200
Thurston, Mrs. S. A.	Hawaiian-born American	2	200
Hanaïke, J. B.	Hawaiian	2	200
Rice, W. H., jr.	Hawaiian-born American	2	200
Hardy, Mary H.	Hawaiian-born American	2	200
Godfrey, W. D. (trustee)	American	1	100
Holdsworth, Mrs. E. W.	British	1	100
Mackintosh.	do	1	100
Total		4,250	425,000

SUMMARY.

British	\$78,300
British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	21,400
Hawaiian-born British	9,700
American	95,800
American-Hawaiian (half-caste)	2,000
Hawaiian-born American	125,800
German	57,200
Norwegian	9,100
Hawaiian	3,600
Chinese-Hawaiian (half-caste)	21,100
French	1,000
Total	425,000

HAWAIIAN ELECTRIC COMPANY, LIMITED, HONOLULU, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$20,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Austin, J.	American	25	\$2,500
Hall & Son, E. O.	American firm	34	3,400
White, E. O.	Hawaiian-born American	12	1,200
Wilcox, G. N.	do	20	2,000
Wilcox, S. W.	do	10	1,000
Cooke, C. M.	do	10	1,000
May, T.	British	10	1,000
Hollister & Co.	American firm	5	500
Hatch, F. M.	American	5	500
Irwin, W. G.	British	5	500
Schaefer, F. A.	German	5	500
Wilcox, A. S.	Hawaiian-born American	20	2,000
Dayton, D.	American	1	100
Thomas, K. M.	British	5	500
Taylor, P. S.	American	4	400
Total		171	17,100
Shares not issued		29	2,900

SUMMARY.

American	\$7,400
Hawaiian-born American	7,200
British	2,000
German	500
Total	17,100

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

WILLIAM G. IRWIN & CO.

[Hawaiian corporation. Capital stock \$500,000 in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Spreckels, C.	American	2, 115	\$211, 500
Irwin, W. G.	British	2, 115	211, 500
Giffard, W. M.	do	200	20, 000
Whitney, H. M., jr.	Hawaiian-born American	100	10, 000
Eldredge, C. H.	American	100	10, 000
Winter, J. W.	do	50	5, 000
Whitney, F.	British	50	5, 000
Porter, T. C.	American	100	10, 000
Spalding, E. J.	do	100	10, 000
Douglas, T. S.	British	50	5, 000
Giffard, E. B.	do	10	1, 000
Cooper, H.	Hawaiian-born British	10	1, 000
Total		5, 000	500, 000

SUMMARY.

American	\$246, 500
Hawaiian-born American	10, 000
British	242, 500
Hawaiian-born British	1, 000
Total	500, 000

PACIFIC HARDWARE COMPANY, HONOLULU, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation. Capital stock \$150,000 in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Dillingham, B. F.	American	600	\$60, 000
Dillingham & Co. (B. F. D. & J. G. S.) ..	do	559	55, 900
Spencer, J. G.	do	187	18, 700
Nott, S.	do	100	10, 000
Winter, F. L.	do	14	1, 400
Torbert, J. L.	Hawaiian-born American	10	1, 000
Dillingham, Mrs. E. L. (& L. S.)	do	20	2, 000
Smith, A. L., trustee	do	5	500
Spencer, A. H.	do	5	500
Total		1, 500	150, 000

SUMMARY.

American	\$147, 000
Hawaiian-born American	3, 000
Total	150, 000

HAWAIIAN TRAMWAY AND COMPANY (LIMITED), HONOLULU, OAHU.

[London corporation. Capital stock \$325, 000, in shares of \$25 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
London stockholders	British	13, 000	\$325, 000

Details not reported in exhibit to interior department.

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

HUMUULA SHEEP STATION COMPANY, HAWAII.

[Hawaiian corporation. Capital stock \$100,000, in shares of \$100 par value.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Haneberg, Aug	German	300	\$30,000
Haneberg, Armin	do	400	40,000
Gramberg, Aug	do	300	30,000
Total		1,000	100,000

WAOHINU AGRICULTURAL AND GRAZING COMPANY, HAWAII.

[Hawaiian corporation. Capital stock \$15,000, in shares of \$100 par value.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Kauhane, J.	Hawaiian	20	\$2,000
Martin, J. H. S.	do	29	2,900
Baker, J. T.	do	15	1,500
Iaukea, C. P.	do	9	900
Irwin, W. G.	British	5	500
Kekaula, J. K.	Hawaiian	14	1,400
Paris, J. D., jr.	Hawaiian-born American	34	3,400
Monsarrat, J. M.	Hawaiian-born British	24	2,400
Total		150	15,000

SUMMARY.

Hawaiian	\$3,700
Hawaiian-born American	3,400
British	500
Hawaiian-born British	2,400
Total	15,000

HILO SODA WORKS COMPANY, HILO, HAWAII.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock \$5,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Tucker, Jona.	American	18	\$1,800
Tucker, P. M., Mrs.	do	10	1,000
Austin, S. L.	do	2	200
Wadworth, R. A.	do	2	200
Austin, H. C.	Hawaiian-born American	3	300
Austin, H. C., Mrs.	American	2	200
Coan, H. P.	Hawaiian-born American	1	100
Hitchcock, A. E.	do	1	100
Saddler, R. C.	British	5	500
Austin, Jona.	American	5	500
Wetmore, C. H.	do	1	100
Total		50	5,000

SUMMARY.

American	\$1,000
Hawaiian-born American	500
British	500
Total	5,000

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

HILO AND HAWAII TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, HILO, HAWAII.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock \$9,900, in shares of \$25 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Wetmore, C. H.	American	17	\$425
Porter, H.	do.	2	50
Kittredge, C. S.	do.	4	100
Lyman, F. S.	Hawaiian-born American	2	50
Richardson, C. E.	American	13	325
Terry, W. S.	do.	3	75
Hitchcock, D. H.	Hawaiian-born American	10	250
Townsend, C. E., Mrs.	do.	1	25
Holmes, W. H.	American	17	425
Like, E. L.	Hawaiian	4	100
Like, L. K.	do.	3	75
Like, S. A.	do.	2	50
Maby, F. W. & W. I.	American-Hawaiian (half caste)	1	25
Maby, M. E. & H. O.	do.	1	25
Willfong, M., Mrs.	do.	1	25
Hapai, H.	Chinese-Hawaiian (half caste)	2	50
Hapai, E. C.	do.	2	50
Matson, W.	American	5	125
Deacon, H.	do.	7	175
Kennedy, C. C.	British	6	150
Kennedy, S. A.	do.	5	125
Waiakea Mill Co.	Hawaiian corporation	5	125
Scott, J. A.	British	8	200
Hilo Sugar Co.	Hawaiian corporation	22	550
Paukaa plantation.	do.	8	200
Hitchcock, E. G.	Hawaiian-born American	7	175
Hitchcock, M. R. Miss.	do.	4	100
Austin, H. C.	do.	2	50
Onomea Sugar Company.	Hawaiian corporation	35	875
Akana, W. S.	Chinese-Hawaiian (half-caste)	2	50
Pepeekeo plantation.	Hawaiian corporation	15	375
Honoum Sugar Company.	do.	8	200
Hakalau Sugar Company.	American corporation	10	250
Hind, R. R.	British	14	350
Lydgate, W.	do.	10	250
Lydgate, J.	do.	10	250
Lanabohoe Sugar Company.	Hawaiian corporation	17	425
Kimball, J. H.	American	15	375
Ookala Sugar Co.	Hawaiian corporation	20	500
Kaula, J. M., Mrs.	Hawaiian	2	50
Nahinu, D. H.	do.	5	125
Kauhane, S.	do.	1	25
Kauhane, J.	do.	1	25
Kauhane, N.	do.	1	25
Kauhane, W. L. M.	do.	1	25
Furneaux, C.	American	12	300
Cassidy, J.	do.	4	100
Richards, E. E.	do.	1	25
Goodale, W. W.	do.	14	350
Shipman, W. H.	Hawaiian-born American	2	50
Castle, W. R.	do.	28	700
Scott, W. E.	American	2	50
Wilson, J. R.	do.	2	50
Total		396	9,900

SUMMARY.

American	\$4,345
Hawaiian-born American	1,830
American-Hawaiian (half-caste)	79
British	2,847
Hawaiian born British	32
British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	2
Hawaiian	510
Chinese	100
Chinese-Hawaiian (half-caste)	150
German	5
Total	9,900

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

1933

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

HONOLULU DAIRY COMPANY, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock \$20,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Dowsett, J. I.	Hawaiian-born British	163	\$16,300
Roth, S.	German	12	1,200
Kanoa, P. P.	Hawaiian	5	500
Colburn, J. F.	American-Hawaiian (half-caste)	5	500
Ena, J. no.	Chinese-Hawaiian (half-caste)	5	500
Dowsett, J. I., jr.	British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	5	500
Magoon, J. A.	American	5	500
Total	200	20,000

SUMMARY.

Hawaiian-born British	\$16,300
British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	500
German	1,200
American	500
American-Hawaiian (half-caste)	500
Hawaiian	500
Chinese-Hawaiian (half-caste)	500
Total	20,000

HONOLULU IRON WORKS COMPANY, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock \$20,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Davies, T. H.	British	520	\$52,000
Janion, R. C. (executor)	do.	520	52,000
Janion, D. R.	do.	260	26,000
Green, M. (executor)	do.	200	20,000
Green, A.	do.	60	6,000
Irwin, W. G.	do.	200	20,000
Castle & Cooke.	American firm	80	8,000
Atherton, J. B.	do.	40	4,000
Hackfeld & Co.	German firm	120	12,000
Total	2,000	200,000

SUMMARY.

British	\$176,000
American	12,000
German	12,000
Total	200,000

KAUAI TELEPHONE COMPANY, KAUAI.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$14,700, in shares of \$10 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Smith, J. W. (estate of)	American	5	\$50
Smith, J. K.	Hawaiian-born American	12	120
Smith, A. H.	do.	5	50
Dreier, A.	German	18	180
Neal, J. D.	American	1	10
Wilcox, G. N.	Hawaiian-born American	100	1,000
Wilcox, S. W.	do.	100	1,000
Wilcox, A. S.	do.	111	1,110
Christian, C.	German	1	10
Rice, W. H.	Hawaiian-born American	10	100
Isenberg, O.	German	1	10
Hardy, J.	American	1	10
Koloa Sugar Company	Hawaiian corporation	10	100

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

KAUAI TELEPHONE COMPANY, KAUAI—Continued.

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Smith, W. O.	Hawaiian-born American	2	\$20
Apoi.	Chinese	1	10
Kau, S.	Hawaiian	1	10
Lihue plantation	Hawaiian corporation	100	1,000
Wainwright, R.	American (?)	2	20
Dole, G. H.	Hawaiian-born American	1	10
Kahele, H.	Hawaiian	1	10
Kealoha, J. M.	do.	1	10
Kaumuali.	do.	1	10
Conchee, A. C.	Chinese	1	10
Purvis, R. W. T.	British	24	240
Spalding, Z. S.	American	25	250
Walters, G.	British	27	270
Strehz, E.	German	2	20
Isenberg, H.	do.	20	200
Ahlborn, L.	do.	20	200
Bishop, Mrs. E.	American	5	50
Zjedrum, K. S.	Norwegian	5	50
Lockwood, W. V.	American	110	1,100
Hall & Son, E. O.	Hawaiian corporation	100	1,000
White, E. O.	Hawaiian-born American	100	1,000
Lota, Mrs.	Hawaiian	8	80
Austin, Jona. (estate)	American	100	1,000
Faye, H. P.	Norwegian	25	250
Koelling, C.	German	30	300
Knudsen, V.	Norwegian	100	1,000
Hawaiian Sugar Co.	Hawaiian corporation	100	1,000
Kaaloa, E.	Hawaiian	1	10
Wilcox, H. H.	Hawaiian-born American	100	1,000
Kahele, E. (trustee).	Hawaiian	6	60
Kekaha Mill Co.	German firm	28	280
Hofgaard, C. B., & Co.	Norwegian firm	14	140
Borchgrevink, C.	do.	14	140
Hanalei, J. B.	Hawaiian	20	200
Total		1,470	14,700

SUMMARY.

American	\$3,340
Hawaiian-born American	6,510
American-Hawaiian (half-caste)	154
British	873
Hawaiian-born British	8
Hawaiian	390
Norwegian	1,580
German	1,767
Hawaiian-born German	45
Chinese	20
Chinese-Hawaiian (half-caste)	3
Portuguese-Hawaiian (half-caste)	10
Total	14,700

ROYAL HAWAIIAN HOTEL COMPANY, HONOLULU, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$75,000, in shares of \$50 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Macfarlane, G. W. & Co.	Hawaiian-born British firm	396	\$19,800
Macfarlane, G. W.	Hawaiian-born British	1,003	50,150
Macfarlane, E. C.	do.	100	5,000
Catton, R.	British	1	50
		1,500	75,000

SUMMARY.

Hawaiian-born British	\$74,950
British	50
Total	75,000

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

KOHALA TELEPHONE COMPANY, HAWAII.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$7,930, in shares of \$10 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
T. H. Wright.....	Hawaiian-born British.....	10	\$100
G. P. Tulloch.....	British.....	30	300
Mrs. C. E. Desborough.....	do.....	20	200
H. H. Webb.....	American.....	5	50
J. O. Desborough.....	British.....	6	60
Mrs. J. C. Hattie.....	do.....	5	50
Jas. Renton.....	do.....	30	300
W. J. Wright.....	Hawaiian-born British.....	20	200
J. Maguire.....	British-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	10	100
W. C. Kapauno.....	Hawaiian.....	2	20
S. C. Luhiau.....	do.....	2	20
Kynnersley Bros.....	British.....	30	300
Hawaiian Railroad Co.....	American firm.....	50	500
S. G. Wilder & Co.....	do.....	8	80
Lung Hee.....	Chinese.....	3	30
H. H. Renton.....	British.....	30	300
C. J. Falk.....	American.....	1	10
C. Awai.....	Chinese.....	3	30
B. Pengelina.....	Spanish.....	2	20
R. Hall.....	British.....	10	100
M. A. Gonsalves.....	Portuguese.....	2	20
J. P. Sisson.....	American.....	5	50
J. W. Moanauli.....	Hawaiian.....	5	50
S. K. Kaunamano.....	do.....	2	20
Lakalo.....	do.....	1	10
P. A. Dias.....	Portuguese.....	1	10
W. R. Castle.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	25	250
D. H. Nahinu.....	Hawaiian.....	16	160
C. F. Phelps.....	American.....	5	50
Mrs. J. Renton.....	British.....	15	150
Mrs. J. R. Kynnersley.....	do.....	2	20
E. C. Bond.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	25	250
H. E. Bryant.....	British.....	10	100
Mrs. G. P. Tullock.....	British.....	2	20
E. Wood.....	Hawaiian-born British.....	9	90
Dr. B. D. Bond.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	57	570
J. C. Hattie.....	British.....	15	150
Dr. and Mrs. J. Wight.....	do.....	109	1,090
John and R. R. Hind.....	do.....	60	600
K. Pake.....	Hawaiian.....	10	100
J. L. Blaisdell (estate of).....	Hawaiian-born British.....	15	150
W. P. Macdougall.....	do.....	45	450
A. Wallace.....	American (?).....	40	400
Hawaiian Mercantile Co.....	Half British and half American.....	5	50
Total.....		758	7,580

SUMMARY.

American.....	\$1,165
Hawaiian-born American.....	1,070
British.....	3,765
Hawaiian-born British.....	990
British-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	100
Portuguese.....	30
Chinese.....	60
Spanish.....	20
Hawaiian.....	380
Total.....	7,580

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

MAUI TELEPHONE COMPANY, MAUI.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$10,000, in shares of \$10 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Armstrong, F. S.	Hawaiian-born American	13	\$130
Aluli, N.	Hawaiian	15	150
Anderson, J.	American	5	50
Borba, A.	Portuguese	2	20
Baldwin, H. P.	Hawaiian-born American	25	250
Bailey, E. H.	do.	13	130
Carney, L.	American	25	250
Collville, J. W.	British	51	510
Carney, E. P.	American	8	80
Campbell, T.	British	50	500
Dickey, C. H.	American	20	200
Enos & Co.	Portuguese	2	20
Engle, R. F.	American	32	320
Everett, T. W.	do.	43	430
Fernandez, A.	Portuguese	2	20
Fleming, J.	British	25	250
Forster, C. M. V.	American	10	100
Hopke, A. F.	do.	5	50
Hawaiian Commercial Co.	San Francisco corporation	75	750
Heineman, G.	German	2	20
Hockings, A.	British	19	190
Herbert, G.	do.	1	10
Hardey, F. W.	American	5	50
Haiku Sugar Co.	Hawaiian corporation	15	150
Kahului store	American firm	10	100
Lindsay, D. C.	British	13	130
Laws, H.	American	100	1,000
Morrison, H.	British	10	100
Mossman, W. F.	Hawaiian-born British	15	150
Milward, J.	British	13	130
Omsted, N.	Norwegian	6	60
Ogg, W.	British	20	200
Plemmer, H.	American-Hawaiian (half-caste)	1	10
Stolz, F. L.	American	52	520
Stolz, G. W.	do.	174	1,740
Simpson, F. M.	do.	33	330
Treadway, H. G.	American-Hawaiian (half-caste)	6	60
Tweedie, G. H.	British	1	10
Veilesen, L. M.	American	5	50
Wailuku plantation	Hawaiian corporation	25	250
Walbridge, R. D.	American	5	50
Waikapu plantation	Hawaiian corporation	20	200
Wilder, L. K.	Hawaiian-born American	10	100
Wilder, G. P.	do.	5	50
Young, Hee.	Chinese	13	130
Total		1,000	10,000

SUMMARY.

American	\$6,267
Hawaiian-born American	858
American-Hawaiian (half-caste)	70
British	2,114
Hawaiian-born British	252
British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	6
Hawaiian	162
Chinese	130
Portuguese	60
Norwegian	60
German	21
Total	10,000

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$439,800, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares. (pro- portion paid in).	Value.
Dillingham, B. F.	American	541	\$54,000
Paty, Mrs. J. H.	do	160	16,000
Frear, W. (trustee)	do	57	5,700
Frear, W.	do	55	5,500
Ashley, W. G.	do	12	1,200
Iaukea, C. P.	Hawaiian	26	2,600
Foster, Mrs. T. R.	British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	100	10,000
Von Holt, H.	Hawaiian-born German	50	5,000
Robinson, Mrs. J.	British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	15	1,500
Robinson, M. P.	do	303	30,300
Castle, W. R.	Hawaiian-born American	300	30,000
Hatch, F. M.	American	200	20,000
May, T.	British	250	25,000
Liliuokalani	Hawaiian	120	12,000
Graham, W. M.	American	45	4,500
Total		2,234	223,400

SUMMARY.

American	\$107,000
Hawaiian-born American	30,000
British	25,000
British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	41,800
Hawaiian	14,600
Hawaiian-born German	5,000
Total	223,400

MUTUAL TELEPHONE COMPANY, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$180,000, in shares of \$10 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Allen, W. F.	American	100	\$1,000
Allen, S. C.	do	202	2,020
Atherton, J. B.	do	220	2,200
Austin, Mrs. K.	do	20	200
Afong, C.	Chinese	20	200
Afong, M.	Chinese-Hawaiian (half-caste)	10	100
Afong, A.	do	10	100
Bishop & Co.	American firm	1,800	18,000
Bishop, C. R.	do	100	1,000
Beger Company	German	50	500
Brown, C.	Hawaiian-born British	10	100
Brown, G.	British	20	200
Brown, Mrs. L.	do	20	200
Bolte, C.	German	10	100
Babcock, C.	American	10	100
Bickerton, R. F.	British	40	400
Beckley, G. C.	British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	20	200
Boyd, J. H.	do	5	50
Buckle, Mary	do	5	50
Brown, C. K., Mrs.	Swedish-Hawaiian (half-caste)	5	50
Campbell, Jas.	British	998	9,980
Castle & Cooke	American firm	20	200
Castle, G. F.	Hawaiian-born American	79	790
Castle, W. R.	do	20	200
Cartwright, B.	do	30	300
Cummins, J. A.	British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	20	200
Cooke, C. M.	Hawaiian-born American	20	200
Cunha, E. S.	Portuguese	20	200
Chang, Lee	Chinese	10	100
Clevior, J. S.	British	5	50
Clark, J., Mrs.	American-Hawaiian (half-caste)	5	50
Dreier, A.	German	100	1,000
Dreier, E.	German-Hawaiian (half-caste)	20	200
Davies, T. H. & Co.	British firm	20	200
Dayton, D.	American	20	200
Dowsett, J. I.	Hawaiian-born British	20	200
Lucas, G.	do	20	200
Alea, C. (estate of)	Chinese	20	200

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

MUTUAL TELEPHONE COMPANY, OAHU—Continued.

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Foster, E	American	20	\$200
Foster, Mary E	British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	20	200
Grimbaum & Co	German firm	20	200
Gartenberg, A	American	10	100
Green, W. I. (estate of)	British	10	100
Green, M	American	10	100
Green, F. M.	do	10	100
Her Majesty	Hawaiian	35	350
Hollister & Co	American firm	45	450
Henderson	British	10	100
Hopper, J. A.	American	25	250
Hackfeld & Co	German firm	20	200
Hall, W. W	Hawaiian-born American	20	200
Hall, M. D	American	20	200
Herbert A	do	20	200
Hassinger, A	do	10	100
Hyman Bros	American firm	20	200
Hyman, M	do	20	200
Hoting, J	German	5	50
Horn, F	do	10	100
Haysselden, F. H	British	20	200
Irwin, Wm. G	do	800	8,000
Jaeger, A	German	5	50
Jaeger, A., Mrs	do	200	2,000
Jaeger, H	German-Hawaiian (half-caste)	100	1,000
Jaeger, Jas	do	100	1,000
Jaeger, I	do	100	1,000
Jaeger, I. A	do	100	1,000
Judd, C	Hawaiian-born American	20	200
Kellet, P. D.	British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	20	200
Lewers, R	American	20	200
Lovejoy, J. H.	do	10	100
Lucas, G. W	British	5	50
May, T	do	50	500
Macfarlane, F. W.	Hawaiian-born British	10	100
Monsarrat, M. D.	do	5	50
Mow, Keeong C	Chinese	20	200
Maertens, W	German	10	100
Monsarrat, J. M	Hawaiian-born British	20	200
McIntyre, H. E	British	120	1,200
McChesney & Sons	American	20	200
McKibbin, R	British	20	200
Muhlendorf, P	German	20	200
Nolte, H. J.	do	5	50
Nott, J	British	10	100
Phillips & Co., M	American firm	20	200
Puahi, L. K., Mrs	Hawaiian	10	100
Renjes, H	German	10	100
Robinson, M. P	British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	20	200
Robinson, C. J., Mrs	do	60	600
Riemenschneider, H	German	5	50
Smith, H	British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	40	400
Spencer, S	American	20	200
Spreckels, C	do	20	200
Spencer, E. J	do	20	200
Spencer, E., Mrs	do	20	200
Schaefer, F. A	German	20	200
Sorenson, T	Dane	5	50
Smith, J. M	American	10	100
Smith, W. J	British	10	100
Tenney, E. D	American	20	200
Trousseau, G., Dr	French	20	200
Wideman, H. A	German	1,035	10,350
Walker, J. S., estate	British	40	400
Wilder, S. G., estate	American	10	100
Waterhouse, J. T., jr	British	20	200
Waterhouse, H	do	20	200
Waterhouse, J. T	Naturalized American	10	100
Wing Wo Chan	Chinese	20	200
Wilcox, S. W	Hawaiian-born American	20	200
Wilcox, G. N	do	20	200
Wilson, C. B	British Tahitian (half-caste)	20	200
Young, Chee	Chinese	10	100
Yee Chin	do	10	100
Baker, J. T	Hawaiian	10	100
Kawainui, B. W	do	8	80
Mercedes, K	Portuguese	3	30
Ward, Mrs	British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	20	200
Total		7,900	79,060

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

SUMMARY.

American.....	\$20,020
British.....	22,480
German.....	15,150
Hawaiian-born British.....	850
Hawaiian-born American.....	2,290
British-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	2,500
Chinese.....	1,100
Chinese-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	200
Hawaiian.....	630
German-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	4,200
Swede.....	50
Portuguese.....	230
American-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	50
Dane.....	50
French.....	200
Total.....	79,000

OAHU RAILWAY AND LAND COMPANY, HONOLULU, OAHU.

[Hawaiian Corporation; capital stock, \$700,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Dillingham, B. F.....	American.....	3,542	\$354,200
Robinson, M. P.....	British Hawaiian (half-caste).....	1,184	118,400
Castle, W. R.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	242	24,200
Castle, S. N.....	American.....	390	39,000
Dowsett, J. I.....	Hawaiian-born British.....	10	1,000
Hatch, F. M.....	American.....	22	2,200
Lewers, R.....	do.....	10	1,000
Jøger, Mrs. A.....	German.....	2	200
Wilder, W. C.....	American.....	10	1,000
Jaeger, A.....	German.....	10	1,000
Whitney, J. M.....	American.....	3	300
Walker, T. R.....	British.....	10	1,000
Foster, W.....	American.....	10	1,000
Allen, W. F.....	do.....	15	1,500
Lowrie, Mrs. A. L.....	do.....	1	100
Allen, S. C.....	do.....	10	1,000
Paty, J. H.....	do.....	10	1,000
Paty, Julia A.....	do.....	4	400
Poor, H. F.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	21	2,100
Monsarrat, J. M.....	Hawaiian-born British.....	16	1,600
Hustace, C., Jr.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	2	200
Bishop, S. E.....	do.....	55	5,500
Brown, Frank.....	British.....	5	500
Rowe, E. C.....	do.....	7	700
Green, Mrs. A.....	do.....	5	500
Thurston, L. A.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	5	500
Mist, H. W.....	British.....	5	500
Forster, W. E.....	do.....	115	11,500
Frear, W.....	American.....	5	500
Atherton, J. B.....	do.....	25	2,500
Afong, C.....	Chinese.....	105	10,500
Wong, Ah In.....	Chinaman.....	2	200
Winter, F. L.....	American.....	55	5,500
Kind, R. R.....	British.....	174	17,400
Torbert, J. L.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	2	200
Von Holt, H. M.....	Hawaiian-born German.....	60	6,000
Stiles, E.....	British-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	5	500
McStocker, F. B.....	American.....	5	500
Kanoa, P. P.....	Hawaiian.....	50	5,000
May, T.....	British.....	28	2,800
Hobron, T. E.....	American.....	200	20,000
Ashley, W. G.....	do.....	26	2,600
Dillingham, M. E.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	10	1,000
Dillingham, W. F.....	do.....	10	1,000
Dillingham, H. G.....	do.....	10	1,000
Toler, Mrs. A.....	American.....	7	700
Dillingham, M. E.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	10	1,000
Spencer, J. G.....	American.....	7	700
Dillingham, E. L.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	257	25,700
Smith, D. B.....	American.....	5	500
Hill, W.....	British.....	16	1,600
Austin, J.....	American.....	5	500
Hawaiian Construction Co.....	American firm.....	200	20,000
Total.....		7,000	700,000

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

SUMMARY.

American.....	\$456,700
Hawaiian-born American.....	62,400
British.....	36,600
Hawaiian-born British.....	2,000
British-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	118,800
German.....	1,200
Hawaiian-born German.....	6,000
Chinese.....	10,700
Hawaiian.....	5,000
Total.....	700,000

PRESS PUBLISHING COMPANY, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation. Capital stock, \$16,000 in shares of \$25 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Thrum, T. G.....	British.....	522	\$13,050
Dillingham, B. F.....	American.....	30	750
Reynolds, W. F.....	British.....	20	500
Spencer, J. G.....	American.....	18	450
Castle, W. R.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	12	300
Bond, B. D. & E. C.....	do.....	20	500
Lowrie, W. J.....	American.....	5	125
Stolz, F. L.....	do.....	5	125
Nott, J.....	Naturalized American.....	4	100
Foster, W. E.....	British.....	4	100
Total.....		640	16,000

SUMMARY.

British.....	\$13,650
American.....	1,550
Hawaiian-born American.....	800
Total.....	16,000

PEOPLE'S ICE AND REFRIGERATING COMPANY, HONOLULU, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation. Capital stock \$150,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Ables, L. C.....	American.....	78	\$7,800.00
Alexander, A., Mrs.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	12	1,200.00
Allen, W. F.....	American.....	29	2,900.00
Austin, Jonathan.....	do.....	8	800.00
Austin, S. L.....	do.....	1	100.00
Austin, Mrs. S. L.....	do.....	1½	133.33
Austin, S. E.....	do.....	46	4,600.00
Banning, B. R.*.....	Hawaiian-born German.....	10	1,000.00
Bolles, Mrs. J.....	American.....	7	700.00
Bishop, C. R.....	do.....	65	6,500.00
Bingham, Miss E. K.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	3	300.00
Buckle, Mary.....	British-Hawaiian (?) (half-caste).....	3	66.67
Castle, G. P.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	12	1,200.00
Cartwright, A. J.....	do.....	26	2,600.00
Carpenter, H. E.....	American.....	13	1,300.00
Cleghorn, A. S.....	British.....	14	1,400.00
Cooke, L., Mrs.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	2	200.00
Collins, D.....	British.....	25	2,500.00
Cooke, C. M.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	30	3,000.00
Dole, A., Mrs.....	American.....	3	300.00
Dowsett, D., Miss.....	Hawaiian-born British.....	3	300.00
Damon, S. M. (trustee).....	Hawaiian-born American.....	8	800.00
Forbes, M. J., Mrs.....	American.....	7	700.00
Fisher, J. H.....	do.....	50	5,000.00
Gonsalves, M. A.....	Portuguese.....	1	100.00
Grieve, R.....	British.....	2	200.00
Gurney, C. F., estate.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	2	200.00
Hall, W. W.....	do.....	16	1,600.00
Hall, M. D., Mrs.....	American.....	6	600.00
Hackfeld, J. F.....	German.....	20	2,000.00
Henderson, B. A., Mrs.....	British.....	16	1,600.00
Hobron, estate.....	American.....	140	14,000.00

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

PEOPLE'S ICE AND REFRIGERATING COMPANY, HONOLULU, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation. Capital stock \$150,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.—Continued.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Hobron, T. W.	Hawaiian-born American	33	\$3,300.00
Hosmer, S. K.	American	2	200.00
Hosmer, F. A.	do.	8	800.00
Howell, Jas.	British	12	1,200.00
Hatch, F. M.	American	16	1,600.00
Hosier, Wm.	do.	35	3,500.00
Hyde, Mary T.	do.	10	1,000.00
Johnson, A. F., Miss	Hawaiian-born American	3	300.00
Judd, A. F.	do.	14	1,400.00
Jones, E. A.	do.	1	100.00
Kaiulani, H. R. H.	British-Hawaiian (half-castes)	10	1,000.00
Kaepa, M., Mrs.	Hawaiian	4	400.00
Keil, E. A.	American	10	1,000.00
Kaehu Wahine	Hawaiian	1	65.87
Knight, E. B., Miss	American	4	400.00
Kruse, M. T., Mrs.	British	5	500.00
Lydgate, J. M.	British	5	500.00
Lewis & Co.	American firm	10	1,000.00
Levitt, M. C., Mrs.	American	6	600.00
May, T.	British	18	1,800.00
Mist, J., Mrs.	do.	4	400.00
Mist, E.	Hawaiian-born British	1	100.00
Mist, H. W. M.	do.	3	300.00
Mist, H. M.	do.	1	100.00
Mist, H. W.	British	1	100.00
Marchant, L., (estate of)	American	10	1,000.00
Makaihona & Kalahiki	Hawaiians	1½	133.33
McKibbin, R.	British	20	2,000.00
McCandles, J. A.	American	55	5,500.00
McCandles, L. L.	do.	44	4,400.00
McCandles, J. S.	do.	20	2,000.00
McCandles, E., Mrs.	do.	5	500.00
McStocker, F. B.	do.	25	2,500.00
Nott, Mrs.	British	6	600.00
Pratt, J., Mrs.	American	6	600.00
Parker, M., Mrs.	Hawaiian-born American	2	200.00
Reed, J. S., Mrs.	American	1½	133.33
Smith, W. O.	Hawaiian-born American	9	900.00
Soper, J. H., Mrs.	British	3½	333.33
Staples, L. M., Mrs.	American	6	600.00
Steiner, Jas.	German	20	2,000.00
Severence, H. C.	Hawaiian-born American	20	2,000.00
Thurston, L. A. (trustee)	do.	22	2,200.00
Wilder, J. K.	do.	23	2,300.00
Wilder, S. G. (estate of)	American	131	13,100.00
Wilder, E. K., Mrs.	do.	20	2,000.00
Wilcox, H. H.	Hawaiian-born American	26	2,600.00
Wilcox, Mrs. K.	Hawaiian	1½	133.34
White, E. O.	Hawaiian-born American	6	600.00
Wood, J. Q.	American	5	500.00
Walbridge, Mrs. R. D.	Hawaiian-born American	2	200.00
Walker, J. S.	British	9	900.00
Wilder & Co.	American firm	19	1,900.00
Walsh, E. M.	American	108	10,800.00
Total		1,500	150,000.00

SUMMARY.

American	\$101,067
Hawaiian-born American	27,200
British	14,033
Hawaiian-born British	800
British-Hawaiian (half caste)	1,067
German	4,000
Hawaiian	733
Hawaiian-born German	1,000
Portuguese	100
Total	150,000

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

UNION FEED COMPANY, HONOLULU, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$75,000, in shares of \$50 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Macfarlane, F. W.	Hawaiian-born British.....	788	\$39,400
Hackfeld, J. F.	German	110	5,500
Cartwright, A. J.	Hawaiian-born American.....	100	5,000
Spreckels & Co., J. D.	American firm.....	100	5,000
Hackfeld & Co., H.	German firm.....	100	5,000
Allen, W. F.	American	100	5,000
Brown, Mrs. J. H.	do	55	2,750
Cartwright, Bruce.....	Hawaiian-born American.....	40	2,000
Brown, Mrs. M. J.	British	30	1,500
Vida, Mrs. K. L.	American	20	1,000
Macfarlane, F. W. (trustee)	British-Hawaiian (half caste)	15	750
Cornwell, Mrs. H.	American	12	600
Macfarlane, Mrs. H. R.	Hawaiian-born British.....	10	500
Pratt, Mrs. Dr.	American	10	500
Vida, F. R.	Hawaiian-born Chilian.....	8	400
Macfarlane, G. W. & E. C.	Hawaiian-born British.....	2	100
Total.....		1,500	\$75,000

SUMMARY.

British.....	\$1,500
Hawaiian-born British.....	40,000
British-Hawaiian (half-caste).....	750
American.....	14,850
Hawaiian-born American.....	7,000
German.....	10,000
Hawaiian-born Chilian.....	400
Total.....	75,000

WOODLAWN DAIRY AND STOCK COMPANY, HONOLULU, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$100,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Dillingham, B. F.	American	992	\$99,200
Spencer, J. G.	do	8	800
Total.....		1,000	100,000

WILDER'S STEAMSHIP COMPANY, HONOLULU, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$500,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Wilder, W. C.	American	45	\$4,500
Bishop, C. R.	do	250	25,000
Rose, S. B.	do	3	300
Tucker, E. W.	do	5	500
Wilder, S. G., estate of	do	2,283	228,300
Wight, L. R.	do	30	3,000
Wilder, G. P.	Hawaiian-born American	7	700
Beckley, G. C.	British-Hawaiian (half-caste)	116	11,600
Henderson, B. A.	British	37	3,700
May, T.	do	13	1,300
Lamb, I. E.	American	127	12,700
Wilder, S. G.	Hawaiian-born American	20	2,000
Boardman, Jennie	American	12	1,200
Wilder, E. K.	Hawaiian-born American	40	4,000
Wilder, H. K.	do	6	600
Brash, W. G.	British	10	1,000
Austin, S. E.	Hawaiian-born American	20	2,000
Boardman, G. E.	do	10	1,000
Dickson, John.....	British	9	900
Wilder, J. A.	Hawaiian-born American.....	20	2,000
Wilder, L.	do	20	2,000
Hebron, T. H., estate of.....	American	50	5,000
Thurston, L. A., trustee	Hawaiian-born American	25	2,500
Hobson, T. W.	do	20	2,000

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

WILDER'S STEAMSHIP COMPANY, HONOLULU, OAHU—Continued.

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Judd, A. F., trustee	Hawaiian-born American	8	\$800
Dickson, H. J.	do	5	500
Allen, W. F.	American	20	2,000
Brash, W. G., executor	British	15	1,500
Parke, A. S.	Hawaiian-born American	55	5,500
Parke, J. S.	do	2	200
Lyons, E. W.	do	4	400
Rowell, M. J.	American	16	1,600
Purvis, R. W. T.	British	10	1,000
Wilcox, S. W.	Hawaiian-born American	200	20,000
Wilcox, G. N.	do	250	25,000
Judd, A. F.	do	21	2,100
White, E. O.	do	20	2,000
Wilcox, A. S.	do	250	25,000
Hoffman, M. L.	American	10	1,000
Hyde, M. T.	do	10	1,000
Beckwith, E. S.	do	10	1,000
Lidgate, J. M.	British	9	900
Carpenter, H. E.	American	9	900
Hillebrand, H. L.	Hawaiian-born American	16	1,600
Hackfeld, J. F.	German	200	20,000
Bosse, C.	German	30	3,000
Soper, J. H.	British	3	300
Halstead, E.	British	25	2,500
Thurston, C. S., estate	Hawaiian-born American	5	500
Wilder, Mrs. W. C.	American	10	1,000
Lindemann, E.	German	5	500
Howie, A. C.	British	20	2,000
Walbridge, Mrs. B. P.	American	2	200
Lackland, Mrs. A.	do	5	500
Irwin, W. G.	British	500	50,000
Judd, H. S.	Hawaiian-born American	22	2,200
Hocking, A.	British	20	2,000
Allen, C. C.	American	4	400
Judd, A. H. B.	Hawaiian-born American	16	1,600
Lackland, W. O.	American	15	1,500
Total		5,000	500,000

SUMMARY.

American	\$291,600
Hawaiian-born American	106,200
British	67,100
British-Hawaiian (half-castes)	11,600
German	23,500
Total	500,000

NORTH PACIFIC PHOSPHATE AND FERTILIZER COMPANY, OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$100,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Wilcox, G. N.	Hawaiian-born American	290	\$29,000
Spencer, C. N.	American	175	17,500
Freeth, G. D.	British	175	17,500
Hackfeld & Co., H.	German firm	150	15,000
Wilcox, A. S.	Hawaiian-born American	145	14,500
Spencer, L. D.	American	45	4,500
Smith, W. O.	Hawaiian-born American	10	1,000
Rosehill, A.	Sweden	5	500
Lyons, A. B.	American	5	500
Total		1,000	100,000

SUMMARY.

American	\$22,500
Hawaiian-born American	44,500
British	17,500
German	15,000
Sweden	500
Total	100,000

Hawaiian corporations other than sugar plantations—Continued.

WOODLAWN FRUIT COMPANY (LIMITED), OAHU.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$30,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares (propor- tion paid in).	Value.
McCarthy, C. J.	American	45	\$700
Love, J. H.	British	5	100
Harrison, A.	do.	5	100
Cartwright, B.	Hawaiian-born American	25	350
Walker, J. S., jr.	Hawaiian-born British	40	600
Morgan, J. F.	do.	50	1,000
Hustace, F.	Hawaiian-born American	10	200
McCorriston, D.	British	5	100
Morgan, E. J.	Hawaiian-born British	10	150
McChesney, F. W. (trustee)	American	30	600
Harrison, F.	British	25	500
Timble, G.	do.	5	100
Law, Chong	Chinese	10	200
Devlin, J.	American	10	200
Wo Sing.	Chinese	5	100
Bowler, J. F.	American	20	400
Total	300	5,400

SUMMARY.

American	\$1,900
Hawaiian-born American	550
British	900
Hawaiian-born British	1,750
Chinese	300
Total	5,400

PUULOLO SHEEP AND STOCK RANCH COMPANY, HAWAII.

[Hawaiian corporation; capital stock, \$60,000, in shares of \$100 par value each.]

Stockholders.	Nationality.	Shares.	Value.
Macfalan, G. W.	Hawaiian-born British	600	\$60,000

No. 33.

*Mr. Carter to Mr. Blount.*HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *July 6, 1893.*

SIR: Regarding elections held in this Kingdom prior to 1887 as to the proportion of foreign residents other than Asiatics, who were qualified voters for representatives, I may say that I had a personal interest in two elections prior to 1880, one in Honolulu, island of Oahu, and one in Wailuka, island of Maui, and was also a candidate for Honolulu, on two occasions between 1880 and 1887; that I was familiar with the lists of voters, and can safely say that less than 30 per cent of the foreign residents were naturalized.

Very respectfully, yours,

J. O. CARTER.

His Excellency JAMES H. BLOUNT,
U. S. Minister Resident, etc.

No. 34.

Mr. Jones to Mr. Blount.

HEADQUARTERS ANNEXATION CLUB,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, July 9, 1893.

In answer to your communication of May I would say that the names on our great register to date are 5,500 and that we are advised of 190-odd on rolls not yet entered, on the other islands.

Of those which are entered I would estimate that 1,218 are American, being 90-odd per cent of the total number of Americans on the islands, and 20-odd per cent of those on the club rolls; English 251, being 26 per cent of those on the islands, and 4 per cent of club rolls.

One thousand and twenty-two Hawaiians, being 11 per cent of those on islands and 18 per cent of club rolls.

Two thousand two hundred and sixty-one Portuguese, being 73 per cent of Portuguese on islands and 41 per cent of club rolls.

Sixty-nine Norwegians, being 50 per cent of those on islands and 1 per cent of club rolls.

Three hundred and fifty-one Germans, being 53 per cent of those on islands and 6 per cent of club rolls.

Others 328, unclassified.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

J. W. JONES,
Secretary Annexation Club.

Hon. J. H. BLOUNT,
United States Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

No. 35.

Mr. Macfarlane to Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, *July 13, 1893.*

SIR: In obedience to your request I append herewith a list of the members of the Legislature of 1892, classified under the political parties represented in that session of the Legislature, by which you will see that the—

Nationals numbered	13
Reformers numbered	11
Liberals numbered	14
Independents numbered	3

Total

52

The above fifty-two members comprising a full legal legislature, viz:

Nobles	24
Representatives	24
Cabinet ministers	4

Total

52

Of the three "Independents" noted above, two of them, Messrs. Hind and Dreier, on every important vote joined with the Nationals and throughout the session were always counted in the ranks of that party, while Mr. Kauki generally followed in the lead of the Reform party.

At the commencement of the session, then, with this disposition of the three Independent members, the House then stood:

Nationals.....	20
Reform.....	18
Liberals.....	14
Total.....	52

In organizing the House Mr. J. S. Walker (National) was elected president by acclamation. The real contest was upon the election of the secretary—all three parties placing candidates in nomination, as follows: C. J. McCarthy (National), J. A. Low (Reform), D. L. Kekumano (Liberal).

On the first ballot 46 votes were cast, of which McCarthy (national) received 22; Low (reform) received 14; Kekumano (liberal) received 10.

There was no election, a majority being required. On the second ballot 45 votes were cast, resulting in the election of the national candidate upon the following vote: McCarthy (national), 23; Low (reform), 20; Kekumano (liberal), 2.

The nationals likewise succeeded in electing the balance of the officers of the House, in spite of a fusion of the liberals and reform party.

At no time during the last session of the Legislature could the reform party carry through any measures without the assistance of either of the other two parties. A combination was finally effected between the reform and liberal parties, and an attempt was made to vote out the Macfarlane-Neumann ministry (national), but they failed to carry the resolution of want of confidence by one vote.

A second attempt was made shortly thereafter and the ministry was retired.

The reform party then formed a ministry, but not being acceptable to the nationals and liberals, the two latter factions combined and in turn the Wilcox-Robinson cabinet was voted out on the day preceding the last day of the session.

The Queen appointed a new cabinet on the last day of the session and then prorogued the Legislature.

The revolution followed within a couple of days thereafter.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

E. C. MACFARLANE.

His Excellency J. H. BLOUNT,

United States Minister Plenipotentiary, etc., Honolulu.

Classification of the members of the Legislature of 1892, with respect to parties.

Nationals.	Reform.	Liberals.
1. Parker.....	1. Kankane	1. Bipikane.
2. Widemann.....	2. J. M. Horner.....	2. Ashford.
3. Spencer	3. Walbridge	3. Aki.
4. Whiting	4. Anderson	4. S. K. Pua.
5. Walker	5. Thurston	5. R. W. Wilcox.
6. Berger	6. G. N. Wilcox	6. Bush.
7. Ena	7. Kanoa	7. Nawahi.
8. Macfarlane.....	8. Wilder	8. Koahou.
9. D. M. Pua	9. Kaluna	9. Kamancha.
10. Peterson.....	10. Josefa	10. Nahim.
11. Cummins	11. W. O. Smith	11. White.
12. Williams	12. A. S. Wilcox	12. Kaneatis.
13. Neumann.....	13. W. Y. Horner	13. Akina.
14. Hoapili.....	14. A. Horner	14. Edwards.
15. Coruwell	15. Baldwin	
16. Kapala	16. Marsden	
17. Kaunamano	17. Young	
18. Waipuilani		

Independents.—Hind, Dreier, Kauha.

No. 36.

Mr. Macfarlane to Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, July 13, 1893.

SIR: In answer to your inquiry as to the rate of taxation imposed upon real and personal property in the Hawaiian Kingdom commencing from the reign of Kalakaua to the present time, I have the honor to inform you that the rate of taxation was three-quarters of one per centum up to 1886, and from that time forward the rate has been 1 per centum on the assessed valuation.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

E. C. MACFARLANE.

His Excellency J. H. BLOUNT,
United States Minister, etc.

No. 37.

Mr. Macfarlane to Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, July 13, 1893.

SIR: Pursuant to your request, I herewith submit a statement of monies expended by the Hawaiian Government on account of immigration, which amount has been appropriated by the legislature from time to time, as hereinbelow mentioned. The amounts so expended were in aid of our sugar-planters, who were in need of cheap labor for their plantations.

1864-'66	\$3,584.75	1880-'82	100,000.00
1866-'68	5,000.00	1882-'84	473,050.86
1868-'70	30,000.00	1884-'86	327,257.81
1870-'72	15,000.00	1886-'88	71,398.90
1872-'74		1888-'90	12,246.69
1874-'76	16,098.23	1890-'92	17,878.23
1876-'78	48,997.61		
1878-'80	60,807.79	Total	\$1,181,320.87

The foregoing \$1,181,320.87 expended for immigration was for Portuguese laborers from the Azores and for Asiatics, and the figures are collated from the departmental reports of the successive biennial periods.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

E. C. MACFARLANE.

His excellency J. H. BLOUNT,
United States Minister Plenipotentiary, etc.

No. 38.

Lieut. Young to Mr. Blount.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, July 16, 1893.

DEAR SIR: During the day of the 17th of January, 1893, at Arion Hall I was in command of the artillery.

Capt. Wiltse said to me: "I will not allow any fighting in the city."

Very respectfully yours,

LUCIEN YOUNG,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

Hon. J. H. BLOUNT,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.

Mr. Macfarlane to Mr. Blount.

MY DEAR MR. BLOUNT: I send you the copies of the lottery petitions duly attested by the clerk of the Legislative Assembly (C. J. McCarthy), whose certificate I have been waiting for all this time. This is my reason for not sending these lists before.

Accompanying these lists I send you another list showing the names of those who are connected with the Provisional Government, also a list of prominent mechanics. Both of these lists are taken from among the signers of the lottery petitions.

Also find affidavit of Phillips and Rooney, who certify to the genuineness of the signatures. Mr. Phillips was the president of the Mechanics' Union and a noble of the Legislature of 1890. Mr. Rooney has been for many years a sugar plantation manager.

Very respectfully,

E. C. MACFARLANE.

His Excellency J. H. BLOUNT.

To Hon. J. S. Walker, C. O. Berger, John Ena, Paul Neumann, J. A. Cummins, J. N. S. Williams, E. C. Macfarlane, A. P. Peterson, and D. W. Pua, Nobles of the National Reform Party:

DEAR SIR: We are informed that a measure is now before the Legislature, which, if it becomes a law, will result in the yearly expenditure of \$500,000 within, or for the benefit of, this country.

We would respectfully call your attention to the fact that we believe this offer can not be overlooked or refused. We hereby, as your constituents, earnestly ask you to favor the proposed bill. We believe, if the bill becomes a law, that it will solve the distressing financial problem which now confronts the country; we believe it will restore the national credit; we believe it will prevent any danger of financial disaster; we believe the passage of the bill will open a new era of prosperity both national and individual.

Furthermore, we believe that the condition of the country financially is such that all questions of sentiment must be set aside and the proposed relief accepted if we are to retain our national independence; and a proper development of our resources can never be accomplished without the assistance tendered.

To refuse this proposition is political and commercial suicide, and we hasten to inform you concerning our feelings on the question, and again we urge you to leave no stone unturned to further the accomplishment of this project.

J. J. Williams.
W. H. Charlock, jr.
J. S. Walker, jr.
H. G. McGrew.
Hart & Co.
Chas. J. Fishel.
Thos. Krouse.
E. Vandoorn.
A. L. Cron.
M. E. Grossman.
A. McWayne.
A. F. Medeiros & Co.
J. P. Rodriguez.
Joe S. Alves.
W. Miller.
L. W. Toussaint.
W. Larsen.

J. H. Hunt.
Jas. Hire.
Theod. H. Boehme.
S. F. Graham.
W. Lucas.
Club Stables Co.
S. I. Shaw.
J. A. Gonsalves.
Geo. C. Stratemeyer.
J. D. Tregloan.
Chas. M. Keahinui.
Geo. W. Smith.
E. Hammer.
H. F. Lewis.
F. G. Goldsworthy.
J. T. McKeague.
H. A. Juen.

John Schleif.
F. M. Lewis.
E. A. McInerny.
N. S. Sachs.
Hugh Gunn.
F. Gertz.
M. G. Silva.
J. W. Fernandez.
M. S. Levy.
Chas. L. Brown.
E. R. Stackable.
W. O. Lackland.
W. R. Chilton.
Henry Congdon.
Chas. Hammer.
M. Davis.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of the original thereof now on file in the archives of the legislative assembly of 1892.

C. J. MCCARTHY,
Clerk legislative assembly of 1892.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23d day of May, A. D. 1893.
[SEAL.]

F. J. TESTA,
Notary Public, First Judicial Circuit.

To Hon. JOHN S. WALKER,

President of the Legislature:

SIR: We, the undersigned, citizens of Honolulu, respectfully represent that they are informed and believe that there is now before your honorable body a bill for the purpose of granting a franchise for the purpose of establishing and maintaining an international lottery for an annual subsidy \$500,000 to be paid to the Hawaiian Government for certain purposes therein set forth which tend to the permanent improvement and prosperity of this Kingdom.

Feeling certain that unless this measure becomes a law this improvement will not become an accomplished fact for a great many years, if ever, owing to the financial depression and outlook of the country, we earnestly recommend and petition that the said bill pass and become a law as being a financial measure of necessity.

John F. Bowler.

J. J. Sullivan.

B. Ordenstein.

T. Honan.

L. A. Sykes.

W. J. Ramsey.

Manual Phillips.

M. N. Kennedy.

Martin Coleman.

James Wallace.

John Clark.

S. I. Shaw.

D. W. Roach.

P. M. Rooney.

J. Lucas.

Henry Wright.

Thos. Wright.

Fredreco Freitas.

John McLain.

J. Galbraith.

Geo. Ritman.

James Monkhouse.

Thomas Rewcastle.

J. Reynolds.

J. W. MacDonald.

G. J. Cavanaugh.

W. L. Cottrell.

Peter O'Sullivan.

F. H. Cooper.

Joe. Ferreira.

D. McCorriston.

J. P. Bowen.

Robt. Waialeale.

William E. Tirrell.

J. O'Conner.

H. G. Wootten.

W. H. Bromley.

D. Porter Johnson.

Ralph Turner.

Henry Turner.

G. E. Barker.

J. H. Taylor.

P. Hughes.

William McLaren.

William Boyd.

H. McCubbin.

Eugene B. Lee.

A. Paaniani.

J. Kekele.

Ben Johanssan.

Gus Schuman.

J. M. Angus.

Richard Day.

Wm. F. Heilbron.

W. E. Edmondson.

J. T. Wright.

Albert Lucas.

C. J. Sherwood.

F. Gondie.

J. A. McGuire.

Elias Froomberg.

Geo. W. R. King.

Wm. Love.

G. W. Patterson.

James Brown.

S. Kea.

J. C. Quinn.

Sam. Knula.

R. A. Carlile.

E. C. Rowe.

N. Peterson.

Fred. Harrison.

Edw. H. F. Wolter.

Kea.

John H. Elling.

Samuel Kekohoni.

Kalauwala.

Peter Travens.

T. Hollinger.

J. E. Carroll.

W. W. Wright.

John F. Ashworth.

S. B. Champaign.

George Ward.

F. H. Redward.

J. S. Andrade.

E. F. Imhof.

J. Silva.

Wallace Jackson.

Geo. Nicholls.

H. Armitage.

Fred Philp.

Chas. Nelson.

Fritz Rowold.

D. H. Kahanamoku.

John C. White.

Thos. Pryce.

John Benito.

Cain D. Wiliokai.

Geo. Lycurgus.

G. Muller.

Peter Keawe.

Antone Recard.

F. Fisher.

John Burke.

W. Kaluna.

T. A. Simpson.

W. H. Taylor.

Manuel Fruize.

E. R. Ryan.

W. T. McDonald.

W. M. Cunningham.

Querius Fernandez.

Thos. Lindsay.

P. J. Higgins.

W. M. Graham.

C. Klemme.

H. Brack.

Frank Gomes.

Nakea I. D.

W. Bix.

John Palau.

Robt. Gardner.

Thos. Carpenter.

Richard Hogan.

Wm. T. O'Gallaron.

Geo. Hawkins.

John A. French.

H. Kaia.

F. L. Leslie.

C. R. Dement.

Z. L. Doane.

L. J. Levey.

D. McKinzie.

J. D. Conn.

W. Kahahele.

Makaiwa.

Chas. Andrew.

Andrew Brown.

Albertus Kannigiessen.

James Veary.

J. A. McKinzie.

H. D. Roberts.

A. Turner.

Chas. Peter.

C. Klemme.

F. J. Souza.

H. Wagesend.

J. H. Lovejoy.

Arthur White.

H. F. Gibbs.

W. J. Donnelly.

John Graham.

J. T. Sylvey.

John T. Campbell.

Thos. P. McCarthy.

James Fitzgerald.

P. McInerny.

J. T. Downey.

Geo. P. Denison.

C. Fisher.

W. F. Sharratt.

H. T. Devoll.

A. Brown.

G. W. Lincoln.

T. W. Matthews.

John Riley.

E. Lacy.

Benj. Whitney.

A. Huggins.

A. Harris.

J. A. Rodanet.
J. F. May.
J. H. Buns.
Hugh Galbraith.
B. Bergersen.
W. H. Pond.
J. Sharon.
Thomas Carey.

Chas. Monteno.
J. E. Murty.
Hugh Munro.
William Dean.
A. Sheppard.
J. L. Tolbert.
T. H. Patterson.
Edward Bedford Thomas.

G. M. Smyth.
Chas. T. Day.
C. W. Spitz.
O. Tideman.
A. R. Rowat.
W. H. Smith, 119 King street.
J. Kahalekauila.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of the original thereof now on file in the archives of the Legislative Assembly of 1892.

C. J. MCCARTHY,
Clerk Legislative Assembly of 1892.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23d day of May, A. D. 1893.

[SEAL.]

F. J. TESTA,
Notary Public, First Judicial Circuit.

To Hon. J. S. WALKER,

President of the Legislature:

SIR: We, the undersigned, of Honolulu, respectfully represent that they are informed and believe that the bill now before your honorable body for the purpose of granting a franchise to establish and maintain a lottery is sound and good and should not be overlooked or refused.

We, as your constituents, earnestly ask you to favor the said bill, for we believe if it becomes a law it will solve the distressing financial problem that is now on this country.

Aug. Dreier.
L. E. Sperry.
H. Gorman.
L. J. Levey.
J. Campbell.
G. W. Lincoln.
K. Podeyn.
Wm. Wright.

M. de Avila.
W. Larsen.
W. A. Hardy.
L. M. Toussaint.
John Nieper.
O. Tolleson.
A. Rosehill.
F. Rose.

Peter O'Sullivan.
Horatio Barber.
C. K. Flag.
Harry Armitage.
J. W. Young.
W. H. Aldrich.
Frank Riedel.
C. Allen.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of the original thereof now on the file in the archives of the Legislative Assembly of 1892.

[SEAL].

C. J. MCCARTHY,
Clerk Legislative Assembly of 1892.

Subscribed and sworn to this 23d day of May, A. D. 1893, before me.

F. J. TESTA,
Notary Public First Judicial Circuit.

The Hon. JOHN S. WALKER.

President of the Legislature:

SIR: We, the undersigned merchants of Honolulu, respectfully represent that they are informed and believe that there is now before your honorable body a bill for the purpose of granting a franchise for the purpose of establishing and maintaining an international lottery for an annual subsidy of \$500,000 to be paid to the Hawaiian Government for certain purposes therein set forth, which tend to the permanent improvement and prosperity of this Kingdom.

Feeling certain that unless this measure becomes a law these improvements will not become an accomplished fact for a great many years, if ever, owing to the financial depression and outlook of the country, we earnestly recommend and petition that the said bill pass and become a law, as being a financial measure of necessity.

J. F. Clay.
J. J. Williams.
E. E. Carey.
Chas. W. Weathermax.
W. H. Charlock, jr.
J. S. Walker, jr.
Hart & Co.
Chas. J. Fishel.
Thos. Krouse.
A. L. Cron.

M. N. Sanders.
A. McWayne.
A. F. Medeiros & Co.
J. P. Rodrigues.
Joaquim da Silva.
Theod. H. Boehme.
S. I. Shaw.
J. B. Tregloan.
Geo. W. Smith.
E. Hannuer.

H. F. Lewis.
F. G. Goldsworthy.
Hugh Gunn.
F. Gertz.
Chas. L. Brown.
E. R. Stackable.
W. O. Lackland.
W. R. Chilton.
Henry Congdon.
Chas. Hannuer.

Alex. Chisholm.	W. Lucas.	R. Spencer.
F. Wilhelm.	A. J. Cartwright.	A. W. Howe.
M. Goldberg.	Js. Tinker.	Fed. J. Wilkens.
W. H. McNerny.	W. C. Peacock & Co., per	Morley Philp.
C. A. Peacock.	C. A. P.	Geo. McLeod.
L. de L. Ward.	F. J. Kruger.	J. M. McChesney.
W. S. Luce.	R. French.	H. Lose.
F. L. Winter.	Wm. Weight.	J. W. Leming.
E. S. Cunha.	John Lyeurgus.	J. Shwanck.
J. S. Martin.	Chas. W. Zeigler.	L. H. Dee.
J. E. Gomes.	F. Bereke.	Harry Miller.
T. E. Wall.	W. C. King.	F. Wilburton.
H. P. Jacobson of Wenner	J. A. Gonsalves.	S. Sachs.
& Co.	D. H. Davis.	S. E. Pierce.
Geo. C. Stratemeyer.	Chas. M. Keahinui.	Henri G. McGrew.
E. A. McInerny.	J. Th. McKeague.	C. E. Williams.
Club Stable Co.	H. A. Juen.	S. W. Lederer.
John S. McGrew.	John Schleif.	M. Davis.
Jas. Steiner.	M. G. Silva.	Louis Adler.
E. Vandoorn.	J. W. Fernandez.	Ed. M. Marshall.
M. E. Grossman.	M. S. Levy.	Geo. Ordway.
W. Miller.	L. C. Ables.	W. F. Reynolds.
J. S. Alves.	L. T. Kenake.	L. J. Levey.
W. Larsen.	T. Dyer.	R. McKibbin.
L. M. Toussaint.	J. C. Cluney.	J. Lazarus.
J. H. Hunt.	Thos. King.	Chas. V. E. Dovo.
Jas. Ald.	O. C. Johnson.	J. N. Wright.
S. F. Graham.	J. G. Thompson.	

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of the original thereof now on file in the archives of the legislative assembly of 1892.

C. J. MCCARTHY,
Clerk Legislative Assembly of 1892.

Subscribed and sworn to this 23d day of May, A. D. 1893, before me.

[SEAL.]

F. J. TESTA,
Notary Public First Judicial Circuit.

Hon. J. S. WALKER,
President of the Legislature:

SIR: We, the undersigned, citizens of Honolulu, respectfully represent that they are informed that there is now before your honorable body a bill for the purpose of establishing an international lottery for an annual subsidy of \$500,000 to be paid to the Hawaiian Government for certain purposes therein set forth which tend to the permanent improvement and prosperity of this Kingdom.

Feeling certain that unless this measure becomes a law these improvements will not be accomplished for a great many years, if ever, owing to the financial depression and outlook of the country, we earnestly recommend and petition that the said bill pass and become a law as being a financial measure of necessity.

John Radin.	George Courtney.	James W. Mitchell.
Frank Murphy.	Peck.	P. C. Justice.
C. Kurtz.	E. M. Jones.	Aleck Kelco.
Jon Keenedy.	J. Dower, jr.	T. L. Gagar.
Geo. Cavenagh.	C. W. Cross.	C. P. J. McGillicuddy.
Frank Lucewiko.	W. Hunter.	Timothy Madden.
M. Ferreiar.	F. J. Turner.	William Downer.
Wm. Davies.	B. Houghtailing.	John Grace.
S. S. Claudine.	Ben Tenorio.	H. C. Vida.
H. H. Smyth.	W. Wilson, esq.	E. H. Hart.
Cyrus Edison.	H. J. Platts.	E. Wery.
John Rice.	Geo. S. Harris.	Harry T. Mills.
Robert Laing.	T. Phillips.	J. Degreaves.
A. F. Franca.	A. McCabe.	P. Murphy.
Henry Gregory.	J. R. Marmont.	H. Adams, P. H. G.
John Johns.	E. M. Alencastre.	E. K. Lilikalani.
Thomas Crosby.	H. Welch.	

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of the original thereof now on file in the archives of the Legislative Assembly of 1892.

C. J. MCCARTHY,
Clerk Legislative Assembly of 1892.

Subscribed and sworn to this 23d day of May, A. D. 1893, before me.

[SEAL.]

F. J. TESTA,
Notary Public, First Judicial Circuit.

Hons. J. S. WALKER, C. O. BERGER, JOHN ENA, PAUL NEUMANN, J. A. CUMMINS,
J. N. S. WILLIAMS, E. C. MACFARLANE, A. P. PETERSON, and D. W. PUA,
Nobles of the National Reform Party:

GENTLEMEN: We are informed that a measure is now before the Legislature which, if it becomes a law, will result in the yearly expenditure of \$500,000, within or for the benefit of this country.

We would respectfully call your attention to the fact that we believe this offer can not be overlooked or refused. We hereby, as your constituents, earnestly ask you to favor the proposed bill.

We believe if the bill becomes a law that it will solve the distressing financial problem which now confronts the country; we believe it will restore the national credit; we believe it will prevent any danger of financial disaster; we believe the passage of the bill will open a new era of prosperity, both national and individual.

Furthermore, we believe that the condition of the country, financially, is such that all questions of sentiment must be set aside, and the proposed relief accepted, if we are to retain our national independence, and a proper development of our resources can never be accomplished without the assistance tendered.

To refuse this proposition is political and commercial suicide, and we hasten to inform you concerning our feelings on the question, and again we urge you to leave no stone unturned to further the accomplishment of this project.

J. J. Williams.
J. W. MacDonald.
J. J. Sullivan.
John F. Bowler.
G. J. Cavanaugh.
B. Ordenstien.
W. L. Cottrell.
T. Honan.
Peter O'Sullivan.
L. A. Sykes.
F. H. Cooper.
W. J. Ramsay.
Mannell Phillips.
D. McCorriston.
M. N. Kennedy.
J. P. Bowen.
Robt. Waialeale.
James Wallace.
William G. Tirrell.
John Clark.
D. W. Roach.
P. M. Rooney.
J. Lucas.
G. E. Barker.
P. Hughes.
J. Galbraith.
William McLaren.
Geo. Ritman.
William Boyd.
James Monkhouse.
H. McCubbin.
Thomas Rewcastle.
Eugene B. Lee.
J. Reynolds.
J. Kekele.
T. Hollinger.
J. M. Angus.
Wm Schumann.

J. E. Carroll.
W. W. Wright.
Richard Day.
John F. Ashworth.
William F. Heilburn.
S. B. Champain.
W. E. Edmondson.
George Ward.
J. T. Wright.
Albert Lucas.
F. H. Redward.
J. S. Andrade.
C. J. Sherwood.
E. F. Imhof.
F. Gaudis.
J. A. McGuire.
Wallace Jackson.
Elias Thoomberg.
George Nichorls.
George M. R. King.
M. N. Sanders.
Harry Armitage.
William Love.
Fred. Philp.
Chas. Nelson.
G. W. Patterson.
James Brown.
Jese Kahle.
Fritz Rowold.
D. H. Kahanamoku.
J. C. Quinn.
John C. White.
Sam Kuula.
Thos. Pryce.
R. A. Carlile.
John Benito.
Cain D. Wiliokai.
N. Peterson.

C. Muller.
Edw. H. F. Wolter.
T. A. Simpson.
Chas. Andrew.
E. R. Ryan.
Andrew Brown.
W. T. McDonald.
Albertus Hannegieser.
W. M. Cunningham.
James Veary.
Querino Fernandez.
J. A. McKinzie.
Thos. Lindsay.
H. D. Roberts.
P. J. Higgins.
A. Turner.
W. M. Graham.
Charles Liter.
J. A. Lovejoy.
W. Dix.
Arthur White.
John Palan.
H. F. Gibbs.
P. McInerny.
F. L. Leslie.
J. T. Downey.
F. C. Smith.
C. R. Dement.
George P. Dennison.
Z. L. Doane.
C. Fisher.
L. J. Levey.
D. McKinzie.
H. T. Devoll.
A. Brown.
I. D. Conn.
G. W. Lincoln.
T. W. Matthews.

J. E. Murty.
John Riley.
J. D. Marlin.
Hugh Munro.
E. Lacy.
William Dean.
Benjamin Whitney.

A. Sherpard.
J. L. Torbert.
A. Harris.
J. A. Rodanet.
Chas. T. Day.
C. W. Spitz.

B. Bergersen.
O. Tideman.
W. H. Pond.
O. Tolleson.
A. R. Rowat.
W. H. Smith, 119 King St.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of the original thereof now on file in the archives of the Legislative Assembly of 1892.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23d day of May, A. D. 1893.

C. J. MCCARTHY,
Clerk, Legislative Assembly of 1892.

F. J. TESTA,
Notary Public, First Judicial Circuit.

[SEAL.]

Some of the members of the Annexation Club and other annexationists who signed the lottery petitions.

E. C. Crick, (editor "Liberal" Annexation Journal.)
G. W. Lincoln.
Wm. Wright.
W. A. Hardy (police station house clerk, now deputy sheriff of Hilo, Island of Hawaii).
John Nieper.
B. Ordenstein.
F. H. Cooper.
M. N. Kennedy.
J. Lucas.
Henry Wright.
Fredrick Freitas.
J. H. Taylor.
John McLain.
P. Hughes.
William McLaren.
Thomas Rewcastle.
Gus Schuman.
J. M. Angus.
Albert Lucas.
J. S. Andrade.
J. Sylva.
Wallace Jackson.
Geo. W. R. King (lieutenant Provisional Government army).
J. C. Quinn.
E. C. Rowe.
Danl. Lyons.
Chas. Andrew.
E. R. Ryan.
W. M. Graham.
E. Klemme.
C. Klemme (captain police).
W. Dix.
Robt. Gardner.
Geo. P. Denison.
Benj. Whitney.
A. Huggins.
J. L. Torbert (Provisional Government army officer).
A. Harris.
B. Bergersen.
O. Tideman.
W. A. Smith (contractor).
H. C. Reid.
L. Busnell.
J. Cushingham.
W. C. Roe.

Wm. Wagener (Provisional Government army).
F. Hustace (chief engineer Honolulu fire department).
Jas. Sutherland.
M. N. Sanders (port surveyor).
L. H. Doe.
P. A. Dias.
M. Davis.
J. C. Strow.
J. H. Nye.
S. Peck.
Carl Willing (Government botanist).
E. Hopkins (Provisional Government army).
J. M. Ferreira.
J. W. Pratt (asst. secy. Annex. Club).
Louis Marks.
J. K. Wilder (brother of Comrs. Wilder).
Robt. W. Cathcart (bookkeeper of Wilder & Co.).
J. W. Sims (employe of Wilder & Co.).
J. D. Marlin (deputy marshal).
Geo. W. Smith (Provisional Government army).
Geo. Cavapaugh (secy. Red, White and Blue Annex. Club).
James W. Mitchell.
Harry T. Mills.
J. Degreaves (Provisional Government army).
J. F. Clay.
E. E. Carey (former editor Liberal).
Chas. W. Weatherwax.
W. H. Charlock, jr.
Chas. J. Fishel.
Thos. Krouse.
J. D. Tregloan (tailor Provisional Government army).
E. Hammer.
Hugh Gunn (captain Provisional Government volunteer forces).
C. Hammer.
F. Wilhelm (advisory councillor, resigned on account ill health).
C. A. Peacock.
F. L. Winter.
J. S. Martin (tailor and recruiter for Provisional Government—has contracts for uniforms).

- T. E. Wall.
 Geo. C. Stratemeyer (custom-house store-keeper).
 E. A. McInerny (Provisional Government army).
 John S. McGrew (editor of Star and head of annexation movement).
 A. J. Cartwright.
 E. A. Lundy.
 J. H. Hunt (first assistant engineer fire department).
 S. F. Graham.
 W. Lucas.
 J. A. Gonsalves.
 D. H. Davis.
 H. A. Juen (captain of police, second watch).
 L. C. Ables (member executive committee Annexation Club).
 Henry Davis.
 L. T. Kenake (lieutenant, Provisional Government volunteer forces and afterwards appointed clerk Honolulu post-office.)
 A. W. Howe.
 F. A. Davis.
 Geo. McLeod (paymaster, Provisional Government army).
 J. M. McChesney (partner of F. W. McChesney of advisory council).
- S. W. Lederer.
 Louis Adler.
 E. M. Marshall.
 Geo. Ordway.
 Capt. J. C. Lorenzen (Honolulu harbor pilot).
 W. Larsen (chief of detective force Provisional Government).
 J. M. Wright.
 Richard Day (Provisional Government army).
 C. W. Zeigler (captain Provisional Government volunteer forces).
 Arthur White.
 P. M. Lucas.
 W. Hickey.
 W. H. Lentz.
 W. C. King (Provisional Government army).
 A. D. Bolster.
 John P. Coakley.
 G. Muller.
 H. G. McGrew, M. D. (Government physician, Honolulu).
 J. E. Gomes.
 F. Wilburton.
 Harry Miller.
 J. C. Cluney.

And about 40 Portuguese, nearly all of whom are in the Provisional Government army.

(The appointments noted were made after the Provisional Government got into power.)

MECHANICS.

- Sam. F. Honsley.
 John Neil.
 L. Smith.
 H. G. Cunha.
 E. N. Voeller.
 Thomas Mills.
 H. Wicks.
 F. Douse.
 K. R. G. Wallace.
 James Sutherland.
 Edwin Hughes.
 Fred. Smith.
 E. Le Clair.
 C. Podersen.
 J. Dohuty.
 Harry Walker.
 C. H. Everett.
 J. J. Sanders.
 L. M. Everett.
 H. English.
 A. V. Inman.
 A. A. Gilfillan.
 William Davies.
 W. R. Johnson.
 Cesar Hoges.
 F. J. Scott.
 J. Tagus.
 T. K. Clarke.
 S. Davis.
 W. Brede, jr.
 C. H. Purdy.
 S. A. Green.
 H. Eberhardt.
 James Gregory.
 H. F. Criss.
 John Schleif.
- J. W. Fernandez.
 W. S. Coltrell.
 Peter O'Sullivan.
 D. McCorriston.
 M. N. Kennedy.
 W. E. Tirrell.
 John Clark.
 J. O. Cowen.
 H. G. Woolten.
 D. W. Roach.
 W. D. Bromley.
 D. Porter Johnson.
 J. Lucas.
 Henry Wright.
 Henry Porter.
 J. H. Taylor.
 Thos. Wright.
 John McLain.
 P. Hughes.
 W. McLaren.
 Thomas Rewcastle.
 T. Hollinger.
 Gus Schuman.
 J. E. Carroll.
 J. F. Ashworth.
 Wm. F. Heilbron.
 Elias Troomberg.
 G. Nichols.
 Geo. W. Lincoln.
 Fred. Philip.
 Fritz Rowold.
 J. C. Quinn.
 E. C. Rowe.
 Fred Harrison.
 G. Muller.
 John H. Elling.
- Charles Andrew.
 James Veary.
 H. D. Roberts.
 P. J. Higgins.
 H. Wegesend.
 Robert Gardner.
 Wm. T. O'Hallaron.
 P. McInerny.
 J. T. Downey.
 Z. L. Doane.
 D. McKinzie.
 H. T. Devoll.
 J. D. Conn.
 John Riley.
 E. Lacy.
 G. M. Smyth.
 J. F. May (Provisional Government army).
 J. H. Burns.
 C. T. Day.
 C. Galbraith.
 W. H. Pond.
 J. Sharon.
 Thomas Carey.
 J. R. Maucauley (captain).
 C. J. Campbell.
 T. S. Chaney.
 H. M. Dows (clerk to marshal).
 Danl. Lyons.
 Store, A. F. Medeiros & Co.
 Store, S. I. Shaw.
 Store, F. Gertz.
 Store, C. L. Brown.
 Store, E. R. Stackable.
 Store, W. O. Lackland.

Store, L. deL. Ward.
 Store, Hart & Co.
 Store, Chas. J. Fishel.
 Store, A. L. Cron.
 Store, C. W. Spitz.
 Store, J. E. Gomes.
 Store, N. P. Jacobson.
 Store, James Steiner.
 Store, E. Vandooorn.
 Store, W. Miller.
 Store, J. S. Alves.
 Store, M. S. Levey.

Store, S. Sachs.
 Store, C. E. Williams.
 Store, Geo. Lycurgus.
 Store, Harry Miller.
 Store, J. S. Andrade.
 Store, J. P. Bowen.
 Store, J. L. Tolbert.
 Store, J. H. Lovejoy.
 Store, Arthur White.
 Store, H. McCubbin.
 Richard Day.

Benj. Whitney (custom-
 house guard).
 A. Harris.
 J. H. McKeague (soldier
 Provisional Government
 army).
 L. C. Ables.
 R. McKibbin.
 Club Stable Co.
 Chas. V. E. Dove.
 J. J. Sullivan.

To Hon. JOHN S. WALKER,
President of the legislature:

SIR: We, the undersigned, mechanics, of Honolulu, respectfully represent that they are informed and believe that there is now before your honorable body a bill for the purpose of granting a franchise for the purpose of establishing and maintaining an international lottery, for an annual subsidy of \$500,000, to be paid to the Hawaiian Government for certain purposes therein set forth, which tend to the permanent improvement and prosperity of this Kingdom.

Feeling certain that unless this measure becomes a law these improvements will not become an accomplished fact for a great many years, if ever, owing to the financial depression and outlook of the country, we earnestly recommend and petition that the said bill pass and become a law as being a financial measure of necessity.

H. C. Reid.
 Thos. Smith.
 Joseph Kela.
 Sam Housley.
 John Neill.
 S. Smith.
 A. G. Cunha.
 E. N. Voeller.
 Thomas Mills.
 Dan L. Mahuka.
 N. Simeona.
 F. Hustace.
 F. McIntyre.
 K. R. G. Wallace.
 Chas. E. Steel.
 Luiz P. Rodrigo.
 Joan Frank.
 Anrik Frelas.
 James Sutherland.
 Edwin Hughes.
 Fred Smith.
 E. Le Clair.
 H. W. Gahan.
 John Piggott.
 Wm. Allen.
 L. Busnell.
 H. Wicks.
 J. Cushingham.
 W. C. Roe.
 F. Douse.
 William Wagener.
 H. N. Kahausumaikai.
 L. M. Everett.
 H. English.
 J. C. Straw.
 A. V. Inman.
 A. A. Gillfillan.
 J. H. Nye.
 S. Peck.

William Davies.
 W. R. Johnson.
 Caesar Koger.
 F. J. Scott.
 B. H. Norton.
 G. Tyren.
 J. Simonson.
 C. Penersen.
 John Dohuty.
 Harry G. Walker.
 C. H. Everett.
 J. W. Luning.
 M. N. Sander.
 L. H. Fee.
 W. Larsen.
 P. A. Dias.
 J. J. Saunders.
 M. Davis.
 A. B. Scrimgeous.
 H. M. Dow.
 E. Hopkins.
 N. Fernandez.
 A. S. Mahaulu.
 B. P. Zablan.
 Wm. Cuelho.
 C. W. Grey.
 A. N. Tripp.
 Dan'l Lyons.
 Geo. Irvins.
 D. Kaapa.
 J. M. Ferreira.
 D. P. Kaiona.
 John Paia.
 D. Makaila.
 D. M. Kane.
 Albert McGurn.
 Sam Ku.
 W. A. Hardy.
 J. W. Pratt.

Louis Marks.
 Gibbs.
 Doyle.
 J. R. Wilelm.
 Robert Wm. Cathcart
 J. M. Sims.
 J. C. Lorensen.
 J. Tague.
 R. Windrough.
 T. K. Clarke.
 Carl Willing.
 W. Bredé, jr.
 C. H. Purdy.
 J. D. Marlin.
 H. H. Webb.
 Jno. Crowder.
 J. W. McAlbert.
 A. M. Queque.
 Geo. W. Smith.
 Alex. Moors.
 S. A. Green.
 Richard N. Mossman.
 Alex. Chuk.
 C. H. Clark.
 M. R. Colburn.
 J. R. Macaulay.
 H. Eberhardt.
 M. Haws.
 C. J. Campbell.
 James Gregory.
 Frank A. Chaney.
 Andr. Guild.
 William Mitchell.
 James Wilkinson.
 John Grace.
 H. H. Wharton.
 W. G. Stahle.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of the original thereof now on file in the archives of the legislative assembly of 1892.

C. J. MCCARTHY,
Clerk legislative assembly of 1892.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23d day of May, A. D. 1893.

[SEAL.]

F. J. TESTA,
Notary Public, First Judicial Circuit.

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *Honolulu, Oahu, ss.*

John Phillips and P. M. Rooney, being severally duly sworn on oath, depose and say: That they had charge and supervision of the petitions circulated in favor of the lottery bill. That they have gone over and revised the signatures attached to the petitions presented to the members of the national reform party and the Legislature, and that the same are genuine signatures of the individuals who subscribed to such petitions. That said petitions were signed almost unanimously by the retail store-keepers and mechanics of Honolulu.

JOHN PHILLIPS.
P. M. ROONEY.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of April, 1893.

[SEAL.]

F. J. TESTA,
Notary Public, First Judicial Circuit.

No. 40.

[Daily Bulletin, August 2, 1889.]

KILLED, REVOLUTION OF 1889.

Loika, Poni, Sam Tucker, Keki, Kelelua, Kawaiwai, Tom Kapa.
Total killed, 7. And 7 wounded.

No. 41.

OFFICERS OF THE PLANTERS' AND LABOR SUPPLY COMPANY.

President, William G. Irwin.
Vice-president, Alex. Young.
Secretary, W. O. Smith.
Treasurer, F. M. Soranz (W. O. Smith, acting).
Auditor, J. O. Carter.

TRUSTEES.

J. B. Atherton,	F. M. Swanzy,	W. F. Glade,
W. O. Smith,	F. A. Schaefer,	A. Young,
W. G. Irwin,	H. P. Baldwin,	J. O. Cater.

List of members: Numerous. Names if wanted can be obtained.

PLANTATION SUBSCRIBERS.

Koloa Sugar Co.	Kohala Plantation Co.	Union Mill Co.
Kukaiau Plantation Co.	Pacific Sugar Mill Co.	Waiakea Mill Co.
Lihue Plantation.	Eleele Plantation.	R. R. Hind.
Kekaha Sugar Co.	Waimanalo Sugar Co.	Hawaiian Agricultural Co.
Hanamaulu Plantation.	Hana Plantation.	Onomea Sugar Co.
Princeville Plantation.	Hawaiian Sugar Co.	Waialua Plantation Co.
Kukaiau Mill Co.	Waihee Sugar Co.	Waimea Sugar Co.
Hamakua Mill Co.	Wailuku Sugar Co.	Honokea Sugar Co.
Laupahoehoe Sugar Co.	Pioneer Mill.	Kahuku Plantation Co.
C. F. Hart.	Grove Farm Plantation.	Heeia Agricultural Co.
Hononu Sugar Co.	W. Y. Horner's Plantation.	Kilauea Sugar Co.
Makee Sugar Co.	Pepeekeo Sugar Co.	Paia Plantation Co.
Ewa Plantation Co.	Hamakua Plantation Co.	Haiku Plantation.

INDIVIDUAL SUBSCRIBERS.

W. J. Lowrie.
J. Marsden.
H. P. Baldwin.
Z. S. Spalding.
G. E. Renton.
Theo. H. Davies & Co.
C. M. Cooke.
H. F. Glade.
A. S. Wilcox.
P. C. Jones.
B. F. Dillingham.
W. R. Castle.
T. S. Kay.
W. M. Giffard.

C. Bolte.
W. H. Ricard.
S. T. Alexander.
W. H. Bailey.
T. R. Walker.
C. S. Kynnersley.
W. W. Hall.
H. Hackfeld & Co.
L. Ahlborn.
J. N. S. Williams.
Alex. Young.
S. B. Dole.
W. G. Irwin.
A. H. Smith.

F. A. Schaefer.
S. N. Castle.
J. B. Atherton.
W. W. Goodale.
James Renton.
C. R. Bishop.
H. M. Whitney.
G. N. Wilcox.
R. D. Walbridge.
J. G. Spencer.
W. O. Smith.
V. Knudsen.
H. Morrison.

No. 42.

[Petitions against annexation.]

A.

To His Excellency JAMES H. BLOUNT,

Special Commissioner of the United States of America:

SIR: The undersigned residents and property holders of the Hawaiian Islands, beg respectfully to place before your excellency their views respecting the present important question of annexation now pending before this community.

First. We beg to call your attention to the fact that the main industry of these islands is the raising and manufacturing of sugar, and which business, to be conducted successfully, and in a manner to compete with other cane-sugar producing countries of the world, must have a labor system such as is now maintained here, but which we understand is prohibited by the existing laws of the United States, and would have to be abolished should the islands become an integral part of that country.

Second. As friends of the Hawaiian race, in whose country we have made our homes, and under whose Government we have heretofore enjoyed prosperity and protection, we must protest against any measure which would deprive them of their civil rights as a race.

Feeling, therefore, that the terms of the treaty of annexation as submitted to the United States Government would cripple the greatest industry of the islands, and that no provision has been made for securing the rights of the Hawaiians, we respectfully subscribe our names as opposed to same.

(Signed by 40 names.)

B.

To the Honorable JAMES H. BLOUNT,

Special Commissioner of the United States of America to Hawaii:

SIR:—In view of the fact that the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands is now attempting to bring about annexation of these islands to the United States of America, we, the undersigned, residents, taxpayers, and voters of the Hawaiian Islands, of foreign birth or parentage, do subscribe our names as signifying our opposition to such annexation.

(Signed by 31 names.)

C.

HAWAIIAN PATRIOTIC LEAGUE, FOREIGN BRANCH.

We, the undersigned, foreign residents of the Hawaiian Islands hereby indorse the sentiments set forth in the constitution of the Hawaiian Patriotic League, for the purpose of perpetuating the independent autonomy of these islands, thereby opposing annexation to any foreign power; and we therefore hereunder subscribe our names for presentation to his excellency Blount, special commissioner of the United States Government.

(Signed by 43 names).

D.

To the Honorable JAMES H. BLOUNT,

Special Commissioner of the United States of America to Hawaii:

SIR: In view of the fact that the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands is now attempting to bring about annexation of these islands to the United States of America, we, the undersigned, residents, taxpayers, and voters of the Hawaiian Islands of foreign birth or parentage, do subscribe our names as signifying our opposition to such annexation.

(Signed by 67 names.)

E.

To the Hon. JAMES H. BLOUNT,

Special Commissioner of the United States of America to Hawaii:

SIR: In view of the fact that the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands is now attempting to bring about annexation of these islands to the United States of America, we, the undersigned, residents, taxpayers, and voters of the Hawaiian Islands, of foreign birth or parentage, do subscribe our names as signifying our opposition to such annexation.

(Signed by 80 names.)

Recapitulation of signers against annexation.

Petition A.....	40	less 1 signed other petition.
Petition B.....	31	less 2 signed other petition.
Petition C.....	48	less 1 signed other petition.
Petition D.....	67	less 8 signed other petition.
Petition E.....	80	
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	261	12
Less.....	12	
	<hr/>	
Total.....	249	

MESSAGE

FROM THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

ON

The Hawaiian Question.

DECEMBER 20, 1893.—Read, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and ordered to be printed.

To the Senate of the United States :

In compliance with a resolution passed by the Senate on the 6th instant, I hereby transmit reports of the Secretaries of State and of the Navy, with copies of all instructions given to the respective diplomatic and naval representatives of the United States in the Hawaiian Islands since the 4th day of March, 1881, touching the matters specified in the resolution.

It has seemed convenient to include in the present communication to the Senate copies* of the diplomatic correspondence concerning the political condition of Hawaii, prepared for transmission to the House of Representatives in response to a later resolution passed by that body on the 13th instant.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, December 18, 1893.

The PRESIDENT:

The Secretary of State, to whom was referred a resolution of the Senate of the United States passed on the 6th instant, requesting the President—

so far as in his opinion it shall not be inconsistent with the public interest, to communicate to the Senate copies of all instructions which may have been given to any representative of the United States, or any naval officer thereof, since the 4th day of March, 1881, in regard to the preservation of public order in Hawaii, or the protection of the lives and property of American citizens, or the recognition or support of any government there;

has the honor to lay before the President, with a view to its transmission to the Senate should he deem proper so to do, copies of the instruc-

*For this correspondence see House Ex. Doc. No. 48, 53d Congress, 2d session.

tions given to the diplomatic representatives of the United States in the Hawaiian Islands, as described in the said resolution.

Respectfully submitted.

W. Q. GRESHAM.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, December 18, 1893.

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- Mr. Adee to Mr. Stevens, No. 11, November 16, 1889.
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- Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens, No. 27, June 14, 1890.
- Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens, No. 2, August 16, 1890.
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- Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens, No. 28, September 9, 1891.
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- Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens, No. 57, September 29, 1892.
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- Mr. Gresham to Mr. Stevens, March 11, 1893.
- Mr. Gresham to Mr. Severance, March 11, 1893.
- Mr. Gresham to Mr. Stevens (telegram), April 25, 1893.
- Mr. Gresham to Mr. Blount, No. 1, May 22, 1893.
- Mr. Gresham to Mr. Blount, No. 2, May 22, 1893.
- Mr. Gresham to Mr. Blount, No. 5, June 23, 1893.
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- Mr. Gresham to Mr. Willis (telegram), November 24, 1893.
- Mr. Gresham to Mr. Willis (telegram), December 3, 1893.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Comly.

No. 102.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 30, 1881.

SIR: Your dispatch No. 172, of the 6th instant, has been considered in connection with your former dispatches, to which you refer, particularly Nos. 13 and 43.

Your course, upon the question to which you have called the attention of the Department, is approved. While I desire earnestly to avoid the use of imperative language toward the Hawaiian Government, and prefer that our relation in any consequent discussion should be that of friendly advice and support, this Government can not permit any violation, direct or indirect, of the terms and conditions of the treaty of 1875.

That treaty was made at the continuous and urgent request of the Hawaiian Government. It was, as it was intended to be, an evidence of the friendship of the United States, and was shaped by a large and liberal disposition on our part to consult the wishes and interests of the Hawaiian Government. As you are aware, there was much opposition to some of its concessions by our own citizens whose capital was employed in certain agricultural industries. The term of the treaty was limited in order that both parties might obtain practical experience of its operation, and in order to secure the experiment from possible disturbance it was expressly stipulated—

On the part of His Hawaiian Majesty that so long as this treaty shall remain in force, he will not make any treaty by which any other nation shall obtain the same privileges, relative to the admission of any articles free of duty, hereby secured to the United States. (Article IV.)

It would be an unnecessary waste of time and argument to undertake an elaborate demonstration of a proposition so obvious as that the extension of the privileges of this treaty to other nations under a "most favored nation clause" in existing treaties, would be as flagrant a violation of this explicit stipulation as a specific treaty making the concession.

You are instructed to say to the Hawaiian Government that the Government of the United State considers this stipulation as of the very essence of the treaty, and can not consent to its abrogation or modification, directly or indirectly. You will add that if any other power should deem it proper to employ undue influence upon the Hawaiian Government to persuade or compel action in derogation of this treaty, the Government of the United States will not be unobservant of its rights and interests, and will be neither unwilling nor unprepared to support the Hawaiian Government in the faithful discharge of its treaty obligations.

In reference to the probability of a judicial construction of the treaty by the Hawaiian courts, upon proceedings instituted by a British merchant, I would have been glad if you had been able to furnish me with the correspondence between the British commissioner and the Hawaiian secretary for foreign affairs. From your history of the controversy, I find it difficult to understand how Her Britannic Majesty's Government can consistently maintain a right of diplomatic intervention for the settlement of any claim for the difference in duty imposed under the British treaties and under the treaty with the United States.

Be that as it may, a judicial decision of this question by the Hawaiian courts would be as unsatisfactory to the United States as to Great

Britain. I am not aware whether or not a treaty, according to the Hawaiian constitution is, as with us, a supreme law of the land, upon the construction of which—the proper case occurring—every citizen would have the right to the judgment of the courts.

But, even if it be so, and if the judicial department is entirely independent of the executive authority of the Hawaiian Government, then the decision of the court would be the authorized interpretation of the Hawaiian Government, and however binding upon that Government would be none the less a violation of the treaty.

In the event, therefore, that a judicial construction of the treaty should annul the privileges stipulated, and be carried into practical execution, this Government would have no alternative and would be compelled to consider such action as the violation by the Hawaiian Government of the express terms and conditions of the treaty, and, with whatever regret, would be forced to consider what course in reference to its own interests had become necessary upon the manifestation of such unfriendly feeling.

The diligence and ability which you have given this subject render perhaps any further instruction unnecessary, but I will suggest that in your communications with the Hawaiian Government it is desirable that you should convey the impression that the Government of the United States believes that the Hawaiian Government desires and intends to carry out the provisions of the treaty in perfect good faith, and that we understand and appreciate the unjust pressure of foreign interests and influence brought to divert it from its plain and honorable duty. The position of the Government of the United States in your representations should be rather that of encouragement of the Hawaiian Government to persevere in the faithful discharge of its treaty obligations than complaint of any anticipated dereliction.

The Department will be glad of the fullest and promptest communication upon this subject.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Comly.

No. 105.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, July 27, 1881.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch, marked "separate and confidential," of the 4th instant, touching the reply of the Hawaiian Government to her Britannic Majesty's commissioner in the matter of the British claims.

Adverting to that part of your dispatch suggesting "that the Hawaiian Government would be glad to have an intimation of the opinion of the Secretary of State" upon the subject, I desire to refer you to my instruction No. 102, of the 30th ultimo, in which I have distinctly stated that the claim of Great Britain for the same privileged treatment by Hawaii as that enjoyed by the United States pursuant to its reciprocity treaty was wholly inadmissible.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Comly.

No. 111.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 19, 1881.

SIR: In your dispatch No. 189 you have informed this Department of the efforts made by the British commissioner to prejudice the interests and influence of the United States in the Hawaiian Islands; and you properly assume that such efforts, so far as they tend to improve the diplomatic position of his country by his personal conduct, must be counteracted by similar endeavors on your part without the formal intervention of this Government.

The action of the Government must necessarily wait upon the actual occurrence or threatened probability of some official transaction in conflict with its treaty rights. But with the proper information before it this Department would undoubtedly instruct you to anticipate any such transaction by such diplomatic remonstrance as our relations with Hawaii would justify.

It is difficult to say that the information derived through the newspapers in reference to a supposed coolie convention with Great Britain is of a character to require our official intervention. But I take it for granted that, since the return of King Kalakaua, you will be able to learn whether such a convention is contemplated, and if, in your opinion, there is enough in the general rumors to warrant it, you will consider yourself as instructed to make formal inquiry of the Hawaiian Government if any such project is entertained.

You say that the proposed convention provides for a—

“protector of the coolie immigrants,” who tries all cases of disputes arising among the coolies themselves, and also between coolies and citizens of the country where they reside; and cases of appeal from his judgment go, not to the courts of the country, but to the British consul or diplomatic representative.

I do not understand whether this is a recital from some existing convention or a rumor of what the contemplated convention is expected to be.

In the treaty between Great Britain and the Netherlands relative to emigration of laborers from India to the Dutch colony of Surinam, signed in 1870 and ratified in 1872, and which is the most recent to which I have been able to refer, I find the following provision:

XIX. All emigrants within the provisions of this convention shall, in the same manner as other subjects of the British Crown, and conformably to the ordinary rules of international law, enjoy in the Netherland colony the right of claiming the assistance of the British consular agent, and no obstacle shall be opposed to the laborers resorting to the consular agent, and communicating with him, without prejudice, however, to the obligations arising out of his engagement.

Properly interpreted and fairly applied, I do not see any reasonable ground of objection to this or to a similar provision. But a convention containing stipulations such as you describe would be very different. To secure to the coolie immigrants from India, who are unquestionably British subjects, such an extreme privilege of extritoriality would be extending to them advantages not possessed by the subjects of any other power. And as articles VIII and X of the treaty between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands of 1849 guarantee to the citizens and consular officers of the United States the treatment of the most favored nation and a participation in all privileges granted to others, the United States would have to insist upon equal treatment for its citizens and consuls, and it can scarcely be doubted that other powers would make the same demand.

A consideration of the embarrassment which such a condition of foreign rights and privileges would create for the Hawaiian Government

would present almost insuperable difficulties in the way of such a convention.

But if negotiations such as you describe are really in progress, you will ask for an interview with the secretary for foreign affairs and make the following representation of the views of the United States:

The Government of the United States has, with unvarying consistency, manifested respect for the independence of the Hawaiian Kingdom and an earnest desire for the welfare of its people. It has always felt and acted on the conviction that the possession of the Islands by a peaceful and prosperous power, with which there was no possibility of controversy or collision, was most desirable, in reference to its own large and rapidly increasing interests on the Pacific. It has declined, even at the request of the Hawaiian people, to assume over their affairs a protectorate, which would only be a thinly disguised domination, and it has confined its efforts and influence to strengthen their Government and open to their commerce and enterprise the readiest and most profitable connection with its own markets; but this policy has been based upon our belief in the real and substantial independence of Hawaii. The Government of the United States has always avowed and now repeats that, under no circumstances, will it permit the transfer of the territory or sovereignty of these Islands to any of the great European powers. It is needless to restate the reasons upon which that determination rests. It is too obvious for argument that the possession of these Islands by a great maritime power would not only be a dangerous diminution of the just and necessary influence of the United States in the waters of the Pacific, but in case of international difficulty it would be a positive threat to interests too large and important to be lightly risked.

Neither can the Government of the United States allow an arrangement which, by diplomatic finesse or legal technicality, substitutes for the native and legitimate constitutional Government of Hawaii, the controlling influence of a great foreign power. This is not the real and substantial independence which it desires to see and which it is prepared to support. And this Government would consider a scheme by which a large mass of British subjects, forming in time not improbably the majority of its population, should be introduced into Hawaii, made independent of the native Government, and be ruled by British authorities, judicial and diplomatic, as one entirely inconsistent with the friendly relations now existing between us, as trenching upon treaty rights which we have secured by no small consideration, and as certain to involve the two countries in irritating and unprofitable discussion.

In thus instructing you, however, I must impress upon you that much is trusted to your discretion. There would be neither propriety nor wisdom in making such declarations unnecessarily or prematurely. If, therefore, you find that the proposed convention is not one with the extreme provisions to which you refer, or if you have reason to believe that your representations of the unfriendly impression which it would make here will be sufficient to change the purpose of the Hawaiian Government, you will confine yourself to ordinary diplomatic remonstrance. And, in any event, it will be prudent to indicate that such would, in your opinion, be the view taken by this Government before making the formal protest, which, under the contingency of persistent adverse action on the part of the Hawaiian Government, you are authorized to make.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Comly.

No. 113.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, December 1, 1881.

SIR: My late instructions, and especially that of the 19th ultimo, will have shown you the deep interest with which the United States observes the course of events in the Hawaiian Islands. The apparent disposition to extend other influences there in lines parallel to or offsetting our own must be watched with care, and met with considerate firmness.

The intelligent and suggestive character of your recent dispatches naturally leads me to a review of the relationship of the Hawaiian Kingdom to the United States at somewhat greater length than was practicable in the limited scope of my instruction of November 19. That dispatch was necessarily confined to a consideration of the immediate question of a possible treaty engagement with Great Britain which would give to that power in Hawaii a degree of extraterritoriality of jurisdiction inconsistent with the relations of the Islands to the other powers, and especially to the United States.

With the abandonment of feudal government by King Kamehameha III in 1839, and the inauguration of constitutional methods, the history of the political relation of Hawaii to the world at large may very properly be said to begin. The recognition of independent sovereignty by the great powers took place soon after that act on the part of the United States, dating from 1844. Even at that early day, before the United States had become a power on the Pacific coast, the commercial activity of our people was manifested in their intercourse with the islands of Oceanica, of which the Hawaiian group is the northern extremity. In 1848 the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo confirmed the territorial extension of the United States to the Pacific, and gave to the Union a coast line on that ocean little inferior in extent and superior in natural wealth to the Atlantic seaboard of the original thirteen States. In 1848-'49 the discoveries of gold in California laid the foundation for the marvelous development of the Western coast, and, in that same year, the necessities of our altered relationship to the Pacific Ocean found expression in a comprehensive treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with the sovereign Kingdom of Hawaii.

The material connection between the Hawaiian Islands and the Pacific coast of the Union was natural and inevitable. But lately admitted to the family of separate states, Hawaii was necessarily drawn into close kinship with California, then just entering on a path of prosperity and greatness whose rapidity of development the world has never seen equaled. Hence the movements toward intimate commercial relations between the two countries which, after the progressive negotiations of 1856, 1867, and 1869, culminated in the existing reciprocity treaty of January 30, 1875, which gave to the United States in Hawaii, and to Hawaii in the United States, trading rights and privileges in terms denied to other countries.

I have spoken of the Pacific coast line given to the American Union by the cession of California in 1848 as little inferior in extent and superior in natural wealth to the Atlantic seaboard of the original Union. Since that time our domain on the Pacific has been vastly increased by the purchase of Alaska. Taking San Francisco as the commercial center on the Western slope, a line drawn northwestwardly to the Aleutian group marks our Pacific border almost to the confines of Asia. A corresponding line drawn southwestwardly from San Fran-

cisco to Honolulu marks the natural limit of the ocean belt within which our trade with the oriental countries must flow, and is, moreover, the direct line of communication between the United States and Australasia. Within this belt lies the commercial domain of our Western coast.

I have had recent occasion to set forth the vitally integral importance of our Pacific possessions, in a circular letter addressed on the 24th of June last to our representatives in Europe, touching the necessary guarantees of the proposed Panama Canal as a purely American waterway to be treated as part of our own coast line. The extension of commercial empire westward from those States is no less vitally important to their development than is their communication with the Eastern coast by the Isthmian channel. And when we survey the stupendous progress made by the western coast during the thirty years of its national life as a part of our dominion, its enormous increase of population, its vast resources of agriculture and mines, and its boundless enterprise, it is not easy to set a limit to its commercial activity or foresee a check to its maritime supremacy in the waters of the Orient, so long as those waters afford, as now, a free and neutral scope for our peaceful trade.

In thirty years the United States has acquired a legitimately dominant influence in the North Pacific, which it can never consent to see decreased by the intrusion therein of any element of influence hostile to its own. The situation of the Hawaiian Islands, giving them the strategic control of the North Pacific, brings their possession within the range of questions of purely American policy, as much so as that of the Isthmus itself. Hence the necessity, as recognized in our existing treaty relations, of drawing the ties of intimate relationship between us and the Hawaiian Islands so as to make them practically a part of the American system without derogation of their absolute independence. The reciprocity treaty of 1875 has made of Hawaii the sugar-raising field of the Pacific slope and gives to our manufacturers therein the same freedom as in California and Oregon. That treaty gave to Hawaii its first great impetus in trade, and developed that activity of production which has attracted the eager attention of European powers, anxious to share in the prosperity and advantages which the United States have created in mid-ocean. From 1877, the first full year succeeding the conclusion of the reciprocity treaty, to 1880, the imports from Hawaii to the United States nearly doubled, increasing from \$2,550,335 in value to \$4,606,444, and in this same period the exports from the United States to Hawaii rose from \$1,272,949 to \$2,026,170. In a word, Hawaii is, by the wise and beneficent provisions of the treaty, brought within the circle of the domestic trade of the United States, and our interest in its friendly neutrality is akin to that we feel in the guaranteed independence of Panama. On the other hand, the interests of Hawaii must inevitably turn toward the United States in the future, as in the present, as its natural and sole ally in conserving the dominion of both in the Pacific trade. Your own observation, during your residence at Honolulu, has shown you the vitality of the American sentiment which this state of things has irresistibly developed in the Islands. I view that sentiment as the logical recognition of the needs of Hawaii as a member of the American system of States rather than as a blind desire for a protectorate or ultimate annexation to the American Union.

This Government has on previous occasions been brought face to face with the question of a protectorate over the Hawaiian group. It has, as often as it arose, been set aside in the interest of such commercial union

and such reciprocity of benefits as would give to Hawaii the highest advantages and at the same time strengthen its independent existence as a sovereign state. In this I have summed up the whole disposition of the United States toward Hawaii in its present condition.

The policy of this country with regard to the Pacific is the natural complement to its Atlantic policy. The history of our European relations for fifty years shows the jealous concern with which the United States has guarded its control of the coast from foreign interference, and this without extension of territorial possession beyond the mainland. It has always been its aim to preserve the friendly neutrality of the adjacent states and insular possessions. Its attitude toward Cuba is in point. That rich island, the key to the Gulf of Mexico, and the field for our most extended trade in the Western Hemisphere is, though in the hands of Spain, a part of the American commercial system. Our relations, present and prospective, toward Cuba have never been more ably set forth than in the remarkable note addressed by my predecessor, Mr. Secretary Everett, to the ministers of Great Britain and France in Washington, on the 1st of December, 1852, in rejection of the suggested tripartite alliance to forever determine the neutrality of the Spanish Antilles. In response to the proposal that the United States, Great Britain, and France should severally and collectively agree to forbid the acquisition of control over Cuba, by any or all of them, Mr. Everett showed that, without forcing or even coveting possession of the island, its condition was essentially an American question; that the renunciation forever by this Government of contingent interest therein would be far broader than the like renunciation by Great Britain or France; that if ever ceasing to be Spanish, Cuba must necessarily become American, and not fall under any other European domination, and that the ceaseless movement of segregation of American interests from European control and unification in a broader American sphere of independent life could not and should not be checked by any arbitrary agreement.

Nearly thirty years have demonstrated the wisdom of the attitude then maintained by Mr. Everett and have made indispensable its continuance and its extension to all parts of the American Atlantic system where a disturbance of the existing status might be attempted in the interest of foreign powers. The present attitude of this Government toward any European project for the control of an isthmian route is but the logical sequence of the resistance made in 1852 to the attempted pressure of an active foreign influence in the West Indies.

Hawaii, although much farther from the Californian coast than is Cuba from the Floridian peninsula, holds in the western sea much the same position as Cuba in the Atlantic. It is the key to the maritime dominion of the Pacific States, as Cuba is the key to the Gulf trade. The material possession of Hawaii is not desired by the United States any more than was that of Cuba. But under no circumstances can the United States permit any change in the territorial control of either which would cut it adrift from the American system, whereto they both indispensably belong.

In this aspect of the question it is readily seen with what concern this Government must view any tendency toward introducing into Hawaii new social elements destructive of its necessarily American character. The steady diminution of the native population of the Islands, amounting to some 10 per cent between 1872 and 1878, and still continuing, is doubtless a cause of great alarm to the Government of the Kingdom, and it is no wonder that a solution should be sought with

eagerness in any seemingly practicable quarter. The problem, however, is not to be met by a substitution of Mongolian supremacy for native control—as seems at first sight possible through the rapid increase in Chinese immigration to the Islands. Neither is a wholesale introduction of the coolie element, professedly Anglo-Indian, likely to afford any more satisfactory outcome to the difficulty. The Hawaiian Islands can not be joined to the Asiatic system. If they drift from their independent station it must be toward assimilation and identification with the American system, to which they belong by the operation of natural laws and must belong by the operation of political necessity.

I have deemed it necessary to go, with somewhat of detail, into the real nature of our relations toward Hawaii, in order that you may intelligently construe my recent instructions in the light of our true and necessary policy on the Pacific. It may also tend to simplify your intercourse with the native government if you are in a position to disabuse the minds of its statesmen of any belief or impression that our course is selfishly intrusive, or looks merely to the exclusive retention of transient advantages of local commerce, in which other countries seek a share. The United States was one of the first among the great nations of the world to take an active interest in the upbuilding of Hawaiian independence and the creation of a new and potential life for its people. It has consistently endeavored, and with success, to enlarge the material prosperity of Hawaii on such independent basis. It proposes to be equally unremitting in its efforts hereafter to maintain and develop the advantages which have accrued to Hawaii and to draw closer the ties which imperatively unite it to the great body of American commonwealths.

In this line of action the United States does its simple duty both to Hawaii and itself; and it can not permit such obvious neglect of national interest as would be involved by silent acquiescence in any movement looking to a lessening of those American ties and the substitution of alien and hostile interests. It firmly believes that the position of the Hawaiian Islands as the key to the dominion of the American Pacific demands their benevolent neutrality, to which end it will earnestly coöperate with the native Government. And if, through any cause, the maintenance of such a position of benevolent neutrality should be found by Hawaii to be impracticable, this Government would then unhesitatingly meet the altered situation by seeking an avowedly American solution for the grave issues presented.

The communication to the Hawaiian Government of the views herein expressed is left, both as to manner and extent, to your own discretion. If the treaty relations with Great Britain, of which my last instruction treats, prove to be of such a nature as to require the communication of a formal protest in the premises to the Hawaiian minister of foreign affairs, it would probably be wise for you to give him a copy of this dispatch as a just and temperate exposition of the intentions of this Government, and a succinct explanation of the reasons which have induced such a protest. Even if the formal delivery hereof to the minister should not appear advisable, it would be well for you to reflect this policy in your conversations with the public men at Honolulu, who will, I am sure, find these views in harmony with the true interests of the Hawaiian Kingdom as they are with those of the United States

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Comly.

[Confidential.]

No. 114.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
*Washington, December 1, 1881.*JAMES M. COMLY, Esq., *Honolulu:*

SIR: In my formal instruction of this date I have reviewed the general question of the relationship between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands, and the position of the latter, both as an integral part of the American system and as the key to the commerce of the North Pacific. As that instruction was written for communication to the Hawaiian secretary of state, I touched but lightly on the essential question of the gradual and seemingly inevitable decadence and extinction of the native race and its replacement by another, to which the powers of Government would necessarily descend.

A single glance at the census returns of Hawaii for half a generation past exhibits this alarming diminution of the indigenous element, amounting to $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent per annum of the population. Meanwhile the industrial and productive development of Hawaii is on the increase, and the native classes, never sufficiently numerous to develop the full resources of the islands, have been supplemented by an adventitious labor element, from China mainly, until the rice and sugar fields are largely tilled by aliens. The worst of this state of things is that it must inevitably keep on in increasing ratio, the native classes growing smaller, the insular production larger, and the immigration to supply the want of labor greater every year.

I have shown in a previous instruction how entirely Hawaii is a part of the productive and commercial system of the American States. So far as the staple growths and imports of the islands go, the reciprocity treaty makes them practically members of an American zollverein, an outlying district of the State of California. So far as political structure and independence of action are concerned, Hawaii is as remote from our control as China. This contradiction is only explicable by assuming what is the fact, that thirty years ago, having the choice between material annexation and commercial assimilation of the islands, the United States chose the less responsible alternative. The soundness of the choice, however, evidently depends on the perpetuity of the rule of the native race as an independent government, and that imperiled, the whole framework of our relations to Hawaii is changed, if not destroyed.

The decline of the native Hawaiian element in the presence of newer and sturdier growths must be accepted as an inevitable fact, in view of the teachings of ethnological history. And as retrogression in the development of the Islands can not be admitted without serious detriment to American interests in the North Pacific, the problem of a replenishment of the vital forces of Hawaii presents itself for intelligent solution in an American sense—not in an Asiatic or a British sense.

There is little doubt that were the Hawaiian Islands, by annexation or distinct protection, a part of the territory of the Union, their fertile resources for the growth of rice and sugar would not only be controlled by American capital, but so profitable a field of labor would attract intelligent workers thither from the United States.

A purely American form of colonization in such a case would meet all the phases of the problem. Within our borders could be found the capital, the intelligence, the activity, and the necessary labor trained

in the rice swamps and cane fields of the Southern States, and it may be well to consider how, even in the chosen alternative of maintaining Hawaiian independence, these prosperous elements could be induced to go from our shores to the islands, not like the coolies, practically enslaved, not as human machines, but as thinking, intelligent, working factors in the advancement of the material interests of the Islands.

I desire, therefore, that you will give this subject due attention. An examination and report will be valuable if showing the proportion of occupied rice and sugar lands to the unoccupied and undeveloped territory, the capacities of production, the peculiarities of climate, the wages of labor, and the cost of living. It will also be well for you in conversation with the leading men of Hawaii to turn their thoughts discreetly in the direction of inviting American colonization there. A Hawaiian homestead act for the benefit of actual American settlers, with remission of taxation during the time necessary to establish new plantations on a paying basis, might be in turn supplemented in the United States by voluntarily organized emigration schemes and coöperative aid to bona fide settlers. Throughout the continent, north and south, wherever a foothold is found for American enterprise, it is quickly occupied, and this spirit of adventure, which seeks its outlet in the mines of South America and the railroads of Mexico, would not be slow to avail itself of openings for assured and profitable enterprise even in mid-ocean.

Commending this aspect of the subject to your earnest and immediate attention.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Comly.

No. 118.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, May 31, 1882.

SIR: Your No. 217, of the 8th instant, in which you report the political tendencies now making themselves manifest in the Islands and the movement in the direction of onerous taxation of capital and property to a degree which can not fail to work injury to the foreign interests and enterprise which have built up Hawaiian prosperity, has been read with attention.

It can not be doubted that indiscriminate and reckless exercise of the tax-levying power by those portions of the native element who have little or no taxable interests at stake must react harmfully on the essential elements of insular prosperity. Independently of the consideration that a large part of the operating capital and mechanical enterprises of Hawaii has been contributed by citizens of the United States, this Government feels itself so kindly bound to Hawaii by the traditions of past intercourse that it would not hesitate to remonstrate with the Hawaiian Government against the adoption of a shortsighted policy which would be alike harmful to existing vested interests and repellant of the further influx of capital from abroad.

While this Government recognized from the first the constitutional sovereignty of Hawaii, and still recognizes her right to adjust internal matters of taxation and revenue on constitutional principles, yet it can not permit to pass, without very urgent protest in all proper quarters, a measure subversive of the material interests of so many of its citizens

who, on the faith of international comity, have given their wealth, labor, and skill to aid in the prosperity of Hawaii. And it makes this protest the more earnestly, inasmuch as the treaty relations between the two countries (in which Hawaiian interests were even more subserved than our own) are such as to give the United States the moral right to expect that American property in Hawaii will be no more burdened than would Hawaiian property in the United States.

I am, etc.,

FRED'K T. FRELINGHUYSEN.

Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Comly.

JUNE 2, 1882.

MY DEAR MR. COMLY: Permit me again to recur to your dispatch No. 217 of the 8th ultimo, touching the possible tendency of political events on the Hawaiian Islands, and to express to you my appreciation of your vigilance in the matter.

In view of the very large interests which are held in those islands by our citizens, many of whom are residents of the Pacific coast, I have thought it expedient to furnish for the confidential information of the honorables John F. Miller and James T. Farley, Senators of the United States from the State of California, a copy of your dispatch without its accompaniments, and a copy of it entire has been sent to the Secretary of the Navy.

Very truly, yours,

FRED'K T. FRELINGHUYSEN.

Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Daggett.

No. 10.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, October 23, 1882.

SIR: Acknowledging the receipt of your No. 9 of the 15th ultimo, I have to inclose, for your information, copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy of the 20th instant, to whom the subject was appropriately referred, from which you will learn that he has issued instructions to the naval authorities on the Pacific station to have at least two vessels of war at Honolulu during the coronation of the King, February 12, 1883.

I am, etc.,

FRED'K T. FRELINGHUYSEN.

[Inclosure in No. 10.]

Mr. Chandler to Mr. Frelinghuysen.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, October 20, 1882.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters, dated, respectively, the 11th and 13th instants, and a copy of each of the accompanying dispatches from Mr. Daggett, United States minister resident at Honolulu, in which he suggests that the *Alaska* or some other of the United States vessels of war may be per-

mitted to remain at that port until the coronation of the King of the Hawaiian Islands, February 12 next.

This Department has instructed Rear-Admiral Balch, commanding our naval force on the Pacific Station, to send at least two of the vessels of his command to Honolulu, to arrive there some time previous to the coronation, and remain until after the ceremony, and as much longer as may be deemed advisable, their movements being governed, to a proper extent, by the opinions and advice of the United States minister resident.

I am, etc.,

W. E. CHANDLER,
Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Daggett.

No 19.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 2, 1883.

SIR: Your dispatch of the 12th ultimo, No. 49, reporting the peaceful crowning of the King and Queen of the Hawaiian Islands at noon of that day has been received.

The present is a fitting occasion to express anew the assurances of the good will we bear to the Hawaiian Government and people. We have also especial pleasure in learning that, as reported in your No. 41 of the 10th ultimo, two of our national vessels arrived at Honolulu in season for His Majesty's coronation.

I am, sir, etc.,

FRED'K T. FRELINGHUYSEN.

Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Daggett.

No. 25.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 5, 1883.

SIR: Upon the receipt of your No. 63 of the 6th ultimo I promptly communicated to the Secretary of the Navy your request touching the presence of a war vessel in the Hawaiian Islands. I have now received Mr. Chandler's reply, of the 3d instant, in which he states that although his Department will be unable to keep a ship constantly at Honolulu, he has given such directions as will insure one of its vessels visiting that port at as frequent intervals as practicable.

I am, etc.,

FRED'K T. FRELINGHUYSEN.

Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Daggett.

No. 45.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 2, 1884.

SIR: Your dispatch No. 115 of the 14th ultimo, announcing the death of Her Royal Highness the Princess Kekaulike, sister of the Queen and governess of Hawaii, at Honolulu the 8th of the past month, has been received, and in the name of the Government and people of the United States I desire that you will properly convey an expression of their sympathy to the Hawaiian Government on account of the demise of this estimable lady.

I am, sir,

FRED'K T. FRELINGHUYSEN.

Mr. Davis to Mr. Daggett.

No. 62.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 2, 1884.

SIR: I have received your dispatch No. 174, of the 14th ultimo, concerning certain important financial proceeding in the Hawaiian legislative assembly, and have forwarded a copy of your dispatch to the Secretary of the Treasury as of possible interest to his Department.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN DAVIS,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Bayard to Mr. Merrill.

[Confidential.]

No. 36.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 8, 1887.

SIR: My attention was lately drawn to the proposed negotiation of a loan of \$2,000,000 in England to the Hawaiian Government, by the terms of which the revenues of Hawaii were to be pledged as a collateral security.

The terms, so reported to me, were practically the creation of a right of inspection and possible control by foreign creditors over the financial measures and administration of the Hawaiian Government, and as such were not in accordance with the spirit, if not of the letter, of the existing treaty between the Hawaiian Islands and the United States, which was intended to prevent any cession of territory or grant of a political nature by Hawaii to any other government than that of the United States.

The reasons for the treaty of 1875 exist to-day in increased and still growing force. The political geography of the United States and the relation of the island groups of the Pacific Ocean to our Pacific coast and to the terminal points of its transcontinental railways have been importantly affected by the progress and natural operation of events since the formation of that treaty.

I shall have occasion shortly to direct your attention to some propositions of the Hawaiian Government in relation to sundry islands in the Pacific, and will not do more at present than suggest to you that it would be well for you discreetly to intimate to His Majesty King Kalakaua, the lively interest we feel in the autonomy and self-preserving force of his Government, and the satisfaction experienced by the President in learning that the late loan, to which I have referred, did not involve the pledge of the revenues of his Government and the possible embarrassments to which he might otherwise have been internationally subjected.

The safety and welfare of the Hawaiian group is obviously more interesting and important to the United States than to any other nation, and for that reason our ties of intercourse and amity should be cherished.

By prudent and friendly approach to the King and expressions of interest and good will in the affairs of Hawaii, it appears to me that you can render efficient service to both governments.

I am, etc.,

T. F. BAYARD.

Mr. Bayard to Mr. Merrill.

No. 48.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, May 26, 1887.

SIR: You are no doubt aware of the departure from Honolulu of Her Majesty the Queen Kapiolani, on her way to London to be present at the celebration of the jubilee in honor of the fiftieth year of her Britannic Majesty's reign.

The Queen Kapiolani and her suite, consisting of her royal highness the Princess Liliuokalani, Lieut. Gen. J. O. Dominis, his excellency the Hon. Curtis P. Jankea, chamberlain, and Col. John H. Boyd, aide-de-camp, reached San Francisco during the latter part of April, and Washington on Tuesday, the 3d instant, for a visit of a few days. The royal party was met at Baltimore by Mr. Sevellon A. Brown, chief clerk of this Department, who, with Capt. D. M. Taylor, U. S. Army, and Lieut. Rodgers, U. S. Navy, representing the War and Navy Departments, respectively, were detailed to attend the Queen and suite during their brief sojourn in this Capital, and bestow such attentions and civilities as might contribute to the pleasure of their visit.

Wednesday, the 4th instant, at noon, the Queen and her party were presented to the President and his wife, at the Executive Mansion, and soon thereafter Mrs. Cleveland, accompanied by the wives of several of the Cabinet officers, returned the Queen's visit, enjoying a half-hour of pleasant conversation at the Arlington Hotel. Friday morning, the 6th instant, at 10 o'clock, an excursion was given to Mount Vernon, in honor of Her Majesty, on board of the U. S. S. *Despatch* kindly placed at my disposal by the Secretary of the Navy. The excursion was very generally attended by the diplomatic corps in the city and by prominent citizens both in public and private life. Friday evening the Queen and her party were the guests of the President and Mrs. Cleveland at a dinner; and prior to her Majesty's departure from Washington she was accorded a serenade by the United States Marine Band.

In concluding this brief narrative of Her Hawaiian Majesty's visit to this capital, I take pleasure in inclosing for your information a copy of a note from the minister of Hawaii here, dated the 9th instant, expressing, by the Queen's direction, her sense of her appreciation of the civilities and courtesies extended to her by this Government, and of my reply thereto, dated the 11th instant.

I am, sir, etc.,

T. F. BAYARD.

Mr. Bayard to Mr. Merrill.

No. 52.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, July 12, 1887.

SIR: The tenor of your late dispatches coincides with other reports from the Hawaiian Kingdom, and indicates the most unsatisfactory and disturbed condition of affairs in the government of that country, which renders it essential that the strictest vigilance should be exercised by

those charged with the care of the rights of American citizens within that jurisdiction, as well as the rights of the United States secured under existing international conventions.

Whilst regretting deeply the existence of domestic disorders in Hawaii, and with no disposition whatever to interfere therein or to obtrude counsel unasked, yet the consequences which may possibly result to the interests of American citizens which have grown up under the extension of the commerce between that country and the United States, under the guaranties of existing treaty, must not be jeopardized by internal confusion in the government of these islands, and it is the duty of the United States to see that these interests are not imperiled or injured and to do all things necessary for their just protection.

The existing treaty between the United States and Hawaii, as was contemplated and intended by the parties thereto, has created and fostered commercial relations more intimate in their nature and of incomparably greater volume and value than Hawaii ever had or ever can have with any other government.

The growth of this commerce and the consequent advancement of these Islands in wealth and importance has been most satisfactory to the United States, and by reason of their geographical position and comparative propinquity to our own territory they possess an interest and importance to us far exceeding that with which they can be regarded by any other power. In the absence of any detailed information from you of the late regrettable disorders in the domestic control of Hawaii and the changes which have taken place in the official corps of that Government, I am not able to give you other than general instructions, which may be communicated in substance to the commanding officer of the vessel or vessels of this Government in the waters of Hawaii, with whom you will freely confer, in order that such prompt and efficient action may be taken as the circumstances may make necessary.

Whilst we abstain from interference with the domestic affairs of Hawaii, in accordance with the policy and practice of this Government, yet obstruction to the channels of legitimate commerce under existing treaty must not be allowed, and American citizens in Hawaii must be protected in their persons and property by the representatives of their country's law and power, and no internal discord must be suffered to impair them. Your own aid and counsel, as well as the assistance of the officers of our Government vessels, if found necessary, will therefore be promptly afforded to promote the reign of law and respect for orderly government in Hawaii.

As is well known, no intent is cherished or policy entertained by the United States which is otherwise than friendly to the autonomous control and independence of Hawaii, and no other member of the family of nations has so great and immediate an interest in the welfare and prosperity of Hawaii on such a basis as this Republic.

The vast line of our national territory on the Pacific coast, and its neighborhood to the Hawaiian group, indicate the recognized predominance of our interests in the regions of these Islands.

This superiority of interest in the welfare of the Hawaiian Islands is accompanied by an appreciation of the right of these friendly inhabitants and their Government to our good offices, which we freely tender whenever they can be efficacious in securing the safety and promoting the welfare of that island group.

I am, etc.,

T. F. BAYARD.

Mr. Bayard to Mr. Merrill.

No. 53.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 22, 1887.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 126 of the 5th instant, concerning the recent political changes in the Hawaiian Islands, and to say that your course in maintaining communication and consultation with the commanding officer of the U. S. S. *Adams*, with a view to promptly meeting an emergency affecting the lives and property of American citizens in Honolulu, anticipates the Department's instruction No. 52 of 12th instant and is approved.

I am, etc.,

T. F. BAYARD.

Mr. Bayard to Mr. Merrill.

No. 55.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 16, 1887.

SIR: I have forwarded a copy of your dispatch No. 132 of July 15, 1887, touching the presence of naval vessels in Hawaiian waters, to the Secretary of the Navy, calling his attention to your recommendation that an American man-of-war be permitted to remain in that vicinity for several months, at least.

I am, etc.,

T. F. BAYARD.

Mr. Bayard to Mr. Merrill.

No. 61.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 30, 1887.

SIR: Your No. 134 of the 25th of July last in reference to an oath required of foreign residents in the Islands is received.

This question was brought to the notice of the Department by Mr. Putnam in his No. 125 of the 1st ultimo, and in reply he was instructed on the 18th ultimo that citizens of the United States who take the oath of fealty prescribed by the new constitution of Hawaii remain citizens of the United States, and are entitled to be regarded and treated as such by our consular and diplomatic officers.

That such a result is contemplated by the Hawaiian Government appears evident from the last sentence of the oath, which reads:

Not here by renouncing, but expressly reserving all allegiance and citizenship now owing or held by me.

This Department is informed that the oath is indiscriminately required of citizens of other nations, who are nevertheless understood by their own governments to retain their nationality of origin. Inasmuch, also, as this oath is a requisite condition for exercising any political privileges on the Island, it is evident that a refusal on the part of this Government of the assent to taking it granted by other Governments to their citizens would result in the destruction of any political power previously possessed by our citizens and its transfer to citizens of other assenting nations.

The Department therefore desires that you will consider the above instruction as addressed to yourself and that you will relieve the minds of all bona fide American citizens who while honestly desiring to retain their American nationality are, in order to obtain the privileges necessary for a residence in the Islands, obliged under local law to take an oath to support the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

I am, etc.,

T. F. BAYARD.

Mr. Bayard to Mr. Merrill.

No. 77.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 29, 1888.

SIR: I have to acknowledge receipt of your No. 166 of January 14 last, in which you inform the Department of the appointment of Mr. Austin as minister of foreign affairs of Hawaii; of Mr. Dole, as fourth associate justice of the supreme court, in place of Judge Fornander, deceased, and of the subsidence of political commotion and popular excitement at Honolulu.

It is gratifying to note the satisfactory turn affairs have taken in Hawaii in the direction of order and stable government. And it is especially pleasing to remark that this desirable and happy change having been brought about without foreign interference gives encouragement to the hope that the inhabitants of the islands may enter upon a period of freedom from the disturbing domestic questions that rendered the situation last summer so uncertain and disquieting.

I am, etc.,

T. F. BAYARD.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Merrill.

No 127.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 27, 1889.

SIR: I have received your No. 241 of the 8th instant, representing the circumstances under which you regard it advisable for a United States ship of war to remain for the present in Hawaiian waters.

A copy of your dispatch has been submitted for the consideration of the Secretary of the Navy.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Merrill.

No. 128.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 31, 1889.

SIR: Adverting to my No. 127 of the 27th instant, I have now to apprise you of the receipt of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, of that date, saying that the *Adams*, now fitting for service at the Mare Island navy-yard, was ordered some days since to proceed to Honolulu as soon as ready for sea.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Merrill.

No. 138.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 23, 1889.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 255 of the 1st instant, relative to the attempt of July 30 last to overthrow the Hawaiian Government.

The steps taken by the legation to protect the lives and property of our citizens at Honolulu in that emergency seem to have proved effectual. A copy of your dispatch will be sent to the Navy Department.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 8.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 6, 1889.

SIR: I transmit for your confidential information a copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy and its inclosure, relating to the political situation in Hawaii; also a copy of the reply of this Department.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 8.]

*Mr. Tracy to Mr. Blaine.*NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 1, 1889.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith for the information of the Department of State a copy of a report dated the 18th ultimo from Rear-Admiral L. A. Kimberly, commanding the United States naval force on the Pacific station, with reference to the political situation in the Hawaiian Islands.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. F. TRACY.

[Inclosure to inclosure 1 in No. 8.]

*Rear-Admiral Kimberly to Mr. Tracy.*U. S. FLAGSHIP ALERT (3D RATE),
Honolulu, October 18, 1889.

SIR: I have to report that, politically speaking, quietness prevails at present. There is an agitation quietly working as to the race question, which no doubt will become a prominent factor in the elections that come off in February.

The natives seem to have an uneasy feeling as to their rights being usurped by the whites, and their gradual loss of prestige and power in the Government as laid down in the principles of the present constitution, which to their ideas circumscribes too much the Kingly power.

It would promote a feeling of security to our own people and, I think, other foreigners, if at the February elections we had a force here competent to preserve order should necessity arise.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. A. KIMBERLY.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 8.]

*Mr. Blaine to Mr. Tracy.*DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 6, 1889.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st instant, and of the copy of Rear-Admiral Kimberly's report of the 18th ultimo, which you inclose, on the political situation in Hawaii.

In view of his opinion that the security of our citizens there would be promoted "if, at the February elections," the United States had a force in those waters competent to preserve order should the necessity arise, I trust that your Department may find it convenient to make such disposition in that quarter as will subserve the desired object.

I have, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Adee to Mr. Stevens.

[Confidential.]

No. 11.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 16, 1889.

SIR: I herewith inclose for your confidential information a copy of the instructions addressed by the Secretary of the Navy (and received with his letter of the 13th instant) to the commanding officer of the United States naval force of the Pacific station, relative to the retention of a sufficient number of vessels of his fleet in Hawaiian waters during the approaching February elections for the prompt protection of American interests should occasion arise.

I am, etc.,

ALVEY A. ADEE,
Acting Secretary.

[Inclosure in No. 11.]

*Mr. Tracy to Mr. Blaine.*NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 13, 1889.

SIR: Referring to your letter of the 6th instant, concurring in the opinion of Rear-Admiral Kimberly that security to our citizens there would be promoted if at the February elections the United States had a force in Hawaiian waters competent to preserve order should necessity arise, the Department incloses herewith, for your information, a copy of its instructions issued this day to that officer for his guidance.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. F. TRACY.

[Inclosure to inclosure in No. 11.]

*Mr. Tracy to Rear-Admiral Kimberly.*NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 13, 1889.

SIR: Referring to your letter No. 165 of the 18th ultimo, with reference to the political situation in the Hawaiian Islands, and in which you state that "it would promote a feeling of security to our people, and, I think, to foreigners, if at the February election we had a force here competent to preserve order should necessity arise," the Department directs that you will keep as many of the vessels of your

command in Hawaiian waters as you may deem expedient for the purpose of carrying out the object in view.

A copy of a letter from the honorable the Secretary of State, concurring in your opinion as to the desirability of such action, is inclosed herewith for your information.

Very respectfully,

B. F. TRACY.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 12.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 3, 1889.

SIR: I have received your No. 11 of the 14th ultimo, confirmatory of the statements of previous dispatches touching the importance of retaining one or more of our naval vessels in Hawaiian waters until after the elections of February next.

You were informed by instruction No. 11 of the 16th ultimo of the action of the Secretary of the Navy in this regard.

You can exhibit to the naval officers concerned copies of the dispatches referred to, and will, in general, keep such officers advised of any political events of importance.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 24.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, April 24, 1890.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 20 of the 20th ultimo, touching the commercial relations of Hawaii with the United States. A copy of your dispatch has been confidentially communicated to the Secretary of the Navy.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 27.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 14, 1890.

SIR: I have received your number 25 of the 28th ultimo, apprising me of the unexpected change in the attitude of "two or three" of the new members of the Hawaiian legislature, by which the opposition to the Reform party gains strength enough to control that body; also of the fact that one member of the present ministry, of Canadian birth, is in declared agreement with the opposition party.

Noting your reference to the circumstance that the present "aspect of the sugar question" in our Congress "strengthens the opponents of the existing ministry and continues to depress and alarm the Americans in Hawaii."

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 2.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 1, 1890.

SIR: I inclose for your confidential information copy of a letter recently received from the Acting Secretary of the Navy, transmitting one from the Commander in Chief of United States naval force on the Pacific Station, in regard to political affairs in the Hawaiian Islands. The letter in question seems to confirm the general tenor of your dispatches on the same subject.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

[Inclosure.]

*Mr. Soley to Mr. Blaine.*NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, August 14, 1890.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith, for your information, a copy of a dispatch, dated the 29th ultimo, from the commander-in-chief of the United States naval force on the Pacific station, regarding political affairs in the Hawaiian Islands.

Very respectfully,

J. R. SOLEY,
Acting Secretary of the Navy.

[Inclosure to inclosure in No. 2.]

Rear-Admiral Brown to Mr. Tracy.

No. 269.]

U. S. FLAGSHIP CHARLESTON,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, July 29, 1890.

SIR: In reference to political matters in the Hawaiian Islands I have to report that since my last communication on this subject, No. 228, of June 26, 1890, many events have transpired in Honolulu which indicate that serious trouble, if not a revolution, is imminent at no distant day. The legislature, now in session, will not probably adjourn before the middle of September next, and until that time the discordant element in the National Reform party, as represented by several natives and half-castes in the legislature, who were prominent leaders in the attempted revolutionary discussions and movements, either in the legislature or at public meetings on the streets. Their efforts are now being made in favor of a constitutional convention, with a view to revising the present constitution, which was adopted in 1887.

The revision of this constitution which these revolutionists desire to bring about is nothing less than an entire new constitution, which will restore to the King his former powers, give the native element almost absolute control of the Government, and ignore the interests of foreign residents and the vast amount of capital they now have invested in the several islands. The present constitution provides for the only way by which it can be amended, and requires the approval of any amendment by two regular successive legislatures. The legislature meets biennially. Any attempt to change the constitution in any other way will be revolutionary and will be resisted by the reform party and by the best elements of the national reformers. It is almost assured that there will be a majority in the legislature opposed to granting a petition for the proposed constitutional convention, and that the defeat of the revolutionists in the legislature will be the signal for an uprising of the lower class of natives.

The result of such an uprising will undoubtedly prove disastrous to them, as the interests of the whites and the better class of natives and half-castes can not be permitted to be jeopardized by a small number of irresponsible and impecunious but educated natives and half-castes. The presence of the force under my command has a marked influence on the would-be revolutionists, as, while they are well aware that I am here to protect the persons and property of citizens of the United States, the general belief among them is, that I will, in the event of a revolution, take a

more decided stand in the interests of those opposed to them than I might be warranted in doing.

The white residents and natives and half-castes who stand ready to oppose the revolutionists have every confidence in their ability to do so successfully, and take great comfort in the knowledge of an adequate naval force being present. I am in frequent personal communication with our minister resident, as also with many of the leading American merchants and lawyers, and from them am able to keep constantly advised of the progress of events.

I am, etc.,

GEORGE BROWN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. N., commanding U. S. Naval Forces, Pacific Station.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 4.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 10, 1890.

SIR: I inclose a copy of the letter of the Secretary of the Navy and a copy of the report therewith on the serious political situation in Hawaii, which, as confirmatory of your No. 30, of the 19th ultimo, will doubtless be read with interest.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

[Inclosure in No. 4.]

Mr. Tracy to Mr. Blaine.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, September 5, 1890.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith, for your information, a copy of a communication received by this Department from Commander Felix McCurley, commanding the U. S. S. *Nipsic*, at Honolulu, and dated August 22, 1890, reporting the political situation of affairs at Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully,

B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy.

[Inclosure to inclosure No. 4.]

No. 379.]

U. S. S. NIPSIC (3RD RATE),
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, August 22, 1890.

SIR: I would respectfully report that since the departure of the flagship *Charleston* from this place, on the 7th instant, the political situation has assumed a more disturbed appearance within the last several days, so I deem it advisable to report the political state of affairs immediately instead of waiting until the end of the month to do so, as is the usual custom, the cause of the disturbance being as follows:

Several days ago a petition was presented to His Majesty King Kalakana by a native delegation asking that the old constitution be revived, and the new or present constitution, formed in 1887, be abrogated; and this petition has been indorsed by the King and presented to the legislature for their consideration, and, as I have been informed by reliable authorities, that the native and bad half-white element threaten to surround the legislative chamber and coerce the members of the legislature into voting for it, so as to give a form of legality to what is otherwise not only against the present constitution, but highly inimical and dangerous to American interests.

The present constitution, formed in 1887, seems to give entire satisfaction to the majority of the prominent American and English residents at this place, including even those white people of the working classes who are prosperous and thriving, as it is of a liberal character, and favors their interest in various ways.

The present constitution, formed in 1887, was, in a manner, forced on the King by a delegation of the prominent residents at this place, and as I was informed by a former minister of the late cabinet, the Hon. John Austin, that if the King had not signed the present constitution and given it his support, a Republic would have been declared, and at that time a sworn league composed of about 4,000 white men residing on the different islands were back of this movement; opposition to it would have been useless, as the respectable element were determined to have a liberal constitution or else a Republic.

The constitution that the natives and the bad half-white element (under the leadership of Mr. Bush) desire is the one just presented to the legislature and indorsed by the King for their consideration, and is somewhat similar to the old constitution existing before the present one, and is objected to strongly by the American and English element, as it in a manner gives the King absolute power to appoint the nobles of the legislature, instead of their being elected as they are at present; and also would enable the ignorant natives to control the situation through the ballot, freehold qualification being waived, all of which would be highly prejudicial to American interest.

The fact is, to form a new reactionary constitution for these Islands and restore arbitrary power to the King would not only be highly disastrous to American interest, but to the prosperity of these Islands, and the people also; but the Anglo-Saxon race here, with intelligence and civilization behind them, move irresistibly forward on their march to democracy, and it is only a question of time when a more liberal government will be formed; as the sentiment is universally expressed that, should the present King die, or the new constitution be formed, giving him absolute power, go into effect, he would then be dethroned and a republic declared, and should the sworn league that existed in 1887 be reorganized they could control these Islands without any outside assistance whatever, it being composed entirely of whites, and all natives being strictly excluded.

I must mention here that the English residents at this place, although numerically much less than the Americans, have one great advantage over them, whether acting politically or otherwise, and that is, whenever there is any matter that is of advantage to them, politically, commercially, or otherwise, they bury all social or personal feeling and act together as a unit, thus giving them a great advantage over the Americans in any matter that concerns their interest.

Unfortunately for the interest of the United States the Americans here are composed of two parties or factions, between whom there seems to be no feeling of unity, socially, politically, or otherwise.

One of these factions is that composed of the old Puritanical stock, whose ideas are very rigid regarding social proprieties, observance of the Sabbath, etc., and whom, I must say, are rather intolerant of the other Americans, who may be termed the society set of these islands; and although they possess an equal degree of intelligence, brains, etc., as their more rigid brethren, they are looked upon by them as being rather frivolous and not setting a proper example to the native element, whereas they take as much interest in furthering the views of our Government as the other faction, although their strong social differences prevent them from acting together, like the English, and placing American interests at a great disadvantage whenever a question of political or commercial advantage arises between American and English interests.

Mr. C. W. Ashford, ex-attorney-general of the late cabinet, changed his politics previous to the dissolution of the late cabinet, and in doing so lost the confidence of both parties; consequently he is eliminated as a factor for producing further trouble, as he did formerly.

Mr. R. Wilcox, another great agitator, still possesses great influence among the native element, and, although lately in public speeches he advocates a quiet settlement of difficulties, he is not to be trusted.

At present the leading spirit of the disturbing element is the Hon. J. E. Bush, a member of the Legislature, but as he is not a military man therefore I do not think he would prove a successful leader in case of any disturbance, as what is termed a revolution at this place would be called a street riot in the United States, and a few hundred men led by a determined man could easily quell any such so-called revolution, and one such lesson to them would be highly beneficial to their future welfare.

Although the different representatives of the different governments here apprehend serious trouble I do not think the situation alarming as a new constitution can not be formed unless it passes the present Legislature, then it has to remain in abeyance and again be brought before the next session before going into force, and the better men of both parties being opposed to such a change I judge it will be quietly settled without resort to force.

The only trouble that may occur is that if the mob attempt to coerce the Legislature to vote for the new constitution, our minister, Hon. John L. Stevens, and the English commissioner, Maj. Wodehouse, propose to land the men from the Ameri-

can and British vessels of war to prevent it, and think this display of force will prevent further trouble.

As regards this movement I asked the Hon. John L. Stevens if this was not interfering with the autonomy of the Government at this place, to which he replied no, not if the Government authorities request it; so as my instructions direct me to support him with the available force at my command, and as the Department of State indicates to the minister the policy to be observed, and I am directed to act in unison with him, I shall in accordance with such instructions fully coöperate and sustain him in any action he may take, deferring to his better judgment on any question that may arise regarding international law.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FELIX MCCURLEY,

Commander U. S. N., Commanding and Senior Officer Present.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 9.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 12, 1890.

SIR: I have received your No. 7 of the 22d October last, favoring the establishment of a coal depot at Honolulu, for the use of our naval force.

A copy has been sent to the Secretary of the Navy.

I am, sir, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 10.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 3, 1890.

SIR: I have read with interest your No. 8 of the 14th ultimo relative to the political situation in Hawaii, and have made known to the Secretary of the Navy what you remark touching the arrival at Honolulu of the U. S. S. *Charleston*.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Blaine to Mr. Stevens.

No. 15.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 28, 1891.

SIR: I have received your No. 16 of the 5th instant relating to the death of King Kalakaua and the accession of Queen Liliuokalani; and your No. 18 of the 9th instant, transmitting a resolution of Hawaiian citizens expressive of the gratitude to the Government of the United States, the governor of California, and the mayor of San Francisco, and through them to the people they represent, for courtesies extended to the late King during his recent visit to California, and of their thanks to Rear-Admiral Brown and the officers and men under his command on the United States flagship *Charleston* for the attentive entertainment of his late Majesty on his way to this country, and the solicitude

and care with which his remains were returned to Honolulu on board that ship.

This Government is gratified to be apprised of the accession of Her Majesty Queen Liliuokalani, surrounded and sustained as she is by the good will and sympathy of her people; and I hasten to express on its behalf, not congratulations and good wishes alone, but the confident expectation that the high duties devolved upon her by the act of Providence will be wisely and beneficently discharged.

By his visits to this country, where he was always assured of a sincere and cordial welcome, the person of the late King had become familiar to many of the people, and his approachableness, the simplicity and amiability of his manner, and the kindness of his disposition, had rendered him the object of their friendly regard and aroused the desire, on their part, to testify their sentiments by such hospitalities as they might offer with propriety. It is, therefore, not necessary to emphasize the fact that his death among them became the cause of something more than a merely formal expression of sorrow, or that he will be long and pleasantly borne in remembrance.

The many years of friendship between his late Majesty and the Government of the United States, and the neighborhood and common interests of the Hawaiian and American peoples made it peculiarly fitting that the last honors should be paid to him, and his body be returned to his people, by officers and men of the American Navy, and on board an American ship of war.

Your address to the committee of Hawaiian citizens, at whose hands you received the copy of resolutions transmitted by you, is approved.

I am, etc.,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 28.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 9, 1891.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 30, of the 20th ultimo, in relation to the need of an American ship of war at Honolulu.

A copy of your dispatch has been transmitted to the Secretary of the Navy.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Assistant Secretary.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 29.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 16, 1891.

SIR: In connection with my No. 28 of the 9th instant I inclose herewith a copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, dated the 10th instant, announcing that the U. S. S. *Pensacola* has been directed to proceed to Honolulu, and to remain there until further ordered.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

[Inclosure in No. 29.]

*Mr. Tracy to Mr. Blaine.*NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, September 10, 1891.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge, with thanks, the receipt of your letter of the 9th instant, inclosing copy of a dispatch from the United States minister to Hawaii, presenting the necessity of an American man-of-war at Honolulu, and to inform you that the U. S. S. *Pensacola* was directed by telegram on the 7th instant to proceed to Honolulu and to remain there until further instructed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 50.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 7, 1892.

SIR: I have received your No. 56 of 21st ultimo, relative to the arrest of several prominent persons at Honolulu on a charge of treason, and have advised the Secretary of the Navy of your suggestions as to the presence of a war vessel of this Government at that port.

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

No. 57.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 29, 1892.

SIR: I have received your No. 65 (confidential) of the 14th instant, describing the deadlock existing between the Hawaiian legislature and the Queen over the constitution of a ministry, and have inclosed a copy to the Secretary of the Navy for his confidential information.

I am, etc.,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

[Confidential.]

No. 62.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 8, 1892.

SIR: Adverting to your current dispatches in relation to the course of political events in the Hawaiian Islands, many of which are marked by you "confidential," and for obvious reasons, I desire to suggest that you endeavor to separate your reports into two classes, one of which shall aim to give the narrative of public affairs in their open historical aspect, and the other to be of a strictly reserved and confidential character, reporting and commenting upon matters of personal intrigue and the like so far as you may deem necessary for my full understanding of the situation. Many of your dispatches combine these two modes of treatment to such a degree as to make their publication, in the event of a call from Congress or other occasion therefor, inexpedient, and, indeed, impracticable, without extended omissions.

I am, etc.,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 28, 1893.

Your dispatch, telegraphed from San Francisco, announcing revolution and establishment of a Provisional Government, was received to-day. Your course in recognizing an unopposed *de facto* government appears to have been discreet and in accordance with the facts. The rule of this Government has uniformly been to recognize and enter into relation with any actual government in full possession of effective power with the assent of the people. You will continue to recognize the new Government under such conditions. It is trusted that the change, besides conducing to the tranquility and welfare of the Hawaiian Islands, will tend to draw closer the intimate ties of amity and common interests which so conspicuously and necessarily link them to the United States. You will keep in constant communication with the commander of the United States naval force at Honolulu, with a view to acting, if need be, for the protection of the interests and property of American citizens and aiding in the preservation of good order under the changed condition reported.

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

No. 71.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 11, 1893.

SIR: Your cipher telegram, dated the 1st instant, and transmitted through the Navy Department's good offices, was received here at 4:30 p. m. on the 9th instant.

You therein make the following important statement:

To-day, at 9 a.m., in accordance with the request of the Provisional Government of Hawaii, I have placed Government of Hawaii under the United States protection during negotiations, not interfering with the execution of public affairs.

The precise character and scope of the act thus announced by you do not appear from this brief recital. The press, however, prints full details of the occurrences of the 1st instant, as telegraphed from San Francisco on the arrival of the mail steamer *Australa* at that port on the morning of the 9th, and I therein find what purports, with appearance of general correctness, to be the text of a proclamation issued by you on the 1st instant, which reads as follows:

By authority, to the Hawaiian people:

At the request of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, I hereby, in the name of the United States of America, assume protection of the Hawaiian Islands for the protection of life and property, and occupation of the public buildings and Hawaiian soil, so far as may be necessary for the purpose specified, but not interfering with the administration of public affairs by the Provisional Government. This action is taken pending and subject to negotiations at Washington.

JOHN L. STEVENS,

*Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.*UNITED STATES LEGATION, *February 1, 1893.*

Approved and executed by C. C. Wiltse, captain U. S. N., commanding U. S. S. *Boston*.

The manner and degree of the execution of your proclamation by the naval force are not related with particularity in a brief telegraphic report just received from Capt. Wiltse. He merely says:

To-day at 9 a. m., in accordance with request of Provisional Government of Hawaii, the United States minister plenipotentiary placed the Government of Hawaii under United States protection during negotiations, not interfering with the execution of public affairs.

It appears from the press reports that the ceremonial for the execution of your orders consisted in the landing of a battalion from the *Boston*, its formation at the Government building in concert with three volunteer companies of the Provisional Government, the reading of your proclamation by Lieut. Rush, and the hoisting of the United States flag over the Government building. The Hawaiian flag on other public buildings in Honolulu is stated not to have been disturbed.

The phraseology of your proclamation in announcing your action in assumption of protection of the Hawaiian Islands in the name of the United States would appear to be tantamount to the assumption of a protectorate over those Islands in behalf of the United States with all the rights and obligations which the term implies. To this extent it goes beyond the necessities of the situation and the instructions heretofore given you.

Your existing instructions, and those under which the commanders of naval vessels of the United States act, were and are ample to provide all legitimate material protection in case of need, either in your discretion or at the request of the duly constituted authorities of the Hawaiian Islands, for the lives and property of American citizens endangered or menaced, or for the prevention of lawless and tumultuous acts of disturbance of the public peace and safety. The accordance of such measures of protection, or the unsolicited taking of the needful precautions to those ends, is, however, not to be confounded with the establishment of a protectorate, which is, in fact, the positive erection of a paramount authority over or in place of the duly constituted local government and the assumption by the protector of the especial responsibilities attaching to such formal protection.

It is not thought probable that the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, in soliciting protection, contemplated more than the coöperation of the moral and material forces of the United States to strengthen its own authority and power as a recognized sovereign Government for the protection of life and property, as stated in your proclamation. Such a degree of protection you were, as I have said, already fully competent to accord, or to exercise in your discretion in case of need.

Your proclamation expresses no reservation as to confirmation of your action by the Government of the United States. Its provisos are, that the assumed function of protection is to be exercised so far as may be necessary for the specified purpose of protecting life and property, without interference with the administration of public affairs by the Provisional Government, and that the action in question "is taken pending and subject to negotiations at Washington." These qualifications are entirely in the line of my views of the scope and intent of the request made to you by the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands. The omission of reference to the necessary sanction of the Government of the United States is immaterial, for its function of revision and confirmation or disavowal of the acts of its agents is inherent and exercisable at its discretion.

So far, therefore, as your action amounts to according, at the request of the *de facto* sovereign Government of the Hawaiian Islands, the coöperation of the moral and material forces of the United States for the protection of life and property from apprehended disorders, your action is commended. But so far as it may appear to overstep that limit by setting the authority and power of the United States above that of the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, in the capacity of protector, or to impair in any way the independent sovereignty of the Hawaiian Government by substituting the flag and power of the United States as the symbol and manifestation of paramount authority, it is disavowed.

Instructions will be sent to the commanding officers of the United States naval forces in the Hawaiian Islands confirming and renewing the instructions heretofore given them under which they are authorized and directed to coöperate with you for the preservation of American life and property, and the maintenance of good order in case of need. Your own instructions in the same sense are continued.

You are accordingly authorized, upon the receipt of these instructions, to arrange with the commanding naval officer for the continued presence on shore of such marine force as may be practicable and requisite for the security of the lives and property interests of citizens of the United States, and the repression of lawlessness and public disturbance threatening them, whenever in your judgment it shall be necessary so to do, or when such coöperative measures may be sought for good cause by the Government of the Hawaiian Islands; being, however, always careful to make due discrimination between these functions of voluntary or accorded protection and the assumption of a protectorate over the Hawaiian Islands by the United States. No step should be taken by you, or will be sanctioned by this Government, which might tend to derogate in anyway from the independence of the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, which the United States have recognized as sovereign and with which they treat on terms of sovereign equality.

A telegraphic instruction briefly outlining the substance of this dispatch, will be sent to you, by way of San Francisco, by the mail steamer sailing from that port on the 15th instant.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 14, 1893.

Your telegram of the 1st instant has been received, with coincident report from commander of the *Boston*. Press telegrams from San Francisco give full details of events of 1st instant, with text of your proclamation. The latter, in announcing assumption of protection of the Hawaiian Islands in the name of the United States, would seem to be tantamount to the assumption of a protectorate over those Islands on behalf of the United States, with all the rights and obligations which the term implies. It is not thought, however, that the request of the Provisional Government for protection, or your action in com-

pliance therewith, contemplated more than the coöperation of the moral and material forces of the United States to strengthen the authority of the Provisional Government, by according to it adequate protection for life and property during the negotiations instituted here, and without interfering with the execution of public affairs. Such coöperation was and is within your standing instructions and those of the naval commanders in Hawaiian waters. So far as your course accords to the *de facto* sovereign Government the material coöperation of the United States for the maintenance of good order and protection of life and property from apprehended disorders, it is commended; but so far as it may appear to overstep that limit by setting the authority of the United States above that of the Hawaiian Government, in the capacity of protector, or to impair the independent sovereignty of that Government by substituting the flag and power of the United States, it is disavowed.

Instructions will be sent to naval commanders, confirming and renewing those heretofore given them, under which they are authorized and directed to coöperate with you in case of need. Your own instructions are likewise renewed and you are accordingly authorized to arrange with the commanding officer for the continued presence on shore of such marine force as may be practicable and requisite for the security of the lives and property interests of American citizens and the repression of lawlessness threatening them whenever in your judgment it shall be necessary so to do, or when such coöperation may be sought for good cause by the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, being, however, always careful to distinguish between these functions of voluntary or accorded protection and the assumption of a protectorate over the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, which the United States have recognized as sovereign and with which they treat on terms of sovereign equality.

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 15, 1893.

A treaty of annexation has been signed and will be sent to the Senate without delay.

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 15, 1893.

The President tenders his heartfelt condolences by reason of your great bereavement. I add my tribute of sincere sorrow.

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

No. 72.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 16, 1893.

SIR: I append copies of my telegrams to you of the 15th instant in relation to your recent bereavement and to the treaty annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States.

I am, etc.,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

No. 73.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 16, 1893.

SIR: I append on the overleaf a copy of a telegram sent to you on the 14th instant relative to the Hawaiian revolution.

I am, etc.,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 74.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 17, 1893.

SIR: I append for your information copy of an instruction to the consul-general at Honolulu, of this date, directing him to report fully as to the shipping under Hawaiian registry on the 17th day of January, 1893, and any transfer of vessels to the Hawaiian flag which may have been or may be affected since that date.

You will kindly lend Mr. Severance your counsel and aid in preparing the indicated report.

I suggest, moreover, for your confidential guidance, that it may be well for you to make such friendly and discreet intimation to the present Government as may discourage the placing of foreign shipping under its flag at this juncture.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

[Inclosure in No. 74.]

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Severance.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 17, 1893.

SIR: I have to request that you will prepare at as early a day as may be possible, and forward to the Department, a table showing all vessels, bona fide, under Hawaiian registry on the 17th of January last, giving names, character, tonnage, horse power, if steamers, where and when built, and how owned at that date, whether by Hawaiian citizens or foreigners.

You will also be expected to report what vessels, if any, have been or may be transferred from foreign registry to the Hawaiian flag since the 17th of January, giving the same particulars.

It is said, but with what positive foundation is not here known, that a movement is on foot to place a number of foreign vessels under the Hawaiian registry with a view to eventually obtaining the benefits of United States registry. Your inquiries, which should be discreet, and your report should aim to throw light on this subject.

The minister has been informed of this instruction, and you may confer with him on the subject.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 22, 1893.

The treaty of annexation still pending in Senate. In addition to previous instructions you will, in coöperation with naval authorities, support Provisional Government in maintaining security to life and property and good order until action can be taken on treaty.

FOSTER.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 76.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 24, 1893.

SIR: I append a copy of a telegram sent you on 22d instant.

I am, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Wharton to Mr. Stevens.

No. 77.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 2, 1893.

SIR: I transmit a letter of the President in reply to the letter of January 24, 1893, of His Excellency the President of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, relating to political events, and a copy thereof. You will send the copy to the foreign offices and deliver the original at a time and in a manner agreeable to His Excellency.

I am, sir, etc.,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

[Inclosure in No. 77.]

President Harrison to President Dole.

BENJAMIN HARRISON, President of the United States of America, to His Excellency
SANFORD B. DOLE, President of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian
Islands:

GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND: I have received your letter of January 24, 1893, by which you inform me that the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands has been quietly and peaceably established under a proclamation formally and publicly made at the door of the Government building in Honolulu, on the 17th day of January, 1893, and that the said Government has honored you with the office of President of the Provisional Government and chairman of the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

I am pleased to note the expression of your earnest desire to maintain and strengthen the strong friendship which has for so many years existed between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands, and to assure Your Excellency that I shall omit no effort which may conduce to the accomplishment of a purpose which I so heartily desire.

May God have Your Excellency and the people of the Hawaiian Islands in His wise keeping.

Your good friend,

BENJ. HARRISON.

By the President:

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary of State.

WASHINGTON, *March 1, 1893.*

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Blount.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 11, 1893.

Hon. JAMES H. BLOUNT, *etc.*:

SIR: The situation created in the Hawaiian Islands by the recent deposition of Queen Liliuokalani and the erection of a Provisional Government demands the fullest consideration of the President, and in order to obtain trustworthy information on this subject, as well as for the discharge of other duties herein specified, he has decided to dispatch you to the Hawaiian Islands as his special commissioner, in which capacity you will herewith receive a commission and also a letter, whereby the President accredits you to the president of the executive and advisory councils of the Hawaiian Islands.

The comprehensive, delicate, and confidential character of your mission can now only be briefly outlined, the details of its execution being necessarily left, in a great measure, to your good judgment and wise discretion.

You will investigate and fully report to the President all the facts you can learn respecting the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, the causes of the revolution by which the Queen's Government was overthrown, the sentiment of the people toward existing authority, and, in general, all that can fully enlighten the President touching the subjects of your mission.

To enable you to fulfill this charge, your authority in all matters touching the relations of this Government to the existing or other government of the Islands, and the protection of our citizens therein, is paramount, and in you alone, acting in coöperation with the commander of the naval forces, is vested full discretion and power to determine when such forces should be landed or withdrawn.

You are, however, authorized to avail yourself of such aid and information as you may desire from the present minister of the United States at Honolulu, Mr. John L. Stevens, who will continue until further notice to perform the usual functions attaching to his office not inconsistent with the powers intrusted to you. An instruction will be sent to Mr. Stevens directing him to facilitate your presentation to the head of the Government upon your arrival, and to render you all needed assistance.

The withdrawal from the Senate of the recently signed treaty of annexation, for reëxamination by the President, leaves its subject-matter in abeyance, and you are not charged with any duty in respect thereto. It may be well, however, for you to dispel any possible misapprehension which its withdrawal may have excited touching the entire friendliness of the President and the Government of the United States toward the people of the Hawaiian Islands or the earnest solicitude here felt for their welfare, tranquillity, and progress.

Historical precedents and the general course of the United States authorize the employment of its armed force in foreign territory for the security of the lives and property of American citizens, and for the repression of lawless and tumultuous acts threatening them; and the powers conferred to that end upon the representatives of the United States are both necessary and proper, subject always to the exercise of a sound discretion in their application.

In the judgment of the President your authority, as well as that of the commander of the naval forces in Hawaiian waters, should be, and is, limited in the use of the physical force to such measures as are necessary to protect the persons and property of our citizens; and while abstaining from any manner of interference with the domestic concerns of the Islands, you should indicate your willingness to intervene with your friendly offices in the interest of a peaceful settlement of troubles within the limits of sound discretion.

Should it be necessary to land an armed force upon Hawaiian territory on occasions of popular disturbance, when the local authority may be unable to afford adequate protection to the life and property of citizens of the United States, the assent of such authority should first be obtained, if it can be done without prejudice to the interests involved. Your power in this regard should not, however, be claimed to the exclusion of similar measures by the representatives of other powers for the protection of the lives and property of their citizens or subjects residing in the Islands.

While the United States claim no right to interfere in the political or domestic affairs or in the internal conflicts of the Hawaiian Islands otherwise than as herein stated, or for the purpose of maintaining any treaty or other rights which they possess, this Government will adhere to its consistent and established policy in relation to them, and it will not acquiesce in domestic interference by other powers.

The foregoing general exposition of the President's views will indicate the safe courses within which your action should be shaped and mark the limits of your discretion in calling upon the naval commander for coöperation.

The United States revenue cutter *Rush* is under orders to await you at San Francisco and convey you to Honolulu.

A stenographic clerk will be detailed to accompany you and remain subject to your orders.

It is expected that you will use all convenient dispatch for the fulfillment of your mission, as it is the President's wish to have the

results before him at the earliest possible day. Besides the connected report you are expected to furnish you will from time to time, as occasion may offer, correspond with the Secretary of State, communicating information or soliciting special instruction on such points as you may deem necessary. In case of urgency you may telegraph, either in plain text or in the cipher of the Navy Department, through the kind offices of the admiral commanding, which may be sent to Mr. W. A. Cooper, United States dispatch agent at San Francisco, to be transmitted.

Reposing the amplest confidence in your ability and zeal for the realization of the trust thus confided to you,

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Stevens.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 11, 1893.

SIR: With a view to obtaining the fullest possible information in regard to the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, the President has determined to send to Honolulu, as his Special Commissioner, the honorable James H. Blount, lately chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Blount bears credential letters in that capacity addressed to the president of the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government, and you are requested to facilitate his presentation.

In all matters pertaining to the existing or other Government of the Islands the authority of Mr. Blount is paramount. As regards the conduct of the usual business of the legation, you are requested to continue until further notice in the performance of your official functions, so far as they may not be inconsistent with the special powers confided to Mr. Blount. You are also requested to aid him in the fulfillment of his important mission by furnishing any desired assistance and information, and the archives of the legation should be freely accessible to him.

Mr. Blount is fully instructed touching his relations to the commanding officer of the United States naval force in Hawaiian waters.

I am, etc.,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Severance.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 11, 1893.

SIR: With a view to obtaining the fullest possible information in regard to the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, the President sends to Honolulu, as his special commissioner, the honorable James H. Blount, lately chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

You are requested to aid Mr. Blount in the fulfillment of his important mission by furnishing any desired assistance and information; and the archives of the consulate-general should be freely accessible to him.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Stevens.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, April 25, 1893.

In view of your tender of resignation dated March 7 and of your dispatch 94 of April 4, I am directed by the President to inform you that your resignation is accepted. You are therefore authorized to quit your post at your early convenience, leaving the archives and property of the legation in custody of Consul-General Severance without diplomatic functions.

GRESHAM.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Blount.

No. 1.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 22, 1893.

SIR: The President having appointed you to be envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States to the Hawaiian Islands, I herewith transmit the following papers:

1. Your commission in that capacity.
2. A letter of credence addressed to His Excellency Sanford B. Dole, President of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, with an office copy of the same. This latter you will deliver to the minister for foreign affairs upon asking, through him, an audience with his excellency for the purpose of presenting the original.
3. A copy of the printed personal instructions prescribed by this Department for the government of the diplomatic officers abroad.
4. A special passport for yourself and suite.
5. A register of the Department of State.

Your compensation, as fixed by law, will be at the rate of \$7,500 a year, for which you will draw upon this Department, quarterly, as it becomes due. You will also be allowed \$1,000 per annum on account of rent and contingent expenses of the legation, and will draw for the same quarterly, as above.

You are particularly referred to the printed personal instructions for detailed information and directions as to the mode of drawing your salary and rendering your accounts, as well as for the regulations relating to the expenditures of your legation.

To become properly conversant with the business of the legation, you will have recourse to the correspondence between this Department and your predecessors in the mission recorded in its archives. Special instructions on important subjects between the two Governments will be sent to you from time to time as occasion may require.

The Department entertains the confidence that your intelligent and zealous attention to the interests of the United States, now confided to your care, will be conducive to the harmony and friendly relations existing between the Governments of the two countries.

You will execute the necessary oath of office, herewith inclosed, and return it to the Department.

Your salary as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary begins from that date.

I am, etc.,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Inclosures: (1) Commission; (2) letter of credence and office copy; (3) printed personal instructions; (4) a special passport for yourself and suite; (5) Department of State Register; (6) oath of office.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Blount.

No. 2.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 22, 1893.

SIR: I inclose herewith the letter of the President recalling Mr. John L. Stevens, your predecessor in the mission to the Hawaiian Islands, with an office copy of the same.

Mr. Stevens, having taken his departure from Honolulu, you will, at the same time you ask an audience for the purpose of presenting your letters of credence, request the privilege of delivering Mr. Steven's letters of recall in view of his departure before they could reach him.

I am, etc.,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Blount.

No. 5.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 23, 1893.

SIR: I transmit for your information a copy of a note of the minister of Hawaii, touching the recall by the Provisional Government of the commission appointed last January, for the purpose of negotiating terms for the union of the Hawaiian Islands with the United States, and announcing his readiness to resume the subject at any convenient time.

I am, etc.

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Mr. Adee to Mr. Willis.

No. 2.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
Washington, September 28, 1893.

SIR: I inclose herewith a letter from the President recalling Mr. James H. Blount as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States to the Hawaiian Islands, with an office copy thereof. This letter you will present to the President of the Provisional Government, with your letter of credence, having previously sent the copy to the foreign office, and explain that Mr. Blount is unable to present it in person by reason of his having resigned the office while in the United States.

I am, etc.,

ALVEY A. ADEE,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Willis.

[Confidential.]

No. 4.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, October 18, 1893.

SIR: Supplementing the general instructions* which you have received with regard to your official duties, it is necessary to communicate to you, in confidence, special instructions for your guidance in so far as

*Similar to the instructions sent to Mr. Blount under date of May 22, 1893.

concerns the relation of the Government of the United States towards the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

The President deemed it his duty to withdraw from the Senate the treaty of annexation which has been signed by the Secretary of State and the agents of the Provisional Government, and to dispatch a trusted representative to Hawaii to impartially investigate the causes of the so-called revolution and ascertain and report the true situation in those Islands. This information was needed the better to enable the President to discharge a delicate and important public duty.

The instructions given to Mr. Blount, of which you are furnished with a copy, point out a line of conduct to be observed by him in his official and personal relations on the Islands, by which you will be guided so far as they are applicable and not inconsistent with what is herein contained.

It remains to acquaint you with the President's conclusions upon the facts embodied in Mr. Blount's reports and to direct your course in accordance therewith.

The Provisional Government was not established by the Hawaiian people or with their consent or acquiescence, nor has it since existed with their consent. The Queen refused to surrender her powers to the Provisional Government until convinced that the minister of the United States had recognized it as the *de facto* authority and would support and defend it with the military force of the United States, and that resistance would precipitate a bloody conflict with that force. She was advised and assured by her ministers and by leaders of the movement for the overthrow of her Government that if she surrendered under protest her case would afterwards be fairly considered by the President of the United States. The Queen finally wisely yielded to the armed forces of the United States then quartered in Honolulu, relying upon the good faith and honor of the President, when informed of what had occurred, to undo the action of the minister and reinstate her and the authority which she claimed as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

After a patient examination of Mr. Blount's report the President is satisfied that the movement against the Queen, if not instigated, was encouraged and supported by the representative of this Government at Honolulu; that he promised in advance to aid her enemies in an effort to overthrow the Hawaiian Government and set up by force a new government in the place, and that he kept this promise by causing a detachment of troops to be landed from the *Boston* on the 16th of January, and by recognizing the Provisional Government the next day when it was too feeble to defend itself, and the Constitutional Government was able to successfully maintain its authority against any threatening force other than that of the United States already landed.

The President has, therefore, determined that he will not send back to the Senate for its action thereon the treaty which he withdrew from that body for further consideration on the 9th day of March last.

On your arrival at Honolulu you will take advantage of an early opportunity to inform the Queen of this determination, making known to her the President's sincere regret that the reprehensible conduct of the American minister and the unauthorized presence on land of a military force of the United States obliged her to surrender her sovereignty for the time being and rely on the justice of this Government to undo the flagrant wrong.

You will, however, at the same time inform the Queen that when reinstated the President expects that she will pursue a magnanimous

course by granting full amnesty to all who participated in the movement against her, including persons who are or have been officially or otherwise connected with the Provisional Government, depriving them of no right or privilege which they enjoyed before the so-called revolution. All obligations created by the Provisional Government in due course of administration should be assumed.

Having secured the Queen's agreement to pursue this wise and humane policy, which it is believed you will speedily obtain, you will then advise the executive of the Provisional Government and his ministers of the President's determination of the question which their action and that of the Queen developed upon him, and that they are expected to promptly relinquish to her her constitutional authority.

Should the Queen decline to pursue the liberal course suggested, or should the Provisional Government refuse to abide by the President's decision, you will report the facts and wait further directions.

In carrying out the general instructions, you will be guided largely by your own good judgment in dealing with the delicate situation.

I am, etc.,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Willis.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, November 24, 1893.

The brevity and uncertainty of your telegrams are embarrassing. You will insist upon amnesty and recognition of obligations of the Provisional Government as essential conditions of restoration. All interests will be promoted by prompt action.

W. Q. GRESHAM.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Willis.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, December 3, 1893.

SIR: Your dispatch, which was answered by steamer on the 25th of November, seems to call for additional instructions.

Should the Queen refuse assent to the written conditions you will at once inform her that the President will cease interposition in her behalf, and that while he deems it his duty to endeavor to restore to the sovereign the constitutional government of the Islands, his further efforts in that direction will depend upon the Queen's unqualified agreement that all obligations created by the Provisional Government in a proper course of administration shall be assumed, and upon such pledges by her as will prevent the adoption of any measures of proscription or punishment for what has been done in the past by those setting up or supporting the Provisional Government. The President feels that by our original interference and what followed we have incurred responsibilities to the whole Hawaiian community, and it would not be just to put one party at the mercy of the other.

Should the Queen ask whether, if she accedes to conditions, active steps will be taken by the United States to effect her restoration, or to maintain her authority thereafter, you will say that the President can not use force without the authority of Congress.

Should the Queen accept conditions, and the Provisional Government refuse to surrender, you will be governed by previous instructions. If the Provisional Government asks whether the United States will hold the Queen to fulfillment of stipulated conditions you will say the President, acting under dictates of honor and duty as he has done in endeavoring to effect restoration, will do all in his constitutional power to cause observance of the conditions he has imposed.

I am, etc.,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

NAVAL INSTRUCTIONS.

S. Rep. 227—126

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., December 12, 1893.

TO THE PRESIDENT:

I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of all instructions given to naval officers of the United States with reference to affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, from March 4, 1881, up to the present time.

I have the honor to be, with great respect,

Very respectfully,

W. MCADOO,
Acting Secretary of the Navy.

LIST OF INSTRUCTIONS

Mr. Chandler to Rear-Admiral Balch, June 6, 1882.
Mr. Chandler to Mr. Frelinghuysen, June 7, 1882.
Mr. Chandler to Rear-Admiral Balch, October 19, 1882.
Mr. Chandler to Mr. Frelinghuysen, May 3, 1883.
Mr. Whitney to American consul at Panama, cablegram, June 24, 1887.
Mr. Whitney to commander-in-chief Pacific Station, July 12, 1887.
Mr. Harmony to Rear-Admiral Kimberly, November 11, 1887.
Mr. Tracy to Rear-Admiral Kimberly, September 13, 1889.
Same to same, December 2, 1889.
Mr. Tracy to Rear-Admiral Brown, May 15, 1890.
Same to same, June 20, 1890.
Mr. Tracy to commanding officer *Mohican*, telegram, August 23, 1890.
Mr. Tracy to Rear-Admiral Brown, telegram, August 27, 1890.
Mr. Ramsay to Rear-Admiral Brown, January 20, 1891.
Mr. Tracy to Rear-Admiral Brown, telegram, January 21, 1891.
Same to same, telegram, January 21, 1891.
Same to same, January 22, 1891.
Same to same, telegram, January 24, 1891.
Same to same, March 11, 1891.
Mr. Ramsay to Rear-Admiral Brown, March 25, 1891.
Mr. Tracy to commanding officer *Iroquois*, June 26, 1891.
Mr. Tracy to commander-in-chief Pacific Station, September 8, 1891.
Mr. Tracy to commanding officer *Boston*, July 15, 1892.
Mr. Soley to commanding officer *Boston*, telegram, August 16, 1892.
Mr. Ramsay to commanding officer *Boston*, telegram, September 2, 1892.
Mr. Ramsay to Admiral Harmony, telegram, September 2, 1892.
Mr. Ramsay to Rear-Admiral Brown, telegram, September 13, 1892.
Same to same, telegram, September 15, 1892.
Same to same, telegram, September 21, 1892.
Mr. Tracy to Rear-Admiral Brown, September 28, 1892.
Mr. Tracy to commanding officer *Alliance*, telegram, October 11, 1892.
Mr. Tracy to Admiral Skerrett, telegram, January 28, 1893.
Same to same, telegram, February 14, 1893.
Mr. Tracy to commander-in-chief Pacific Station, February 14, 1893.
Mr. Ramsay to commanding officer *Boston*, February 17, 1893.
Mr. Herbert to Admiral Skerrett, March 11, 1893.
Same to same, telegram, April 8, 1893.
Mr. McAdoo to commander-in-chief Pacific Station, May 10, 1893.
Mr. Herbert to Pay-Inspector Lyons, telegram, August 16, 1893.
Mr. Herbert to commander-in-chief Pacific Station, August 18, 1893.
Mr. Herbert to Admiral Skerrett, telegram, September 27, 1893.
Same to same, telegram, October 9, 1893.
Mr. Herbert to Rear-Admiral Irwin, telegram, October 10, 1893.



NAVAL INSTRUCTIONS.

Secretary Chandler to Rear-Admiral Balch.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, June 6, 1882.

SIR: I inclose for your information a copy of a dispatch from Gen. Comly, United States minister resident at Honolulu, addressed to the honorable the Secretary of State, and have to direct that you send one of the vessels of your squadron to Honolulu for a reasonable visit, and to other ports of the Hawaiian Kingdom, if thought advisable, after which you will make such disposition of that vessel as the needs of the station may dictate. It is not thought advisable for the flagship to leave the west coast of South America at present. You will therefore detail the *Alaska* or *Lackawanna* for the services indicated above.

Very respectfully,

WM. E. CHANDLER,
Secretary of the Navy.

Rear-Admiral GEORGE B. BALCH,
Commanding United States Naval Force on Pacific Station.

Secretary Chandler to Secretary Frelinghuysen.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, June 7, 1882.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your confidential letter of the 2d instant, and the copy of the dispatch of the 8th ultimo, with accompanying papers, from the United States minister resident at Honolulu. Instructions have been given Rear-Admiral George B. Balch, commanding our naval force in the Pacific, to send one of the vessels of the squadron to the Hawaiian Islands, in compliance with your suggestion.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. E. CHANDLER,
Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. FREDK. T. FRELINGHUYSEN,
Secretary of State.

Secretary Chandler to Rear-Admiral Balch.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, October 19, 1882.

SIR: The coronation of the King of the Hawaiian Islands is fixed for the 12th of February next. It is desirable that at least two of our vessels of war should go to Honolulu some time previous to that date and remain until after the ceremony, and as much longer as may be deemed advisable, their movements being governed to a proper extent by the opinions and advice of the United States minister.

You will give the necessary orders to carry these instructions into effect.

Very respectfully,

WM. E. CHANDLER,
Secretary of the Navy.

Rear-Admiral GEORGE B. BALCH, U. S. Navy,
Commanding United States Naval Force on Pacific Station.

Secretary Chandler to Secretary Frelinghuysen.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, May 3, 1883.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of April 28, transmitting copy of dispatch of April 6 from Mr. Daggett, United States minister resident at Honolulu, giving reasons why a United States naval vessel should at all times remain within the limits of the Hawaiian Kingdom. In reply, I have to say that this Department, while unable to keep a vessel constantly at Honolulu, will give such directions as to insure one of its vessels visiting Honolulu at as frequent intervals as practicable.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. E. CHANDLER,
Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. FREDERICK T. FRELINGHUYSEN,
Secretary of State.

[Cablegram.]

JUNE 24, 1887.

AMERICAN CONSUL, Panama.
(Via Galvestou.)

Wire Kimberly deemed advisable he go Sandwich Islands in near future. Adams instructed await his arrival.

WHITNEY.

Secretary Whitney to Commander-in-Chief, United States Naval Force, Pacific Station.

JULY 12, 1887.

SIR: In view of the reported unsettled condition of political affairs in the Hawaiian Kingdom, the Department is very desirous that there should be a cordial and coöperative understanding between our minister at Honolulu and the commanding officer of the naval force on

the Pacific station. The Department of State will indicate to the minister the policy which it is desirable to be observed, and in order that the views of our Government may be discreetly and properly sustained, you will be pleased to keep yourself in constant communication with Mr. Morrill, supporting him if necessary with the available force under your command.

Very respectfully,

W. C. WHITNEY,
Secretary of the Navy.

The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
United States Naval Force, Pacific Station.

Acting Secretary Harmony to Rear-Admiral Kimberly.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 11, 1887.

SIR: Under the late treaty between this Government and that of the Hawaiian Islands the United States has acquired certain rights in Pearl Harbor, Island of Oahu. For the present it is deemed advisable for such ships of your squadron as practicable to remain at the Sandwich Islands. While there you will be pleased to have Pearl Harbor examined, particularly at the entrance, the extent of artificial channel which it will be necessary to cut and the best point for such work determined, and an estimate made of its cost. At the same time you will procure as full information as possible with regard to the rights of private individuals in Pearl Harbor, together with any other information bearing upon the general subject that you may be able to collect, and forward the whole to the Navy Department for the information of this Government.

The *Marion*, now at Panama, has been ordered to touch at various Central American and Mexican ports as far north as Acapulco, from which point she is to proceed to the Sandwich Islands to remain a reasonable time before proceeding to Yokohama to report for duty on the Asiatic station. Similar orders will probably be issued to the *Omaha* in March next.

Very respectfully,

D. B. HARMONY,
Acting Secretary of the Navy.

Rear-Admiral L. A. KIMBERLY, U. S. Navy,
*Commanding United States Force on Pacific Station,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.*

Secretary Tracy to Rear-Admiral Kimberly.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *September 13, 1889.*

SIR: The Department incloses herewith, for your information, a copy of a cipher message sent you yesterday by wire, through the United States consul at Auckland, N. Z.

Very respectfully,

B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy.

Rear-Admiral L. A. KIMBERLY, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Pacific Station, Apia, Samoa.

*Secretary Tracy to Rear-Admiral Kimberly.*NAVY DEPARTMENT, *November 13, 1889.*

SIR: Referring to your letter, No. 165, of the 18th ultimo, with reference to the political situation in the Hawaiian Islands, and in which you state that "it would promote a feeling of security to our own people, and I think to other foreigners, if at the February election we had a force here competent to preserve order should necessity arise," the Department directs that you will keep as many of the vessels of your command in Hawaiian waters as you may deem expedient for the purpose of carrying out the object in view.

A copy of a letter from the Honorable the Secretary of State, concurring in your opinion as to the desirability of such action, is inclosed herewith for your information.

Very respectfully,

B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy.

Rear-Admiral L. A. KIMBERLY,
Commanding United States Naval Force, Pacific Station.

*Secretary Tracy to Rear-Admiral Kimberly.*NAVY DEPARTMENT,
December 2, 1889.

SIR: In reply to your letter, No. 177*d*, of the 16th ultimo, expressing a desire to relinquish the command of your station at Honolulu about the 15th of January, 1890, in order that you can return to the United States by the steamer of January 17, you are informed that the Department finds it inconvenient to comply with this request, but authorizes you to proceed to San Francisco, Cal., by the steamer of January 17, and to turn over your command at that place upon the arrival of your relief.

Upon your arrival at San Francisco you are authorized to hoist your flag upon any vessel of your squadron that may be in that port.

Very respectfully,

B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy.

Rear-Admiral L. A. KIMBERLY, U. S. Navy.
*Commanding Pacific Station,
U. S. F. S. Mohican, Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.*

*Secretary Tracy to Admiral Brown.*NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, May 15, 1890.

SIR: The Department deems it advisable that you give up, for the present, your projected cruise along the coast of Central and South America, and that you proceed, without delay, to the Sandwich Islands.

Inclosed are copies of two confidential papers received from the State Department, which will inform you of matters that need your consideration.

The Department desires that you will carefully study the situation at these islands, and relies upon your discretion in looking after our interests. Any change of policy on the part of the Hawaiian Government, or any matter which may affect the policy of this Government, should be immediately reported.

Very respectfully,

B. F. TRACY.

[Inclosures.]

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine. Confidential letter (No. 20), United States legation; Honolulu, March 20, 1890.

Mr. Cleghorn to Mr. Damon. Letter, Honolulu, March 13, 1890.

Secretary Tracy to Admiral Brown.

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1890.

SIR: The Department has received your letter 203, of the 5th instant, and has to say that your interpretation of its order of the 15th ultimo to remain in Hawaiian waters until further instructed is correct.

Very respectfully,

B. F. TRACY.

Secretary Tracy to commanding officer Mohican.

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, August 23, 1890.

SHEPARD,
American Steamer Mohican,
Sydney, Australia.

Go to Honolulu.

TRACY.

Secretary Tracy to Admiral Brown.

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1890.

Admiral BROWN,
Flagship Charleston,
Seattle, Wash.:

Proceed with all dispatch to Honolulu, Hawaii. Keep your movements and intentions secret.

TRACY.

Commodore Ramsay to Admiral Brown.

WASHINGTON, January 20, 1891.

SIR: The following telegram was sent you yesterday:

Admiral BROWN,

Flagship Charleston,

Mare Island, Cal.:

Within how many hours can you sail for Honolulu, Hawaii?

TRACY.

Very respectfully,

F. M. RAMSAY,
Chief of Bureau.

Secretary Tracy to Admiral Brown.

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, January 21, 1891.

Rear Admiral BROWN,

Flagship Charleston, San Francisco, Cal:

San Francisco Examiner requests authority to send out reporter to Honolulu in *Charleston*. If one representative will satisfy San Francisco press, you may take if agreeable. Act as you think best.

TRACY.

Secretary Tracy to Admiral Brown.

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, January 21, 1891.

Rear-Admiral GEORGE BROWN,

Flagship Charleston, San Francisco, Cal:

When King of Hawaii's funeral takes place? It is very important you sail as soon as possible.

TRACY.

Secretary Tracy to Admiral Brown.

WASHINGTON, January 22, 1891.

Rear Admiral GEORGE BROWN,

Flagship Charleston, San Francisco, Cal:

It is important to reach Honolulu, Hawaii, as soon as possible; full speed.

TRACY.

Secretary Tracy to Admiral Brown.

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, January 24, 1891.

Will remain until further orders at Honolulu, unless affairs are settled and absolutely safe.

TRACY.

Secretary Tracy to Rear-Admiral Brown.

MARCH 11, 1891.

SIR: Referring to your dispatches Nos. 37, 39, 50, and 54, in which you give a detailed account of the services rendered by you and the officers and men under your command, in connection with the funeral of the late Hawaiian King and the ceremonies attending the accession to the throne of his successor, Queen Liliuokalani, the Department desires to express to you its high appreciation of the thorough and efficient manner in which the delicate and responsible duties connected with those events have been performed.

B. F. TRACY.

Acting Secretary Ramsay to Rear-Admiral Brown.

MARCH 25, 1891.

SIR: The Department incloses a copy of a telegram received this day from Mr. de Young, of the San Francisco Chronicle, and desires a full explanation of your action in connection with the cipher telegram sent you January 21 last, which was as follows:

The San Francisco Examiner requests authority to send out reporters to Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, in the *Charleston*. If one representative will satisfy the San Francisco press, you may take, if agreeable. Do as you think best.

F. M. RAMSAY.

Secretary Tracy to Commanding Officer Iroquois.

[Telegram.]

JUNE 26, 1891.

Proceed to Samoa as early as you can conveniently, unless in your opinion it is not advisable to leave Sandwich Islands at present time without a ship of war.

TRACY.

Secretary Tracy to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Station.

SEPTEMBER 8, 1891.

SIR: You are informed that the U. S. S. *Pensacola* has been attached to the Pacific Station under your command. The following orders were telegraphed to her commanding officer on the 7th instant:

Proceed to Honolulu, Hawaii, and guard American interests in that vicinity until further instructed. Report to Brown by letter.

B. F. TRACY.

Secretary Tracy to Commanding Officer Boston.

WASHINGTON, July 15, 1892.

SIR: As soon as the U. S. S. *Boston* is in all respects ready for sea, proceed with her to Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, and report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Station.

Respectfully,

B. F. TRACY.

Acting Secretary Soley to Commanding Officer Boston.

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1892.

*Commanding Officer Steamer Boston,
Through Commandant, Navy Yard, Mare Island, Cal.:*

Upon your arrival at Honolulu deliver following telegram:

STEVENS,

United States Minister, Honolulu:

If you have not already done so, prepare report on annexation of Johnson's Island by British steamer *Champion*, with statement of history, occupancy by American comers, and any adverse claims thereto.

FOSTER.

Acknowledge receipt.

JAMES R. SOLEY.

Commodore Ramsay to Commanding Officer Boston.

[Telegram.]

Washington, Sept. 2, 1892.

*Commanding Officer Steamer Boston, Honolulu, H. I.
(Care Navy Pay Office, San Francisco, Cal.)*

Should *Alliance* arrive at Honolulu, order her to remain there and proceed with *Boston* to San Francisco.

RAMSAY.

Commodore Ramsay to Admiral Harmony.

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, September 2, 1892.

HARMONY,
Steamer Lancaster, Yokohama, Japan:

Order *Alliance* to stop at Honolulu.

RAMSAY.

Commodore Ramsay to Admiral Brown.

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, September 13, 1892.

Rear-Admiral BROWN,
*Steamer San Francisco,
Mare Island, Cal.:*

Commandant directed to have *Alliance* ready for sea without delay and to order her to report to you. She will be attached to your squadron. Department wants her to go at once to Honolulu and relieve *Boston*. Report when *Alliance* can sail.

RAMSAY.

Commodore Ramsay to Admiral Brown.

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1892.

Rear-Admiral BROWN,
Steamer San Francisco,
Navy-yard, Mare Island, Cal.:

Department does not desire *Boston* to leave Honolulu until *Alliance* arrives. Commander Barclay will go by steamer to Honolulu to relieve Rich.

RAMSAY.

Commodore Ramsay to Admiral Brown.

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1892.

Rear-Admiral BROWN,
Steamer San Francisco, Mare Island, Cal.:

Order *Alliance* to proceed with dispatch to Honolulu. Order *Boston* upon arrival of *Alliance* to proceed to Acapulco.

RAMSAY.

Secretary Tracy to Admiral Brown.

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1892.

Commanding Officer *Steamer Boston, Honolulu,*
(Care Navy Pay Office, San Francisco, Cal.):
 Remain at Honolulu until further orders.

TRACY.

Secretary Tracy to commanding officer Alliance.

[Telegram.]

OCTOBER 11, 1892.

Commanding Officer *U. S. S. Alliance:*

(Care Navy Pay Office, San Francisco, Cal.)

Orders to Samoa revoked. Remain at Honolulu until further orders.

TRACY.

Secretary Tracy to Admiral Skerrett.

[Telegram.]

JANUARY 28, 1893.

Admiral SKERRETT,
Flagship Mohican:

(Through commandant navy-yard, Mare Island, Cal.)

When the *Mohican* is ready for sea proceed with her to Honolulu with all dispatch. The present Provisional Government of Hawaii is recognized by this Government and by all foreign governments except England. Be vigilant in protecting American interests and be prepared to meet any danger by which such interests may be threatened. Deliver to Minister Stevens, Honolulu, the following dispatch from the State Department.

TRACY

Secretary Foster to Mr. Stevens.

[Telegram.]

JOHN L. STEVENS,

United States Minister, Honolulu:

Your dispatch, telegraphed from San Francisco, announcing revolution and establishment of a provisional government, was received to-day. Your course in recognizing an unopposed *de facto* government appears to have been discreet and in accordance with the facts. The rule of this Government has uniformly been to recognize and enter into relations with any actual government in full possession of effective power with the assent of the people. You will continue to recognize the new government under such conditions. It is trusted that the change, besides conducing to the tranquility and welfare of the Hawaiian Islands, will tend to draw closer the intimate ties of amity and common interests which so conspicuously and necessarily link them to the United States. You will keep in constant communication with the commander of the United States naval force at Honolulu, with a view to acting, if need be, for the protection of the interests and property of American citizens, and aiding in the preservation of good order under the changed conditions reported.

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Acknowledge receipt of the above.

B. F. TRACY.

Secretary Tracy to Rear-Admiral Skerrett.

[Telegram.]

FEBRUARY 14, 1893.

Rear-Admiral SKERRETT,

United States Steamer Mohican, Honolulu, Hawaii:

(Through Pay Inspector Lyon, Navy Pay Office, San Francisco, Cal.)

The following is a copy of a telegram, dated February 14, from the Secretary of State to the United States minister at Honolulu, which is transmitted for your information and guidance:

Your telegram of the 1st instant has been received, with coincident report from commander of the *Boston*. Press telegrams from San Francisco give full details of events of 1st instant, with text of your proclamation. The latter, in announcing assumption of protection of the Hawaiian Islands in the name of the United States, would seem to be tantamount to the assumption of a protectorate over those islands on behalf of the United States, with all the rights and obligations which the term implies. It is not thought, however, that the request of the Provisional Government for protection, or your action in compliance therewith, contemplated more than the coöperation of the moral and material forces of the United States to strengthen the authority of the Provisional Government by according to it adequate protection for life and property during the negotiations instituted here, and without interfering with the execution of public affairs. Such coöperation was and is within your standing instructions and those of the naval commanders in Hawaiian waters.

So far as your course accords to the *de facto* sovereign government the material coöperation of the United States for the maintenance of good order and protection of life and property from apprehended disorders, it is commended; but so far as it may appear to overstep that limit by setting the authority of the United States above that of the Hawaiian Government, in the capacity of protector, or to impair the independent sovereignty of that Government by substituting the flag and power of the United States, it is disavowed.

Instructions will be sent to naval commanders, confirming and renewing those heretofore given them, under which they are authorized and directed to coöperate with you in case of need. Your own instructions are likewise renewed and you are accordingly authorized to arrange with the commanding officer for the continued presence on shore of such marine force as may be practicable and requisite for the security of the lives and property interests of American citizens and the repression of lawlessness threatening them whenever in your judgment it shall be necessary so to do, or when such coöperation may be sought for good cause by the Government of the Hawaiian Islands; being, however, always careful to distinguish between these

functions of voluntary or accorded protection and the assumption of a protectorate over the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, which the United States have recognized as sovereign and with which they treat on terms of sovereign equality.

(Signed) John W. Foster.

B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy.

Secretary Tracy to Commander in Chief Pacific Station.

FEBRUARY 14, 1893.

SIR: I have to transmit, for your information and guidance, a copy of a letter from the honorable Secretary of State to the United States minister at Honolulu, dated February 11, 1893.

Very respectfully,

B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.

[Inclosure.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 11, 1893.

SIR: Your cipher telegram, dated the 1st instant, and transmitted through the Navy Department's good offices, was received here at 4:30 p. m. on the 9th instant.

You therein make the following important statement:

"To-day at 9 a. m., in accordance with the request of the Provisional Government of Hawaii, I have placed Government of Hawaii under the United States protection during negotiations, not interfering with the execution of public affairs."

The precise character and scope of the act thus announced by you do not appear from this brief recital. The press, however, prints full details of the occurrences of the 1st instant, as telegraphed from San Francisco on the arrival of the mail steamer *Australia* at that port on the morning of the 9th, and I therein find what purports, with appearance of general correctness, to be the text of the proclamation issued by you on the 1st instant, which reads as follows:

"By authority of the Hawaiian people:

"At the request of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, I hereby, in the name of the United States of America, assume protection of the Hawaiian Islands for the protection of life and property, and occupation of the public buildings and Hawaiian soil, so far as may be necessary for the purpose specified, but not interfering with the administration of public affairs by the Provisional Government. This action is taken pending and subject to negotiations at Washington.

"JOHN L. STEVENS,

"Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

"UNITED STATES LEGATION, *February 1, 1893.*

"Approved and executed by G. C. Wiltse, captain, U. S. Navy, commanding U. S. S. *Boston.*"

The manner and degree of the execution of your proclamation by the naval force are not related with particularity in a brief telegraphic report just received from Capt. Wiltse. He merely says:

"To-day, at 9 a. m., in accordance with request of Provisional Government of Hawaii, the United States minister plenipotentiary placed the Government of Hawaii under United States protection, during negotiations, not interfering with the execution of public affairs."

It appears from the press reports that the ceremonial for the execution of your orders consisted in the landing of a battalion from the *Boston*, its formation at the Government building in concert with three volunteer companies of the Provisional Government, the reading of your proclamation by Lieut. Rush, and the hoisting of the United States flag over the Government building. The Hawaiian flag on other public buildings in Honolulu is stated not to have been disturbed.

The phraseology of your proclamation in announcing your action in assumption of protection of the Hawaiian Islands in the name of the United States would appear to be tantamount to the assumption of a protectorate over those islands in behalf of the United States with all the right and obligations which the term implies. To this extent it goes beyond the necessities of the situation, and the instructions heretofore given you.

Your existing instructions and those under which the commanders of naval vessels of the United States acted were and are ample to provide all legitimate material protection in case of need, either in your discretion or at the request of the duly-constituted authorities of the Hawaiian Islands, for the lives and property of American citizens endangered or menaced or for the prevention of lawless and tumultuous acts of disturbance of the public peace and safety. The accordance of such measures of protection or the unsolicited taking of the needful precautions to those ends is, however, not to be confounded with the establishment of a protectorate, which is in fact the positive erection of a paramount authority over or in place of the duly-constituted local government, and the assumption by the protector of the especial responsibilities attached to such formal protection.

It is not thought probable that the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, in soliciting protection, contemplated more than the coöperation of the moral and material forces of the United States to strengthen its own authority and power, as a recognized sovereign government, for the protection of life and property, as stated in your proclamation. Such a degree of protection you were, as I have said already, fully competent to accord, or to exercise in your discretion, in case of need.

Your proclamation expresses no reservation as to confirmation of your action by the Government of the United States.

Its provisos are that the assumed function of protection is to be exercised so far as may be necessary for the specified purpose of protecting life and property without interference with the administration of public affairs by the Provisional Government, and that the action in question "is taken pending and subject to negotiations at Washington."

These qualifications are entirely in the line of my views of the scope and intent of the request made to you by the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands. The omission of reference to the necessary sanction of the Government of the United States is immaterial, for its function of revision and confirmation or disavowal of the acts of its agents is inherent and exercisable at its discretion.

So far, therefore, as your action amounts to according, at the request of the *de facto* sovereign Government of the Hawaiian Islands, the coöperation of the moral and material forces of the United States for the protection of life and property from apprehended disorders, your action is commended. But so far as it may appear to overstep that limit by setting the authority and power of the United States above that of the Government of the Hawaiian Islands in the capacity of protector, or to impair in any way the independent sovereignty of the Hawaiian Government by substituting the flag and power of the United States as the symbol and manifestation of paramount authority, it is disavowed.

Instructions will be sent to the commanding officers of the United States naval forces in the Hawaiian Islands confirming and renewing the instruction heretofore given them under which they are authorized and directed to coöperate with you for the preservation of American life and property and the maintenance of good order in case of need. Your own instructions in the same sense are continued. You are accordingly authorized, upon receipt of these instructions, to arrange with the commanding naval officer for the continued presence on shore of such marine force as may be practicable and requisite for the security of the lives and property interests of the citizens of the United States and the repression of lawlessness and public disturbance threatening them whenever in your judgment it shall be necessary so to do, or when such coöperative measures may be sought for good cause by the Government of the Hawaiian Islands; being, however, always careful to make due discrimination between those functions of voluntary or accorded protection and the assumption of a protectorate over the Hawaiian Islands by the United States.

No step should be taken by you or will be sanctioned by this Government which might tend to derogate in any way from the independence of the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, which the United States have recognized as sovereign and with which they treat on terms of sovereign equality.

A telegraphic instruction, briefly outlining the substance of this dispatch, will be sent to you, by way of San Francisco, by the mail steamer sailing from that port on the 15th instant.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

JOHN L. STEVENS,
Etc., Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.

Commodore Ramsay to commanding officer Boston.

FEBRUARY 17, 1893.

SIR: The vessel under your command is detached from the squadron for special service and assigned to duty on the Pacific Station.

Report by letter to Rear-Admiral Joseph S. Skerrett, U. S. Navy, the Commander-in-Chief.

Very respectfully,

F. M. RAMSAY,
Chief of Bureau.

COMMANDING OFFICER U. S. S. BOSTON,
Honolulu, Hawaii.

Secretary Herbert to Rear-Admiral Skerrett.

MARCH 11, 1893.

SIR: This letter will be handed to you by the Hon. James H. Blount, Special Commissioner from the President of the United States to the Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

You will consult freely with Mr. Blount, and will obey any instructions you may receive from him regarding the course to be pursued at said islands by the force under your command.

You will also afford Mr. Blount all such facilities as he may desire for the use of your cipher code in communicating by telegraph with this Government.

Respectfully,

HILARY A. HERBERT,
Secretary of the Navy.

Rear-Admiral J. S. SKERRETT,
*Commander in Chief United States Naval Forces,
Pacific Station, Flagship Mohican, Honolulu, H. I.*

Secretary Herbert to Rear-Admiral Skerrett.

[Telegram.]

APRIL 8, 1893.

Rear-Admiral SKERRETT,
Honolulu, H. I.

(Care Navy Pay Office, San Francisco, Cal.):

Have *Mohican* ready for service in Bering Sea. Adams will be sent to Honolulu. Shift your flag to such vessel as you deem proper.

HERBERT.

Acting Secretary McAdoo to Commander in Chief Pacific Station.

MAY 10, 1893.

SIR: Replying to your letter of the 25th ultimo, reporting the political condition of affairs at Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, I have to invite your attention to paragraphs 9 and 10, article 1607, of the U. S. Navy Regulations, 1893.

The Department regrets the necessity which caused the detail of the *Mohican* for duty in Bering Sea, and will send a suitable flagship to the station under your command as soon as practicable.

There is no appropriation that can be drawn upon to pay the rent of a room on shore to be used as your office.

Very respectfully,

W. MCADOO,

Acting Secretary of the Navy.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC STATION,
(Care of Navy Pay Office, San Francisco, Cal.)

[Translation of cipher dispatch,]

Secretary Herbert to Pay Inspector Lyons.

NAVY PAY OFFICE,
San Francisco, August 16, 1893.

Pay Inspector LYON,

Navy Pay Office, San Francisco, Cal.:

Send following message to Admiral Skerrett, Honolulu, by first mail:

I desire to impress upon you in the absence of United States Minister Blount that your sole duty is confined to that of an officer of the Navy, although it is to be performed in the spirit of the instructions of Minister Blount, which doubtless have been seen by you. Protect American citizens and American property, but do not give aid, physical or moral, to either party contending for the government of Honolulu.

HERBERT.

Secretary Herbert to Commander in Chief Pacific Station.

AUGUST 18, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that the U. S. S. *Philadelphia* has to-day been ordered by cable to proceed from Callao, Peru, to Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, and there report to you.

Upon the arrival of the *Philadelphia* you will please order the U. S. S. *Boston* to the navy-yard, Mare Island, Cal., to be docked.

A cipher telegram to the same effect as this letter was sent to you to-day through U. S. Navy Pay Office, at San Francisco.

Very respectfully,

H. A. HERBERT,
Secretary of the Navy.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF.

U. S. NAVAL FORCE ON PACIFIC STATION,
United States Flagship Boston, Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.

[Translation of cipher dispatch.]

Secretary Herbert to Rear-Admiral Skerrett.

SEPTEMBER 27, 1893.

Yours September 12 received. My instructions misconstrued. You will afford to British subjects and property such protection as has always been accorded by vessels of American fleets to the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty and their property under like circumstances in the absence of British vessels.

HERBERT.

Rear-Admiral SKERRETT.

(Care Pay Inspector Lyons, Navy Pay Office, San Francisco, Cal.)

[Translation of cipher dispatch.]

Secretary Herbert to Rear-Admiral Skerrett.

[Confidential.]

OCTOBER 9, 1893.

Transfer flag to the *Boston* at San Francisco. Proceed to San Francisco with personal staff by first mail steamer practicable. It is the intention of the Department to transfer you to command Asiatic Station.

HERBERT.

Admiral SKERRETT,

(Care Navy Pay Office, San Francisco.)

[Translation of cipher dispatch.]

Secretary Herbert to Rear-Admiral Irwin.

[Confidential.]

OCTOBER 10, 1893.

You are relieved of command of naval force on Asiatic Station on October 27. Proceed with personal staff by mail steamer leaving Yokohama, Japan, on October 27, to Honolulu, Hawaii Islands, hoist flag on board the *Philadelphia*, and assume command of naval force on the Pacific Station.

HERBERT.

Admiral IRWIN,

Yokohama.



MESSAGE

FROM THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

IN ANSWER TO

The Senate resolution of February 16, 1894, and transmitting copies of additional dispatches, and exhibits thereto, relating to Hawaii.

FEBRUARY 20, 1894.—Read, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and ordered to be printed.

To the Senate:

On the evening of the 16th instant I received a copy of a resolution passed by the Senate, requesting the transmission to that body of all reports and dispatches from our minister at Hawaii, and especially a certain letter written to him by Mr. Dole, President of the Provisional Government.

On the same day I received from the State Department a copy of a dispatch from Minister Willis, accompanied by various exhibits. I was not able to send them to the Senate on that day. The Senate adjourned that afternoon until to-day, and thus prevented the submission until now of these papers.

The next day after the receipt of the Senate resolution, and on the 17th instant, other dispatches were received from Mr. Willis at the State Department. They were copied with all possible haste and are now submitted at the first meeting of the Senate since their receipt. They include the letter mentioned in the Senate resolution and the answer of Minister Willis to the same.

Since the 18th day of December last, when I submitted to the "broader authority and discretion of the Congress" all matters connected with our relations with Hawaii, I have, with the utmost promptness, transmitted to the Congress all dispatches and reports relative to the subject, and I am not aware of any dispatches or documents in the remotest way connected with these relations which have come to the possession of the State Department or the Executive and been withheld from the Senate.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
February 19, 1894.

The PRESIDENT:

The Secretary of State has the honor to lay before the President, with a view to their transmission to Congress, copies of additional correspondence from our minister to Hawaii.

Dispatches No. 31 to No. 34, inclusive, were received to-day.

Respectfully submitted,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, February 19, 1894.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 30.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 19, 1894.

SIR: The first anniversary of the Provisional Government was celebrated last Wednesday, January 17, in accordance with the programme set forth in Dispatch No. 28, of January 16, by public reception, military parade, illuminations of Executive building, and a mass meeting at night. None of the foreign representatives participated in the observance of the day. No salutes were fired from the American, English, or Japanese war vessels in port. The day passed with no disturbance.

I inclose clippings from Commercial Pacific Advertiser of January 18, and The Hawaiian Star of same date, giving full account of the day's proceedings and comments upon the failure of our Government to participate.

The representatives of foreign governments acted upon the instructions of their own governments, and upon their own responsibility, with the distinct disavowal on the part of the representative of the United States that its action was either intended or desired to control theirs.

Frequent editorials, similar in character to those inclosed, many of them severely reflecting upon the President of the United States and his Secretary of State, and also upon Mr. Blount, have appeared in the daily press. As the Hawaiian question is now pending before the Congress, and as the feeling here has been very intense, I have not thought proper thus far to take any official notice of them. I would be glad to have instructions from you upon the subject.

Very respectfully,

ALBERT S. WILLIS,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

[The Pacific Commercial Advertiser: Honolulu, January 18, 1894.]

A wonderful celebration—What Honolulu did on its Government's first birthday—The speeches and speakers of the evening—Splendid illuminations at the Executive building—The morning's parade—Fireworks in the evening—The largest crowd ever gathered together in Hawaii assembles on Palace Square.

The greatest anniversary in Hawaiian history has come and gone—January 17, a day that will live in the memories of all loyal people in the group, a day that by us and our descendants will be considered a day of rejoicing and gladness, a day that will be celebrated by everyone.

The celebration of the day started early in the morning, and a regular Fourth of July noise was heard from all quarters. Guns, firecrackers, bombs, tin horns, and every other available instrument that would make a noise was used. At about 6 a. m. the "antiques and horrors" turned out. At 9:30 the parade of the military forces started and drew an immense crowd, estimated at at least 4,000 people, who watched their evolutions with great interest. The reception of the President and Mrs. Dole was also a big attraction.

The raising of the big American flag on the flag pole of the American League also took place during the morning. In the afternoon the band concert at Thomas Square attracted a large crowd.

But the crowning event of the day occurred in the evening. Palace Square was not only crowded, but it was absolutely jammed with a seething mass of humanity. Fully 7,000 people were present at the evening's celebration, and they were amply repaid for their trouble in going. There has never been such a crowd on any previous occasion in the history of Hawaii as assembled at the mass meeting last evening, and the fact that it was, in spite of the immense number, a most orderly gathering, is a matter of congratulation for the people of Honolulu.

The executive building and the grounds were a bower of loveliness. Thousands of lanterns were scattered about, suspended on trees, shrubbery, and every available point, while the building itself seemed covered with the soft radiance of innumerable lamps. Stretching from the ground on one side to the ground on the other, and extending to the highest point of the flag poles on the executive building, was a row of delicately colored lanterns. At the top of each flag pole was a circlet of lanterns. Across the entrance to the former palace, a row of brilliant red lights was extended. Each balcony was illuminated, and the whole building and grounds looked like a glimpse of fairyland.

All along the front of the grounds of the executive building a row of lanterns, lighted by incandescent electric lights, made a grand display. In front of the speaker's stand two long lines of flags of all nations were crossed. The stand itself was lighted by a number of lanterns and decorated with American flags. A few chairs were placed in front of the stand, but the great majority of the listeners stood.

Before the speeches began a great many fireworks were set off in the executive building yard. The display was magnificent, and is an immense credit to those in charge. There were firecrackers, skyrocket, dynamite bombs, red and green lights, and many other kinds of fiery illuminations, both before and after speech-making. They were fired from all parts of the grounds and from the top of the building, and were greatly enjoyed by the thousands present.

A more detailed account of the day's proceedings follows:

ANTIQUES AND HORRIBLES—THEY TURN OUT EARLY IN THE MORNING AND ENJOY THEMSELVES.

The Antiques and Horribles made their appearance at 6 o'clock, as advertised. All Fort street, between King and Hotel, was crowded with people, mostly little boys, who were out early to see fun.

About 6:30 o'clock the procession started up Fort street. The caricatures were not horrible enough, and so created but little mirth and laughter. One of the characters represented Blount carrying a rat trap on which were the words "Blount's instruments." Much fun was caused by one of the Antiques running through the crowd on a bullock. The take-off on Mrs. Vint King and George Washington was poor. Satan made a good hit. About 7:30 o'clock the Antiques and Horribles, after parading through the principal streets, broke up near May's store on Fort street.

RAISING THE FLAG—THE AMERICAN LEAGUE'S HUGE BANNER IS ELEVATED.

The huge flag of the American League was unfurled to the breeze during the morning, accompanied by martial strains from the band. The tall flag pole, with a big star on its top, looked rather bare before the big banner was hauled up, but when the wind caught the large folds of the flag, and the Stars and Stripes floated gracefully to the breeze, the pole was complete, and a cheer went up from the crowd that had assembled to see the raising.

THE PARADE—THE TROOPS TURN OUT IN HONOR OF THE DAY.

An immense throng of people watched the parade of the military on Palace Square during the morning. There were over 800 men in line, and the drill passed off in a manner most creditable to the officers and men of the different companies. Col. Soper received the troops, and after a short preliminary drill they were handed over to Lieut. Col. Fisher, who put them through the manual of arms. After this the

men were marched up Punchbowl to Beretania, to Fort, to King, to Nuuanu, and thence back to the barracks, where they were dismissed. When they arrived in front of the building of the American League the new flag was saluted, while the band played the Star Spangled Banner. The men were followed over the whole line of march by quite a crowd.

The following are the companies and the commanders who took part in the parade: Company B, Capt. John Good; Company C, Capt. Jos. Camara; Company F, Capt. Julius Asch; Company D, Capt. Hugh Gunn; Company A, Capt. Ziegler; and Company E, Capt. Wilder.

THE PRESIDENT RECEIVES.—A FEW OF THOSE WHO CALLED AT THE EXECUTIVE BUILDING.

The reception held at the executive building was a great success, and was in many ways a marked contrast with those which were held in the palace under the monarchy. There was no stiffness, but an atmosphere of free and democratic good fellowship prevailed. The people came in freely, in their every morning dress, and were received by President Dole and Mrs. Dole, with the Vice-President, the members of the cabinet, and the members of the supreme court and their ladies, and also Judges Cooper and Whiting of the circuit court. Immediately behind the President were the officers of his staff, Col. J. H. Super, Lieut. Col. Fisher, and Maj. McLeod. Maj. Potter introduced the guests. Mrs. Dole was also assisted by the following ladies: Mrs. C. L. Carter, Mrs. Iaukea, Miss Hopper, Miss Lowrey, Miss Parke, Miss Perry, Miss Von Holt, Miss Mossman, Miss Gilman, Miss Judd, Miss Wing, Miss Forbes, Miss Jones, Miss Hartwell, Miss Mott-Smith, Miss Helen Wilder, Miss Lita Wilder, the Misses Young, Miss Glade, Miss Atkinson, Miss Paty, Miss McGrew, Miss Hassinger, Miss Sorrenson, Miss Hatch, Miss Tanner, Miss Afong, and Miss Howland.

The reception took place in the large council chamber. It was undecorated except with bunches of chrysanthemums, with which flower also many official button holes were adorned. The stream of people came in double file and flowed unceasingly from 11 o'clock until 10 minutes of 12, after which it began to intermit. The halls and verandas of the executive building, as well as the council chamber, were thronged. Among those who called to pay their respects to the President and his wife were a considerable number of Hawaiians. One old native from Manoa Valley presented Mr. Dole with a large bouquet. The incident was a very pretty and affecting one, and excited much attention.

A few naval officers were present in civilian dress. Royalists were conspicuous by their absence.

About one hundred of those present inscribed their names in the visitors list, but owing to the large attendance hundreds went away without doing so.

Following are the names of those who registered:

J. W. Pratt, Thomas E. Wall, Joseph A. Altsheier, John S. McGrew, James L. Torbert, Wray Taylor, Joseph Marsden, William Horace Wright, R. P. Waipa, E. M. Langley, D. O. Kaimae, J. Kanae, Joseph U. Kawainui, H. Stangelwald, M. D., and wife, E. R. Neuman and wife, T. M. Starkey, W. James Smith, D. B. Smith, G. West, Miss L. West, A. A. Montana, Lieut. J. Bergot, Lieut. Julius Asch, W. C. Wilder, Jr., H. M. Leonards, W. C. Parke, L. W. Hough, George L. Desha, F. M. Lyon, L. M. Johnson, W. L. Stanley, Henry Danfad, C. Bolte and wife, Mr. T. W. Horbron and wife, Miss K. Grey, Laura Duncan, Mr. and Mrs. F. J. Lowery, Jonathan Shaw, George C. Ross, Charles F. Peterson, De B. P. Penhallow, Mrs. Penhallow, Charles M. Cooke, Anna C. Cooke, C. H. Kluegel, H. H. Williams and wife, W. R. Castle and wife, H. T. Taylor, W. C. Waldman, U. S. N., J. J. Egan, Mrs. J. Egan, E. L. Marshall, Mr. and Mrs. G. P. Castle, Mrs. M. E. Tenny, Dr. F. J. Cordiao, U. S. N., Ambrose Perry, W. D. Alexander, jr., Miss Nanon Gullixon, Portland, Oreg., Miss Myrtle Compton, Portland, Oreg., Mr. and Mrs. Thomas F. Lansing, Charles J. Fishee, Frank Godfrey, editor Paradise of the Pacific, C. S. Bradford, Seattle, Wash., S. Sacks, sr., Denver House, R. T. Coulter, Los Angeles, Cal., W. H. McInerney, Mr. and Mrs. E. Loisson, H. M. Whitney, Mrs. Clara Banning, E. E. Mossman, Miss M. H. Mossman, Mr. and Mrs. J. S. Andrade, Miss Fanny Viera, Mr. and Mrs. C. H. Luther, Mr. and Mrs. H. F. Wichman, Mrs. Sorrenson, Miss H. Sorrenson, M. A. Gonsalves, Mrs. W. D. Alexander, Curtis B. Lyons, W. A. Kinney, Henry Smith, Mapuana Smith, Mr. and Mrs. Henry Davis, Mr. and Mrs. J. A. Kennedy, Mr. and Mrs. J. A. Hopper, Mr. and Mrs. W. L. Hopper, Miss Hopper, Miss E. E. Hopper, Mr. and Mrs. E. W. Peterson, Miss Burroughs of Brooklyn, N. Y., Miss R. Lewers, Miss H. Lewers, Miss E. Carter, Mrs. S. Gilman, F. Atherton, J. M. Oat and wife, Mr. E. Hamner, Mrs. R. Corea, Mrs. S. W. Wilson, Mrs. M. J. Forbes, Miss H. Forbes, M. P. Robinson, William J. J. Keasler, Mrs. A. McWayne, Miss Frances Jonnson, Miss Bertha Bindt, Mr. F. Bindt, John L. Bush, Mrs. John L. Bush, F. A. Davies, Mr. and Mrs. M. D. Monsarrat, Miss Fanning, Lieut. L. T. Kanake, Miss S.

Genns, Mark Green, H. H. Palmer, Mrs. G. J. Ross, Mrs. M. A. Wood, Miss F. Lynch, Miss T. Henry, William A. Bowen, F. B. McStocker, Mrs. N. L. McStocker, Miss Bessie Afong, Miss L. Brickwood, Mrs. C. K. Brown, Miss Mabel Ladd, John H. Paty, Miss Annie Paty, Otto G. Benschultz, Ella V. Benschultz, William P. Elliott, lieutenant U. S. Navy, C. Theo. Vogelgesang, ensign U. S. Navy, T. B. Murray, W. N. F. Behrens, Flora Glade, Clara Glade, Mr. and Mrs. E. D. Tenney, Mary Ann Hatch, Mary H. S. Carter, Zoe Atkinson, J. B. Atherton, F. A. Hosmer and wife, Miss E. B. McLoud, Miss Beckwith, Mr. and Miss P. H. Dodge, Miss Snow, Hiram Bingham, E. K. Bingham, L. Bingham Coan, Mrs. William W. Hall, Miss Charlotte Hall, A. B. Lyons, P. J. Frein, S. E. Bishop, Mrs. S. E. Bishop, Mildred S. Kinney, Mr. and Mrs. J. S. Martin, Mrs. E. Damon, Frank W. Damon, R. J. Green, Mrs. R. Jay Green, Ida C. Mott-Smith, Mary F. Paty, John Effinger, J. Lucas, Nell M. Lowrey, Margaret L. Hopper, Dr. and Mrs. R. P. Myers, Mrs. George C. Lees, Mrs. E. W. Jordan, Miss Emma Jordan, Mrs. P. C. Jones, Ada Jones, Rev. C. M. Hyde, Mrs. Hyde, Miss Knight, Mrs. Tenney, Miss Gilman, Anna M. Sorrenson, Marie R. Von Holt, Mr. and Mrs. L. A. Andrews, Miss Mabel Hartwell, Miss Forbes, Miss Parke, Anna Perry, Kate Howland, Myra Angus, Grace L. Wing, Ida C. Dower, Mary G. Dower, Susanna R. Patch, Arthur F. Wall, W. E. Brown, G. H. Paris, Ellen R. Hopper, Harriet Burrows, W. M. Templeton, Rev. A. Mackintosh, Mrs. A. Mackintosh, Miss A. Mossman, Miss J. Tanner, Miss B. Ruth Young, Miss Young, Miss M. Smith, Mrs. Mary Clement Leavitt, Justice and Mrs. Bickerton, Helen Kinau Wilder, Lita Wilder, Miss Hassinger, Mrs. J. M. Angus, Mrs. Jaonew, Francis M. Nicoll, Mr. and Mrs. Walter C. Weedon, Virginia S. Winslow, Marie Afong, E. A. Magee, John M. Angus, Agnes E. Judd, G. G. Tucker, George W. Smith, Mr. and Mrs. Melancthon M. Hurd, Miss Alice G. Hurd, Mrs. Arthur Whipple, A. F. Judd, Dr. J. A. Cloud, R. C. A. Peterson, Henry W. Howard, M. D., R. B. Dunlop, Maj. George McLoud, Hugh J. Ordway, H. F. Glade, German consul, Mrs. Glade.

PORTUGUESE PROCESSION—HEADED BY THE BAND THEY MAKE A FINE APPEARANCE.

Just before the speeches began a large number of Portuguese marched down Richard street, headed by their own band. A large number of torches were carried, and also transparencies, on which the following mottoes were conspicuous: "Progresso, uniao, liberdade," "No monarchy in ours," "P. G. and Portugee, we're the 400," "Liberty or death," "Liberty and union," "America is our goal," and others of a like nature. They took up their position on the corner of King and Richard streets, where they stood during the speaking.

THE SPEECHES.—WHAT WAS SAID BY THE SPEAKERS OF THE EVENING.

The immense throng that crowded around the speakers' platform long before the time set for the speeches to begin was amply rewarded by hearing what followed. Eloquent eulogiums of the Provisional Government were applauded to the echo, and great enthusiasm was shown by the audience. Never has such a crowd been seen at a mass meeting in Honolulu. In the right-hand part of the stand was the place reserved for the speakers and a few other prominent men. On the left, the press stand, occupied by representatives of the local press and the foreign correspondents.

Mr. ATHERTON, the chairman of the evening, spoke as follows:

"Fellow Citizens: The last mass meeting of citizens and others in this city was held on the 28th of November, 1893. It was called to protest against the action of Mr. Cleveland, and was large and enthusiastic. The protest was emphatic. Contrary to the expectation of Grover Cleveland, the publication of Gresham's letter bound together the men who had imperiled not only their lives, but their property and their fortunes, in an effort to establish a good, an honest, and a strong government in Hawaii. The same men have come together again to-night, though not in the same place nor for the same purpose. We are here to celebrate the anniversary of the Provisional Government. It has been on trial for a full year, and in spite of prophecies it has stood firm and has been sustained by the best and the most trustworthy men in Hawaii. The future is in the hands of men whom we can trust. The Government is morally and financially sound, and upheld as it is by strong hands and willing hearts, it will live and prosper, until in the providence of God it shall be absorbed in the great American Union."

J. B. CASTLE: "Fellow annexationists: It seems to me that there is but little to say, but that little should be said in tones to reverberate through the ages of Hawaii's future, in tones which will reach our children's children. These truths, citizens of the future State of Hawaii, others can emphasize better than I, but two thoughts have come to me. One year ago to-day noon, we stood on a platform with two planks—the abolition of the monarchy and absorption into the United States. On the 24th day of last month the Provisional Government drove the last nail in the

coffin of Hawaiian monarchy. By the strength of our own right arms and steadfast purpose, united in all that is essential, the last article of our platform will be accomplished, and our mother in Washington will take to herself her own. 'All roads lead to Rome,' was a proverbial saying in that great Empire. In Hawaii every political highway and byway should lead to annexation. Our hope is in that. Every road leads to Washington. Standing upon this platform of one plank, all differences must vanish; all factions melt away. We wish no permanent government, nor anything else which does not lead to annexation; no change which does not make for that; no republic but the Great Republic. The question before us is simplicity itself. No man of clear brain and right heart will oppose union with that country which secures, by its system of equal liberty and equal laws, the best opportunity for the solution of every problem which can assail us in the century to come. We hear voices which might as well come from royalists: 'You're not out of the woods yet!' 'Don't count your chickens before they are hatched.'

"Such words should come, if not from cowards, at least from men who have no faith in our cause. We celebrate the justice of our cause, and would do so still though a thousand restorations were to follow. I would write this day in our statutes and make it an eternal holiday, and in the future our children will thank God that there were men here who held to their purpose, and who never flinched. The 17th is a day of auspicious omen. It was the birthday of Kamehameha III, who, at the close of his life, wearied with an ineffectual struggle, fought for union with the United States. It is worthy of note that the influences against us then came from the slave power, as the only element which has caused delay now, has come from the party which upheld slavery in the United States. Gentlemen, I am done. I have made no preparation for to-night. This sea of heads, this illumination, surpassing every other, are inspiration enough. There is one man in this city to-night whom I envy. It is the anniversary of his wedding day, and when in the future his children gather around his knee, he will add to the patriotic memories of this holiday, those which cluster around the hearth-side, and will bless doubly the 17th of January, 1893.

Gen. HARTWELL said: "The development of national liberty, regulated by law, is not the result of accident or chance. It is peculiar to no country nor clime; wherever there is a community in which intelligent, honest, and independent habits of thought and of action prevail, civil liberty is sure to come and abide. The day of the divine rights of kings and queens has disappeared from modern civilization; but the supremacy of law is everywhere bound to assert itself, for it has a divine origin in the Great Law Giver of the universe. On the 13th day of January, 1893, the Government of the Hawaiian Islands was that of a constitutional monarchy, under the constitution which was established in July, 1887. The head of the Government, the Queen, was not amenable to any law, except to the unwritten law which required her to govern herself in accordance with the requirements of the constitution under which she became a sovereign, which she had sworn to observe, and under which alone she could legally remain a sovereign. If any official of the Government, whether in the executive, legislative, or judicial department, violated the law, he could be called to account, and the community had a remedy, more or less effective, for such violation of its rights.

"What was the remedy if the head of the Government declined to be bound by the constitution? When King John refused to govern himself by English by-laws, the barons of England at the point of the sword, compelled him to sign and swear to the Magna Charta of Runnymede in the year 1215. The right of petition and the right of habeas corpus followed, culminating in the glorious revolution of 1688, when William and Mary came over. All this is known to every school boy, as part of the history of civil liberty in the great Republic of England. But how was it in Hawaii last January? The Hawaiian Runnymede had been passed in July of 1887, and yet the Hawaiian Sovereign declined to keep her obligations. The result was that the system known as the Hawaiian Constitutional Monarchy, no longer existed. It was like the removal of the keystone of an arch, the structure fell. It was then that citizens of Honolulu established a Provisional Government, in the presence of actual or impending anarchy. That was a conservative and not a revolutionary proceeding.

"The avowed and the legitimate objects of that Government were to maintain the public peace and to promote political union with the United States of America. The latter object awaits the result of time and full consideration and may depend upon events and contingencies yet to occur; but the preservation of law and order which thus far has been secured is a simple necessity. For the continued accomplishment of that object there will be ample scope for the wisdom and patriotism and moderation and charity of this community to display themselves. With the founders and supporters of the existing Government of Hawaii there is no place for selfish interest or personal aggrandizement. The strong common sense of the people is thoroughly enlisted in the cause of honest stable government. It will have

nothing short of that, and it will have no other, for the end in view is, that 'this shall be a government of laws and not of men.'

President HOSMER. "Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, and fellow citizens, at a banquet given to Prince Bismarck, a few years before his retirement, he offered a toast to the three great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race, to the German Fatherland, to Great Britain, and to the young Republic of the West. While these three nations have taken the largest strides, and the Latin race has been less fortunate, it has an example of popular government in France, and the spirit of liberty still lives in Portugal. This community with its mixed population has seen fit to resist absolutism, and to create a purer form of government. For the last twenty years there has not been a stable government here, a government that commanded the respect of the civilized world. If we get annexation we will have a stable government (A voice: That's what we want), and that's what we will get. With annexation there will be a brilliant opportunity for every industrious man and prosperity will be within the reach of all.

"The Nicaragua Canal will bring a flood of trade, and immensely enhance the importance of these islands. Annexation is manifest destiny, and we are bound to have it. During these troubles we have been fortunate in the possession of men who have been willing, at great personal loss and sacrifice, to assume the burdens and responsibilities of public office. We want to assure them of our heavy support, and entire confidence, and they have it."

H. T. WATERHOUSE spoke briefly in Hawaiian, [pointing to the motto Aloha]: "That is our foundation, to live in love to each other. The light has broken upon us—we have lived in darkness. Let us now embrace the light. The doors of the former palace were opened to-day for the poor and needy to enter, and that movement will enlarge the opportunities of the poor. Then go forward and secure liberty and prosperity."

W. O. SMITH: "I am to speak on behalf of the Provisional Government; I am sorry no one worthier has been found. [A voice, "You are good enough!"] Our feeling should be one of gratitude and pride. I am proud of the strong and brave men who have supported the Provisional Government for the past year." The speaker then went on to say a good word for the Hawaiians, who have been quiet and orderly, submitting to the laws although the meaning of the movement had been misrepresented to them, and they were mistrustful in consequence. Europeans would not have done so under the same circumstances. It was necessary to have patience and forbearance with them. Matters of a public nature were difficult enough to deal with under any circumstances, but now this is more than ordinarily the case. The ordinary channels of expression through the ballot box have been closed, and there has been a powerful, hostile influence from without to contend against.

"It is a matter of pride that thus far self-interest has been subordinated to higher considerations. Men have stood ready to make any sacrifices to support the great principle at stake. If any one thinks it is an easy job to be wet nurse to a baby government let him try it and see. The baby has been teething, has had the whooping cough and the measles, and lately I think it has been suffering with the colic, and then the grandmother in the United States wanted to come over and spank it, but it has lived through it all, and is a lusty and growing infant, and with your aid and support another year will find it stronger. I have just a few words more to say. I don't know in just what form our future difficulties will arrive. Our grand object is the attainment of good government through union with the United States. We must subordinate personal ambition and self-interest to this one end and then we will move on to success."

Some one in the crowd then proposed three cheers for President Dole, which were given with a will.

Judge ROBERTSON: "I thank the committee for giving me this opportunity to appear as a fellow Annexationist. A year ago I was five thousand miles away, unconscious of what was taking place and unable to take part in the resistance to the fatal act of the foolish Queen. Upon the arrival of the five commissioners in the United States I recognized the same spirit which told Kalakaua in 1887 to come down from his high horse, and in 1889 told Bob Wilcox to come out from his gasoline tank. I was pleased to hear that the boys of '87 were still in the ranks in 1893. I read a letter in the Star the other day in which a British sailor was offended at being called a boy, but I shall never feel insulted at being called 'one of the boys.' Old men for counsel; young men for war. The young men here were ready a few weeks ago to fight our great and good friend, Grover Cleveland.

"I am not ashamed to confess that my conversion to annexation dates back only one year. I was proud of my country's independence and willing to submit to the monarchy until its abuses and corruptions were too intolerable to be borne any longer. We will seek a new and greater independence in the United States, where all our people will become citizens of the Republic, where the accident of birth will no longer be regarded, and all will be equal before the law. I believe that now that

there is no more monarchy and no more royalty, the country is better for it. Every boy who grows up will feel on an equal footing with his neighbor. The royalists have prophesied that the Queen would be restored to her throne. The throne was not hers, but lent her by the people, whose voice is as the voice of God, and when she violated the conditions and abused her privileges the people had an inalienable right to take it away from her again. Many had hoped that she had learned something from the example of Kalakaua and believed that she should have a fair chance. The supreme court gave her a chance to choose her own cabinet, and everybody knows how she returned the compliment in the constitution which she didn't promulgate. While we decline to return in our steps, we must be patient and considerate. The period is one of transition and trial, and the future will depend on our present conduct. With an administration like the present we may be sure that what the Government does will be for the best interest of the country at large, and that their efforts will be finally crowned with success."

WALTER G. SMITH said: "The 17th of January is a day which stands for a great deal that is inspiring in the political annals of the world. It was upon that day, in 1793, that the people of France condemned to death a despotic king and made liberty, which has been the dream of the philosopher, the possession of the subject. Then and there the republican movement in Europe, in spite of precedents and older activities, really began its onward march. Up to that era most of the people of the European mainland had been fixed in the belief that a state without a king and a church without a bishop meant chaos and infidelity.

"The events which grouped about that January day brought them to their senses. The scales fell from their eyes when the King's head fell into the basket, and they saw that the divinity which had seemed to hedge the despot had been but a figment of their own superstitious and inherited fears. It was then that the feudal principle in the politics of the world received a wound that was to defy all surgery. One hundred years after that great day in France came a day in Hawaii when the last independent sovereign in the Western Hemisphere lost her throne and the last recognized dynasty on this side of the globe was expunged from the calendar of princes.

"Thereupon the 17th of January gained the right to be known as one of the world's democratic holidays. It is the day from which an historical chapter in the contest of the subject against the crown, on both sides of the earth, transpicuously dates. Let what the day has witnessed for France, for Hawaii, and for all men, approve the thought that it is a sign set eternal in the heavens of futurity that kings and queens and potentates shall be no more, and that the reign of the people has begun. My friends, it builds up a man's political constitution to be a citizen of Hawaii in such an era as is now in the vigor and brightness of its prime. It is a privilege, so far as the principle is concerned, equal to that enjoyed by the fortunate men, some of them your ancestors and mine, who did duty at Faneuil Hall or behind the earthworks of Bunker Hill. I do not withdraw the comparison, because Hawaii in contrast with colonial America is so small or because the forces with which you grappled beside those which stood for England, were so weak and impotent; for it must ever be remembered that your defiance to the tottering Hawaiian monarchy lost no tone of sternness or of courage when you stood at bay to the President of the United States and the power which he misused.

"There is nothing more inspiring in the annals of 1776 than the unwavering front which you preserved in your great emergency. There, on the one side, was the chief of sixty millions; here was an armed body of a paltry thousand; there was the strongest of modern powers, with its army and its fleets; here were a few lone rocks in the ocean without a fort upon its pinnacles and without a gun upon a deck; there was a great Government whose President had declared that our dethroned Queen should reign again; here was a little band of men who said that she must pass over their dead bodies first; there in our harbor were the broadsides of a possible foe; here on shore was a battalion behind its sandbags! The odds were great, but the patriots of Hawaii took them; and if the American people, aroused by that spectacle, had not placed themselves between us and all harm, I feel that here upon this soil would have been a new Thermopylæ, not less consecrated to human courage than was that which made immortal the memory of 300 Greeks. It is not enough, fellow citizens, to look backward with pride, for we must look forward with courage. You destroyed a monarchy one year ago to-day; what are we to have in place of it a year from to-day or ten years hence?

"The problem of January 17 was easy to solve beside the problems that may be in store; problems which will tax the calmest statesmanship of the great man who is our President to-day; which will also tax the wisdom and experience of his cabinet, the sagacity and patience of our councils. We have a party at home devoted to the lost cause and a moneyed influence abroad conspiring for control. We are in the midst of alien races and more alien creeds. There is a clamor of many tongues within our gates; the pressure of foreign governments at the outer walls. Our

enemies are powerful and insidious, and though some work secretly and others openly all are united to defeat the objects of the January revolution. It is for us to remain steadfast to those objects, no matter who or what may prove false to them; no matter who or what may conspire or oppose; no matter what self-interest may undermine; no matter who may come with the olive branch in one hand and a dagger in another. This is our highest public duty. There is but one political goal and watchword for us all and that is annexation. It is the beginning and end of our political alphabet. It is the best hope of the Americans in Hawaii, and of thousands who are not Americans except in principle, and it is the best that could happen to the natives.

"Whatever comes and whatever proposals of government may be, we must be true to the objects of the revolution or we shall be undone by the forces now at work against us. But what, it may be asked, if annexation is long delayed, if the wait becomes one of years? What if we are left to work out our own salvation first? Fellow-citizens, in that event, the best thing we can do is to work it out on the American plan and by the exercise of Anglo-Saxon pluck, and leave the rest to the Ruler of all nations. I sometimes think that Providence may have a great political work for this little island community to perform before our common hopes may be secured and realized. It is in such small confines that God has set the mightiest forces of the world's affairs in motion. Events upon a narrow strip of sea shore, among the fishers and the poor, have swayed the world for nineteen centuries.

"Some of the brightest chapters of civilization and the strongest ones of philosophy, and the most heroic ones of war, opened among the isles of Greece. Upon the narrow ledges of Switzerland a few plain people and a few plain rules did more for mankind in one unhappy day than all the empires. Among the sea-girt hills of Corsica was born the genius of Napoleon. In Haiti all men were once taught the might of a free people. Nor is this all. From those little islands in the northern seas where the British flag first reddened the dull air, the strongest tides of civilization have flowed for a thousand years in a continuous stream. You might take those islands and put them in the midst of one of the many great American lakes and they could not be seen from the shore; but their very name to the Zulu of the Cape, to the bushman of Australia, to the redman of the forests of Manitoba, to the high and the low all over the earth is the incarnation of one of the world's affairs. Surely the opportunity to do great things and useful things is not dependent upon the size of the theater. It may be, for ought we know, that Hawaii has some historical function to perform before her identity is merged into the greatness of the Union.

"No man can foresee where and how the responsibility is to fall; but if it should be for us to spread ideas of free government through the thousands sent among us from the coast of Asia; if it becomes our privilege to inspire the same eagerness for liberty among them which the colonial Americans lodged in the minds of their French allies, and which the latter put to such good service on the 17th of January, 1793, why that is a duty which all true Americans would be proud to perform as the best homage they could pay to the Fatherland, to the flag they yet hope to see waving over the North American continent, and to the principles which they believe will some day dominate the world. Whether annexation comes now or is deferred for a generation, in either case there are American principles to teach and American duties to perform on the Hawaiian Islands which our people will uphold with courage, administer with prudence, and defend, if needs be, with their lives. And if such years are to come and stern duties befall, I am sure that none of us will forget that annexation is the end that must be sought, the object that must and shall be won. It is that which will give Hawaii diversified industries; fill the land with the instruments of modern progress; connect it with the cable systems of the world; multiply its population by a score; expand its commerce and its trade; upbuild its civilization; give peace to all its people, and strengthen the authority of the American Republic in this great ocean.

"It is a prize worth working for, and one upon which courage and patience will not be wasted. Standing here upon ground once consecrated to the pomp of monarchy, face to face with the deroyalized house of government, knowing no flag so dear as the Stars and Stripes, we appeal to our countrymen to open their gates to us of kindred blood; but we pledge ourselves, if that can not be, to be at least worthy of the service by the work we shall do on this soil for the glory of American principles."

NOTES OF THE DAY—SOME OF THE HAPPENINGS OF YESTERDAY BRIEFLY REVIEWED.

Two large bon fires, in honor of the day, were made on the peninsula at Ewa, by the Portuguese, from 7 till 8 o'clock.

The decorations of the executive building and grounds surpassed anything of the kind ever attempted.

Three thousand people grilled in the sun watching the parade.

The report of Judge Hartwell's and W. G. Smith's speeches in this issue is a verbatim one.

An old resident states that he has never seen as large a crowd in Honolulu, except, possibly, at the funeral of Kamehameha III.

One of the policemen on duty last night at Palace Square states that he had never seen such an orderly and well-behaved crowd.

The column was so long that when the head of the battalion reached the corner of Fort street and Beretania one company was still on Richard street.

A number of fireworks in the executive grounds were "homemade."

The green and red lights that so beautifully lit up the grounds made a scene not soon to be forgotten by those fortunate enough to see it.

The Portuguese procession was a great success.

C. S. Bradford deserved great credit for his arrangement of the speakers and press stand.

Notwithstanding the fact that orders were received by the officers of the men of war in port not to call officially at the president's reception, a number of them did so, though in plain clothes.

The fireworks that were being fired from the roof of the executive building accidentally caught fire and went up in one big blaze. It was hard on the boys, but it was a beautiful sight while it lasted.

The flag pole of No. 1 engine company was gaily decorated with lanterns last evening.

In front of the engine house No. 2 an evergreen banner was stretched across the street containing the word "Annexation." In the evening the flag pole and house were illuminated with lanterns.

[The Pacific Commercial Advertiser, Thursday, January 18, 1894.]

The celebration of the 17th of January was the most enthusiastic and successful festival ever held in this city. The programme of the day went off without a jar. The Government and the Annexation party stand more strongly intrenched and more united in feeling now that they have turned to review the events and mark the progress of this stirring year.

A VICARIOUS APOLOGY.

A great deal of indignation is felt at the discourtesy, to use no stronger word, shown by the diplomatic corps towards the Provisional Government yesterday. This indignation is directed towards the U. S. minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary, Willis, who as the head of the diplomatic body, is of course responsible for the course taken, the other members merely following his lead.

We feel no sympathy for this indignation, which appears to us quite unfounded. At the same time it is so natural that it should be felt, and expressed too, that we take the liberty of suggesting some considerations in explanation of the apparently extraordinary course of the American minister.

In a nutshell, the truth is that Mr. Willis found himself in a dilemma. The entire sovereignty and independence of the Hawaiian Government having been fully recognized by the United States, the American war ships should have fired a salute. On the other hand, the United States having demanded the surrender of the Government, a salute should not have been fired. As a free and independent nation, we should have been saluted, but as a private dependency of Mr. Cleveland, we should not. As we are at peace with the United States, the minister should have bowed and smiled at the Executive building, but as we are at war, he should have barred his front gate, rolled himself up in the American flag, and gazed around with an air of gloomy and forbidding defiance. Who shall "rede" this riddle; who shall resolve these contradictions? Whatever course Mr. Willis had pursued, he might have cited chapter and verse for it. Whatever he had done he would have been right. Is this Government at peace with the United States or not? Does the United States recognize its sovereignty or not? Who shall say? Does Mr. Willis himself know?

We think that the foregoing facts should teach us to be patient and forbearing in our relations with the United States minister, and to withhold our judgments. Whichever way he turns he finds himself confronted with the bristling horns of a dilemma. Everywhere bloody prospects of impalement, and no way of escape. If he has not found a way out of the difficulty consistent with the usages of diplomacy, the ordinary requirements of courtesy, the dignity and power of the great nation which he represents, the fault is not his, but his master's.

The whole situation is an extraordinary commentary upon the foreign policy which has brought things to such a pass. Mr. Cleveland disowning the acts of his prede-

cessor is like the Pope who exhumed the body of a rival and cast it into the Tiber. Unhappily, the President has not to deal with a rival only. His own acts of recognition are there, in like manner to be exhumed and disowned. What is to be done with them? He would, and he would not; and what with calling President Dole his "great and good friend," and then stabbing him under the fifth rib—between the open smiles of friendship and the secret acts of enmity—he has brought the diplomatic relations of the United States with this country into a tangle which it would take a greater than Solomon to unravel. Hawaii is at peace with the American people, but at war with Mr. Cleveland, and Mr. Willis has chosen to cast in his lot with that of the man who unquestionably is his master, and who claims to be the master of the American people, too.

We are inclined to believe that the above suggestions contain a sound theory of the conduct of the American minister. At the same time any hypothesis can be at best but tentative and provisional. We are treading here diplomatic mazes where all light fails us and precedents are not. Yet the theory indicated would seem to be as plausible as any. It would be absurd to suppose that Mr. Willis denies the right of this Government to observe such holidays as it may choose. It would be monstrous to imagine that he or his Government resents the celebration of a day which marks above all other days the regard which this Government and its supporters bear the United States. If it be true, indeed, that the constant affection of Americans for their native land is a crime in the eyes of Mr. Willis and his master, then, certainly, like Othello, we have "loved not wisely, but too well."

In the meanwhile, in spite of the neglect of the United States minister plenipotentiary, the Provisional Government still lives and pursues its calm way unmoved. It has celebrated its anniversary, rejoicing. It has not only survived a year of trial within and without, but it has grown stronger, wiser, and better, and it stands to-day secure in its strength, in the brightness of its hopes, in anticipations well founded upon the deeds of the past, leading away from despotism, pointing forward to the freedom of the American flag, and remaining an abiding guarantee that government of the people, by the people and for the people shall not perish in this outpost of civilization in the Pacific.

[The Hawaiian Star, Thursday, January 18, 1894.]

JANUARY 17.

Within the memory of the oldest inhabitant there has been no more inspiring holiday than that of January 17. This is not alone due to the events it stood for. A fact of but less significance was in the way it was received by the natives who have been so strongly counted on to swell the following of the lost cause. They flocked to the reception at the executive building and paid sincere honors to the chief of the State, and hundreds of them participated with unmistakable good will in the splendid festivities of the evening. The day was one of rejoicing and satisfaction to the masses, and the party of reactionaries was forgotten in the midst of the common jubilee. The Provisional Government and the cause of annexation are the stronger for the way in which the people showed their *aloha* for the powers that be.

DID VERY WELL WITHOUT HIM.

It is to be regretted that "contingencies" should have arisen by which Minister Willis was unable to take note of yesterday's holiday and by which the *Philadelphia* and her consort were prevented from hanging up flags in place of their weekly washing. These "contingencies," it may be observed, are due to the strange perversity of the Americans here in not making way when asked to, for the return of a discarded heathen Queen and her rabble of boodlers and hula-drivers. To have them do that is so strong and fervid an ambition of the part of the worshipful chieftain of the American Democracy, or what there is left of it since the November elections, that he would see them in the river Styx before he would let his personal agent here acknowledge their claims of independence; that is to say acknowledge them again. As to that personal agent himself, whom we have heard was a gallant Union captain during the war, we are constrained to doubt that he fully believes in the justice and Americanism of such a programme. However, He-Who-Must-Be-Obedy leaves his official employes small latitude of judgment when a question comes up between the rights of a free people and the prerogatives of a would-be dictator. Being somewhat in the dictator line himself, Cleveland feels like standing in with the profession. We must surmise that he abhors the fact that such an uncontrollable thing as popular sentiment and Congressional initiative sometimes gets in his way.

However, the Americans of Hawaii and their German, English, Portuguese, and

native friends made a great holiday all by themselves on the 17th of January, and hardly missed the diplomatic absentee, or stopped to grumble at the long lines of half-dry undershirts and pantaloons with which the Navy saluted the Republican anniversary. They were having too good a time for anything of that sort and were content to leave the extraordinary envoy to himself and to the pleasure which he might derive from hearing the song of the dinkey bird in the damafula tree.

The local public need not be surprised to hear at any time that the lower branch of Congress has indorsed the President's Hawaiian policy. So much may be predicated of its partisanship and its desire to let the Executive down easily. The meaning of such action, if it has been or should be taken, would fall very short of doing any harm to the Provisional Government. So far as it has developed, the Cleveland policy is of the pleading and admonitory type towards Hawaii and to indorse that would be, so far as the government of these islands is concerned, a harmless proceeding, "intended," as a former Congressman would have put it, "for Buncombe County only."

WAS A DAY OF DAYS—COMPLETE SUCCESS OF THE FIRST CELEBRATION—LEAGUE FLAG RAISING—MILITARY PARADE—RECEPTION—MEETING—DECORATIONS—FIREWORKS.

The celebration programme was carried through with a dash. There was no variations from the proceedings as announced in advance. The weather was absolutely perfect. The feeling was enthusiastic. So far as could be observed, none held aloof from the occasion. It seemed that nearly everybody in the city was heart and soul in the observance of the first regular "Fourth of July" for Hawaii. A little coterie, which wandered about in holiday attire, attempted to wet-blanket the affair, but found its mission the saddest sort of a failure and was actually compelled to become an indistinguishable part of the gala gathering. During the evening of the 16th and on the morning of the 17th this worthy contingent circulated rumors designed to frighten people. The scare scheme miscarried completely. Even the roundabout threat of a dynamite explosion at the speaker's stand had not the least effect. There was no brooking the tide of patriotism; it was universal and resistless. The sentiments of freedom and independence pervaded and governed everywhere. Vent was given to the spirit of the day by actions indorsing fully the Provisional Government and reaffirming the principles which actuated the overthrow of monarchy.

The events of the day were the flag-raising by the American League, the battalion drill and review of troops, the reception by President Dole and Mrs. Dole, the great mass meeting, and the display of fireworks.

THE FLAG-RAISING.

At 8 o'clock an immense crowd had gathered at the corner of Nuuanu and King to witness the hoisting of a 60 by 30 American flag on a 120-foot pole. The band was in attendance, and rendered such patriotic airs as "Star-Spangled Banner," "Marching through Georgia," "Rally Round the Flag." A great cheer went up from the throng that congested two streets as the flag was hauled aloft. R. H. Sampson, who served in the civil war as first lieutenant of Company G, First Massachusetts Cavalry, cracked a bottle of champagne and christened the flag "General Dix." Three cheers were then proposed and given with a will. Twenty-one giant bombs, furnished by John Egan, were set off as a salute. Each explosion brought cheers. Gen. Dix, of New York, is the man who said, "If any man hauls down the American flag, shoot him on the spot." This was the feeling throughout the concourse of liberty-loving people. As the flag gracefully swung to the breeze, winding itself like a thing of life, and as the band sent into the air the glorious music so dear to Americans the world over, eyes moistened, and men with the G. A. R. button, and men and women who are with them, said: "It would not go well with the one who molested that flag." It was a pretty, impressive scene, really inspiring, conjuring to the surface all that is best in the man. For some time a crowd lingered about, and all day the flag was a center of attraction.

REVIEW AND PARADE.

The review of the troops attracted about the entire population to Union Square. The band, of which Prof. Berger lately said, "They will either fight or play," led the column of seven companies fully accoutered. Col. Soper delivered a few commands, and then Lieut. Col. Fisher put the battalion through a series of intricate maneuvers, concluding with the manual of arms. Every movement was executed

with the precision and finish noticeable in veteran regulars in the United States. The troops have profited by their training at the hands of capable tacticians. All are proud of the military branch of the Government. The officers at the head of the companies were Capts. Good, Camara, Lieut. Asch, Capts. Gunn, Ziegler, and Wilder.

The line of march was up Punchbowl street to Beretania, thence to Fort, to King, to Nuuanu, and back to the garrison on King. The streets were almost impassable during the parade, thousands lining the sidewalks.

At the headquarters of the American League the celebrants once more centered. The grand flag raised in the morning was given by the Provisional Government and the assembled multitude that cordial salute denied it from a certain quarter. "The Star Spangled Banner" was again heard, and cheer after cheer almost rent the air. Each succeeding explosion of patriotism was more hearty than the one before.

STATE RECEPTION.

The council hall and, in fact, the entire executive building and grounds, had been decorated for the reception by President and Mrs. Dole between the hours of 11 and 12. Carpets were laid in the great hallways and in the legislative chamber. There were flowers everywhere. Paper lanterns were pendent from trees and festooned about the place. There was an entire absence of ceremony and formality. All were welcomed, and after being received the guests scattered about and a social, free from restraint, lasted a couple of hours. The President was attended by his staff officers, Col. Soper, Lieut. Col. Fisher, and Majs. McLeod and Potter. The latter presented the guests. In the immediate receiving party were President Dole and wife, the cabinet members and their ladies, and the judges of the supreme and circuit courts with their ladies. Mrs. Dole was assisted by Mrs. C. L. Carter, Mrs. Iaukea, and the Misses Hopper, Lowry, Park, Perry, Von Holt, Mossman, Gillman, Judd, Wing, Forbes, Jones, Hartwell, Mott-Smith, Wilder, Young, Glade, Atkinson, Paty, McGrew, Hassenger, Sorenson, Hatch, Tyler, Afong, and Howland. Ball dresses were not shown, but many exquisite costumes were worn. The callers numbered about 750. Over 250 registered. Many natives called, one with an immense bouquet for the President. The German consul was present, and a number of officers from the American men-of-war attended in civilian dress. The book for names was in an out-of-the-way place, and there was such a crush during the first half of the hour that comparatively few placed their names. During the reception the band played on the veranda.

At noon the national salute of 21 guns was fired in short order by a detail from the artillery company.

ILLUMINATIONS.

It was agreed on all sides that Honolulu was never before so brilliantly illuminated as last night. Further, it was asserted freely that never before had so many people appeared on the streets in the evening. The committee on decorations was extensively assisted by the military companies, the fire companies, business men, and citizens generally. There were flags everywhere. Such buildings as the headquarters of the Annexation Club, the American League, and the fire houses were resplendent in bunting and paper lanterns. Across Union Lane from No. 2 fire house the word "Annexation" in evergreen letters three feet high greeted all. At Union Square a pole in the center bore lines of merchantmen signals in four directions. The speakers' stand was literally covered with bunting, with the word "Aloha" in big red letters with a white background in the crowning piece. Some of the best artistic effects were produced at the Judiciary building, where lines of light made a pleasing whole.

An enormous amount of labor was expended on the Executive building and grounds. The illumination began at the pinnacle of the flagstaff, and the brilliancy increased and broadened to the limits of the great square, rich in tropical trees and shrubs and flowers. Above 1,000 waxen candles were used here, and nearly as many incandescent electric lights were placed through the efforts of Mr. Cassidy and his well-organized corps of wiremen. There was a line of incandescents inclosed with Japanese and Chinese lanterns extending from the corner of Richards and King a square up King. A couple of miles of light found place in front of and above the Executive building. Several sketches were made of the illuminations. A trip around the city developed many private residences appropriately decorated.

The fireworks, which were used lavishly, consisted of rockets, roman candles, and crackers and bombs. These were set off on the grounds of the Executive and Judiciary buildings, and the displays were greatly admired. The decoration of the Government buildings was the offering of the soldiers themselves, and were highly creditable in every way.

EVENING PARADE.

The evening demonstration, abandoned by the general arrangement committee, was taken up by the enthusiastic Portuguese contingent and most successfully carried out. These patriotic citizens came down from the slopes of Punchbowl about 300 strong, just in time for the speechmaking. Their own band led the procession and played unusually well. The marchers bore torches and transparencies. The sentiment first shown was "Progresso, uniao, liberadado." Other inscriptions were: "Lily, make room for your anti," "Liberty or death," "America is our goal," "No monarchy in ours," "Liberty and union," "P. G., and Portuguese," "We're the 400." At the end of the column was a fireworks wagon, which left a trail of explosives and colored lights.

MASS MEETING.

The attendance at the mass meeting was variously estimated at from 7,000 to 10,000. It included throngs of natives, and the seats reserved for ladies were all occupied. Enthusiasm was unbounded, the speakers being constantly interrupted by cheering and marks of approval. The proceedings were enlivened by the discharge of fireworks at intervals, and music from the band. A spontaneous outburst was given of three cheers for President Dole.

Hon. J. B. Atherton was chairman. In a brief address he spoke of the meeting of November 28 to protest against the action of Mr. Cleveland. The opinions they expressed are fixed. The year just ended had been one of trial. The Provisional Government administered and sustained by the most trustworthy men of Hawaii has stood firm and it is now, with strength, means, and backing, on a solid footing. It will live and prosper until admitted into the great American Union.

Collector-General J. B. Castle said: There was but little to be added to what had already been uttered. What was to be said should be heard in no uncertain tones. It should be such expression as would reverberate through the ages of the Hawaiian future and live as a legacy to our children. A year ago there was struck a blow which drove the last nail into the coffin of monarchy. Those associated in the Government had been steadfast and faithful. They believed their hopes would witness fruition before the year 1897. "All roads lead to Rome," was an ancient and significant saying. Our watchword is "All roads lead to Washington." We believe Hawaii will come into the Union. We have here a Government that is sound and strong, and in which the people have confidence. He was certain it was satisfactory, and it, or its immediate successors, were good enough for those who desired annexation.

There have been objections to the celebration of this day. Comments tinged with disapproval have emanated in some instances from our own ranks. The day was a most memorable one and the speaker would be in favor of making it a holiday for all time. Those who thought otherwise were either imbued with lack of confidence or even cowardice. It was a day worthy of celebration for many reasons. For one thing, it commemorated the unsuccessful seizure of the islands nearly one hundred years ago by the English, who were forced to restore them by the action of Napoleon. The 17th was the birthday anniversary of Kamehameha III, the King who desired the annexation of the islands to the United States.

Said Judge HARTWELL: "Wherever is found a community enjoying possession of higher sentiments, there is civil liberty. The day of kings is past but the rule of law is never ending." Judge Hartwell entered upon a legal analysis of the Hawaiian Government. "Until the advent of Kalakaua there had been no actual constitutional government. For the first time, then, a monarch was sworn to enforce and observe a constitution; for the first time absolute kingly authority was abolished. In Liliuokalani the country found a sovereign who disregarded and ignored the constitution. What did the English do when their King John rebelled? They forced him at Runnymede to obligate himself by signing Magna Charta. On the 17th of January, 1893, the monarch of this country abrogated constitutional government by violating and defying the constitution. From that instant Hawaiian constitutional government ceased to exist. The proceeding that followed was a conservative and legitimate one. Citizens took upon themselves the functions of government. The ultimate end sought is annexation to the United States. The Government is protecting citizens and property and quietly and fairly conducting the affairs of state. We have a stable government. That is the only Government, and it will continue to be the recognized, honored, and efficient power on the islands.

President of Punahou College, Prof. F. A. Hosmer, said that Prince Bismarck, at a banquet, offered a toast to the fatherland Great Britain and the Republic of the West. The French and Portuguese governments further afford fine examples of republican forms of government. Out here on an island on the mid-Pacific, people with the incentive of patriotism have been brave enough to resist absolutism. Prof. Alexander's history is authority for the notorious fact that Hawaii has not for twenty years had a stable government. We have it now and we will have annexation.

Their inventors will cease to be backward. Every man here will have an opportunity. The islands are rich in material resources. We have Pearl locks and other grand harbors. There is prosperity in store for all. We have been extremely fortunate in having men here who have accepted public office as a public trust. They are able and self-sacrificing gentlemen, worthy of our trust and confidence, and entitled to our support.

H. T. Waterhouse made a few timely and effective remarks in the native tongue. The effort was received with every mark of cordiality and favor. This translation was furnished by Rev. Sereno Bishop: [Pointing to the motto "Aloha."] "That is our foundation, to live in love to each other. The light has broken upon us; we have lived in darkness—let us now embrace the light. The doors of the former palace were open to-day for the poor and needy to enter, and that movement will enlarge the opportunities of the poor. Then go forward and secure liberty and prosperity.

Attorney-General W. O. Smith said, in speaking for the Government, that if any one feeling should animate our hearts it should be a union of gratitude and pride. I am proud of the conduct of the people and of their support of the Government. The natives, many of them, not clearly understanding the situation, have evinced confidence in us. Their behavior merits the greatest commendation. The Government has had to contend with many difficulties; the people have been patient; there has been no exercise of the ballot; self-interest has been subordinated to public interest; men have been brave, courageous, and forbearing. It has been no easy task to act as wet nurse to an infant. The child has had the measles and the colic, and it has even been threatened with a spanking; but it is now a lusty little one, able to walk. We are working for one great destiny—stability of government. We will secure it in annexation. Let there be a continuance of the noble subordination of self-interests, and we shall march on to victory.

Judge Robertson said he was thankful for the opportunity to lift his voice as an Annexationist. He was in the United States when the Queen committed her fatal error. He recognized the effects of the happenings when accounts were wired across the continent. He knew that the sentiments which were then uppermost were the same sentiments which forced Kalakaua to dismount his high horse in 1881 and drew Bob Wilcox from his gasoline tank in 1889. He had been amused at the complaint of an English man of war's man upon being called a boy. "Old men for council, young men for war." The services of the "boys" were in demand a few weeks ago when it looked as if "our great and good friend" Grover Cleveland, would force us to fight. He was with the boys. The speaker had not been an ardent Annexationist until about one year ago. Having been born here he was proud of the autonomy of Hawaii. Now he was convinced that a higher state of citizenship would be the possession of all who went into the American Union with Hawaii. As Robert Lincoln said, every man is the equal of every other man in the United States. Some of the Royalists are saying that Lilioukalani will be given back her throne. There was no such thing as her throne. She had forfeited it when she abolished constitutional government.

Walter G. Smith said the 17th day of January was a date of note in the political history of the world. On that day in 1792 the people of France condemned a despotic king to death and gained that liberty which, from the dream of the philosopher, had become the possession of the subject. That day marked the inauguration of the republican movement in Europe. It dispelled the belief that a country without a king or a church without a bishop meant chaos and infidelity. The events of that January day had brought men to their senses. They saw that the attributed divinity of a monarch was but the figment of their inherited fears and superstitions. The feudal principle then received a wound that defied all surgery. A century after that day in France came a day in Hawaii when the last independent sovereign on the Western Hemisphere lost her throne and the last recognized dynasty on this side of the globe was expunged from the calendar of princes. Then the 17th of January gained the right to be known as one of the world's democratic holidays. Let it approve the fact that it is a sign set eternal in the heavens of history that kings and queens and potentates shall be no more and that the reign of the people has begun. There is nothing more inspiring in the annals of 1776 than the unwavering front this people preserved in their great emergency.

On one side was the chief of 60,000,000, here an armed body of a paltry thousand; there was the greatest of modern powers with its armies and fleets, here a few lone rocks in the ocean without a fort upon their pinnacles or a gun upon a deck; there was a government whose President declared that our dethroned queen should reign again; there was a little band of men who said that she must pass over their dead bodies first. In our harbor was the broadside of a possible foe, here on shore was a battalion behind its sandbags. The odds were great, but the patriots of Hawaii took them. If the American people had not intervened there might have been a new Thermopylae. While we look back with pride we must look forward with

courage. There are grave problems yet to solve. We have an antagonistic element at home and a negative moneyed influence abroad conspiring for control. Our enemies are powerful and insidious. They are united to defeat the objects of the January revolution. It is for us to remain steadfast to those objects no matter how they may be assailed. This is our highest duty.

There is but one political goal and watchword for us all, and that is annexation. If this is delayed, and we are left to work out our own salvation, the best thing is to work it out on the American plan by the exercise of Anglo-Saxon pluck, and leave the rest to the Ruler of all nations. Perhaps Providence may have a great political work for this little island community to perform. Perhaps its destiny is to work out a parallel to Greece, to Switzerland, to Haiti. On rocky shores, among fishermen and the poor, occurred events which, after nineteen centuries, sway and control the world. In closing, Mr. Smith said: "Standing here upon ground once consecrated to the pomp of monarchy, face to face with the deroyalized house of Government, knowing no flag so dear as the Stars and Stripes, we appeal to our countrymen to open their gates to us of kindred blood; but we pledge ourselves, if that can not be, to at least be worthy of the service by the work we shall do on this soil for the glory of American principles."

The crowd lingered about the square for an hour after the mass meeting closed, viewing the fireworks and illuminations.

NOTES OF THE DAY.

Mr. Emmeluth fired a salute at his residence early in the morning.

There was a large crowd at Thomas Square in the afternoon to hear the concert.

The judiciary building was decorated by Company F, and the executive building by Company E.

The crowds were very orderly throughout the day and evening. Not a single disturbance occurred.

The Antiques and Horribles made up an interesting circus and especially pleased the young folks. The award of prizes was just and entirely satisfactory.

Bonfires lit up the evening in Ewa.

Corporal Kelby, E Company, had a hand severely injured by a premature explosion of fireworks on the tower of the executive building. He is in the hospital.

A private of E Company made a bomb with a piece of gas pipe. The metal was blown to fragments on the executive building front. Five panes of glass were shattered and some stucco work loosened. The man was only slightly bruised.

A GOOD WORD FOR MR. WILLIS.

The excitement attending the arrival and departure of the *Corwin* having subsided, we hope that our citizens will be fair and just toward Mr. Willis. His position is not one of his own creation. It was made by his master. He did not seek trouble but was ordered to make it. The sins of the principals are often visited upon the heads of the agents. If his temper has not been altogether lovely in making his answers to questions regarding his use of force in restoring the ex-Queen, it must be remembered that he was instructed to perform a difficult job. "Don't use force, but don't let them know that you won't use it." A nobleman said to the artist who was about to paint his portrait: "In painting my portrait paint that of my valet standing behind me, but so that he can not be seen." Instructions are often difficult to execute.

Mr. Willis knows, for he must read some books, that in no modern time has an envoy been sent to express good will toward a government, and at the same time ordered peremptorily to compass, instigate, and procure the destruction of that government. He knows, furthermore, that he never would have been ordered to do so if we had numbered fifty millions of people; that the "high sense of justice" which inspired his instructions was accompanied with an equally high and lively sense of superior strength. Mr. Willis is not responsible for all this. If he stands out in diplomatic history as one of the parties to a queer and novel diplomatic escapade, he must thank his principal for it. His character and ours, as good Christians, are to be tested in the future. It may occur to him that a Christian spirit are not incompatible with true statesmanship. Still, he may feel like the darkey preacher who made this reply to an inquiry: "I reckons I'se broke all de Commandments, but tank de Lord I keeps my religion," and while he may cultivate for private use that which is the greatest of all, charity, he may feel that his public mission here will be to "get even" with us poor Hawaiian worms of the dust. The mothers in Honolulu, who, after the arrival of the *Corwin*, bent over their babes in prayer anxiously inquiring if the guns of the *Philadelphia* and *Adams* were shotted for them, gratefully thank him that he ordered the death angel to touch but not to rest on their pillows. It is now in order that we cultivate charity and forgiveness.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 31.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 19, 1894.

SIR: In recent dispatches I have sent letters between Hon. S. B. Dole, minister of foreign affairs, and myself in regard to my "attitude showing the intention to use force."

I have the honor to transmit herewith the letters of Mr. Dole of January 11 and 18, 1894, and my reply of this and prior date, which will, on my part, end correspondence on the subject.

Very respectfully,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

Inclosures.

1. Letter of Mr. Dole to Mr. Willis.
2. Letter of Mr. Willis to Mr. Dole.
3. Letter of Mr. Willis to Mr. Dole, January 15, 1894.
4. Letter of Mr. Dole to Mr. Willis, January 18, 1894.

[Inclosure 1, in No. 31.]

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, January 11, 1894.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication dated January 1 instant, in which you refer to my communication to you dated December 27 as "containing statements which I am fully prepared to show are not warranted by the facts, seriously affecting the President of the United States and the representatives of the United States in this country, and that these charges and statements, if accepted as the official views of your Government, demand prompt answer and equally prompt action on the part of the Government of the United States to the end that the condition of affairs therein described should be removed by the removal of the alleged causes."

You also refer to the intervening correspondence between us, stating that my above-mentioned communication, "being for the first time the official information that the warlike preparations described by you were caused by and intended for the diplomatic and military representatives of the United States."

You further state that, believing that upon further consideration I would realize the great injustice of my statements, you, on the 29th ultimo, wrote, suggesting the withdrawal of my communication of the 27th ultimo and your reply, and that no copies be given to the public or made a record by either Government; and on the 31st stated to Mr. Damon that your note to me "was prompted by no improper or unfriendly spirit, but was intended to continue the amicable relations heretofore existing."

You further state that, in my letter of December 29, there is no "withdrawal or modification of the statements complained of, but, on the contrary, an expression of readiness, implying ability, to furnish the specifications requested."

You also acknowledge the receipt of my note to you, dated January 1, stating that it was not my intention to withdraw any of my letters, which note you state is unsigned by me. The omission of the signature was unintentional.

You conclude by stating that "I have now to ask that you furnish me, at your earliest convenience, with the desired specifications, as I wish to make immediate answer."

I will comply with your request. Before doing so, however, I desire to say, in reply to your communication of the 1st instant, that I have made no "charges" against the President of the United States or its representatives. On the contrary, in order that there might be no misapprehension concerning the matter, I specifically stated, in my communication to you of the 27th ultimo, that I do not claim or intimate that this unfortunate situation has been intentionally created by you or by the Government which you represent. I still disclaim any intention of charging you or your Government with intent to produce the results and conditions described in my communication of December 27.

The object of my communication to you was to formally bring to your attention certain facts and conditions existing in this country; what, in my opinion, were

the causes of the same, and to obtain from you such information and assurances as would tend to allay the prevailing excitement and apprehension.

Concerning your statement above referred to, that my communication of December 27 contains statements which you are fully prepared to show are not warranted by the facts, I would say that it would give me great pleasure to become convinced that the alleged conditions and facts referred to by me did not in truth exist. The matters hereinafter stated constitute in part the basis for my belief in the existence of the conditions referred to and the causes producing the same; but I shall be glad to receive from you any evidence tending to remove from my mind the belief that they or any of them did exist, and assuring you that upon becoming convinced that I am under misapprehension concerning any of such alleged facts, the allegations concerning the same will be immediately withdrawn.

Concerning your statement that my letter of December 29 contains "no withdrawal or modifications of the statements complained of," you will pardon me if I say that I was not aware that any complaint had been made concerning any statement made by me, your reply having been primarily directed to eliciting more specific information concerning certain points.

Referring to the suggestion contained in your note of the 29th and your interview with Mr. Damon, that I withdraw my communication of December 27, I would say that to do so would have been in the nature of an admission that the statements therein contained were incorrect, which, unfortunately, in the absence of the information which you say you are prepared to present and with certain other evidence before me, it was impossible for me to do so.

Allow me to assure you that it is with deep gratification that I received your assurance that your communication to me of the 29th December was prompted by no improper motive or unfriendly spirit, but was intended to continue the amicable relations heretofore existing, and to further assure you that this and all other communications from this Government are written in the same spirit, and I trust that no statement presenting the claims and views of this Government concerning any matter of law or fact may by reason of its directness and distinctness be construed as otherwise than of a similar character.

In compliance with your request for certain specifications concerning my letter of December 27, I reply thereto as follows:

First. You inquire as to the meaning of the word "attitude" as used in my letter.

I reply that the word was used by me in its ordinarily accepted sense, meaning the bearing, the posture as indicating purpose, of those referred to.

You further say: "Will you point out where and when and how the representatives of the United States assumed any attitude toward the supporters of the Provisional Government, or that Government itself, other than one essentially and designedly expressive of peace?"

In reply I would say that the attitude of a person is to be ascertained only by inferences drawn from the known words and acts of such person, and the conditions and circumstances under which they take place.

Some of the words and actions of the United States and its representatives in this connection and the conditions and circumstances attendant thereupon, from which its intentions and attitude toward the Provisional Government must be inferred, are as follows:

(1) A treaty of annexation had been negotiated between the Provisional Government and the United States Government and presented to the Senate for ratification. This treaty was withdrawn by President Cleveland immediately upon his entering office without prior notice to this Government or its representatives of his intention so to do, or of his reasons for such action.

(2) Immediately thereafter the President appointed Hon. James H. Blount a special commissioner to Hawaii to investigate the condition of affairs at Hawaii.

The knowledge of such appointment was withheld from the representatives of this Government at Washington. The press having announced the appointment, the Hawaiian representatives applied to the State Department for information concerning the same. The Secretary of State refused to state the objects of the mission or even to admit that a commissioner had been appointed.

(3) On the 19th day of June, 1893, Mr. Thurston, Hawaiian minister at Washington, addressed a communication to Mr. Gresham, Secretary of State, in which the following language is used, viz:

"I am directed by my Government to represent to you that, while the Hawaiian Government has full confidence in the good faith of the United States towards Hawaii in and concerning its treatment of the relations between the two countries, it seems proper that it should be informed as to the effect the present uncertainty as to the ultimate course to be pursued has upon the situation in Hawaii.

"The long-continued delay and uncertainty keeps the entire community in a feverish state of mind, by reason of which business is seriously affected; capital is rendered timid, thereby hampering all enterprises which are conducting their business

on credit; the Government credit and ability to borrow is prejudiced; the expenses of the Government are largely increased by the necessity of maintaining a considerable armed force for the protection of public order, and the enemies of the Government are encouraged to conspire against law and order, all of which is highly prejudicial and injurious not only to the Hawaiians, but to the very large amount of American capital invested in Hawaii and the mutual trade now being conducted between the two countries.

"It is important for the Hawaiian Government to know the intention of the United States Government concerning annexation at as early a date as possible, as if annexation is not to take place the methods of treating local conditions in Hawaii must be radically different from those to be pursued if annexation is to take place.

"It is also important that whatever the intentions of the United States Government may be concerning the subject-matter, the Hawaiian Government be informed what such intentions are before the same are made public, in order that it may consider the situation with full knowledge of all its aspects and decide upon such course of action as may be necessary to preserve order and protect the interests of the people of Hawaii.

"For the reasons above stated I respectfully request that a decision may be arrived at and communicated as speedily as is consistent with the interests of the United States."

No reply has ever been made to such communication.

(4) Upon the arrival of Mr. Blount in this country he did not communicate nor in any matter intimate to the Hawaiian Government that his investigations were to be directed toward the right of existence of the Government to whom he was accredited. All of his investigations and examinations were private, and such persons only were examined as he chose to call.

(5) An examination of his report, since published, shows that there are statements made by approximately 60 Royalists and 20 supporters of the Provisional Government.

That he has obtained no statements from the 4 members of the cabinet voted out three days before the revolutionary attempt of the Queen, although he has obtained exhaustive statements from their Royalist successors.

That he has examined only 2 of the 13 members of the committee of safety; one of the original 4 members of the executive council of the Provisional Government; 3 of the original 14 members of the advisory council; 2 of the 8 speakers who addressed the mass meeting called by the committee of safety on the day prior to the establishment of the Provisional Government, and but 1 of the 8 field and staff officers, and none of the 17 line officers in command of the forces of the Provisional Government and none of the 5 commissioners sent to Washington, although all of such men omitted to be examined were eye witnesses and active participants in the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of the Provisional Government, and are men of character and standing in the community, while a number of those examined on the Royalist side are irresponsible characters.

(6) Upon the 15th day of May, 1893, Mr. Blount, without first communicating to this Government what his instructions were, or his intention so to do, published his official instructions in a Honolulu newspaper in the form of an address "To the people of the Hawaiian Islands," and concluded with the following words:

"While I shall refrain from interference between conflicting forces of whatever nationality for supremacy, I will protect American citizens not participating in such conflict."

(7) Although Mr. Blount's report is official in character, vitally affects this Government, and is distinctly hostile to it in tone and conclusions, no request to this Government for explanation of the charges therein made was received nor opportunity to reply thereto or notice of its contents given prior to its publication. The first information concerning the contents of such report was obtained by this Government through published extracts in the American papers dated November 20, last, no official copy thereof being furnished the Hawaiian minister at Washington until November 25, and none received by this Government at Honolulu until December 22, last, such copies having been furnished only after several applications therefor at the State Department.

(8) On November 7 you, having arrived in Honolulu, presented your credentials to this Government as American minister, with the usual declarations of friendship and regard and were duly received and acknowledged. Simultaneously therewith, Admiral Skerrett was suddenly and unexpectedly removed and Rear-Admiral Irwin appointed to the command of the American naval forces in Honolulu. Such change was almost universally interpreted by the press of the United States as having a bearing upon the contemplated execution of the announced policy of the President concerning Hawaii. The extract hereinafter contained from the New York Herald is a sample of the interpretation placed thereon by the press of your own country favorable to such policy.

I do not claim or intimate that the personnel of the commanding officer of the United States forces is of any concern to this Government, nor suggest that the interpretation placed thereon by the American press is correct, nor that your Government is responsible for such interpretation. This incident is mentioned simply as a part of the *res geste* of the case which this Government had before it, and as one of the many things which it was obliged to consider in drawing its inferences as to what the intentions of your Government were.

(9) Upon the 8th of November last the New York Herald published a statement from its Washington correspondent from which I make the following extracts:

"A diplomatic bombshell will burst within the next few days and the report will be heard throughout the entire world.

"The bomb will be thrown by an accredited representative of the United States Government, and he will hurl it against the badly conceived and worse managed Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

"If Minister Willis and Rear-Admiral Irwin arrived in Honolulu on schedule there would be even livelier times in the capital city of the Hawaiian Islands to-day than there is in the metropolis of the United States. * * * Briefly stated, the present administration will do all in its power to restore the condition of affairs which existed in Hawaii at the time Minister Stevens * * * brought about the overthrow of Queen Liliuokalani, * * *

"The same force, that of the United States Government, which made the Provisional Government possible has sustained them in power to this day. They could not have made the revolution of which they were the head center a success but for the support given them by the administration in Washington, and there is every reason to believe * * * that the Provisional Government would have gone down long ago but for this same support. * * *

"The fact that a new minister has been sent to Honolulu to succeed Minister Stevens and that Rear-Admiral Irwin has been sent to relieve Commander Skerrett has been accepted in many instances as an inkling of the administration's policy towards Hawaii. * * *

"This means that the Queen will be restored to her throne and the Provisional Government, representing only a small part of the people of Hawaii, will soon be a thing of the past."

I do not intimate that the U. S. Government is responsible for the utterances of the Herald, but cite the above as one of several instances in which information of intended acts on the part of your Government, vital to this Government, has been denied to this Government and first made known to it through the public press.

(10) On November 11 the papers of the United States published a letter from the Secretary of State to the President, dated October 18, 1893.

No previous notice had been given to this Government of the contents of such letter or of the intention to make it public.

In that letter the Secretary, referring to the initiation of this Government, says:

"They relied on no military force of their own, for they had none worthy of the name. The Provisional Government was established by the action of the American minister and the presence of the troops landed from the *Boston*, and its continued existence is due to the belief of the Hawaiians that if they made an effort to overthrow it they would encounter the armed forces of the United States.

"The earnest appeals to the American minister for military protection by the officers of the Provisional Government after it had been recognized show the utter absurdity of the claim that it was established by a successful revolution of the people of the islands.

"These appeals were a confession by the men who made them of their weakness and timidity. Courageous men, conscious of their strength and the justice of their cause, do not act thus. * * *

"Should not the great wrong done to a feeble but independent State by an abuse of the authority of the United States be undone by restoring the legitimate Government? Anything short of that will not, I respectfully submit, satisfy the demands of justice. * * * Our Government was the first to recognize the independence of the islands, and it should be the last to acquire sovereignty over them by force and fraud."

You have intimated in your communication dated December 2 that the foregoing letter, "being a domestic affair, the transaction is not the subject of diplomatic representation," which statement you have reiterated in your communication of January 1.

I must submit, however, that an official communication from the chief of the Department of State to the President, in which he charges this Government and its officers with conspiracy, weakness, timidity, and fraud, and recommends its subversion, which letter is officially furnished to and published by the public press without any information concerning the same being afforded to this Government, is not a "domestic transaction," and is preeminently a proper subject for inquiry on

the part of this Government as to the intentions of your Government concerning the subject-matter.

(11) On November 14 Mr. Thurston, Hawaiian minister at Washington, called upon the Secretary of State and inquired if the above letter was authentic, and was assured by Mr. Gresham that it was.

Mr. Thurston then said: "I wish, then, to further ask whether it is the intention of the U. S. Government to carry out the policy therein indicated by force; or, in other words, whether if the Provisional Government declines to accede to the request of the U. S. Government to vacate in favor of the Queen, U. S. troops will be used to enforce the request."

To which Mr. Gresham replied: "I am not at liberty at present to answer that question. It is a matter concerning which I will speak to the President and talk with you more fully this afternoon."

In the afternoon of the same day Mr. Gresham further said to Mr. Thurston:

"I have already answered your first question, to the effect that the letter published (Secretary Gresham to the President) was authentic and a correct statement of the policy of the United States. As to your second question, as to whether force is to be used by the United States to restore the Queen, all that I am at liberty to state is that Mr. Willis has no instructions to do anything which will cause injury to life or property of anyone at the islands. Further than this I am not at liberty to state what his instructions are. You can draw your own inferences from my statement and allay any apprehension which may have been caused by what has been published."

Mr. Thurston further said to Mr. Gresham:

"Your answer does not convey the information which I requested. What I desire is to obtain information which will guide my Government in their action. If they know that force is to be used by you their course of action will necessarily be different from what it otherwise would be. The definite information from me that you intend to use force may be the means of preventing them from using force and causing bloodshed."

To which Mr. Gresham replied:

"Our relations in the past have been pleasant and I want them to continue to be so in the future, and to be perfectly courteous to you, but I can not at present answer you more fully than I have."

(12) On the 16th of last November there was published in the Honolulu Star an interview with you, with the accompanying statement that the proofs had been revised by you.

The following are extracts therefrom, purporting to be statements made by you:

"You are authorized to say from me that no change in the present situation will take place for several weeks. I brought with me certain instructions. * * * Since my arrival here contingencies have arisen about which neither the United States Government nor myself were aware when I left Washington. * * * I forwarded my dispatches to Washington by to-day's steamer, and until I receive an answer to them no change will take place in the present situation, *nor will any be allowed.*"

"What do you mean by the expression 'nor will any be allowed?'"

"I mean just this; that until the time comes for me to carry out my instructions, the peace and good order of this community will be kept undisturbed in the interests of humanity. That any attempt made by any person or persons to make trouble will be promptly checked and punished. You may put the matter more plainly and say that even if the Provisional Government discharged the whole of its troops to-day, no lawlessness would be allowed for one moment under the present situation of affairs. * * * The whole Hawaiian question is now in abeyance and nothing the newspapers can say or do, will alter the situation one iota; * * * There is not the slightest necessity for any one to stay out of bed nights for fear of trouble of any kind, for none will be permitted."

In the Honolulu Bulletin of November 17, last, there is published what purports to be a letter signed by yourself, in which you state concerning the above-mentioned interview:

"The interview in the Star was submitted to me but I did not scrutinize it carefully. It contains several expressions which are misleading; due, I am sure, not to any intention on the part of the writer."

There is no specification of what the "misleading" portions are, although you have since verbally informed me in substance that you did not intend to use such words and had no intention of exercising authority inconsistent with that of the Government.

(13) On November 29, last, the Hawaiian Star published a statement purporting to be a report of remarks made by you to a delegation of the American League, in which the following words are stated to have been used by you:

"I have my instructions which I can not divulge. * * * But this much I can say:

The policy of the United States is already formulated regarding these islands, and that nothing which can be said or done either here or there can avail anything now. I do not come here as did Mr. Blount. I come here as the executive officer. I come to act. When the proper time comes, I *shall* act. * * * I wish to state, positively, that any outside interference will not be tolerated by the United States."

I am not aware that you have ever disavowed the correctness of this report.

(14) On November 29 last, having that day for the first time received information through the Hawaiian minister at Washington of the contents of Mr. Gresham's letter to the President, and of his statements concerning the same and his refusal to state whether it was the intention of your Government to carry out its policy by force, I called upon you in company with the Attorney-General, stated to you the substance of my information, and asked you what the intentions of your Government were in relation to Mr. Gresham's recommendations. You replied that you were not at liberty to tell us, but would do so as soon as you could.

(15) Immediately thereafter, I addressed a communication to you, revoking the general permission theretofore granted to the United States forces to land for drill, and a further communication formally stating to you the information received by me concerning said letter of Mr. Gresham and asking you the following question:

"I desire to inquire of you whether the published reports of such letter of Secretary Gresham are substantially correct? If they are, I feel that it is due this Government that it should be informed of the intention of your Government in relation to the suggestions contained in the said letter of Mr. Gresham."

On December 2, you replied to such letter stating that "as to the letter of Mr. Gresham I have the honor to call your attention to the fact, as shown by you, that it is a communication from a member of the cabinet to the President of the United States, and being a domestic transaction is not the subject of diplomatic representation. Answering your note further, I must express my sincere regret that it is not in my power at present to inform you of the views or intentions of the United States."

(16) On December 4th last President Cleveland transmitted his annual message to Congress, in which the following language was used concerning Hawaii.

Referring to Mr. Blount's report he said:

"Upon the facts developed it seemed to me the only honorable course for our Government to pursue was to undo the wrong that had been done by those representing us, and to restore, as far as practicable, the status existing at the time of our forcible intervention. With a view of accomplishing this result within the constitutional limits of executive power our present minister at Honolulu has received appropriate instructions to that end."

(17) On December 14 last the U. S. dispatch-boat *Corwin* arrived in Honolulu from San Francisco bringing dispatches to yourself. No mail was allowed to be brought by her, but the press of Honolulu obtained from persons on board of her and published the above extract from the President's message. But for such accidental information no information concerning the same would have been obtained by this Government until the arrival of the *Alameda* on December 22.

Up to the time of the arrival of the *Corwin* the U. S. naval officers in port were in the habit of coming ashore in citizen's dress, the crews received the usual liberty on shore, and no unusual warlike preparations were visible on board.

Immediately after the arrival of the *Corwin* the liberty of the crews was stopped, as was that of most of the officers. Those who came on shore were in service uniform. Rifles were stacked, cartridge belts were filled with ball cartridges, and knapsacks packed for immediate use were conspicuous on the decks of the ships, and were seen there by visiting citizens, who in reply to inquiry as to the meaning of such preparations were informed by the officers that they were ready to land at a moment's notice. When asked if the landing would be to protect or fight us the reply of the officers of the *Philadelphia* was that no one on board knew what orders would be received.

(18) It was known at the time that several of the wives of the U. S. naval officers temporarily in Honolulu were packing up their baggage preparatory for immediate removal in view of possible hostilities.

(19) It was also known that you were in frequent communication with the ex-Queen, and leading royalists were constantly reiterating that you were going to immediately restore the Queen by force.

As a sample of the innumerable assertions of this character is the following, made by Mr. J. O. Carter, the ex-Queen's most trusted counselor and confidant, a gentleman who was then known to be in consultation with you and the ex-Queen and who appears as the attesting witness, to the exclusion of the former members of her cabinet, to her proposition of amnesty hereunder referred to.

Mr. Carter warned his nephew, Mr. C. L. Carter, a supporter of the Provisional Government, that restoration was certain; that force would be used by the United

States for that purpose, and that he ought to consider the rights of his family and not risk his life in opposing the inevitable.

This information was from one of the sources from which numerous prophecies of future action on the part of the United States had *emanated*, with almost invariable correctness.

(20) It was the almost well-nigh universal belief in the city that you were about to attempt to land the naval forces of the United States to enforce the execution of the President's policy.

In anticipation thereof for a number of days the wharves were lined with crowds of people, among them prominent Royalists, waiting to see the United States troops land to restore the Queen.

(21) On December 18, Mr. H. F. Glade, consul for Germany, called upon you and, in substance, asked if you could not speak out and relieve the public from the state of extreme tension they were in, which was becoming unbearable; to which you replied, in substance, that you were aware of the conditions and were making every effort to bring the matter to a speedy determination and would act within forty-eight hours.

(22) On December 16, it being reported that the *Corwin* was at an early date to return to San Francisco, the attorney-general called upon you stating that there would be no regular mail for nearly three weeks and asked permission to forward Hawaiian Government dispatches by her, which permission you refused, stating that your instructions would not permit it.

(23) On December 18, Maj. Wodehouse, the British minister, and Mr. Fujii, the Japanese diplomatic representative, both asked permission to land troops from their respective warships for the purpose of protecting their respective legations, which permission was granted by this Government.

(24) In view of the existing conditions, Mr. Fujii, the diplomatic representative, sent word to a number of prominent American supporters of the Provisional Government offering the use of the Japanese legation as a refuge for their families in case of hostilities.

(25) On December 18 last, I addressed to you a communication containing the following words:

"I am informed that you are in communication with Liliuokalani, the ex-Queen, with a view of reestablishing the monarchy in the Hawaiian Islands, and of supporting her pretensions to the sovereignty. Will you inform me if this report is true, or if you are acting in any way hostile to this Government. * * * You will pardon me for pressing you for an immediate answer."

(26) On December 19 you called upon and made a verbal address to me furnishing me with a manuscript copy of your remarks from which I make the following extracts:

"The President regrets, as I do, that any secrecy should have surrounded the interchange of views between our two Governments. I may say this, however, that the secrecy thus far observed has been in the interest and for the safety of all your people. * * *

"Upon the facts embodied in Mr. Blount's reports the President has arrived at certain conclusions and determined upon a certain course of action with which it becomes my duty to acquaint you.

"The Provisional Government was not established by the Hawaiian people or with their consent or acquiescence, nor has it since existed with their consent. * * * (Other reasons are set forth for the conclusions reached.)

"In view of these conclusions I was instructed by the President to take advantage of an early opportunity to inform the Queen of this determination, and of his views as to the responsibility of our Government. * * * I was instructed at the same time to inform the Queen that, when reinstated, that the President expected that she would pursue a magnanimous course by granting full amnesty to all who participated in the movement against her. * * *

"In obedience to the commands of the President, I have secured the Queen's agreement to this course. * * * It becomes my duty further to advise you, sir, the Executive of the Provisional Government and your ministers, of the President's determination of the question which your action and that of the Queen devolved upon him, and that you are expected to promptly relinquish to her her constitutional authority. And now Mr. President and gentlemen of the Provisional Government, with a deep and solemn sense of the gravity of the situation * * * in the name and by the authority of the United States of America I submit to you the question 'Are you willing to abide by the decision of the President?'"

(27) Upon the 23d of December, I replied to the foregoing communication in the negative.

Up to the time of sending you my communication of December 27, no further communication had been received by me from you and no assurance had been

received that force was not to be used nor what your further intentions were concerning this Government.

(28) During your nearly two months' residence in this city you and your family have declined the customary social courtesies usually extended to those occupying your official position, on the specified ground that it was not deemed best under existing circumstances to accept such civilities.

I do not for a moment intimate that such a course is improper or that it is a subject for criticism. It is simply referred to by me as an existing fact bearing upon your relations to this Government and germane in considering the question of your attitude thereto. It would not have been referred to by me except in response to your inquiry.

In the absence of specific definite information as to the intentions of your Government, the foregoing are some of the facts from which this Government has been obliged to infer what such intentions were, and which, considered as a whole, constitute the "attitude" toward this Government.

It may be that the proper logical deduction and inference from the foregoing facts is that the attitude of the United States and its representative toward the Provisional Government is and has been "one essentially and designedly expressive of peace." It will give us the greatest pleasure to receive assurances to that effect, but I submit that under the circumstances and in the absence of such assurances, they are capable of another construction, to a sufficient extent at least, to warrant the question which I have asked you in my communication of December 27.

Your second request for information is as follows:

"You assert that at the time of my arrival in this country the forces of this Government were organized and amply sufficient to suppress any internal disorder. Will you inform me what connection this statement has or is designed to have with the Government of the United States or with the future action of its representative?"

I reply that there are two reasons for the said statement. First, that already stated in my letter of December, that "in consequence of your attitude, the enemies of the Government, believing in your intentions to restore the monarchy by force, have become emboldened," etc.; and, second, that by reason of my inability to ascertain whether your Government proposed to use force in support of its policy of restoration, I was obliged to act as though it did so intend; as a result of which this Government has been obliged to increase its forces, and has been, and now is, subjected to the necessity of increased watchfulness and large additional expense, which, but for such attitude, would have been unnecessary.

The effect which I had hoped this communication might have upon the future action of the representative of the United States was that he might give such assurances that such additional watchfulness and expense might be avoided.

Your third request is for the time, place, and subject-matter of the "language" used by yourself in public and in communication to this Government. The answer to this is covered by my reply to your first inquiry.

Your fourth inquiry is as to what particular words in the published letter from Secretary Gresham and in the President's message, and which message of the President I referred to. I reply that certain of the words of the Secretary and the President which I deem pertinent to the subject-matter have already been quoted in my reply to your first inquiry, although there are other obviously bearing on the same subject.

I have already replied to you that I referred to the President's first message in my letter dated the 27th, having actually been written on the 26th of December, and forwarded to you before I had knowledge of the contents of the second message.

Your fifth inquiry is as to the time and contents of your communications which were "ambiguous."

I have enumerated them in my reply to your first inquiry.

The ambiguity consists in the reiterated statement that you proposed to do some act and carry out certain instructions which all the surrounding circumstances indicated were inimical to this Government, without stating what that act nor what those instructions were; and, while presenting and speaking assurances of friendship and amity, without the consent of this Government negotiating with its enemies for its subversion and declining to state what your intentions were.

Such utterances and actions were so inconsistent, one with the other, with international rules of comity, and the past relations and international policy of the two governments, as to be not only ambiguous but incomprehensible to this Government.

Your sixth inquiry is as to when, where, and to whom you declared that you intended to do some act when the proper time arrived. The reply to your first inquiry covers this also.

Your seventh inquiry is as to the time and manner when the Government has sought the assurance that force would not be used. The answer is contained in my reply to your first inquiry.

You finally ask my "careful consideration" of the following statement contained in my letter:

"Your action has unfortunately aroused the passions of all parties and made it probable that disturbances may be created at any moment," and say that you "refuse to believe that upon reexamination you (I) will feel at liberty to affix your (my) official signature to such an extraordinary declaration."

In reply I beg to state that I have resided in this country for nearly fifty years and had intimate personal knowledge of the conditions prevailing during the riot of 1874 and the revolutions of 1887, 1889, and 1893, and with all deliberation I state of my own knowledge that during such period there has never been a time when this country has been subjected to such strain and excitement as during the eight days following the arrival of the *Corwin*. The business of the entire community was practically suspended and its time and energy devoted to an excited and absorbing consideration of the political situation and to military preparations to meet unknown contingencies; which state of things has since been fortunately allayed by advices from America furnishing, in reports of the President's special Hawaiian message to Congress and his instructions to your excellency, information which made a satisfactory and favorable response to the inquiry of my letter to you of December 27.

I also state with equal deliberation that such condition was produced and maintained by reason of your actions and declarations and the actions and declarations of your Government and the circumstances and uncertainties attendant thereupon, as detailed in my letter of December 27, and herein.

I make this statement in no spirit of unfriendliness to you or your Government but as an historical fact which, if not already known to you, should, in the interests of both countries, be made known to you.

In conclusion, I beg to refer to the statement in your communication of January 1, wherein you state that it is a source of "sincere and profound regret" that my letter "brings, for the first time, the official information that the war-like preparations described by you were caused by and intended for the diplomatic and military representatives of the United States."

In reply, I would say that such regret on your part at receiving such information can not exceed the sincerity and profoundness of my own regret that such a condition should exist.

Such regret on my part is only equaled by inability to understand how it has come about that a Government and a community which is to-day more closely connected with the United States by ties of commerce, friendship, and blood, than any other lying beyond its borders, which values your friendship above that of all other nations, which fully admits and appreciates the many and deep obligations which it is under to your Government and people, which has done you and your country no wrong, has been forced into a position where, in defense of their very right to exist, they have been obliged to take up arms to meet the possible hostility of that country whose flag they revere and whose principles of liberty they love.

I can not but believe that it has arisen through a misunderstanding of facts on the part of your Government and a mutual misapprehension of motives and intentions which may, I sincerely hope, at an early day, be cleared away.

Allow me, in closing, to thank you, Mr. Minister, for your frequent expressions of personal regard, and for the evident sincerity of purpose displayed by you under recent trying circumstances, and to assure you of my deep appreciation thereof.

I have the honor to assure you, that, with highest consideration,

I am, your excellency's obedient servant,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

His excellency, ALBERT S. WILLIS,
U. S. Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, ———, 1894.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 11th instant, which was in reply to mine of the 1st.

The only question of practical importance arising out of the present correspondence was whether the United States war vessels were at the time your letter was written objectionable to your Government. Certain language which seemed to convey that idea was, in a subsequent note of January 18, withdrawn, thus, as I am pleased to know, leaving their peaceful and friendly purpose without question.

In addition to the above there were statements which were, as I thought, unjust, in that the sole responsibility for the recent disturbed condition of this community was attributed to me, the diplomatic agent of the United States.

In your last communication you expressly disclaim any intention of charging me or my Government "with intent to produce the results or conditions described in the communication of December 27." Your first letter contains a similar assurance, coupled with the statement that your "Government is reluctant to believe that this condition of affairs was contemplated or expected by yourself or by the President of the United States."

In view of the above, a reply to your last communication may not be necessary, nor would one be made except from the desire of my Government to have the good will and friendship of the people for whom you speak, which result will, in my opinion, be advanced by an explanation of several matters therein referred to.

I am the more encouraged to this course because of your assurance that upon becoming convinced that you are "under misapprehension concerning any such alleged facts the allegations concerning the same will be immediately withdrawn."

With the hope that I may be able to convince you of such misapprehension, I will now briefly consider the "specifications" furnished by you which refer to my "attitude," "language" and "public communications" since arriving here, and which in your judgment show that I "intended to use force."

Your last communication embraces many topics that are not only irrelevant to the above inquiry, but are not proper for me to discuss. Among these are (1) the withdrawal of the treaty of annexation; (2) the appointment of Mr. Blount; (4) his official conduct while here; (5) the class of witnesses whom he examined; (6) the publication in a "Honolulu newspaper," of his official instructions "without your previous knowledge," and (7) the publication of his reports to the State Department without an opportunity on the part of your Government to "reply thereto."

The above paragraphs, referring to matters occurring before my arrival, I do not feel at liberty to discuss further than to say that they were not at the time given the unfriendly construction now imputed to them, nor do they, except in a very remote degree, bear upon your statements as to my "purpose to use force."

The following five paragraphs, embracing matters occurring in the United States, some of them now for the first time brought to my knowledge and with none of which had I any connection, have so slight a reference to my "attitude" showing an "intention to use force" that I will, with due respect to you, confine myself to a brief epitome of their contents.

Paragraph 3 recites a communication of the 19th of last June from Hon. L. A. Thurston, Hawaiian minister at Washington, to Secretary Gresham, to which no answer was received.

Paragraph 8 refers to the appointment of Admiral Irwin as successor to Admiral Skerrett.

Paragraph 9 is an extract from a letter of November 8, sent to the New York Herald by its Washington correspondent, giving his interpretation of the above change.

Paragraph 10 gives copious extracts from Secretary Gresham's letter published in the press of the United States on November 11, outlining the views of the State Department, which letter reached here on November 24.

Paragraph 11 contains extracts from a dispatch of Hon. L. A. Thurston to your Government which, as appears from your note of the 18th instant, was received here Friday, November 24, simultaneously with the letter of Mr. Gresham referred to in your paragraph 10.

This dispatch shows that three days after the publication of Mr. Gresham's letter Mr. Thurston called upon him and inquired as to its authenticity and as to the "intention of the United States Government to carry out the policy therein indicated by force."

After speaking to the President on the subject, Mr. Gresham replied as follows:

"I have already answered your first question to the effect that the letter published [Secretary Gresham to the President] was authentic and a correct statement of the policy of the United States. As to your second question, as to whether force is to be used by the United States to restore the Queen, all that I am at liberty to state is that Mr. Willis has no instructions to do anything which will cause injury to life or property of anyone at the islands. * * * You can draw your own inferences from my statement, and allay any apprehension which may have been caused by what has been published."

Waiving for the present, for reasons stated, any further consideration of the eleven foregoing paragraphs, I come now to number 12, which quotes certain expressions from an interview in a local paper of the 16th of last November. As this does involve my "attitude," I have this to say:

The subject-matter of that interview and the circumstances out of which it arose were known to you at the time.

In the forenoon of Wednesday, November 15, Hon. S. M. Damon, minister of finance, notified me in person that there were rumors of an attack that night, or the ensuing night, upon the Executive building. The Government did not credit

these rumors, but there were many people who had apprehensions upon the subject, in consequence of which, as he informed me, the regular guard had been increased and one of the volunteer companies would be ordered under arms for the night. I asked him, "Who constitute the volunteer companies?" His reply was, "They consist mainly of the citizens, many of them being the young men employed in the banks and business houses of the city."

I then said: "It seems hard to have these young men called from their homes under such circumstances, as their families will necessarily be under great anxiety during their absence." I further remarked: "The Japanese consul-general, the English minister, and other foreign representatives have already called to say that their people are apprehensive of mob violence, and had asked me as the only representative whose Government has war vessels now in port to protect their people. The friends of the Queen, also, are apprehensive as to her safety. I do not wish to interfere in any way with your domestic affairs, except with your approval. If you do not object, however, I will publicly announce that the United States will cooperate to prevent mob violence. I will also state that there will be no communication to your Government from the President of the United States for several weeks."

Mr. Damon replied, thanking me for the offer, and saying that he could see no objection to it whatever, that such an announcement would go very far toward allaying excitement and relieving general anxiety.

In reply to the question whether the order calling out the volunteer troops could not be rescinded he said that he would go immediately to the executive building, but was afraid it was too late to make any change for that night.

The following evening I met Mr. Damon at a dinner given by Capt. Barker on board the U. S. flagship *Philadelphia*, when he expressed his hearty appreciation of my action, and said that the effect of the interview, which you quote, had been to greatly relieve the apprehensions of the community as to mob violence.

On the following morning you called at this legation, and being informed of the preceding facts and that, as stated in your letter, I "had no intention of exercising authority inconsistent with that of your Government," you expressed your satisfaction and approval of what had occurred. The representatives of the foreign governments and many prominent citizens expressed themselves to the same effect.

The action taken was meant and understood at the time as in the interest of peace, humanity, and good order, and will, after this explanation, no longer, I hope, be considered an evidence of hostility.

Paragraph (13) contains extracts from remarks published in a local paper of the 17th of last November, purporting to have been made by me to a "delegation of the American League," and which you accept as correct.

In the same issue of that paper, its editor, commenting upon these "remarks," says: "They contained two statements which must give encouragement to those to whom the future of Hawaii as a civilized state is a cherished and Christian object. We group these declarations together so that they may stand out with the prominence which is their due."

"I am an ardent American. I would like to see the Stars and Stripes waving, under proper conditions, not only over the Pacific islands, but over any other territory which would be beneficial to the United States, and this—'knowing the policy of the United States, I could not have accepted the position of an executive officer had it been in conflict with the principles I hold.'"

"Surely," continues this editor, "the time can not be far off when the American flag shall wave over these Pacific islands and do so under proper conditions."

By a singular coincidence the "two statements" above cited were the only portions of the alleged "address" that are omitted in your quotation. I respectfully submit that as an entirety the "address" admits only of the friendly construction given by this editor.

Without reference, however, to such construction or to the question of the correctness of the published "address," I state now that nothing was said on that occasion which was intended or which could be construed into an unfriendly sentiment towards you or your Government.

Paragraphs (14) and (15) refer to your personal call at the legation in company with the attorney-general on Friday, November 24, and inquiry as to "what the intentions of my Government were" and to your letter of November 29, asking "whether the published reports of the letter of Secretary Gresham are substantially correct;" and stating "if they are, I feel that it is due this Government that it should be informed of the intention of your Government."

My duty, as I understood it, did not permit me to discuss with you, the letter of Mr. Gresham to the President, nor could I, under the state of facts, be questioned as to the existence or nature of the "intentions" of my Government. As a matter of fact, it was, at that time, doubtful whether my Government had any "intentions," hostile or otherwise, towards your Government.

This inability to comply with your requests should not have been construed as an

evidence of "hostile intent" for the further reason that the information upon both points submitted to me, had already on November 14, been given to your minister at Washington and through him, on November 24, to your Government.

If there was nothing in the subject of your inquiries to warrant the belief that the United States "intended to use force," was there anything unfriendly in my manner of receiving or responding thereto?

As to the written communication, the language used will answer for itself. The oral interview is reported to the United Press by its correspondent here, whose accuracy you will attest. In a letter from Honolulu of December 5 he says:

"On the 24th ultimo the *Warrimoo* brought from Victoria our earliest knowledge of Secretary Gresham's letter. * * * Immediately after the news by the *Warrimoo* was received President Dole and Attorney-General Smith waited upon Minister Willis. They asked to know his instructions. He courteously declined to communicate them, but renewed to them a previous assurance that he would take absolutely no action until the return of the *Alameda* on December 21. He further assured them that they would be the first to know of any course of action decided upon by him. He evinced a genuine sympathy for the Government if not for their cause. Minister Willis then listened appreciatively to a representation by the attorney-general to the effect that their struggles for a good and constitutional government had been protracted for fifteen years."

You further, in paragraph (15), refer to your communication of November 29, "revoking the general permission theretofore granted to the U. S. forces to land for drill." You assigned no reason for such action, and I know of none. You were, however, promptly notified that such privilege would not thereafter be exercised, and to this day no armed soldier of our Government has been landed here for that or any other purpose.

Indeed, as appears from a letter of Admiral Irwin of November 29, acknowledging the receipt of a copy of your letter above referred to, he had "already given orders that our troops were not to be landed for drill or any other purpose," as in his opinion the landing of troops for drill would have a tendency to increase the disquiet already existing.

Your paragraph (16) is a brief extract from the message of President Cleveland of December 4, which was received here on the *Corwin* December 14.

Under our Constitution, as you are well aware, Congress alone has the "power to declare war." As the President distinctly announced that he would only act "within the constitutional limits of Executive power," he precluded the idea of using force and reaffirmed his declaration of November 14, delivered through Secretary Gresham, not "to do anything which would cause injury to life or property of anyone at the islands."

Paragraph (17) describes, upon the authority of certain "visiting citizens," the preparations on board our war vessels after the arrival of the *Corwin*, which seemed to imply that our forces "were ready to land at a moment's notice." "Rifles were stacked, cartridge belts were filled with ball cartridges, and knapsacks packed for immediate use." "The liberty of the crews was stopped as was that of most of the officers. Those who came on shore were in service uniform," etc.

If those "visiting citizens" had made inquiry of the officers in command their apprehensions would have been promptly allayed by the information that what they saw on that Friday they could have seen on any third Friday in the month, it being the usual "squadron routine drill," viz: "Boat drill, fire party, arm and away," requiring the "packing of knapsacks" and other preparations which you detail.

I append two letters of Rear-Admiral Irwin of the 13th and 15th instant, giving "notes from entry in log book U. S. Flagship *Philadelphia*" and "extract from Squadron Routine Drills," showing the above facts, and further that, in his own words:

(1) "No different preparations for landing have ever been made since I assumed command of this squadron than those made by my predecessor, Rear-Admiral Skerrett, * * * which were intended to suppress riot and to protect the lives and property of 'American and English residents.'"

(2) As to the stoppage of shore leave he explains: "I did, as a matter of precaution, suspend liberty to the crews until I could ascertain whether it would be prudent to permit them to land without danger of collision. After coming ashore and having satisfied myself on that point, which I did in less than an hour, the order was revoked by telephone."

(3) "On the 18th of December, as the excitement on shore was very great, and as quite a mob had gathered at our usual landing, I gave orders for our officers to wear their uniforms on shore, which is the usual precaution taken in foreign countries in times of great public excitement. It is proper to add that I had been informed by Capt. Rooke, of the British cruiser *Champion*, that he had given a similar order."

(4) "The great guns of the *Philadelphia* and *Adams* have never been loaded since their last target practice at sea. The usual harbor drills have been kept up, as

required by regulations, the exception being that our men have not been landed for the purpose of drill since my assumption of command."

(5) "The reply quoted as made by the officers of the *Philadelphia* 'that no one on board knew what orders would be received,' should convince any reasonable person that no order had been given."

The admiral says in conclusion: "As you are aware, I have studiously avoided doing anything that would have a tendency to increase the excitement prevailing in Honolulu, and I now distinctly state that the naval force under my command is in no way responsible for the feeling now existing."

Your letter referring to the preceding facts makes this frank and just admission: "Up to the time of the arrival of the *Corwin* * * * no unusual warlike preparations were visible on board." The only warlike preparations seem, therefore, to have been confined to one day—December 15—and these as just shown by Admiral Irwin were not subject to an unfriendly construction.

In this connection it may not be improper to mention the conduct of our naval forces during the trying circumstances succeeding the 24th of last November. The many rumors as to their purpose of landing and attacking your people, the feelings of resentment naturally resulting from the honest belief by a large part of the community that such was their intention, the opprobrious epithets that were freely employed, brought such a dangerous and critical condition that for a time, as Admiral Irwin states, it became necessary for all our officers going ashore to wear their service uniform as a protection against insult and attack. During the whole of this unfortunate and regrettable situation the demeanor of both officers and men was one of forbearance and self-control.

Your paragraph (18) sets forth that "it was known at this time that several of the wives of the U. S. naval officers, temporarily in Honolulu, were packing up their baggage preparatory for immediate removal in view of possible hostilities."

It is true that on the day of the *Corwin's* arrival, December 14, three ladies, wives of naval officers, in the absence of their husbands on board ship, made preparations to leave. Within a few hours their apprehensions were allayed and they decided to remain where they were. If, however, these ladies had left the city upon the 24th of last November it would not, even at that early date, have been an evidence of any hostile purpose nor "in view of possible hostilities toward your Government," but an act of ordinary prudence and protection against the contingency of mob violence. Their fears, under the circumstances, were, it must be admitted, not unreasonable.

The wives of the officers to whom you refer and others, with their children, numbering nearly a score, having no anticipation of danger, had selected as their residence a most central and exposed location, within a few hundred yards of the executive building, and of easy access from every direction. Their husbands were daily absent on shipboard and if danger threatened were compelled to be absent. Their diplomatic representative could not exercise the usual privilege of landing troops for their protection, because that act, in the unfortunate condition of affairs, would, he feared, have been construed as a hostile invasion, of which the lawless element might have taken advantage.

Paragraph (19) states: "It was also known that you were in frequent communication with the ex-Queen." I desire to state that the only communications of a political character which I have had with the Queen were limited to three occasions. As to the first of these, on November 14, I have no reason to believe you were informed. The other two, on the 16th and 18th of December last, were the following day reported by me in person to your Government and their subject-matter fully explained. The sole purpose of these negotiations were, as you know, to secure proper guarantees from the Queen as to life and property of all connected with the overthrow of the monarchy. These having been secured, I then, under the instructions of the President of the United States, presented his decision, setting forth the reasons therefor and submitting it to your Government for its voluntary action.

With regard to Mr. J. O. Carter's comments on the situation and conversation with his nephew, I have this to say. Mr. Carter was invited by me to the last interviews with the Queen, December 16 and 18. He knew nothing until then of the interview of November 14. As a native Hawaiian, of American parentage, whose character for integrity and intelligence was acknowledged in the community, I considered him a proper person to be present. His counsel to his nephew was, to use his own language, "based entirely upon Secretary Gresham's published letter and current newspaper comments. * * * It was not a warning in the sense the letter of Minister Dole conveys."

In paragraph (20) you state: "It was the almost well-nigh universal belief in the city that you were about to attempt to land the naval forces of the United States to enforce the execution of the President's policy."

My answer is that my Government, one month prior to the time referred to, had given you information negating the idea of using force and had authorized the

publication of such information "to allay any such apprehension." Furthermore, as frankly admitted by you in this correspondence, "your Government did not itself entertain this apprehension."

As to the "crowds of people among them, many prominent Royalists" at the wharves "for several days," you will recall the fact as set forth in your subsequent paragraph (23) that the British minister and the Japanese consul-general at this time, December 18, "asked permission to land troops." As much publicity had been given these facts in the daily press, I respectfully suggest that the crowd was most probably assembled out of harmless curiosity to witness the anticipated landing of the English and Japanese troops and not that of the United States "to enforce the execution of the President's policy."

Touching the statement in paragraph (22) that your Government was refused permission to forward "Hawaiian Government dispatches" by the dispatch boat *Corwin* it is only necessary to remind you that the naval officers of the United States and the public generally were denied such privilege and that no inference of unfriendly feeling should therefore have been drawn. Moreover, at the time your letter was written, you were aware of the fact that for the accommodation of your Government the *Corwin* had been delayed over half a week.

As to the requests referred to in paragraph (23) of the British minister and Japanese consul-general, for permission to land troops, they were, I am informed, precautionary measures against possible mob violence. This permission is still outstanding and is not now and was not then, in my judgment, proper evidence of a hostile purpose on the part of our Government.

In reply to paragraph (24) and also to a clause in your letter of the 27th, I have the honor to state upon the authority of a letter now in my possession from the diplomatic agent of Japan that it is a mistake in supposing that his offer of protection was confined to "prominent American supporters of the Provisional Government," or was based upon the fear of "American invasion." Mr. Fujii says in his letter: "Many of my neighbors were nervous and excited, being afraid of some sudden acts of lawless people, and I deemed it proper to say to them that in case of immediate need [his residence being in a somewhat distant part of the city] my consulate was always at their service as a good friend and neighbor."

My answer to paragraph (25) is set forth in my reply to paragraph (19), which shows that all the communications with the Queen were fully, and, I trust, satisfactorily explained to your Government.

In paragraph (26) you quote from my address of December 19, submitting the views of the President upon the Hawaiian question. I respectfully suggest that there is in this address no intimation as to the use of force and that even had there been no prior information to you upon the subject, there is enough in its tone and terms to show that, as stated in the opening words of the address itself, "the President's action is now and has been from the beginning, absolutely free from resentment and entirely consistent with the long-established friendship and treaty ties which have so closely bound together our respective Governments."

Your paragraph (27) states "Upon the 23d December I replied to the foregoing communication in the negative. Up to the time of sending you my communication of December 27 no further communication had been received by me from you, and no assurance had been received that force was not to be used, nor what your further instructions were concerning this Government."

Let me call your attention to the fact that at the time your answer was delivered I notified you that I would forward it to Washington, and that nothing would be done by me until further instructed. To this your reply was: "That will be very satisfactory to our people."

The *Corwin*, which, as hereinbefore stated, had been delayed for the purpose of receiving your answer, left at 4 a. m. Sunday, December 24. The next day being Christmas no communication could be sent to you, but on the following day, December 26, I acknowledged, in writing, the receipt of your answer to President Cleveland's decision, notifying you that it had been sent to Washington. This communication was delivered at the executive building before 3 p. m. of date above named, December 26. On the following day, December 27, at 4 p. m., I received the letter out of which this correspondence has arisen.

Your paragraph (28) states: "During your nearly two months' residence in this city you and your family have declined the customary social courtesies usually extended to those occupying your official position, on the specified ground that it was not deemed best, under existing circumstances, to accept such civilities."

In reply permit me to say that the course of conduct referred to was prompted by the friendliest motive, had no official significance, was adopted, not toward the Provisional Government alone, and was intended to leave all persons, after the disclosure of the views of my Government, free and unembarrassed to determine for themselves the relations they desired to hold to me and to my family. The only

official courtesy extended up to the date of your present communication was a concert by the Government band on the night of our arrival, which was accepted.

Thus, without unnecessary comment, I have considered and endeavored to explain those portions of your correspondence which bore upon the question of the "purpose to use force" and the responsibilities arising therefrom.

While duly respecting the doctrine of noninterference by the representative of another government with your domestic affairs, I shall rejoice to know that anything I have done or said, now or heretofore, has tended to a better understanding of recent events in your history and of motives and intentions as to which there may be, as you state, "mutual misapprehension."

Thanking you for the courteous and appreciated terms which you have been pleased to express and which are cordially reciprocated, and trusting that there may be a speedy, honorable, and satisfactory adjustment of all pending questions, I have the honor, with renewed assurances of high consideration to be, sir,

Yours, most respectfully,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

Hon. SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 15, 1894.

SIR: In the fourteenth paragraph of your communication of January 11, 1894, is the following statement:

"On November 29 last, having that day for the first time received information through the Hawaiian minister at Washington of the contents of Mr. Gresham's letter to the President and of his statements concerning the same and his refusal to state whether it was the intention of your Government to carry out its policy by force, I called upon you, in company with the Attorney-General."

I desire to inquire whether the date above mentioned is not a clerical mistake, as your call upon me was on the 24th, not the 29th, of November, and it was the 24th, as I am informed, that you received the information above referred to from your minister at Washington. Am I correct in this?

I wish also in this official way to call your attention to three extracts from your letters, of which the two first have already been mentioned to you.

In your letter of December 27 you say:

"The Government offices have been placed and still continue in a condition of defense and preparation for siege and the community has been put into a state of mind bordering on terrorism."

In your letter of January 11, page 42, you say:

"As a result of which this Government has been, and now is, subjected to the necessity of increased watchfulness and large additional expense, which, but for such attitude, would have been unnecessary."

In the same communication, toward the close, you say:

"I can not but believe that it—the necessity of 'taking up arms to meet the possible hostility' of the United States—has arisen through a misunderstanding of facts on the part of your Government, and a mutual misapprehension of motives and intentions, which may, I sincerely hope, at an early day be cleared away."

Asking your attention to the above, I am, sir,

With sincere respect, very truly, yours,

ALBERT S. WILLIS,
*Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary,
United States of America.*

Hon. S. B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 18, 1894.

SIR: A communication, dated January 15, 1894, received by me on the 16th, calls my attention to a probable mistake of dates in my letter to you of January 11, 1894, in connection with my allusion to a call made by the attorney-general and myself on you to ask for information concerning the intentions of the United States Government in relation to the recommendations of Mr. Gresham's letter to the President. My letter stated that this call was made November 29, and that on that day I had received information of the contents of the Gresham letter. I now find, in accordance with your suggestion, that our call was made some days before November 29, probably on November 24, the former date being the day upon which I sent you a written communication on the same subject.

You further call my attention to an extract of the same letter, page 42, which you quote as follows:

"As a result of which this Government has been and now is subject to the necessity of increased watchfulness and large additional expense, which but for such attitude would have been unnecessary." I find that you have left out a line belonging to this part of my letter, which should read as follows:

"As a result of which this Government has been obliged to increase its forces and has been and now is subjected to the necessity of increased watchfulness and large additional expense, which but for such attitude would have been unnecessary." As I have already verbally assured your excellency, when you kindly called my attention informally to the words importing the present tense into this sentence, such a meaning was not intended and is inconsistent with other expressions of my letter. I then requested you to erase the words "and now is" and promised to make the same correction in my copy of the letter, which has been done.

You further call my attention to another extract from my letter of December 27, 1893, but you make no comment on these extracts. Being ignorant of your reasons for calling my attention to these passages, I am unable to consider them, and ask that you will at your convenience state such reasons.

I have the honor to be, sir, your excellency's most obedient servant,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency ALBERT S. WILLIS,
U. S. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Honolulu.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 32.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, February 2, 1894.

SIR: In my dispatch No. 10, of December 9, 1893, transmitting an interview with Col. C. B. Wilson, former marshal of the Kingdom, reference is made by him to a list of special and supplementary advisers whom he had selected, and among whom were many of the most prominent and influential citizens. It was not claimed by Mr. Wilson, as far as I am informed, that the selection by him was with the knowledge or consent of these gentlemen, some of whom in the daily press, and others to me in person, have so stated. Among these are Hon. Richard F. Bickerton, first associate justice of the supreme court, Hon. W. Austin Whiting, first judge circuit court, and Hon. F. A. Schaefer, who explicitly disavow any knowledge of the said list, and state that the use of their names was entirely unauthorized and unwarranted. The same disavowal is made by Hon. A. G. M. Robertson, Hon. Paul Neumann, Messrs. James H. Boyd, Henry Smith, Thomas R. Lucas, W. M. Cunningham, and others. It is doubtful whether any of those whose names are on these lists were informed of the fact.

Very respectfully,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 33.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 20, 1894.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of January 12, 1894, sent to W. A. Cooper, U. S. dispatch agent at San Francisco, and by him forwarded, which reached here to-day.

Permit me to express my thanks for your words of approval.

I will, as directed, endeavor to keep the Department fully informed of the course of events and will, until further notice, consider that my

special instructions have been fully complied with, the Hawaiian question being, as you now inform me, submitted to the Congress.

I have further to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch No. 6 of December 23, 1893, in regard to Department cipher, and your dispatch No. 7 of December 30, 1893, inclosing copies of documents in relation to Hawaiian affairs.

I am, etc.,


ALBERT S. WILLIS.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 34.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, February 3, 1894.

Refers to salary.



MESSAGE

FROM THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

TRANSMITTING

Copies of additional dispatches from the minister at Hawaii, and inclosures accompanying the same.

MARCH 7, 1894.—Read, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and ordered to be printed.

The CONGRESS:

I transmit herewith copies of certain dispatches lately received from our minister at Hawaii, together with copies of the inclosures which accompanied such dispatches.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
March 7, 1894.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 7, 1894.

The PRESIDENT:

The Secretary of State has the honor to lay before the President copies of dispatches, numbered 35, 36, and 37, received from our minister to Hawaii.

W. Q. GRESHAM.

No. '35.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, February 10, 1894.

Hon. W. Q. GRESHAM,
Secretary of State:

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatches numbered 8 and 9.

Very respectfully,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

No. 36.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, February 14, 1894.

Hon. W. Q. GRESHAM,

Secretary of State:

SIR: The past month has been unusually quiet. The action of Congress is awaited with great interest, as indicating the future policy of the United States towards this country.

Several days ago a number of the Government soldiers were affected in a peculiar way, which gave rise to a rumor of poisoning. There seems, however, to have been little cause for such suspicion.

To-day at 6 o'clock p. m. the Chinese have called a meeting to consider certain proposed changes in the law affecting them. Upon this slender basis a rumor is current of a Chinese uprising. This is, in my judgment, utterly without foundation. The absence of frequent communication with the outside world, and the feeling of unrest and excitement naturally incident to the surroundings, make it an easy matter to originate these sensational reports.

By a vote of the executive council the salary of the President has been fixed at \$12,000 per annum. This action must, however, be ratified by the advisory council. Under the act, a printed copy of which I inclose, the office of minister of foreign affairs is separated from that of the office of president. Hon. F. M. Hatch, late Vice-President, will, it is understood, be chosen minister of foreign affairs, becoming thereby also a member of the executive council. In this connection may be mentioned the published report that Mr. Dole, in his retirement from the foreign office, will devote himself to the work of preparing a new constitution.

At a mass meeting held last night, Mr. D. B. Smith, a merchant of this city, was nominated to fill the vacancy in the advisory council created by the resignation of Mr. Hatch. This nomination is subject to the approval of the councils.

A spirited contest is now in progress, looking to the introduction of the "representative system" into the councils of the Provisional Government. In this direction a resolution was passed by the meeting last night, favoring the enactment of a law "increasing the membership of the advisory council from 14 to 24," the new members to "be selected by the suffrages of loyal citizens in a manner to be hereafter provided."

The reasons set forth in the resolutions for such legislation are (1) "The advisory council as at present constituted is not representative of either the varied interests of the islands or the mass of the supporters of the Provisional Government and the policy of annexation of Hawaii to the United States;" (2) "The legislative department of the Government is dangerously compact as well as too small for its constituency;" (3) "The composition of the advisory council has been made objectionable by the action of retiring members in practically selecting their own successors;" (4) "The personnel of the advisory council has been considerably changed since it came into existence;" and (5) "In making changes the mass of the supporters of the Provisional Government have had no voice."

The above resolution and preamble looking to the enlargement of the council, according to the report of the newspaper favoring it, "was adopted with less than a dozen negative votes."

I send you herewith the reports and editorial comments of the two newspapers which agree upon the question of annexation, but differ as to the propriety and necessity of the proposed changes.

The Chinese question has given rise to considerable discussion in the press and in the councils. The meeting of the Chinese, heretofore referred to, as one of their representatives informed me, is for the purpose of expressing their views upon the new legislation now pending.

With sentiments of high esteem, I am, sir, your obedient servant,
ALBERT S. WILLIS.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 36.]

BY AUTHORITY.

ACT 63.—AN ACT relating to the office of minister of foreign affairs.

Be it enacted by the Executive and Advisory Councils of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands:

SECTION 1. The office of minister of foreign affairs is hereby separated from that of the office of President.

Hereafter the department of foreign affairs shall be presided over by an officer called the minister of foreign affairs who shall be chosen by the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

The minister of foreign affairs so chosen shall be a member of the executive council of the Government.

SEC. 2. This act shall take effect from the date of its publication.

Approved this 8th day of February, A. D. 1894.

SANFORD B. DOLE,
President of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.
J. A. KING,
Minister of the Interior.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 36.]

[Advertiser report of mass meeting, February 13, 1894.]

D. B. SMITH IS AGAIN NOMINATED—THE AMERICAN LEAGUE TAKES POSSESSION OF THE ANNEXATION CLUB—THE CLUB IS EASILY PULLED ALONG BY THE NOSE—THE TAIL WAGS THE DOG AND ALL GOES AS MERRY AS A MARRIAGE BELL—NO ONE ELSE IS ALLOWED IN NOMINATION EXCEPT THE LEAGUE'S CANDIDATE.

D. B. Smith, the chosen candidate of the American League for the vacancy in the councils, was railroaded through the Annexation Club meeting last evening in very quick order. The American League was out in force, and would not allow anyone except their own members to have a word to say on any subject.

The crowd was very orderly until the meeting opened. The league was present almost in toto, and they formed a solid circle around the chairman's table. As soon as the meeting opened, Mr. W. H. Hoogs placed in nomination Mr. F. W. McChesney as a candidate. This was seconded by four or five voices. T. B. Murray, the president of the league, took possession of the floor and read the following resolution:

"Whereas the American League of this city is a respectable and representative body composed of several hundred men pledged to support the Provisional Government and the policy of annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States; and

"Whereas the American League is without a spokesman or representative in the councils of this Government; and

"Whereas it is just and proper that such a section of the loyal citizenship should have a voice in the conduct of the Provisional Government; and

"Whereas it has been generally conceded and so stated by at least one cabinet minister that the American League should designate the successor to Mr. F. M. Hatch, who is about to retire from the advisory council; and

"Whereas the American League has named Mr. D. B. Smith for this place: Therefore, be it

"Resolved, That this mass meeting hereby indorses Mr. D. B. Smith for the advisory council, and shall, through its secretary and president, so inform the executive and advisory councils."

Great applause followed this resolution, every league man in the hall shouting vociferously. As soon as he could, T. B. Severin moved that nominations close. He was promptly ruled out of order by the chairman.

Mr. Hatch then announced that Mr. McChesney had been placed in nomination, and asked the pleasure of the meeting in regard to his name. Those in favor of his candidacy were asked to raise their hands. Not many were raised. When the adverse opinion was called for, the league, as if moved by a single lever worked by an invisible engine, lifted their hands and voices at the same time. Mr. Hatch then declared that Mr. McChesney was not nominated.

T. B. Severin then placed in nomination D. B. Smith. His name was received with prolonged cheers, and was seconded by the whole league. Three howls were called for on the nomination, the clockwork was again put in motion and the league, as one man, signified its approval of Mr. Smith. J. B. Atherton then moved that the nominations be closed, which was carried, and D. B. Smith had been sent through the meeting like water through a tin horn.

After a loud cry of "three cheers for Smith," the latter was called on for a speech. He made the following:

"MR. CHAIRMAN AND GENTLEMEN: As this is my first experience on the platform in the capacity of a speaker, you will not expect a speech from me of any length. I want to say this: I am heart and soul in favor of annexation to the United States, our mother country, where our prosperity, progress, and civilization come from, and I will and have always done everything in my power to further it since the 14th of January last. 'We have not got it, but we will, just as certain as the sun rises and sets.' These words are not mine, but were spoken to me by the grandest American statesman that ever put foot on these coral sands—Minister John L. Stevens—and I heartily indorse his words. That is as far as I got. I fully appreciate the honor you have done me in signifying the wish to have me represent you in the council."

T. B. Murray then moved that his resolution be adopted as the sense of the meeting. Again the machinery worked and the pendulum-like hands rose and fell.

James Nott, jr., then read the following resolution:

"Whereas the advisory council, as at present constituted, is not representative of either the varied interests of the islands or the mass of the supporters of the Provisional Government, and the policy of annexation of Hawaii to the United States; and

"Whereas the legislative department of the Government is dangerously compact, as well as too small for its constituency; and

"Whereas the composition of the advisory council has been made objectionable by the action of retiring members in practically selecting their own successors; and

"Whereas the personnel of the advisory council has been considerably changed since the body came into existence; and

"Whereas in making changes the mass of the supporters of the Provisional Government have had no voice: Therefore be it

"Resolved, That this mass meeting of annexationists and supporters of the Provisional Government hereby petitions the councils to enact a law increasing the membership of the advisory council from 14 to 24.

"Resolved, That the 10 men to fill the new places be selected by the suffrages of loyal citizens in a manner to be hereafter provided.

"Resolved, That the councils are hereby petitioned to elect to membership the 10 men to be chosen by loyal citizens.

"Resolved, That copies of these resolutions be transmitted to the executive and advisory councils."

The chairman said that this resolution was not included in the business for which the meeting had been called.

Mr. T. F. Lansing protested, as a member of the Annexation Club, against allowing such a resolution, which was totally out of order, being adopted, and also said he wished to remonstrate against the American League taking possession of the meeting as they had done. He was interrupted by the league and the machinery, as with one voice, drowned his remarks. Some one in the crowd recommended appealing from the chair's ruling. When Mr. Hatch called for hands the clock struck again and up went all hands, overruling Mr. Hatch's decision, and cheers were again given. Mr. Hoogs demanded a roll call, and was promptly squelched by the machinery, and after it had run down the chair announced that its decision was overruled. The resolution was then adopted by another turn of the wheels.

Speeches were then called for, and Mr. Hatch responded. He said, in part:

"There is one good sign of the times, and that is that the Annexation Club can call a meeting and have it largely attended. There are always enough who turn out to show that the annexation movement is the strong movement and will be carried on to victory. [Applause and cheers.] Our friends on the other side are very fond of spreading the report that there is dissention in our party [cries of No, No]; and I am glad to have an opportunity to say a few words on the subject. There is no split. We are all working with one object, and that is to keep good government here until annexation is an established fact. This is not a one-man government."

Every man has a right to express his views on any question. In closing I want to congratulate you on the neatness and dispatch with which you have carried your point."

Mr. W. G. Smith was then called upon. He said:

"This is an occasion of rejoicing, that we have met in so orderly a manner. We have secured the boon that we have a long time been waiting for. I mean representative government. I presume that the councils will be responsive to the sense of this meeting. It is an open meeting of the Annexation Club, and I resent the imputation that it has been attempted to confine this meeting to the representatives of any one league. There have been many objections to the enlargement of the councils, the principal one being that the time was not opportune. This is the great cry of the conservatives. It was the same in 1887, when it was proposed to dethrone Kalakaua, when we had an American President in Washington, who was favorable to annexation. Instead of this they did not think that the 'time was opportune,' and they waited until 1893, when they had to put up with Cleveland, Gresham, and Blount. I plead for the radical course in a revolutionary movement. As Bismarck said, 'Some eggs must be broken to make an omelette,' and I advocate breaking all the royalist eggs that we can find. As I said, I have heard many times that it was not advisable to increase the size of the advisory council. This is the conservative idea. At the last day, when the heavens split and the earth quakes, some Honolulu conservative will lift up his head and cry in a weak voice: 'Don't toot now, Gabriel; it isn't opportune.' I hope it will be impressed on all our friends who dissent from us that in this country and this era the radical movement must and shall and will have its way." [Cheers and applause.]

The meeting then adjourned.

The drill shed was not vacated for some time. D. B. Smith was congratulated by all his friends. Many stood around and talked over the result of the meeting, and then went down town and talked it over again.

[Advertiser editorial comments.]

Mr. Hatch made a very happy speech at the close of the meeting last night. He drew attention to the fact that annexation was the live movement in this country, and that the alleged dissensions between the different wings of the Annexation party only ruffle the surface, without going to the essence. There could be no more striking proof of the fundamental unanimity which exists in the Annexation party to-day than the good nature which prevailed at last night's meeting, and the enthusiasm which expressed itself upon every mention of the common cause.

THEY WILL CONSIDER IT.

The programme for an election to be held by the Annexation Club this week has fallen through. This is owing to the fact that last night's mass meeting forgot that it was summoned simply as a preliminary nominating convention, and proceeded to fix upon a single candidate. This course was due apparently to an error of Mr. Hatch.

Of course a nomination made in this way can not be regarded as though it were the result of a regular election. It would be absurd to expect anything of the sort. Mr. D. B. Smith will go before the councils in connection with other nominations as the candidate of the American League, and as such will receive consideration.

THE HAND OF ESAU.

The mass meetings of the Annexation Club have generally been rather serious affairs; last night's, however, afforded for once a humorous diversion.

The Star claims that the American League is not a secret organization. Last night certainly it was not. It marched up in a body, took possession of the meeting, issued a declaration of its own rights, and, in the name of the Annexation Club, loudly chanted its own praises. Everything was done, as Mr. Hatch observed, with "neatness and dispatch" and with great good humor.

The action thus taken is, of course, simply the action of the American League. The course taken was laid out in advance by that body; the resolutions passed were drafted and adopted in its meeting of the night before. Everything was cut and dried, and the work was done by men who were acting, not in the interest of the Annexation Club, but in that of an altogether different organization. The forms were observed, and that was all. The voice was the voice of Jacob, but the hand was the hand of Esau.

IS IT SECRET OR NOT?

Last night's Star devotes a column of its valuable space to what is apparently an attempt to prove that the American League is not a secret organization. At the same time it argues that secrecy is all right, because there was a secret league here in 1887.

This double defense reminds one of the Irishman who exonerated himself from a charge of breaking his neighbor's wheelbarrow as follows: 1. I never borrowed your wheelbarrow. 2. It was broken when I borrowed it. 3. It was whole when I returned it.

If it is true that the American League is not a secret organization then all objections to it on this score fall to the ground. But if it is not secret, let it publish the list of its members and admit reporters to its deliberations.

The comparison instituted by the Star between the American League and the League of 1887 is a rather unlucky one. The League of 1887 was secret because its aims were revolutionary. Those of the American League, on the other hand, are peaceful and lawful. The first league was organized to overthrow the Government; the second to support it. Secrecy was as appropriate in the one case as openness would be in the other.

WHAT IS THE PLEDGE?

The Advertiser is informed that before D. B. Smith became the American League's candidate, he was required to take a "cast-iron" pledge of some kind, and that one reason the other candidates withdrew was because they declined to bind themselves in any such manner. We will not venture any remarks as to the precise character of this pledge, since, in spite of correction from a very high quarter, we are still of opinion that the proceedings of the American League are secret. We can not, therefore, pretend to know exactly what this oath may have been.

What was the pledge? That public will want to know. They have a right to know. The councils too, may be desirous of satisfying a natural curiosity on this question before they proceed to hold their election. The "representative principle," that is, the principle that secret leagues shall be represented, is perhaps not yet so firmly established as to exclude the lawful Government of the country from asserting their right to a voice in its affairs.

What is the pledge?

[Inclosure in No. 36.—From the Star, February 13, 1894. Report of meeting.]

D. B. SMITH THE WINNER.—LEAGUE CHOICE RATIFIED BY THE MASS MEETING.—GREAT GATHERING AT THE DRILL SHED.—VOTED FOR AN ENLARGED COUNCIL.—SPEECHES MADE.—D. B. SMITH FIRST, THE REST NOWHERE.

That is the result, so far as the electors are concerned, of the contest for the seat in the advisory council that is to become vacant, owing to the promotion of Mr. F. M. Hatch to the foreign portfolio. The voice of the people was heard again in the historic drill shed last night. The people went on record in the regulation American manner. They resented the attempt at clique domination, and in clear tones declared for rule by the masses.

The Annexationists were out early for the expected fray. The programme was for a nominating convention as preliminary to an election projected to be held during the week. By the action of the mass meeting of the Annexation Club the necessity for an election is removed entirely. There was only one nominee. The name of F. W. McChesney was proposed, but a very large majority voted down the motion to place him in nomination.

There was a most enthusiastic indorsement by the meeting of the proposal to enlarge the advisory council by electing 10 more members.

A little conservative combination attempted to control the meeting, but were simply "snowed under." Members of the American League who were also members of the Annexation Club, took an active part in the proceedings, working like beavers for their candidate, Mr. D. B. Smith, and for the larger council.

President Hatch was in the chair and Secretary Jones kept account of the proceedings. It was about 7:45 when the meeting was rapped to order. The call was read. The remark that nominations were in order was not entirely out of the President's mouth when W. H. Hoogs, who was but a couple of feet from the desk, shouted: "I nominate F. W. McChesney." T. B. Murray then offered resolutions indorsing the American League candidate. Mr. Hatch stated the motion before the meeting as: "Shall Mr. McChesney be placed in nomination?" It was voted that Mr. McChes-

ney should not be placed in nomination. The negative majority was very large. D. B. Smith was placed in nomination by T. B. Severin. This was received with great cheers, then with three more. The nominations were then closed on motion of J. B. Atherton. Mr. Murray then called for his resolution, which reads as follows:

"Whereas the American League, of this city, is a respectable and representative body composed of several hundred men pledged to support the Provisional Government and the policy of annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States, and

"Whereas the American League is without a spokesman or representative in the councils of this Government, and

"Whereas it is just and proper that such a section of the loyal citizenship should have a voice in the conduct of the Provisional Government, and

"Whereas it has been generally conceded and so stated by at least one cabinet minister that the American League should designate the successor to Mr. F. M. Hatch, who is about to retire from the advisory council, and

"Whereas the American League has named D. B. Smith for the place, therefore be it

"Resolved, That this mass meeting hereby endorses D. B. Smith for the advisory council, and shall, through the secretary and president, so inform the executive and advisory councils."

This resolution was adopted almost unanimously.

There were calls for D. B. Smith. Mounting the table, he said:

MR. CHAIRMAN AND GENTLEMEN: As this is my first experience on the platform in the capacity of a speaker, you will not expect a speech from me of any length. I want to say this: I am, heart and soul, in favor of annexation to the United States, our mother country, where our prosperity, progress, and civilization come from, and I will, and have, always done everything in my power to further it since the 14th of January last. That was before the revolution. "We have not got it, but we will, just as certain as the sun rises and sets." These words are not mine, but were spoken to me by the grandest American statesman that ever put foot on these coral sands, Minister John L. Stevens, and I heartily indorse his words. That is as far as I got. I fully appreciate the honor you have done me in signifying the wish to have me represent you in the council, and when I learn that my services there are not satisfactory I will step down and out.

These resolutions were offered by James Nott, jr.:

"Whereas the advisory council as at present constituted is not representative of either the varied interests of the islands or the mass of the supporters of the Provisional Government and the policy of annexation of Hawaii to the United States; and

"Whereas the legislative department of the Government is dangerously compact, as well as too small for its constituency, and

"Whereas the composition of the advisory council has been made objectionable by the action of retiring members, in practically selecting their own successors; and

"Whereas the personnel of the advisory council has been considerably changed since it came into existence; and

"Whereas in making changes the mass of the supporters of the Provisional Government have had no voice: Therefore be it

"Resolved, That this mass meeting of annexationists and supporters of the Provisional Government hereby petition the councils to enact a law increasing the membership of the advisory council from 14 to 24.

"Resolved, That the ten men to fill the new places be selected by the suffrages of loyal citizens in a manner to be hereafter provided.

"Resolved, That the councils are hereby petitioned to elect to membership the ten men to be chosen by loyal citizens.

"Resolved, That copies of these resolutions be transmitted to the executive and advisory councils."

Cheering for the resolutions was loud and long.

President Hatch, referring to the call for the meeting, ruled the resolutions out of order. W. G. Smith appealed from the decision of the chair, and the chair was overruled. T. F. Lansing said he protested against the manner in which the meeting was being conducted. W. H. Hoogs demanded a roll call. The meeting went on with business and the resolution to enlarge the council was adopted with less than a dozen negative votes.

The president suggested that adjournment may be in order, as no other business was brought forward. Mr. Hatch was called upon to speak. His popularity was evidenced by his cordial reception. He said:

"There is one good sign of the times, gentlemen; the Annexation Club never calls a meeting which is not well attended. [Applause.] There are always enough of the members of this club who turn out on every opportunity which is given them

to strike right home on this question, that this movement is the live movement, and it is the movement which will be carried through by the people of this community. [Applause.] Now our friends on the other side are fond of spreading reports both here and abroad, very largely abroad, that we are split up by dissensions in our ranks. [Cries of 'No!' 'No!' 'No!']

"Gentlemen, nothing of that kind exists and this is a very good opportunity to brand all statements of that kind which have been so industriously spread broadcast by certain people in this community, in order to discredit the standing of this party and this movement abroad, that the fact is not so, and I am glad to have this opportunity to express my ideas upon that point. Gentlemen, we are all working for a common object, there is no split or division between us, and that one object is the maintenance of a good stable government here until we obtain annexation to the United States. [Applause.] I think there will be no difficulty in carrying out that programme. This is not the government of one man or one individual; every man in this community has a right to express his views and will be heard. I congratulate you, gentlemen, on the neatness and dispatch with which the business of the evening has been carried. [Laughter and applause.]"

Walter G. Smith was called upon. He said:

"FELLOW-CITIZENS: It is certainly an occasion of rejoicing that we have met here in so orderly a manner, and, as Mr. Hatch has so aptly said, have conducted our deliberations with neatness and dispatch. I think we have secured the one boon which we have been waiting for and working for so long a time, and that is the introduction of the representative system into the councils of the Provisional Government. [Applause.] I assume that the councils will be responsive to the wish of this majority. This has been an open meeting, not called by the American League, but called by the Annexation Club, to which all annexationists are welcome, and I resent the imputation that there has been anything done to keep annexationists away, or to confine these proceedings within the limits of a single league. This has been a thoroughly and fairly and completely representative meeting, and I believe that its wishes will be respected by every man in the councils.

"There have been some objections raised from time to time to this enlargement of the councils. We have all heard them. We have heard, for instance, that the time is not opportune. That is a very favorite expression of the conservative element. You heard in 1887 that the time was not opportune to dethrone Kalakaua and declare a republic, in spite of the fact that you soon after had an American President and Secretary of State in favor of annexation. Our conservative friends thought it opportune to drop that great cause then and thus leave annexation to the tender mercies of Cleveland, Gresham, and Blount.

"We heard again from a great many that it was not opportune to have the revolution of 1893. But, gentlemen, not all the conservatives thought that. I credit them with it, but all the radicals thought that it was opportune and the revolution you had. We heard later on that it was not opportune to take off the name of the ex-Queen from the salary list and to deprive her of her guard, but our conservative friends were outvoted again, and the heavens didn't fall and the earth didn't quake. [Laughter and applause.] The radicals had their way, and what was done was properly done, and no harm has come to us since.

"I am pleading now, gentlemen, for the radical course in a revolutionary era. I never heard of any other course succeeding at such a time. As Bismarck says, when an omelet has to be made some eggs must be broken, and we propose to break every royalist and anti-American egg we find. (Applause.) We have continually heard that this, that, and the other thing was not opportune, and all day long up to the time this meeting came together I have heard it was not opportune to increase the advisory council to twenty-four, and I have sometimes thought, hearing that word used so often in the last few months, that, to paraphrase a great American orator, on that last dread day when the heavens roll up like a scroll and the angel of resurrection with one foot on the sea and another foot on the land shall raise that tremendous trumpet to his lips there will be the spirit of some Honolulu conservative to cry up out of the dust, "Don't toot now, Gabriel. Don't toot yet. It is not opportune." (Great laughter and applause.)

"I tell you, gentlemen, it is opportune to do the right thing and the decisive thing always in a revolutionary era, and I believe that is the thing we have done to-night. The conservatism that stands in the way of political progress I am sure must go. The conservative of that disposition is like the conservative horse that won't budge out of his burning stable and could not be led out of it, because he has always been there and it was not opportune to go at that time.

"I have nothing more to say except I hope it will be impressed upon all our friends who dissent from some of our views that in this country, under these conditions, in this era, the radical, which is the progressive and decisive element, will and must and should have its way. I thank you, gentlemen." [Great applause and three cheers for the speaker.]

The meeting lasted less than an hour. Quite a crowd remained in the drill shed for some time. There were knots of men on the streets till quite late. D. B. Smith, as the successful candidate, is still receiving congratulations to-day.

[From the Star, February 14, 1894.—Editorial comments on meeting.]

THE ACT OF ANNEXATIONISTS.

Under the headline, "The American League takes possession of the Annexation Club," the Advertiser implies that the action of the mass meeting last night was that of a foreign body invading the unprotected camp of the legitimate party garrison. A poor excuse for the defeat of the conservative group is probably better than none, hence we can not blame the morning paper for saying what it has; but when the public comes to understand that all but about 5 per cent of the members of the American League present are members of the Annexation Club; that the gentleman who presided at the meeting is president of the club; that the gentleman who presented the resolution indorsing Mr. Smith and the one who spoke for the enlargement of the advisory council are both members of the governing body of the Annexation Club; and that there were nearly as many radicals at the turnout who do not belong to the American League as there were of those who do, it will be seen how far short the Advertiser has come of summing up the actual meaning and describing the real personnel of the great rally.

What was seen last night was not the machination of a secret league, but the outpouring of the radical majority in the Annexation party—of the men who believe that the time has come to change the old order. The reason why the sentiment was so strong in one direction is because the sentiment of four-fifths of the Annexation party is that way—the party which has, in turn, made the revolution in spite of conservative objections, which cut the ex-Queen from the Provisional salary list, which has enforced royalist removals, and which challenged Cleveland last December to match the prowess of his troops with those of the Provisional Government. It was this element which proclaimed its numbers and principles last night, and if it controlled the situation it was not by machine trickery, but by the power of a clear majority of the loyal supporters of the present régime.

It does not become the Advertiser to accuse the American League of machine methods, particularly since its bland acquiescence in the results of the packed conservative meeting in the Fishel block a few days ago. Then the action of a hundred gentlemen in the name of the Annexation party, and by means of a prearranged programme, was cordially indorsed. It is only when a successful appeal is made from that small junta to the wider discretion of the party as a whole that the Advertiser raises the whites of its eyes and the palms of its hands over a wicked "prearrangement"—a deadly assault upon the liberty of club action.

We therefore say: Publish the names of the secret league.—(Holomua.)

"If it is true that the American League is not a secret organization then all objections to it on this score fall to the ground. But if it is not secret let it publish the list of its members and admit reporters to its deliberations."—(Advertiser.)

Why publish the list any more than that of the Annexation Club, which, if we remember aright, was kept away from Mr. Blount and Mr. Nordhoff, who wanted copies of it? When it becomes the usage to hand over the muster roll of any organization, either military or civil, to the enemy then the league will probably accede to the wishes of the Holomua and the Advertiser in that respect. Until then our eager contemporaries should gird their souls with patience.

Mr. Smith will go before the councils as the nominee of both the American League and the Annexation Club. He has behind him the annexation majority on this island. The credentials he will carry are as good as those of any official in the executive building, high or low. He can not be rejected without a serious affront to the representative principle and to party unity.

AS TO THE BALLOT.

"The Star does not believe that anybody outside of the Annexationists should ever be allowed to vote or to have a voice in the affairs of the country. We presume that the Star would find it perfectly legitimate if the Democratic party should refuse to grant the Republicans a vote because the Republicans are not in favor of the Democratic government."—(Holomua.)

Well, when the Republicans had the Southern and anti-Union wing of the Democracy to deal with after 1865, they forbade it a vote until after it had taken the iron-clad oath and become thoroughly reconstructed. Men who refused to accept the new order of things, as did Jeff Davis, Robert Toombs, and a few hundred others, were thenceforth men without a country and were denied all electoral participation

in the concerns of the American nation or of the town, county, and State in which they lived. It is the rule also in the United States, subject to some local modification in the Indian Territory, that aborigines shall not vote. It is not necessary to be so severe in the latter regard towards the aboriginal race of Hawaii, but as to disloyal citizens of any kind, men who would overthrow the Government by force if they could and establish a monarchy in its place, it would be absurd and un-American to give them equal voice with loyal people in the voting booths.

Before the adherents of Mrs. Dominis can vote in Hawaii for anything really decisive, there should be a long reconstruction period.

"The programme for an election to be held by the Annexation Club this week has fallen through. This is owing to the fact that last night's mass meeting forgot that it was summoned simply as a preliminary nominating convention and proceeded to fix upon a single candidate. This course was due apparently to an error of Mr. Hatch."—(Advertiser.)

If Mr. Hatch was in error in letting the Annexation Club, in mass meeting assembled, overrule the action of its own board of officers, then the oftener he makes such errors the better it will be for the party. No doubt the Advertiser would like to have had him hold that the club has no rights which its executive committee is bound to respect; but as the chief of that committee, and as a man of sense and fairness, Mr. Hatch knew better than to make any such ruling.

Mr. Damon was "present and voting" with the progressive element last night, a fact which speaks well for his political prescience and sagacity. Being a friend of the annexation of Hawaii to America, he has quickly seen the fitness of adopting those American ideas which have expressed themselves in the demand for a representative council. Under annexation those ideas must have full swing in Hawaii, and Mr. Damon sees no reason why we should not all get used to them now.

Mr. F. W. McChesney called at the Star office this morning and stated that the use of his name at the mass meeting last night as a candidate for the prospective council vacancy was unauthorized by him, and that he supports and will continue to support the candidacy of D. B. Smith.

If the Cocoanut Club has any more resolutions on hand it had better feed them to the office cat.

"The old order changeth."

[From the Advertiser, February 13, 1894.]

THE COCOANUT CLUB.

It demands representation in the advisory council.

The following resolutions were adopted at an adjourned meeting of the Cocoanut Club, held at Waikiki on Saturday, the 9th instant:

"Resolved, That the cocoanut industry of these islands has great value, and should receive recognition from the Provisional Government.

"Resolved, That this club, in order to secure political preference, shall hereafter be conducted as a secret club, and be known as the 'Cocoanut League.'

"Resolved, That this club is entitled to representation in the advisory council, and that that council will prove recreant to its high trust if it refuses to grant it.

"Resolved, That the Cocoanut League protests against the existence of any other league.

"Resolved, That this league knows where the milk in the cocoanut is to be found."

THE PLOT THICKENS.

We publish this morning a set of resolutions by which it appears that the Cocoanut Club demands representation in the councils.

And who, pray, is the Cocoanut Club? What is it composed of, and what is it for? We never saw a list of its members nor read an account of its transactions. According to its own statement it knows where the milk in the cocoanut is to be found, and it does not take a very shrewd guesser to opine that about all the society was ever organized for was to extract the milk.

It is about time that this impertinent folly should cease. The Cocoanut Club, indeed! The next thing we shall have a series of resolutions and demands from the Roast Pig Hui.

ANOTHER CLUB HEARD FROM.—THE SISTERS, COUSINS, AND AUNTS SOCIETY PASS RESOLUTIONS.

Editor Star: At a regular back-office meeting of the Sisters, Consins, and Aunts Society the following preamble and resolutions were unanimously passed, a full representation of the office-holders belonging to the society being present and voting:

"Whereas the control of the Provisional Government and the selection of its leg-

islative members having been heretofore left to the Sisters, Cousins, and Aunts Society; and

"Whereas the members of that society are engaged in the same line of business and therefore know what the country needs; and

"Whereas government by a secret back-office caucus of this society has resulted in great benefits to the sisters, cousins, and aunts and therefore to Hawaii; and

"Whereas if there is going to be a permanent form of government we, of that compact, are able to build it without help from those who call themselves the masses, but are really the masses: Therefore be it

"Resolved, That we view with alarm and disfavor the attempt of anybody not related to us or in our line of business to become a member of the advisory council.

"Resolved, That we attend the mass meeting of the Annexation Party and elect a sister, a cousin, or an aunt, if we have to bust a trace."

The Cocoanut Club and the Schuetzen-Verein were not alone in the business meeting last night. The Sisters, Cousins, and Aunts Society also held a meeting and passed appropriate resolutions. These appear elsewhere.—(From the Star, February 13.)

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 37.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, February 15, 1894.

SIR: At the regular meeting this afternoon of the Government councils, Hon. F. M. Hatch read the report of the judiciary committee on the petition for the enlargement of the advisory council, recommending, as reported in the newspapers, "that there be chosen delegates to sit with the councils and prepare a constitution for a permanent form of government." The report was adopted and a committee appointed by the President to prepare an act for the holding of the constitutional convention.

At the same meeting Mr. Hatch was elected and took his seat as minister of foreign affairs.

The mass meeting of the Chinese last night was very largely attended. The newspapers report the attendance at 3,000. Vigorous resolutions against the proposed legislation of the Government were passed. I send newspaper clippings in regard to the above subjects.

Very respectfully,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

[Extract from the Star, February 15, 1894.]

NOW FOR A NEW DEAL—A PLAN OF PERMANENT GOVERNMENT BROACHED—HATCH FOR MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS—THREE ADVISORY NOMINATIONS MADE TO-DAY.

The members attending this afternoon's regular meeting at the councils were: President Dole; Ministers Smith, Damon, and King; Messrs. Wilder, Hatch, Allen, Waterhouse, Ena, Brown, Tenney, Nott, Morgan, Bolte, and Emmeluth.

Mr. Brown presented a petition from 150 Chinese merchants and trades, praying that the councils refrain from enacting into a law the pending anti-Chinese bill. Referred to the judiciary committee.

Mr. Smith read the resolutions adopted at the Chinese mass meeting last evening. These resolutions were in yellow coverings, bound with red ribbons. The second set was in Chinese and English.

Secretary Rodgers read the resolutions adopted at the Annexation Club mass meeting Tuesday evening. The first was the indorsement of D. B. Smith for the advisory council. The second was the petition for the enlargement of the council.

Mr. Smith said that the cabinet proposed to make some answer to the resolution, which he believed intimated that the Provisional Government was not favorable to

the policy of annexation of the islands to the United States. Both resolutions were placed on file.

A note from the board of officers of the Annexation Club recommended Mr. Hatch for the office of minister of foreign affairs. The executive council has replied that in view of former correspondence, the selection of a member of the executive council should not be interfered with by the public.

A note from the American League mentioned the action of that organization in nominating D. B. Smith for the advisory council.

The Schuetzen Club, in a set of resolutions which were read by Mr. Smith, urges that the Government undertake public improvements, to the end that loyal citizens now idle may receive employment. Mr. Smith said there had been consideration of this letter, in the way of canvassing on improvements needed and money available. Resolutions referred to the executive council.

There was a big surprise when Mr. Hatch read a report of the judiciary committee on the petition for enlargement of the advisory council. It was set forth that even greater numbers might not give the representation which seems to be so greatly desired. In view of this, and perhaps the fact that more councilmen elected at a mass meeting might become unsatisfactory, and the certainty that a semblance of perpetuity in office was dangerous, the committee recommends that there be chosen delegates to sit with the councils and prepare a constitution for a permanent form of government. The report was adopted.

President Dole named as the committee to prepare an act for a constitutional convention, Messrs. Hatch, Bolte, Wilder, Nott, and W. O. Smith.

Mr. Smith moved that the councils proceed to the election of a minister of foreign affairs.

Mr. Hatch said that he wanted to tell the councils that he was not a candidate for this place in the sense of seeking it. If he was elected and installed it must be with the understanding that he had leave to resign when prior private engagements demanded his time. He could only accept the office temporarily.

Mr. Waterhouse nominated Mr. Hatch for the place. Messrs. Tenney and Waterhouse were appointed tellers and the ballot spread. All the ballots were for Mr. Hatch, and there was applause when the result was announced. Messrs. Brown and Ena conducted the new minister to a seat at a table beside Messrs. Smith, Damon, and King.

Mr. Wilder moved that the election of a successor to Mr. Hatch as an advisory councilman be postponed for a week.

Mr. Emmeluth, ascertaining from the chair that nominations were in order, entered Fritz Wilhelm who was described as a "man who had been earnest in the cause so long as his health permitted."

Mr. Damon named D. B. Smith as an active worker for annexation and good government.

Mr. Allen offered Mark Robinson, an Hawaiian, as a candidate, saying that it would not be out of place to have another Hawaiian in the council.

The nominations were closed and the election postponed for one week.

VOICE OF THE CHINESE COLONY DECLARES ITSELF IN A BIG MASS MEETING—POSITIVE EXPRESSIONS—WHAT THEY HAVE DONE FOR THE COUNTRY—THEIR RIGHTS—RESOLUTIONS.

In no city of a State or Territory of the American Union could the Chinese have made such a demonstration as was held at the theater of the colony last night. Here the Pakes have been first tolerated, then encouraged, until they assume an attitude plainly defiant and close bordering on the dominant and dictatorial. From the weak and lowly field hand of the time of 1851 and the wage scale of \$3 a month they have, by an unparalleled and alarming evolution, reached the station of an assertive element in the policy of the nation. The spectacle has not its counterpart elsewhere on the globe.

The Chinese theater here is a larger and better building than the colony of some 40,000 Asiatics in the city of San Francisco can boast. Last night the playhouse was jammed. It contained not less than 2,500 men, perhaps 500 more. Every particle of space was occupied. All Chinese business places, except the restaurants, closed at 4 o'clock. During the next two hours and a half Chinamen flocked to the theater from every direction. Hundreds of them rode in hacks. The tram cars were crowded and the rest walked in the heavy rain. The storm kept away many living at a distance. A weight was borne by the big gallery that it never had before. The throng extended well out into the street. As a mass meeting the event was in every way a success. The place is illy ventilated and scores were compelled to stand. The proceedings throughout riveted the attention of all. There were

frequent outbursts of applause and positive expressions from the audience. Half a hundred of the leading Chinese had seats on the stage. A number of natives and a few whites were present. A squad of police was in attendance. It is said that nearly all the 800 vagrants of Chinatown were on hand.

The tenor of the meeting may be judged by the fact that the use of a man-of-war was more than hinted at. The statement the Chinese paid more taxes than any other class was made, also the claim that but for them Honolulu trade would die, and that they had only to unite and stand firm to gain their ends.

Kam Chim, editor of one of the Chinese newspapers, called the meeting to order. He named Lau Chung, of the Wing Wo Tai Company, as president. No one else was mentioned. Lau Chung designated Chang Kim and Chang Den Sing as secretaries. Next Lau Chung announced the objects of the meeting at length and read and commented upon the license bill which has been placed before the councils by Attorney-General Smith. They were gathered, Chung said, to ascertain the views of the colony upon the proposed legislation. Chung had the act written on a sheet of paper about as large as a page of this paper and occupied about a quarter of an hour in placing it before the meeting.

Ing Chan, of the Tong On Jan Company, was presented as the first speaker, and was greeted with great cheering. He made a salaam and launched out into an impassioned tale of the wrongs of his race. When he asked: "Shall we put up with it?" a storm of noes came from all over the house. After suggesting that they communicate to the councils, he said: "If they will not listen to us, let us instruct our representative to communicate with the Chinese minister at Washington and ask him to write the home Government about our troubles." Chan said that up to ten years ago the Chinese on the islands had been treated as men and as the equals of all. They are law-abiding, but their treatment is getting worse all the time. They do not meddle with the politics. They are now over 20,000 strong, and in varied occupations do good for the country; and, like one big family, must unite their forces. The white people are dissatisfied and want to impose laws that other countries would not think of passing.

The next speaker was Wong Wah Toy of the Wing Wo Tai Company, who said they were assembled to see if all were of one mind respecting the situation. Through their energy and industry they have made land more valuable. They have been oppressed long enough. The Government wants to tie their hands still more. Shall we allow it? [No, no, from the audience.] "These foreigners do not remember their own scripture, which says 'Do unto others as you would they should do unto you.' They claim to be an enlightened people, but I say they are not if they act in this way. Unity is what we want and must have—unity in mind and action. If we unite we will gain our point. [Cheers.] We must unite, but in a peaceful way. There must be no talk yet of a man of war settling our troubles for us. That may come later."

"I have been in the country for fifteen years," said Ching Ling Him, a clerk for the Hawaiian Hardware Company, who says he hopes to become a merchant. "We are not a better nor a worse class than any other. [Cheers.] If this bill passes no man can do any business except the one allowed him by law. The Chinese pay most of the taxes, and were it not for us the white merchants of Honolulu would be ruined. I can not be a rich man if this law passes, and we are treated worse than dogs. We do not steal. Why do they want to make such laws against it? All we must do is to stick together and we will come out all right."

Chung Kim, a lawyer's clerk, who brought his speech from C. W. Ashford's office, said that the meeting was occasioned by the purpose of the Government to place Chinese under the ban and favor Portuguese. The Chinese have been extremely patient. They have borne oppression which would from almost any other race have provoked revolution. The Government seems to have formed the opinion that no injustice heaped upon the Chinese will be opposed or resented. That is a mistake. Even a worm will turn when trodden upon, and so it may be with the despised Chinese should the oppression be carried too far. Are we not all members of one great family? Is there any reason why one of God's creatures should be trampled upon by his brothers?

By what right do our white-skinned brothers lord it over us and to say that we shall do business and trade and live and breathe only by their consent? Is it only because our skins are brown and theirs are white? The Government is glad enough to collect taxes from the Chinese, but when it comes to finding a class upon whom the spite of all cranks shall be expended, they at once light upon the patient and long-suffering Chinaman. The Geary Act in the United States is bad enough, but this act proposed to be imposed upon us is even worse than that. The Hawaiian constitution declares that the Government is established for the equal benefit of all men and all classes, but if the Chinese license act shall pass it will show that the Government intends to deny to us the equal benefit of the laws.

W. C. Achi, a practicing attorney, who calls himself a Chinaman without a queue, and who addressed the gathering as "countrymen of my father," spoke in the native tongue at length. "You have no representation in the councils to speak for you," wailed Mr. Achi, "but you have the right to make your wishes known to the councils by resolutions. If this law passes a laborer who may save his money can not engage in business. The law will put a rope around your necks; it will injure all the Chinese, rich and poor, high and low, strong and weak. To turn in our favor the tide that is setting against us we must take some intelligent action. [Very good.] The supreme court would decide that this law was wholly unconstitutional."

Another clerk of a lawyer was now heard. This was N. Monwor, of Paul Neumann's office. He believed that the good men at the head of the Government would refrain from passing an unjust law. Like Achi, he mentioned the supreme court, saying that it had protected the Chinese against the law of 1888.

Lee Chu, a carpenter, is a radical. Said he: "We are descended from great fathers. Why should we be treated differently from others? I say that if we do not do our best to overcome this law we will show that we have no blood in us."

A number of other addresses were made and this committee of thirteen was selected to place the resolutions given below: C. Winam, Wong Wah Foy, Yun Quom, Chu Gem, Chang Kim, Ho Ton, Lau Chock, Chang Chick, N. Monwar, N. Chan, Chu Wing, I. Kat Poo, Lau Chang. The resolutions read:

"Whereas there is now pending before the legislative body of the Provisional Government an act obliging Chinese residents of these islands to obtain a special license, not called for in the case of any other nationality, as a prerequisite to conducting business in this country; and

"Whereas such legislation is directed against the Chinese as a class, in violation of constitutional provisions and of the principles of equity and justice supposed to inhere in all civilized governments; and would, if enacted into law, prove an irritating oppression to a numerous and law-abiding class of residents who pay a large proportion of the taxes collected by the Government, and who are entitled to the protection of the laws, on terms of equality with other residents of these islands; now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That we, the Chinese residents of Honolulu, in mass meeting assembled, on the evening of Wednesday, the 14th day of February, 1894, do solemnly protest against the injustice, degradation, and insult threatened to be imposed upon us and our race by the legislation so, as aforesaid, pending and proposed to be enacted into law;

Resolved, That we respectfully assert our right, under the principles of enlightened justice and the provisions of the Hawaiian constitution, to dwell in Hawaii and be accorded the protection of the law upon terms of equality with those of other nationalities here sojourning.

Resolved, That the Chinese in Hawaii have been guilty of no act or course of action which should in justice subject them to the humiliation of being singled out as objects of legislative caprice, oppression, or hatred, such as the act herein protested against will, if passed into law, embody and express.

Resolved, That while we ask for nothing more than equality with other residents of equally good behavior, we shall be satisfied with and shall support and respect nothing that accords to our race a lesser degree of consideration and justice than residents of other nationalities enjoy.

Resolved, That the chairman of this meeting do appoint a committee of 13 Chinese residents of this city to present these resolutions to his Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs at their earliest opportunity, and to urge upon his excellency the sentiments herein expressed."

MESSAGE

FROM THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

TRANSMITTING

Further correspondence relating to the Hawaiian Islands.

JANUARY 20, 1894.—Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed.

The CONGRESS:

I transmit herewith dispatches received yesterday from our minister at Hawaii, with certain correspondence which accompanied the same, including a most extraordinary letter, dated December 27, 1893, signed by Sanford B. Dole, minister of foreign affairs of the Provisional Government, addressed to our minister, Mr. Willis, and delivered to him a number of hours after the arrival at Honolulu of a copy of my message to Congress on the Hawaiian question, with copies of the instructions given to our minister.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, January 20, 1894.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 20.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 26, 1893.

SIR: The *Corwin* did not leave until 4 a.m. December 24. I delivered the dispatches 14 to 19, inclusive, and telegram, with files of Hawaiian newspapers, to Capt. Munger in person. This delay was caused by the failure of the Provisional Government to deliver its answer to the President's decision.

This morning I acknowledged the receipt of its answer, with the information that a copy thereof had been forwarded to you as above. I inclose my letter.

On the same day I notified the Queen, through Mr. J. O. Carter, of the result. I inclose the letter to Mr. Carter.

I have the honor to be, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, United States of America.

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 20.]

Mr. Willis to Mr. Dole.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

Honolulu, December 26, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 24th instant, conveying the response of the Provisional Government to the decision of the President of the United States, submitted through me on the 19th instant, and to inform you that a copy thereof was forwarded, on the same day, to Hon. W. Q. Gresham, Secretary of State.

With assurances of high regard, I am, sir, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, United States of America.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 20.]

Mr. Willis to Mr. Carter.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 26, 1893.

SIR: Will you inform Her Majesty the Queen that on the 20th instant, in obedience to my instructions, I notified the President and ministers of the Provisional Government that the President of the United States had reached the decision that she had been illegally deprived of her authority as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands, and that they were expected to promptly relinquish to the Queen her constitutional authority.

On the 24th instant I received in reply a written communication from the Provisional Government, which was of such a nature that it became my duty, as previously instructed, to submit it to the Secretary of State, Hon. W. Q. Gresham, which was done on the same day.

With assurances of high regard, I am, sir, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS,

*Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, United States of America.**Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.*

No. 20½.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 5, 1894.

SIR: On Tuesday the 26th ultimo, as stated in my dispatch No. 20, of December 26, I wrote to Hon. S. B. Dole, minister of foreign affairs, acknowledging the receipt of his response to the decision of the President and informing him that his communication had been forwarded to you.

On Wednesday the 27th ultimo, at 12 a. m., the steamship *Oceanic* arrived, with newspapers containing the President's special message in full, together with the instructions to Mr. Blount and myself. The message was reproduced in the afternoon papers under conspicuous headlines.

At 4 p. m. of the same day I received the four-page, closely-written letter, which I inclose, from Mr. Dole, minister of foreign affairs, asking to be informed, "with the least delay, whether you (I) held instructions to enforce your policy with the use of arms in any event." The information desired, although fully embodied in the President's message, might have been asked for and, except for the remarkable statements contained in the letter, would have been promptly and satisfactorily given in a few words.

Confident that the charges so surprisingly and unjustly made could not be sustained, an answer, herewith inclosed, was on the following (Thursday) morning sent to Minister Dole, asking that they be made more direct and specific.

On Friday morning, 29th ultimo, I received another letter from Mr. Dole, herewith inclosed, in which he says the "special message of the President of the United States * * * has rendered any further correspondence on the subject of my letter of 27th December unnecessary, as the message satisfactorily answers the question;" but he added, "If you still desire the specifications requested I will be ready to furnish them."

The instructions of the President to me had been strictly followed or, if departed from at all, it had been in favor of the beneficiaries of our wrongdoing. I felt, therefore, that the statements contained in the letter of Mr. Dole of the 27th ultimo were directed not at me personally, but at the President, and should be qualified or absolutely withdrawn.

Believing, from the high character and sense of justice of Mr. Dole, that if he reexamined his letter such would be the result, I wrote him a note, which I inclose. This note was delivered at his residence on the night of the same day (Friday, December 29) upon which his second letter was received. Having no answer up to Sunday night (December 31), and having occasion to communicate with his colleague, Mr. Damon, upon another matter, I called his attention to the failure of Mr. Dole to reply to my note, which, I explained to him, was written with no unfriendly purpose, but was, as by itself declared, "for the best interests of all." He informed me that the "Advisory Council" met the next day at 12 o'clock, and he thought the subject would then receive attention.

At 3 p. m. of that day (January 1) I received the letter from Hon. S. B. Dole, herewith inclosed, in which he states that "it was not my intention to withdraw any of my letters." This, of course, left every charge and statement in full force as of that date.

Believing that these charges, whether so intended or not, reflected very unjustly upon the President, whose agent I was, at 6 p. m. of the same day (Monday, January 1) I replied in the inclosed letter, asking that the "desired specifications be furnished at the earliest convenience."

Up to this hour (Friday, January 5) no reply has been received to this request nor have I any intimation when one may be expected. My request for specifications has been in the hands of the minister of foreign affairs since Monday, January 1, at 6 o'clock. I had hoped to receive it in time to answer by steamer *Pekin*, leaving to-day at 2 o'clock, especially as Mr. Thurston and Mr. Hatch, late Vice-President of the Provisional Government, leave to-morrow on the *Australia* for the United States. This delay in answering is a great surprise and regret.

I am fully prepared to show that every step taken by the representatives of our Government has been in the direction of peace and good order and that the military preparations of the Provisional Government were in progress at the time of my arrival, cases of arms, as I telegraphed you on November 4, having been brought by the steamer upon which I arrived. At that time and up to the morning of November 24 (which was the day your letter to the President first appeared here) it will not be claimed that there was the slightest apprehension as to the interference of the United States forces. And yet on the 13th of November, as is well known here, the greatest excitement prevailed at the Execu-

tive building, the military forces were increased in number, and the volunteer companies were ordered on duty at night. These preparations were due, not to any fear of "American intervention," but as Mr. Damon, minister of finance, called officially to explain, resulted from the apprehensions of many citizens, mostly women and children, that as the following day was the birthday anniversary of King Kalakaua large numbers of natives from the adjoining districts would be here and an outbreak might occur. The steamer leaves in a few moments and I am unable to write more at length, but will do so when the expected answer is received.

With high regard, I am, very respectfully,

ALBERT S. WILLIS,
*Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary,
United States of America.*

[Inclosure No. 1 in No. 204.]

Mr. Dole to Mr. Willis.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 27, 1893.

SIR: Pending the further action of the Government of the United States upon the matters contained in your communication of December 19, and my reply to the same, dated December 23, I desire to call your excellency's most serious consideration to the dangerous and critical condition of this community, arising, I must respectfully submit, out of the attitude which you have assumed, and the language which you have used in public, and in communications to this Government, and also out of the published letter of the Secretary of State of the United States, and the President's message on the subject of the restoration of the monarchy.

I do not, however, claim or intimate that this unfortunate situation has been intentionally created by you, or by the Government which you represent, but arises from a natural construction of your attitude, and the ambiguous terms of the statements referred to.

At the time of your arrival in this country the forces of this Government were organized and were amply sufficient to suppress any internal disorder.

After your arrival you made communications regarding your policy which were ambiguous, and for several weeks you failed to disclose your intentions, and have only partially done so up to the present moment, leaving this Government to infer what they may ultimately be from the letter of Mr. Gresham and the President's message, in which it has been declared in very distinct language that the deposed Queen ought to be restored to the throne by the Government of the United States, and leaving us, further, to infer that this assumed obligation would be discharged. Your language expressed in public declared that you intended to perform some act when the proper time arrived, without disclosing what that act would be.

Under these circumstances there arose at once a general feeling of disquiet. The natural inference, from your attitude, language, and refusal to disclose your purpose and from Mr. Gresham's letter and the President's message, was, and is, that you intended to use force in maintaining your policy. The fact is well known that you, as admitted by yourself in your communication of December 19, without the consent or knowledge of this Government, have held negotiations with the deposed Queen for the purpose of overthrowing this Government. The apprehension of both political parties, as well as that of persons who remain neutral in these matters, is that you hold instructions to use physical force for the restoration of the monarchy. I am not prepared to state that this Government entertains this opinion, although its want of information to the contrary has compelled it to act as if it was correct.

In consequence of your attitude in this behalf, the enemies of the Government, believing in your intentions to restore the monarchy by force, have become emboldened. Threats of assassination of the officers of this Government have been made. The police force is frequently informed of conspiracies to create disorder. Aged and sick persons, of all nationalities, have been and are in a state of distress and anxiety. Children in the schools are agitated by the fear of political disturbances. The wives, sisters, and daughters of residents, including many Americans, have been in daily

apprehension of civic disorder, many of them having even armed themselves in preparation therefor; citizens have made preparation in their homes for defense against assaults which may arise directly or indirectly from such conflict. Persons have begun to pack their valuables with a view of immediate departure; large quantities of bandages have been prepared. Unprotected women have received the promise of asylum from the Japanese representative against possible disturbance arising in consequence of American invasion. Rumors of the intended landing of your forces for offensive purposes have agitated the community for many days. The situation for weeks has been one of warfare, without the incident of actual combat. Even the ex-Queen has called upon this Government for protection, which was awarded to her. Owing to your attitude, the Government has been compelled by public apprehension to largely increase its military force, at great expense. Its offices have been placed and still continue in a condition of defense and preparation for siege; and the community has been put into a state of mind bordering on terrorism.

This Government has most earnestly sought from you, and through our representative at Washington from your Government, some assurance that force would not be used, and has failed to obtain it. Your action has, unfortunately, aroused the passions of all parties, and made it probable that disturbances may be created at any moment.

I am informed by military authorities that while the force at your command is sufficient to destroy this city it is insufficient to suppress any general rising and conflict of armed forces and insurrections or to prevent the loss of life and property.

This Government is reluctant to believe that this condition of affairs was contemplated or expected by yourself or by the President of the United States.

I have therefore to ask you to inform me with the least delay whether you hold instructions to enforce your policy with the use of arms in any event.

I trust that you will be able, in reply, to give assurances that will tend to allay the apprehensions existing in the community.

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration,

Your excellency's obedient servant,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

[Inclosure No. 2 in No. 204.]

Mr. Willis to Mr. Dole.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 27, 1893.

SIR: Your communication of this date was delivered at 4 p. m., and would have received an immediate answer except for the statements reflecting upon the President of the United States and upon his diplomatic agent in this country, which, in view of their gravity, should, I respectfully submit, be set forth with more particularity and certainty.

In order, therefore, to answer your communication as it deserves to be answered, I beg leave to call your attention to the following clauses and sentences, which can not be properly commented on or replied to until understood.

(1) You refer in several places to "the attitude which you (the diplomatic agent of the United States) assumed," "the natural construction of my attitude," "the natural inference from your attitude," "in consequence of your attitude in this behalf," "owing to your attitude the Government has been compelled," etc.

"Attitude," as is well understood, is "essentially and designedly expressive," its object being "to set forth and exhibit some internal feeling."

If this is the accepted meaning of the word will you point out when, and where, and how, the representative of the United States "assumed" any "attitude" towards the supporters of the Provisional Government, or that Government itself, other than one "essentially and designedly expressive" of peace.

(2) You assert that "at the time of your (my) arrival in this country the forces of this (your) Government were organized and were amply sufficient to suppress any internal disorder." Will you inform me what connection this statement has or is desired to have with the Government of the United States or with the future action of its representative?

(3) You refer to the "language which you (I) have used in public, and in communication to this (your) Government," but you give neither the time, place, or subject-matter of the "language" or "communication."

(4) You call attention to the "published letter of the Secretary of State of the United States, and the President's message on the subject of the restoration of the Queen," but you quote the words of neither, so that if I were at liberty to discuss

with you, matters not properly subject to diplomatic cognizance, I have not sufficient data to do so, as the Secretary's letter is not before me and the President has transmitted to the Congress two messages on the subject referred to, both of which, I assume, you were familiar with at the time you wrote your communication. May I ask, therefore, to which message do you refer, or do you include both?

(5) You further state that "after your (my) arrival, you (I) made communications regarding your policy, which were ambiguous." May I ask to whom and when these "communications" were made and what were their contents?

(6) You also say "your (my) language, expressed in public, declared that you (I) intended to perform some act when the proper time arrived, without declaring what that act would be." May I inquire, again, when and where and to what "public" was such language used?

(7) You further say: "This Government has most earnestly sought from you * * * some assurance that force would not be used, and has failed to obtain it." Will you inform me at what time and in what manner your Government "earnestly sought" the "assurance" referred to?

In conclusion, I would ask your careful consideration of the following statement: "Your (my) action has unfortunately aroused the passions of all parties and made it probable that disturbances may be created at any moment." Before replying to the above, I think that your further attention should be drawn to it, as I refuse to believe that upon reexamination you will feel at liberty to affix your official signature to such an extraordinary declaration.

Hoping that you will enable me to reply "with the least delay," as requested, by giving me the desired information, I am, sir, with renewed assurances of friendly consideration,

Very respectfully,

ALBERT S. WILLIS,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, United States of America.

[Inclosure No. 3 in No. 204.]

Mr. Dole to Mr. Willis.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 29, 1893.

SIR: Your excellency's letter of December 27, referring to my communication of the same date, which requests information as to the nature of your instructions from your Government in regard to the use of force against this Government, and asking for a more specific statement of matters therein contained, has been received.

I desire to state that the arrival of newspaper copies by the late mail, since my note to you was written, of the special message of the President of the United States to Congress on the Hawaiian matter has rendered any further correspondence on the subject of my letter unnecessary, as the message satisfactorily answers my question as to future action of the American administration towards the Government, the whole Hawaiian matter having been referred to Congress by the President.

If, however, you still desire the specifications requested I will be ready to furnish them.

With assurances of the highest consideration, etc.,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

[Inclosure 4 in No. 204.]

Mr. Willis to Mr. Dole.

HONOLULU, December 29, 1893.

SIR: I received your note of this date in answer to one from me of the 27th instant.

Am I to understand that your communication of the latter date is withdrawn? If this is your intention, as I hope it is, I would for the best interests of all, suggest that the whole correspondence on the subject be withdrawn, with the understanding that the original letters be returned to their authors, and that no copies be given to the public or made a record by either government.

With sincere regard, I am, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

[Inclosure 5 in No. 204.]

*Without signature to Mr. Willis.*DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, January 1, 1894.

SIR: Your Excellency's communication of December 29, inquiring if my note amounted to a withdrawal of my communication on the subject referred to, has been received.

It was not my intention to withdraw any of my letters, but merely to inform you that the arrival of newspaper copies of the special message of the President of the United States on the Hawaiian matter, made it unnecessary for me to press you for further answer to my question.

With the highest appreciation of your kindly interest, I have the honor, etc.,

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Not signed.)

[Inclosure 6 in No. 204.]

*Mr. Willis to Mr. Dole.*LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 1, 1894.

SIR: On the 27th ultimo, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, I received a lengthy communication from you containing statements, which I am fully prepared to show are not warranted by the facts, seriously affecting the President of the United States and the representatives of the United States in this country. These charges and statements, if accepted as the official views of your Government, demanded prompt answer and equally prompt action on the part of the Government of the United States, to the end that the condition of things therein described should be removed by the removal of the alleged causes.

In order more satisfactorily to answer your communication I immediately, in a letter written the same day, requested a more specific statement upon seven points at issue.

I have the honor now to acknowledge the receipt on last Friday, December 29, at 1 p. m., of a letter from you stating that the last message of the President of the United States "satisfactorily answers your question as to the future action of the American administration toward this (your) Government."

You further say: "If, however, you still desire the specifications requested I will be ready to furnish them."

In reply to this last letter, I beg leave most respectfully to state that if your first communication on this subject had been confined to the single question above mentioned an immediate and satisfactory answer would have been given. That a different course was adopted, has been a source of sincere and profound regret to myself, as it will be, I know, to my Government, and this for several reasons, among which not the least is that it brings for the first time the official information that the war-like preparations described by you were caused by and intended for the diplomatic and military representatives of the United States.

Your communications on this subject, being official in character, become a part of the permanent records of this legation, and are required to be transmitted to the Government at Washington.

In view of these facts, and in the confident belief that upon fuller consideration you would realize the great injustice of your statements, I wrote you a brief note, which was delivered at your residence on the night of Friday, December 29, expressing the hope that your letter of the 27th instant was intended as a withdrawal of your first communication, and stating that if such was the case I would "for the best interests of all suggest that the whole correspondence on the subject be withdrawn, with the understanding that the original letters be returned to their authors and that no copies be given to the public or made a record by either Government."

Having received no reply to this note, I took occasion last night (December 31) to explain in an informal way to one of your ministers (Mr. Damon) that my note to you was prompted by no improper or unfriendly spirit, but was intended to continue the amicable relations heretofore existing.

There was in your letter of December 29 no withdrawal or modification of the statements and charges complained of, but on the contrary an expression of "readiness," implying ability, to furnish the "specifications requested."

I am just in receipt of your letter (which bears no signature) of this date, in reply to my last note, in which you say: "It is not my intention to withdraw any of my letters, but merely to inform you that the arrival of newspaper copies of the special message of the President of the United States on the Hawaiian matter made it unnecessary for me to press you for further answer to my question."

Accepting the above as your decision, I have now to ask that you furnish me, at your earliest convenience, with the desired specifications, as I wish to make immediate answer.

With renewed assurances, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, United States of America.

MESSAGE

FROM THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

TRANSMITTING

Additional correspondence relating to the Hawaiian Islands.

JANUARY 22, 1894.—Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed.

The Congress:

I transmit herewith copies of dispatches received from our minister to Hawaii after the arrival of those, copies of which accompanied my message of the 20th instant.

I also inclose for the information of the Congress copies of reports and a copy of an order just received by the Secretary of the Navy from Rear-Admiral Irwin, commanding our naval forces at Honolulu.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
January 22, 1894.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 21.]

HONOLULU, *January 4, 1894.*

Transmits contingent expense account of the legation.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 22.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 6, 1894.

SIR: I have the honor to call your attention to the following changes in the Provisional Government: Hon. F. M. Hatch resigned yesterday the office of vice-president, assigning as reason that he was "under the necessity of going beyond the limits of the country." Hon. W. C. Wilder, of the advisory council, was elected to fill the vacancy.

An act was brought before the executive and advisory council "separating the office of minister of foreign affairs from that of the office of president," and providing "that hereafter the department of foreign affairs shall be presided over by an officer called the minister of foreign affairs, who shall be chosen by the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands. The minister of foreign affairs so chosen shall be a member of the executive council of the Government." This act was referred to the judiciary committee, but it was understood to be the unanimous judgment of the councils and that Mr. Hatch will be elected to the position. At present the duties of the minister of foreign affairs are discharged by the president, Mr. Dole. The executive committee now consists of four persons. By the above act it will be increased to five.

With assurances, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 23.]

HONOLULU, January 6, 1894.

Transmits minister's monthly salary account.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 24.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 6, 1894.

SIR: I send herewith the petition of the "Hui Aloha Aina" (Hawaiian Patriotic League), an association which claims to represent over 8,000 legal voters. The petition was brought here last night by Hon. J. A. Cummins, the honorary president of the association, and Mr. A. Marques, a member of its "executive council," who stated that they were a committee for that purpose.

With high regard, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

[Original.]

Petition of the Hawaiian Patriotic League to President Cleveland.

To His Excellency Grover Cleveland, President of the United States of America:

SIR: The Hawaiian people are moved with the deepest concern in view of the delayed and uncertain conditions of affairs in Hawaii, and also of the active hostility that seems to have suddenly developed in the United States against the policy of Your Excellency and the American administration regarding our unhappy little country and the just restoration of our national monarchy. We have noted with anxiety and sorrow the apparent success which a campaign of malign falsehoods has had in the American press to embarrass the administration at Washington, and we reproach the newspapers of America for their unchivalrous and untruthful abuse of our Queen, who, only a year ago, was in the acknowledged lead of the Christian work in Hawaii and the gracious patron of the sycophantic church society that now maligns her. Therefore, in the event of the Hawaiian question having to be discussed before the American Congress, the Hawaiian people have thought it timely to come out of their past reserve and to assert their views, as against those of the Provisional Government, who falsely assume to represent the whole nation.

To this effect, the officers and members of the Hui Aloha Aina (Hawaiian Patriotic League), an association numbering over 8,000 legal voters, created for the purpose of preserving the autonomy of the country under the native Monarchy, have prepared for such use as your Excellency may deem proper the present memorial, for the public ratification of which they can confidently vouch, had the association been permitted to hold public meetings for that purpose, in Honolulu and the other districts.

In this document we aim principally at making patent what the people at large, have suffered and lost since the assumption of the so-called Provisional Government.

MEMORIAL.

Last January, a political crime was committed, not only against the legitimate Sovereign of the Hawaiian Kingdom, but also against the whole Hawaiian nation, a nation who, for the past sixty years, had enjoyed free and happy constitutional self-government. This was done by a *coup de main* of U. S. Minister Stevens, in collusion with a cabal of conspirators, mainly faithless sons of missionaries and local politicians angered by continuous political defeat, who, as a revenge for being a hopeless minority in the country, resolved to "rule or ruin" through foreign help.

The facts of this "revolution," as it is improperly called, are now a matter of history. Under the false pretense of protecting American interests, which were in no way endangered, troops were landed regardless of international rights from the U. S. S. *Boston* on the afternoon of January 16, 1893, and so placed as to intimidate the Queen and interfere with the forces at her command, which were ample to quell any domestic disturbance. At about 3 o'clock p. m. on the next day, the 17th of January, a mob of a dozen aliens, principally Germans of a desperate character, paid by the conspirators, invaded the Government building, which was virtually commanded by the United States troops. They then went through the farce of proclaiming the Provisional Government, which Minister Stevens hastened to recognize and support before they had obtained possession of any of the other public buildings, all strongly occupied by the armed police and the Queen's guard. The Queen and her Government, realizing the situation, but unwilling to make war with the United States forces and to occasion useless bloodshed of innocent Hawaiian subjects, yielded under protest to the superior force and moral power of the United States. And while waiting for the result of this appeal, with full confidence in the American honor, the Queen requested all her loyal subjects to remain absolutely quiet and passive, and to submit with patience to all the insults that have been since heaped upon both the Queen and the people by the usurping Government.

The necessity of this attitude of absolute inactivity on the part of the Hawaiian people was further indorsed and emphasized by Commissioner Blount, so that, if the Hawaiians have held their peace in a manner that will vindicate their character as law-abiding citizens, yet it can not and must not be construed as evidence that they are apathetic or indifferent, or ready to acquiesce in the wrong and bow to the usurpers. No; the traditional virtue of the aborigines is respect and obedience to their rulers, and it has been fully tested in the present crisis; and when the Hawaiian Patriotic League, whose representatives the present memorialists are, formed its enthusiastic branches all over the islands, the first watchword was to maintain a dignified peace pending the arbitrament of the United States. Had it not been for this request of our Sovereign, there would doubtless have been a tremendous uprising throughout the islands to crush the usurpers, but it would have been a sad tale of blood and destruction, which, from the first, it was sought to avoid if possible.

The advent of Mr. Blount as a special commissioner was hailed with satisfaction by both contending factions. His course in Hawaii was marked by a dignity, courtesy, and discretion that was highly creditable to his country, and gained for him at the time the respect and confidence of all classes. His report to the President has been characterized by the greatest impartiality and absolute respect for truth, so that this Patriotic League have fully indorsed it and can solemnly testify to its veracity and reliability.

The letter of Secretary Gresham to the President and the instructions to Minister Willis to request the Provisional Government to relinquish its power to our legitimate Sovereign have created a deep feeling of gratitude in the minds and hearts of the Hawaiian people, and a still more profound respect for the American Government, who now appears to be acting with the same spirit of justice and friendship that has always characterized its actions in the past toward this little nation. And the policy therein outlined, though quite expected, has caused us to honor and respect Your Excellency as a distinguished, firm, and just ruler, worthy of a great people.

But, in the meantime, a number of the American people, deceived by the most astounding and unblushing falsehoods disseminated through the States by the papers

supporting the plotters, do not realize the wrongs and sufferings that the true people of these islands have undergone for the past eleven months under the shield of American prestige. In fact, it ought to be understood that the people have suffered even more than the Sovereign. The Queen was simply deprived of her throne, power, and revenues, while, under the pretense of obtaining American liberty, the people have lost their dearest liberties and civil rights, many their livelihood, and were on the eve of losing even their nationality, their country having been offered without their assent as a barter by the filibusterers who owe their power to Minister Stevens.

The Provisional Government, its leaders, and their defenders claim abroad to represent the Hawaiian nation. This we most *emphatically deny*; they represent only a clique bent upon oppressing the masses, they are only a fractional portion of the population, wealth, intelligence, and civilization of Hawaii, and even a fraction only of the American colony, and the fact of there being among the usurpers some men of intelligence and capital makes their conduct only more odious, because in direct violation of those American principles for which Americans have repeatedly shed their blood, viz, the government of the people, by the people, and for the people, and the rule of the majority. The presence of men of intelligence and capital among the usurpers only shows that even in those classes there can be found depraved men and moral criminals. We assert that any trial at the ballot box would show that the native Hawaiians and the rapidly increasing class of halfwhites, both claiming to be the equal in intelligence of any electorate in the United States, are virtually, as a unit, "Royalists" and opposed politically to the P. G. and its self-appointed dictators; moreover, fully one-half of the foreign merchants, capitalists, planters, and mechanics are also opposed to the same and are avowed sympathizers of the monarchy. And we solemnly declare that unless crushed by force, as old Poland was, the Hawaiian people will never be conciliated to the present misrule. This the P. G. so well know that they have persistently refused to have their tenure of power legalized and ratified by public vote, even on a restricted basis of property qualification; and ever since Mr. Stevens's *coup de main* to maintain themselves in power they have depended, as proved by their military display, not on the sympathies, confidence, and good will of the people, but on the force of alien bayonets and of Draconian laws. How can they have the insolence to call themselves "the people" when they exist solely as a military despotism and oligarchy, which defies all public opinion and constitutional ideas? They are common pirates, and cling to their ill-gotten power as freebooters.

Furthermore, the Provisional Government now claim their right (through might) to perpetuate themselves, to declare themselves permanent without any reference to the people or to the taxpayers, although the American Government have very correctly declared that the only excuse to their existence (viz, the negotiations for annexation to the U. S.) was at an end. This is the greatest of all the aggravations and provocations to the Hawaiians that have been accumulated against them, on account probably of their peaceful and patient attitude. And here a short *exposé* of our grievances, as resulting from our patient confidence in the justice and honor of the American nation, will not be out of place:

(1) Through Minister Stevens's premeditated conspiracy the Hawaiian people have been deprived of all their political rights, and the Provisional Government have emphatically declared that no more elections would be held as long as they could keep control of the country; thus sixty years of recognized rights are swept away at the whim of a selfish and small minority.

(2) The legal constitution having been virtually abrogated, as declared by judicial decisions, the inhabitants of Hawaii now really live under the arbitrary sufferance of the Provisional Government and under the laws which an irresponsible "advisory council," recruited between themselves, chose to enact or to cancel to satisfy the prejudices and whims of their little clique, and it is only the fear of the foreign representatives that deters them from absolute star-chamber rule.

(3) The people have lost all confidence in the administration of justice, as the supreme bench—formerly the model of integrity and the pride of the country—as well as all the lower courts, have been filled by adventurers with no other claim than partizanship, whereby crimes are conveniently condoned when committed by followers or sympathizers of the P. G., while honest citizens known to be Royalists, have been harshly treated or denied justice and satisfaction.

(4) The public funds have been outrageously squandered for the maintenance of an unnecessary large army, fed in luxury, and composed *entirely* of aliens, mainly recruited from the most disreputable classes of San Francisco. To face the expenditures of this force and, the arms that have been imported by thousands, nearly all the public works have been suspended; and yet in presence of the country's impending bankruptcy, the taxes (which have already been largely increased) will have to be doubled or more.

(5) All the natives and the foreign Royalists have been disarmed, while arms have been distributed wholesale to all aliens who profess sympathy to the P. G. and

principally to the Portuguese element, who form a large but ignorant and vicious part of our population; and this alone constitutes a permanent menace to the security and peace of the community.

(6) Several clubs and leagues, composed mostly of Germans, Portuguese, and Scandinavians, with really very few American citizens, have been called into existence for the support of the revolutionary government, and these organizations, with socialistic tendencies, have become an uncontrollable power, this fact being recognized and admitted by the executive council, who are intimidated by their clamors for the dismissal from public service of all Hawaiian or Hawaiian born subjects, to be replaced by the newly arrived adventurers, at their nomination.

(7) These clubs and their organs have repeatedly threatened murder, violence, and deportation against all those not in sympathy with the present state of things, and the police being in their control, intimidation is a common weapon, under various forms, even that of nocturnal searches in the residences of peaceful citizens, so that, were it not for the presence in port of foreign men-of-war, the population would be living under a hopeless reign of terror.

(8) The situation may be summed up by saying that never before in these islands, under what our filibusterers are pleased to refer to as the rule of heathenism, have we had such an unruly, despotic, unrepresentative, and squandering government, whose chief supporters are from the disorderly and adventurous foreign element, not from the natural inhabitants with families and property. And never before have the lives and peace of inoffensive citizens been so jeopardized, all of this under the pretense of American peace and civilization!!!

The above is but a faint outline of what the Hawaiian have suffered and are now suffering under the régime imposed on them by the alleged Christians of Mr. Stevens's following. And while the Hawaiians, disarmed by American intervention, have been patiently and peacefully waiting the judgment of your administration, the Provisional Government, actually under American protection, have diligently employed the long delay and used the people's money in fortifying themselves. They have grown desperate, so that when the arbitration of the United States is decided against them, those very men who appealed to America and claimed American citizenship for the furtherance of their selfish ends, turn around ready with their alien soldiers imported for the purpose to fight against their own Government and the soldiers of their nation. These unholy "patriots" are ready and willing to commit, against their own country, the crimes of rebellion and high treason, all the more heinous in this case, since the Hawaiians, who might have some right to fight in their own country for their own independence, have always declared their unchangeable resolution not to lift an aggressive hand against the great nation which, in the past, has so befriended Hawaii, and their readiness to abide by its decision, be that what it may.

Will it now appear a wonder that the Provisional Government have rendered themselves odious to all classes except their immediate supporters?

We shall not dwell on the fact that the Provisional Government have never been a legally constituted administration, but merely a temporary *de facto* police organization to preserve the peace pending the action of the United States; their power could only come from the people, who have not been consulted, because a public meeting of less than 1,000 foreigners, mostly nonvoters, out of a total voting population of 13,000 and a total number of inhabitants of 92,000 can not be said to constitute the nation.

Yet we hear that the principal objection raised, by otherwise well-meaning Americans, against your excellency's policy of doing justice to our cause is the apparent inconsistency of a republican form of government restoring a monarchy. But we claim that our case is really a question of right and equity, and not one of a form of government; it is the matter of a peaceful monarchy, friendly to the United States, invaded by the hostile forces of that Republic to assist a revolutionary *junta* who verily intended to use America only as a convenient cat's-paw for their personal interests.

The principle of monarchical government may be distasteful to the radical democracy of America. But it is the chosen and preferred form of the Hawaiian people, under which, with its constitutional limitations, they and the foreign settlers have prospered and enjoyed, equally as well as any Republic, all the advantages and democratic privileges of popular government. Why should the Americans in Hawaii, who constitute only the small portion of 2-14 per cent of our population, or the people in America, 2,000 miles away, object to a monarchical form of government in Hawaii, popular with the great majority of the population who have here their only home and country?

Therefore the Hawaiians, as a nation, appeal for justice and redress to the impartiality of the American nation, in whose honor, integrity, and love of fair play we have so long and so patiently trusted. As peaceful and law-abiding citizens, ever ready to submit to the constitutional rule of the majority, duly expressed through

an untrammelled ballot box, we ask that, in the place of the present temporary usurpers who are hostile to the native race, our own government, in the person of Queen Liliuokalani, be restored to us, with a new constitution more equitable to us than the one that was wrested from the late King Kalakaua in 1887 through force of arms.

To this effect we now pray the God of a common faith, that, right, justice, and honor prevailing, Hawaii, our home and country, be allowed again to enjoy the blessings of the independent autonomy and constitutional régime which were so infamously subverted on the 17th day of January last; and we also earnestly pray that the Almighty may grant all His blessings on yourself, Mr. President, and on the noble American nation.

And your memorialists, Mr. President, have the honor to be, of your excellency, most humble and obedient servants,

J. A. CUMMINS,
Honorary President.
JOSEPH NAWAHI,
President.
JNO. E. BUSH,
Vice-President.
JOHN LOT KAULUKOU,
Vice-President.
J. K. KAUNUMANO,
Vice-President.
J. W. BIPIKANE,
Vice-President.
JAS. K. KAULIA,
Secretary.
ENOCH JOHNSON,
Treasurer.
JNO. UAHIAI KANEAKUA,
Executive Councilor.
D. W. PUA,
Executive Councilor.
J. K. MERSEBURG,
Executive Councilor.
W. H. RICKARD,
Executive Councilor.
JOHN ROSS,
Executive Councilor.
JOHN K. PRENDERGAST,
Executive Councilor.
ABRAHAM K. PALEKALUHI,
Executive Councilor.
J. KAHAHAWAI,
Executive Councilor.
A. MARQUES,
Executive Councilor.
W. T. SEWARD,
Executive Councilor.

HONOLULU, this 27th day of December, 1893.

PACIFIC STATION, OFFICE OF THE
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. NAVAL FORCE,
U. S. F. S. PHILADELPHIA,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 2, 1894.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report in regard to the situation since the departure of the *Corwin* on the 24th ultimo.

The military preparations for defense continue to be made by the Provisional Government and the excitement is unabated.

The newspapers assume that I, as the military representative of the U. S. Government, intend to use force to restore the Queen, at the same time they quote me as saying that I would not obey any order which I

considered unlawful, also that the officers and men under my command had assumed the same attitude.

These sensational reports are intended to influence public opinion in the United States and are entirely without foundation. Since my arrival I have carefully avoided all expression of opinion except in conference with the U. S. minister, and have ordered all my command to pursue a similar course. I may further add that Mr. Willis has never given me the slightest hint that there was ever any intention on the part of the U. S. Government to use force in order to restore the Queen. My own orders to preserve strict neutrality have been implicitly obeyed.

It has been asserted quite often that we were prepared to land, which is true, but our motives were intentionally misconstrued, as Mr. Willis stated openly, and his statement was published that we would land solely for the purpose of suppressing riot, and to protect the lives and property of the defenseless.

Were it not for the course of the newspapers in their endeavor to influence public opinion in the United States, no uneasiness would be felt, and business would go on as usual. I do not believe that ordinary business is seriously affected, as is reported, but no new enterprises will be undertaken until there is some settled government.

The commanding officers of the Japanese cruiser *Naniwa Kan* and the British cruiser *Champion* called on me to arrange for landing a force to protect the lives and property of their countrymen in case there should be any serious riot. They offered to cooperate with me and to place their landing parties where, in my opinion, they would do the most good.

Now, as the general public in Honolulu is fully aware of the above fact, and have no longer any apprehension of any riot, and, as the perusal of the President's message has convinced every one that no force would be used to change the Government, it is criminal for any one to make the misstatements referred to.

Foreign influence, inimical to the interests of the United States, is secretly at work here, as it is wherever we have any trade interests, and that influence will account for many of the misstatements in the papers.

I forward files of newspapers covering the period since last mail. The health of the crews of the vessels here remains good.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN IRWIN,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

PACIFIC STATION,
OFFICE COMMANDER IN CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE,
U. S. FLAGSHIP PHILADELPHIA,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 3, 1894.

SIR: I have the honor to call the attention of the Department to the admirable discretion exercised by the officers and men of this squadron under the most trying circumstances.

Notwithstanding the great parade of preparations for war not one case of misconduct on shore has occurred, and this evidence of perfect discipline has been very favorably commented upon by disinterested parties ashore and afloat.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN IRWIN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

GENERAL ORDER, }
No. 2. }

PACIFIC STATION,
FLAGSHIP PHILADELPHIA,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 29, 1893.

The commander in chief calls the attention of all under his command to the manifest impropriety of taking sides with either political party in Hawaii.

The expression of political opinion or the wearing of badges is strictly forbidden.

JOHN IRWIN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Pacific Station.

MESSAGE
FROM THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

TRANSMITTING

Certain further information relating to the Hawaiian Islands.

JANUARY 13, 1894.—Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed.

To the Congress:

I transmit herewith copies of all dispatches from our minister at Hawaii relating in any way to political affairs in that country, except such as have been heretofore laid before the Congress.

I also transmit a copy of the last instructions sent to our minister, dated January 12, 1894, being the only instructions to him not already sent to the Congress.

In transmitting certain correspondence with my message, dated December 18, 1893, I withheld a dispatch from our present minister, numbered 3, and dated November 16, 1893, and also a dispatch from our former minister, numbered 70, and dated October 8, 1892. Inasmuch as the contents of the dispatch of November 16, 1893, are referred to in the dispatches of a more recent date now sent to Congress, and inasmuch as there seems no longer to be sufficient reason for withholding said dispatch, a copy of the same is herewith submitted. The dispatch, numbered 70, and dated October 8, 1892, above referred to, is still withheld for the reason that such a course still appears to be justifiable and proper.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *January 13, 1894.*

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 3.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, November 16, 1893.

SIR: In the forenoon of Monday the 13th instant, by prearrangement, the Queen, accompanied by the royal chamberlain, Mr. Robertson, called at the legation. No one was present at the half-hour interview which followed, her chamberlain having been taken to another room and Consul-General Mills, who had invited her to come, remaining in the front of the house to prevent interruption.

After a formal greeting, the Queen was informed that the President of the United States had important communications to make to her and she was asked whether she was willing to receive them alone and in confidence, assuring her that this was for her own interest and safety. She answered in the affirmative.

I then made known to her the President's sincere regret that, through the unauthorized intervention of the United States, she had been obliged to surrender her sovereignty, and his hope that, with her consent and cooperation, the wrong done to her and to her people might be redressed. To this, she bowed her acknowledgments.

I then said to her, "The President expects and believes that when reinstated you will show forgiveness and magnanimity; that you will wish to be the Queen of all the people, both native and foreign born; that you will make haste to secure their love and loyalty and to establish peace, friendship, and good government." To this she made no reply. After waiting a moment, I continued: "The President not only tenders you his sympathy but wishes to help you. Before fully making known to you his purposes, I desire to know whether you are willing to answer certain questions which it is my duty to ask?" She answered, "I am willing." I then asked her, "Should you be restored to the throne, would you grant full amnesty as to life and property to all those persons who have been or who are now in the Provisional Government, or who have been instrumental in the overthrow of your government?" She hesitated a moment and then slowly and calmly answered: "There are certain laws of my Government by which I shall abide. My decision would be, as the law directs, that such persons should be beheaded and their property confiscated to the Government." I then said, repeating very distinctly her words, "It is your feeling that these people should be beheaded and their property confiscated?" She replied, "It is." I then said to her, "Do you fully understand the meaning of every word which I have said to you, and of every word which you have said to me, and, if so, do you still have the same opinion?" Her answer was, "I have understood and mean all I have said, but I might leave the decision of this to my ministers." To this I replied, "Suppose it was necessary to make a decision before you appointed any ministers, and that you were asked to issue a royal proclamation of general amnesty, would you do it?" She answered, "I have no legal right to do that, and I would not do it." Pausing a moment she continued, "These people were the cause of the revolution and constitution of 1887. There will never be any peace while they are here. They must be sent out of the country, or punished, and their property confiscated." I then said, "I have no further communication to make to you now, and will have none until I hear from my Government, which will probably be three or four weeks."

Nothing was said for several minutes, when I asked her whether she was willing to give me the names of four of her most trusted friends, as I might, within a day or two, consider it my duty to hold a consultation with them in her presence. She assented, and gave these names: J. O. Carter, John Richardson, Joseph Nawahi, and E. C. Macfarlane.

I then inquired whether she had any fears for her safety at her present residence, Washington Square. She replied that she did have some fears, that while she had trusty friends that guarded her house every night, they were armed only with clubs, and that men shabbily dressed had been often seen prowling about the adjoining premises—a schoolhouse with large yard. I informed her that I was authorized by the President to offer her protection either on one of our war ships

or at the legation and desired her to accept the offer at once. She declined, saying she believed it was best for her at present to remain at her own residence. I then said to her that at any moment, night or day, this offer of our Government was open to her acceptance.

The interview thereupon, after some personal remarks, was brought to a close.

Upon reflection, I concluded not to hold any consultation at present with the Queen's friends, as they have no official position, and furthermore, because I feared, if known to so many, her declarations might become public, to her great detriment, if not danger, and to the interruption of the plans of our Government.

Mr. J. O. Carter is a brother of Mr. H. A. P. Carter, the former Hawaiian minister to the United States, and is conceded to be a man of high character, integrity, and intelligence. He is about 55 years old. He has had no public experience. Mr. Macfarlane, like Mr. Carter, is of white parentage, is an unmarried man, about 42 years old, and is engaged in the commission business. John Richardson is a young man of about 35 years old. He is a cousin of Samuel Parker, the half-caste, who was a member of the Queen's cabinet at the time of the last revolution. He is a resident of Maui, being designated in the directory of 1889 as "attorney at law, stock-raiser, and proprietor Bismark livery stable." Richardson is "half-caste." Joseph Nawaki is a full-blooded native, practices law (as he told me) in the native courts, and has a moderate English education. He has served twenty years in the legislature, but displays very little knowledge of the structure and philosophy of the Government which he so long represented. He is 51 years old, and is president of the native Hawaiian political club.

Upon being asked to name three of the most prominent native leaders, he gave the names of John E. Bush, R. W. Wilcox, and modestly added, "I am a leader." John E. Bush is a man of considerable ability, but his reputation is very bad. R. W. Wilcox is the notorious half-breed who engineered the revolution of 1889. Of all these men Carter and Macfarlane are the only two to whom the ministerial bureaus could be safely entrusted. In conversation with Sam Parker, and also with Joseph Nawahi, it was plainly evident that the Queen's implied condemnation of the constitution of 1887 was fully indorsed by them.

From these and other facts which have been developed I feel satisfied that there will be a concerted movement in the event of restoration for the overthrow of that constitution which would mean the overthrow of constitutional and limited government and the absolute dominion of the Queen.

The law referred to by the Queen is Chapter VI, section 9 of the Penal Code, as follows:

Whoever shall commit the crime of treason shall suffer the punishment of death and all his property shall be confiscated to the Government.

There are, under this law, no degrees of treason. Plotting alone carries with it the death sentence.

I need hardly add, in conclusion, that the tension of feeling is so great that the promptest action is necessary to prevent disastrous consequences,

I send a cipher telegram asking that Mr. Blount's report be withheld for the present, and I send with it a telegram, not in cipher, as follows:

Views of the first party so extreme as to require further instructions.

I am, etc.

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 6.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, November 19, 1893.

SIR: It will be remembered that in connection with the presentation on the 19th of July, 1893, of a cane to Mr. Claus Spreckels, there was an unwarrantable use of the name of Hon. James H. Blount, late envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at Honolulu.

On yesterday, November 18, Hon. Sanford B. Dole, minister of foreign affairs, transmitted a letter dated July 24, 1893, addressed by him to Mr. Charles Crichton, calling his (Crichton's) attention to the improper and unauthorized use of Mr. Blount's name and asking an apology therefor. He also inclosed Mr. Crichton's answer to the effect that Mr. Blount—

had no knowledge of the preparation of the said cane nor of the presentation thereof to Col. Spreckels, and it was not the intention of the donors of the same to intimate in any way that he (Mr. Blount) was interested or in any way concerned in or cognizant of the said presentation.

I can further assure your excellency, continues Mr. Crichton, that if Mr. Blount deems that any act of discourtesy to him has been committed that nothing was further from our intentions, and at the time we had no idea that such an inference could be drawn from the occurrence, more than could be drawn from Mr. Johnston's list.

I will file these letters in the Department and presume that the matter will end here.

With high regard, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 7.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, December 1, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith a printed statement presented by Hon. S. M. Damon, minister of finance, showing the financial condition of the Provisional Government for week ending November 29, 1893.

With high regard, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

[Inclosure.]

TUESDAY, November 23.

The executive and advisory councils met at 1:30 this afternoon, President Dole in the chair. The members present were: Ministers King, Damon, and Smith, and Councilors Hatch, Ena, Brown, Waterhouse, Emmeluth, Tenney, Wilder, Young, Allen, Morgan, and Mendonca. Minister of Finance Damon then presented his weekly report, as follows:

Finance statement for week ending November 23, 1893.

Current account balance.....	\$136,481.84
Loan fund account balance.....	368.89
Total treasury balance.....	\$136,850.73

Finance statement for week ending November 23, 1893—Continued.

RECEIPTS.

Interior department.....	\$2,988.00	
Customs.....	7,274.25	
Fines, penalties, and costs.....	36.70	
Revenue stamps.....	336.50	
Water.....	375.00	
Post-office.....	600.00	
Taxes.....	2,452.80	
Crown lands.....	850.00	
		<u>\$14,913.25</u>
		151,763.98

EXPENDITURES.

Finance department, salaries, incidentals, etc.....	\$74.25	
Interest.....	3,583.00	
Attorney-general's department.....	50.00	
Road tax—to special deposit.....	256.00	
School tax—to special deposit.....	258.00	
		<u>\$4,221.25</u>
Current account balance.....	147,173.84	
Loan fund account balance.....	368.89	
		<u>147,542.73</u>
Total treasury balance above date.....		151,763.98
		<u>2,653,200.00</u>
Outstanding bonds.....		40,000.00
Treasury notes.....		705,416.95
Due postal savings bank and Postmaster-General's notes.....		3,398,616.95
		<u>368.89</u>
Less loan fund balance.....		3,398,248.06
Net indebtedness.....		

Postal Savings Bank memorandum.

Notices this date of withdrawals maturing in November and December, 1893, and January and February, 1894.....	\$31,474.00
Cash on hand, Postal Savings Bank this day.....	29,381.15

Expenses Provisional Government memorandum.

Expenses Provisional Government this date.....	\$159,954.21
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This amount covers all expenses, including military and items not appropriated by the last legislature.

Memorandum cash in treasury outstanding.

Certificates.....	\$284,000.00
Certificates, withdrawn from circulation, and deposited for safe-keeping.....	28,000.00
Cash in treasury to redeem certificates.....	284,000.00
Certificates in treasury to redeem certificates.....	284,000.00
Cash in treasury to redeem certificates.....	284,000.00
	<u>29,381.15</u>
Cash on hand, Postal Savings Bank.....	51,624.03
Road board fund in treasury.....	38,143.48
School board fund in treasury.....	147,542.73
Available cash, as above.....	
	<u>266,691.39</u>

This was received and placed on file.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

[Confidential.]

No. 8.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, December 5, 1893.

SIR: On November 24 the British war ship *Champion* arrived, Capt. Rooke commanding. He has about 250 men. On reaching here a telegraphic order was handed him, which will detain him until the difficulties here are settled.

On Saturday, December 2, the Japanese cruiser *Naniwa Kau*, Capt. Mosi commanding, arrived. She will also remain here until a settlement.

On Friday, November 24, your letter appeared in the Honolulu papers and created a great sensation. Crowds were gathered at all points on the streets discussing the news, but, although the excitement was so intense, I am glad to report that there was not a single breach of the peace. A public meeting was called, for the following night, of all friends of the Provisional Government. The meeting was held, the annexation papers stating that there were 1,600 present and the royalist papers putting the number at between 700 and 800. The speakers were Mr. Hatch, vice-president of the Provisional Government; Z. S. Spaulding, a large sugar-planter, who was, many years ago, U. S. consul here; Mr. W. R. Castle, a member of the advisory council; Hon. A. F. Judd, chief justice of the supreme court, and Mr. W. G. Smith. Mr. Smith is the editor of the *Hawaiian Star*, which holds very advanced views upon annexation and other political questions. I inclose an account of the meeting from the *Hawaiian Gazette*. The meeting quietly dispersed at 8:30 and there was no disorder of any kind.

On yesterday a protest against the use of force by the United States against their persons or property was presented to me by several gentlemen who, like the other 146 signers, still claim allegiance to our Government. One of the gentlemen, the secretary of the American League, claims to represent 150 members of that body. I inclose a printed copy of the protest. It may become necessary, hereafter, to reply to this protest, as many of its signers are officially connected with the Provisional Government.

On the morning of November 29 I received a letter from Hon. Sanford B. Dole, minister of foreign affairs, which letter I inclose, rescinding the privilege heretofore given to Admiral Skerrett, of landing his troops for drilling purposes. On Friday morning, December 1, I acknowledged the receipt of his letter and informed him that I had transmitted a copy of it to Admiral Irwin for his information and guidance.

In the afternoon of November 29 I received a second communication from Minister Dole, inquiring as to the authenticity of your letter to the President and the intentions of our Government in connection therewith. I inclose a copy of Mr. Dole's letter and of my answer. I should have stated that, on the morning when information of your letter was received, President Dole and Attorney-General Smith called upon me, to know what the United States intended to do. I explained to them my inability at present to comply with their request.

Since then active preparations for defense have been going on. The former palace, now known as the executive building, has been fortified by bags of sand, both in front and around the various porticos. Guns and pistols have been placed in the hands of all who are willing to take them, whether American, foreigners, or natives, and herein lies one of the greatest dangers. Many of those who have received

these weapons, like children with a new toy, are eager to use them; lacking in intelligence and self-restraint and having no property interests at stake, they are liable at any moment to break into mob violence. The Portuguese consul-general, a most intelligent and capable man, called here last night to express his great fears that many of his people would become involved in trouble and disaster, as they had been supplied with arms, and, against his protest, mustered into the volunteer service.

There are over 10,000 Portuguese on the islands of whom one-fourth are in Honolulu. There are over 1,000 in this city of military age. The nationality, however, which, in my judgment, is destined to give most anxiety here is the Japanese, and this because of their aspiration for suffrage. Mr. Irwin, a brother of Admiral Irwin, arrived here yesterday from Japan. He has for many years been the minister of this country at Japan, and negotiated most of the contracts now pending. He is here, he tells me, to protect these contracts. He reports the Emperor of Japan as unwilling to interfere with these islands because of the large interests of our Government. When the contract period is over, the Emperor thinks the Japanese should be accorded the right of suffrage, but admits the propriety of a high educational and property qualification. As there are now 22,000 Japanese here every intelligent observer concedes that this question of suffrage will soon be a very important one.

As to the Queen's safety I do not have any fear at present. There is a telephone in my sleeping room and I have authorized her people to call me up at any hour of the night or day. She also has the privilege, as stated in previous dispatches, of coming here or of going on one of our war vessels.

Aside from my communication with her, in regard to her safety, I have had nothing to say to the Queen or to her representatives since the interview reported in dispatch No. 3 of November 14. There have been various newspaper hints as to the fact of the interview, but none as to the subject-matter thereof. I have made further inquiries as to the Queen's understanding of the English tongue, and find that she is perfectly familiar with it, having been a classmate of Chief-Justice Judd and other prominent citizens.

I received your cipher telegram. My telegram to you was purposely indefinite and obscure, for reasons which you doubtless now understand. I send a cipher telegram to-day by the steamer *Oceanic* covering several of the points above set forth.

After a careful study of my instructions and of all the surroundings I felt it to be my duty to take no further step until I heard from you and the President.

With sentiments of profound regard, I am, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

A GREAT MEETING.

The drill shed filled with enthusiastic men.—An immense throng turns out.—The people's voice is raised in indignant protest against Cleveland and Gresham.—Prominent men thrill a vast audience with their patriotic utterances, and show the fallacy of restoring monarchy.—Text of the speeches in full.

Enthusiasm, cheers, indignation at Gresham's late action, American patriotism, and men with their feelings strung up to the highest pitch of excitement, were the features of Saturday evening's mass meeting. Over 1,200 men were present, and not a dissenting voice among them; men who were not only ready and willing, but anxious to express their sentiments on the question now so near the hearts of all good Americans.

An immense crowd was expected and an immense crowd came. By 7:30 o'clock the hall was crowded and from that time till 8:30 many others came in. When the meeting was over the surging crowd of humanity quietly melted away, each one talking to his companion, whether friend or stranger, about the situation.

On one side of the hall a platform had been erected for the use of speakers. On it were seated Vice-President F. M. Hatch, Col. Z. S. Spalding, W. R. Castle, Chief Justice A. F. Judd, P. C. Jones, W. C. Wilder, and W. G. Smith.

F. M. Hatch, president of the Annexation Club, was the first speaker, and he opened the meeting with a rousing speech. He said:

FELLOW CITIZENS: You have been invited to meet to-night to consider our present political situation. We are confronted by the declaration of Secretary Gresham that royalty must be restored and our Government destroyed. A kind Providence has given us this opportunity to be heard before final action will be taken upon this issue. At present we are proceeding merely upon the newspaper reports which have been received here and which certainly we have a right to discuss. We do not know what action will be taken by the President or by Congress. Certainly any action taken by the Congress of the United States of America can not be resisted by anybody in this community. Let us not be misunderstood or misrepresented by a hostile press; we do not meet here to-night to defy the power of the United States, that would be absurd, gentlemen, nor to villify those at present in charge of the Government of the United States. [Cries of "Hear! Hear!" and applause.]

But we meet with the hope that our words will be heard by Congress before action is taken by that body. There are certain features in the letter of Mr. Gresham to the President which show that he is proceeding upon a false assumption. Let us hope that the distinguished Secretary has been misinformed up to this date. It is certainly our prerogative to point out the false assumptions and to challenge them. Now, chief among those false assumptions is the one which seems to underlie the whole letter, that there has been submitted to the arbitration of the President of the United States the question whether or not we had a right to establish a government in this country. Gentlemen, I challenge that assumption. [Great applause, cheers, and cries of "you're right."] The assumption is false in every respect. [Cheers and applause.]

Let me briefly point out why. Two parties can make a contract, but it requires the consent of three to make a valid arbitration—that of the two parties in interest and the arbitrator. The parties must clearly define the subject-matter of the arbitration. It is absurd to contend that there could be any arbitration by inference or imputation. First, has there been any issue framed; has the Provisional Government submitted to the decision of anybody its right to exist? [Cries of "No!" "No!"] Not one word or one act can be produced in support of that contention. Gentlemen, from the nature of things, a government which started in revolution, though now the government *de jure* as well as *de facto*, could not submit the question of the legality of its existence to any arbitration because its right lay in its might. Having satisfied our consciences as to the justness of our cause we depend upon our might, and are answerable to no other power. [Applause.]

I brand as false the claim that we have put in issue the question whether or not we were proceeding legally or not in overturning a corrupt and rotten monarchy. [Great applause, cheers, and cries of "Hear!" "Hear!"] Second, has the President of the United States, up to this point, pretended to have been acting in a judicial capacity? I say his acts do not justify that assumption. An arbitrator or judge would not interfere with the existing status of the parties. The President of the United States immediately upon gaining his seat lowered the American flag and thereby changed the status of the parties. [Cries of "Hear!" "Hear!"] That was not the act of a judge, gentlemen. Again, has he notified anybody that he was proceeding with a judicial investigation? Has he given any notice that a hearing would be had on such a date? Has he notified anybody the witnesses were being examined? Has he given anybody an opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses or to confront them? Has he given anybody on our side an opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses or to confront them? Has he given anybody on our side the opportunity to be heard? [Cries of "no, no; he never has!"]

Now, we do not need the legal knowledge of that distinguished judge, who is now Secretary of State, to know that no arbitration could stand for a moment in law, however insignificant the matter, which was conducted *ex parte*, without an opportunity to be heard; without an inspection of the evidence which has been produced, or opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. How was the late arbitration conducted in Paris? Did a number of gentlemen get together on the Bering Sea question and in private decide upon that matter? Did they send a private agent off to Bering Sea to look about and scratch the back of the seals [laughter], interview the neighbors and make a report? [Laughter, cheers, and applause.]

Gentlemen, it can hardly be contended that the Provisional Government and we representing the supporters of that Government have submitted our right to

exist to Col. James H. Blount, of Georgia. [Applause.] The President of the United States had the undoubted right, so far as we were concerned, to examine into the status here, the situation of the country, as bearing upon the question whether or not he should continue the negotiations of union pending when he took his seat as President. That was ostensibly the object for which Col. Blount was sent to these shores. We insist that up to this point there has been no judicial investigation in which both parties have been given the opportunity to be heard. [Applause.] And again, as showing conclusively the utter absurdity of the position that this has been an arbitration, could an arbitration of such a nature be possible when the Government of the United States had a treaty pending before it—between it and the power which it is charged was submitting its right to exist to the decision of one man? [Cries of "No, no!"]

We were a power *de facto* then; we were recognized by certain great powers of the world, which made us a power *de jure*, and we were a power having treaty relations with the United States of America. [Applause.] A treaty had been negotiated which bound the Executives of the two nations at the moment President Cleveland took his seat. That treaty awaited ratification to make it final, but it nevertheless was a treaty binding the Executive. Now, gentlemen, I challenge the right of the Chief Executive of that great nation, of his own mere motion, to undo the act of any of his predecessors. [Great applause.] Congress may do it; Congress has the full power; but Grover Cleveland has no more right, legally or morally, to undo the act of Benjamin Harrison than he had to undo any act of Abraham Lincoln. [Great applause and cheers.]

But waiving all those considerations, there remains this fundamental one, that no court of arbitration would have the right to ignore the great question at issue; that is, whether or not Liliuokalani had violated the constitution; had thrown it to the dogs, and had put herself beyond the pale and protection of the law. To ignore all that and decide this great issue upon the petty technicality as to whether or not Mr. Stevens recognized the power of this community five minutes too soon or not, was not in the power of a Judge. [Great applause, and cries of "You're right."] I repeat, there has been no submission to arbitration. Let us, therefore, challenge all false assumptions, gentlemen, and let that challenge go on record. Let us hold the President to the true issue, and then if the legally constituted power of the United States, the power which has the right under the Constitution to declare war, overpowers us, we will go down with our colors flying, and with no misrepresentation possible. Let it be known to the world that if that event takes place it will be because the United States has exercised its power, but not its right. Let us hope that the showing we can make will have the effect upon Congress in shaping its course, and that it will also have its effect upon the distinguished Secretary of State and the Chief Executive of the American Nation. [Great applause.]

No. 203.

W. R. CASTLE.

W. R. Castle was the next speaker. His speech follows:

FELLOW-CITIZENS: We come here to-night to voice our indignant protest. [Cheers, and cries of "Hear! Hear!"] It is well, upon great occasions, for people to assemble and express their united voice, as this meeting to-night will speak. Great occasions demand great meetings like this. The history of the world gives us many memorable instances. The history of Hawaii has shown us that when a great occasion demanded, a public assembly was called, and the voice of that assembly has been listened to. When the arrogance of the monarch, Kalakaua, became too great, the mass meeting of 1887 met, and its voice was heard, and the Monarch yielded.

That monarch proved false. His successor has followed in the same footsteps. The people have been patient; we have waited, we have hoped for better things; but when the attempt was made to sweep our rights from under our feet, to take away the liberties of the subject, the result was the mass meeting of January 16, 1893, and the voice of that meeting, as expressed, resulted in the downfall of the monarchy and in the establishment of the Provisional Government. [Cheers.] The Provisional Government, gentlemen, represents you, and no one else. [Applause.] As it was said by one of the leading men of the United States recently, a few people went on the ships in Boston harbor and threw some tea overboard. Had the question been submitted to the people of the colonies at that time: "Shall the colonies separate from Great Britain?" a great majority of the people of the united colonies would have said no. They were afraid to step in the dark.

I believe the same is true here. We know that the native population of Hawaii was afraid of what seems to them one step in the dark; but the time will come when they will thank God that there were people willing to risk their lives, their property, their all to establish in Hawaii true liberty. [Great applause and cheers.]

Fellow citizens, Hawaii tends towards one goal and only one; that is, union with its mother across the water. [Great applause.]

If to-day the progress of Hawaii is arrested, is delayed, it is simply delay for a short time. We shall go on, and the time will come, and most of us here will see that time, when Hawaii will rest secure in the bosom of its great and good mother. [Cries of "Hear!" cheers and applause.] In olden times there was a man whose wisdom led him to declare that the world was round; that the world went round the sun; that the stars revolved in their courses, and he was met by the mighty power of the Roman Catholic Church, which declared that he was wrong. Gentlemen, did that make any difference with the facts; did that make any delay in the revolving of the spheres? Can Secretary Gresham stop the onward progress of Hawaii? [Cries of "Never!" and applause.] You sent a commission to Washington to ask that Hawaii might be admitted to the Union.

What was the response of the great heart of that people when we went there? The people welcomed us with a thrill throughout the country from one end to the other. [Applause.] And we went on and were welcomed in Washington. But our enemies, of course, have been alert—they have filled the ears of the present administration in Washington with falsehood; they have stuffed the ears of Secretary Gresham, perhaps of the President, with lies as to what is taking place here. Do they know the facts? We are bound to believe that Secretary Gresham and the President of the United States are trying to execute justice; are trying to do what is right. Whether they are doing it, we know, not they. [Cries of "Hear! Hear!" and applause.] They do not know what the facts are, but we do know, and now it is proposed to take away from us the liberty which we have gained. [Cries of "No! No! They never will do it."]

It is proposed to restore the tottering throne, the monarchy of Hawaii. [Cries of "They can't do it! Never!"] Who proposed to do that? The people of the United States? [Cries of "No! No!"] It is proposed by Secretary Gresham; it is proposed by the President; but the people have spoken. What has been their voice? The people of the United States have, with one accord, voiced our sentiments in favor of liberty. Gentlemen, after the remarks of the president of the Annexation Club it is perhaps unnecessary to dilate any further on the constitutionality of the proposed proceeding of the President of the United States.

In all my reading I fail to find anywhere that the President of the United States is authorized to begin a war, and this proposition to restore the Queen to the throne of Hawaii, if carried out, will be an act of war. Then let us stand firm in our right, and if such a step is taken let him be impeached before the Senate of his country. [Cheers and applause.] Let me call your attention to just one specimen of truthfulness in that report. Mr. Gresham tells the President that the people of Hawaii dare not rise to overthrow the present Government, because they will meet the armed forces of the United States. The President of the United States sent out here his commissioner, his "paramount commissioner" [laughter], and the first act of that commissioner was to take down the American flag. Then he stood by to see us tumble.

Well, gentlemen, we didn't tumble worth a cent. [Laughter.] That taking down of the flag was an invitation, and it was so understood by the people of this country, to overturn the best government this country ever had. [Cries of "Hear, hear!" and "It didn't do it!"] The paramount commissioner waited to see the result, and no such result following, thereupon issued his proclamation, and again invited the people to overthrow this Government. Was not the fact of the flag being taken down known to Secretary Gresham? Has not the proclamation that Commissioner Blount issued in Honolulu, inviting rebellion, inviting the overthrow of this Government, threatening the dire vengeance of the United States upon any and all Americans who assisted us—has not that been published broadcast from one end of the United States to another? Has not Secretary Gresham read that proclamation until he knows it by heart?

The second invitation by the commissioner of the United States to overturn the Government failed in its object, and now the Secretary of the United States blinded, I believe, by false information, again proposes to overturn the Government established by the people of this country. [Cries of "Never!" "He won't do it!"] He proposes to take that position and assumes that the people of this country will not oppose it. [Cries of "He can't do it!"]

Gentlemen, the time is coming when we will see that glorious flag, that emblem of the truest liberty the world knows, floating over our heads—the flag of this country. [Great applause and cheers, and a voice in the crowd shouted: "What is the matter with putting it up there now and keeping it there?"] Gentlemen, the people of the United States wish to hear our voice, they wish to hear what we have to say upon this subject, and I hope that the next vessel that goes to the coast will bear an unmistakable voice from us to-night. At the request of the president of this association, I will now offer the following resolution, which I hope will be adopted without one dissenting voice:

Resolution.

Resolved, That we have read with surprise and regret the recommendation of the Secretary of State of the United States to the President, to restore the monarchy lately existing in Hawaii.

Resolved, That we condemn the assumption of the Secretary that the right of the Provisional Government to exist was terminated by his refusal to re-submit to the Senate the treaty of Union pending between the two countries; and also his assumption that the Provisional Government had at that very time submitted the question of its continued existence to the arbitrament of the President or of any other power.

Resolved, That we support to the best of our ability the Provisional Government, in resisting any attack upon it which may be made contrary to the usage of nations.

Z. S. SPALDING.

Mr. Castle was followed by Col. Z. S. Spalding, the speaker of the evening. His remarks were interrupted many times by cheers and applause. He said:

FELLOW CITIZENS: The State Department at Washington having recently made public some of the ancient history of these islands, in which they did me honor of proving my being "an annexationist" as far back as 1868. [Cries of "Good boy!" and cheers.] I feel that I am entitled to attend this meeting. [Cries of "Hear, hear!"] And I also feel that it was no matter to be ashamed of at that date, when I had the honor of being the representative of the great American Republic at these Islands, it is still less my desire now to repudiate those sentiments or falter in my allegiance to the doctrine so ably upheld by, and so intimately connected with the names of Webster, Seward, and Blaine. [Great applause.]

I have great respect for the honorable gentleman who now holds the portfolio of the State Department at Washington. He and I were two humble units in the great mass of loyal men who helped to save the integrity of the Union in the dark days of the civil war. [Cries of "hear, hear."] I can forgive almost any weakness in the judgment of a man whose heart and hand were on the right side in that bloody strife, but I confess it requires a good deal of charity to overlook the proposition that the same spirit which in 1861 animated the defenders of that Christian civilization and advancement, by means of which the United States have outstripped the world, shall now take a back seat or march to the rear, and leave the work of nearly a century of devoted hearts and willing hands in the enlightenment of this people and the improvement of this country to be destroyed by the ruthless hand of superstition and ignorance. [Cheers and applause.]

It is not my intention to measure swords with the honorable Secretary in the discussion of facts relating to the establishment of the present Government. That it was established and has since been maintained in the interests of the whole country and for the purpose of giving the whole people the benefit of an honest and able administration of its affairs is, in my opinion, beyond dispute. I publicly declare that the newspaper statement attributed to Claus Spreckels, to the effect that "under the management of the Revolutionary Government business on the islands has become depressed * * * and would have continued to diminish as long as the Government had existed," etc., is not borne out by the facts. [Applause.]

If Mr. Spreckels's plantations have not been more remunerative during the past year than for any year since the passage of the McKinley bill it has been on account of the dry weather, and not from any fault of the Provisional Government. [Laughter and applause.] Mr. Jaeger is credited with saying for publication, "the Provisional Government has little to commend it. It could not long endure if left to itself." Such statements would have little effect were the parties uttering them known to the people who read their utterances. [Laughter.] I have lived in this country quite as long as Mr. Jaeger, and I challenge any man to name a cabinet during the last twenty-five years the members of which were the superiors, if indeed the equals, of the men who now hold the various offices under the Provisional Government. [Cheers and applause.]

Now, why are we annexationists? I quite agree with my friend, Mr. Spreckels, that under the conditions he names and fears my business as a sugar-planter would not be benefited by having this country come under the laws and restrictions of the United States regarding Chinese and other labor. [Laughter.] If I owned the whole country, and belonged to the sugar trust, I think it very likely I would not want to be annexed. [Laughter.] But, here again, as I am only a unit, and as I believe the future welfare of the country would be better assured by annexation, I am willing to take my chances under the Stars and Stripes, especially as I believe such union would prove a benefit to the country from which we on these islands have drawn all our support. [Great applause.]

We are here this evening to consider the publication of the views of the Secretary

of State, at Washington, and perhaps decide the question as to whether or not we shall give up the idea of annexation. [Cries of "no, no, never."] If the opinion expressed by the honorable Secretary of State could be considered as the voice of the people of the United States, I should advise that we save our breath to cool our porridge. But from the somewhat forcible opposition expressed by the press and public, I am led to believe that the Secretary found the snow coming down the side of the mountain very rapidly after his letter was made public. [Laughter and applause.] Therefore, I am forced to give my opinion that it would be unwise and unadvisable to give up the fight before the back countries are heard from. [Here a voice in the crowd shouted: "Let us give up our guns hot, and cartridge belts empty." Cheers and applause.]

Here I must beg your indulgence for a personal explanation. Secretary Gresham says in his letter: "Mr. Blount states that while in Honolulu he did not meet a single annexationist who expressed his willingness to submit the question to a vote of the people; he did not talk with one on that subject who did not insist that if the islands were annexed suffrage should be so restricted as to give a complete control to the foreigners or whites, while representative annexationists have repeatedly made similar statements to the undersigned." I had the honor, while in Washington, of an interview with the honorable Secretary, and was asked by him to give my views upon the matter quoted. My reply was, that while I did not consider it proper to submit the terms of a treaty to the people before the treaty was made in Hawaii any more than in the United States, I was, and am perfectly willing to say that under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and especially under such restrictions as the representatives of the United States Government might themselves see fit to make, I would allow every native voter with the ordinary qualifications to vote at any and every election to be held. [Applause.]

I may not have been classed with the "representative annexationists" by the honorable Secretary, but as I had been called upon and had given him my opinion, I object to his wholesale denunciation of "annexationists" under the charge that they would rob the natives of any rights natural to them under the circumstances. [Cries of "Hear, hear!" and "Good boy!"] When the time comes for reestablishment of the right of suffrage in this country the native population may depend upon the annexationists to demand for them the privileges of republican citizenship as fully certainly as granted through the great political party to which the honorable Secretary belongs by the grand old State of Mississippi to its citizens. [Laughter and applause.]

I further object to the position taken by the honorable Secretary in the assumption of the right on the part of the President of the United States to arbitrate between the present Government of these islands and any party whomsoever without being specially invited to such arbitration by this Government. [Cries of "Hear!" "Hear!"] And I heartily concur with the resolution you have passed denouncing the assumption by the Secretary of State at Washington, if we are right in our interpretation of the language ascribed to him, that the Provisional Government of Hawaii, or its powers, terminated with his advice to the President—that the treaty of annexation be not returned to the Senate. [Applause.] The Provisional Government was created (to use the Secretary's own words) "To exist until the terms of the union with the United States have been negotiated and agreed upon." So far, the two Governments have fully "negotiated" the terms of union, but no official agreement has been reached. When either party gives notice to the other of failure to agree, it will be, I think, time enough for the Provisional Government to decide whether such failure is positive and complete, or only temporary, and to act as may seem best for the interests of the people it serves. [Cries of "Hear!" "Hear!" and applause.]

At present I can not accept the opinion expressed by the honorable Secretary of State as the decision or will of the people of that great Republic which for nearly a century has fostered the growth upon these islands of an American sentiment that to-day, in its devotion to the stars and stripes, may challenge the loyalty of even the honorable Secretary himself. [Cheers and applause.] Hawaii is the one spot in all the world outside the strict boundaries of the United States where "Americanism" has grown and flourished even under the blighting influences of an effete monarchy. [Great applause.]

Do you ask how this has been accomplished? I answer, through the kindly influences of that great Republic which has been to these islands a "creator bounteous and benign." By the example and precepts of her missionaries she has let in the light of Christianity where all was dark before. By the sunshine of her favors and the rainfall of her financial benefits to us she has enabled us to change the barren hillsides into productive fields and add largely to the food supply of her people. [Applause.] We, in return, have consumed many of her products, and there has arisen an exchange of commodities between the two countries of mutual benefit. That this would go on under a more perfect union I can not doubt; **not**

can I doubt that the interchange would be more generally beneficial than under the monarchical form of government advocated by my friend and naturalized fellow-countryman, who has so strongly expressed himself against this Government.

That the good people of the United States will refuse the admission of Hawaii, under proper regulations, and thus add another star to the galaxy which leads the van in the advance of civilization throughout the world, I can not doubt. [Cheers.] But we must show our right to march in that front rank of civilization, and therefore it behooves us to guard well the structure that has been established, and not to allow its fair fame to be sullied by acts unworthy of the cause in which it was raised. [Cheers and applause.] We believe that the present Government represents the best elements of this country. Let us so show it to the world. [Great applause.]

Mr. HATCH. Gentlemen, I believe that no opportunity should be lost to reiterate the announcement that we have no quarrel with the Hawaiian people, our quarrel is with the Hawaiian monarchy. In this connection I will introduce Chief Justice Judd.

CHIEF-JUSTICE JUDD.

Chief-Justice A. F. Judd followed with the following:

FELLOW CITIZENS: I am glad to be with you this evening. [Cries of "Hear!" "Hear?"] During the last twenty years I have attended but one political meeting before this to-night, and that was in the old Bethel, in 1881. I took a back seat at that time when a few citizens assembled together there to protest against the appointment of Celso C  sar Moreno as minister of foreign affairs of this then kingdom. [Applause.] I come before you and wish to say something because I am a Hawaiian. My father came to this country in 1828. I was born here and received the larger part of my education here. I am a Hawaiian by birth, but an American in blood. [Cries of "Hear!" "Hear!" and applause.] My ancestors date back to 1634, when the first Judd came from England and settled in America. I am proud of that ancestry, and I am proud of the fact that I was born in this country. I love this country. It is my country, and it is the "garden of the gods." [Applause.]

My father devoted his life to this country and I have, thus far, conscientiously to the best interests of the Hawaiian people. [Cries of "Hear!" "Hear!"] And I challenge anyone to say that any act of mine has been knowingly done against the best interests of this country. [Applause.] And if the Queen, the classmate and friend of my early years, had listened to the advice of the justices of the supreme court she would not be where she is over there, but she would still be in the building over yonder. [The palace.] I was loyal to the monarchy and supported the autonomy of this country, and I believed, up to the 14th of January, that it was possible to maintain our independence as a Kingdom. But, gentlemen, I spent from 12 o'clock noon until 4 o'clock in the afternoon in that palace and the events which took place there converted me and made me feel that it was impossible that that state of things could continue any longer. [Applause.]

What was attempted on that day? Was it not to promulgate by force a constitution that would have destroyed the independence of the supreme court? What has been the bulwark of this country? I speak humbly; not for myself, but for my associates and predecessors. Has it not been a court that has sustained the law and the constitution and the rights of the people; an independent judiciary appointed for life, subject only to impeachment? And the constitution that was proposed on the 14th of January, was to make the term of office six years, and the salaries dependent upon such legislature as this last one. Could any white man take the commission under such conditions? Not if his name was Judd. [Applause.] This is not a political meeting. If it were a partisan, political meeting, I should have more respect for the office that I have held for nearly twenty years and stayed away. I was the last person that Col. Blount sought an interview with, and wish to say publicly that not one question did he address to me as to my views with regard to whether the revolution of January 17 was accomplished by the aid of Minister Stevens and the troops of the *Boston*. That subject he did not touch upon. [Cries of "He didn't want to touch upon it!"]

I believe, gentlemen, that it was that mass meeting held in the old armory that settled the question, was it not? [Applause.] And this mass meeting, gentlemen, settles the question that we shall be true and resolute and support the present Government, which is, as brother Hatch has called it, not only the Government *de facto*, but as it has lasted nearly a year, and received the recognition of all the great powers of the world, it is the Government *de jure*. I have sworn to support it, I intend to support it, and, gentlemen, I will only say one thing more, that we will all have to hang together or hang separately. [Laughter and applause.]

W. G. SMITH.

W. G. Smith, editor of the Star, spoke as follows:

FELLOW-CITIZENS: If I have any apology to-night for speaking in this distinguished presence, it is that I am a newcomer to these islands. But I think I may atone for that by standing elbow to elbow to you in any trouble that may come to us [cries of "Hear!" "Hear!" and applause], and in encouraging every man newly arrived on this soil to defend the institutions which you have founded, and help preserve the liberty which you have won. [Applause.] This meeting to-night, in a smaller way, must remind us of those meetings which stirred the blood of Boston and the heart of Philadelphia in the last quarter of the previous century. Then, as now, men were met together to band themselves against a despotism. [Cries of "Hear!" "Hear!" and applause.]

Then, as now, they were met to protest to the mother country that she should not betray and outrage her sons. [Applause.] Then, as now, they were met to pledge their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor in the cause of liberty. [Applause.] It can not be, fellow-citizens, that any man inheriting a drop of that patriotic blood, with any strain of it in his veins, could want to-day to take the place of old King George and coerce the men of his own flesh, of his own flag, and of his own speech because they are Americans enough not to bow down before a throne. [Great applause and cheers.] I do not believe, fellow-citizens, that any man who has taken that position has a right to Revolutionary sires; but I thank God that there are Americans who have spoken since the infamies of Gresham who have patriot blood and ancestry; and I thank God again that if they get the opportunity to speak in the way they would they will be heard in the earthquake voice of majorities like those of Pennsylvania and New York. [Great applause.]

Fellow-citizens, we are few, but it was said of old that one with God is a majority; and surely that cause which has Christian civilization on its side, which stands for Christianity and morality as well as liberty, will have Almighty aid. [Applause.] I say, gentlemen, we are few. Some of us are Hawaiians of American descent; some of us are Americans by birth, inheritors of Lexington and Concord [cries of "Hear!" "Hear!"]; some of us are Germans, whose sturdy manliness was never known to compromise with an enemy in arms [applause]; some of us are British by birth and inherit, perhaps, the British love of constitutional liberty, not overawed by respect to thrones; some, again, are of Latin blood, and among them centuries of subject life has not quenched the spark of democratic aspiration [applause]; but though we are of many bloods, yet we are of one mind [great applause], and that one mind means loyalty to the Provisional Government no less in its hour of peril than in its hour of apparent triumph. [Great applause.]

If we are dispossessed, I take it that it must be by the armed forces of the United States, illegally and unconstitutionally ordered for a coercive purpose and triumphing over such legal as well as patriotic opposition as our policy may see fit to put in line. Let us have hope and faith that if this outrage comes to us the time will be when the United States, in truer, wiser, and more patriotic hands, will undo the wrong and repair the infamy. [Cries of "Hear, hear!" and applause.] I want to say in closing that it is our duty, forgetting all past dissensions and minor differences, to close in solid ranks about the Provisional Government. [Great applause.] We need to do this for two reasons: One, to suppress all domestic insurrection with a hand of iron, and the other, to compel Mr. Cleveland, if he intends to follow out the course so far outlined, to do it by a violation of the Constitution, which confers the act of war upon Congress alone, and thus expose himself to merited impeachment. [Great applause.]

We can not fire upon the American flag nor upon the men in blue, our brothers and our countrymen, but we can so resist the progress of the American troops as to make their capture of this Government by President Cleveland's orders an infraction of the Constitution. [Great applause.] And that, fellow citizens, I believe we have the power to do, and not only the power to do, but the willingness to do. [Great and continued applause.] Here some one in the crowd called for three cheers for Mr. Smith, which were given with a will.

P. C. JONES.

P. C. Jones was the last speaker. He said:

Grover Cleveland has been heard from. [Laughter.] The American people are being heard from. [Laughter.] The next Congress is yet to be heard from. [Laughter and applause.] I think that Grover Cleveland in completing his plan to restore the monarchy here should have done one more thing, and that is, he should have issued an order that all four of the original members of the executive council of the Provisional Government should be shot on the day of the restoration. (Laughter.)

That in itself would have rounded out the whole scheme and would have afforded a great deal of pleasure to some royalists. [Laughter.]

Our motto you know, is "Liberty or death" [great applause] with, as the fellow said, a very strong preference for the former. [Laughter.] In thinking over the question, fellow-citizens, there is one thing that comes to me very clearly, and that is, our duty at this time to the Provisional Government [cries of "Stick to it!"] is to stand by it and support the executive. They are the men who are bearing the brunt and the burden and the strain of the day. [Applause.] We must help them with our arms, with our hands, with our tongues, with our prayers, and with every instrument that we can serve them with. We should help them. [Cries of "We will."] They are good men and true. I think the time has been taken up with speeches and I must be very brief, fellow-citizens. In 1884 when Grover Cleveland was first chosen President of the United States it was said that he obtained his election by three R's, Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion. You all know the story, and it is unnecessary for me to tell it to you.

To-day, fellow-citizens, Grover Cleveland stands impeached before the American colony of Hawaii by three R's, and I hope that very soon the U. S. Congress will also impeach him unless he retracts. [Cheers and applause.] Now those three R's are the Restoration of a Rotten Royalty. [Laughter and applause.] But, fellow-citizens, we are not alone in condemning this; there are sixty million of our countrymen in our own country backing us up. [Cheers.] And I furthermore believe, fellow-citizens, that God Almighty is with us. [Cheers.] I believe that on the 17th of January He was with us, and I believe He has been with us ever since; and in His own time and in His own way He will let us out into a large place. And so I say let us thank God, and take courage. [Cheers and applause.]

This ended the speeches for the evening. Mr. Hatch again read the resolution, and asked all those in favor of it to signify it. A mighty "aye," that almost shook the building, went up. The contrary minded were then called for, and death-like stillness was the result.

Some one called for three cheers for the Provisional Government, and they were given with a will, and, with a last tiger. The meeting broke up, and one of the most enthusiastic, as well as one of the largest assemblages Honolulu has ever witnessed was over.

[Inclosure 2.]

CITIZENS' PROTEST.

Minister Willis addressed by the people.—He is reminded that interference by his Government will be an act of war.—Full text of the protest.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, December 1, 1893.

His Excellency ALBERT S. WILLIS,

*Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
of the United States of America:*

SIR: The undersigned, American residents of Honolulu, in the Island of Oahu, one of the Hawaiian Islands, respectfully represent to your excellency that they are citizens of the United States of America and have done nothing whereby to forfeit or waive their full legal and constitutional rights as such citizens.

That the undersigned made their residences and homes and acquired and owned property in the Hawaiian Islands, relying on the rights secured and guaranteed by the Hawaiian constitutions of 1852 and of 1865, which rights were confirmed and enlarged by the constitution of 1887.

That on the 14th day of January last the undersigned learned that it was the determination of Liliuokalani, then Hawaiian sovereign, to disregard and annul the rights of life, liberty, and property guaranteed, secured, confirmed and enlarged by the said Hawaiian constitutions, and that she publicly proclaimed her determination to repudiate the obligations imposed upon her by virtue of her oath of office as such sovereign to support and maintain the Constitution of the Hawaiian Islands, and publicly announced her intention to govern this country pursuant to her arbitrary, despotic will, to be proclaimed by a public manifesto which she called a new constitution.

That a meeting of many citizens of Honolulu was held upon the afternoon of said day, which was attended by John F. Colburn, then minister of the interior, and Arthur P. Peterson, then attorney-general, by whom it was then publicly stated that such was the determination and intention of said Liliuokalani, and that, if assisted by the citizens, they would oppose the same.

That on said 14th day of January the then legally constituted authorities of the Hawaiian Islands were undoubtedly and avowedly incapable of controlling the elements of the anarchy which was proclaimed and intended by said Liliuokalani, or of preventing impending mob violence, or of keeping the public peace.

That in consequence and by reason of the premises a committee of public safety was chosen at said meeting and on the following Monday, at a mass meeting of the citizens of Honolulu, the said committee was authorized to take measures requisite for the public safety; that, in conformity therewith, on the 17th day of said January the present Government of the Hawaiian Islands was established and proclaimed, and has since governed and controlled the Hawaiian Islands, having been recognized by all foreign representatives in Honolulu, and having diplomatic and consular representatives abroad, especially in the United States of America, who have been and still are recognized and treated as the only accredited representatives of the said Government.

That a treaty of annexation was negotiated with said Government by and in behalf of the U. S. Government, and that no public notice has been given to the undersigned of any intention on the part of the U. S. Government to break off diplomatic relations with the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, or to do any acts of war or hostility to the said Government.

That no such acts of war or hostility can now be done without endangering the lives and property of the undersigned, and of their families, relatives, and friends in the Hawaiian Islands.

That owing to the insular situation of this country there would be no opportunity for the undersigned to take such steps and do such things as would secure the safety of the lives of themselves, their wives and children, and of their property in case of such acts of war or hostility.

And the undersigned hereby solemnly and respectfully protest to your excellency, and to Grover Cleveland, President of the United States, and to Walter Q. Gresham, Secretary of State, and to Hilary A. Herbert, Secretary of the Navy, and to Rear-Admiral John Irwin, commanding the United States naval forces now in the waters of the Hawaiian Islands, and to all others concerned, that any such acts of war or hostility if taken, attempted, or announced in the time of profound peace now existing between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands, or without any full, formal, and timely announcement thereof, will and would cause all concerned in authorizing the same to be held responsible for all the consequences that may ensue therefrom, not only before Almighty God and in the forum of conscience, but by all sanctioned rules and observances of civilized nations in their dealing with each other, and will and would be in violation of the rights of the undersigned, secured and belonging to them as citizens of the United States of America.

We have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servants and fellow-citizens.

[Inclosure No. 3.]

Mr. Dole to Mr. Willis.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 29, 1893.

SIR: On the 7th of August last permission was given by the Government, through the office of the American legation, to Rear-Admiral J. S. Skerrett, commanding U. S. naval force, Pacific Station, at his request to land the crews of the ships under his command for battalion drill when desired.

The Government now wishes to rescind the said privilege in its indefinite character and to return to the former practice under which a request was made at each occasion when the privilege of landing men under arms was desired.

I have the honor to request that this modification of the present arrangement be transmitted through your office to Rear-Admiral Irwin, commanding U. S. naval force, Pacific Station.

With sentiments of the highest consideration and esteem.

I have, etc.,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

[Inclosure No. 4.]

*Mr. Dole to Mr. Willis.*DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 29, 1893.

SIR: Having received from our minister at Washington, Hon. Lorin A. Thurston, accredited to the Government of the United States of America, information of an official letter from Secretary of State, Hon. Walter Q. Gresham, to President Cleveland, which is of an unfriendly nature toward this Government, recommending hostile action by the President towards us, alleged copies of which letter have been published in the American press, I desire to inquire of you whether the published reports of such letter of Secretary Gresham are substantially correct? If they are, I feel that it is due this Government that it should be informed of the intentions of your Government in relation to the suggestions contained in the said letter of Mr. Gresham.

Accept the assurance of the profound consideration and high esteem with which I have, etc.,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

[Inclosure 5.]

*Mr. Willis to Mr. Dole.*LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, December 2, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 29th ultimo inquiring as to the authenticity of a letter of Hon. W. Q. Gresham, Secretary of State, upon the Hawaiian question, and stating that if the "published reports of such letter are substantially correct" you "feel that it is due this (your) Government that it should be informed of the intentions of your (my) Government in relation to the suggestions contained in the said letter of Mr. Gresham."

As to the letter of Mr. Gresham, I have the honor to call your attention to the fact, as shown by you, that it is a communication from a member of the Cabinet to the President of the United States, and, being a domestic transaction, is not the subject of diplomatic representation.

Answering your note further I must express my sincere regret that it is not in my power at present to inform you of the views or intentions of the United States. The President earnestly desires a speedy settlement of your troubles, and will, in my opinion, be ready to make known his purposes as soon as he is informed of certain matters recently submitted to him.

With high regard, I am, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 9.]

DECEMBER 5, 1893.

In this dispatch Mr. Willis speaks solely of the difficulty experienced in translating the naval cipher which he is obliged to use and suggests that he be furnished with a simpler code.

[Confidential.]

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 10.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 9, 1893. (Received—.)

SIR: On the morning of December 5 C. B. Wilson, who was the marshal of the Queen at the time of her dethronement, called upon me.

I asked him what business he was now in. He said he was doing nothing; he was "awaiting results." I asked: "What results?" He said: "The restoration of the Queen." I asked him where he got any such information. He said: "Nowhere," but he hoped for it. I then turned the conversation to other subjects.

As he was leaving he drew from his pocket a document and gave it to me, saying that he did not know whether it was proper or not and left.

Upon examining the paper I found that it was a detailed "method of procedure" upon the restoration of the Queen, a copy of which I inclose.

I endeavored to have him call on the same afternoon, but he could not be found. On the following morning Mr. Mills, whom I asked to find him, saw him at about 10 o'clock, and he said he would come immediately to see me and started toward the legation. He did not reach here for half an hour. My opinion is that he consulted several parties before coming here.

Upon reaching the legation an interview followed, a copy of which I inclose.

It will be seen that although claiming to be the author of the document, a claim which is doubtful, he finally admitted that it had been submitted to and approved by the Queen, by her attorney, and by all the members of her former ministry, all of whom had received copies.

An analysis of the list of special advisers, whether native or foreign, is not encouraging to the friends of good government or of American interests. The Americans who for over half a century held a commanding place in the councils of state, are ignored, and other nationalities, English especially, are placed in charge. This is true both of the special list of advisers and of the supplementary list. If these lists had been selected by Wilson himself, no special importance would attach to them, but it would seem from the facts that it is a list which has been approved after consultation with leading royalists and most probably with the approval of the Queen.

With high regard I am, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 10.]

PROPOSED COURSE OF PROCEDURE.

Immediately on receiving information officially or otherwise that Her Majesty the Queen, with Her Government as of the 17th day of January, 1893, is to be restored to its former prestige as the permanent Government of the Hawaiian Islands, Her Majesty's Cabinet as of said date will at once call a cabinet meeting for the purpose of considering on and preparing a course of action to be pursued under the circumstances, and adopting such course as will be the best means of securing protection to Her Majesty and Her Government, and the security of life and property generally to the residents of the Kingdom, and the perfect maintenance of law and order throughout the Islands, together with such other matters incident to the restoration as Her Majesty's Cabinet may deem necessary and advisable, so that the laws of the Kingdom may and can be constitutionally enforced, and all unnecessary bloodshed and loss of life through possible fanatical opposition be avoided.

Those possible events should be provided for by the discussion of matters of such a complicated nature and of such far-reaching consequences, in a calm and sober way, prior to the event. None but the best results may be looked for, and if carefully and calmly reasoned out the highest success should be the result; while if left to the last moment for discussion and action, hasty conclusions may bring disappointment, failure, and possibly even serious disaster.

After Her Majesty's cabinet have decided upon a plan and course of procedure they shall invite to their counsels, in a body, the following list of tried and trusty

friends of the monarchy and nation, to act with as advisers and assistants on all matters taking place during the restoration of Her Majesty and her Government to the standing from which they were so unjustly forced until the natural order and tranquillity of former times shall be once more established, and Her Majesty's Government be once more recognized as the lawful and regular Government of the Hawaiian people.

These persons named as advisers and assistants will meet with the cabinet for the purpose of considering, suggesting, and amending, if necessary, and finally approving and adopting the plans laid before them by the cabinet for the attainment of the previously-mentioned objects. After final action by the united meeting the cabinet will at once proceed to lay the result before Her Majesty for her approval, the advisers and assistants meanwhile remaining assembled, to await the return of Her Majesty's cabinet after their meeting with Her Majesty. On their return they shall report the result of their conference with Her Majesty to the meeting, and the joint meeting will then consider and approve it. Upon which, having by vote placed the execution of the approved plans in the hands of the executive, the meeting will adjourn subject to call by the cabinet, they in the meantime to place themselves individually in its hands for orders or for counsel as the executive may require or direct.

The preceding propositions are made in the event of the United States Government, through its officials, causing and compelling the Provisional Government to surrender unconditionally and proceeding to the restoration of Her Majesty's Government as it was on the 17th day of January, 1893, possibly coupled with a request or a recommendation to mercy and leniency on behalf of those who took part as principals in the overthrow of the Queen's Government on that date.

In the event of such restoration taking place in order that the details may be properly attended to, and that an assurance may be given that law and order will be maintained, and that the Constitutional Government of Her Majesty Queen Liliuokalani be once more established on an assured basis, the following important details must be carried out while at the same time having due regard to all recommendations of leniency made by the United States Government.

(If it does not conflict with their instructions from their home Government, the U. S. commander in chief should be requested by Her Majesty's Government to bring and keep his forces on shore, in quarters to be provided for them, till Her Majesty's Government has been fully reorganized and feels itself in a proper condition to maintain law and order; and also, if not in conflict with his instructions from home, that he be asked by Her Majesty's Government to direct that the place and hour of surrender by the Provisional Government and its forces to him and his forces be at 10 o'clock a. m. on _____, the day of _____, 1893, at Palace Square, where they will deliver up to him the possession of the Government and its buildings and archives, and hand over to him all the arms and munitions of war delivered up to them on the 17th day of January, 1893, by Her Majesty's Government, and all others since obtained by them or which have been in their possession since, and surrender all their officers and men to him as prisoners to be subsequently turned over to Her Majesty's Government, to be dealt with by a court specially appointed for that purpose; also the turning over of Government arms and munitions of war, prisoners, etc., by the United States Government to Her Majesty's Government.)

Detail for Consideration and Adoption.

I. Proclamation by the Queen's Government of their reassumption of the control of the Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

II. Appointment of Commander-in-Chief and staff.

III. Proclamation of Martial Law and the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

IV. Calling on all loyal citizens and well-wishers of the Government to register their names for service at _____ office; Enrollment of Volunteers.

V. Surrender of all arms and ammunition in private hands, and the prohibition of all sale and transfer of arms and ammunition other than by direction of the Commander-in-Chief.

VI. Taking possession of all Government Buildings and other places necessary by the Queen's forces and placing guards therein.

VII. Proclamation prohibiting the departure of coasting vessels or other vessels to the other Islands.

VIII. Reappointment of all officials and the filling of vacancies.

IX. Arrest of all persons implicated or concerned in the late overthrow.

X. Custody and care of all prisoners made under authority of the above paragraph and those handed over by the U. S. forces.

XI. Receiving of all arms and munitions of war and other Government property surrendered to U. S. forces by the P. G. forces.

XII. Despatch vessels to the other Islands to proclaim the Queen's Government and make all necessary changes and arrests.

We hereby certify that the above thirteen (13) pages have this day been compared with the original type-written four (4) pages and are an exact copy both in words and punctuation.

Witness our hands this 5 Dec., 1893 at 2.30 p. m.

ALBERT S. WILLIS,
E. E. & M. P., U. S. A.
ELLIS MILLS,
Consul General of the U. S.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 10.]

Q. In the paper you left with me yesterday mention is made of certain parties to be invited to your council. You did not give any list.—A. I have the list in my pocket.

Q. Did you intend to leave it with me the other day?—A. No.

Q. Have you any objection to my reading it?—A. No.

(Reading:) Prince David, Prince Cupid, S. Parker, C. P. Jankia, J. H. Boyd.

Q. Who is J. H. Boyd?—A. Clerk in the Interior Department.

(Reading:) J. Richardson, A. Fernandez—that is Mr. Richardson, of Maui?

A. Yes; Richardson and Fernandez are selected. They would be called upon to be present [having a check \checkmark mark].

Q. Then among those that would be called upon to be present at any meeting would be Richardson and Fernandez?—A. Yes. (Reading:) J. F. Colburn, C. White, Hon. Alex. Robertson.

Q. What does the round mark \oplus mean near the name?—A. That they have been Government officers.

(Reading:) W. R. Holt, P. D. Kellett—he has a round mark.

A. He is a clerk.

(Reading:) W. Aylett, Kaunamo, Kanuokano, C. Maile.

A. He is not an officer—the mark ought to be rubbed out.

(Reading:) P. Woods.

A. He is a Government officer.

(Reading:) C. Nolein (no mark), J. Cummins, J. E. Bush (mark \checkmark), W. R. Wilcox, Joseph Nawahi, C. L. Hopkins (he is marked \checkmark), Bergemann, G. E. Boardman.

A. He was deputy collector of customs.

(Reading:) J. Testa, H. B. Defrees, S. Dwight, J. D. Holt—he has a round mark.

A. He is a Government officer.

(Reading:) H. Poor, J. L. Kaulakou—he has a round mark—Kahaomi, there is no mark, Alapi, H. Smith, Carl Widdeman. The only names that have check (\checkmark) marks opposite them are John Richardson, A. Fernandez, Kellet, Sam'l K. Pira, Kaluomano, C. L. Hopkins, J. E. Bush, J. L. Kaulokou.

A. Those are all I have selected.

Q. I see you have a second list.—A. Yes; that is the foreign list.

(Reading:) J. O. Carter (check), F. A. Schaefer (check), John H. Phillips (check), J. E. Quinn (check), Dr. Geo. Trousseau (check), J. Campbell (check), C. J. McCarty (check), T. R. Lucas (check), R. More (check).

A. Those with checks are my selection.

(Reading:) P. Neumann, McIntyre, W. H. Rommel, C. W. Ashford, R. F. Bickerton. Is that the judge?

A. Yes.

(Reading:) J. W. Robertson, Daniel Logan, Lloyd A. P. Peterson, E. Narvie, Rickard, Fred. Harrison, W. F. Love, Maj. Seward, W. Cunningham, E. S. Cunha, H. A. Widemann, A. P. Cleghorn, W. G. Irwin, J. B. Peterson, T. R. Walker (British vice consul), Marquise, W. A. Whiting, Crowley, L. G. Levey, C. O. Berger, J. Kenyon, Capt. Jno. Ross, Geo. F. Ross, sr., E. B. Thomas, T. B. Walker, J. F. Bowler, F. Wundenburg. These are foreign names that you had picked?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you pick them yourself?—A. I picked them out to propose to the cabinet.

Q. Who prepared this paper?—A. Kenyon, who was my former secretary and clerk, did the typewriting from the copy I furnished him.

Q. Do I understand that you drew up this without consultation with any other person?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you have any intimation from any person in the world that the Queen would be restored?—A. I had not.

Q. This is your own work entirely?—A. It is.

Q. You are a pretty good lawyer if you drew this up. This is your verbiage?—A. Yes, sir.

- Q. Have you ever studied law?—A. No.
 Q. Did anybody see this?—A. Mr. Peterson.
 Q. Did he aid you?—A. No.
 Q. Who else saw it?—A. Peterson, Paul Neumann, and the Queen saw it.
 Q. When did the Queen see this?—A. The day before your arrival. She saw the original four months ago.
 Q. This has been a long-pending matter, then?—A. Yes.
 Q. Did you have any authority from the Queen to do it?—A. No.
 Q. Did she approve of all this?—A. Yes.
 Q. Who was present?—A. My wife.
 Q. Yourself and your wife were present when you submitted this to the Queen—the original paper, of which this is a copy—and she approved it?—A. Yes.
 Q. What do you mean by saying “to be dealt with by a court especially appointed for that purpose?” Was it a court within or without the law?—A. A court under martial law.
 Q. I see one of your details calls for the “suspension of habeas corpus and trial by martial law?”—A. Yes.
 Q. What is meant in clause 7 by “prohibiting the departure of sailing vessels?”—A. To prevent carrying news to excite the people on the other islands.
 Q. Did you discuss with the Queen as to the time—how long—martial law ought to last?—A. No.
 Q. What do you mean by the “reappointment of officials and filling of vacancies,” in clause 8?—A. The reappointment of those who had been dismissed by the Provisional Government.
 Q. What do you mean by “filling the vacancies?” Take the case of Mr. Dole, would you consider all those offices vacated?—A. Yes.
 Q. Section 9. How about the arrest of “all persons concerned in the late movement”?—A. We propose to arrest all leaders in the revolution.
 Mr. WILLIS. I took this paper. I do not intend that you should draw any inference whatever from that. I am surprised to hear you say you are the sole author of this paper. My idea was that you had been in consultation with others. It seems strange that you should have written this without any knowledge of what the United States meant to do. That you may not misunderstand me I now return the paper. I did not know at the time what its contents were. I wished to inquire from you in regard to the authorship, etc. I would not have taken it had I known its contents.
 Q. You say you gave a copy to Mr. Paul Neumann. Is he now the Queen’s attorney?—A. He is now and always has been. I gave, also, a copy to Mr. Peterson and other members of the cabinet.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 11.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 14, 1893.

SIR: The day set apart by the President’s proclamation as a day of thanksgiving was appropriately observed by the American citizens residing in Honolulu. The customary newspaper notices from the U. S. legation were inserted and services were held in the Central Union and St. Andrew’s churches.

Very respectfully,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 12.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 14, 1893.

SIR: Your cipher telegram of the 2d instant was delivered to me by Capt. Munger of the revenue cutter *Corwin* this Thursday morning, December 14, at about 6:30 o’clock. I gave it to Admiral Irwin within a half-hour. He and his secretary have been engaged in deciphering

it up to this time, 3 p. m. The steamship *Mariposa* was to leave at 12 m., but the agents voluntarily offered to detain her until 5 p. m., which offer I accepted in the hope that after reading your telegram I might answer it.

In view of the length of time required to translate the naval cipher, I desire to most respectfully renew the suggestion made in my dispatch, No. 9, of December 5, that the State Department cipher or the one which I heretofore inclosed to you be hereafter used.

The excitement consequent upon the unexpected arrival of the *Corwin* is intense throughout the city. The President's message, which was published this morning, has increased the excitement, but I hope no immediate outbreak will occur.

With high regard, very respectfully,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 13.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 14, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Department dispatch, No. 5, inclosing two copies of the report of the electrical congress held in Chicago August 19, 1893, in the matter of units of electrical measure.

Very respectfully,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

[Confidential.]

No. 14.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 18, 1893.

SIR: Your cipher instructions of December 2 were received as translated at 3 p. m. Thursday, the 14th instant. An arrangement was immediately made for an interview with the Queen for Saturday, December 16 at 9 a. m.

Mr. J. O. Carter was invited to be present. Mr. Carter, as stated in my dispatch No. 3, of November 14, is a brother of the late Mr. H. A. P. Carter, who was the Hawaiian minister to the United States. He is the president and manager of the incorporated company of "C. Brewer & Co.," which does a large general mercantile and commission business, and is agent for a number of large sugar plantations. He is conceded by all factions to be a man of great intelligence and strict integrity. He is a native Hawaiian, but of American parentage.

At the appointed hour the Queen and Mr. Carter came, and the interview was, with their consent, reported stenographically by Mr. Mills, our consul-general.

I inclose the report, verified by the Queen and Mr. Carter. I also send a copy of a part of the interview with the Queen, reported in my dispatch No. 3, of November 14, which is also verified by the Queen, marked A.

Mr. Mills' report includes all that was said. It will be observed that no restrictions were placed upon the Queen or upon Mr. Carter, the object being to secure a full and unreserved expression of views. This interview was held at the legation.

Very respectfully,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

The Queen was informed that the President of the United States had important communications to make to her and she was asked whether she was willing to receive them alone and in confidence, she being assured that this was for her own interest and safety. She answered in the affirmative.

I then made known to her the President's sincere regret that, through the unauthorized intervention of the United States, she had been obliged to surrender her sovereignty, and his hope that, with her consent and cooperation, the wrong done to her and to her people might be redressed. To this she bowed her acknowledgments.

I then said to her: "The President expects and believes that when reinstated you will show forgiveness and magnanimity, that you will wish to be Queen of all the people, both native and foreign born, that you will make haste to secure their love and loyalty, and to establish peace, friendship, and good government." To this she made no reply. After waiting a moment I continued:

DECEMBER 16, 1893.

Mr. WILLIS (addressing the Queen). I sent word yesterday asking you to come this morning and to bring Mr. Carter, whom you had mentioned in a previous interview as one of your friends. His was the first name given to me in the only interview we have had. My idea was to have some one present as your friend, who could hear what I wish to say to-day.

(Addressing Mr. Carter, Mr. Willis said:)

Mr. Carter, before having any further conversation it is proper I should make known to you what occurred at the previous interview. On the 13th of November I sent word to the Queen asking if she would come here, as there would be less publicity than if I went to her house. She complied, came here with Mr. Robertson, and a conversation ensued the substance of which I have made known to the President. I will read what I have written as an official report to the President, as leading up to the present interview, and as I read [speaking to the Queen] if there is any portion of the interview as given that you think is incorrect do not hesitate to stop me and make such changes as you desire, although it has been already submitted.

[The report in question was at this point read to the Queen by Mr. Willis. It is appended hereto, marked A.]

Mr. WILLIS. I wish to ask you now, and I ask you to deliberate well before answering, whether the views expressed at that time, as read to you now, have been in any respect modified since that conversation?

The QUEEN. They have not.

Mr. WILLIS. You still adhere to your judgment, as then expressed, that all of those persons should be punished according to the law under the constitution of 1887, which is that they should be punished with capital punishment and their property confiscated?

The QUEEN. I feel that if any change should be made that they must not be permitted to remain in the country, and that their property should be confiscated. That is my view.

Mr. CARTER. You do rescind so much of that interview as pronounced upon them the death penalty?

The QUEEN. I do in that respect.

Mr. CARTER. You feel that their remaining in the country would be a constant source of trouble to you and your people?

The QUEEN. I do. I think I mentioned at the time that should they be permitted to remain, that as they have once committed treason and this being the second offense, that the next time would be dangerous for the community and the people. I think I said that in the other conversation.

Mr. CARTER. In general terms, then, you feel that the continued living in this community of these persons who were guilty of the act of 1887, and the act of the 17th of January, would be dangerous and a constant menace to your people?

The QUEEN. I do. I feel also that if they were sent away they should never be permitted to return—they or their children.

Mr. CARTER. Unless you exercised clemency; or would you pronounce against them definitely now?

The QUEEN. I feel so; that they should be permanently banished, and their children.

Mr. WILLIS. The present Provisional Government while in existence has created certain obligations. Would you consent that all such obligations assumed in the proper course of administration should be assumed and paid by you?

Mr. CARTER. May I make it clearer? The minister wishes to know if the obligations the Provisional Government has entered into under the law, you would be willing that your Government should assume and be responsible for those obligations.

The QUEEN. Yes.

Mr. CARTER. I want to make matters clear. I think they have been careful as a rule to observe statutory provisions, but there have been exigencies that demanded actions that are entirely outside statutory provisions—appropriations made, moneys expended. The question is, how far the new Government should be responsible for such acts.

Mr. WILLIS. That is the question to which I desire an answer. Whether, in the exercise of their discretion, they have even adopted measures that may not be strictly conformable to the statutory law of the land, but if the money has been expended for the benefit of the people in the matter of roads or in any other way, and not put into their private pockets. If these expenditures have been of a public character, and there is no charge of corruption, would they be recognized, whether strictly in conformity with the statutory law or not?

The QUEEN. I think such expenditures are legal. I would recognize them.

Mr. CARTER. There has been a very heavy expenditure for military.

Mr. WILLIS. That is a question I wish explicitly answered. Grant that there has been; would you or would you not consider that an expenditure in the proper course of administration?

The QUEEN. I have thought the matter over; but I felt that the confiscation of the properties belonging to these parties would cover.

Mr. CARTER. You believe that persons should be held in their estates liable for such matters—military, police, and other expenditures of like nature?

The QUEEN. I do.

Mr. CARTER. I want to say a word, I have never said one word to Her Majesty on the subject. These questions are entirely new to me.

Mr. WILLIS. It is entirely proper for you to ask such questions as you have. Any question that brings out the exact views of Her Majesty is entirely proper. I understand [speaking to the Queen] then, in answer to the last question, that you would be willing to give an unqualified agreement that all obligations created by the Provisional Government in the ordinary course of administration should be assumed, but that as to the expenditure for police and military defense you would leave the cost of that to be met out of property confiscated from those who were engaged in the revolution? Is that right?

The QUEEN. Yes.

Mr. WILLIS. I understand from you that you would be unwilling to give a pledge that would absolutely prevent the adoption of any measure of proscription or punishment for what has been done in the past, as to those setting up and supporting the Provisional Government. I understand you to be unwilling to give such a pledge?

The QUEEN. I do not understand.

Mr. WILLIS. I understand from the fact that you have affirmed our previous conversation, and from your conversation to-day, that you would not be willing to grant absolute amnesty both as to persons and property to those who have either supported or who have aided in setting up the Provisional Government. That you feel you could not do it?

The QUEEN. I feel I could not do it for the safety of our subjects.

Mr. CARTER. That is, that the continued presence of these people is a continued menace?

Mr. WILLIS. Do you adopt Mr. Carter's words?

The QUEEN. I do.

Mr. CARTER. I would like to make one remark here. Do I understand your Majesty that this matter is one that you may personally decide—that it is not one that you can commit to the ministers that you may appoint?

Mr. WILLIS. I am not instructed to ask such views. It is the views of the Queen herself I wish to ascertain. I have asked you to come here so that there can be no mistake in the matter. I am authorized, directly instructed and absolutely required to know three things—two of which I have asked, and I am now about to ask the third. It is this: Whether in the event of a restoration it would be a restoration under the existing constitution of the country or under a different constitution?

The QUEEN. I believe it would be better to have a government under a new constitution that would be more suited to the present times and to the future. May I add—

Mr. WILLIS. Anything at all. There is no restriction upon what you may say.

The QUEEN. That it would be one that would give the same privileges to my subjects as to the foreign subjects in my country. That they should receive the same advantages as the foreigners of which they have been deprived since 1887.

Mr. WILLIS. If I understand you the objection you have to the constitution of 1887 is the property qualification in voting for nobles, by which the native population is largely excluded from suffrage.

The QUEEN. That is correct.

Mr. WILLIS. Is there any other objection to that constitution?

The QUEEN. That is the principal objection. In the constitution I intended to promulgate, I changed the time of the term of the chief justice to six years, because I felt that if it were a life appointment that there are no bounds by which whoever holds the office—there would be no bounds by which he would carry on. There would be no limit to his actions.

Mr. WILLIS. In your remark as to the supreme court, do you limit it to the chief justice or does it include all the supreme court?

The QUEEN. All of them.

Mr. WILLIS. You mean not only the chief justice, but your judgment is that all of the supreme court should be appointed for six years?

The QUEEN. Yes; but if they proved themselves correct in their deportment they may be appointed over again for another six years.

Mr. WILLIS. How are their salaries to be determined?

The QUEEN. It would not affect the salary.

Mr. WILLIS. The salary would remain as at present?

The QUEEN. Yes.

Mr. WILLIS. The reason I ask you was that there has been some rumor that the question of salary was to be left to the legislature.

The QUEEN. I think the legislature would appropriate the sum.

Mr. CARTER. The minister wishes to know whether the salary they entered the office with would be the salary they would continue to receive?

The QUEEN. Yes.

Mr. CARTER. The idea is that they are not to be reduced to submit to the will of the legislature.

Mr. WILLIS. Is it your idea that the salaries they receive at the time of their appointment shall not be subject to change by the legislature or other action during the term of six years?

The QUEEN. Yes. These questions may be submitted to the cabinet.

Mr. CARTER. That is another question. The minister wishes to get at your thought.

Mr. WILLIS. You are the only one now authorized to speak for your Government. In the conversation you have had to-day in the presence of Mr. Carter, you fully comprehend the meaning of all that has been said, and all that you have said, and you adhere to it?

The QUEEN. I do.

Mr. WILLIS. You adhere to it?

The QUEEN. I do.

Mr. WILLIS. When this is written out and you have made such changes as you deem proper, I will ask you to sign it. When signed, it will be submitted to the President. Is there anything further you desire to say at the present time?

The QUEEN. I wish to mention, speaking of the new constitution, that it would require some changes. The new constitution I wish to make up would require more members.

Mr. WILLIS. Of the legislature?

The QUEEN. No; in the cabinet.

Mr. WILLIS. Had you determined in your mind how many should be in the cabinet?

The QUEEN. Six instead of four.

Mr. WILLIS. Have you anything more you wish to say?

The QUEEN. Nothing more.

The within report of an interview held between the Queen and Mr. Willis, the United States minister, on the 16th instant (Mr. J. O. Carter being present at the said interview), has been read in our presence by Consul-General Mills, and agreed to by both of us as being full and correct in every particular.

LILIUOKALANI.
J. O. CARTER.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
December 18, 1893.

Witness:

ELLIS MILLS.

(Indorsement:) Interview with ex-Queen, Saturday, December 16, 1893. This interview took place at the legation.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

[Confidential.]

No. 15.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 19, 1893.

SIR: In the forenoon of yesterday (Monday, December 18) Mr. Mills met the Queen and Mr. Carter at the Queen's private residence, "Washington Place," when the report of the interview held at the legation on the preceding Saturday was read over and verified..

After the close of Saturday's interview and the withdrawal of the parties, Mr. Carter returned to inquire whether a supplementary statement by the Queen would be received. He informed me that he had held a conversation with her a few minutes after she left the legation, and he believed that on next Monday (this being Saturday) she would desire another interview. I told him that the object of the President was to ascertain her course of action in the event of restoration; that the United States could not dictate the policy of the Queen, if restored, nor interfere in any way with the domestic affairs of her Kingdom. A certain status or condition of affairs existed on the 17th of January, 1893, which was overthrown by our unlawful intervention. If the President, within constitutional limitations, could remedy this wrong, he was willing to do so, and to this extent only and under these circumstances only he inquired as to the future policy of the Queen. Whatever she determined upon, however, must be her voluntary act.

With this explanation I consented to receive further communications from the Queen.

Accordingly, upon learning that the Saturday interview had been verified, I went to Washington Place, where the interview occurred, a report of which I inclose.

Very respectfully,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

[Inclosure with No. 15.]

DECEMBER 18, 1893.

MR. CARTER. I am permitted by Her Majesty to say that I have had a conversation with her this morning concerning the first interview you had with her; that I have said to her that I was surprised and pained at the substance of it; that I have felt that the remarks you have made as coming from the President of the United States are entitled to Her Majesty's consideration, and that they are to carry weight as being the expressions of the President, particularly in reference to this first statement, where the President expresses his sincere regret that through "the unauthorized intervention of the United States she had been obliged to surrender her sovereignty, and his hope that, with her consent and coöperation, the wrong done to her and her people might be redressed."

I have explained as clearly as possible the meaning of the words "consent and coöperation;" that he recognizes he alone can not do all that has to be done.

I then referred to this expression as given by you, that the President believes "that when reinstated you will show forgiveness and magnanimity, that you will wish to be Queen of all the people, both native and foreign born, that you will make haste to secure their love and loyalty and to establish peace, friendship and good government."

I have said to her that I have been deeply impressed with that language and I think that perhaps Her Majesty is now more impressed with this language than she was at first, and I say to her that it seems to me good government is impossible without Her Majesty shows a spirit of forgiveness and magnanimity; that this movement against her and her people embraced a large and respectable portion of the foreign element of this community—an element we can not ignore.

I next came to this expression: "Should you be restored to the throne, would you grant full amnesty as to life and property to all those persons who have been or are now in the Provisional Government, or who have been instrumental in the overthrow of your Government?"

I have said to Her Majesty that it seems to me that the position of Mr. Cleveland is full of difficulties and embarrassments; that as President of the United States he is a ruler among the nations of the earth as Her Majesty was and, I hope, is to be, and that she should make the way as clear to him to carry out his wishes to repair the wrong done as she possibly can, not giving way to any personal feelings in the matter; that she must leave out of consideration in the question any idea of revenge. I told her that I took it as the wish of the President that she should grant amnesty as to life and property.

Then I went on to the remark that she makes that she feels unsettled and unsafe with these people in the country. I am bound to repeat what Her Majesty said to me, although it may not be in accord with my own views, that she feels that these people should leave the country, or peace and good government can not prevail. She thinks any third attempt at revolution on the part of these people would be very destructive to life and property; that her people have stood about all they can stand of this interference with what they consider their rights.

I have gone into the matter of the constitution with her, because I know our views are not as fully in accord as I wish they were. I have said to Her Majesty that I think she can safely put her cause into the hands of the President of the United States, and say to him unreservedly, "You dictate my policy and I will follow it."

Is Your Majesty satisfied with the statement I have made? Is it correct?

The QUEEN. Yes.

Mr. CARTER. Is it your wish?

The QUEEN. I must think a moment.

Mr. CARTER. But you said you are not seeking the lives of these people.

The QUEEN. Not their lives. I am willing their lives should be spared.

Mr. CARTER. And their property?

The QUEEN. Their property should be confiscated to the Government, and they should not be permitted to remain in the Kingdom.

Mr. CARTER. Is Your Majesty willing that this should be taken by the minister as your wish to-day, that this matter should be put unreservedly in the hands of President Cleveland with this statement. This is said by me as a friend, and I think you have always found me such. In the conversation had with you this morning I asked you as a friend to you and your people that you give it prayerful consideration. You need not sign it if you do not wish. It is your privilege to do as you please. I wish you would read it over, consider it, and give it to Mr. Willis at as early a moment as possible.

The QUEEN. I should like to talk with some of my friends.

Mr. CARTER (to Mr. Willis). Can she see some one in the matter?

Mr. WILLIS. I do not think it would be safe. I take it for granted that in matters of such great importance she has ascertained the wishes of her native people and the leaders, and that she has been in consultation with them upon these general propositions. Is not that true, Your Majesty? I mean as to the general policy to be pursued?

The QUEEN. I have. I must mention here (speaking to Mr. Carter) that I have never consulted you in this matter before. But I have talked the situation over with some of my subjects, and I consider their judgment is wise and in accordance with law, and have come to the conclusion that the statement I gave in my first interview was what the people wished. I had hoped some day I might have a chance to confer with you, Mr. Carter, in these matters.

Mr. WILLIS. I understand, then, that you said that the first interview I had with you embodies the views of the leaders of your people with whom you have been in consultation in the present crisis?

The QUEEN. They do.

Mr. WILLIS. And you have no withdrawal to that to make this morning?

The QUEEN. Although I have never stated to them what I had decided personally, still I feel that there may be some clemency, and that clemency should be that they should not remain in the country.

Mr. WILLIS. That is the extent of the clemency—that they should be removed from the country instead of being punished, according to the laws of the country, with death.

The QUEEN. Yes.

Mr. WILLIS. I understand that there is no withdrawal of your conversation of Saturday with reference to military expenses and police expenses that have been incurred by the Provisional Government. You still insist that those expenses should be met out of property confiscated?

The QUEEN. I feel so.

Mr. WILLIS. I understand that you would not be willing that the constitution as it existed on the 17th of January, 1893, should be established permanently in the Islands, believing, as you stated on Saturday, that it discriminated against your native subjects.

The QUEEN. The constitution I wished to promulgate was an improvement on the constitution of 1887, but since then I have considered further, and think that we ought to have a constitution that would be more suited to the future. I would not like to have the government continue under that constitution.

Mr. WILLIS. In the limitation which you now make as to your clemency, do you include their children or just the parents? Last Saturday you said: "They and their children." Do you still adhere to that judgment?

The QUEEN. I do.

Mr. WILLIS. Both parents and children should be permanently removed from the country and their property confiscated?

The QUEEN. I do, and their property confiscated.

Mr. WILLIS. I desire now to read to you in the express terms the judgment of the President. After citing the fact that Mr. Blount had been sent here to ascertain the facts in connection with this revolution, and after expressing a conclusion based upon Mr. Blount's report, that this revolution resulted largely if not entirely from the improper intervention of our then minister, and of the American troops, and expressing his desire within certain limitations to correct the wrong done, he states as follows:

"On your arrival at Honolulu you will take advantage of an early opportunity to inform the Queen of this determination. * * * You will, however, at the same time inform the Queen that when reinstated the President expects that she will pursue a magnanimous course by granting full amnesty to all who participated in the movement against her, including persons who are or have been officially or otherwise connected with the Provisional Government, depriving them of no right or privilege which they enjoyed before the so-called revolution.

"All obligations created by the Provisional Government, in due course of administration, should be assumed."

I read now from a cipher dispatch which has been sent since my communication of the 14th of November, in which it is stated:

"Should the Queen refuse assent to the written conditions, you will inform her at once [which I now do] that the President will cease interference in her behalf, and while he deems it his duty to endeavor to restore to the sovereign the constitutional government of the islands, his further efforts in that direction depend upon the Queen's unqualified agreement that all obligations created by the Provisional Government in the proper course of administration shall be assumed, and upon such pledge by her as shall prevent adoption of any measures of proscription or punishment for what has been done in the past by those setting up or supporting the Provisional Government.

"The President feels that we by our original interference have incurred responsibilities to the whole Hawaiian community, and it would not be just to put one party at the mercy of the other."

The QUEEN. I want to say in regard to the request of Mr. Cleveland asking for complete amnesty—how shall I know that in future our country will not be troubled again, as it has been in the past?

Mr. WILLIS. That is a question of domestic policy of the country which you have to decide largely for yourself. Do you intend to inquire as to whether the United States would support you if restored?

The QUEEN. I do not expect that. The decision I have given is not from any feeling of disrespect to the President nor from a feeling of animosity toward anyone here, but I feel it is a duty I should assume for the benefit of my people.

Mr. WILLIS. I so understand it—that you are of the opinion that under the state of things which existed at the time of this revolution, and also in 1887, that there could not be permanent peace in the islands. That is a matter that the United States has no right to look into or express an opinion upon.

The foregoing has been read to us by Consul-General Mills, and we pronounce it a full and correct report.

Honolulu, H. I., December 18, 1893.

LILIUOKALANI.
J. O. CARTER.

Witness:
ELLIS MILLS.

(On back:) Interview with ex-Queen in presence of Mr. J. O. Carter. Monday, December 18, 1893. This interview occurred at Washington Place, the ex-Queen's private residence.

After this paper was signed, as above, Mr. Mills said to the Queen, in behalf of Mr. Willis, that the reports of the two interviews of Saturday, December 16, and of to-day (Monday, December 18), as attested by her, would be immediately forwarded to the President, and his answer, when received, should be promptly made known to her.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

[Confidential.]

No. 16.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 20, 1893.

SIR: On Monday afternoon at 6 p. m., before the report of the Washington Place interview, referred to in my dispatch, No. 15, of December 19, had been written from the stenographic notes, Mr. Carter called at the legation and read to me a note to him, just received from the Queen, in which she unreservedly consented, when restored as the constitutional sovereign, to grant amnesty and assume all obligations of the Provisional Government.

On yesterday (Tuesday) morning at 9 o'clock Mr. Carter brought a letter from the Queen, a copy of which I inclose, and an agreement signed by her, binding herself, if restored, to grant full amnesty, a copy of which I inclose.

Very respectfully,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

[Inclosure 1 with No 16.]

WASHINGTON PLACE,
Honolulu, December 18, 1893

His Excellency ALBERT WILLIS,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, U. S. A. :

SIR: Since I had the interview with you this morning I have given the most careful and conscientious thought as to my duty, and I now of my own free will give my conclusions.

I must not feel vengeful to any of my people. If I am restored by the United States I must forget myself and remember only my dear people and my country. I must forgive and forget the past, permitting no proscription or punishment of any one, but trusting that all will hereafter work together in peace and friendship for the good and for the glory of our beautiful and once happy land.

Asking you to bear to the President and to the Government he represents a message of gratitude from me and from my people, and promising, with God's grace, to prove worthy of the confidence and friendship of your people,

I am, etc.,

LILIUOKALANI.

[Inclosure 2 with No. 16.]

I, Liliuokalani, in recognition of the high sense of justice which has actuated the President of the United States, and desiring to put aside all feelings of personal hatred or revenge and to do what is best for all the people of these Islands, both native and foreign born, do hereby and herein solemnly declare and pledge myself that, if reinstated as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands, that I will immediately proclaim and declare, unconditionally and without reservation, to every person who directly or indirectly participated in the revolution of January 17, 1893, a full pardon and amnesty for their offenses, with restoration of all rights, privileges, and immunities under the constitution and the laws which have been made in pursuance thereof, and that I will forbid and prevent the adoption of any measures of proscription or punishment for what has been done in the past by those setting up or supporting the Provisional Government.

I further solemnly agree to accept the restoration under the constitution existing at the time of said revolution and that I will abide by and fully execute that constitution with all the guaranties as to person and property therein contained.

I furthermore solemnly pledge myself and my Government, if restored, to assume all the obligations created by the Provisional Government, in the proper course of

administration, including all expenditures for military or police services, it being my purpose, if restored, to assume the Government precisely as it existed on the day when it was unlawfully overthrown.

Witness my hand this 18th of December, 1893.

LILIUOKALANI.

Attest:

J. O. CARTER.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

[Confidential.]

No. 17.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, December 20, 1893.

SIR: On Monday, December 18, the interview with the Queen at her residence, Washington Place, was held, lasting until 1 p. m.

At 5:30 p. m. of the same day I received a communication from the Provisional Government, through the Hon. S. B. Dole, minister of foreign affairs, referring to my visit to the Queen. He asked to be informed whether I was "acting in any way hostile to this (his) Government," and pressed for "an immediate answer." I inclose a copy of the communication.

As I had two days before notified a member of the cabinet, Hon. W. O. Smith, attorney-general, that I would be ready in forty-eight hours to make known to the Provisional Government the President's decision, and as the tone of the communication—doubtless without intention—was somewhat mandatory, I thought it best not to make any reply to it. Moreover, at that hour I had not received the written pledge and agreement of the Queen, without which I could take no step.

This morning at 9:30 o'clock I received the letter and agreement of the Queen, as set forth in my No. 16 of this date. I immediately addressed a note to the minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Dole, informing him that I had a communication from my Government, which I desired to submit in person to the president and ministers of his Government at any hour during the day that it might please him to designate. I inclose a copy of my letter. This note was delivered to the minister of foreign affairs by Mr. Mills, and the hour of 1:30 p. m. was verbally designated for the interview.

At the hour appointed I went to the executive building and met the President and his associate ministers, to whom I submitted the decision of the President of the United States.

A memorandum of what I said upon the occasion was left with them after delivery, a copy of which I inclose.

It may be proper at this time briefly to state my course of action since arriving here on Saturday the 4th day of November last. My baggage containing credentials did not come to hand until 4 o'clock, before which time the offices of the Provisional Government were closed.

On Monday morning following, Mr. Mills, our consul-general, bore a note to the minister of foreign affairs asking that he designate a time for the presentation of Mr. Blount's letter of recall and my letter of credence. Mr. Mills was authorized to say, and did say to him, that I was ready on that day (Monday) to present my credentials. The Provisional Government, however, appointed the following day (Tuesday) at 11 o'clock, at which time I was formally presented.

As our Government had for fifty years held the friendliest relations with the people of these islands—native as well as foreign born—in

addressing the President, who was for the time being the formal representative of these people, I felt no hesitancy in employing the usual terms of friendship, drawing, however, in what I said, a distinction between the Provisional Government as a government and the people of the islands. These statements were not only, as I have said, consistent with the uniform policy and feelings of the United States for half a century, but expressed, as I knew, the personal feelings of the President and of yourself towards the officers of the Provisional Government as men, and the kindly regard and interest felt in the welfare and happiness of all the people who are now under its *de facto* rule.

From that day until last Tuesday at half-past one, there has been no expression, direct or indirect, from the representative of the United States towards the Provisional Government, explaining or defining our relations, present or prospective, towards it. The delay in making any announcement of your policy was, as you well understand, because of the direct verbal and written instructions under which I have been acting. Under those instructions my first duty was to guard the life and safety of those who had by the act of our own minister been placed in a position where there was an apparent antagonism between them and our Government. As I understood from the President and from you, the sole connection which our Government had with the settlement of the Hawaiian question was the undoing of what, from an international standpoint, was considered by the President to have been a wrong to a feeble, defenseless, and friendly power. In undoing this wrong I was, however, instructed first of all to see that proper safeguards were thrown around those who had been probably misled as to the position of our Government and the wishes of our people.

My dispatch No. 3, of November 14, set forth my inability to secure satisfactory guarantees from the Queen upon the points indicated. Until that was done you had directed me to take no further steps, but to inform you of the result, which I did by a cipher telegram as well as by the dispatch referred to. Your cipher instruction in reply thereto, dated December 2 and received by me December 14, by the revenue cutter *Corwin*, reiterated the duty which had been already enjoined upon me to secure these guarantees.

I accordingly renewed my efforts in that direction, and finally, on last Tuesday morning at 9 o'clock, as hereinbefore stated, I secured from the Queen the written pledge and agreement which was the prerequisite of my further action.

Having received this pledge, I was then for the first time in a position to make known to the Provisional Government the decision of the President upon the questions that had been submitted to him by the protest of the Queen, which protest had been acknowledged and accepted by the Provisional Government through its President, Mr. Dole, the immediate effect of which was, according to the statement of Mr. Damon, another honored member of the Provisional Government, the Queen's temporary surrender of her throne.

You will observe that in presenting the decision of the President I have used the language employed by yourself in your instructions to me upon the subject. In my opening statement I thought proper to explain what was known to you, and doubtless to the Provisional Government, that the secrecy which had been observed by our Government was in the interest of the peace and safety of this community.

The President's attention had been called by you to the evidence contained in Mr. Blount's report showing the extraordinary complications and dangers surrounding this community, among which were the racial

prejudices, the intense feeling consequent upon the dethronement of the constitutional sovereign, the presence of so many different nationalities—Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese, Americans, and English—in such large numbers and with such diverse traits and interests, the possibility that the Japanese, now numbering more than one-fifth of the male population of the islands, might take advantage of the condition of affairs to demand suffrage and through it to obtain control of the Government, together with the discontent of the native Hawaiians at the loss of their Government and of the rights secured under it.

In addition to these facts, I was fully apprised by you in your personal conversations of the presence here of many lawless and disorderly characters, owing allegiance to neither party, who would gladly take advantage of the excitement and general derangement of affairs to indulge in rapine and mob violence; and also of the conflict between the active responsible representatives of the Provisional Government and certain men who were not officially connected with it, but who had undertaken to dictate its policy. The danger from this last source I found upon arriving here was much greater than you had supposed. As I stated to you in my dispatch, No. 2, of November 10, the President and ministers of the Provisional Government and a large per cent of those who support them are men of high character and of large material interests in the islands. These men have been inclined to a conservative course toward the Hawaiians.

They had placed in the police and fire departments, and also in many other more important offices, native Hawaiians, thus endeavoring to conciliate the friendship and support of the 40,000 natives of the country. The irresponsible element referred to were pressing for a change of this wise and patriotic policy and insisting that they should be invested with all power, thus intensifying and aggravating the racial feeling already too extreme. Many of these men were open in their threats against the life of the Queen. They have even gone as far in the public prints and elsewhere as to threaten the representatives of the Provisional Government in the event they should listen to the President's supposed policy of peaceful settlement, if it involved the restoration of the Queen.

Besides this danger, which would have been precipitated by any premature announcement of the policy of our Government, there was another danger deserving serious attention.

The native Hawaiians, under the wise advice of their best native leaders supplemented by that of many sympathizing foreigners, have maintained the policy of peace during the settlement of this question. While, however, they have been always known as a peaceful and law-abiding people, the evidence of the most thoughtful men in these islands, including Mr. Damon, the present minister of finance, called attention to the fact that under proper leadership they might collect quite an effective and aggressive following; hence his opinion given to Mr. Blount while here and to me since that a strong force should be retained by the Provisional Government or else trouble might result from a sudden attack on their part.

The history of the Hawaiian people, their well-known devotion to the cause of royalty or chieftainship, their willingness to sacrifice themselves in defense of their supposed rights or in redress of the wrongs imposed upon those whom they revered confirmed the opinion expressed by Mr. Damon as to their manly spirit and courage.

Repeatedly since I reached these islands I have been advised by those in the confidence of the native Hawaiians that it was very diffi-

cult to further restrain them. They were looking with confidence to the United States for an amicable settlement of their grievances, and this had exercised a wholesome influence upon their conduct. Any sudden announcement of an adverse result, or any attempt upon the dignity or life of the Queen, might, in their judgment, precipitate the most serious consequences.

Under this state of affairs, which was known in part, although not fully, to the Provisional Government, the policy of silence, to which you advised, until the time had arrived for definite action, was unquestionably wise and humane. My deliberate judgment is that a different course would have proved disastrous.

No one can estimate to what extent the presence of the different war vessels has prevented demonstrations of marked or other violence.

I need not assure you that I have endeavored faithfully to comply with the views and instructions of the President in regard to the military or naval forces of the United States. The two war ships now here were here when I came. During the month of last August a general license had been granted Admiral Skerrett by the Provisional Government to land and drill his forces whenever he so desired. On the 29th day of November, as has been stated in my dispatch No. 8 of December 5, the Provisional Government addressed me a note revoking this license, which action on behalf of our Government was promptly acquiesced in. No such privilege has been since exercised. So punctilious has been the doctrine of non-intervention that when the band of the *Philadelphia* came ashore one afternoon during a reception of some of the ladies of the navy Admiral Irwin's attention having been called to the fact that it had excited some comment he promptly issued an order that there should be no repetition of this incident.

The Japanese and English legations have been guarded by marines from their respective vessels, but no American soldier has been stationed here, and none will be. No official communication has been conveyed from me to the Provisional Government by any representative of the naval forces of the United States; nor did I, under my instructions, feel at liberty, as I otherwise gladly would have done, to consult with the admiral and high officers in command of our fleet, whose clear and intelligent judgment would have been of great advantage to me in the frequent and delicate questions that have arisen.

In a word, neither directly nor indirectly have I conveyed or countenanced the idea that our Government proposed to interfere by force in the domestic affairs of these islands. My visits to the United States men-of-war have for this reason been limited to two or three social occasions.

There has been, therefore, as little foundation for criticism in this direction as there was for the temporary secrecy observed, as we have seen, as a safeguard against sudden outbreak and mob violence.

Under these circumstances, and guided by your imperative instructions, I submitted the decision of the President as one which was of the greatest gravity and importance. What the answer will be I do not know, but hope to be able to report in a very short time, as President Dole stated that the Provisional Government would take the matter under its immediate advisement.

I have, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

[Inclosure No. 1 with No. 17.]

*Mr. Dole to Mr. Willis.*DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 18, 1893.

SIR: I am informed that you are in communication with Liliuokalani, the ex-Queen, with a view of re-establishing the monarchy in the Hawaiian Islands and of supporting her pretensions to the sovereignty. Will you inform me if this report is true or if you are acting in any way hostile to this Government.

I appreciate fully the fact that any such action upon your part in view of your official relations with this Government would seem impossible; but as the information has come to me from such sources that I am compelled to notice it, you will pardon me for pressing you for an immediate answer.

Accept the assurances of distinguished consideration with which I have the honor to be sir,

Your excellency's obedient, humble servant,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

[Inclosure No. 2 with No. 17.]

*Mr. Willis to Mr. Dole.*LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, December 19, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that I have a communication from my Government which I desire to submit to the President and ministers of your Government at any hour to-day which it may please you to designate.

With high regard and sincere respect, I am, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

[Inclosure No. 3 with No. 17.]

*Memorandum.***MR. PRESIDENT AND GENTLEMEN:**

The President of the United States has very much regretted the delay in the consideration of the Hawaiian question, but it has been unavoidable. So much of it as has occurred since my arrival has been due to certain conditions precedent, compliance with which was required before I was authorized to confer with you. The President also regrets, as most assuredly do I, that any seeming secrecy should have surrounded the interchange of views between our two Governments. I may say this, however, that the secrecy thus far observed, has been in the interest and for the safety of all your people.

I need hardly premise that the President's action upon the Hawaiian question has been under the dictates of honor and duty? It is now, and has been from the beginning, absolutely free from prejudice and resentment, and entirely consistent with the long-established friendship and treaty ties which have so closely bound together our respective Governments.

The President deemed it his duty to withdraw from the Senate the treaty of annexation which had been signed by the Secretary of State and the agents of your Government, and to dispatch a trusted representative to Hawaii to impartially investigate the causes of your revolution, and ascertain and report the true situation in these islands. This information was needed, the better to enable the President to discharge a delicate and important duty. Upon the facts embodied in Mr. Blount's reports, the President has arrived at certain conclusions and determined upon a certain course of action with which it becomes my duty to acquaint you.

The Provisional Government was not established by the Hawaiian people or with their consent or acquiescence, nor has it since existed with their consent. The Queen refused to surrender her powers to the Provisional Government until convinced that the minister of the United States had recognized it as the *de facto* authority and would support and defend it with the military force of the United States, and that resistance would precipitate a bloody conflict with that force. She was advised and assured by her ministers and by leaders of the movement for the overthrow of her

Government that if she surrendered under protest her case would afterwards be fairly considered by the President of the United States. The Queen finally yielded to the armed forces of the United States then quartered in Honolulu, relying on the good faith and honor of the President, when informed of what had occurred, to undo the action of the minister and reinstate her and the authority which she claimed as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

After a patient examination of Mr. Blount's reports the President is satisfied that the movement against the Queen, if not instigated, was encouraged and supported by the representative of this Government at Honolulu; that he promised in advance to aid her enemies in an effort to overthrow the Hawaiian Government and set up by force a new government in its place, and that he kept this promise by causing a detachment of troops to be landed from the *Boston* on the 16th of January, and by recognizing the Provisional Government the next day when it was too feeble to defend itself and the Constitutional Government was able to successfully maintain its authority against any threatening force other than that of the United States already landed.

The President has therefore determined that he will not send back to the Senate for its action thereon the treaty which he withdrew from that body for further consideration on the 9th day of March last.

In view of these conclusions, I was instructed by the President to take advantage of an early opportunity to inform the Queen of this determination and of his views as to the responsibility of our Government.

The President, however, felt that we, by our original interference, had incurred responsibilities to the whole Hawaiian community, and that it would not be just to put one party at the mercy of the other. I was, therefore, instructed, at the same time, to inform the Queen that when reinstated, that the President expected that she would pursue a magnanimous course by granting full amnesty to all who participated in the movement against her, including persons who are or who have been officially or otherwise connected with the Provisional Government, depriving them of no right or privilege which they enjoyed before the so-called revolution. All obligations created by the Provisional Government in due course of administration should be assumed.

In obedience to the command of the President I have secured the Queen's agreement to this course, and I now read and deliver a writing signed by her and duly attested, a copy of which I will leave with you.

(The agreement was here read.)

It becomes my further duty to advise you, sir, the executive of the Provisional Government and your ministers, of the President's determination of the question, which your action and that of the Queen devolved upon him, and that you are expected to promptly relinquish to her her constitutional authority.

And now, Mr. President, and gentlemen of the Provisional Government, with a deep and solemn sense of the gravity of the situation and with the earnest hope that your answer will be inspired by that high patriotism which forgets all self-interest, in the name and by the authority of the United States of America, I submit to you the question, "Are you willing to abide by the decision of the President?"

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

[Confidential.]

No. 13.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, December 23, 1893.—12 midnight.

SIR: President Dole has just delivered in person at this hour (midnight) the answer of the Provisional Government, declining for reasons therein stated to accept the decision of the President of the United States, a copy of which is herewith inclosed.

The revenue cutter *Corwin* is under sailing orders and will leave here in a few minutes for San Francisco. The captain has been instructed to slow up, if necessary, and enter the harbor of San Francisco at night and to deliver in person the dispatches numbered 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 to our dispatch agent at that place.

The object of this is to enable the President to receive these official

communications before any intimation of their character can be telegraphed.

I will on Tuesday acknowledge the receipt of the answer of the Provisional Government, notifying it that the President of the United States will be informed thereof, and that no further steps will be taken by me until I shall have heard from him. I shall deliver a similar communication to the Queen.

The very great excitement prevailing here and the peculiar conditions surrounding this people prompt the above course, which, I trust, will meet with the approbation of the President and of yourself.

I think it proper to acknowledge in this public way the efficient services rendered to the Government of the United States by our consul-general, Mr. Mills, since my arrival at this place.

I have, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

[Inclosure with No. 18.]

Mr. Dole to Mr. Willis.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, December 23, 1893.

SIR: Your excellency's communication of December 19, announcing the conclusion which the President of the United States of America has finally arrived at respecting the application of this Government for a treaty of political union with that country, and referring also to the domestic affairs of these islands, has had the consideration of the Government.

While it is with deep disappointment that we learn that the important proposition which we have submitted to the Government of the United States, and which was at first favorably considered by it, has at length been rejected, we have experienced a sense of relief that we are now favored with the first official information upon the subject that has been received through a period of over nine months.

While we accept the decision of the President of the United States, declining further to consider the annexation proposition, as the final conclusion of the present administration, we do not feel inclined to regard it as the last word of the American Government upon this subject, for the history of the mutual relations of the two countries, of American effort and influence in building up the Christian civilization which has so conspicuously aided in giving this country an honorable place among independent nations, the geographical position of these islands, and the important and, to both countries, profitable reciprocal commercial interests which have long existed, together with our weakness as a sovereign nation, all point with convincing force to political union between the two countries as the necessary logical result from the circumstances mentioned. This conviction is emphasized by the favorable expression of American statesmen over a long period in favor of annexation, conspicuous among whom are the names of W. L. Marcy, William H. Seward, Hamilton Fish, and James G. Blaine, all former Secretaries of State, and especially so by the action of your last administration in negotiating a treaty of annexation with this Government and sending it to the Senate with a view to its ratification.

We shall therefore continue the project of political union with the United States as a conspicuous feature of our foreign policy, confidently hoping that sooner or later it will be crowned with success, to the lasting benefit of both countries.

The additional portion of your communication referring to our domestic affairs with a view of interfering therein, is a new departure in the relations of the two governments. Your information that the President of the United States expects this Government "to promptly relinquish to her (meaning the ex-Queen) her constitutional authority," with the question "are you willing to abide by the decision of the President?" might well be dismissed in a single word, but for the circumstance that your communication contains, as it appears to me, misstatements and erroneous conclusions based thereon, that are so prejudicial to this Government that I can not permit them to pass unchallenged; moreover, the importance and menacing character of this proposition make it appropriate for me to discuss somewhat fully the questions raised by it.

We do not recognize the right of the President of the United States to interfere in our domestic affairs. Such right could be conferred upon him by the act of this

Government, and by that alone, or it could be acquired by conquest. This I understand to be the American doctrine, conspicuously announced from time to time by the authorities of your Government.

President Jackson said in his message to Congress in 1836: "The uniform policy and practice of the United States is to avoid all interference in disputes which merely relate to the internal government of other nations, and eventually to recognize the authority of the prevailing party, without reference to the merits of the original controversy."

This principle of international law has been consistently recognized during the whole past intercourse of the two countries, and was recently reaffirmed in the instructions given by Secretary Gresham to Commissioner Blount on March 11, 1893, and by the latter published in the newspapers in Honolulu in a letter of his own to the Hawaiian public. The words of these instructions which I refer to are as follows: "The United States claim no right to interfere in the political or domestic affairs or in the internal conflicts of the Hawaiian Islands other than as herein stated (referring to the protection of American citizens) or for the purpose of maintaining any treaty or other rights which they possess." The treaties between the two countries confer no right of interference.

Upon what, then, Mr. Minister, does the President of the United States base his right of interference? Your communication is without information upon this point, excepting such as may be contained in the following brief and vague sentences: "She (the ex-Queen) was advised and assured by her ministers and leaders of the movement for the overthrow of her government that if she surrendered under protest her case would afterward be fairly considered by the President of the United States. The Queen finally yielded to the armed forces of the United States, then quartered in Honolulu, relying on the good faith and honor of the President, when informed of what had occurred, to undo the action of the minister and reinstate her and the authority which she claimed as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands." Also, "it becomes my further duty to advise you, sir, the Executive of the Provisional Government, and your ministers, of the President's determination of the question which your action and that of the Queen devolved upon him, and that you are expected to promptly relinquish to her her constitutional authority."

I understand that the first quotation is referred to in the following words of the second, "which your action and that of the Queen devolved upon him" (the President of the United States), and that the President has arrived at his conclusions from Commissioner Blount's report. We have had as yet no opportunity of examining this document, but from extracts published in the papers and for reasons set forth hereafter, we are not disposed to submit the fate of Hawaii to its statements and conclusions. As a matter of fact no member of the executive of the Provisional Government has conferred with the ex-Queen, either verbally or otherwise, from the time the new Government was proclaimed till now, with the exception of one or two notices which were sent to her by myself in regard to her removal from the palace and relating to the guards which the Government first allowed her and perhaps others of a like nature. I infer that a conversation which Mr. Damon, then a member of the advisory council, is reported by Mr. Blount to have had with the ex-Queen on January 17, and which has been quoted in the newspapers, is the basis of this astounding claim of the President of the United States of his authority to adjudicate upon our right as a government to exist.

Mr. Damon, on the occasion mentioned, was allowed to accompany the cabinet of the former Government, who had been in conference with me and my associates, to meet the ex-Queen. He went informally, without instructions and without authority to represent the Government or to assure the ex-Queen "that if she surrendered under protest her case would afterwards be fairly considered by the President of the United States." Our ultimatum had already been given to the members of the ex-cabinet who had been in conference with us. What Mr. Damon said to the ex-Queen he said on his individual responsibility and did not report it to us. Mr. Blount's report of his remarks on that occasion furnish to the Government its first information of the nature of those remarks. Admitting for argument's sake that the Government had authorized such assurances, what was "her case" that was afterwards to "be fairly considered by the President of the United States?"

Was it the question of her right to subvert the Hawaiian constitution and to proclaim a new one to suit herself, or was it her claim to be restored to the sovereignty, or was it her claim against the United States for the alleged unwarrantable acts of Minister Stevens, or was it all these in the alternative; who can say? But if it had been all of these, or any of them, it could not have been more clearly and finally decided by the President of the United States in favor of the Provisional Government than when he recognized it without qualification and received its accredited commissioners, negotiated a treaty of annexation with them, received its accredited envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, and accredited successively two envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary to it; the ex-Queen in the mean-

time being represented in Washington by her agent who had full access to the Department of State.

The whole business of the Government with the President of the United States is set forth in the correspondence between the two governments and the acts and statements of the minister of this Government at Washington and the annexation commissioners accredited to it. If we have submitted our right to exist to the United States, the fact will appear in that correspondence and the acts of our minister and commissioners. Such agreement must be shown as the foundation of the right of your Government to interfere, for an arbitrator can be created only by the act of two parties.

The ex-Queen sent her attorney to Washington to plead her claim for a reinstatement in power, or failing that for a money allowance or damages. This attorney was refused passage on the Government dispatch boat, which was sent to San Francisco with the annexation commissioners and their message. The departure of this vessel was less than two days after the new Government was declared, and the refusal was made promptly upon receiving the request therefor either on the day the Government was declared or on the next day. If an intention to submit the question of the reinstatement of the ex-Queen had existed, why should her attorney have been refused passage on this boat? The ex-Queen's letter to President Harrison dated January 18, the day after the new Government was proclaimed, makes no allusion to any understanding between her and the Government for arbitration. Her letter is as follows :

"His Excellency BENJAMIN HARRISON,
"President of the United States :

"MY GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND: It is with deep regret that I address you on this occasion. Some of my subjects aided by aliens, have renounced their loyalty and revolted against the constitutional Government of my Kingdom. They have attempted to depose me and to establish a provisional government in direct conflict with the organic law of this Kingdom. Upon receiving incontestible proof that his excellency the minister plenipotentiary of the United States, aided and abetted their unlawful movements and caused United States troops to be landed for that purpose, I submitted to force, believing that he would not have acted in that manner unless by the authority of the Government which he represents.

"This action on my part was prompted by three reasons: The futility of a conflict with the United States; the desire to avoid violence, bloodshed and the destruction of life and property, and the certainty which I feel that you and your Government will right whatever wrongs may have been inflicted upon us in the premises.

"In due time a statement of the true facts relating to this matter will be laid before you, and I live in the hope that you will judge uprightly and justly between myself and my enemies. This appeal is not made for myself personally, but for my people, who have hitherto always enjoyed the friendship and protection of the United States.

"My opponents have taken the only vessel which could be obtained here for the purpose, and hearing of their intention to send a delegation of their number to present their side of this conflict before you, I requested the favor of sending by the same vessel an envoy to you, to lay before you my statement, as the facts appear to myself and my loyal subjects.

"This request has been refused, and I now ask you that in justice to myself and to my people that no steps be taken by the Government of the United States until my cause can be heard by you.

"I shall be able to dispatch an envoy about the 2d of February, as that will be the first available opportunity hence, and he will reach you by every possible haste that there may be no delay in the settlement of this matter.

"I pray you, therefore, my good friend, that you will not allow any conclusions to be reached by you until my envoy arrives.

"I beg to assure you of the continuance of my highest consideration.

"LILIUOKALANI R.

"HONOLULU, January 18, 1893."

If any understanding had existed at that time between her and the Government to submit the question of her restoration to the United States, some reference to such an understanding would naturally have appeared in this letter, as every reason would have existed for calling the attention of the President to that fact, especially as she then knew that her attorney would be seriously delayed in reaching Washington. But there is not a word from which such an understanding can be predicated. The Government sent its commissioners to Washington for the sole object of procuring the confirmation of the recognition by Minister Stevens of the new Government and to enter into negotiations for political union with the United States. The protest of the ex-Queen, made on January 17, is equally with the let-

ter devoid of evidence of any mutual understanding for a submission of her claim to the throne to the United States. It is very evidently a protest against the alleged action of Minister Stevens as well as the new Government, and contains a notice of her appeal to the United States.

The document was received exactly as it would have been received if it had come through the mail. The indorsement of its receipt upon the paper was made at the request of the individual who brought it as evidence of its safe delivery. As to the ex-Queen's notice of her appeal to the United States, it was a matter of indifference to us. Such an appeal could not have been prevented, as the mail service was in operation as usual. That such a notice, and our receipt of it without comment, should be made a foundation of a claim that we had submitted our right to exist as a government to the United States had never occurred to us until suggested to us by your Government. The protest is as follows:

"I, Liliuokalani, by the grace of God and under the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against any and all acts done against myself and the constitutional Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming to have established a provisional government of and for this Kingdom.

"That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America, whose minister plenipotentiary, his excellency John L. Stevens, has caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu, and declared that he would support the said Provisional Government.

"Now, to avoid any collision of armed forces, and perhaps the loss of life, I do, under this protest, and impelled by said force, yield my authority until such time as the Government of the United States shall, upon the facts being presented to it, undo the action of its representative and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

"Done at Honolulu the 17th day of January, A. D. 1893.

"LILIUOKALANI, R.

"SAMUEL PARKER,

"*Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

"WILLIAM H. CORNWELL,

"*Minister of Finance.*

"JOHN F. COLBURN,

"*Minister of the Interior.*

"A. P. PETERSON,

"*Attorney-General.*

"S. B. DOLE, Esq., and others,

"*Composing the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.*"

(Indorsed:) "Received by the hands of the late cabinet this 17th day of January, A. D. 1893. Sanford B. Dole, chairman of executive council of Provisional Government."

You may not be aware, but such is the fact, that at no time until the presentation of the claim of the President of the United States of his right to interfere in the internal affairs of this country, by you on December 19, has this Government been officially informed by the United States Government that any such course was contemplated. And not until the publication of Mr. Gresham's letter to the President of the United States on the Hawaiian question had we any reliable intimation of such a policy. The adherents of the ex-Queen have indeed claimed from time to time that such was the case, but we have never been able to attach serious importance to their rumors to that effect, feeling secure in our perfect diplomatic relations with your country, and relying upon the friendship and fairness of a government whose dealings with us had ever shown full recognition of our independence as a sovereign power, without any tendency to take advantage of the disparity of strength between the two countries.

If your contention that President Cleveland believes that this Government and the ex-Queen have submitted their respective claims to the sovereignty of this country to the adjudication of the United States is correct, then, may I ask, when and where has the President held his court of arbitration? This Government has had no notice of the sitting of such a tribunal and no opportunity of presenting evidence of its claims. If Mr. Blount's investigations were a part of the proceedings of such a court, this Government did not know it and was never informed of it; indeed, as I have mentioned above, we never knew until the publication of Secretary Gresham's letter to President Cleveland a few weeks ago, that the American Executive had a policy of interference under contemplation. Even if we had known that Mr. Blount was authoritatively acting as a commissioner to take evidence upon the question of the restoration of the ex-Queen, the methods adopted by him in making his investigations were, I submit, unsuitable to such an examination or any examination upon which human interests were to be adjudicated.

As I am reliably informed, he selected his witnesses and examined them in secret, freely using leading questions, giving no opportunity for a cross-examination, and often not permitting such explanations by witnesses themselves as they desired to make of evidence which he had drawn from them. Is it hardly necessary for me to suggest that under such a mode of examination some witnesses would be almost helpless in the hands of an astute lawyer, and might be drawn into saying things which would be only half-truths, and standing alone would be misleading or even false in effect. Is it likely that an investigation conducted in this manner could result in a fair, full, and truthful statement of the case in point? Surely the destinies of a friendly Government, admitting by way of argument that the right of arbitration exists, may not be disposed of upon an *ex parte* and secret investigation made without the knowledge of such Government or an opportunity by it to be heard or even to know who the witnesses were.

Mr. Blount came here as a stranger and at once entered upon his duties. He devoted himself to the work of collecting information, both by the examination of witnesses and the collection of statistics and other documentary matter, with great energy and industry, giving up, substantially, his whole time to its prosecution. He was here but a few months, and during that time was so occupied with this work that he had little opportunity left for receiving those impressions of the state of affairs which could best have come to him, incidentally, through a wide social intercourse with the people of the country and a personal acquaintance with its various communities and educational and industrial enterprises. He saw the country from his cottage in the center of Honolulu mainly through the eyes of the witnesses whom he examined. Under these circumstances is it probable that the most earnest of men would be able to form a statement that could safely be relied upon as the basis of a decision upon the question of the standing of a government?

In view, therefore, of all the facts in relation to the question of the President's authority to interfere and concerning which the members of the executive were actors and eye-witnesses, I am able to assure your excellency that by no action of this Government, on the 17th day of January last or since that time, has the authority devolved upon the President of the United States to interfere in the internal affairs of this country through any conscious act or expression of this Government with such an intention.

You state in your communication—

"After a patient examination of Mr. Blount's reports the President is satisfied that the movement against the Queen if not instigated was encouraged and supported by the representative of this Government at Honolulu; that he promised in advance to aid her enemies in an effort to overthrow the Hawaiian Government and set up by force a new government in its place; that he kept his promise by causing a detachment of troops to be landed from the *Boston* on the 16th of January, 1893, and by recognizing the Provisional Government the next day when it was too feeble to defend itself and the Constitutional Government was able to successfully maintain its authority against any threatening force other than that of the United States already landed."

Without entering into a discussion of the facts I beg to state in reply that I am unable to judge of the correctness of Mr. Blount's report from which the President's conclusions were drawn, as I have had no opportunity of examining such report. But I desire to specifically and emphatically deny the correctness of each and every one of the allegations of fact contained in the above-quoted statement; yet, as the President has arrived at a positive opinion in his own mind in the matter, I will refer to it from his standpoint.

My position, is briefly, this: If the American forces illegally assisted the revolutionists in the establishment of the Provisional Government that Government is not responsible for their wrong-doing. It was purely a private matter for discipline between the United States Government and its own officers. There is, I submit, no precedent in international law for the theory that such action of the American troops has conferred upon the United States authority over the internal affairs of this Government. Should it be true, as you have suggested, that the American Government made itself responsible to the Queen, who, it is alleged lost her throne through such action, that is not a matter for me to discuss, except to submit that if such be the case, it is a matter for the American Government and her to settle between them. This Government, a recognized sovereign power, equal in authority with the United States Government and enjoying diplomatic relations with it, can not be destroyed by it for the sake of discharging its obligations to the ex-Queen.

Upon these grounds, Mr. Minister, in behalf of my Government I respectfully protest against the usurpation of its authority as suggested by the language of your communication.

It is difficult for a stranger like yourself, and much more for the President of the United States, with his pressing responsibilities, his crowding cares and his want of familiarity with the condition and history of this country and the inner life of its

people, to obtain a clear insight into the real state of affairs and to understand the social currents, the race feelings and the customs and traditions which all contribute to the political outlook. We, who have grown up here or who have adopted this country as our home, are conscious of the difficulty of maintaining a stable government here. A community which is made up of five races, of which the larger part but dimly appreciate the significance and value of representative institutions, offers political problems which may well tax the wisdom of the most experienced statesman.

For long years a large and influential part of this community, including many foreigners and native Hawaiians, have observed with deep regret the retrogressive tendencies of the Hawaiian monarchy, and have honorably striven against them, and have sought through legislative work, the newspapers, and by personal appeal and individual influence to support and emphasize the representative features of the monarchy and to create a public sentiment favorable thereto, and thereby to avert the catastrophe that seemed inevitable if such tendencies were not restrained. These efforts have been met by the last two sovereigns in a spirit of aggressive hostility. The struggle became at length a well-defined issue between royal prerogative and the right of representative government, and most bitterly and unscrupulously has it been carried on in the interests of the former. The King's privilege of importing goods for his own use without paying the duties thereon was abused to the extent of admitting large quantities of liquors, with which to debauch the electorate. He promoted the election of Government officers, both executive and judicial, to the legislative assembly, and freely appointed to office elected members thereof.

In the legislature of 1886, of which I was a member, the party supporting the Government was largely in the majority, and nearly every member of such majority held some appointment from the Government, and some of them as many as two or three, thereby effectually placing the legislative branch of the Government under the personal and absolute control of the King. The constitutional encroachments, lawless extravagance, and scandalous and open sales of patronage and privilege to the highest bidder by Kalakaua brought in at length the revolution of 1887, which had the full sympathy and moral support of all the diplomatic representatives in Honolulu, including Minister Merrill, who was at that time President Cleveland's minister here.

This revolution was not an annexation movement in any sense, but tended toward an independent republic, but, when it had the monarchy in its power, conservative counsels prevailed, and a new lease of life was allowed that institution on the condition of royal fidelity to the new constitution, which was then promulgated and which greatly curtailed the powers of the sovereign. Kalakaua was not faithful to this compact, and sought as far as possible to evade its stipulations. The insurrection of 1889 was connived at by him, and the household guards under his control were not allowed to take part in suppressing it. The Princess Liliuokalani was in full sympathy with this movement, being a party to it, and furnished her suburban residence to the insurgents for their meetings. The arrangements were there made, and the insurgents marched thence for their attack upon the Government. The affair was suppressed in a few hours of fighting, with some loss of life to the insurgents, by the party which carried through the revolution of 1887.

The ex-Queen's rule was even more reckless and retrogressive than her brother's. Less politic than he, and with less knowledge of affairs, she had more determination and was equally unreliable and deficient in moral principle. She, to all appearance, unhesitatingly took the oath of office to govern according to the constitution, and evidently regarding it merely as a formal ceremony began, according to her own testimony to Mr. Blount, to lay her plans to destroy the constitution and replace it with one of her own creation. With a like disregard of its sanctions, she made the most determined efforts to control all of the appointments to office, both executive and judicial. The session of the legislature of 1892 was the longest that had ever occurred in our history, and was characterized by a most obstinate struggle for personal control of the Government and the legislature on the part of the Queen. This was strenuously resisted by the opposition.

During this contest four ministerial cabinets were appointed and unseated, and the lottery-franchise bill, which had been withdrawn early in the session for want of sufficient support, was at the last moment, when the opposition was weakened by the absence of several of its members, again brought forward and passed through the exercise of improper and illegitimate influences upon the legislators, among which were personal appeals on the part of the Queen to them. The cabinet which represented the opposition and the majority of the legislature which the Queen had been compelled to appoint was unseated by similar means, and with a new cabinet of her own choice the legislature was prorogued. This lottery franchise was of a character corresponding with similar institutions which have been driven out of every State of the American Union by an indignant public sentiment. If it had been established here it would in a brief period have obtained full control of the Government patronage and corrupted the social and political life of the people.

Although the situation at the close of the session was deeply discouraging to the community, it was accepted without any intention of meeting it by other than legal means. The attempted *coup d'état* of the Queen followed, and her ministers, threatened with violence, fled to the citizens for assistance and protection; then it was that the uprising against the Queen took place, and, gathering force from day to day, resulted in the proclamation of the Provisional Government and the abrogation of the monarchy on the third day thereafter.

No man can correctly say that the Queen owed her downfall to the interference of American forces. The revolution was carried through by the representatives, now largely reinforced, of the same public sentiment which forced the monarchy to its knees in 1887, which suppressed the insurrection of 1889, and which for twenty years has been battling for representative government in this country. If the American forces had been absent the revolution would have taken place, for the sufficient causes for it had nothing to do with their presence.

I, therefore, in all friendship of the Government of the United States, which you represent, and desiring to cherish the good will of the great American people, submit the answer of my Government to your proposition, and ask that you will transmit the same to the President of the United States for his consideration.

Though the Provisional Government is far from being "a great power" and could not long resist the forces of the United States in a hostile attack, we deem our position to be impregnable under all legal precedents, under the principles of diplomatic intercourse, and in the forum of conscience. We have done your Government no wrong; no charge of discourtesy is or can be brought against us. Our only issue with your people has been that, because we revered its institutions of civil liberty, we have desired to have them extended to our own distracted country, and because we honor its flag and deeming that its beneficent and authoritative presence would be for the best interests of all of our people, we have stood ready to add our country, a new star, to its glory, and to consummate a union which we believed would be as much for the benefit of your country as ours. If this is an offense, we plead guilty to it.

I am instructed to inform you, Mr. Minister, that the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands respectfully and unhesitatingly declines to entertain the proposition of the President of the United States that it should surrender its authority to the ex-Queen.

This answer is made not only upon the grounds hereinbefore set forth, but upon our sense of duty and loyalty to the brave men whose commissions we hold, who have faithfully stood by us in the hour of trial, and whose will is the only earthly authority we recognize. We can not betray the sacred trust they have placed in our hands, a trust which represents the cause of Christian civilization in the interests of the whole people of these islands.

With assurances of the highest consideration,
I have, etc.,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency ALBERT S. WILLIS,
U. S. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 19.]

DECEMBER 23, 1893.

This communication simply transmits minister's salary account.

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, January 12, 1894.

W. A. COOPER,
U. S. Dispatch Agent,
Post-Office Building, San Francisco, Cal.:

Forward following telegram to Hon. A. S. Willis, U. S. minister, Honolulu, by steamer *Mariposa* to-morrow.

W. Q. GRESHAM.

WILLIS,
Minister, Honolulu:

WASHINGTON, *January 12, 1894.*

Your numbers 14 to 18, inclusive, show that you have rightly comprehended the scope of your instructions, and have, as far as was in your power, discharged the onerous task confided to you.

The President sincerely regrets that the Provisional Government refuses to acquiesce in the conclusion which his sense of right and duty and a due regard for our national honor constrained him to reach and submit as a measure of justice to the people of the Hawaiian Islands and their deposed sovereign. While it is true that the Provisional Government was created to exist only until the islands were annexed to the United States, that the Queen finally, but reluctantly, surrendered to an armed force of this Government illegally quartered in Honolulu, and representatives of the Provisional Government (which realized its impotency and was anxious to get control of the Queen's means of defense) assured her that, if she would surrender, her case would be subsequently considered by the United States, the President has never claimed that such action constituted him an arbitrator in the technical sense, or authorized him to act in that capacity between the Constitutional Government and the Provisional Government. You made no such claim when you acquainted that Government with the President's decision.

The solemn assurance given to the Queen has been referred to, not as authority for the President to act as arbitrator, but as a fact material to a just determination of the President's duty in the premises.

In the note which the minister of foreign affairs addressed to you on the 23d ultimo it is stated in effect that even if the Constitutional Government was subverted by the action of the American minister and an invasion by a military force of the United States, the President's authority is limited to dealing with our own unfaithful officials, and that he can take no steps looking to the correction of the wrong done. The President entertains a different view of his responsibility and duty. The subversion of the Hawaiian Government by an abuse of the authority of the United States was in plain violation of international law and required the President to disavow and condemn the act of our offending officials, and, within the limits of his constitutional power, to endeavor to restore the lawful authority.

On the 18th ultimo the President sent a special message to Congress communicating copies of Mr. Blount's reports and the instructions given to him and to you. On the same day, answering a resolution of the House of Representatives, he sent copies of all correspondence since March 4, 1889, on the political affairs and relations of Hawaii, withholding, for sufficient reasons, only Mr. Stevens' No. 70 of October 8, 1892, and your No. 3 of November 16, 1893. The President therein announced that the conditions of restoration suggested by him to the Queen had not proved acceptable to her, and that since the instructions sent to you to insist upon those conditions he had not learned that the Queen was willing to assent to them. The President thereupon submitted the subject to the more extended powers and wider discretion of Congress, adding the assurance that he would be gratified to cooperate in any legitimate plan which might be devised for a solution of the problem consistent with American honor, integrity, and morality.

Your reports show that on further reflection the Queen gave her unqualified assent in writing to the conditions suggested, but that the

Provisional Government refuses to acquiesce in the President's decision.

The matter now being in the hands of Congress the President will keep that body fully advised of the situation, and will lay before it from time to time the reports received from you, including your No. 3, heretofore withheld, and all instructions sent to you. In the meantime, while keeping the Department fully informed of the course of events, you will, until further notice, consider that your special instructions upon this subject have been fully complied with.

GRESHAM.

MESSAGE

FROM THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

TRANSMITTING

A letter from the Secretary of State, with a dispatch received from the U. S. minister at Hawaii.

FEBRUARY 2, 1894.—Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed.

The CONGRESS:

I hereby transmit a communication from the Secretary of State, accompanying a dispatch received a few days ago from our minister at Hawaii.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
February 2, 1894.

The PRESIDENT:

I send herewith, with a view to their transmission to Congress, if in the opinion of the President such action is not inconsistent with the public interest, two copies of dispatch No. 27½, under date of January 12, from Mr. Willis, our minister at Honolulu, it being the only communication received from him since January 22 bearing upon the relations between the United States and Hawaii.

Three other dispatches, Nos. 25, 26, and 27, inclosing requisitions for stationery, duplicate accounts of transit salary, and other papers having no relevancy to the matters which the President submitted to Congress in his special message of December 18, came by the same mail.

Respectfully submitted.

W. Q. GRESHAM.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 2, 1894.

[Confidential.]

No. 27½.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 12, 1894.

SIR: On yesterday at 6:30 p. m. I received the Hon. S. B. Dole's answer to my letter of January 1, requesting him "at his earliest convenience" to give me the specifications contained in a prior letter. His answer is about fifty pages of closely written official paper, and has been delivered to me too late to either copy or reply to, in time for the steamer leaving at 2 p. m. to-day.

There is one extract, however, to which I think your attention should be called, wherein it is stated "this Government has been and *now is* subjected to the necessity of increased watchfulness and large additional expense, which, but for such attitude, would have been unnecessary." The emphasis above is mine. In a previous letter of December 27 Minister Dole had stated: "The Government offices have been placed and still continue in a condition of defense and preparation for siege, and the community has been put into a state of mind bordering on terrorism." The emphasis above is mine. Some portions of the letters from which these extracts are made confirm the above statements while others seem to negative them. With this explanation, I submit them for your consideration.

The next steamer leaves here February 3, which would place you in possession of Mr. Dole's letter and my purposed reply thereto about February 18.

Very respectfully,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

Hon. W. Q. GRESHAM,
Secretary of State.

MESSAGE

FROM THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

TRANSMITTING

Further correspondence relating to the Hawaiian Islands.

FEBRUARY 13, 1894.—Read, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and ordered to be printed.

The Congress :

I transmit herewith two dispatches, received a few days ago, from our minister at Hawaii, and a reply to one of them from the Secretary of State, in which a correct version is given of an interview which occurred November 14, 1893, between the Secretary of State and Mr. Thurston, representing the Provisional Government at Washington.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

Washington, February 12, 1894.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

[Confidential.]

No. 28.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 16, 1894.

SIR: On last Thursday, January 11, by a vote of 7 to 2, the 17th day of January, being the first anniversary of the Provisional Government, was declared a public holiday.

On yesterday afternoon the representatives of foreign governments received invitations to "participate in the observance of the day."

Subsequently, the British minister, Maj. Wodehouse; the Portuguese chargé d'affaires and consul-general, Senhor Canavarro; the diplomatic agent and consul-general of Japan, Monsieur Fujii, together with Monsieur Vizzavona, chancellor and acting commissioner of France, called to inquire what reply the U. S. diplomatic agent would make.

I stated to these gentlemen that the course of our Government had not then been determined, but I did not feel at liberty to assent to the suggestion made by one of them that they should be guided exclusively in this matter by the United States. After an interchange of views they concluded that under the instructions of their respective governments they could not participate in the observance of the day and that they would so notify the Provisional Government.

This afternoon I replied to Mr. Dole's letter, a copy of which reply I inclose, stating that "with due appreciation of his courtesy and with no disrespect to him or his Government, I was, I regretted to say, unable to accept the invitation extended."

The programme of the celebration to-morrow includes battalion review and parade of military, reception at executive building, firing of national salute, and mass meeting at night, to be addressed by half a dozen speakers.

With high regard, I am, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary,
United States of America.

[Inclosure.]

Mr. Willis to Mr. Dole.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 16, 1894.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt on yesterday afternoon of your communication of January 13, 1894, informing me that "Wednesday, the 17th instant, will be observed as a national holiday. The Hawaiian flag will be displayed on all Government buildings and a national salute will be fired from the battery at noon," and inviting me "to participate in the observance of the day."

With due appreciation of your courtesy and with no disrespect to you or your Government, I am, I regret to say, unable to accept the invitation extended.

The letters inclosed in your communication, addressed to Admiral Irwin, Capt. Barker, and Capt. Nelson, of the U. S. Navy, were, as requested, transmitted to them, and the answers thereto I send herewith.

With renewed assurances of high consideration, and with the earnest hope that all questions between our governments may be speedily, honorably, and satisfactorily determined,

I am, etc.,

ALBERT S. WILLIS,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, United States of America.

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

[Confidential.]

No. 29.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 16, 1894.

SIR: In a letter from Hon. S. B. Dole, minister of foreign affairs, addressed to me under date of January 11, the following statement is made:

On November 14, Mr. Thurston, Hawaiian minister at Washington, called upon the Secretary of State, and inquired if the above letter [yours of October 18] was authentic, and was assured by Mr. Gresham that it was.

Mr. Thurston then said: "I wish, then, to further ask whether it is the intention of the United States Government to carry out its policy therein indicated by force;

or, in other words, whether, if the Provisional Government declines to accede to the request of the United States Government to vacate in favor of the Queen, United States troops will be used to enforce the request."

To which Mr. Gresham replied:

"I am not at liberty at present to answer that question. It is a matter concerning which I will speak to the President and talk with you more fully this afternoon."

In the afternoon of the same day Mr. Gresham further said to Mr. Thurston:

"I have already answered your first question, to the effect that the letter published [Secretary Gresham to the President] was authentic, and a correct statement of the policy of the United States. As to your second question, as to whether force is to be used by the United States to restore the Queen, all that I am at liberty to state is that Mr. Willis has no instructions to do anything which will cause injury to life or property of any one at the islands. Further than this I am not at liberty to state what his instructions are. You can draw your own inferences from my statement and allay any apprehension which may have been caused by what has been published."

Mr. Thurston further said to Mr. Gresham:

"Your answer does not convey the information which I requested. What I desire is to obtain information which will guide my Government in their action. If they know that force is to be used by you their course of action will necessarily be different from what it otherwise would be. The definite information from me that you intend to use force may be the means of preventing them from using force and causing bloodshed."

To which Mr. Gresham replied:

"Our relations in the past have been pleasant and I want them to continue to be so in the future and to be perfectly courteous to you, but I can not at present answer you more fully than I have done."

I do not know whether Mr. Thurston made this statement public in the United States at the time, but I do know that the first intimation that this community has upon the subject is contained in Mr. Dole's letter of the 11th instant.

Had your statement to Mr. Thurston been made public here at the time (November 24) when it was received the excitement resulting from the warlike preparations of the Provisional Government would have been allayed and critical and dangerous conditions avoided.

With high regard, I am, sir, very respectfully,

ALBERT S. WILLIS,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

Mr. Gresham to Mr. Willis.

No. 13.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 8, 1894.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 29, of January 16, in which you refer to a letter received from the Hon. S. B. Dole, minister of foreign affairs of the Provisional Government, addressed to you under date of January 11, containing statements alleged to have been made by me in an interview with Mr. Thurston, the Hawaiian minister, on November 14, last.

It is true that I had two interviews with Mr. Thurston on the day mentioned, the first of which was very brief. Immediately after the second interview I dictated to a stenographer a statement, from which the following is quoted, it being all that relates to the subject of Mr. Dole's communication to you:

On the forenoon of November 14 Hon. L. A. Thurston, minister of the Provisional Government of Hawaii, called at the State Department for an interview with the Secretary of State on the Hawaiian situation. The minister was informed by the Secretary that it was about time for a cabinet meeting, and he was under the neces-

sity of requesting the minister to call again at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He replied that he would do so, but before leaving desired to submit two questions to the Secretary: First, Was the letter addressed by the Secretary to the President about Hawaii and the Provisional Government and printed in the papers a few days ago authentic and official? Second, If it was, and he presumed it was, was it the President's intention to use force, If need be, against the Provisional Government in restoring the Queen? The Secretary replied that the letter was authentic, but not having time to spend with the minister just then he could repeat the questions on calling in the afternoon. The minister called at the appointed hour, and the Secretary informed him that the letter addressed to the President was authentic, and that *no action had or would be taken by our minister, Mr. Willis, which would imperil the lives or property of the officers or supporters of the Provisional Government, and that if they suffered in any way it would be in consequence of their own acts or attitude.*

The interview continued:

"MINISTER. Mr. Secretary, that answer is not satisfactory, and I would be glad if you would be more explicit.

"SECRETARY. I can not be more explicit at this time. You can draw your own inferences from what I have said and correct any false impressions that may have been created by what has been published."

I answered the second question in the underscored language from a slip of paper which lay on my table in plain view before me. I did not say in either interview that I was not at liberty to answer either question.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. Q. GRESHAM.

ALBERT S. WILLIS, ESQ., etc.,
Honolulu.

LETTER

FROM

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

TRANSMITTING.

Pursuant to House resolution dated the 16th ultimo, information relative to the placing of the naval forces of the United States under the orders and control of the late commissioner of the United States to the Hawaiian Islands.

MARCH 10, 1894.—Referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs and ordered to be printed.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, March 9, 1894.

SIR: Under date of the 16th ultimo the House of Representatives adopted a resolution which, after referring to the order issued by this Department, March 11, 1893, to Rear-Admiral J. S. Skerrett, commander in chief of the U. S. naval forces, Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, respecting his relations to the Hon. James H. Blount, special commissioner from the President of the United States to the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, concludes as follows:

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Navy be, and he is hereby, directed to inform the House of Representatives by what authority instructions were issued placing the armed naval forces of the United States and the use of its ensign under the orders and control of said Blount, and that the Secretary of the Navy is further directed to furnish the House of Representatives with copies of all orders, directions, instructions, or official suggestions issued by him, or any officer of the Navy Department or of the Navy, since the 4th day of March, 1892, concerning the use or movements of the armed naval forces of the United States at the Hawaiian Islands.

With respect to that portion of the resolution above quoted which directs the Secretary of the Navy "to inform the House of Representatives by what authority instructions were issued placing the armed naval forces of the United States and the use of its ensign under the orders and control" of Special Commissioner Blount, I have the honor to submit the following statement:

The letter of the Secretary of the Navy to Rear-Admiral Skerrett, dated March 11, 1893, referred to in the resolution, was printed with the papers transmitted to the House by the President, December 18,

1893, and appears on page 455, House Ex. Doc. No. 48 of the present session, and reads:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, March 11, 1893.

SIR: This letter will be handed to you by the Hon. James H. Blount, special commissioner from the President of the United States to the Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

You will consult freely with Mr. Blount, and will obey any instructions you may receive from him regarding the course to be pursued at said islands by the force under your command.

You will also afford Mr. Blount all such facilities as he may desire for the use of your cipher code in communicating by telegraph with this Government.

Respectfully,

HILARY A. HERBERT,
Secretary of the Navy.

Rear-Admiral J. S. SKERRETT,
Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Forces,
Pacific Station, Flagship Mohican, Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.

At the time this order was issued, Hon. James H. Blount was charged with the duty of visiting the Hawaiian Islands, as a special commissioner, appointed by the President. Mr. Blount was the bearer of a letter of credence to His Excellency Sanford B. Dole, president of the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, in which letter of credence President Dole was advised that in all matters affecting relations with the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, Mr. Blount's authority was paramount. (House Ex. Doc. No. 47, present session, p. 3.)

The instructions given by the Secretary of State to Mr. Blount, under date of March 11, 1893 (House Ex. Doc. No. 47, present session, pp. 1 and 2), contained the following paragraphs respecting the authority conferred upon Mr. Blount:

The comprehensive, delicate, and confidential character of your mission can now only be briefly outlined, the details of its execution being necessarily left, in great measure, to your good judgment and wise discretion.

You will investigate and fully report to the President all the facts you can learn respecting the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, the causes of the revolution by which the Queen's Government was overthrown, the sentiment of the people toward existing authority, and, in general, all that can fully enlighten the President touching the subjects of your mission.

To enable you to fulfill this charge, your authority in all matters touching the relations of this Government to the existing or other governments of the islands, and the protection of our citizens therein, is paramount, and in you alone, acting in cooperation with the commander of the naval forces, is vested full discretion and power to determine when such forces should be landed or withdrawn. * * *

In the judgment of the President your authority, as well as that of the commander of the naval forces in Hawaiian waters, should be and is limited in the use of physical force to such measures as are necessary to protect the persons and property of our citizens. * * *

Should it be necessary to land an armed force upon Hawaiian territory on occasions of popular disturbance, when the local authority may be unable to give adequate protection to the life and property of citizens of the United States, the assent of such authority should first be obtained, if it can be done without prejudice to the interests involved. Your power in this regard should not, however, be claimed to the exclusion of similar measures by the representatives of other powers for the protection of the lives and property of their citizens or subjects residing in the islands.

It is also to be borne in mind, as matter of fact, that at the time the order of March 11, referred to in the resolution, was issued, this Department was advised that armed naval forces of the United States had been landed upon the territory of Hawaii, a country with which the United States were at peace, and that the flag of the United States had been raised over the public buildings in the capital of that country.

Under these circumstances, and in view of the remoteness of the Hawaiian Islands from telegraphic communication, it was essential not only that no conflict of authority should arise with reference to the disposition of the United States naval forces at Hawaii, but that such forces should be employed in entire harmony with and in support of the policy of the diplomatic branch of the Government. For these reasons, and in order that the special commissioner appointed by the President might, in the discharge of the important duties intrusted to him, be aided by the fullest cooperation on the part of the naval branch of the Government, it was deemed proper to direct that Rear-Admiral Skerrett should consult freely with Mr. Blount, and should carry out any instructions given by him in regard to the course to be pursued by the United States naval forces at the Hawaiian Islands.

I deem it to be at all times the duty of the naval forces of the United States, in matters affecting our foreign relations, to act in subordination to and in the fullest cooperation with, the policy of the civil branch of the Government, and not to take the initiative in such matters, unless in accordance with the letter and spirit of such general or special orders as may be issued to them by the Secretary of the Navy, or when required to do so in cases of special exigency by circumstances of such gravity and urgency as to admit of no delay. If the observance of this general principle is incumbent upon the naval forces of the United States in their relations with our diplomatic representatives in foreign countries under ordinary circumstances, it becomes particularly important upon occasions when a direct representative of the President, charged with duties of a comprehensive, delicate, and confidential character, is sent abroad.

Believing that the action taken by the Department in its order of March 11, 1893, was not only proper and necessary in order to preclude the possibility of any misunderstanding or conflict of authority which might have resulted in serious embarrassment to American interests, and, further, that such action was in harmony with established precedent, I have to state, in response to the direct inquiry contained in the resolution of the House, as to my authority for issuing the order in question, that said order was issued by authority of the President, who, by constitutional provision is made Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.

In this connection attention is invited to the inclosed copies of orders issued by Secretaries of the Navy, my predecessors, relevant to the matters herein discussed.

1. Letter dated April 8, 1823, from the Secretary of the Navy to John Gallagher, commanding U. S. brig *Enterprise*, directing him to proceed to the Island of Puerto Rico, to protect all American vessels and the persons and property of American citizens "from illegal seizure by Spanish or other cruisers under whatever flag. In this letter the commander of the *Enterprise* was directed to regulate his operations by the advice of Thomas Randall, esq., agent of the Government, who was to be taken on board the *Enterprise* at New York and landed at Puerto Rico.

2. Letter dated April 24, 1823, from the Secretary of the Navy to John Gallagher, commanding U. S. brig *Enterprise*, instructing him "under the advice and approbation of Mr. Randall, special agent of the United States," to "carry into effect the views expressed" by Hon. John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, in certain communications, copies of which were forwarded to Capt. Gallagher.

3. Letter from the Secretary of the Navy to Commodore M. C. Perry, commanding the home squadron, advising him that the President had "directed Nicholas T. Trist, esq., of the State Department, to proceed to the headquarters of the Army or to the squadron as he should deem most convenient," that Mr. Trist was "clothed with such diplomatic power as to authorize him to enter into arrangements with the Mexican Government for the mutual suspension of hostilities," and adding "you will not relax the vigor of your operations while he may remain in Mexico, unless he directs you to suspend them."

4. Letter dated May 8, 1847, from Commodore Perry reporting receipt of and compliance with the above order.

5. Letter dated November 6, 1869, from the Secretary of the Navy to Capt. G. B. Balch, commanding U. S. S. *Albany*, directing him to receive on board the *Albany* Gen. Babcock, who would "have certain orders from the President of the United States;" to conform to all Gen. Babcock's wishes and orders and to convey him to such points as he might desire to visit; and when he had accomplished the duty on which he was sent to return with him to the United States if he so desired.

6. Letter dated January 11, 1870, from the Secretary of the Navy to Lieut. Commander F. M. Bunce, on the same subject.

7. Letter dated December 2, 1881, from the Secretary of the Navy to Rear-Admiral G. B. Balch, commanding the U. S. naval force, Pacific station, advising him of the appointment of Mr. William Henry Trescott, of the Department of State, as special envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, with instructions to proceed to Chile, and directing Rear-Admiral Balch to be governed as far as practicable by his wishes.

With reference to the direction contained in the latter clause of the resolution, I have to state that copies of all orders, directions, and instructions issued by the Secretary of the Navy, or by any officer of this Department or of the Navy, so far as such orders, directions, and instructions are to be found upon the files and records of the Department, from March 4, 1889, to December 18, 1893, were transmitted to the House by the President on the date last named, and were printed as a part of House Ex. Doc. No. 48 of the present session, a copy of which is inclosed. Copies of all papers in the possession of the Department relating to the subject-matter of the resolution which have been issued or received since December 18, 1893, are also inclosed.

Very respectfully,

H. A. HERBERT,
Secretary of the Navy.

THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 29, 1893.

SIR: I send herewith copy of a letter received at 11:30 this a. m. from Hon. S. B. Dole, minister of foreign affairs of the Hawaiian Provisional Government. I have made no reply to said communication.

Very respectfully,

ALBERT S. WILLIS,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, U. S. A.

JOHN IRWIN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 29, 1893.

SIR: On the 7th of August last permission was given by the Government through the office of the American legation to Rear-Admiral J. S. Skerrett, commanding U. S. naval force, Pacific station, at his request, to land the crews of the ships under his command for battalion drill when desired.

The Government now wishes to rescind the said privilege in its indefinite character and to return to the former practice, under which a request was made at each occasion when the privilege of landing men under arms was desired.

I have the honor to request that this modification of the present arrangement be transmitted through your office to Rear-Admiral Irwin, commanding U. S. naval force, Pacific station.

With sentiments of the highest consideration and esteem,

I have the honor to be, your excellency's obedient servant,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency ALBERT S. WILLIS,
U. S. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

U. S. FLAGSHIP PHILADELPHIA,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 29, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, with inclosure. In answer, I have to state that I had already given orders that our troops were not to be landed for drill or any other purpose unless ordered by myself, as in my opinion the landing of troops for drill would have a tendency to increase the disquiet already existing.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN IRWIN,
Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

His excellency Hon. A. S. WILLIS,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

PACIFIC STATION,
 OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. NAVAL FORCE,
 U. S. FLAGSHIP PHILADELPHIA,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 4, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report regarding the political situation in Honolulu. The Provisional Government is in undisturbed control of the government of all the islands. They have fortified the palace grounds, and assert that they will defend themselves at all hazards against an attack, no matter from what source it may emanate; they have fortified the palace, and have 1,000 men under arms and 500 in reserve. The reserve is also armed, the men acting as minute men and ready for instantaneous call to arms.

The feeling of both parties is intensely bitter, but I do not anticipate any collision. I have endeavored to ascertain what force the Royalists have at their command, but have not succeeded. They are naturally secretive at present. I have no reason to think that they have any organized force, as they have had no opportunity for drill. I have received no instructions other than those given my predecessor. In order to give you an idea of the feeling existing in Honolulu, I forward files of newspapers giving the views of both parties.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN IRWIN,
*Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy,
 Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.*

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *December 7, 1893.*

DEAR SIR: We have the honor herewith to transmit to you a copy of a protest and signatures by American citizens, the original of which, on the 2d instant, acting in behalf of the signers, we laid before his excellency Albert S. Willis, U. S. minister at these islands.

With the highest respect and consideration, we have the honor to be your most obedient servants,

JNO. S. MCGREW.
B. F. DILLINGHAM.

Rear-Admiral JOHN IRWIN,
U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. Naval forces, Honolulu.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *December 1, 1893.*

His Excellency ALBERT S. WILLIS,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America:

SIR: The undersigned, American residents of Honolulu, in the island of Oahu, one of the Hawaiian Islands, respectfully represent to your excellency that they are citizens of the United States of America and have done nothing whereby to forfeit or waive their full legal and constitutional rights as such citizens.

That the undersigned made their residences and homes and acquired and own property in the Hawaiian Islands, relying on the rights secured and guaranteed by the Hawaiian constitutions of 1852 and of 1865, which rights were confirmed and enlarged by the constitution of 1887.

That on the 14th day of January last the undersigned learned that it was the determination of Liliuokalani, then Hawaiian sovereign, to disregard and annul the rights of life, liberty, and property guaranteed, secured, confirmed, and enlarged by the said Hawaiian constitutions, and that she publicly proclaimed her determination to repudiate the obligations imposed upon her by virtue of her oath of office as such sovereign to support and maintain the constitution of the Hawaiian Islands, and publicly announced her intention to govern this country pursuant to her arbitrary despotic will, to be proclaimed by a public manifesto, which she called a new constitution.

That a meeting of many citizens of Honolulu was held upon the afternoon of said day, which was attended by John F. Colburn, then minister of the interior, and Arthur P. Peterson, then attorney-general, by whom it was then publicly stated that such was the determination and intention of said Liliuokalani and that if assisted by the citizens they would oppose the same.

That on said 14th day of January the then legally constituted authorities of the Hawaiian Islands were undoubtedly and avowedly incapable of controlling the elements of the anarchy which was proclaimed and intended by said Liliuokalani or of preventing impending mob violence or of keeping the public peace.

That in consequence and by reason of the premises a committee of public safety was chosen at said meeting, and on the following Monday, at a mass meeting of the citizens of Honolulu, the said committee was authorized to take measures requisite for the public safety; that in conformity therewith, on the 17th day of said January, the present Government of the Hawaiian Islands was established and proclaimed, and has since governed and controlled the Hawaiian Islands, having been recognized by all the foreign representatives in Honolulu, and having diplomatic and consular representatives abroad, especially in the United States of America, who have been, and still are, recognized and treated as the duly accredited representatives of the said Government.

That a treaty of annexation was negotiated with the said Government by and in behalf of the United States Government, and that no public notice has been given to the undersigned of any intention on the part of the United States Government to break off diplomatic relations with the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, or to do any acts of war or hostility to the said Government.

That no such acts of war or hostility can now be done without endangering the lives and property of the undersigned, and of their families, relatives, and friends in the Hawaiian Islands.

That owing to the insular situation of this country there would be no opportunity for the undersigned to take such steps and do such things as would secure the safety of the lives of themselves, their wives, and children, and of their property in case of such acts of war or hostility.

And the undersigned hereby solemnly and respectfully protest to your excellency and to Grover Cleveland, President of the United States, and to Walter Q. Gresham, Secretary of State, and to Hilary A. Herbert, Secretary of the Navy, and to Rear-

Admiral John Irwin, commanding the U. S. naval forces now in the waters of the Hawaiian Islands, and to all others concerned, that any such acts of war or hostility, if taken, attempted, or announced in the time of profound peace now existing between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands, or without any full, formal, and timely announcement thereof, will and would cause all concerned in, or authorizing the same, to be held responsible for all the consequences that may ensue therefrom, not only before Almighty God and in the forum of conscience, but by all sanctioned rules and observances of civilized nations in their dealings with each other, and will and would be in violation of the rights of the undersigned, secured and belonging to them as citizens of the United States of America.

We have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servants and fellow-citizens,

John S. McGrew.
E. G. Beckwith.
Geo. W. Smith.
A. W. Keech.
Fred. A. Smith.
Chas. M. Cooke.
C. B. Ripley.
Peter C. Jones.
Alfred S. Hartwell.
Edwin R. Newman.
H. C. Hadley.
John J. Egan.
Robt. W. Anderson.
Wm. Heilbron.
F. W. McChesney.
G. P. Castle.
Geo. M. Hill.
L. La Piere.
H. F. Gibbs.
Bruce Cartwright.
M. N. Sanders.
Chas. W. Day.
James Carty.
J. M. Webb.
Benj. D. Whitney.
Henry Davis.
John Kidwell.
John Farnsworth.
J. Simonson.
Geo. McLeod.
N. B. Emerson.
Wm. Brown.
Jas. Carlisle.
W. D. Hamilton.
C. B. Gray.
Jno. Dixon.
J. C. Clapp.
Robert Grieve.
Jas. G. Spencer.
F. L. Winter.
C. W. Gray.
M. M. Scott.
W. H. Wilkinson.
W. C. King.
B. F. Dillingham.
John C. Cluny.
James Knott, jr.
G. W. Kelly.
F. F. Porter.
L. T. Bailey.

H. A. Juen.
C. M. Hyde.
T. P. McConthy.
Paul Smith.
A. E. Nichols.
M. McInerny.
W. H. Smith.
J. Alfred Magoon.
F. A. Hosmer.
W. L. Hopper.
James Green.
H. A. Parmelee.
F. J. Lowrey.
J. B. Atherton.
S. Olesen.
Jonathan Shaw.
A. E. Weirick.
B. R. Campbell.
H. C. Reid.
T. B. Murray.
J. M. Whitney.
Jos. L. Carter.
L. P. Hanson.
James A. Hopper.
E. O. White.
G. Schuman.
Wm. R. Sims.
A. Gartenberg.
J. B. Gibson.
Chas. L. Dodge.
E. P. Chapin.
John McLain.
C. H. Kluegel.
E. A. Lundy.
Geo. Dillingham.
Edwin Benner.
D. B. Smith.
Wm. A. Bowen.
F. C. Lowrey.
H. C. Woodke.
Thos. E. Wall.
Geo. C. Stratemeyer.
J. H. Black.
Henry Congdon.
J. A. Gilman.
G. H. Green.
Theodore F. Lansing.
Danl. Lyons.
Geo. A. Turner.

Hugh Gunn.
T. H. Patterson.
H. B. Schroder.
L. Sullivan.
Frank Lawlor.
J. S. Martin.
Wm. A. Kenney.
John Hagerman.
Dick Leal.
A. J. Campbell.
E. L. Marshall.
C. S. Hall.
J. W. Sproat.
J. S. Marlin.
B. Ordenstein.
Geo. H. Paris.
A. Fuller.
Robert Laing.
S. W. Lederer.
Geo. W. Canney, jr.
F. Clifford.
C. T. Rodgers.
Clarence H. Luther.
C. Hammer.
Arthur Reynolds.
L. W. Hough.
R. A. Dexter.
E. C. Winston.
J. W. Jones.
S. G. Tucker.
L. C. Ables.
John Curly.
Charles McKay.
Geo. H. Babb.
Jas. Sherin.
W. F. Coon.
A. Storm.
F. M. Lyon.
W. M. Graham.
A. T. Smith.
C. R. Dement.
Jno. Cassidy.
Sam McKeague.
Serenio E. Bishop.
Wm. W. Hall.
Curtis J. Lyons.
Wm. McMeekin.
Capt. Kipling.
W. S. Terry.

PACIFIC STATION,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. NAVAL FORCE,
U. S. FLAGSHIP PHILADELPHIA,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 9, 1893.

SIR: (1) I have the honor to inform you that nothing of any importance has transpired since the departure of the *Oceanic*.

(2) There being quite a long interval between mails from the United States, party passion has cooled down somewhat, having no fresh fuel to feed the flame.

(3) I forward files of newspapers up to date, and inclose one pamphlet and a communication, or protest, that was sent to me. I have retained a copy of protest for the files of my office.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN IRWIN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

PACIFIC STATION,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. NAVAL FORCE,
U. S. FLAGSHIP PHILADELPHIA,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 14, 1893.

SIR: (1) I have the honor to inform you that nothing has transpired since the departure of the steamship *Australia* on the 9th instant.

(2) I forward files of newspapers to date.

(3) The health of the crews of the vessels here remains good.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN IRWIN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

PACIFIC STATION,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. NAVAL FORCE,
U. S. FLAGSHIP PHILADELPHIA,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 14, 1893.

SIR: (1) I have the honor to inform you that the U. S. revenue cutter *Corwin* has arrived here with dispatches.

(2) That the mail is now closing.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN IRWIN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

U. S. LEGATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 14, 1893.

SIR: The U. S. revenue steamer *Corwin* has arrived here under orders of the State Department and as I require her services to send important dispatches to the United States, I request that you will have her supplied with coal and whatever stores she may require to return to San Francisco, Cal.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

Rear-Admiral JOHN IRWIN,
Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force,
Pacific Station, Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.

PACIFIC STATION,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. NAVAL FORCE,
U. S. FLAGSHIP PHILADELPHIA,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 23, 1893.

SIR: (1) I have the honor to report that the U. S. revenue cutter *Corwin*, arrived on the 14th instant, bringing important dispatches for the U. S. minister.

(2) In compliance with the request of Minister Willis, I have prepared the *Corwin* for sea, supplying her with coal and whatever she required to enable her to return to San Francisco.

(3) I have nothing now to report in regard to the situation here. There has been no disturbance, but party feeling is unchanged.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN IRWIN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

PACIFIC STATION,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. NAVAL FORCE,
U. S. FLAGSHIP PHILADELPHIA,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, December 26, 1894.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that I forwarded by the U. S. revenue cutter *Corwin* under date of the 23d instant, for transmittal by the Navy pay office, San Francisco, Cal., the following telegram:

"HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *December 23, 1893.*

"SECRETARY NAVY,
"Washington:

"Condition in Honolulu unchanged since last report.

"IRWIN."

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN IRWIN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

PACIFIC STATION,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. NAVAL FORCE,
U. S. FLAGSHIP PHILADELPHIA,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 2, 1894.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report in regard to the situation since the departure of the *Corwin* on the 24th ultimo.

The military preparations for defense continue to be made by the Provisional Government and the excitement is unabated.

The newspapers assume that I, as the military representative of the U. S. Government, intend to use force to restore the Queen; at the same time they quote me as saying that I would not obey any order, which I considered unlawful; also that the officers and men under my command had assumed the same attitude.

These sensational reports are intended to influence public opinion in the United States and are entirely without foundation. Since my arrival I have carefully avoided all expressions of opinion, except in conference with the U. S. minister, and have ordered all my command to pursue a similar course. I may further add that Mr. Willis has never given me the slightest hint that there was ever any intention on the part of the U. S. Government to use force in order to restore the Queen. My own orders to preserve strict neutrality have been implicitly obeyed.

It has been asserted quite often that we were prepared to land, which is true, but our motives were intentionally misconstrued, as Mr. Willis stated openly, and his statement was published, that we would land solely for the purpose of suppressing riot and to protect the lives and property of the defenseless.

Were it not for the course of the newspapers in their endeavor to influence public opinion in the United States no uneasiness would be felt and business would go on as usual. I do not believe that ordinary business is seriously affected, as is reported, but no new enterprises will be undertaken until there is some settled government.

The commanding officers of the Japanese cruiser *Naniwa Kan* and the British cruiser *Champion* called on me to arrange for landing a force to protect the lives and property of their countrymen in case there should be any serious riot. They offered to

cooperate with me and to place their landing parties where, in my opinion, they would do the most good.

Now, as the general public in Honolulu is fully aware of the above fact, and have no longer any apprehension of any riot, and as the perusal of the President's message has convinced everyone that no force would be used to change the Government, it is criminal for anyone to make the misstatement referred to.

Foreign influence, inimical to the interests of the United States, is secretly at work here, as it is wherever we have any trade interests, and that influence will account for many of the misstatements in the papers.

I forward files of newspapers covering the period since last mail. The health of the crews of the vessels here remains good.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN IRWIN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

PACIFIC STATION,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. NAVAL FORCE,
U. S. FLAGSHIP PHILADELPHIA,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 3, 1894.

SIR: I have the honor to call the attention of the Department to the admirable discretion exercised by the officers and men of this squadron, under the most trying circumstances.

Notwithstanding the great parade of preparations for war, not one case of misconduct on shore has occurred, and this evidence of perfect discipline has been very favorably commented upon by disinterested parties ashore and afloat.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN IRWIN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

PACIFIC STATION,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. NAVAL FORCE,
U. S. FLAGSHIP PHILADELPHIA,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 11, 1894.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the situation since my letter of the 2d instant is changed to this extent:

The preparations for defense have ceased and the sand bags used about the Government buildings are being removed.

There does not appear to be any danger of riot, unless the preparations to celebrate on the 17th the anniversary of the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of the Provisional Government should irritate the Royalists beyond the bounds of prudence.

It is not yet certain that there will be any celebration, and wise counsel may prevail to prevent it.

I send files of papers as usual.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN IRWIN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 15, 1894.

SIR: At the request of Hon. Sanford B. Dole, minister of foreign affairs, I transmit to you the inclosed communication.

With high regard, I am, sir, yours, respectfully,

ALBERT S. WILLIS,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

Rear-Admiral IRWIN,
Commanding U. S. Naval Forces, Pacific Station.

PACIFIC STATION,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE,
U. S. FLAGSHIP PHILADELPHIA,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 13, 1894.

SIR: Referring to our conversation of this morning, I have the honor to inform you that no different preparations for landing have ever been made since I assumed command of this squadron than those made by my predecessor, Rear-Admiral Skerrett.

Rear-Admiral Skerrett had organized landing parties, intended to suppress riot and to protect the lives and property of American and English residents. In making the preparations referred to, he was acting under instructions from the Navy Department received October 7, 1893, nearly a month before your arrival. When the revenue cutter *Corwin* arrived, I did, as a matter of precaution, suspend liberty to the crews of the *Philadelphia* and *Adams* until I could ascertain whether it would be prudent to permit them to land without danger of collision.

After landing, and having satisfied myself on that point, which I did in less than an hour, I telephoned to Capt. Barker and Capt. Nelson to give liberty as usual.

I will further state that the great guns of the *Philadelphia* and *Adams* have never been loaded since their last target practice at sea. The usual harbor drills have been kept up, as required by regulations, the exception being that our men have not been landing for the purpose of drill since my assumption of command.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN IRWIN,
Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force Pacific Station.

Hon. A. S. WILLIS,
U. S. Minister Plenipotentiary and
Envoy Extraordinary to the Hawaiian Islands.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 13, 1894.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that, Wednesday next, the 17th instant, will be observed as a national holiday. The Hawaiian flag will be displayed on all Government buildings and a salute will be fired from the battery at noon.

You are respectfully invited to participate in the observance of the day.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Rear-Admiral IRWIN,
Commanding U. S. Naval Forces on the Pacific Station,
and Staff, Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.

PACIFIC STATION,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE,
U. S. FLAGSHIP PHILADELPHIA,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 16, 1894.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of January 15, 1894, transmitting a communication from the minister of foreign affairs of the Hawaiian Government, dated January 13, 1894, relative to the celebration to take place on Wednesday, January 17.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN IRWIN,
Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. Naval Force Pacific Station.

His Excellency ALBERT S. WILLIS,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States
to the Hawaiian Islands.

PACIFIC STATION, OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
U. S. FLAGSHIP PHILADELPHIA,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 16, 1894.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge, with thanks, the receipt of your excellency's invitation to participate in the celebration of to-morrow as a national Hawaiian holiday.

It is a matter of sincere regret to myself and the officers under my command to feel compelled to refrain from taking part in the celebration.

I have the honor to be, with sentiments of highest consideration,
Your excellency's most obedient servant,

JOHN IRWIN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

His Excellency Hon. SANFORD B. DOLE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 15, 1894.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: In a recent communication from the Provisional Government the following statement is made:

"Up to the time of the arrival of the *Corwin* the U. S. naval officers in port were in the habit of coming ashore in citizen's dress, the crews receiving the usual liberty on shore, and no unusual warlike preparations were visible on board. Immediately after the arrival of the *Corwin* the liberty of the crews was stopped, as was that of most of the officers. Those who came on shore were in service uniform, rifles were stacked, cartridge belts were filled, and ball cartridges and knapsacks packed for immediate use were conspicuous on the decks of the ships, and were seen there by visiting citizens, who, in reply to inquiry as to the meaning of such preparations, were informed by officers that they were ready to land at a moment's notice. When asked if the landing would be to protect or fight us the reply of the officers of the *Philadelphia* was that no one on board knew what orders would be received."

Will you please give me any information touching the above, and much oblige.

Very respectfully,

ALBERT S. WILLIS.

Admiral IRWIN.

PACIFIC STATION,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. NAVAL FORCE,
U. S. FLAGSHIP PHILADELPHIA,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 15, 1894.

SIR: In answer to your personal letter of this date, I have the honor to submit the following statement:

On the day the *Corwin* arrived (Thursday, December 14) word was brought to me that there was great excitement on shore; whereupon, as a precautionary measure, I gave orders to suspend liberty until I could ascertain whether it would be prudent to permit my men to land. As I have already informed you officially, the order was revoked by telephone in less than an hour from the time of my landing.

In regard to the statements regarding the drills on the 14th and 15th, I have to state that the squadron routine drills were carried out as usual. On the 18th, as the excitement on shore was very great, and as quite a mob had gathered at our usual landing, I gave orders for our officers to wear their uniforms on shore, which is the usual precaution taken in foreign countries in time of great public excitement. It is proper to add that I had been informed by Capt. Rooke of the British cruiser *Champion*, that he had given a similar order.

In regard to the statements regarding the preparations for landing, I have to state that any parties visiting the vessels under my command will have an opportunity to witness similar preparations every week, when the routine calls for it.

The reply quoted as made by the officers of the *Philadelphia*, "that no one on board knew what orders would be received," should convince any reasonable person that no order had been given.

As you are aware, I have studiously avoided doing anything that would have a tendency to increase the excitement prevailing in Honolulu, and I now distinctly state that the naval force under my command is no way responsible for the feeling now existing.

Notes from entry in Log Book, U. S. Flagship Philadelphia.

Thursday, December 14, 1893, morning watch 4 to 8 a. m.; at 6 o'clock U. S. revenue steamer *Corwin* came in bearing dispatches for U. S. Minister Willis (Signed), C. M. Knepper, ensign, U. S. Navy.

Forenoon watch from 8 a. m. to meridian; at 9:35 beat to general quarters exercised batteries (Signed), Samuel Seabury, lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

Afternoon watch from meridian to 4 p. m.; sent an officer to commanding officer of *Adams* and *Corwin* that permission could be granted to visit shore (Signed), Alex. Sharp, jr. lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

Friday, December 15, 1894.

Forenoon watch, 8 a. m. to meridian: At 9:30 mustered and inspected quarters, immediately called away all boats, armed and equipped. "Drilled boats at fleet tactics under oars." (Signed) Alex. Sharp, jr., Lieut., U. S. N.

Meridian to 4 p. m.: "Exercised boats under sail at fleet tactics." (Signed) P. J. Werlich, Lieut., U. S. N.

[Extract from squadron and routine drills.]

Second Thursday, general quarters, exercise and instruct all divisions.

Third Friday, boat drill, fire party, arm and away.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

His Excellency ALBERT S. WILLIS,
*Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
of the United States to the Hawaiian Islands.*

PACIFIC STATION,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE,
U. S. FLAGSHIP PHILADELPHIA,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 19, 1894.

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith copies of all the correspondence between the Provisional Government of Hawaii and myself and the U. S. minister to Hawaii and myself.

Inclosures.

Letter of November 29, 1893, from the U. S. minister transmitting copy of a communication from the Provisional Government of Hawaii relative to landing men for drill.

Letter of November 29, 1893, to the U. S. minister acknowledging his letter of same date and reply thereto.

Letter of December 14, 1893, from the U. S. minister concerning supplies for the *Corwin*.

Letter of January 13, 1894, to the U. S. minister replying to conversation relative to preparations for landing, etc.

Letter of January 15, 1894, from the U. S. minister asking for information concerning preparations on board after the arrival of the *Corwin*.

Letter of January 15, 1894, to the U. S. minister answering above letter.

Letter of January 15, 1894, from the U. S. minister transmitting communication from Provisional Government of Hawaii of January 13, regarding celebration of January 17 as a national Hawaiian holiday.

Letter of January 16, 1894, to the U. S. minister acknowledging receipt of above letter.

Letter of January 16, 1894, to Provisional Government of Hawaii acknowledging receipt of their invitation to participate in the celebration of January 17.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN IRWIN,
*Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.*

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

PACIFIC STATION,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U. S. NAVAL FORCE,
U. S. FLAGSHIP PHILADELPHIA,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 19, 1894.

SIR: Taking advantage of the proposed departure of a fast merchant vessel this day, I have the honor to state that there is no material change in the condition of affairs here.

January 17, having been proclaimed a national Hawaiian holiday, was duly observed by the adherents of the Provisional Government. The foreign diplomatic corps and the war vessels of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan refrained from any participation in the celebration.

I forward a few papers, reserving the files for the regular mail.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN IRWIN,
*Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.*

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

PACIFIC STATION,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U. S. NAVAL FORCE,
U. S. FLAGSHIP PHILADELPHIA,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, February 2, 1894.

SIR: I have the honor to report that there has been no material change in the political situation here. Both parties seem to be awaiting the action of Congress. The bitterness of feeling between the party leaders is, if anything, intensified.

My impression is that there is a strong movement on foot looking toward the proclamation of a republic, with qualified suffrage, the qualifications being educational and the possession of a given amount of property.

I forward files of papers, also duplicates of communications sent by a fast sailing vessel on the 19th ultimo.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant.

JOHN IRWIN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM.

Department to John Gallagher, esq., commanding U. S. brig *Enterprise*, New York, dated April 8, 1823.

Department to John Gallagher, esq., commanding U. S. brig *Enterprise*, New York, dated April 24, 1823.

Department to Commodore M. C. Perry, commanding the home squadron, dated April 15, 1847.

M. C. Perry, commanding home squadron, U. S. flagship *Mississippi*, to Department, dated May 8, 1847.

Department to Capt. G. B. Balch, commanding U. S. S. *Albany*, New York, dated November 6, 1869.

Department to Lieut. Commander F. M. Bunce, commanding U. S. S. *Nantasket*, San Domingo, dated January 11, 1870.

Department to Rear-Admiral George B. Balch, commanding the U. S. naval force, Pacific station, dated December 2, 1881.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, April 8, 1823.

SIR: When the U. S. brig *Enterprise* shall be fully equipped and ready, proceed to sea, shaping your course directly for the island of Porto Rico to protect all American vessels and the persons and property of our citizens from illegal seizure by Spanish or other cruisers, under whatever flag. Thomas Randall, esq., will embark with you as agent of the Government, to be landed at Porto Rico. You will cruise about the island until he shall be ready to reembark, visiting the different ports for the purpose of affording protection to our commerce, and if time will permit you may, should circumstances require it, run over to the main, cruising about La Guayra and Porto Cabello, affording convoy to all American vessels that shall desire it. You will, however, regulate your operations by the advice of Mr. Randall, so as to be ready to receive him on board at any time, and proceed with him to Cuba, or any port that he may designate.

Should you fall in with Commodore Porter during your cruise, report to him, and he will decide as to the expediency of permitting you to return to the United States with dispatches, or employing one of the smaller vessels of the squadron under his command for that purpose. I inclose, for your government, copies of the general instructions for cruising under the acts of Congress for the suppression of the slave trade, and punishment of the crime of piracy, I transmit to you a memorandum describing a piratical vessel, that you may make use of the same should an opportunity offer for the purpose.

Previously to sailing, transmit a complete roll of all persons on board.

Wishing you a successful cruise,

I am respectfully, etc.,

SMITH THOMPSON.

JOHN GALLAGHER, Esq.,
Commanding U. S. Brig *Enterprise*, New York.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, April 24, 1823.

SIR: In addition to the instructions sent to you under date of the 8th instant, I now transmit to you copies of two letters, addressed to me by the Hon. John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, dated the 29th and 30th ultimo, and I request that you will, under the advice and approbation of Mr. Randall, special agent of the United States, carry into effect the views expressed by Mr. Adams, adhering strictly in all respects to the suggestions contained in his letter.

I am, respectfully, etc.,

SMITH THOMPSON.

JOHN GALLAHER, Esq.,
Commanding U. S. Brig *Enterprise*, New York.

[Confidential.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
April 15, 1847.

SIR: The successes which have recently crowned our arms would seem to justify the expectation that the Government of Mexico would feel disposed to submit proposals for peace. That there may be no unnecessary delay in acting on such proposals, if they shall be made, the President has directed Nicholas T. Trist, esq., of the State Department, to proceed to the headquarters of the Army or to the Squadron as he shall deem most convenient, and be in readiness to receive any proposition for a settlement of the questions at issue. Mr. Trist is clothed with such diplomatic power as to authorize him to enter into arrangements with the Mexican Government for the mutual suspension of hostilities. If he shall communicate to you in writing that the contingency has occurred, you will act in accordance with his directions and suspend actual hostilities until further orders from the Department unless the enemy shall continue or recommence them. In doing so you will not relinquish any position which you may occupy, or abstain from any change of position which in your judgment may be necessary for the security or health of your command.

You will afford to Mr. Trist every facility and accommodation in your power, and a speedy passage to New Orleans when he may desire to return. You will not relax the vigor of your operations while he may remain in Mexico, unless he directs you to suspend them, but during that time it is desirable, if it does not conflict with your arrangements, that you shall be in the harbor of Vera Cruz, or as accessible as may be.

You will be pleased to make your communications to the Department as frequent as you may find opportunity.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. Y. MASON.

Commodore M. C. PERRY,
Commanding the *Home Squadron*.

U. S. FLAGSHIP *MISSISSIPPI*,
Anton Lizardo, May 8, 1847.

SIR: I have received by Mr. Trist your confidential communication of the 15th instant, [*sic.*] and in a personal interview with that gentleman have made the requisite arrangements for carrying out the wishes and intentions of the Department.

It is highly necessary that I should no longer delay a visit to the eastern coast as far as Laguna and Campeche. This I can do before any communication of interest can be received from Mr. Trist, and we both agree that it is better for me to make the visit now, that I may be at Vera Cruz about the time he shall have been informed of the result of his mission; but to prevent any inconvenience I shall leave a steamer at Vera Cruz to bring me any communication that Mr. Trist might transmit during my absence.

The *Potomac* will also be left at Vera Cruz.

With great respect, I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

M. C. PERRY,
Commanding *Home Squadron*.

Hon. JOHN Y. MASON,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, November 6, 1869.

SIR: You will have your vessel in all respects ready for sea by the 8th of this month, and be ready to receive on board three officers ordered by the President to take passage with you to San Domingo. Gen. Babcock will have certain orders

from the President of the United States. You are directed to conform to all his wishes and orders, and to convey him to such points as he may desire to visit.

When he has accomplished the duty on which he is sent, you will return with him to the United States, if he so desires it.

If he has no further use for you and determines to return by private steamer, you will proceed and report to the commander in chief of the North Atlantic Squadron, unless directed by Gen. Babcock to remain on the coast of San Domingo.

Very respectfully,

GEO. M. ROBESON,
Secretary of the Navy.

Capt. G. B. BALCH,
Commanding U. S. S. Albany, New York, N. Y.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *January 11, 1870.*

SIR: I have received your communication dated the 17th ultimo, Harbor of San Domingo, inclosing a copy of instructions given you by Gen. Babcock. Your prompt compliance with the instructions, and your efforts to carry them out to the full extent of your power, meet with the approval of the Department, and you will, unless otherwise ordered, be guided by any additional instructions which you may receive from him.

The Department is surprised that Capt. Balch, in view of the important duties with which Gen. Babcock was charged by the President, and the fact that the *Albany* had been placed under his orders, should have declined to give his official sanction or indorsement upon the instructions of Gen. Babcock to you.

Very respectfully,

GEO. M. ROBESON,
Secretary of the Navy.

Lieut. Commander F. M. BUNCE,
Commanding U. S. S. Nantasket, San Domingo.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, December 2, 1881.

SIR: You will instruct the commanding officer of the vessel of your command, most available for the service, to receive on board at Panama the following named gentlemen, who compose the special mission of the Department of State to South America: Mr. William Henry Trescot, special envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary; Mr. Walker Blaine, Third Assistant Secretary of State, on special diplomatic service, and the gentlemen attached to the mission. You will direct the commanding officer of the vessel detailed for this service to proceed, at such times as may be indicated by Mr. Trescot, at Valparaiso, stopping en route at Callao, or at any other points desired by the mission; and you will instruct him to render to these gentlemen every possible courtesy and facility in his power. On the 28th of last month, the Department sent a message, by cable, to Capt. Henry Wilson, care of the U. S. consul at Panama, to remain there to receive on board the mission. The *Lackawanna*, under his command, left San Francisco for Panama on the 6th of November, and, it is presumed, will arrive in time. If he arrives in time, Capt. Wilson will carry out the instructions of the Department issued to him this day to receive the mission on board and proceed with them as indicated until falling in with your flagship when he will report to you for further instructions, if necessary.

The honorable the Secretary of State is especially desirous that there should be two vessels at Valparaiso, as it is likely that prompt communication between that port and Callao may be necessary and he does not wish that the mission should be without a United States vessel at its service. You will distribute your vessels so that this wish of the Secretary of State shall be fulfilled. It is suggested that the *Alaska* be one of the vessels, she having more convenient and comfortable quarters, and being faster than either the *Penacola* or *Lackawanna*. The Department desires to impress upon you that the President attaches great importance to this mission, and it is hoped and expected that you will cheerfully render it such service as it may require. To accomplish this, Mr. Trescot will consult with you, and you will be governed, as far as practicable, by his wishes. A duplicate of this letter has been given Mr. Trescot in order that there may be no delay in the mission leaving Panama.

Very respectfully,

WILLIAM H. HUNT,
Secretary of the Navy.

Rear-Admiral GEORGE B. BALCH,
Commanding the U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

House Ex. Doc. No. 48, Fifty-third Congress, second session.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, December 18, 1893.

To the PRESIDENT:

I have the honor to transmit herewith the naval correspondence relating to Hawaiian matters, from March 4, 1889, to the present time.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully,

H. A. HERBERT,
Secretary of the Navy.

NAVAL CORRESPONDENCE.

Secretary Chandler to Rear-Admiral Balch.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, June 6, 1882.

SIR: I inclose for your information a copy of a dispatch from Gen. Comly, United States minister resident at Honolulu, addressed to the honorable the Secretary of State, and have to direct that you send one of the vessels of your squadron to Honolulu for a reasonable visit, and to other ports of the Hawaiian Kingdom, if thought advisable, after which you will make such disposition of that vessel as the needs of the station may dictate. It is not thought advisable for the flagship to leave the west coast of South America at present. You will therefore detail the *Alaska* or *Lackawanna* for the services indicated above.

Very respectfully,

WM. E. CHANDLER,
Secretary of the Navy.

Rear-Admiral GEORGE B. BALCH,
Commanding United States Naval Force on Pacific Station.

Secretary Chandler to Secretary Frelinghuysen.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, June 7, 1882.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your confidential letter of the 2d instant, and the copy of the dispatch of the 8th ultimo, with accompanying papers, from the United States minister resident at Honolulu. Instructions have been given Rear-Admiral George B. Balch, commanding our naval force in the Pacific, to send one of the vessels of the squadron to the Hawaiian Islands, in compliance with your suggestion.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. E. CHANDLER,
Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. FREDK. T. FRELINGHUYSEN,
Secretary of State.

Secretary Chandler to Rear-Admiral Balch.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, October 19, 1882.

SIR: The coronation of the King of the Hawaiian Islands is fixed for the 12th of February next. It is desirable that at least two of our vessels of war should go to Honolulu some time previous to that date and remain until after the ceremony, and as much longer as may be deemed advisable, their movements being governed to a proper extent by the opinions and advice of the United States minister.

You will give the necessary orders to carry these instructions into effect.

Very respectfully,

WM. E. CHANDLER,
Secretary of the Navy.

Rear-Admiral GEORGE B. BALCH, U. S. Navy,
Commanding United States Naval Force on Pacific Station.

Secretary Chandler to Secretary Frelinghuysen.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, May 3, 1883.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of April 28, transmitting copy of dispatch of April 6 from Mr. Daggett, United States minister resident at Honolulu, giving reasons why a United States naval vessel should at all times remain within the limits of the Hawaiian Kingdom. In reply, I have to say that this Department, while unable to keep a vessel constantly at Honolulu, will give such directions as to insure one of its vessels visiting Honolulu at as frequent intervals as practicable.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. E. CHANDLER,
Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. FREDERICK T. FRELINGHUYSEN,
Secretary of State.

[Cablegram.]

JUNE 24, 1887.

AMERICAN CONSUL, Panama.
(Via Galveston.)

Wire Kimberly deemed advisable he go Sandwich Islands in near future. Adams instructed await his arrival.

WHITNEY.

Secretary Whitney to Commander-in-Chief, United States Naval Force, Pacific Station.

JULY 12, 1887.

SIR: In view of the reported unsettled condition of political affairs in the Hawaiian Kingdom, the Department is very desirous that there should be a cordial and cooperative understanding between our minister at Honolulu and the commanding officer of the naval force on

the Pacific station. The Department of State will indicate to the minister the policy which it is desirable to be observed, and in order that the views of our Government may be discreetly and properly sustained, you will be pleased to keep yourself in constant communication with Mr. Morrill, supporting him if necessary with the available force under your command.

Very respectfully,

W. C. WHITNEY,
Secretary of the Navy.

The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
United States Naval Force, Pacific Station.

Acting Secretary Harmony to Rear-Admiral Kimberly.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 11, 1887.

SIR: Under the late treaty between this Government and that of the Hawaiian Islands the United States has acquired certain rights in Pearl Harbor, Island of Oahu. For the present it is deemed advisable for such ships of your squadron as practicable to remain at the Sandwich Islands. While there you will be pleased to have Pearl Harbor examined, particularly at the entrance, the extent of artificial channel which it will be necessary to cut and the best point for such work determined, and an estimate made of its cost. At the same time you will procure as full information as possible with regard to the rights of private individuals in Pearl Harbor, together with any other information bearing upon the general subject that you may be able to collect, and forward the whole to the Navy Department for the information of this Government.

The *Marion*, now at Panama, has been ordered to touch at various Central American and Mexican ports as far north as Acapulco, from which point she is to proceed to the Sandwich Islands to remain a reasonable time before proceeding to Yokohama to report for duty on the Asiatic station. Similar orders will probably be issued to the *Omaha* in March next.

Very respectfully,

D. B. HARMONY,
Acting Secretary of the Navy.

Rear-Admiral L. A. KIMBERLY, U. S. Navy,
*Commanding United States Force on Pacific Station,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.*

Secretary Tracy to Rear-Admiral Kimberly.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *September 13, 1889.*

SIR: The Department incloses herewith, for your information, a copy of a cipher message sent you yesterday by wire, through the United States consul at Auckland, N. Z.

Very respectfully,

B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy.

Rear-Admiral L. A. KIMBERLY, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Pacific Station, Apia, Samoa.

*Secretary Tracy to Rear-Admiral Kimberly.*NAVY DEPARTMENT, *November 13, 1889.*

SIR: Referring to your letter, No. 165, of the 18th ultimo, with reference to the political situation in the Hawaiian Islands, and in which you state that "it would promote a feeling of security to our own people, and I think to other foreigners, if at the February election we had a force here competent to preserve order should necessity arise," the Department directs that you will keep as many of the vessels of your command in Hawaiian waters as you may deem expedient for the purpose of carrying out the object in view.

A copy of a letter from the Honorable the Secretary of State, concurring in your opinion as to the desirability of such action, is inclosed herewith for your information.

Very respectfully,

B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy.

Rear-Admiral L. A. KIMBERLY,
Commanding United States Naval Force, Pacific Station.

*Secretary Tracy to Admiral Brown.*NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, May 15, 1890.

SIR: The Department deems it advisable that you give up, for the present, your projected cruise along the coast of Central and South America, and that you proceed, without delay, to the Sandwich Islands.

Inclosed are copies of two confidential papers received from the State Department, which will inform you of matters that need your consideration.

The Department desires that you will carefully study the situation at these islands, and relies upon your discretion in looking after our interests. Any change of policy on the part of the Hawaiian Government, or any matter which may affect the policy of this Government, should be immediately reported.

Very respectfully,

B. F. TRACY.

[Inclosures.]

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine. Confidential letter (No. 20), United States legation, Honolulu, March 20, 1890.

Mr. Cleghorn to Mr. Damon. Letter, Honolulu, March 13, 1890.

*Secretary Tracy to Admiral Brown.*WASHINGTON, *June 20, 1890.*

SIR: The Department has received your letter 203, of the 5th instant, and has to say that your interpretation of its order of the 15th ultimo to remain in Hawaiian waters until further instructed is correct.

Very respectfully,

B. F. TRACY.

Secretary Tracy to commanding officer Mohican.

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, August 23, 1890.

SHEPARD,
American Steamer Mohican,
Sydney, Australia.
Go to Honolulu.

TRACY.

Secretary Tracy to Admiral Brown.

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1890.

Admiral BROWN,
Flagship Charleston,
Seattle, Wash.:

Proceed with all dispatch to Honolulu, Hawaii. Keep your movements and intentions secret.

TRACY.

Commodore Ramsay to Admiral Brown.

WASHINGTON, January 20, 1891.

SIR: The following telegram was sent you yesterday:

Admiral BROWN,
Flagship Charleston,
Mare Island, Cal.:

Within how many hours can you sail for Honolulu, Hawaii?

TRACY.

Very respectfully,

F. M. RAMSAY,
Chief of Bureau.

Secretary Tracy to Admiral Brown.

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, January 21, 1891.

Rear Admiral BROWN,
Flagship Charleston, San Francisco, Cal:

San Francisco Examiner requests authority to send out reporter to Honolulu in *Charleston*. If one representative will satisfy San Francisco press, you may take if agreeable. Act as you think best.

TRACY.

Secretary Tracy to Admiral Brown.

[Telegram,]

WASHINGTON, *January 21, 1891.*

Rear-Admiral GEORGE BROWN,
Flagship Charleston, San Francisco, Cal:

When King of Hawaii's funeral takes place? It is very important you sail as soon as possible.

TRACY.

Secretary Tracy to Admiral Brown.

WASHINGTON, *January 22, 1891.*

Rear Admiral GEORGE BROWN,
Flagship Charleston, San Francisco, Cal:

It is important to reach Honolulu, Hawaii, as soon as possible; full speed.

TRACY.

Secretary Tracy to Admiral Brown.

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, *January 24, 1891.*

Will remain until further orders at Honolulu, unless affairs are settled and absolutely safe.

TRACY.

Secretary Tracy to Rear-Admiral Brown.

MARCH 11, 1891.

SIR: Referring to your dispatches Nos. 37, 39, 50, and 54, in which you give a detailed account of the services rendered by you and the officers and men under your command, in connection with the funeral of the late Hawaiian King and the ceremonies attending the accession to the throne of his successor, Queen Liliuokalani, the Department desires to express to you its high appreciation of the thorough and efficient manner in which the delicate and responsible duties connected with those events have been performed.

Acting Secretary Ramsay to Rear-Admiral Brown.

MARCH 25, 1891.

SIR: The Department incloses a copy of a telegram received this day from Mr. de Young, of the San Francisco Chronicle, and desires a full explanation of your action in connection with the cipher telegram sent you January 21 last, which was as follows:

The San Francisco Examiner requests authority to send out reporters to Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, in the *Charleston*. If one representative will satisfy the San Francisco press, you may take, if agreeable. Do as you think best.

Secretary Tracy to Commanding Officer Iroquois.

JUNE 26, 1891.

Proceed to Samoa as early as you can conveniently, unless in your opinion it is not advisable to leave Sandwich Islands at present time without a ship of war.

Secretary Tracy to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Station.

SEPTEMBER 8, 1891.

SIR: You are informed that the U. S. S. *Pensacola* has been attached to the Pacific Station under your command. The following orders were telegraphed to her commanding officer on the 7th instant:

Proceed to Honolulu, Hawaii, and guard American interests in that vicinity until further instructed. Report to Brown by letter.

Secretary Tracy to Commanding Officer Boston.

WASHINGTON, July 15, 1892.

SIR: As soon as the U. S. S. *Boston* is in all respects ready for sea, proceed with her to Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, and report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Station.

Respectfully,

B. F. TRACY.

Acting Secretary Soley to Commanding Officer Boston.

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1892.

Commanding Officer Steamer *Boston*,

Through Commandant, Navy Yard, Mare Island, Cal.:

Upon your arrival at Honolulu deliver following telegram:

STEVENS,

United States Minister, Honolulu:

If you have not already done so, prepare report on annexation of Johnson's Island by British steamer *Champion*, with statement of history, occupancy by American comers, and any adverse claims thereto.

FOSTER.

Acknowledge receipt.

JAMES R. SOLEY.

Commodore Ramsay to Commanding Officer Boston.

[Telegram.]

Washington, Sept. 2, 1892.

Commanding Officer Steamer *Boston*, Honolulu, H. I.

(Care Navy Pay Office, San Francisco, Cal.)

Should *Alliance* arrive at Honolulu, order her to remain there and proceed with *Boston* to San Francisco.

RAMSAY.

Commodore Ramsay to Admiral Harmony.

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, September 2, 1892.

HARMONY,

*Steamer Lancaster, Yokohama, Japan:*Order *Alliance* to stop at Honolulu.

RAMSAY.

Commodore Ramsay to Admiral Brown.

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, September 13, 1892.

Rear-Admiral BROWN,

*Steamer San Francisco,**Mare Island, Cal.:*

Commandant directed to have *Alliance* ready for sea without delay and to order her to report to you. She will be attached to your squadron. Department wants her to go at once to Honolulu and relieve *Boston*. Report when *Alliance* can sail.

RAMSAY.

Commodore Ramsay to Admiral Brown.

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1892.

Rear-Admiral BROWN,

*Steamer San Francisco,**Navy-yard, Mare Island, Cal.:*

Department does not desire *Boston* to leave Honolulu until *Alliance* arrives. Commander Barclay will go by steamer to Honolulu to relieve Rich.

RAMSAY.

Commodore Ramsay to Admiral Brown.

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1892.

Rear-Admiral BROWN,

Steamer San Francisco, Mare Island, Cal.:

Order *Alliance* to proceed with dispatch to Honolulu. Order *Boston* upon arrival of *Alliance* to proceed to Acapulco.

RAMSAY.

Secretary Tracy to Admiral Brown.

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1892.

Commanding Officer Steamer *Boston*, Honolulu,

(Care Navy Pay Office, San Francisco, Cal.):

Remain at Honolulu until further orders.

TRACY.

Secretary Tracy to commanding officer Alliance.

[Telegram.]

OCTOBER 11, 1892.

Commanding Officer U. S. S. Alliance :

(Care Navy Pay Office, San Francisco, Cal.)

Orders to Samoa revoked. Remain at Honolulu until further orders.
TRACY.

Secretary Tracy to Admiral Skerrett.

[Telegram.]

JANUARY 28, 1893.

Admiral SKERRETT,

Flagship Mohican :

(Through commandant navy-yard, Mare Island, Cal.)

When the *Mohican* is ready for sea proceed with her to Honolulu with all dispatch. The present Provisional Government of Hawaii is recognized by this Government and by all foreign governments except England. Be vigilant in protecting American interests and be prepared to meet any danger by which such interests may be threatened. Deliver to Minister Stevens, Honolulu, the following dispatch from the State Department.

Secretary Foster to Mr. Stevens.

[Telegram.]

JOHN L. STEVENS,

United States Minister, Honolulu:

Your dispatch, telegraphed from San Francisco, announcing revolution and establishment of a provisional government, was received to-day. Your course in recognizing an unopposed *de facto* government appears to have been discreet and in accordance with the facts. The rule of this Government has uniformly been to recognize and enter into relations with any actual government in full possession of effective power with the assent of the people. You will continue to recognize the new government under such conditions. It is trusted that the change, besides conducing to the tranquility and welfare of the Hawaiian Islands, will tend to draw closer the intimate ties of amity and common interests which so conspicuously and necessarily link them to the United States. You will keep in constant communication with the commander of the United States naval force at Honolulu, with a view to acting, if need be, for the protection of the interests and property of American citizens, and aiding in the preservation of good order under the changed conditions reported.

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Acknowledge receipt of the above.

B. F. TRACY.

Secretary Tracy to Rear-Admiral Skerrett.

[Telegram.]

FEBRUARY 14, 1893.

Rear-Admiral SKERRETT,

United States Steamer Mohican, Honolulu, Hawaii:

(Through Pay Inspector Lyon, Navy Pay Office, San Francisco, Cal.)

The following is a copy of a telegram, dated February 14, from the Secretary of State to the United States minister at Honolulu, which is transmitted for your information and guidance:

Your telegram of the 1st instant has been received, with coincident report from commander of the *Boston*. Press telegrams from San Francisco give full details of events of 1st instant, with text of your proclamation. The latter, in announcing assumption of protection of the Hawaiian Islands in the name of the United States, would seem to be tantamount to the assumption of a protectorate over those islands on behalf of the United States, with all the rights and obligations which the term implies. It is not thought, however, that the request of the Provisional Government for protection, or your action in compliance therewith, contemplated more than the coöperation of the moral and material forces of the United States to strengthen the authority of the Provisional Government by according to it adequate protection for life and property during the negotiations instituted here, and without interfering with the execution of public affairs. Such coöperation was and is within your standing instructions and those of the naval commanders in Hawaiian waters.

So far as your course accords to the *de facto* sovereign government the material coöperation of the United States for the maintenance of good order and protection of life and property from apprehended disorders, it is commended; but so far as it may appear to overstep that limit by setting the authority of the United States above that of the Hawaiian Government, in the capacity of protector, or to impair the independent sovereignty of that Government by substituting the flag and power of the United States, it is disavowed.

Instructions will be sent to naval commanders, confirming and renewing those heretofore given them, under which they are authorized and directed to coöperate with you in case of need. Your own instructions are likewise renewed and you are accordingly authorized to arrange with the commanding officer for the continued presence on shore of such marine force as may be practicable and requisite for the security of the lives and property interests of American citizens and the repression of lawlessness threatening them whenever in your judgment it shall be necessary so to do, or when such coöperation may be sought for good cause by the Government of the Hawaiian Islands; being, however, always careful to distinguish between these functions of voluntary or accorded protection and the assumption of a protectorate over the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, which the United States have recognized as sovereign and with which they treat on terms of sovereign equality.

(Signed) John W. Foster.

B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy.

Secretary Tracy to Commander in Chief Pacific Station.

FEBRUARY 14, 1893.

SIR: I have to transmit, for your information and guidance, a copy of a letter from the honorable Secretary of State to the United States minister at Honolulu, dated February 11, 1893.

Very respectfully,

B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.

[Inclosure.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 21, 1893.

SIR: Your cipher telegram, dated the 1st instant, and transmitted through the Navy Department's good offices, was received here at 4:30 p. m. on the 9th instant.

You therein make the following important statement:

"To-day at 9 a. m., in accordance with the request of the Provisional Government of Hawaii, I have placed Government of Hawaii under the United States protection during negotiations, not interfering with the execution of public affairs."

The precise character and scope of the act thus announced by you do not appear from this brief recital. The press, however, prints full details of the occurrences of the 4th instant, as telegraphed from San Francisco on the arrival of the mail steamer *Australia* at that port on the morning of the 9th, and I therein find what purports, with appearance of general correctness, to be the text of the proclamation issued by you on the 1st instant, which reads as follows:

"By authority of the Hawaiian people:

"At the request of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, I hereby, in the name of the United States of America, assume protection of the Hawaiian Islands for the protection of life and property, and occupation of the public buildings and Hawaiian soil, so far as may be necessary for the purpose specified, but not interfering with the administration of public affairs by the Provisional Government. This action is taken pending and subject to negotiations at Washington.

"JOHN L. STEVENS,

"Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

"UNITED STATES LEGATION, February 1, 1893.

"Approved and executed by G. C. Wiltse, captain, U. S. Navy, commanding U. S. S. *Boston*."

The manner and degree of the execution of your proclamation by the naval force are not related with particularity in a brief telegraphic report just received from Capt. Wiltse. He merely says:

"To-day, at 9 a. m., in accordance with request of Provisional Government of Hawaii, the United States minister plenipotentiary placed the Government of Hawaii under United States protection, during negotiations, not interfering with the execution of public affairs."

It appears from the press reports that the ceremonial for the execution of your orders consisted in the landing of a battalion from the *Boston*, its formation at the Government building in concert with three volunteer companies of the Provisional Government, the reading of your proclamation by Lieut. Rush, and the hoisting of the United States flag over the Government building. The Hawaiian flag on other public buildings in Honolulu is stated not to have been disturbed.

The phraseology of your proclamation in announcing your action in assumption of protection of the Hawaiian Islands in the name of the United States would appear to be tantamount to the assumption of a protectorate over those islands in behalf of the United States with all the right and obligations which the term implies. To this extent it goes beyond the necessities of the situation, and the instructions heretofore given you.

Your existing instructions and those under which the commanders of naval vessels of the United States acted were and are ample to provide all legitimate material protection in case of need, either in your discretion or at the request of the duly-constituted authorities of the Hawaiian Islands, for the lives and property of American citizens endangered or menaced or for the prevention of lawless and tumultuous acts of disturbance of the public peace and safety. The accordance of such measures of protection or the unsolicited taking of the needful precautions to those ends is, however, not to be confounded with the establishment of a protectorate, which is in fact the positive erection of a paramount authority over or in place of the duly-constituted local government, and the assumption by the protector of the especial responsibilities attached to such formal protection.

It is not thought probable that the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, in soliciting protection, contemplated more than the coöperation of the moral and material forces of the United States to strengthen its own authority and power, as a recognized sovereign government, for the protection of life and property, as stated in your proclamation. Such a degree of protection you were, as I have said already, fully competent to accord, or to exercise in your discretion, in case of need.

Your proclamation expresses no reservation as to confirmation of your action by the Government of the United States.

Its provisos are that the assumed function of protection is to be exercised so far as may be necessary for the specified purpose of protecting life and property without interference with the administration of public affairs by the Provisional Government, and that the action in question "is taken pending and subject to negotiations at Washington."

These qualifications are entirely in the line of my views of the scope and intent of the request made to you by the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands. The omission of reference to the necessary sanction of the Government of the United States is immaterial, for its function of revision and confirmation or disavowal of the acts of its agents is inherent and exercisable at its discretion.

So far, therefore, as your action amounts to according, at the request of the *de facto* sovereign Government of the Hawaiian Islands, the coöperation of the moral and material forces of the United States for the protection of life and property from apprehended disorders, your action is commended. But so far as it may appear to overstep that limit by setting the authority and power of the United States above that of the Government of the Hawaiian Islands in the capacity of protector, or to impair in any way the independent sovereignty of the Hawaiian Government by substituting the flag and power of the United States as the symbol and manifestation of paramount authority, it is disavowed.

Instructions will be sent to the commanding officers of the United States naval forces in the Hawaiian Islands confirming and renewing the instruction heretofore given them under which they are authorized and directed to coöperate with you for the preservation of American life and property and the maintenance of good order in case of need. Your own instructions in the same sense are continued. You are accordingly authorized, upon receipt of these instructions, to arrange with the commanding naval officer for the continued presence on shore of such marine force as may be practicable and requisite for the security of the lives and property interests of the citizens of the United States and the repression of lawlessness and public disturbance threatening them whenever in your judgment it shall be necessary so to do, or when such coöperative measures may be sought for good cause by the Government of the Hawaiian Islands; being, however, always careful to make due discrimination between those functions of voluntary or accorded protection and the assumption of a protectorate over the Hawaiian Islands by the United States.

No step should be taken by you or will be sanctioned by this Government which might tend to derogate in any way from the independence of the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, which the United States have recognized as sovereign and with which they treat on terms of sovereign equality.

A telegraphic instruction, briefly outlining the substance of this dispatch, will be sent to you, by way of San Francisco, by the mail steamer sailing from that port on the 15th instant.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

JOHN L. STEVENS,
Etc., Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.

Commodore Ramsay to commanding officer Boston.

FEBRUARY 17, 1893.

SIR: The vessel under your command is detached from the squadron for special service and assigned to duty on the Pacific Station.

Report by letter to Rear-Admiral Joseph S. Skerrett, U. S. Navy, the Commander-in-Chief.

Very respectfully,

F. M. RAMSAY,
Chief of Bureau.

COMMANDING OFFICER U. S. S. BOSTON,
Honolulu, Hawaii.

Secretary Herbert to Rear-Admiral Skerrett.

MARCH 11, 1893.

SIR: This letter will be handed to you by the Hon. James H. Blount, Special Commissioner from the President of the United States to the Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

You will consult freely with Mr. Blount, and will obey any instructions you may receive from him regarding the course to be pursued at said islands by the force under your command.

You will also afford Mr. Blount all such facilities as he may desire for the use of your cipher code in communicating by telegraph with this Government.

Respectfully,

HILARY A. HERBERT,
Secretary of the Navy.

Rear-Admiral J. S. SKERRETT,
*Commander in Chief United States Naval Forces,
Pacific Station, Flagship Mohican, Honolulu, H. I.*

Secretary Herbert to Rear-Admiral Skerrett.

[Telegram.]

APRIL 8, 1893.

Rear-Admiral SKERRETT,
Honolulu, H. I.

(Care Navy Pay Office, San Francisco, Cal.):

Have *Mohican* ready for service in Bering Sea. Adams will be sent to Honolulu. Shift your flag to such vessel as you deem proper.

HERBERT.

Acting Secretary McAdoo to Commander in Chief Pacific Station.

MAY 10, 1893.

SIR: Replying to your letter of the 25th ultimo, reporting the political condition of affairs at Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, I have to invite your attention to paragraphs 9 and 10, article 1607, of the U. S. Navy Regulations, 1893.

The Department regrets the necessity which caused the detail of the *Mohican* for duty in Bering Sea, and will send a suitable flagship to the station under your command as soon as practicable.

There is no appropriation that can be drawn upon to pay the rent of a room on shore to be used as your office.

Very respectfully,

W. MCADOO,
Acting Secretary of the Navy.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC STATION,
(Care of Navy Pay Office, San Francisco, Cal.)

[Translation of cipher dispatch,]

*Secretary Herbert to Pay Inspector Lyons.*NAVY PAY OFFICE,
San Francisco, August 16, 1893.

Pay Inspector LYON,

Navy Pay Office, San Francisco, Cal.:

Send following message to Admiral Skerrett, Honolulu, by first mail:

I desire to impress upon you in the absence of United States Minister Blount that your sole duty is confined to that of an officer of the Navy, although it is to be performed in the spirit of the instructions of Minister Blount, which doubtless have been seen by you. Protect American citizens and American property, but do not give aid, physical or moral, to either party contending for the government of Honolulu.

HERBERT.

Secretary Herbert to Commander in Chief Pacific Station.

AUGUST 18, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that the U. S. S. *Philadelphia* has to-day been ordered by cable to proceed from Callao, Peru, to Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, and there report to you.

Upon the arrival of the *Philadelphia* you will please order the U. S. S. *Boston* to the navy-yard, Mare Island, Cal., to be docked.

A cipher telegram to the same effect as this letter was sent to you to-day through U. S. Navy Pay Office, at San Francisco.

Very respectfully,

H. A. HERBERT,
Secretary of the Navy.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF

U. S. NAVAL FORCE ON PACIFIC STATION,

United States Flagship Boston, Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.

[Translation of cipher dispatch.]*Secretary Herbert to Rear-Admiral Skerrett.*

SEPTEMBER 27, 1893.

Yours September 12 received. My instructions misconstrued. You will afford to British subjects and property such protection as has always been accorded by vessels of American fleets to the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty and their property under like circumstances in the absence of British vessels.

HERBERT.

Rear-Admiral SKERRETT.

(Care Pay Inspector Lyons, Navy Pay Office, San Francisco, Cal.)

[Translation of cipher dispatch.]

Secretary Herbert to Rear-Admiral Skerrett.

[Confidential.]

OCTOBER 9, 1893.

Transfer flag to the *Boston* at San Francisco. Proceed to San Francisco with personal staff by first mail steamer practicable. It is the intention of the Department to transfer you to command Asiatic Station.

HERBERT.

Admiral SKERRETT,
(Care Navy Pay Office, San Francisco.)

[Translation of cipher dispatch.]

Secretary Herbert to Rear-Admiral Irwin.

[Confidential.]

OCTOBER 10, 1893.

You are relieved of command of naval force on Asiatic Station on October 27. Proceed with personal staff by mail steamer leaving Yokohama, Japan, on October 27, to Honolulu, Hawaii Islands, hoist flag on board the *Philadelphia*, and assume command of naval force on the Pacific Station.

HERBERT.

Admiral IRWIN,
Yokohama.

Mr. Stevens to Captain Wiltse.

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, January 16, 1893.

SIR: In view of existing critical circumstances in Honolulu, indicating an inadequate legal force, I request you to land marines and sailors from the ship under your command for the protection of the United States legation and the United States consulate, and to secure the safety of American life and property.

Yours truly,

JOHN L. STEVENS,
*Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
of the United States.*

Capt. G. C. WILTSE.

Capt. Wiltse to Executive Officer U. S. S. Boston.

U. S. S. BOSTON, SECOND RATE,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January, 16, 1893.

SIR: You will take command of the battalion and land in Honolulu for the purpose of protecting our legation, consulate, and the lives and property of American citizens, and to assist in preserving public order.

Great prudence must be exercised by both officers and men, and no action taken that is not fully warranted by the condition of affairs, and by the conduct of those who may be inimical to the treaty rights of American citizens.

You will inform me at the earliest practicable moment of any change in the situation.

Very respectfully,

G. C. WILTSE,

Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S. Boston.

Lieut. Commander W. T. SWINBURNE,

Executive Officer U. S. S. Boston.

Mr. Stevens to Captain Wiltse.

UNITED STATES LEGATION,

Honolulu, February 1, 1893.

SIR: The Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands having duly and officially expressed to the undersigned the fear that said Government may be unable to protect life and property, and to prevent civil disorder in Honolulu, the capital of said Hawaiian Islands, request that the flag of the United States may be raised, for the protection of the Hawaiian Islands, and to that end confer on the United States, through the undersigned, freedom of occupation of the public buildings of the Hawaiian Government and the soil of the Hawaiian Islands, so far as may be necessary for the exercise of such protection, but not interfering with the administration of the public affairs by said Provisional Government.

I hereby ask you to comply with the spirit and terms of the request of the Hawaiian Government, and to that end to use all the force at your command, in the exercise of your best judgment and discretion, you and myself awaiting instructions from the United States Government at Washington.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN L. STEVENS,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

Captain G. C. WILTSE,

Commander of the U. S. Ship Boston.

Capt. Wiltse to Executive Officer U. S. S. Boston.

U. S. S. BOSTON, SECOND RATE,

Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, February 1, 1893.

SIR: You will take possession of the Government building and the American flag will be hoisted over it at 9 a. m.

Very respectfully,

G. C. WILTSE,

Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S. Boston.

Lieut. Commander W. T. SWINBURNE,

Commanding Battalion, U. S. S. Boston.

Rear-Admiral Skerrett to Secretary Herbert.

U. S. S. MOHICAN, FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, April 6, 1893.

SIR: Since my last of the 29th ultimo, I have to inform the Department of the arrival, after closing my mail on that day, of the U. S. R. S. *Richard Rush*, having on board Special United States Commissioner J. H. Blount. On March 31 I was called by Mr. Blount for a special interview, on which occasion, by his directions, I was ordered to withdraw the *Boston's* force from the shore, and at 11 a. m. on April 1 to haul down the United States flag from the Government building, which was to be replaced by the Provisional Government hoisting the Hawaiian flag. These orders were promptly executed as directed. There was not the remotest evidence shown, by the crowd of natives and others about the Government building, of any feeling; no demonstration of any description. Since which time, by the advice of Mr. Blount, the guard that had been placed at the United States Legation was allowed to be returned to that place. This was done to quiet the apprehensions of Minister Stevens. There has been no turmoil of any description on shore; peace and quiet have reigned throughout. The cadets will leave by this steamer, and are ordered to report arrival on reaching San Francisco. The U. S. R. S. *Richard Rush* left for San Diego on the 5th instant; after I had had her supplied with 80 (eighty) tons of coal from the Government coal pile.

Political affairs remain as formerly stated. I would further state that the *Boston's* force was before its withdrawal from shore relieved at the Government building by one (1) company of the Provisional Government's troops.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. SKERRETT,
Rear Admiral U. S. Navy, Commanding
U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

HON. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Commander Woodward to the Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. S. ADAMS (THIRD RATE),
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, July 27, 1893.

SIR: On arriving in this port July 4 I made a hurried report on account of the mail leaving so soon after. I will now report that I found in the harbor, besides the U. S. S. *Alert*, H. B. M. S. *Espiegle* and the Chilean corvette *Pilcomayo*. The official visits were exchanged. I called on the United States minister resident and consul-general; also on the minister of foreign affairs, Hawaii.

On Monday, July 8, the U. S. S. *Alert* went to sea to Fanning Island to convoy the U. S. S. *Nipsic* into this port; on the same day H. B. M. S. *Espiegle* went to sea for a cruise among the islands. On Wednesday, July 10, the Chilean corvette *Pilcomayo* went to sea bound for Vancouver, thence for San Francisco, leaving the *Adams* the only man-of-war in port.

On July 7 I received your order, through Commodore Benham, commandant Mare Island, to proceed with the *Adams* to Apia, Samoa.

I commenced preparations for sea, filling up with coal, and putting 25 tons on deck. On the morning of the 9th Passed Assistant Surgeon Marsteller was reported as being very sick. I allowed him to go on shore for medical treatment, the *Adams* having only one medical officer on board. Thursday, the 11th, coal was all on board, and Friday the ship was ready for sea, but the doctor was still sick.

On Saturday I requested a survey of three reputable doctors on shore, and on Sunday, the 14th, they reported to me in writing that the condition of Dr. Marsteller was such that he ought not to go out on the ship, that he was suffering from broncho-pneumonia, and it might be three weeks before he was able to be about.

Not feeling myself justifiable in proceeding to sea, especially on such a cruise, without a doctor on board, I inquired about hiring one from the city, and not feeling sure of the standing of the only person that offered service, and knowing that the *Alert* and *Nipsic* would arrive in a week or ten days, I concluded I would be justified in waiting and transferring a doctor from one of those vessels and then proceeding to carry out my orders, which had not specified any particular hurry for the *Adams* to be at Apia.

On Wednesday, the 17th, I received a communication from the minister resident, desiring to see me. He informed me that he had been notified by the minister of foreign affairs that there was a plot on foot to make some disturbance when the *Adams* should leave, as then there would be no man-of-war in port, and that if I could delay the departure of the *Adams* until the arrival of H. B. M. S. *Espiegle* he thought the affair would fall through, but that he did not deem it well for all the vessels to leave just at present. I informed him that I could not well leave on account of the condition of the doctor, and so it was fortunate I had concluded to remain.

On the 18th His Majesty notified me that he would receive myself and officers on Friday, the 19th, at Merid, and at that time we were presented.

On the 22nd H. B. M. S. *Espiegle* arrived in port from a cruise among the Islands. Paid the usual calls; also dressed ship, Chinese flag at the main, in honor of the Emperor's birthday, at the request of the Chinese legation.

On the 26th the steamer *Australia* arrived; also steamer *Mariposa* from Sydney. No mail.

The doctor continues sick, and as soon as the *Alert* arrives I will transfer Dr. Green to this ship and proceed to obey my orders.

H. B. M. S. *Espiegle* sails to-day under sealed orders.

I attach correspondence from minister and report of medical survey.

Very respectfully,

E. T. WOODWARD,
Commander, Commanding.

Hon. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington, D. C.

Commander J. G. Green to Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. S. *ALERT* (THIRD RATE),
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, August 6, 1889.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that this vessel and the *Nipsic* arrived here on the 2d instant, from Fanning Island, which place I left on the 24th of July, as soon as the coal which I shipped from here on July 6 was received.

I left here on July 8, arriving at Fanning Island on the 14th.

In accordance with my instructions, I have made arrangements to repair the *Nipsic* sufficiently to enable her to continue her voyage to San Francisco in safety. She is taking out all possible weight preparatory to hauling out on the marine railway, which she expects to do on the 8th or 9th instant, when a temporary sternpost and rudder will be attached, and new propeller put on, which is here.

Her stern will be refastened, and a temporary keel put on, if practicable.

I estimate that the necessary repairs will take a month or six weeks, but I will forward the work with all possible dispatch.

Affairs at Honolulu are quiet and no further trouble is apprehended.

I inclose slips cut from the official paper, which show the present relations between the King and cabinet, and every one seems to feel that the prospect of future peace is better than for a year past.

The only men-of-war in port are the *Nipsic* and ourselves. The French flag ship *Duquesne*, bearing the flag of Admiral Lefevre, arrived from San Francisco on the 4th, and is anchored outside. She leaves for Tahiti on the 8th.

The *Adams* sailed for Samoa on the 4th instant.

The health of this ship's company and the *Nipsic* is excellent.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAS. G. GREEN,

Commander, U. S. Navy, Commanding and Senior Officer Present.

Hon. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington, D. C.

Paymaster Goldsborough to Secretary of the Navy.

[Telegram.]

SAN FRANCISCO, August 9, 1889.

Unsuccessful revolution at Honolulu. The *Adams* landed men for protection of the United States Consulate and American citizens. The *Alert* and *Nipsic* arrived the day the *Austria* sailed. All well. Leaders of the revolution are prisoners. No further trouble.

W. GOLDSBOROUGH.

Acting Secretary of State to Secretary of the Navy.

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1889.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit, for your information, a copy of a telegram from our minister at Honolulu, touching an insurrection there on the 30th ultimo, and the landing of men from the U. S. S. *Adams* to protect lives and property.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

J. B. MOORE.

[Inclosure.]

HONOLULU, *August 2, 1889.*
(Via San Francisco, August 9, 1889.)

HON. JAMES G. BLAINE,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.:

On July 30 unsuccessful attempt by about 100 half-castes and natives to overthrow Government and depose King. Insurrection suppressed by Hawaiian Government without foreign aid. Six insurgents killed, twelve wounded; order restored same day; men from U. S. S. *Adams* landing by permission to protect lives and property is found necessary; afterwards returning to ship.

GEO. W. MERRILL.

Secretary of State to Secretary of the Navy.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 23, 1889.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit a copy of a dispatch from our minister at Honolulu, relative to the attempt of 30th July last to overthrow the Hawaiian Government; and to express the Department's appreciation of the prompt response of the commander of the U. S. S. *Adams* to the minister's request for the landing of marines to protect life and property in case of need. Inclosing also a copy of the printed accompaniment of the dispatch.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM F. WHARTON,
Acting Secretary.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

Rear-Admiral Kimberly to Commodore Walker.

U. S. MONONGAHELA (TEMPORARY FLAGSHIP),
Apia, Samoa, September 2, 1889.

SIR: Owing to the very satisfactory condition of affairs at present and the promising outlook for the future, I feel that my presence is no longer required here; and I shall, therefore, leave Apia in the *Adams* about the 13th instant, to take passage in the mail steamer *Alameda*, off Tutuila, on the 14th, for Honolulu, where I hear that there is an uneasy feeling after the late attempt at insurrection.

I expect to find the *Nipsic* and *Alert* at that port, where their presence may tend to allay any apprehensions on the part of the inhabitants of that city.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. A. KIMBERLY,
Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Pacific Station.

Commodore J. G. WALKER, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Office of Detail.

Secretary of the Navy to Rear-Admiral Kimberly.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
September 13th, 1889.

SIR: The Department incloses herewith for your information a copy of a cipher message sent you yesterday by wire, through the United States consul at Aukland, New Zealand.

Very respectfully,

B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy.

Rear-Admiral Kimberly to the Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. S. ALERT (TEMPORARY FLAGSHIP),
Honolulu, September 27, 1889.

SIR: On the 24th instant I was received, together with my personal staff, by His Majesty King Kalakau at the Iolani Palace. As far as I can see everything is quiet.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. A. KIMBERLY,
Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

Rear-Admiral Kimberly to the Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. FLAGSHIP ALERT (THIRD RATE),
Honolulu, October 18, 1889.

SIR: I have to report that, politically speaking, quietness prevails at present. There is an agitation quietly working as to the race question which, no doubt, will become a prominent factor in the elections that come off in February.

The natives seem to have an uneasy feeling as to their rights being usurped by the whites and their gradual loss of prestige and power in the Government, as laid down in the principles of the present constitution, which to their ideas circumscribes too much the kingly power.

It would promote a feeling of security to our own people and, I think, other foreigners, if, at the February elections, we had a force here competent to preserve order should necessity arise.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. A. KIMBERLY,
Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

Secretary of State to Secretary of the Navy.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt to your letter of the 1st instant and to the copy of Rear-Admiral Kimberly's report of the 18th ultimo, which you inclose, on the political situation in Hawaii.

In view of his opinion that the security of our citizens there would be promoted "if at the February elections" the United States had a force in those waters competent to preserve order, should the necessity arise, I trust that your Department may find it convenient to make such dispositions in that quarter as will subserve the desired object.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

JAMES G. BLAINE.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

Secretary Tracy to Rear-Admiral Kimberly.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

November 13, 1889.

SIR: Referring to your letter No. 165, of the 18th ultimo, with reference to the political situation in the Hawaiian Islands, and in which you state that "it would promote a feeling of security to our people and I think to other foreigners, if at the February election we had a force here competent to preserve order should necessity arise," the Department directs that you will keep as many of the vessels of your command in Hawaiian waters as you may deem expedient for the purpose of carrying out the object in view.

A copy of a letter from the honorable the Secretary of State, concurring in your opinion as to the desirability of such action, is inclosed herewith for your information.

Very respectfully,

B. F. TRACY,

Secretary of the Navy.

Rear-Admiral L. A. KIMBERLY,

Commanding United States Naval Force, Pacific Station.

Rear-Admiral Kimberly to the Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. FLAGSHIP MOHICAN (THIRD RATE),

Honolulu, November 16, 1889.

SIR: I have to acknowledge with thanks the Department's letter dated October 12, referring to my dispatch of September 26, from Honolulu, relating to the repairs of the Nipsic and my intention of relinquishing command of the Pacific Station.

I appreciate highly the Department's approval of my course in connection with the Nipsic, and avail myself of the Department's consideration, as expressed in its letter referred to above, of relinquishing the command of the station, and would elect to turn it over to my successor at Honolulu about the middle of January, 1890, in order that I can return to the United States by the steamer that leaves here on January 17 for San Francisco.

I have hoisted my flag on the *Mohican*, where I hope to keep it until relieved.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. A. KIMBERLY,

Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,

Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

Rear-Admiral Kimberly to the Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. FLAGSHIP MOHICAN (THIRD RATE),
Honolulu, November 19, 1889.

SIR: The political situation since my letter No. 165, dated October 18, remains unchanged.

An uneasy feeling still exists throughout the community as to the possible results of the coming elections. I do not anticipate that anything of a serious nature will result therefrom.

I am retaining two ships here, the *Mohican* and *Nipsic*, to encourage a better feeling of security.

Very respectfully your obedient servant,

L. A. KIMBERLY,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

Secretary Tracy to Rear-Admiral Kimberly.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
December 2, 1889.

SIR: In reply to your letter, No. 177*d*, of the 16th ultimo, expressing a desire to relinquish the command of your station at Honolulu about the 15th of January, 1890, in order that you can return to the United States by the steamer of January 17, you are informed that the Department finds it inconvenient to comply with this request, but authorizes you to proceed to San Francisco, Cal., by the steamer of January 17, and to turn over your command at that place upon the arrival of your relief.

Upon your arrival at San Francisco you are authorized to hoist your flag upon any vessel of your squadron that may be in that port.

Very respectfully,

B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy.

Rear-Admiral L. A. KIMBERLY, U. S. Navy.
Commanding Pacific Station,
U. S. F. S. Mohican, Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.

Rear-Admiral Kimberly to the Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. FLAGSHIP MOHICAN (THIRD RATE),
Honolulu, December 13, 1889.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the Department's letter dated November 13 and inclosing copy of a letter from the Secretary of State referring to the desirability of keeping a sufficient force at Honolulu to promote a feeling of security to our own people and to other foreigners at the coming elections in February.

The *Mohican* and *Nipsic* are already here and the *Adams*, when relieved by the *Iroquois*, has orders to leave for this port.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. A. KIMBERLY,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

*Admiral Brown to Secretary of the Navy.*HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *May 31, 1890.*

SIR: Referring to my letter of this date, reporting the arrival of the *Charleston*, on the 29th instant, I have to report that I found political affairs very quiet.

The Legislature was convened on the 21st instant, and up to the present time nothing has been brought before it of a character calculated to indicate what those in the majority and opposed to the present constitution may endeavor to force on the minority in the way of legislation inimical to the interests of the people of the United States, as well as to the future commercial prosperity of these islands.

As yet, my intercourse with the United States minister resident has been only of a formal and official character. I have arranged with him for a confidential conference at an early date, until which time I do not expect to get any reliable information bearing on the political situation of the present and the possibilities of the future.

Personally I am most favorably impressed with the diplomatic ability of Mr. Stevens, and feel assured that I can heartily coöperate with him in every way for the best interests of the Government of the United States.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE BROWN.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

Rear-Admiral Brown to the Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. FLAGSHIP CHARLESTON,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, June 9, 1890.

SIR: I have the honor to report that His Majesty the King of Hawaii visited this ship on the 7th instant. He was received on board with all the ceremonies customary on such occasions and the required salutes were fired.

The *Nipsic*, *Adams*, and H. B. M. S. *Acorn* manned yards.

Hon. John L. Stevens, U. S. Minister Resident to Hawaiian Islands, was present.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. BROWN,
Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

HON. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Brown to Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. FLAGSHIP CHARLESTON,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, June 26, 1890.

SIR: Since my last communication, No. 193, of May 31, referring to the condition of political affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, the only event of any import has been a change in the cabinet officers.

On the 13th instant the ministry tendered their resignation, and on

the 17th instant the present ministry were named by the King. The Legislature then adjourned until the 30th instant.

There was nothing of a very exciting character attending the change of ministry, as it was a foregone conclusion that the change would be made in the interest of the National Reform party, which is in a small majority in the Legislature.

The present cabinet ministers appear to have the confidence and support of the best elements and representatives of both the Reform and National Reform parties in the Legislature. It is regarded as conservative, and the only opposition which has so far shown itself comes from three or four members of the Legislature and the dominant party.

The reputations of these men for patriotism do not extend beyond their personal ambition for such power and recognition as would place them in positions where their well-established characters as agitators and as "patriots for revenue only" would have enabled them to have done much mischief and kept the native element in a constant state of excitement. They are the leaders of a faction in the National Reform party whose cry was "Hawaii for the Hawaiians."

The action of the King in absolutely ignoring these men, by neither appointing one or more of them cabinet officers, as they had expected, or consulting them or their wishes in the formation of the present cabinet, has done much towards establishing a feeling of security from political disturbances in the near future.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE BROWN,

Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,

Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

HON. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Brown to Secretary of the Navy.

No. 269]

U. S. FLAGSHIP CHARLESTON,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, July 29, 1890.

SIR: In reference to political matters in the Hawaiian Islands I have to report that since my last communication on this subject, No. 228 of June 26, 1890, many events have transpired in Honolulu which indicate that serious trouble, if not a revolution, is imminent at no distant day. The Legislature now in session will not probably adjourn before the middle of September next, and until that time the discordant element in the National Reform party, as represented by several natives and half-castes in the Legislature, who were prominent leaders in the attempted revolution of July, 1889, will not cease their revolutionary discussions and movements either in the Legislature or in public meetings on the streets. Their efforts are now being made in favor of a constitutional convention with a view of revising the present constitution, which was adopted in 1887.

The revision of this constitution which these revolutionists desire to bring about is nothing less than an entire new constitution which will restore to the King his former powers, give the native element almost absolute control of the Government, and ignore the interests of foreign residents and the vast amount of capital they now have invested in several islands. The present constitution provides for the only way by which it can be amended, and requires the approval of

any amendment by two regular successive Legislatures. The Legislature meets biennially. Any attempt to change the constitution in any other way will be revolutionary and will be resisted by the Reform party and by the best elements of the National Reformers. It is almost assured that there will be a majority in the Legislature opposed to granting a petition for the proposed constitutional convention, and that the defeat of the revolutionists in the Legislature will be the signal for an uprising of the lower class of natives. The result of such an uprising will undoubtedly prove disastrous to them, as the interests of the whites and the better class of natives and half-castes can not be permitted to be jeopardized by a small number of irresponsible and impecunious but educated natives and half-castes.

The presence of the force under my command has a marked influence on the would be revolutionists, as while they are well aware that I am here to protect the persons and properties of citizens of the United States, the general belief among them is that I will, in the event of a revolution, take a more decided stand in the interests of those opposed to them than I might be warranted in doing. The white residents and natives and half-castes who stand ready to oppose the revolutionists have every confidence in their ability to do so successfully, and take great comfort in the knowledge of an adequate naval force being present. I am in frequent personal communication with our Minister Resident, as also with many of the leading American merchants and lawyers, and from them am able to keep constantly advised of the progress of events.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

GEO. BROWN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

Hon. B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department, Washington D. C.

Rear-Admiral Brown to Secretary of the Navy.

No. 270.] UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP CHARLESTON,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, July 29, 1890.

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Department that His Majesty King Kalakaua made an official visit to this ship on the 7th ultimo, and that on the 24th instant Her Majesty Kapiolani, Queen Consort, was received on board. To both were accorded all the ceremonies due their rank.

On the 5th instant I received an official visit from the four cabinet ministers. They came on board in a body and were given a salute of 17 guns.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

GEO. BROWN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding United States Naval Force, Pacific Squadron.

Hon B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Commander McCurley to Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. S. NIPSIC (THIRD RATE),
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, August 22, 1890.

SIR: I would respectfully report that since the departure of the flag-ship *Charleston* from this place on the 7th instant the political situation has assumed a more disturbed appearance within the last few days, so I deem it advisable to report the political state of affairs immediately, instead of waiting until the end of the month to do so, as is the usual custom, the cause of the disturbance being as follows:

Several days ago a petition was presented to His Majesty King Kalakaua by a native delegation asking that the old constitution be revived and the new or present constitution, formed in 1887, be abrogated; and this petition has been indorsed by the King and presented to the Legislature for their consideration, and as I have been informed by reliable authorities that the native and bad half-white element threaten to surround the legislative chamber and coerce the members of the Legislature into voting for it, so as to give a form of legality to what is otherwise not only against the present constitution, but highly inimical and dangerous to American interest.

The present constitution, formed in 1887, seems to give entire satisfaction to the majority of the prominent American and English residents at this place, including even those white people of the working classes, who are prosperous and thriving, as it is of a liberal character, and favors their interest in various ways.

The present constitution, formed in 1887, was, in a manner, forced on the King by a delegation of the prominent residents at this place, and, as I was informed by a former minister of the late cabinet, the Hon. Jona. Austin, that if the King had not signed the present constitution and given it his support a Republic would have been declared, and at that time a sworn league composed of about 4,000 white men residing on the different islands were back of this movement, opposition to it would have been useless, as the respectable white element were determined to have a liberal constitution or else a Republic.

The constitution that the natives and the bad half-white element, under the leadership of Mr. Bush, desire, is the one just presented to the Legislature and indorsed by the King for their consideration, and is somewhat similar to the old constitution existing before the present one, and is objected to strongly by the American and English element, as it, in a manner, gives the King absolute power to appoint the nobles of the Legislature, instead of their being elected as they are at present; and also would enable the ignorant natives to control the situation through the ballot, freehold qualification being waived, all of which would be highly prejudicial to American interest.

The fact is, to form a new or reactionary constitution for these islands, and restore arbitrary power to the King, would not only be highly disastrous to American interest, but to the prosperity of these islands, and the people also; but the Anglo-Saxon race here, with intelligence and civilization behind them, move irresistibly forward on their march to democracy, and it is only a question of time when a more liberal Government will be formed as the sentiment is universally expressed, that should the present King die, or the new constitution be formed, giving him absolute power go into effect, he would then be dethroned and a Republic declared, and should the sworn league that existed in 1887 be organized, they could control these islands without any out-

side assistance whatever, it being composed entirely of whites, and all natives being strictly excluded.

I must mention here that the English residents at this place, although numerically much less than Americans, have one great advantage over them, whether acting politically or otherwise, and that is, whenever there is any matter that is of advantage to them politically, commercially, or otherwise, they bury all social or personal feeling, and act together as a unit, thus giving them a great advantage over the Americans in any matter that concerns their interest.

Unfortunately for the interest of the United States, the Americans here are composed of two parties or factions, between whom there seems to be no feeling of unity socially, politically, or otherwise.

One of these factions is that composed of the old Puritanical stock whose ideas are very rigid regarding social proprieties, observance of the Sabbath, etc., and whom I must say are rather intolerant of the other Americans, who may be termed the society of these islands, and although they possess an equal degree of intelligence, brains, etc., as their more rigid brethren, they are looked upon by them as being rather frivolous and not setting a proper example to the native element; whereas they take as much interest in furthering the views of our Government as the other faction, although their strong social differences prevent their acting together like the English, and placing American interests at a great disadvantage whenever a question of political or commercial advantage arises between American and English interests.

Mr. C. W. Ashford, ex-attorney general of the late cabinet, changed his politics previous to the dissolution of the late cabinet, and in doing so lost the confidence of both parties, consequently he is eliminated as a factor for producing further trouble, as he did formerly.

Mr. R. Wilcox, another great agitator, still possesses great influence among the native element, and, although lately in public speeches he advocates a quiet settlement of difficulties, he is not to be trusted.

At present the leading spirit of the disturbing element is the Hon. J. E. Bush, a member of the Legislature, but as he is not a military man, therefore I do not think he would prove a successful leader in case of any disturbance, as what is termed a revolution at this place would be called a street riot in the United States, and a few hundred men, led by a determined man, could easily quell any such so-called revolution, and one such lesson to them would be highly beneficial to their future welfare.

Although the different representatives of the different governments here apprehend serious trouble, I do not think the situation alarming, as a new constitution can not be formed unless it passes the present Legislature; then it has to remain in abeyance and again be brought before the next session before going into force, and, the better men of both parties being opposed to such a change, I judge it will be quietly settled without resort to force.

The only trouble that may occur is, that if the mob attempt to coerce the Legislature to vote for the new constitution, our minister, Hon. John L. Stevens, and the English commissioner, Maj. Wodehouse, propose to land the men from the American and British vessels of war to prevent it, and think this display of force will prevent further trouble.

As regards this movement, I asked the Hon. John L. Stevens if this was not interfering with the autonomy of the Government at this place, to which he replied no, not if the Government authorities request it, so, as my instructions direct me to support him with the available force at my command, and, as the Department of State indicates to the min-

ister the policy to be observed, and I am directed to act in unison with him, I shall, in accordance with such instructions, fully coöperate and sustain him in any action he may take, deferring to his better judgment on any question that may arise regarding international law.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FELIX MCCURLEY,

Commander, U. S. Navy, Commanding, and Senior Officer Present.

HON. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Brown to Secretary of the Navy.

[Telegram.]

PORT TOWNSEND (VIA SEATTLE), WASH.,
September 1, 1890.

Orders received. Will sail for Honolulu at noon to-day.

BROWN.

Rear-Admiral Brown to Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. FLAGSHIP CHARLESTON,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, September 19, 1890.

SIR: I have the honor to report the arrival of this ship at this port on the 12th instant, after a passage of eleven days from Port Townsend, Wash.

The *Nipsic* sailed from this place for San Francisco on the 9th instant.

The *Iroquois* arrived here on the 7th instant, seventeen days from Pago Pago.

I learn from the steamer *Mariposa*, which arrived here this morning en route from Australia to San Francisco, that the *Mohican* was at Auckland on the 8th instant on her way to this place, and that Commander Shepard was having difficulty in obtaining coal on account of the general strike in the coal mines of the colonies, and that he would go to Pago Pago under sail, if necessary, and there take coal. I look for the *Mohican* here about October 15, or possibly a few days earlier.

Very respectfully,

GEO. BROWN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

CHIEF OF BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Brown to Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. FLAGSHIP CHARLESTON,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, September 19, 1890.

SIR: I have the honor to report that this ship reached this place on the 12th instant, after a passage of eleven days from Port Townsend. I found the *Iroquois* here, the *Nipsic* having sailed from San Francisco on the 9th instant.

During my absence of thirty-six days there has, at times, been considerable excitement, but nothing of an alarming character has occurred.

A committee representing the Mechanics' Union and one wing of the National Reform Party, presented a petition to the King asking that a constitutional convention should be called. The King referred the petition to the Legislature without consulting his cabinet officers, which fact is an evidence that he is in sympathy with those who favor a change in the constitution. The petition was referred to a select committee of the Legislature, and it is an open secret that a majority of this committee will report adversely to the demand for a convention. The report will be made on the 22d instant, and it is almost certain that the Legislature will adopt the majority report, as the reform party will be joined by enough of the best element of the Nationalists.

The discussion of the majority and minority reports will give the disgruntled Nationals an opportunity of repeating their incendiary speeches, such as have been recently made in the Legislature and at mass meetings, as will be shown by the inclosed clippings from local papers.

There has been a strong movement made looking toward impeaching the present ministry by a vote of want of confidence. A few days ago I was shown a list of members who were pledged to vote for impeachment, and was assured that action would be taken this week. I have to-day been informed that there is some doubt about some of the members who were expected to vote for impeachment and that action has been postponed for a few days.

During my absence, the two companies of militia known as the "Honolulu Rifles," have been disbanded and ordered to turn their arms and ammunition in to the marshal of the Kingdom. This by legislative resolution. The Rifles were counted on to check such uprising as took place in June, 1889, on which occasion they did good service. It is known to many that the best and most reliable men of the disbanded companies have secretly organized as a social club and that they have their own arms and can be brought together at short notice if their services are needed.

It appears evident that the disgruntled Nationals, who at one time had a very strong following, have, by their incendiary speeches and threats to dethrone the King, disgusted many of the respectable members of their own political party, and are thereby weakened in their efforts to bring about a change of the constitution or of the ministry.

The present excitement will be kept up as long as the Legislature is in session, after which matters may quiet down. The minister of foreign affairs informed me to-day that he thought an adjournment could be brought about in about three weeks.

I find that many of the prominent Americans who two months ago were positive that an uprising was imminent now talk as if the danger was passed, and they all say that the condition of affairs at present is due to the fact that there is a split in the national party, brought about by what they term the ill-advised speeches and demonstrations of the so-called Revolutionists.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. BROWN,

Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,

Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

HON. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Brown to Secretary of the Navy.

UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP CHARLESTON,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, September 26, 1890.

SIR: Since my last report, of the 19th instant, nothing exciting of a political nature has occurred.

On the 23d instant the special committee of the Legislature to which was referred the bill to authorize the calling of a convention to remodel or revise the constitution of Hawaii presented the majority report, which was signed by six of the nine members of the committee.

This majority reported, in very strong terms, adversely to amending the constitution in any other way than as provided for in the existing constitution, as it would be revolutionary. (I inclose a copy of the report.)

The minority of the committee have presented no report as yet, and it is thought that none will be made. The report of the majority will be discussed and voted on on the 29th instant, at which time there may be considerable excitement, as it is understood that the agitators will have their followers crowd the legislative hall and possibly express their disapproval of the report of the committee. There is no doubt that this report will be adopted by a large majority.

I do not anticipate any serious trouble on that occasion.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

GEO. BROWN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding United States Naval Force, Pacific Station.

Hon. B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Admiral Brown to Secretary Tracy.

HONOLULU, HAWAII, *October 24, 1890.*

SIR: Since my last report on the condition of political affairs here, by letter No. 348 of September 26 ultimo, nothing of special note has occurred, with the exception that the bill to authorize the calling of a constitutional convention was defeated in the Legislature. Several amendments to the constitution have been recommended by the same committee which reported adversely to the convention proposition, and they will probably be adopted without much opposition.

The leading political agitators have been losing their following very rapidly. They were so badly beaten in their efforts to obtain a constitutional convention that they dared not attempt to carry out their revolutionary threats.

Yesterday a resolution of a want of confidence in the ministry was introduced in the Legislature, and after a full day's discussion was defeated by a vote of 26 to 18. With one exception, the members of the reform party voted to sustain the ministry. The others, who opposed the resolution, represent the best elements of the national party (which is the party in power). It is the general impression that the King favors a change of ministry.

The effect of this very decided defeat of the would-be revolutionists

and spoilsmen will be that the aggressive element in the national party will be quieted and not heard from again during the present session.

The Legislature will probably adjourn before November 10 proximo, and after that matters will settle down and there will be nothing of a political nature to disturb the quiet of the Hawaiian Kingdom until the campaign of February, 1892. There will be no necessity of having more than one ship of the squadron at these islands after the adjournment of the Legislature.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. BROWN.

Rear-Admiral Brown to the Secretary of the Navy.

No. 393.]

UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP CHARLESTON,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 11, 1890.

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Department that the *Mohican* arrived at this place on the 3d instant, seventeen days from Papeete, Tahiti.

The *Mohican* sailed from Sydney, Australia, on September 1, arrived at Auckland, New Zealand, on the 6th, and finding it impossible to obtain coal at that place on account of the general strike she went to the Bay of Islands where she, with great difficulty, obtained a supply. She arrived at Apia, Samoa, on September 26 and left the same day for Pago Pago, where she coaled. She sailed from that place on October 1, arrived at Papeete, Tahiti, on the 11th, and sailed from there on the 16th for this port.

The *Mohican* has been actively cruising since she sailed from Samoa, and has visited important island ports which are very rarely touched at by the ships of this squadron.

She is in good order and condition and requires only such overhauling of her engines and boilers as can be done with her own mechanics. Her stay in this port will be indefinite.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. BROWN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding United States Naval Force, Pacific Station.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Brown to the Secretary of the Navy.

No. 400.]

UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP CHARLESTON,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 14, 1890.

SIR: Since my last report on the condition of political affairs here, by letter No. 373, of October 24, ultimo, nothing of an exciting nature has occurred.

This day at noon the Legislature was prorogued by His Majesty the King, at which ceremony I attended with my staff. Until the next

general election in February, 1892, there will be no probability of any trouble in these islands.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. BROWN,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding United States Naval Force, Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Brown to the Secretary of the Navy.

No. 409.]

UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP CHARLESTON,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 20, 1890.

SIR: In anticipation of the receipt, by mail due here on the 22nd instant, of such instructions as authorize me to proceed with this ship to the Mare Island navy yard, I am having preparations made for sea by taking on board a full supply of coal and cleaning the extremely foul bottom with divers. Unless otherwise directed, I propose to sail for San Francisco on the 25th instant, and we should reach there on the 3rd or 4th proximo.

Through our minister, Hon. John L. Stevens, I have received an official request from the Hawaiian minister of foreign affairs that His Majesty, the King of Hawaii, be given a passage to San Francisco in this ship, and I have replied that it will give me great pleasure to comply with that request.

His Majesty goes to California for the benefit of his health, which has been failing of late, and his expectation is to remain in southern California for two months. He expects to have an official reception on his arrival at San Francisco, and then travel incog. He will take with him his chamberlain and one servant.

The Legislature was prorogued on the 14th instant, and having consulted with our minister, I am clearly of the opinion that one ship at these islands will be all that will be required to guard our interests for at least a year.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. BROWN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding United States Naval Force, Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Brown to the Secretary of the Navy.

[Telegram.]

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.,
December 4, 1890.

Charleston arrived; left Honolulu 25. King Kalakaua, of Hawaii, chamberlain, and one aide came with me. Can go to navy-yard as soon as ordered.

BROWN,
Rear-Admiral.

Rear Admiral Brown to the Secretary of the Navy.

No. 39.]

UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP CHARLESTON,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, February 7, 1891.

SIR: As reported in a previous letter, this ship arrived here on January 29, 1891. The final obsequies of the late King Kalakaua will take place on the 15th instant.

Lilioukalani was proclaimed Queen by the cabinet ministry on the 29th day of January, the day of our arrival here with the remains of the deceased King.

It is not probable that any political complications of a serious nature will be brought about by the recent change in the Sovereign of Hawaii. There will probably be a new cabinet named by the Queen when the present cabinet resigns, as it will probably do immediately after the funeral of the late King Kalakaua.

I will remain here until about the 20th instant, so as to take part in the funeral ceremonies. I will, after that event, recognize the accession of Her Majesty by saluting from this ship and the *Mohican*.

The visit of the late King to California, his demise on American soil, the attentions and courtesies extended to him by Government, State and city officials, as well as by the best citizens of every place he visited, and the honors shown to his memory by the officials and citizens of San Francisco, and by the Navy Department in returning the remains to his people, is appreciated in the highest degree by the Government of Hawaii and by the people of these Islands, more especially by the native element, and can not but result in much closer relations between them and the United States.

I inclose a copy of resolutions presented to me on the 5th instant and a clipping from a local paper.

I am sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. BROWN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding United States Naval Force, Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Brown to the Secretary of the Navy.

No. 50.]

UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP CHARLESTON,
At Sea, Lat. 30° 09' N., Long. 139° 53' W., February 23, 1891.

SIR: As previously reported, Lilioukalani was proclaimed Queen of Hawaii on the 29th of January, 1891, as provided for by article 22 of the constitution of the Hawaiian Islands.

The remains of his late majesty, King Kalakaua, were kept lying in state in the throne room of the palace from January 29 (the date of their being landed from this ship) until the 15th instant, when the final obsequies took place. On this occasion I was, by special invitation, the honored guest of the Royal family, and rode in a state carriage, following next after the Queen.

The naval battalion, under the command of Commander E. M. Shepard, of the *Mohican*, consisted of the band, six companies of sailors equipped as infantry, and two companies of marines from the vessels under my command, and one company of sailors equipped as infantry

from H. B. M. ship *Nymphé*. This escort was given a prominent position in the funeral procession.

By special request of the minister of foreign affairs, the two companies of marines formed the "firing party" at the mausoleum and the three cornet players of the *Charleston's* band sounded "taps." All the officers of both ships who could be spared (24 in number, besides those in the naval battalion) attended the funeral ceremonies in special full dress uniform.

As the catafalque and Royal mourners left the Palace grounds, the yards of the ships were cockpilled and their ensigns half-masted, and, until the catafalque reached the mausoleum, minute guns were fired from this ship and the *Mohican*. The *Mohican* fired the first thirty guns and the *Charleston* the last eighty-nine. The mausoleum is about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the Palace, and the time occupied in the passage of the catafalque was one hour and fifty-nine minutes.

On the 16th instant, the day following the funeral, I officially recognized the accession of Queen Liliuokalani to the throne of Hawaii, by dressing ships with flags and firing salutes of twenty-one guns from the *Charleston* and *Mohican* at noon. While these salutes were being fired I was being presented to Queen Liliuokalani by our minister, Mr. Stevens. All the officers who could be spared from duty on both ships, thirty-three in number, were also present in special full dress uniform, and were presented by me to the Queen.

I had been officially notified that princess Kiulani (aged 15 years last October), the daughter of the late princess Likiliki and her husband A. S. Cleghorn (an Englishman by birth), would be proclaimed heir presumptive to the throne, and that a royal salute would be fired in her honor from the shore battery at 2 p. m. on the 16th instant. After consultation with our minister, I decided that I would take no part in this ceremony, as any action of mine at that time might lead to future complications, and that I would await the action of the President and instructions from the Navy Department before ordering any recognition of the action of the Queen in naming her successor.

For some reason the Queen's proclamation was withheld, and had not been issued up to the time I left Honolulu, which was twenty-four hours after the time designated.

It was generally known that the Queen desired to form a new cabinet, and that she had asked for the resignations of the present one.

The present incumbents, however, unanimously decided that they would not tender their resignations, as, under the constitution, their tenure of office extended until impeachment, or until the Legislature, by a majority vote, passed a resolution of want of confidence. The position taken by the cabinet will be accepted by the Queen and her people.

It is not probable that any political complications of a serious nature will result. I was informed by one member of the cabinet that the ministers adopted this course on purely constitutional grounds, and that if the decision of the supreme court sustained them they would voluntarily tender their resignations, provided they were positively assured that their successors would be men in whom the people had every confidence.

The recent events connected with the death of Kalakaua in San Francisco, the honors accorded his memory by the Government of the United States, the State of California, the officials and citizens of San Francisco, and the return of his remains by this ship, and the part taken by the officers and men under my command in the various ceremonies and the final obsequies, has engendered in the hearts and

minds of the native Hawaiians, as well as the foreign-born citizens, a feeling of affection and gratitude toward the United States which it will be difficult to eradicate and which has already resulted, and will continue to result, in bringing these people in closer and more desirable relations with the Government and people of our country.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. BROWN,

Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,

Commanding United States Naval Force, Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Brown to the Secretary of the Navy.

[Telegram.]

FEBRUARY 27, 1891.

Left Honolulu 18th; accession of Queen was officially recognized 16th, day following King's funeral. Some political excitement among officials. Queen desired change in cabinet, but incumbents declined to resign because constitution fixes tenure of office during pleasure of Legislature. The question is before the supreme court and decision will be accepted. *Iroquois* now due at Honolulu; *Mohican* will also remain there and sail for California March 20, if all is quiet and orders are not countermanded, which can be done by steamer leaving San Francisco, March 10, if desirable.

BROWN,

Rear-Admiral.

Commander Shepard to Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. STEAMER MOHICAN (THIRD RATE),

Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, March 9, 1891.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report regarding the political situation in the Hawaiian Islands:

On the 16th ultimo the King's cabinet sent a request to the supreme court for an opinion upon the question whether the Queen was authorized by the constitution to request their resignations and was free to appoint a new cabinet.

On the 17th the cabinet asked the justices to suspend their reply until further notice. On the 25th the cabinet asked them to proceed, and at about 3 p. m. the opinion of the court was handed to the attorney-general, and the cabinet sent in their resignations to the Queen, who at once appointed a new cabinet, as follows: Samuel Parker, minister of foreign affairs; H. A. Widemann, minister of finance; C. N. Spencer, minister of interior; W. A. Whiting, attorney-general.

To these gentlemen the chief justice soon afterwards administered the oaths of office. I inclose herewith a clipping from a local paper giving in full the decision of the court.

Previous to the change of the cabinets there were numbers of wild rumors about malcontents attempting to gain control of affairs, and they would probably have made the effort, but were deterred by the fact that there was no chance of success.

The appointment of a cabinet apparently free from any discordant element seems to have convinced the agitators that the opportunity is not favorable for a demonstration, for at present everything is quiet, and, according to best information obtainable, is likely to remain so, at least until the meeting of the next Legislature, more than one year from this date.

To-day (March 9) Her Majesty, the Queen, with the consent of the nobles, proclaimed Princess Kaiulani her successor, and at the request of the minister of foreign affairs the *Mohican* fired a salute of twenty-one guns, accompanying the shore battery.

H. M. S. *Nymphe* sailed for Esquimault on Saturday, the 7th instant.

Very respectfully,

E. M. SHEPARD,
Commander, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department.

Commander Read to Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. S. IROQUOIS (THIRD RATE),
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, July 1, 1891.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, from all the information I am able to learn, matters of a political nature here are quiet, nothing of importance having occurred since my last letter, No. 6, dated June 16.

The health of the port and ship is good. During the past month the American ship *Centennial* arrived with a cargo of 1,005 tons of coal on account of the Navy Department, which has been stored in the Navy coal shed, excepting 500 tons, which is stored outside, the capacity of shed not being sufficient to store it all. Total amount of coal for Navy purposes now available is $2,052\frac{186}{2240}$ tons.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. J. READ,
Commander, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Brown to Secretary of the Navy.

UNITED STATES CRUISER SAN FRANCISCO,
FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaii, February 29, 1892.

SIR: I have the honor to report the arrival of this ship at this port on the 27th instant.

We left the harbor of San Diego at noon on the 17th instant, and until the afternoon of the following day the time was occupied in target practice with the main battery and the rapid-fire guns.

The *Pensacola* will sail for San Francisco, Cal., on or about March 12.

If the *Iroquois* received her orders she should reach here within a week.

Political matters are extremely quiet in Hawaii.

Very respectfully,

GEO. BROWN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,

Commanding United States Naval Force, Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Brown to the Secretary of the Navy.

No. 99.]

U. S. FLAGSHIP SAN FRANCISCO,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, March 28, 1892.

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Department that, accompanied by my staff and other officers of this ship, I was presented to Her Majesty Queen Lilioukalani by the Hon. John L. Stevens, our minister to Hawaii, on the 3d instant.

On the 19th instant the Queen, accompanied by the members of the cabinet and her official staff, was received on board this ship with all the honors due her. As she had not been on board of a man-of-war for fifteen years, I regarded her visit as a special evidence of her desire to show to the public her friendly consideration towards the United States; on this occasion Hon. John L. Stevens, United States minister, was on board and assisted in receiving the distinguished guests.

From a careful consideration of political affairs in Hawaii, and from information obtained by consultations with our minister, it is evident that there is a rapidly growing sentiment of friendship towards the United States Government on the part of the native Hawaiians on all the islands, and a consequent opposition to the Queen, and especially to those who are near her court. This feeling can be traced to the depression of business affairs, due to the fact that all holding interests in the production of sugar see nothing of an encouraging nature in the future of that production. The question of annexation to the United States is freely discussed at public meetings and on the streets by those natives whose cry was "Hawaii for the Hawaiians" one year ago.

There exists a strong faction which is prepared to overthrow the present Government by force of arms, but the majority of the leaders of this party are opposed to violent measures, and I am of the opinion that the presence of this ship in the harbor deters the so-called "Liberal Party" from resorting to extreme measures.

Among the business men, who have large pecuniary interests in Hawaii, there is a strong feeling of doubt as to the outcome of the present political agitation, and the general sentiment is that radical reforms in the interests of economy in governmental management must be made by the next legislature, which convenes in May next.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. BROWN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,

Commanding United States Naval Force, Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear Admiral Brown to Secretary of the Navy.

No. 140.]

U. S. CRUISER SAN FRANCISCO,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, April 26, 1892.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that since my last report political affairs in Hawaii have been unusually quiet.

Several election cases have been contested in the lower courts by the Liberals, and in each case the decision was against them, and the results were not changed by the appeals to the supreme court.

The Liberals make a very small showing in the Legislature which will convene on the 28th of May. Until after that date there will be nothing done by either party, but the Liberals will make no violent demonstrations against the Queen until they are satisfied that they can not obtain some satisfactory legislation.

The conservative and reform parties will act as one, and will have such an overwhelming majority in the Legislature as to enable them to absolutely control matters.

It is distinctly understood that the present cabinet will be ousted by a vote of "want of confidence" and that no cabinet will be accepted by the Legislature, unless it pledges itself to make several changes in high officials, which will have the desirable effect of purifying the moral atmosphere near the royal court.

I do not anticipate any violent measures in Hawaii during the next six months, but regard the presence of one ship as absolutely necessary in order to guard our interests.

There is no question but that the presence of one of our ships in this harbor will serve to check the few agitators from taking any action which would disturb the quiet of the islands.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. BROWN.

Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,

Commanding United States Naval Force, Pacific Station.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Brown to the Secretary of the Navy.

No. 168.]

U. S. CRUISER SAN FRANCISCO,
FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaii, May 23, 1892.

SIR: Since my last report, No. 140, of April 26, 1892, political affairs in Hawaii have been quiet, until the 20th instant.

The liberal party, led by the Ashford brothers (Canadians) and Robert W. Wilcox, have been holding public meetings weekly and secret meetings frequently, and were becoming more bold and outspoken in their treasonable utterances. Their plans were known to be about perfected, and it seemed as if any night might see an uprising of 600 or 700 liberals, who would endeavor to make prisoners, in their residences, all Government officers of importance, as well as the Queen in the palace, and thereby prevent all communication between the Queen and her ministers, and between the Government officials.

The liberals were not generally provided with arms, and it is certain that their desire was to carry out their plans with out violence.

Although no overt act of treason had been committed by the liberals, the Government, on the 20th instant, caused the arrest of nineteen of the most prominent men of that party, on the charge of treason. These arrests included V. V. Ashford and R. W. Wilcox. All arrests were made without any trouble or opposition. Additional arrests will probably follow.

Under the laws of Hawaii, all of those arrested must be taken before one of the judges of the supreme court, who decides whether they will be released or committed for trial. It is thought that the Government has sufficient evidence to hold these parties for trial, in which case they will be kept close prisoners until July next.

There is no doubt in my mind but that the prompt action of the Government has checked, if not prevented, any movement on the part of the liberals for some months to come. It has certainly within the last three days had the effect of strengthening the Government and frightening and demoralizing the lower classes of liberals, who were mere tools of the leaders of their party, for they do not appear to have much sympathy with the leaders who are prisoners, nor have they shown the slightest signs of taking any concerted action in opposition to the law of the Kingdom.

The results of the action of the Government will be watched with great interest, and the future will depend on whether or not there is sufficient evidence against the prisoners to prove the charge of treason if they are committed for trial.

I do not anticipate any trouble which will call for any action on my part, but the moral effect of the presence of a ship of war in this harbor is such as to prevent any acts of violence.

The Legislature will meet on the 28th instant.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE BROWN,
Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy,
Commanding United States Naval Force, Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Brown to the Secretary of the Navy.

No. 191.]

U. S. CRUISER SAN FRANCISCO,
FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaii, June 20, 1892.

SIR: Since my last report the only event of any interest in Hawaiian affairs was the committal of R. W. Wilcox and five others for trial on the charge of treason. The trial will commence next month. All the others who were arrested on a similiar charge have been discharged. V. V. Ashford, who was leader among those discharged, left the islands immediately for the United States.

There is every reason to believe that there will be no political disturbances here for some time to come.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE BROWN,
Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

Hon. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Brown to the Secretary of the Navy.

No. 194.]

U. S. CRUISER SAN FRANCISCO,
 FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaii, June 30, 1892.

SIR: I have the honor to report that political affairs in Hawaii are very quiet at this date.

It is assured that the Legislature now in session will pass a resolution of a want of confidence in the present cabinet at an early date.

The Government has abandoned the prosecution of all persons who were recently arrested on the charge of treason, and have released them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE BROWN,
Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

HON. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Brown to the Secretary of the Navy.

No. 216.]

U. S. CRUISER SAN FRANCISCO,
 FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaii, July 19, 1892.

SIR: Since my last report of June 30 nothing of an important character has occurred in Hawaiian politics.

A resolution of a want of confidence has been introduced in the Legislature and will come up for consideration day after to-morrow, the 21st instant, unless the members of the cabinet tender their resignations before that time.

It is a foregone conclusion that there will be a change of cabinet, and that the present minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Samuel Parker, will be the leader of the new cabinet, as he represents satisfactorily the better class of natives.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE BROWN,
Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

HON. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Brown to the Secretary of the Navy.

No. 248.]

U. S. CRUISER SAN FRANCISCO,
 FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaii, August 17, 1892.

SIR: I have the honor to report that there has been nothing of an unusual or exciting character in Hawaiian politics since my last report.

The great depression in business matters in the islands is being felt

by all classes. Importations from the United States are extremely light, and many vessels leave here in ballast.

The Legislature is considering the appropriation bills, and has the difficult problem to solve of confining necessary expenditures within the limits of prospective revenues for the coming period of two years.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE BROWN,
Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

Hon. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Captain Wiltse to Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. S. BOSTON (SECOND RATE),
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, October 12, 1892.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on September 14 the introduction in the Hawaiian legislature of a want of confidence resolution in the new ministry resulted in a vote of 24 to 21 in favor of the resolution. The opposition claimed that the resolution had passed, but the ministry declared it required a vote of 25 to pass, and the chair sustained them. As the question hinged on an interpretation of the constitution, the matter was referred to the supreme court, which decided in favor of the ministry.

On October 4 an election was held to fill the vacant seats of two members. The ministry party raised the cry of anti-annexation, and were ardently supported by the British and other foreigners. Unwarranted attacks were made (in my opinion for political purposes) upon the United States representatives by anonymous writers in the official organ of the Government. The election resulted in a victory for the ministry.

The British representatives manifest the most unusual interest, publicly, in all political proceedings. The action of the ministry, with possibly one exception, and of the English element is plainly in opposition to the United States.

There is a large and growing sentiment, particularly among the planters, in favor of annexation to the United States, but I am informed that the leaders do not think an opportune moment will arrive for some time to come. However, everything seems to point toward an eventual request for annexation.

The political situation at present is more quiet and will probably remain so unless another resolution of want of confidence is passed, which is not likely in the immediate future.

The financial question is the most important question to be met by the ministry.

Very respectfully,

G. C. WILTSE,
Captain, Commanding.

Hon. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Capt. Wiltse to the Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. S. BOSTON (SECOND RATE),
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, October 20, 1892.

SIR: I have the honor to report that since my last letter on Monday, October 17, a want of confidence resolution was unexpectedly introduced and passed by a vote of 31 to 15, forcing the ministry to resign.

The political situation is still unsettled. It is thought that the names of the new cabinet will be sent to the legislature by Monday next, October 24. If the new ministry is acceptable to the majority, legislation will be resumed and affairs become more settled. If, however, the Queen persists in consulting only her own inclination, regardless of the wishes of the opposition, which is a large majority, it is difficult to predict what will be the outcome.

I inclose a paper giving an account of the proceedings, etc., when the want of confidence resolution was introduced.

Very respectfully,

G. C. WILTSE,

Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S. Boston.

Hon. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Captain Wiltse to the Secretary of the Navy.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *November 1, 1892.*

SIR: Respecting the state of political affairs in the Hawaiian Kingdom, I have the honor to report that after much delay a cabinet was sent to the Legislature to-day, and was immediately voted out by a vote of 26 to 13. The Legislature then adjourned until November 7, having yesterday refused to pass appropriation bills for the running expenses of the Government. Meanwhile the salaries of all officials are overdue, and must remain unpaid until the Legislature appropriates the money according to law.

The Queen persists in refusing to appoint a cabinet in conformity with the wishes of the majority, and it is possible that her obstinacy may precipitate a crisis.

Very respectfully,

G. C. WILTSE,

Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S. Boston.

Hon. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Capt. Wiltse to the Secretary of the Navy.

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
November 9, 1892.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the danger of a political crisis in the Hawaiian Kingdom seems to have passed. The Queen has appointed a cabinet, after much pressure had been brought to bear, that

is strong financially, and favorable to American interests. The new ministry will probably be supported by the Legislature, although much opposition has been aroused among the native members because they are not represented. It is doubtful, however, if the natives can secure enough votes to vote the cabinet out, though they would do so, if possible. I am informed from reliable sources that the Queen had been strongly advised to dissolve the Legislature and order a new election, which would have been unconstitutional and which would probably have caused a revolution; but she was deterred by the presence of United States vessels of war. I inclose paper containing editorials on the situation.

Very respectfully,

G. C. WILTSE.

Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S. Boston.

Hon. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Capt. G. C. Wiltse to the Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. S. BOSTON (SECOND RATE),

Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 4, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the condition of political affairs in the Hawaiian Kingdom is very quiet, and has remained unchanged since my last letter of December 6, 1892.

The Legislature has nearly finished its work and will probably adjourn in a very short time.

Very respectfully,

G. C. WILTSE,

Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S. Boston.

Hon. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Capt. Wiltse to the Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. S. BOSTON (SECOND RATE),

Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 18, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report concerning the condition of political affairs in the Hawaiian Islands:

As stated in my communication of January 4, 1893, the *Boston* sailed from this port for Hilo, Hawaii, with the United States minister on board.

During the absence of the ship from this port, on January 12, the cabinet was voted out of office by a vote of 25 to 16.

And the cabinet was appointed on January 14.

On the morning of January 14 the *Boston* arrived in this port from Lahina, Maui, and came to anchor.

At noon on the same day the Legislature was prorogued by the Queen, and it was rumored that the Queen intended proclaiming a new constitution. This however was not done.

On Monday, January 16, there was a large and enthusiastic mass

meeting composed of the representative men of Honolulu, held in the largest hall in the city, at 2 p. m.

On the same day I received from the United States minister a request to land the sailors and marines of the *Boston* to protect the United States legation, consulate, and the lives and property of American citizens.

At 4:30 p. m., January 16, I landed the ships battalion under the command of Lieut.-Commander William T. Swinburne.

One detachment of marines was placed at the legation and one at the consulate, while the main body of men, with two pieces of artillery, were quartered in a hall of central location near the Government building.

On Tuesday, January 17, a Provisional Government was established and the Queen dethroned.

The Provisional Government took possession of the Government buildings, the archives, and the treasury, the Queen acquiescing under protest.

The Provisional Government was recognized as the *de facto* Government of the Hawaiian Islands by the United States minister.

The revolution has been accomplished without the loss of a single life, and to-day, January 18, the Provisional Government has possession and control of the city, which is under martial law.

I am informed that commissioners will leave to-morrow for Washington, fully accredited for purposes of negotiation to permit these islands to come under the control of the United States.

Very respectfully,

G. C. WILTSE,

Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S. Boston.

HON. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

John L. Stevens, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States, to Captain G. C. Wiltse.

UNITED STATES LEGATION,

Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 16, 1893.

SIR: In view of the existing critical circumstances in Honolulu, indicating an inadequate legal force, I request you to land marines and sailors from the ship under your command for the protection of the United States legation and the United States consulate, and to secure the safety of American life and property.

Yours truly,

JOHN L. STEVENS,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States.

Capt. Wiltse to Lieut. Commander Swinburne.

SIR: You will take command of the battalion and land in Honolulu for the purpose of protecting our legation, consulate, and the lives and property of American citizens, and to assist in preserving public order.

Great prudence must be exercised by both officers and men, and no action taken that is not fully warranted by the condition of affairs and by the conduct of those who may be inimical to the treaty rights of American citizens.

You will inform me at the earliest practicable moment of any change in the situation.

Very respectfully,

G. C. WILTSE,

Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S. Boston.

Lieut. Commander W. T. SWINBURNE,

Executive Officer U. S. S. Boston.

Capt. Wiltse to Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. S. BOSTON (SECOND RATE),
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, February 1, 1893.

SIR: As stated in my last report of January 18, I landed the ship's battalion on January 16, at the request of the United States minister, a copy of which is herewith inclosed, a request that this should be done having been made to him by the committee of public safety.

The battalion is under the command of Lieut. Commander W. T. Swinburne, with Lieut. W. R. Rush as adjutant.

I inclose herewith a copy of the orders given by me to Lieut. Commander Swinburne.

The battalion consists of one company of marines, 30 men, under command of Lieut H. L. Draper, U. S. Marine Corps; two companies of sailors, the first consisting of 34 men, under the command of Lieut. Charles Laird, Naval Cadet J. F. Carter being chief of section; and the second, consisting of 35 men, under command of Lieut. De Witt Coffinan, Naval Cadet W. D. Brotherton being chief of section; two pieces of artillery, one short gatling, and one 37^{mm} H. R. C., under command of Lieut. Lucien Young, Naval Cadet W. Evans being chief of section.

At the request of the Provisional Government I have kept the battalion ashore and it is not my intention to withdraw all the force until a request that it be done is made by the Provisional Government, with the approval of the United States minister.

On January 25 the guard at the legation was reduced from 14 to 6, at the request of the minister, 8 men going to the consulate, where the remainder of the marine guard is stationed.

While there has been no demonstration so far, there can be no doubt that the prompt landing of the battalion has prevented bloodshed and saved life and property.

The Provisional Government has organized an armed force of four companies, three of volunteers and one of regulars, and is daily gaining strength and followers.

The conduct of the officers and men of the *Boston* has been such as to reflect credit on the American Navy.

To-day at 9 forenoon, at the request of the Provisional Government, officially expressed, Honolulu and the Hawaiian Islands were placed through the United States Minister under the protection of the United States, pending negotiations at Washington, not however interfering

with the administration of public affairs by the Provisional Government.

Very respectfully,

G. C. WILTSE,
Captain, U. S. Navy, commanding U. S. S. Boston.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Dept., Washington, D. C.

Captain Wiltse to the Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. S. BOSTON (SECOND RATE),
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, February 8, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the state of political affairs in Hawaii has remained unchanged since my last report of February 1.

As stated in that report the flag of the United States was raised over the Government building at 9 a. m. on February 1, the United States minister having been requested by the Hawaiian Provisional Government to assume a protectorate over the Hawaiian Islands.

The battalion from this ship, under command of Lieut.-Commander W. T. Swinburne, marched from their quarters ashore to the Government building, arriving there at 8.40 a. m.

The building was then turned over to me and the battalion was formed in front of the building.

At 8.55 a. m., the proclamation to the Hawaiian people was read on the steps of the Government building by Lieut. W. R. Rush the adjutant of the battalion, and at 9 a. m. the flag was raised over the building by my aide, Naval Cadet J. R. P. Pringle.

Since the establishment of the protectorate martial law has been suspended, and the general feeling seems to be one of security and satisfaction.

I inclose herewith copies of the request made to me by the United States minister and my order to Lieut. Commander Swinburne.

The marine guard, under command of Lieut. H. L. Draper, is now in charge of the Government building, five of the guard being retained at the legation.

On February 3, the company, under command of Lieut. Lucien Young, was withdrawn in accordance with an understanding between the President of the Provisional Government, the United States minister, and myself, the whole force being no longer deemed necessary.

The President accompanied by other members of the Provisional Government paid an official visit to this ship on Friday, February 3, and were received with customary honors.

Very respectfully,

G. C. WILTSE,
Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S. Boston.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

John L. Stevens, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States, to Captain Wiltse.

UNITED STATES LEGATION,
Honolulu, February 1, 1893.

SIR: The Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands having duly and officially expressed to the undersigned the fear that said Government may be unable to protect life and property and to prevent civil disorder in Honolulu, the capital of said Hawaiian Islands, request that the flag of the United States may be raised, for the protection of the Hawaiian Islands, and to that end confer on the United States, through the undersigned, freedom of occupation of the public buildings of the Hawaiian Government and the soil of the Hawaiian Islands, so far as may be necessary for the exercise of such protection, but not interfering with the administration of the public affairs by said Provisional Government.

I hereby ask you to comply with the spirit and terms of the request of the Hawaiian Provisional Government, and to that end to use all the force at your command, in the exercise of your best judgment and discretion, you and myself awaiting instructions from the United States Government at Washington.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN L. STEVENS,
*Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
of the United States.*

Capt. G. C. WILTSE,
Commander of the U. S. S. Boston.

Capt. Wiltse to Lieut. Commander Swinburne.

U. S. S. BOSTON (SECOND RATE),
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, February 1, 1893.

SIR: You will take possession of the Government building and the American flag will be hoisted over it at 9 a. m.

Very respectfully,

G. C. WILTSE,
Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S. Boston.
Lieut. Commander W. T. SWINBURNE,
Commanding Battalion, U. S. S. Boston.

Secretary of State to Secretary of Navy.

STATE DEPARTMENT,
Washington, February 14, 1893.

SIR: Acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 11th instant, communicating copy of a telegram from San Francisco containing the report of Capt. Wiltse, of the *Boston*, in regard to the action of Mr. Stevens and himself in extending protection for life and property in the Hawaiian Islands during the pending negotiations at Washington, I have the honor to hand you, for your information, copy of a telegram

which I am about to send via San Francisco for transmission to the minister by the mail steamer sailing from that port to-morrow, the 15th instant.

You will observe that Mr. Stevens' action is commended so far as it lies within the scope of standing instructions to the legation and the naval commanders in Hawaiian waters, but is disavowed so far as it may appear to overstep that limit by setting the authority of the United States above that of the Hawaiian Government.

I beg to draw your attention to the concluding paragraph of that telegram, and have to request that instructions in the same sense be forwarded at the same time to the commanding officer of the United States naval force in Hawaiian waters.

The instructions conveyed by this telegram are more fully set forth in a written instruction to Mr. Stevens, to be sent by the next mail, of which a copy is inclosed for your further information.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN W. FOSTER.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

[Inclosures.]

1. Telegram to the U. S. minister at Honolulu, February 14, 1893.
2. Instruction to the same, No. —, February 11, 1893.

Capt. Wiltse to the Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. S. BOSTON (SECOND RATE),
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, February 27, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose a report of the operations of the battalion of this ship while quartered ashore for duty made to me by Lieut. Commander W. T. Swinburne, he being in command of the battalion.

Since the battalion has been quartered ashore the behavior of both officers and men has been commented upon by all parties as reflecting credit upon the American Navy.

Very respectfully,

G. C. WILTSE,
Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S. Boston.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Capt. Wiltse to Lieut. Commander Swinburne.

U. S. S. BOSTON (SECOND RATE),
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 16, 1893.

SIR: You will take command of the battalion, and land in Honolulu, for the purpose of protecting our legation, consulate, and the lives and property of American citizens, and to assist in preserving public order.

Great prudence must be exercised by both officers and men, and no cation taken that is not fully warranted by the condition of affairs and

by the conduct of those who may be inimical to the treaty rights of American citizens.

You will inform me at the earliest practicable moment of any change in the situation.

Very respectfully,

G. C. WILTSE,

Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S. Boston.

Lieut. Commander W. T. SWINBURNE, U. S. Navy,
Executive Officer, U. S. S. Boston.

A true copy.

W. T. SWINBURNE,

Lieutenant-Commander, U. S. Navy.

Capt Wiltse to Lieut. Commander Swinburne.

U. S. S. BOSTON,

Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, February 1, 1893.

SIR: You will take possession of the Government building, and the American flag will be hoisted over it at 9 a. m.

Very respectfully,

G. C. WILTSE,

Captain U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S. Boston.

Lieut. Commander W. T. SWINBURNE,
Commanding Battalion U. S. S. Boston.

A true copy.

WM. T. SWINBURNE,

Lieut. Commander, U. S. Navy.

Lieut. Commander Swinburne to Capt. Wiltse.

CAMP BOSTON,

Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, February 27, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the landing and subsequent operations of the battalion of the U. S. S. *Boston* in the city of Honolulu:

In obedience to your order, a copy of which is attached, marked A, the battalion of the *Boston* landed at Brewers Wharf, in the city of Honolulu, at 5 p. m. January 16.

The following is a complete roster of the battalion as landed:

Lieut. Commander W. T. Swinburne, U. S. Navy, commanding;
Lieut. W. R. Rush, U. S. Navy, adjutant; P. A. Surgeon T. C. Craig, U. S. Navy, surgeon.

Company A, Artillery, 40 men; 1.37 mm. Rev. Cannon; 1.37 mm. caisson with reserve ammunition; 1 Gatling gun; 22 Lee rifles, 18 revolvers; Lieut. Lucien Young, commanding; Naval Cadets H. C. Kuenzli and W. Evans.

Company B, Infantry, 35 men; Lieut. Charles Laird, U. S. Navy, commanding; Naval Cadet J. F. Carter.

Company C, Infantry, 34 men; Lieut. D. Coffman, U. S. Navy, commanding; Naval Cadet W. D. Brotherton.

Company D, Marines, 30 men; First Lieut. H. L. Draper, U. S. Marine Corps, commanding.

Color guard, 4 men; hospital corps, 1 apothecary, 4 stretchermen; signalmen, 2; music, 3.

Total, 153 men, 11 officers.

Each man carried the regulation knapsack, with blanket and change of clothing, haversack with mess gear and ration of hard bread, and filled canteen. Those armed with Lee rifle wore the double webbing belt carrying 60 cartridges in the loops and 20 in magazines. The marines were fitted out with the same belts, but the loops only were filled.

The ammunition boxes of the Gatling gun contained four filled Accle's Feeds and 1,380 extra rounds of .45 caliber in pasteboard boxes. The ammunition boxes of the 37 mm. contained 64 cartridges, common shell. Reserve ammunition in 37 mm. caisson was as follows: After compartments, 112 37 mm. cartridges, common shell; forward compartment 1,600 caliber .45 cartridges in pasteboard boxes; top or center compartment, four filled Accle's Feeds, and 800 .38 caliber revolver cartridges. This amount of ammunition stowed safely and compactly and the caisson was easily drawn and manoeuvred by twelve men. The recharge for Accle's Feed, with its tripod, was lashed to whippletree of caisson.

After battalion was formed, it was, agreeably to your verbal instructions, marched first to the United States consulate, where Lieut. Draper, with his company, was detached with orders to proceed to the legation and leave half his command in charge of the orderly sergeant, returning with the remainder to the United States consulate, himself, and remain there as a guard until further orders.

The remainder of the battalion then marched down King street. In passing the palace the battalion, in column of companies, gave a marching salute, trumpeters sounding four ruffles in honor of the royal standard, which was flying there.

On arriving at the residence of Mr. J. B. Atherton, an American, the command was halted, and permission having been obtained, was marched into the grounds, arms stacked and ranks broken, awaiting further orders from you.

About 8 in the evening your aid, Naval Cadet Pringle, arrived with orders to march the battalion to Arion Hall and camp there, which was done, artillery parked, and sentries posted.

Arion Hall is a long one-story building containing one long room, and having verandas on the two long sides, separated from the street by a narrow yard and fence, and with a fair-sized yard in rear. It fronts the side of the Government building, from which it is separated by a narrow street.

During the night the men were kept ready for an instant's call, but there were no disturbances of any kind.

At reveille the next morning, 17th, the camp routine, which is attached marked B, was published and has been strictly carried out in all its details ever since. Latrines were built in the yard and every sanitary precaution taken.

At 2:30 p. m., a civilian, armed, reported to me that a policeman had been shot while attempting to stop a wagonload of ammunition which was being conveyed to the old armory where the civilian forces enrolled

by the committee of safety were then assembling, and that a large crowd was collecting on Merchant street. I immediately assembled the battalion under arms in the yard in rear of the building to await developments. Very shortly after you arrived at the camp. During the time you were at the camp, viz, until nearly 6 o'clock, the men leading the citizens' movement had assumed charge of the Government building without opposition of any kind; the civilian companies under arms had marched in and established a line of sentries about the Government building.

The *Boston's* battalion was kept in rear of the camp, at their company parades, with arms stacked. When you left the camp, about 6 p. m., you notified me that a Provisional Government, of which Mr. S. B. Dole was presiding officer, was in complete possession, and showed me a letter from the United States minister recognizing it as the *de facto* government of the Hawaiian Islands, and directed me to consider it as such.

During the night again officers and men were kept ready for a moment's call, but the city was perfectly quiet.

During the day of the 18th the royal standard was hauled down over the palace, and the household troops disbanded, by order of the Provisional Government, except a small guard of honor, who accompanied the ex-Queen to her residence on Beretania street.

On January 19 new quarters were provided for the battalion at the unoccupied house on King street, the property of Mr. C. R. Bishop, of Bishop & Co., bankers of the place. Having thoroughly policed the old camp, the battalion moved into the new quarters at 1:30 p. m.

The grounds around the new quarters have a frontage on King street of about 250 feet, separated from the street by a high stone wall with two broad entrance gates giving on a broad path which sweeps around in front of the house, affording ample space for company inspection and morning guard mounting. The grounds are about 300 feet in depth, with a broad lawn in the rear amply sufficient for company and artillery drill for one company at a time. The house is a square two story building of stone, with broad verandahs on three sides. The lower floor was occupied by the men, each company having its own room, the color guard and drum corps one room, a room for adjutant and officer of day, and one room and verandah on one side for guardroom. One out building was used for armory and lamp room, and one for sick bay and quarters for ambulance corps. As the place had been used at one time as a hotel there was already good water-closet and bathing accommodations for both officers and men. The upper story was occupied by the officers. A long shed was immediately built and water led in to six faucets, and proper drainage facilities for morning ablutions and scrubbing of clothes, which has added very materially to the comfort of the command and the sanitary condition of the place.

In accordance with your verbal orders given me the evening of January 31, the battalion was paraded on the morning of February 1, at 8:30, in front of the quarters. A Company as artillery with Gatling and 37 men. The rest as infantry in light marching order.

As the line was formed you handed me a written order dated February 1, a copy of which is attached marked C.

In obedience to those orders the battalion marched to the Government building, where we were received by the civilian troops in line, who presented arms as we entered. President Dole, and all members

of the ministry and advisory council were also present. I immediately showed your order to Col. Sofer, Commander in Chief of the Provisional Government forces, who at once turned over the custody of the building to me. Then by your order a proclamation from Minister Stevens establishing a protectorate over the Hawaiian Islands in the name of the United States, pending negotiations with the Hawaiian Commissioners at Washington, was read by the adjutant. At 9 a. m. the United States ensign was hoisted over the building, the battalion and civilian forces presenting arms. Then the front of the battalion being changed to the rear, the Hawaiian flag, hoisted on the pole in the grounds, received the same salute.

The civilian forces of the Provisional Government were then withdrawn and the custody of the building turned over to Lieut. Draper with his company of 25 marines, which were withdrawn from the United States consulate for the purpose, the guard at the United States legation being continued but reduced to 5 men. The blue jacket companies of the battalion then returned to their quarters.

During the three nights preceding the 1st of February the town was full of rumors of a threatened attack on the Government building by adherents and sympathizers with the late monarchy, and all the troops of the Provisional Government were kept in the Government building with patrols about the place. The hoisting of the United States flag had the effect of at once stopping these rumors and restoring confidence, and appeared to be approved by everybody.

My orders to Lieut. Draper were to consider himself responsible for the custody and safety of the Government building; to consult freely with the officers of the Provisional Government and carry out their wishes as to who should be admitted to the building and during what hours they should be admitted, and to do everything to facilitate public business. On the morning of February 4, at the request of President Dole, the gates of the grounds of the public building were thrown open, and everybody allowed free access from 9 a. m. to 4 p. m. Lieut. Draper was notified to that effect and directed to remove the sentinel from the front of the building during these hours. During the time the marines have occupied the Government building they have received the highest praise from all parties for their courtesy and military bearing. I would like to add, also, that during their five weeks of service on shore there has not been a single report of infraction of regulations made against any one of them.

On February 3, Company A, Lieut. L. Young, was withdrawn from garrison and sent on board ship, by your order.

Since the protectorate was established everything has been perfectly quiet in the city. The garrison routine has been carried out with most careful attention to all military details.

The afternoon company drills have been alternately artillery and infantry. Battalion drill has taken the place of morning dress parade in Palace Square. During this time, now nearly four weeks, the men have made great progress in all drills and their interest in all their military duties has never flagged. As a disciplinary school, particularly for petty officers, the experience has been very useful.

This successful result is due to the zeal, tact, and attention to duty of the company officers.

To the adjutant, Lieut. W. R. Rush, I am indebted for all the details of military organization, the sanitary condition of the camp, and for the very excellent condition in which the place has been kept.

After nearly five weeks' occupancy by a hundred men both grounds and buildings are in better condition than when we arrived.

Very respectfully,

WM. T. SWINBURNE,
*Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy,
Commanding Battalion of U. S. S. Boston.*

Capt. G. C. WILTSE, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. S. Boston.

Approved:

G. C. WILTSE,
Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S. Boston.

Admiral Skerrett to the Secretary of the Navy.

No. 28.]

UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP MOHICAN,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, February 27, 1893.

SIR: In obedience to telegraphic orders of the Secretary of the Navy, January 28, the *Mohican* was coaled and provisioned on the same day and left Mare Island on January 29, at about 6 a. m. for Honolulu.

After a passage of twelve days we arrived at our destination just in time to see the O. O. steamer *Belgic* passing out to sea. We signaled to her to report us, but apparently she either did not or could not understand our signal made to her as we were passing Diamond Head, she being inshore of us. On our arrival it was found that the *Boston* and the Japanese war vessel, the *Kongo*, were at anchor, and that the United States ensign was displayed over the Government building. This was explained to me immediately on anchoring, by Capt. Wiltse, U. S. Navy, who reported that the flag had been hoisted at the request of the Provisional Government through the United States envoy, Mr. Stevens.

Shortly after anchoring I made a visit to the United States minister where all things reported to me by Capt. Wiltse were fully corroborated. It was learned that the political status remained as had been reported to the Department by Capt. Wiltse. After leaving the legation I made a visit with my staff upon the Provisional Government officials, and learned from them that everything at this place was quiet and in peaceable condition, and that they were most gratified by the present condition of things political. On the 12th instant, H. B. M. S. *Garnet*, Capt. Hughes-Hallet, R. N., anchored outside near the outer buoy. She saluted the Hawaiian flag and then saluted the United States Rear-Admiral with thirteen guns, which were duly returned, first by the Hawaiian shore battery and then by ourselves. I have made official visits of ceremony to return visits of a pleasing character from the captain of H. I. J. ship *Kongo*, who saluted me with thirteen guns, which was returned by the *Mohican*.

On my visit to the *Garnet*, in consideration of a very recent salute having been made to me, I requested that none should be fired. This was complied with.

From all information gleaned I am impressed with the idea that the Provisional Government are quite able to administer the affairs of the present Government, upheld as they are by the presence of our men ashore. The stock of coal having been consumed on our passage down

here, it was decided to coal the ship since our arrival, and now the bunkers are filled.

The ship has been visited, and received in accordance with regulations, by the President and Vice-President and members of the Provisional Government, which seems to have produced a beneficial effect.

On the visit of the Vice-President, he was accompanied by three Hawaiians of distinction. On the 28th instant, the Japanese vessel of war *Naniwa Kan* came in and anchored. She fired a salute of twenty-one guns to the Hawaiian flag, and then saluted the flag of the U. S. Rear-Admiral with thirteen guns, all of which were returned, gun for gun. She moored near the *Boston*. On the 24th the governor of Oahu visited the ship and was duly received, and, on leaving, requested that he be not saluted.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. SKERRETT,

Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,

Commanding United States Naval Force, Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Capt. Wiltse to the Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. S. BOSTON (SECOND RATE),

Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, February 28, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith a copy of a resolution passed by the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

Very respectfully,

G. C. WILTSE,

Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S. Boston.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Be it resolved by the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands as follows:

That the thanks of this Government are due and are hereby tendered to Gilbert C. Wiltse, captain in the U. S. Navy, now commanding the United States steamship of war *Boston*, for his gallant, well-timed, and judicious conduct in protecting life and property in the city of Honolulu, upon the occasion of his landing his forces at the request of the United States envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.

That like thanks are due and are hereby tendered to the officers and men of the U. S. Navy who composed the landing force from the *Boston*, and whose discipline, forbearance, and gentlemanly conduct under circumstances of considerable annoyance and in several instances of much exasperation, entitle them to the gratitude of the people of the Hawaiian Islands.

Capt. GILBERT C. WILTSE AND OFFICERS OF THE U. S. S. BOSTON:

GENTLEMEN: I have the honor hereby to inform you that the above resolution was unanimously passed by the executive and advisory councils of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands in session this day.

JAMES B. CASTLE,

Secretary Executive and Advisory Councils,

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,

February 27, 1893.

Admiral Skerrett to Secretary of the Navy.

No. 83.]

U. S. FLAGSHIP MOHICAN,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, March 15, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Department that affairs of a political nature continue to progress favorably for the established Provisional Government, affairs evidently being kept quiet, from the fact that the *Boston's* battalion continues to remain on shore.

Since my last letter H. B. M. S. *Garnet* has left for British Columbia, and on to-morrow the Japanese war vessel *Kongo* will leave for Japan.

I have considered that for the present I can spare the presence of the *Alliance*. Therefore have ordered her to proceed to Mare Island, carrying some condemned sick, court-martial prisoners, and men whose terms of service expire prior to June next. I have directed her commanding officer to rejoin this vessel here after such required repairs are made and her complement of officers and men are filled up, unless otherwise ordered by the Department. All of which, I trust, will meet the approval of the honorable Secretary of the Navy.

Very respectfully your obedient servant,

J. S. SKERRETT,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding United States Naval Force, Pacific Station.

Hon. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Admiral Skerrett to Secretary of the Navy.

No. 101.]

U. S. FLAGSHIP MOHICAN,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, March 29, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Department that political affairs at this place seem to go along quietly and without any apparent friction; I regret to say, however, that there are a number of persons in this community who are greatly opposed to the Provisional Government, whether or not the opposition will ever amount to anything, is probably better known to the minister plenipotentiary, etc., than myself.

I have thought it expedient to withdraw a portion of the *Boston's* battalion from shore, leaving on shore the marines and one company of (36) blue jackets, together with the requisite officers. I am of the opinion that the number will be sufficient. The *Naniwa Kan* (Japanese man-of-war) has been outside, for apparent gun practice, for the last three days. Since my last communication the *Alliance* has left here, by my orders, for Mare Island, to make necessary repairs and examination of her bottom, and to carry sick and others from the ships here. I have directed her return to this place, if not otherwise ordered. There is nothing further to communicate.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. SKERRETT.
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy.
Commanding United States Naval Force, Pacific Station,

Hon. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Admiral Skerrett to the Secretary of the Navy.

No. 112.]

U. S. FLAGSHIP MOHICAN,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, April 4, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt, on the 29th ultimo, of your letter of instructions, dated March 11, 1893, the same having been delivered to me by the Hon. James H. Blount, Special Commissioner from the President of the United States to the Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. SKERRETT,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
*Commanding United States Naval Force, Pacific Station.*Hon. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

*Rear-Admiral Skerrett to Secretary Herbert.*U. S. S. MOHICAN, FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, April 6, 1893.

SIR: Since my last of the 29th ultimo, I have to inform the Department of the arrival, after closing my mail on that day, of the U. S. R. S. *Richard Rush*, having on board Special U. S. Commissioner J. H. Blount. On March 31 I was called by Mr. Blount for a special interview, on which occasion, by his directions, I was ordered to withdraw the *Boston's* force from the shore and at 11 a. m. on April 1 to haul down the United States flag from the Government building, which was to be replaced by the Provisional Government hoisting the Hawaiian flag. These orders were promptly executed as directed. There was not the remotest evidence shown, by the crowd of natives and others about the Government building, of any feeling; no demonstration of any description. Since which time, by the advice of Mr. Blount, the guard that had been placed at the United States legation was allowed to be returned to that place. This was done to quiet the apprehensions of Minister Stevens. There has been no turmoil of any description on shore; peace and quiet have reigned throughout. The cadets will leave by this steamer and are ordered to report arrival on reaching San Francisco. The U. S. R. S. *Richard Rush* left for San Diego on the 5th instant, after I had had her supplied with eighty tons of coal from the Government coal pile.

Political affairs remain as formerly stated. I would further state that the *Boston's* force was, before its withdrawal from shore, relieved at the Government building by one company of the Provisional Government's troops.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. SKERRETT,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
*Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.*Hon. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Skerrett to Secretary Herbert.

U. S. S. MOHICAN, FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION.

Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, April 25, 1893.

SIR: I take pleasure to inform the department that the political condition remains about the same. The Provisional Government has its own troops quartered in the Government building, and there is no apparent indication of either uneasiness or apprehension on the part of the Government officials. Everything is moving on placidly. The detail of marines now at the United States Legation gives apparent comfort and contentment to the United States Minister.

The U. S. S. *Adams* has not yet arrived; therefore the changes of officers ordered by the Department have not yet been carried out, but will be immediately on her arrival. The U. S. S. *Mohican* will be ready for sea, and her departure from this port on her cruise to Bering Sea, immediately after the arrival of the *Adams*. On the departure of the *Mohican* I will transfer the commander-in-chief's flag to the U. S. S. *Boston*, together with my two aides and retinue. For myself I purpose to take up my quarters on shore. I feel that I ought to ask the Department for an allowance for the pay of rent of a room for my office, leaving it to the Department to determine how much can be granted me.

There is neither room nor conveniences either on board the *Boston* or on board the *Adams* for the accommodation of the commander-in-chief. It probably will be well to call attention of the Department to the fact that in fitting out the U. S. S. *Mohican*, to be flagship of the Pacific station, certain changes were authorized on board of her, for the comfort and convenience of the commander-in-chief, his staff, and the band. Neither of the ships that will be here have any of the conveniences I refer to; but, as I am told, that a proper flagship will be sent out here for my uses I am content to patiently await the arrival of said ship. Since my former letter H. B. M. S. *Hyacinth* has arrived, and is moored a short distance from the *Mohican*. Not being a saluting ship, she did not salute my flag. The usual visits were exchanged between the two ships. H. I. J. M. S. *Naniwa* still remains in port. We are on pleasant and visiting terms with the officers of both ships.

APRIL 26TH.

I have to inform the Department of the arrival at 7 o'clock this morning of the U. S. S. *Adams* from San Francisco. Health of officers and crew good. The changes of officers directed by the Department will be made to-day.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. SKERRETT,

*Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,**Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.*

HON. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Skerrett to the Secretary of the Navy.

No. 150.]

U. S. S. BOSTON,
 FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, May 4, 1893.

SIR: The political status remains as I reported in my last letter. Everything is going on quietly. There seems to be an indication that the Provisional Government is gaining and increasing their friends.

The orders of the Navy Department respecting the *Mohican* have been carried out by sending her to Port Townsend, she leaving here on the 1st day of May, having remained until that day in order to remove the accumulation of marine growth formed on her copper since our arrival here; in leaving she unfortunately fouled her propeller with a line or hawser that I suppose was unavoidably left hanging from her quarter, causing a delay of a few hours. Assistance was rendered by H. M. S. *Hyacinth*, and proffers of assistance offered by the commanding officer of H. I. J. M. S. *Naniwa*. As a matter of course the *Boston* rendered all the assistance in her power that was needed. Prior to the sailing of the *Mohican* the commander-in-chief's flag was transferred to the *Boston*, as was also the commander-in-chief's retinue.

At the request of Commander Ludlow, I granted permission to him to carry to Port Townsend, as a guest of the wardroom officers of the *Mohican*, Mr. C. H. Wetmore. The health of the officers and crew of the ships remaining here is excellent. Reports of changes of officers, etc., have been mailed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. SKERRETT,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

HON. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Skerrett to the Secretary of the Navy.

No. 175.]

U. S. S. BOSTON,
 FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, May 23, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Department that, because of the continued agitation among people of certain classes in and about Honolulu, I have found it necessary to retain the presence here in this harbor of both the *Boston* and the *Adams*, this preventing these ships from going out to sea for target practice, in accordance with Department Regulations; but I am of the impression that these orders of the Department will be carried out, in accordance with the Regulations, in the near future, doubtless prior to the end of June, that being the end of the quarter. The two marines who were detailed at the United States legation, at the instance of the Hon. J. L. Stevens, United States minister, etc., have been returned to their ship, their services being no longer considered necessary.

Commissioner Blount to-day presented his credentials, being in the form of the letter accrediting him to the Provisional Government as United States Minister etc.; this letter he presented to President Dole, he being at the head of the Provisional Government. He was ceremo-

niously received at the Government building by the authorities, in the presence of the Provisional Government troops. As neither myself nor my aids were invited to be present, I can not detail precisely what occurred. I am of the opinion, however, that everything passed off satisfactorily. There has been some friction occasioned from a letter written by Mr. Charles Nordhoff, to the paper of which he is the correspondent, the New York Herald, with reference to the condition of affairs at this point. The United States minister, Col. Blount, thought it necessary to call the Provisional Government's attention to the position occupied by this gentleman as a distinguished United States citizen. I am led to believe that this gentleman will receive such protection as the Provisional Government can extend to him. He was to have been brought to-day before the provisional advisory council; whether or not such was the case I am unable to tell. There is apparently some agitation existing among some foreign residents who are opposed to the Provisional Government, and it is barely possible that trouble may ensue, in which event directions have been given for the immediate landing, if required, of both the battalions of the ships here, to protect the property and lives of citizens of the United States. I hope, however, that there will be no necessity for such an occurrence.

To-morrow being the anniversary of the birthday of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, I have directed the commanding officers of both ships to full dress the ships, with the English ensign at the main, and that the *Boston* should at noon fire a national salute, in accordance with regulations. The dressing of the ships having been requested by the commanding officer of H. B. M. S. *Hyacinth*; the firing of the salute, I have thought proper to direct to be done myself, as is ordinarily done under such circumstances.

Health of officers and crew at present time is good. H. I. J. M. S. *Naniwa* left on the 11th instant for Japan. Ex-United States Minister John L. Stevens leaves for the United States in the steamer to-morrow.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. SKERRETT,
Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy,
Commanding United States Naval Force, Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Skerrett to the Secretary of the Navy.

No.181.]

U. S. S. BOSTON,
FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, May 31, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to state that the *Boston* left this port on the 29th instant for Lahaina, Maui, for target practice, in accordance with regulations. On her departure I hoisted the flag of the commander in chief on the *Adams*, where it will remain until the return of the *Boston*, which will probably be the latter part of this week.

Yesterday being Memorial Day, I, accompanied by my staff, participated in the exercises, by invitation of the George W. De Long Post, No. 45, Grand Army of the Republic.

I have information from the commanding officer of H. B. M. S. *Hyacinth* that she will depart for Tahiti to-morrow, although I have

learned through the newspapers here that the royalists' party have requested that she shall not leave. Late interviews held with officers attached to that ship lead me to infer that she will proceed on her destination to Tahiti.

The observance of the birthday of Queen Victoria and my participation by dressing ship and firing a salute, was very gratifying to the British minister and the commanding officer of the *Hyacinth*, who each personally expressed their thanks to me for the compliment I had paid to them.

The observance of Memorial Day, which was participated in, as I have said, by myself and aids, was also participated in by the United States minister, Col. Blount, and the United States consul-general, which seems to have been very much appreciated by these good people.

The condition of political affairs remains about the same. I believe the Provisional Government is daily adding to its adherents, and in my opinion appears to be firmly and solidly established. As is usual under all circumstances in this place, there are many wild rumors afloat, one of which was that the Provisional Government will be overturned by the royalist party, and Liliuokalani again placed upon the Hawaiian throne. I am informed by perusal of the local papers, and also by one of the Provisional council, that Mr. Claus Spreckels has demanded repayment from the Provisional Government of the indebtedness of the Hawaiian Government to him, in the sum of \$95,000. Whether or not this demand has been made with a disposition of worrying and crippling the Provisional Government is not known to me, but surmises of that kind have been advanced, Mr. Spreckels having stated some while ago that he was in no hurry for the payment of his money, as he preferred to draw the interest on it as an investment. But it appears to me to be needless to call attention to the many flying rumors that are in circulation. As I have stated, I am of the opinion that the Provisional Government is solidly and firmly established, and that their rule is bringing quiet and contentment to the Islanders.

The health of officers and crew of both the *Boston* and *Adams* is good.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. SKERRETT,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Skerrett to the Secretary of the Navy.

No. 203.]

U. S. S. BOSTON,
FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, June 21, 1893.

SIR: Since the forwarding of my last communication, No. 181, of May 31, 1893, relative to the political state of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, I have the honor to state that no changes have occurred in the same that require any special report.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. SKERRETT,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

*Admiral Skerrett to the Secretary of the Navy.*HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *June 28, 1893.*

SIR: Since my last letter with reference to the state of political affairs, I must inform the Department that the stability and solidity of the Provisional Government is not considered to be all that had so impressed me formerly. Very recently three arrests have been made of persons considered to be conspirators. When these cases were brought before the court, the attorney-general, it would appear, had not secured sufficient evidence to make a case against them; therefore asked for a continuance for a time specified; they were so continued without bail, the persons being held in custody. It would appear that the iron heel of military law is really what serves to keep the Provisional Government in authority.

There are a great many in this community, as well as others on the islands, who are opposed to this Government. There have been many rumors of contemplated uprisings as well as rumors of contemplated assassinations. I simply report it for what it is worth. I have been generally impressed by the quietness and orderliness of the native population; but they are, in my opinion, easily led and impressed by designing men, who for their own low aims are, or would be, willing even to commit murder or assassination to secure their ends. One of the Government officials said to Minister Blount that he considered the condition of affairs here as bad as it had ever been. This, I suppose, had reference to the fixedness and popularity of the Government. They were not elected by the vote of the people, and it is believed were it submitted to a popular vote the present Government would be ousted.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. SKERRETT.

*Admiral Skerrett to the Secretary of the Navy.*HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *July 25, 1893.*

SIR: In my last letter, commenting on the political condition of affairs here, I informed the Department that my faith in the stability and fixedness of the Provisional Government was a good deal shattered. I have now to inform the Department that the cases of the conspirators referred to in that letter has progressed so far that two are held for trial before the court to assemble in August on the charge of conspiracy; that one has been discharged. This action in regard to the charge brought against them inspires me with the hope that they will be convicted. Recently the attention of the Provisional Government has been given to the disease among the natives known as leprosy, they being anxious to extinguish that disease. Several of the persons so afflicted had congregated and were living on the Island of Kauai.

The Government determined to arrest these persons and to convey them to Molokai, to the leper settlement. To accomplish this a military force, together with policemen, were sent to arrest and bring them to Honolulu. One of the lepers, who was known to be a dangerous man, secreted and strengthened himself in one of the ravines on the Island of Kauai and held the force at bay. In the attempt to arrest this person three of the Government men were killed. This man is still at large and other means are being tried in order to arrest the person. The only way in which this evil may be stamped out is in the

segregation and ultimate watchfulness and care given to them. This means is being tried by the Provisional Government, and I think it will result in the eventual success and extinguishment of the disease. This Government is certainly successfully doing what it can to benefit the whole community in these islands, and although there is much opposition to them, I believe the means employed to attain the good of all will eventually bring them success and win to their side many who are now in opposition to them.

They progress in the government of these islands most successfully, and surely the government they now give the people is the best that they have ever had. I believe in their eventual success and have implicit faith in them. At present perfect quiet reigns, as far as I am able to judge, and also from the reports in the newspapers published here in Honolulu. This is all I have to report upon with reference to the political status. I speak in this letter on the subject of leprosy for this reason: that, in my opinion, the opposition evinced against the means now being used by the Provisional Government has shown that the adverse political party are opposed to segregation by force used by the Government. It is for this reason that I apparently treat in the letter on two subjects, whereas it is but one.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. SKERRETT.

Rear-Admiral Skerrett to the Secretary of the Navy.

No. 252.]

U. S. S. BOSTON,
FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, August 14, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Department that, on the 8th of August, Col. Blount, the United States minister, sailed for home, leaving me to act as the diplomatic representative until a new United States minister reported for duty.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. SKERRETT,
Rear Admiral U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

HON. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Skerrett to the Secretary of the Navy.

No. 253.]

U. S. S. BOSTON,
FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, August 14, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the political condition remains as previously reported. All is quiet and orderly, the Provisional Government remains as stable and satisfactory as before mentioned, and there seems to be no evidence of any dissatisfaction.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. SKERRETT,
Rear Admiral U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

HON. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Skerrett to the Secretary of the Navy.

No. 281.]

U. S. S. BOSTON,
FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, September 12, 1893.

SIR: (1) I have to report as follows with respect to the political status at this place: The Provisional Government continues to display the same courageous disposition to control, and to display their power to direct and to lead these people in the right way towards self-government for the benefit of all concerned.

(2) The three persons arrested and tried for conspiracy have been again set at liberty; not to the disadvantage of the Government, for the arrest and trial showed evidence of the proper disposition to guard against such things as conspiracies and evil intent, and also showed the intention to punish all such offenders with the utmost rigor of the law.

(3) At the present time all things move along most agreeably. President Dole has gone to the other islands to recruit his health, which has been somewhat pulled down by constant and assiduous work in behalf of his people. His intention was to be absent about one month. When he departed the shore battery saluted him with twenty-one guns and I gave instructions to do the same on board the *Boston*.

(4) There is not the remotest evidence of any disposition to give trouble to the Provisional Government.

(5) In conversation recently with Her Britannic Majesty's minister he asked me if I had any instructions about giving protection to other than United States citizens. I replied that my own instructions were to give protection to none but United States citizens and their property. He remarked, then I will have to request my government to send a ship here to give protection to Her Majesty's legation should it be needed, so I dare say we will have English ships sent here.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. SKERRETT,
Rear Admiral U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

HON. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Skerrett to the Secretary of the Navy.

No. 350.]

U. S. S. PHILADELPHIA,
FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, October 10, 1893.

SIR: (1) Since my last letter I have to report that the Provisional Government continues to be stable, and able to govern and direct these islands for the greatest benefit of all; whether or not its numbers of friends increase seems to be a question, yet there is every appearance that its friends are increasing and its objects for good government shown in every way.

(2) The President of the Provisional Government has been absent nearly the whole month of September and is still absent, recuperating on the island of Hawaii.

(3) The Russian Government has recently informed the Provisional Government, through a letter from the secretary of foreign affairs in Russia, that the Government recognizes and seeks a continuance of good will and amity with what is designated the Republican Government of Hawaii. This has made the good people here very happy, especially those who are designated as annexationists.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. SKERRETT,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

Hon. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Skerrett to Secretary Herbert.

NAVY PAY OFFICE,
San Francisco, Cal., November 16, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Department's letter of November 6 last, and in reply to the honorable Secretary's inquiry respecting my previous letter regarding British subjects, etc., I beg to say the friendly relations that had for years existed between Her Britannic Majesty's representative in Hawaii and myself, which was renewed on my again visiting Hawaii after an absence of many years, became quite as cordial as formerly, and in the conversation I detailed to the Department I simply told Maj. Wodehouse what my instructions were, but I did not say to him that I would not accord the protection that was warranted by the acts of comity that have been so frequently afforded under like circumstances on other occasions. When I received the Department's reply to my letter giving me that authority, I sought Maj. Wodehouse, and told him of my latest instructions, telling him how gratified I was to have the directions that so pleasantly accorded with my own wishes. I here furnish the Department with a copy of the instructions I first received.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. SKERRETT,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy.

Hon. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1893.

I desire to impress upon you in the absence of Minister Plenipotentiary Blount that your sole duty is confined to that of an officer of [the] Navy, although it is to be performed in the spirit of the instructions of Mr. Blount, which doubtless have been seen by you.

Protect American (United States) citizens and American (United States) property, but do not give aid, physical or moral, to either party contending for the Government at Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.

HERBERT.

Admiral Irwin to Secretary of the Navy.

No. 2.]

U. S. S. PHILADELPHIA,
 (FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION),
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 10, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that on the 9th instant I, accompanied by my personal staff, called officially on the United States Minister to Hawaii, the Hon. A. S. Willis.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN IRWIN,
Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

Hon. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Admiral Irwin to Secretary of the Navy.

No. 3.]

U. S. S. PHILADELPHIA,
 FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 13, 1893.

SIR: (1) I have the honor to inform you that on the 9th instant I, accompanied by my personal staff, called officially on Her Britannic Majesty's minister resident, Maj. James Hay Wodehouse.

(2.) That, on the 11th instant, in company with the United States minister and accompanied with my personal staff, I called on the President and executive council of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN IRWIN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

Hon. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Rear-Admiral Irwin to Secretary of the Navy.

No. 4.]

U. S. S. PHILADELPHIA,
 FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 14, 1893.

SIR: (1) I have the honor to report that I have this day received the United States minister officially with the usual honors.

(2) That I have freely consulted with him in regard to the situation here.

(3) I have carefully studied the instructions of the Department; they are perfectly clear to me, and will be carried out to the best of my ability.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN IRWIN,
Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

Hon. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Admiral Irwin to Secretary of the Navy.

No. 5.]

U. S. S. PHILADELPHIA,
FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 15, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to report that I have this day received the following official calls: Her Britannic Majesty's minister resident, Maj. James Hay Wodehouse; United States consul-general, Hon. Ellis Mills. They were received with the usual honors.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN IRWIN,
Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy,
Commanding United States Naval Force Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Admiral Irwin to Secretary of the Navy.

No. 6.]

U. S. S. PHILADELPHIA,
FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 16, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to report that I have this day received on board the flagship an official call from the Hon. S. B. Dole, President of the Provisional Government, accompanied by his staff and the members of the executive council. They were received with the usual honors.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN IRWIN,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Navy Department, Washinton, D. C.

Admiral Irwin to Secretary of the Navy.

[Telegram.]

HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, *December 4.*
(Via B. C., December 12.)

SECRETARY OF NAVY,
Washington, D. C.:

Confidential. Provisional Government they have 1,000 men under arms. Palace prepared for defence. Party feeling intense, but no outbreak anticipated at present.

IRWIN.

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
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